Endencia vs David: Separation of Powers Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice

Pastor Endencias and Justice Fernando Jugos salary pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that SEC. 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law. According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional. HELD: By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office, found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. ** The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials. The independence of the judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries. In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not

violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. Perfecto v Meer 85 Phil 552 GREGORIO PERFECTO vs. BIBIANO L. MEER [G.R. No. L-2348. February 27, 1950.] Facts: In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution. Issue: Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution thereof? Held: Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of judges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here ; and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution of the judges' compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them. This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon buying gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real property, they pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official stipend that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the fundamental charter. Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did

not perceive and block encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges personal and therefore waivable but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest (Evans vs. Gore).

immediately executory. The clear import of these statements taken together is impose penalties that are not enumerated in the said section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the decision.

Libanan vs. HRET 283 SCRA 520 LAPID vs. COURT OF APPEALS A complaint was filed in the Ombudsman charging petitioner Gov. Manuel M. Lapid and 5 other government officials with alleged dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for allegedly having conspired between and among themselves in demanding and collecting from various quarrying operators in Pampanga a control fee, control slip, or monitoring fee of P120 per truckload of sand, gravel, or other quarry material, without a duly enacted provincial ordinance authorizing the collection thereof and without issuing receipts for its collection. The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding guilty the petitioner for misconduct for which they are meted out the penalty of 1 year suspension without pay pursuant to section 25 (2) of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) implemented the assailed decision of the Ombudsman. Proceeding from the premise that the decision of Ombudsman had not yet been become final, the petitioner argued that the writs of prohibition and mandamus may be issued against the respondent DILG for prematurely implementing the assailed decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman finding petitioner administratively liable for misconduct and imposing upon him a penalty of 1 year suspension without pay is immediately executory pending appeal. HELD:NO. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act provides that any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more than one months salary shall be final and unappealable. It is clear from the above provision that the punishment imposed upon petitioner, i.e. suspension without pay for one month, is not among those listed as final and unappealable, hence, Nature: Special Civil Action in the SC. Certiorari Facts: May 28, 1997: HRET affirmed proclamation of Jose Tan Ramirez as duly elected rep of Eastern Samar over Marcelino Libanan Libanan filed an election protest before HRET claiming, among other things, that the May 8, 115 elections were marred by massive electoral irregularities perpetrated by Ramirez and his followers. Libanan prayed for HRET to issue an order to annul election and proclamation of Ramirez and thereafter so proclaim him as duly elected Rep of Samar. HRET said ballots had the requiredCOMELEC watermarks and were thusva lid. Petitioners said the absence of the signature of the chairman of BEI deemed ballots void. Issue: WON HRET committed GAD in ruling that the absence of the signature of the Chairman of the BEI in the ballots did not render the ballots spurious? Held: NO. Failure of the BEI to sign the ballot shall constitute an election offense. However, ballot shall not be considered invalid. It merely renders BEI Chairman accountable for such failure. (Section 24 of RA 7166)Authenticating marks may be any of the following: a. COMELEC watermark b. Signature or initials or thumbprint of Chairman of BEI c . Presence of red and blue fibers People vs. Jabinal February 27, 1974

Facts: On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be in possession of a revolver without the requisite license or permit. He claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had appointments as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the said firearm. The accused further contended that in view of his appointments, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Courts decisions in People vs. Macarandang and in People vs. Lucero. The trial court found the accused criminally liable for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings in Macarandang* and in Lucero* were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa**. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the Supreme Courts rulings in the cases of Macarandang and of Lucero. Ruling: The appellant was acquitted. Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the law means; this is the reason why Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides that, Judicial decisions applying and interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal system. The interpretation upon a law by the Supreme Court constitutes in a way a part of the law as of the date the law was originally passed, since the courts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim legis interpretatio legis vim obtinetthe interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and in Macarandang was part of the

jurisprudence, hence, of the law of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm and when he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. Considering that the appellant possessed a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and in Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm, the appellant should be absolved. The appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable. _

The accused were acquitted for through their appointment as

confidential/secret agent they were deemed to be peace officers. Peace officers had the privilege of carrying firearms without license.

The

Mapa was convicted although he was a secret/confidential agent. court ruled that the law did not explicitly provide that

secret/confidential agents are among those who are exempted from acquiring a license to carry a firearm. Case of People of the R.P. vs. Purisima GR Nos. L-42050-66 20November1978 FACTS OF THE CASE: There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law. Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them the details of which will be recounted below an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the

Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime. ISSUES OF THE CASE: Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder. The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous weapon outside of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory construction. HELD: COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON: The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequence