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SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA) vs. CA G.R. No.

85279 July 28, 1989 CORTES, J: Facts: On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal. It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices. Issue: Whether or not employees of the SSS have the right to strike. Held: The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such governmentcontrolled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

UP vs. CA G.R. No. 97827. February 9, 1993. ROMERO, J.: Facts: UP Prof. Bailen and Salazar of Anthropology and History Dept. respectively, disputed in a conference held in PSSC Diliman the authenticity of the Tasaday discovery as claimed by PANAMIN Minister Elizalde. A year later while attending an International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences in Yugoslavia, the two professors reiterated their claim that the Tasaday find was a hoax which was widely published in several newspapers. Private respondents filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief against the professors before the RTC alleging among others loss of dignity and personality of the Tasadays and the right to the benefits under Pres. Proclamation No. 995 accorded to cultural minorities. Petitioner in support of their faculty members filed a motion to intervene, asserting their right to institutional academic freedom. The professors who were later joined by petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case for the complaints failure to state cause of action and a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the lower court for grave abuse of discretion but were denied by the courts. Issues: Is UP correct in asserting that the acts of its faculty members are privileged communications which are within the protective mantle of academic freedom guaranteed by the Constitution and therefore not liable for damages? Ratio: No. UP failed to prove that the alleged damaging acts of its faculty members are within the protective principle of academic freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. UPs interest was not affected being not the original defendant in the complaint. There was no showing that UP authorized its faculty members to conduct the study on the Tasadays nor had it authorized or sponsored the presence of the professors in the Yugoslavian Congress where the alleged act complained of came about. Held: The Court affirmed the questioned order of the lower court and the decision of the Court of Appeals. The lower court was directed to proceed with the hearing of the case with dispatch. No pronouncement as to costs. Obiter Dictum: The petitioner erred in trying to abort the proceedings at its inception by filing the motion to dismiss. The petitioner, during trial could have invoke and dwell upon the special defense of institutional academic freedom (Tangonan v. Pano, 137 SCRA 245, June 27, 1985) and individual academic freedom of its faculty members. RUTTER VS ESTEBAN Facts: On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land situated in the Manila for P9,600 of which P4,800 were paid outright, and the balance was made payable as follows: P2,400 on or before August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum. To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage has been constituted in favor of the plaintiff. Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed upon, as well as the interest that

had accrued and so Rutter instituted an action to recover the balance due, the interest due and the attorney's fees. The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the properties mortgaged in accordance with law. Esteban claims that this is a prewar obligation contracted and that he is a war sufferer, having filed his claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission for the losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last war; and that under section 2 of RA 342(moratorium law), payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until after the lapse of eight years. The complaint was dismissed. A motion for recon was made which assails the constitutionality of RA 342. Issue: Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on non-impairment clause grounds. Held: Yes. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of police power. The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts. The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end. However based on the Presidents general SONA and consistent with what the Court believes to be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, declared that the continued operation and enforcement of RA 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged should be declared null and void and without effect. This holds true as regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, with greater force and reason considering that said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as regards the suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligation. ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO., G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979 SANTOS, J.: FACTS: In March 1952, the petitioner, who was engaged in the real estate business, sold 2 parcels of land (lot 5 and 6) in Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA to spouses Angeles who in turn transferred their rights over said lots to Emma Chavez. A Deed of Sale was executed upon payment. The Deed contained stipulations and restrictions, stating, that the lots shall be used by the buyer EXCLUSIVELY for residential purposes among others. Respondent bank then bought Lot 5 from Chavez with the same restrictions which were imposed as part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and development of the Highway Hills Subdivision. About May 1963, respondent began making a building on said lots for banking purposes. Petitioner asked respondent to stop such, being violative of their existing contract. However, the respondent said that the construction was in accordance with Resolution 27 of Municipality of Mandaluyong, a zoning regulation, which declared the location of the lots to be a commercial and industrial zone. Holding that the resolution was a

valid exercise of police power, both the trial and appellate court sustained the resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee. RULING: Yes. The decision of the lowers courts were affirmed. RATIO: The resolution is not merely an ordinance but a regulatory measure. Although the non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute. It has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. The passing of the resolution was for the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. The state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about the place .EDSA, a main road which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. The reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. OBITER: Police power "is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not, confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions. It keeps expanding as civilization advances. The state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations LOZANO VS MARTINEZ G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986 YAP, J: Facts: Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, assail the law's constitutionality. BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the

maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check. Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute prima facie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check." The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions. ISSUE: Whether or not (W/N) BP 22 violates the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. HELD: No. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. ISSUE: W/N BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract. HELD: No. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it

forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state. GAMBOA VS. CRUZ G.R. No. L-56291; June 27, 1988 Padilla, J. FACTS: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The court denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners right to counsel and due process violated. HELD: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. RATIO: He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel. OBITER: On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. _________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE VS. JUDGE AYSON [175 SCRA 216; G.R. NO. 85215; 7 JUL 1989] Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement of accused. Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not present in case at bar). This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself. It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it and could be waived. Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include: 1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. 2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. 3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. ___________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE VS. MAQUEDA [242 SCRA 565; G.R. NO.112983; 22 MAR 1994] Facts: British Horace William Barker (consultant of WB) was slain inside his house in Tuba, Benguet while his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza was badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Two household helpers of the victims identified Salvamante (a former houseboy of the victims) and Maqueda as the robbers. Mike Tabayan and his friend also saw the two accused a kilometer away from the house of the victims that same morning, when the two accused asked them for directions. Maqueda was then arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon. He was taken to Calauag, Quezon where he signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the crime. According to SPO3 Molleno, he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before he signed such document. Afterwards he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail. While he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." Maqueda also admitted his involvement in the commission of the robbery to Prosecutor Zarate and to Salvosa. Issue: Whether or Not the trial court was correct in holding that the Sinumpaan Salaysay is admissible as evidence.

Held: No. The Sinumpaang Salaysay is inadmissible because it was in clear violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. First, he was not informed of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Second, he cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. At the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well that a case had already been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not have to do so. The contention of the trial court that the accused is not entitled to such rights anymore because the information has been filed and a warrant of arrest has been issued already, is untenable. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1) of the Bill of Rights are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense." Pursuant to Section 12(3) of the Bill of Rights therefore, such extra-judicial admission is inadmissible as evidence. As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial court admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove the truth of the admission because such testimony was objected to as hearsay. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission (Salvosa), it was given to a private person therefore admissible. Note: a distinction between a confession and admission has been made by the SC: Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him. ___________________________________________________________________________ _ PEOPLE VS. BANDULA [232 SCRA 566; G.R. NO. 89223; 27 MAY 1994] Facts: Six armed men barged into the compound of Polo Coconut Plantation in Tanjay, Negros Oriental. The armed men were identified by Security Guard, including accused. Salva and Pastrano, security guards were hogtied and accused proceeded to the Atty. Garay, counsel of plantation. They ransacked the place and took with them money and other valuables. Atty. Garay was killed. Accused-appellant is charged with robbery with homicide along with 3 others who were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. Appellant was convicted. Now, appellant argues that the extrajudicial confessions he and accused Dionanao executed suffer from constitutional infirmities, hence, inadmissible in evidence considering that they were extracted under duress and intimidation, and were merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney who, by the nature of his position, was not entirely an independent counsel nor counsel

of their choice. Consequently, without the extrajudicial confessions, the prosecution is left without sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime charged. Issue: WoN extrajudicial confessions of appellant is admissible as evidence against him. Held: No. When accused-appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to accused Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to appellant Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that violence was used against the accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations of the Constitution which mandates in Sec. 12, Art. III. Irregularities present include: 1. The investigators did not inform the accused of their right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of their own choice, even before attempting to elicit statements that would incriminate them. 2. Investigators continuously disregard the repeated requests of the accused for medical assistance. Reason for Accused Sedigos "black eye" which even Pat. Baldejera admitted is not established, as well as Bandulas fractured rib. 3. Counsel must be independent. He cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. ___________________________________________________________________________ _ PEOPLE VS. LUCERO [244 SCRA 425; G.R. NO.97936; 29 MAY 1995] Facts: Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and John Doe were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. The prosecution: Accused-appellant (alighted from a gray-reddish car), armed with handgun, blocked the way of the said complainant who was on board a Mercedes Benz passing along Road 14, Mindanao Avenue, Pag-asa, QC, rob and carry away cash money; one gold necklace with cross pendant, 7 karat; one gold Rolex watch; one 3 karat gold ring; one 2 karat gold ring, domino style; one solid gold bracelet; all worth P363,600.00, belonging to DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID. Accused shot LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA, a driver of the said offended party, thus inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which resulted to the instantaneous death of ALERIA. Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended. When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer, in due time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta conferred with Lucero. He apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He observed no reaction from Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the impression that Lucero understood his advice. When the investigator started asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the wake of his friend. The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by CIS agents to Atty.

Peralta's house. The extrajudicial statement of Lucero was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was already signed by Lucero. The three accused denied complicity in the crime charged. Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that he was at his house in Caloocan City. He said he was surprised when several unidentified men accosted him while he was walking towards his house. They chased him, handcuffed and blindfolded him and pushed him into a jeep. He was blindfolded the whole night and did not know where he was taken. The men turned out to be police officers. The next day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed that he was tortured. He was not informed of the offense for which he was being investigated. Neither did they reveal the identity of the complainant. Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the other accused in this case. He said he only met Dr. Madrid at the CIS Office during the police line-up. He was made to line-up four (4) times before Dr. Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time. Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession under duress. He denied engaging the services of Atty, Peralta. He likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was not present during his actual custodial interrogation. After trial, the court a quo acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient evidence. The trial court, however, convicted accused Lucero GUILTY as principal by direct participation of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced to suffer an imprisonment term of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Issue: Whether or Not the lower court erred in convicting accusedappellant. Held: Appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extrajudicial confession. Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be provided with counsel. The Court have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions can render them inadmissible. The records show that Atty. Peralta, who was not the counsel of choice of appellant. Atty. Peralta himself admitted he received no reaction from appellant although his impression was that appellant understood him. More so, it was during his absence that appellant gave an uncounselled confession. Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The circumstances clearly demonstrate that appellant received no effective counseling from Atty. Peralta. Whereof, Decision convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel is hereby reversed. ============================================= =============================== PEOPLE VS. AGUSTIN [240 SCRA 541; G.R. NO. 110290; 25 JAN 1995] Facts: Dr. Bayquen, a dentist, together with his son, Anthony; Anthony's girlfriend, Anna Theresa; his daughter, Dominic; and Danny, a family friend, were on their way aboard their Brasilia to the doctor's residence at Malvar Street, Baguio City. While they were cruising along Malvar Street and nearing the Baptist church, a man came out from the right side of a car parked about two meters to the church. The man approached the Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle through its window, and fired at the passengers. The Brasilia swerved and hit a fence. The gunman

immediately returned to the parked car which then sped away. All those in the car were hit and Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot. Dominic was bale to get out of the Brasilia to run to the Alabanza store where she telephoned her mother. Later, she and her mother brought her father and Anthony to the hospital. Danny went home and was then brought to the Hospital for treatment. Accused Quiao, an alleged former military agent who had been picked up by the police authorities, confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman. He implicated Abenoja, Jr., who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain "Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiao was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation as transcribed with the sworn statement of Quiao was signed, with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal Balajadia. The following day, Agustin was apprehended, and was investigated and was afforded the privileges like that of Quijano. Agustins defense interpose that he was forced to admit involvement at gunpoint in the Kennon Road. He further declared that although he was given a lawyer, Cajucom (a law partner of the private prosecutor), he nevertheless, asked for his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands. The promise that he would be discharged as a witness did not push through since Quijano escaped. However the RTC convicted him, since conspiracy was established. Hence the appeal. Issue: Whether or Not accused-appellants extrajudicial statements admissible as evidence. Held: No. Extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession. In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused, while an admission is a statement direct or implied of facts pertinent to the issue. The rule on inadmissibility, however expressly includes admissions, not just confessions.The extrajudicial admission of the appellant, contained in twenty-two pages appear to be signed by him and Atty. Cajucom but for reasons not explained in the records, the transcript of the notes which consists of twelve pages was not signed by the appellant. Since the court cannot even read or decipher the stenographic notes it cannot be expected that appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth grade, to read or decipher its contents. The appellant, therefore was deprived of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Firstly, he was not fully and properly informed of his rights. The appellant was not explicitly told of his right to have a competent and independent counsel of his choice, specifically asked if he had in mind any such counsel and, if so, whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if he could not, whether he would agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him. He was not categorically informed that he could waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel and that this waiver must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel. He had, in fact, waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to be investigated. Yet, no written waiver of such right appears in the transcript and no other independent evidence was offered to prove its existence. In short, after the appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by counsel, the City fiscal, through suggestive language,

