1) Canet vs Decena Municipal Corporation Adminsitrative Powers Cockfighting Facts: Canet was a cockpit operator in Bula, Camarines Sur

ur while Decena was the mayor therein. In 1998, Canet, by virtue of a council resolution, was allowed to operate a cockpit in Bula. In 1999, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance 001 entitled An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Cockpits and Other Related Game-Fowl Activities in the Municipality of Bula, Camarines Sur and Providing Penalties for any Violation to (sic) the Provisions Thereof. This ordinance was submitted to Decena for her approval but she denied it because the said ordinance does not contain rules and regulations as well as a separability clause. The council then decided to shelf the ordinance indefinitely. Meanwhile, Canet applied for a mayors permit for the operation of his cockpit. Decena denied Canets application on the ground that under the LGC of 1991 (Section 447 (a) (3) (v)), the authority to give licenses for the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits as well as the regulation of cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks is vested in the Sangguniang Bayan. Therefore, she cannot issue the said permit inasmuch as there was no ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan authorizing the same. Canet then sued Decena on the ground that he should be given a permit based on the 1998 resolution allowing him to operate a cockpit as by virtue of local municipal tax ordinances which generally provide for the issuance of a mayors permit for the operation of businesses. ISSUE: Whether or not Decena can be compelled to issue a permit sans a municipal ordinance which would empower her to do so. HELD: No. To compel Decena to issue the mayors permit would not only be a violation of the explicit provisions of Section 447 of the Local Government Code of 1991, but would also be an undue encroachment on Decenas administrative prerogatives. Further, the 1998 resolution allowing Canet to operate cockpits cannot be implemented without an ordinance allowing the operation of a cockpit (ordinance

vs resolution). The tax ordinances Canet mentioned contain general provisions for the issuance of business permits but do not contain specific provisions prescribing the reasonable fees to be paid in the operation of cockpits and other game fowl activities.

4) ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION V. CITY OF CEBU

FACTS: Ordinance No. 207 was passed by the Municipal Board of Cebu, requiring the shipping concerns whose vessels dock at the public wharves of piers located in said city but owned by the National Government to pay for wharfage. Aboitiz Shipping Corporation paid the wharfage charges under protest. The petitioner questioned the validity of the said ordinance contending that the said ordinance could not have been enacted because the right to collect wharfage in question belongs to the National Government. Respondent on the other hand cited Sec 17 (w) of the Charter of Cebu which gives the Municipal Board the power xxx To fix the charges to be paid by all watercrafts landing at or using public wharves, docks, levees, or landing places. They further contest that the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the National Government and those owned by the City of Cebu. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not under its charter, the City of Cebu may provide by ordinance for the collection of wharfage from shipping concerns whose vessels dock at the public wharves of piers located in said city but owned by the National Government. HELD: The City of Cebu may not provide by ordinance for the collection of wharfage from shipping concerns whose vessels dock at the public wharves of piers located in said city but owned by the National Government because Sec 17 (w) of the Charter of Cebu as cited by the respondent in consonance with its preceding section, would refer only to those public wharves or landing places owned by the City of Cebu and not to those owned by the National Government under the exclusive supervision

of the Bureau of Customs, according to section 1142 of the Revised Administrative Code. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction.

5) JULIO AGCAOILI, vs. ALBERTO SUGUITAN, Facts: Julio Agcaoli was appointed as justice of the peace on the 25th day of March, 1916, with authority "to have and to hold the said off ice with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments thereunto of right appertaining unto him, subject to the conditions prescribed bylaw. He continued to occupy said office until the age of 65. He was ordered by the secretary of justice to vacate the office on april1923.Since then, the auxiliary justice of the peace, acted as justice of the peace of the municipality. Agcaoli instituted qou warranto proceedings to inquire to the acting justices right to occupy said off ice and to procure reinstatement as justice of the peace. Issue: Won the provision of Act 3107 stating that the justices of the peace and auxiliary justices shall be appointed to serve until they reach the age of 65 should be given retroactive or prospective effect. Held: It should be given prospective effect only.Act no. 3107 amended sec 203of the administrative code by adding at the end thereof the following proviso:provided: that justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of 65 years however,section206of the administrative code, entitledTenure of Office and reading a justice of the peace having the requisite legal qualifications shall hole\d office during good behavior unless his office be aboliched or merged into the jurisdiction of some other justice