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Aristotelian

Epagoge

T. ENGBERG-PEDERSEN

During the last two decades there has been growing interest in Aristotle's doctrine and use of dialectical, non-demonstrative forms of argument. One of the results is that his concept of epagoge or induction has received renewed attention in scholarly literature. I am thinking of the monograph by Kurt v. Fritz from 19641 and two articles in Phronesis, one by Walter Hess ( 1 970)2and one fairly recent by D. W. Hamlyn ( 1 976)3. Much may be learnt from reading these works, as well as what has proved a natural starting-point for modern research into the topic, viz. Ross' discussions in his Aristotle4 and his edition of the Analytics5. In this paper I wish to add of Prior Anaonly one substantial point that concerns the interpretation II 23 (section III). The remaining sections serve mainly to establish lytics the proper context for that point, section I by considering the various senses of epagoge and the corresponding verb epagein in Aristotle, section II by trying to find the proper place for nous or reason in connection with epagoge, and section IV by glancing rapidly at the notorious final chapter of the Posterior Analytics. In much of what I say in these sections I am particularly indebted in one way or another to Hamlyn's paper, but do not in general mark where I follow or reject his interpretations. I What is the sense of epagein and epagoge in Aristotle? He uses the terms in various contexts and with various complements: is it possible to bring these uses into some kind of order? I suggest the following schema: (1) 'leading another person towards something with the aim and consequence that he acquires insight into it'. (2) 'leading another person towards something katholou or universal with the aim and consequence that he acquires insight into it'. (3) 'leading another person, by pointing to particular cases, towards something katholou with the aim and consequence that he acquires insight into it'. that (4) 'pointing to particular cases with the aim and consequence another person is led towards insight into something katholou'. 1 (5) 'moving towards insight into something katholou by being aware of particular cases'. 301

that one (6) 'being aware of particular cases with the consequence into something katholou'. I acquires insight Three remarks will make clear the point of this schema. First, unlike other critics who have attempted to schematise Aristotle's use of epagein and epagoge I am not concerned to distinguish senses of the concrete terms epagein and epagoge. For instance, I am not suggesting that in a given passage the sense of the term epagein is, e.g., that of item (4). Rather what I am talking about is the general idea of the practice of epagoge that is being expressed in any given passage by means of those terms and their complements and their contextual implications. Secondly, the schema is a logical reconstruction in the sense that it is tied to individual passages at certain crucial points, in particular with regard to items (1), (4) and (6), but that the other items need not be tied to any specific passage for the schema to be illuminating. In fact they are, but that is an additional bonus, not a necessary condition for the schema to serve its purpose. Thirdly, I am not concerned to distinguish sharply the six items as expressing six different types of epagoge. This is partly because it is often difficult to decide whether a given passage belongs under one item or another, but much more importantly because the whole point of construing the schema is to bring out the essential connection that I take to exist between all Aristotelian applications of epagein and epagoge by making the step from one usage to another appear natural and intelligible. In the schema as given the development from (1) to (6) is as follows. The difference between (1) and (2) is that in (1) what the person is led to see may be any intelligible point, while in (2) it is restricted to being a universal point. The difference between (2) and (3) is that in (3) the means by which the person is led to see the universal point is mentioned. The difference between (3) and (4) is that (4) reverses the emphasis on means and end. (5) and (6) are related to each other as are (3) and (4), but differ from (3) and (4) in that while these are working with two participants to the process, (5) and (6) concern cases where there is one participant only. The step from (3)-(4) to (5)-(6) should cause no surprise: the origin of Aristotelian logic in the dialectical situation is well known (Ernst Kapp and others). Thus there is an intelligible development from (1) to (6). On the other hand, some steps from one item to another are more marked than others. (2), (3) and (4) go closely together and so do (5) and (6). The steps from (1) to (2), then, and from (4) to (5) are more marked. I now consider the textual basis for the individual items. 302