immediately informed him that Atty. Cajucom was ready to assist him. Moreso said counsel is not independent since he is an associate of the private prosecutor. PEOPLE VS. BOLANOS July 3, 1992 Paras, J.: Facts The case at bar is with regard to the decision of the RTC convicting herein appellant of Murder. The corroborating testimony of patrolmen indicated that when they apprehended the accused, they found the firearm of the deceased on the chair where the accused was allegedly seated. That they boarded the appellant and one Magtibay on the police vehicle where Bolanos accordingly admitted that he killed the deceased because he was abusive. The oral admission of the appellant was given without the assistance of counsel as it was made while on board the police vehicle on their way to the police. This alleged confession or admission of the accused was the only reason for the conviction of the same. Issue: WON the constitutional rights of the accused were herein violated when he was convicted by virtue of the alleged confession. Held: YES. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police station, appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article 3, section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that; (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the service of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. XXX (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. Considering the requirements of the Constitution with respect to the manner by which confession can be admissible in evidence, and the glaring fact that he alleged confession obtained while on board the police vehicle was the only reason for the conviction, besides appellants conviction was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Constitutional rights of the accused have been violated and must be acquitted. ============================================= ============================== PEOPLE VS. MACAM [238 SCRA 306; G.R. NOS. 91011-12; 24 NOV 1994] Facts: Prosecutions version: On Aug 18,1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan Jr., Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque went to the house of Benito Macam (uncle of Eduardo Macam) located at 43 Ferma Road QC. Upon the arrival

of the accused, Benito invited the former to have lunch. Benito asked his maid Salvacion Enrera to call the companions of Eduardo who were waiting in a tricycle outside the house. A. Cedro, E. Cawilan and D. Roque entered the house while E. Roque remained in the tricycle. After all the accused had taken their lunch, Eduardo Macam grabbed the clutch bag of Benito Macam and pulled out his uncles gun then declared a hold-up. They tied up the wife (Leticia Macam), children, maid (Salvacion) and Nilo Alcantara and brought them to the room upstairs. After a while Leticia was brought to the bathroom and after she screamed she was stabbed and killed by A. Cedro. Benito, Nilo and Salvacion was also stabbed but survived. The total value of the items taken was P536, 700.00. Defenses version: Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver drove the 4 accused to Benitos house for a fee of P50.00. Instead of paying him, he was given a calling card by Eduardo Macam so that he can be paid the following day. Upon arriving, he went with the accused inside the house to have lunch. Thereafter he washed the dishes and swept the floor. When Eugenio Cawilan pulled a gun and announced the hold-up, he was asked to gather some things and which he abided out of fear. While putting the said thins inside the car of Benito (victim) he heard the accused saying kailangan patayin ang mga taong yan dahil kilala ako ng mga yan. Upon hearing such phrase he escaped and went home using his tricycle. He also testified that his brother Ernesto Roque has just arrived from the province and in no way can be involved in the case at bar. On the following day, together with his brother, they went to the factory of the Zesto Juice (owned by the father of Eduardo Macam) for him to get his payment (50.00) . He and his brother was suddenly apprehended by the security guards and brought to the police headquarters in Q.C. They were also forced to admit certain things. After which, he together with all the accused, in handcuffs and bore contusions on their faces caused by blows inflicted in their faces during investigation, was brought to the QC General Hospital before each surviving victims and made to line-up for identification. Eugenio Cawilan was also charged with Anti-fencing Law but was acquitted in the said case. Issue: Whether or Not their right to counsel has been violated. WON the arrest was valid. WON the evidence from the line-up is admissible. Held: It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before trial. A police line-up is considered a critical stage of the proceedings. Any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. HOWEVER, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellants identification at the line-up. The witnesses identified the accused again in open court. Also, accused did not object to the in-court identification as being tainted by illegal line-up. The arrest of the appellants was without a warrant. HOWEVER, they are estopped from questioning the legality of such arrest because they have not moved to quash the said information and therefore voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and participating in trial. The court believed the version of the prosecution. Ernesto Roque, while remaining outside the house served as a looked out. Wherefore, decision of lower court is Affirmed. Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque is guilty of the crime of robbery with

homicide as co-conspirators of the other accused to suffer reclusion perpetua. Things taken: 2 toygun, airgun riffle, CO2 refiller, TV, betamax tapes, betamax rewinder, Samsonite attache case, typewriter, chessboard, TOYOTA Crown Car Plate No. CAS-997, assorted jewelry. .22 gun and money. ============================================= =============================== PEOPLE VS. DY [158 SCRA 111; G.R. 74517; 23 FEB 1988] Facts: Pat. Padilla reported along with Benny Dy, with caliber .38 as suspect to the shooting incident at "Benny's Bar," at Sitio Angol, ManocManoc Malay, Aklan (Boracay) situated on the Island which caused the death of Christian Langel Philippe, tourist, 24 years old and a Swiss nationale. He was charged with the Murder With the Use of Unlicensed firearms. Appellant alleges that he carried the victim to the shore to be brought to the hospital to save the latter, and who facilitated the surrender to Pat. Padilla a gun which his helper found the following morning while cleaning the bar. Accused posted bail which was granted. The accused denied having made any oral confession alleging that he went to Pat. Padilla not to report the incident but to state that a boy helper in the bar had found a gun on the sand floor while cleaning and that Pat. Padilla picked up the gun from the bar at his request. The Accused argues that even if he did make such a confession, the same would be inadmissible in evidence. He was found guilty in the RTC. Hence the appeal. Issue: Whether or Not the lower court correct in saying that the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant case. Held: YES. Appellant's assertion that the gun he had surrendered was merely found by a boy helper while cleaning the bar deserves no credence for, if it were so, it would have been absurd for him to have placed himself under police custody in the early morning after the incident. Sworn Complaint for "Murder with Use of Unlicensed Firearm" signed by the Chief of Police also attests to Appellant's oral confession. That Complaint forms part of the record of the proceedings before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga, Aklan, and is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Appellant's voluntary surrender implies no violation as "no warrant of arrest is issued for the apprehension of the accused for the reason that he is already under police custody before the filing of the complaint." What was told by the Accused to Pat, Padilla was a spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning, but given in ordinary manner. No written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation. ============================================= =============================== NAVALLO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [234 SCRA 177; G.R. NO. 97214; 18 JUL 1994] Facts: Accused was the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National Vocational School, which school is also located at del Carmen, Surigao del Norte. His duties included the collection of tuition fees, preparation of vouchers for salaries of teachers and employees, and remittance of collections exceeding P500.00 to the National Treasury. An

information for malversation of public funds was filed. A warrant of arrest was issued, but accused-petitioner could not be found. on 10 December 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect creating the Sandiganbayan and conferring on it original and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. On 15 November 1984, Navallo was finally arrested. He was released on provisional liberty upon the approval of his property bail bond. When arraigned by the RTC on 18 July 1985, he pleaded not guilty. Upon motion of the prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan. Special Prosecutor Luz L. Quiones-Marcos opined that since Navallo had already been arraigned before the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the case. The matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held otherwise. The information was then docketed with the Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo's arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan. The warrant was returned with a certification by the RTC Clerk of Court that the accused had posted a bail bond. Navallo filed a motion to quash, contending (1) that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense and the person of the accused and (2) that since the accused had already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy. However this was denied and trial ensued and he was found guilty. Issue: Whether or Not the constitutional right against double jeopardy and in custodial investigations in favor of the accused violated. Held: No. Double jeopardy requires the existence of the following requisites: (1) The previous complaint or information or other formal charge is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge; and (4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed without his express consent. The RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused which by then had already been conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed. No. Appellant is not in custodial investigation. A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having been "pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime (examined cash, as ordered by Espino, the provincial auditor) appears to be belied by his own testimony. ============================================= =============================== PEOPLE VS. ALICANDO [251 SCRA 293; G.R. NO. 117487; 2 DEC 1995] Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie Mae Penecilla, a minor, four years of age, choking her with his right hand. The incident happened after appellant drank liquor. A neighbor,

Leopoldo Santiago found the victims body and the parents and police were informed. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five arm's length from Penecilla's house. Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the prosecution. He was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO. Appellant pleaded guilty. The RTC convicted him. Hence an automatic review for the imposition of death penalty. Issue: Whether or Not the death penalty proper. Held: No. The records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in the English language. It is unknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known what dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the Information couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. The RTC violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to due process of law. It is urged that we must presume that the arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. There could be no presumption. The court must be sure. The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant. Said section requires that the court shall conduct a searching inquiry the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. The trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover late body marks of maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone. Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These consists of a pillow with bloodstains in its center 14 and the T-shirt 15 of the accused colored white with bloodstains on its bottom. These physical evidence are evidence of the highest order. They strongly corroborate the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim was raped.These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the benefit of counsel. PEOPLE vs. DE GUZMAN, et al FACTS: The accused was convicted before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu with three counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder. On April 4, 1989, Major Antonio Carteciano was driving his private jeep toward Camp General Arcadio Maxilom in Lahug, Cebu City, with his wife, Lorna Carteciano, who was seated beside him, his mother-in-law, Juanita

Ricaplaza, his 13-year old son Reiser, his brother, Francisco Carteciano, Jr., a neighbor, Engr. Jose Bantug, Jr., and Bantug's daughter, Jennifer. virtual law library When they reached a certain intersection, gunshots were fired in succession, hitting Major Carteciano, Francisco Carteciano, Jose Bantug, and Lorna Carteciano. When the jeep came to a full stop, several gunmen emerged from their hiding places and approached the jeep, fired at Major Carteciano point-blank, hitting his head which was resting on Lorna's lap. Then the gunmen withdrew toward a jeepney. chanrobles virtual law library As a result of the, shooting, Major Antonio Carteciano, Francisco Carteciano, and Engineer Jose Bantug died. Lorna Carteciano was seriously wounded, and would have died were it not for the timely medical assistance rendered to her. ISSUES: 1. Was the arrest unlawful due to the absence of warrant of arrest issued against him and his co-accused? 2. Was the accused deprived of his right to counsel when he was subjected to a paraffin test without the assistance of counsel? RULINGS: 1. No, the appellant is stopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. 2. No, his reliance on his constitutional right to counsel at the time he was given a paraffin test is misplaced for he was not then under custodial investigation. RATIO DECIDENDI: 1. It is much too late for accused-appellant to raise the question of his arrest without a warrant of arrest. It bears emphasis that accusedappellant, together with his co-accused, pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Appellant is, thus, estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. Any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial. Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error 2. Accused-appellant's reliance on his constitutional right to counsel at the time he was given a paraffin test is misplaced for he was not then under custodial investigation. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of an investigation, that is, when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation. In People vs. Loveria, this Court held that during a police line-up where the accused was identified by the victim, the accused's right to counsel was not violated because he was not, at that moment, under custodial investigation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual w library

OBITER DICTUM: Credibility of the prosecution witnesses: The inconsistencies pointed out by accused-appellant in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses are so minor and trivial that they cannot impair the main thrust of their testimony that they saw accused-appellant at the scene of the shooting, describing with clarity his active participation in the commission of the crimes. Accused-appellant was only 2 feet away from Lorna Carteciano, who was cradling the head of Major Carteciano, when he shot Major Carteciano in the head. At that distance the possibility of Lorna Carteciano making a mistaken identification is remote. She could not have been impelled by any evil motive in identifying accused-appellant as the killer of her husband. Her motive, laudable at that, is to obtain justice for the murder of her husband. No proof of conspiracy: Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; it may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated and spontaneous coordination of the attack by the accused establishes the existence of conspiracy PEOPLE VS. JUDGE DONATO [198 SCRA 130; G.R. NO.79269; 5 JUN 1991] Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court once every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that: 1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA) 2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address; 3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity; 4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address; 5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and address were also found to be false; 6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his arrest. This however was denied. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail. Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution. Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him. Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CARPIO VS. MAGLALANG [196 SCRA 41; G.R. NO. 78162; 19 APR 1991] Facts: On January 8, 1987, information for the murder of Mayor Jose Payumo of Dinalupihan Bataan was filed against Escao and ten other unindentified persons by the provincial fiscal in the RTC of Bataan at Balanga. Four days later, the Acting Executive Judge of said court issued an order of arrest against Escao recommending no bail for his provisional liberty. Pat. Cesar Diego who acted on the warrant returned to the court with a certification issued by NBI agent Gonzales, stating therein that accused was still under investigation. Through counsel Rolando T. Cainoy, Escao filed in court an urgent ex-parte motion for his commitment at the provincial jail of Bataan on the ground that he wanted to be where his family and counsel could have easy access to him. He alleged therein that his detention at the NBI headquarters in Manila was irregular and in defiance of the warrant of arrest issued by the court. This was granted. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Director Carpio stating that the NBI needed physical custody of Escao for the identification of the other accused in the case who were still the objects of a manhunt by NBI agents; that in view of the finding of NBI agents that the other accused and suspects in the case were subversive elements or members of the New People's Army, it was for the best interest of Escao that he be detained at the NBI lock-up cell where security measures were adequate; and that the NBI would produce the person of Escao before the court whenever required and every time that there would be a hearing on the case. However another motion was executed by Escao stating that he now wants to be detained in the NBI, alleging that he did not authorize his counsel to execute the first motion. Also, Escao's counsel Rolando T. Cainoy filed an application for bail stating that Escao was arrested by NBI agents on December 7, 1986 without a warrant having been presented to him and that since then he had been detained in the lock-up cell of the

NBI; that said agents, also without a warrant, searched his house when he was arrested; that he was subjected to inhuman torture and forced to admit participation in the killing of Mayor Payumo and to implicate other persons, and that during the custodial investigation, he was not represented by counsel. In opposing said application, the public prosecutor averred that the accused was charged with a capital offense for which no bail may be availed of, that the reasons advanced in said application would be overcome by strong and sufficient evidence; and that during the custodial investigation, he was represented by counsel. The court granted the application for bail fixing the same at P30,000, having found no sufficient evidence against accused. Director Carpio was ordered to justify his actions and so as not to be considered in contempt. Issue: Whether or Not the order granting right to bail was proper. Held: No. The order granting bail had been rendered moot not only by the fact that he had been released from NBI custody, but also because Escao jumped bail and did not appear on the date set for his arraignment. Notwithstanding, the Court resolved the issue of the legality of the order granting bail to Escao. Although the right to bail is principally for the benefit of the accused, in the judicial determination of the availability of said right, the prosecution should be afforded procedural due process. Thus, in the summary proceeding on a motion praying for admission to bail, the prosecution should be given the opportunity to present evidence and, thereafter, the court should spell out at least a resume of the evidence on which its order granting or denying bail is based. Otherwise, the order is defective and voidable. In the case at bar the RTC erred in not summarizing the factual basis of its order granting bail, the court merely stated the number of prosecution witnesses but not their respective testimonies, and concluded that the evidence presented by the prosecution was not "sufficiently strong" to deny bail to Escao. The facts, however, that Mayor Payumo was killed on August 20, 1986 when the 1973 Constitution allowing the death penalty was still in force and that the application for bail was made on March 5, 1987 during the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution which abolished the death penalty, should not have gotten in the way of resolving the application for bail in accordance with the Constitution and procedural rules. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides that "(a)ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law." As the phrase "capital offenses" has been replaced by the phrase "offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, 25 crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua instead of those punishable by the death penalty, when evidence of guilt is strong, are the exceptions to the rule that the right to bail should be made available to all accused. As the court itself acknowledged in its order of April 2, 1987 that "capital punishment" in Section 4, Rule 114 has been amended to reclusion perpetua, the court should have proceeded accordingly: i.e., resolved the application for bail pursuant to Section 13, Article III of the Constitution. It did not have to invoke the abolition of the death penalty and the lack of legislative enactment restoring it in justifying the grant of bail. All it had to do was to determine whether evidence of

guilt is strong in the light of the provision of Section 13, Article III. The RTC has the discretion in the consideration of the strength of the evidence at hand. However, in the exercise of said discretion, the court is controlled by the following: first, the applicable provisions of the Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules which this Court may promulgate; and third, by those principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be part of the laws of the land. 27 The lower court not only failed to properly apply the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the Rules but it also disregarded equity and justice by its failure to take into account the factual milieu surrounding the detention of Escao. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE VS. FORTES [223 SCRA 619; G.R. NO. 90643; 25 JUN 1993] Facts: Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said municipality to report a rape committed against the latter by the accused. Following this, the accused was apprehended and charged. A bond of P25000 was granted for accuseds provisional release. The MCTC found him guilty. An appeal to RTC was filed, the request for the fixing of bond was denied. Now accused assails denial of bail on the ground that the same amounted to an undue denial of his constitutional right to bail. Issue: Whether or Not the accuseds right to bail violated. Held: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. ___________________________________________________________________________ _ COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA [200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO. 93177; 2 AUG 1991] Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process. In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for

provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail. The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release. Issues: Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail. Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of G/SCM) It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto. The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup. Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------MANOTOC VS. COURT OF APPEALS [142 SCRA 149; G.R. NO. L-62100; 30 MAY 1986] Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The

prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel. Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated. Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------GALMAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [144 SCRA 43; G.R. NO.72670; 12 SEP 1986] Facts: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom. The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them. Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer. Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and

respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84page memorandum for the prosecution. But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them). Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process. However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused. (2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause. Held: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process. Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacaang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'. The Court then said that the then President (codenamed Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the AquinoGalman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity

to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office. More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded. The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice." Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required

the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process. The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and honor. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE VS. DRAMAYO [42 SCRA 60; G.R. L-21325; 29 OCT 1971] Facts: Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the robberycase where he is an accused. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, whowas returning from Sapao. The others were to station themselves nearby. Only Dramayo andEcubin were convicted in the RTC for murder. Hence the appeal Issue: Whether or not the accuseds criminal liability proved beyond reasonable doubt. Held: Yes. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of innocence. So it must be,according to the Constitution. That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not,according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecutiondemonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence ontheir behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for convictionbe in existence. Their guilt be shown beyond reasonable doubt. What is required then is moralcertainty. "By reasonable doubt is meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is doubtengendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to letthe mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certain of guilt is not demanded by the lawto convict of any carnal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as toevery proposition of proof regular to constitute the offense."The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the twoappellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more thanamply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it wasmore than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution. The principalcontention raised is thus clearly untenable. It must be stated likewise that while squarelyadvanced for the first time, there had been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, didhold the party or parties, responsible

for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certaintyhaving arisen as to their capability. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------DUMLAO VS. COMELEC [95 SCRA 392; L-52245; 22 JAN 1980] Facts: Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52 asdiscriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.Sec. 4 provides that any retired elective provicial or municipal official who has received paymentsof retirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective localoffice from which he has retired. According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation.Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52,which states that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the offices covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein: providedthat a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and thefiling of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact. Issue: Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and thus, shouldbe declared null and void Held: In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains constitutionaland valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rationalclassification. One class can be treated differently from another class. In this case, employees 65years of age are classified differently from younger employees. The purpose of the provision is tosatisfy the need for new blood in the workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, itshould be declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocenceguaranteed to an accused. Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions,the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right tobe heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation,according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged provisocontravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified fromrunning for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before acivil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to thedegree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and oneagainst whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have beenfiled against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crimewith the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right tohold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie

evidence, and therefore, maybe rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of theelections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contraryproof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courtsrather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, willthereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not beallowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionableportion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself. Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared validand that portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is herebydeclared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocenceguaranteed to an accused.