I start from (1). I then consider (2)-(4), starting from (4), which marks the position that is furthest removed from (1). Finally I consider (5) and (6), starting again from the position that is furthest removed from the earlier items. ( I ). epagein is used in this way in Posterior A nalytics I 1, 71 a 21 and 24; epagoge is used in the same way in Prior Analytics II 21, 67 a 23, in both cases in connection with the problem about knowledge raised in Plato's Meno. Ross, v. Fritz and Hamlyn6 connect the use of epagein and epagoge in these passages with 'application of general principles to cases' and hence more or less directly with 'deduction'. It is not clear that this is what is meant. In the passage from the Posterior A nalytics Aristotle is operating with three pieces of knowledge that together form a first-figure syllogism: (A) 'that every triangle has its angles equal to two right angles', (B) 'that this figure in the semicircle is a triangle' and (C) 'that this figure in the semicircle has its angles equal to two right angles'. The point he is trying to make is that if one knows (A) in advance one may come to see (B) at the same time as one is being led by epagoge to see (C). For this to make any sense the idea must be that one comes to see (C) in other ways than by deducing it from (A) and (B). Deduction is involved in the whole situation as described by Aristotle, viz. (instant) deduction of (B) from (A) and (C), when (C) has become known in other ways, but this piece of deduction has no direct connection with the piece of epagoge that is involved7. In the passage from the Prior Analytics Aristotle is, more implicitly, working with the same three pieces of knowledge. Here his point is that knowledge (episteme) of something, e.g. of this particular figure, may be acquired instantly when one comes to see some other thing about that figure. Thus suppose one knows in advance, (A), that every triangle has its angles equal to two right angles. Then if one comes to see, (B), that this and this is what one comes to see by epagoge: one is figure is a triangle led, in whatever ways, to see it - one instantly acquires knowledge of the figure, viz. comes to see, (C), that it has its angles equal to two right angles - and this is done (anagnorisis). by a kind of recognition or 'd6nouement' What the latter means is presumably that (C) is seen by subsumption of (B) under (A), which was already known, i.e. by incorporating this figure under what is already known, (A), as a result of seeing, (B), that it is a triangle. That is, (C) becomes known by deduction from (A) and (B) - but what was learnt by epagoge was not (C), but (B); hence the passage does not imply that learning by epagoge is learning by deduction. Nothing, then, seems implied in the use of epagoge and epagein in these 303

passages besides the simple idea of being led to see some particular point'. In the group of (2)-(4), (4) seems to be the idea that is being expressed at Topics I 18, 108 b 10- 1 1 : "by means of particular epagoge concerned with similar cases we claim to lead forward the universal" (Tf1 9XOtCFTOt II TWV r6 The idea of pointing to 6poimv particular cases is contained in "by means of particular epagoge" (Tf1XaO' X<XOT<X and it is clear from the context that this act is performed with the aim and consequence that another person is led towards insight into something katholou. The same idea seems expressed in Sophistici Elenchi 15, 174 a 37. As for (2) and (3) Topics VIII 1, 156 a 4-5 is relevant: "leading on from Eiri,T6 EXOLCFTOV particulars to the universal" (... EirayovTa ... aiio TJov Once again it seems clear from the context that we should understand 'another person' as complement object) to (grammatical on" in a 4, and that the act of epagoge is performed "leading with the aim and consequence that this person is led towards insight into the katholou that is mentioned. More difficult is the question as to the significance of the mention of the particulars. Either we say that the phrase "from particulars" (&IT6 TWV Exa6TOV) serves to indicate the way in which the person is led towards universal insight - if so, we will make the passage belong under (3); or we say that the phrase merely serves to indicate (for contextual reasons which do not so much concern the idea of epagoge that is being expressed) what may already seem implied in (2), viz. that the starting-point for the movement towards universal insight is, Be that as it may, the question whether our pasage is evidently, particulars. best seen to belong under (2) or (3) can hardly be answered, and for reasons already given we need not try to answer it. By itself and however interpreted Topics VIII 1, 156 a 4-5 is sufficient to validate our filling in the gap between (1) and (4) with (2) and (3). In the group of (5) and (6), (6) seems to be the idea that is being expressed at Posterior Analytics II 19, 100 b 4, on which see below section IV. If (6) is a properly Aristotelian idea it seems admissible to claim that (5) is contained in the classic definition of epagoge in Topics I 12, 105 a 13-14: "epagoge is the march (ephodos) from particulars to the universal". This claim involves interpreting the mention of the particulars in the definition as indicating the way or means by which insight into the universal is acquired (cf. my remarks on Topics VIII 1, 156 a 4-5), but that, after all, seems plausible: epagoge is the movement towards insight into the uni-

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versal that 'starts from' particulars in the sense that it occurs as a result of attending to particulars. Thus the individual items of the schema seem to be vouched for by different Aristotelian passages. Whether the schema is also adequate in the sense that it captures everything that goes into the Aristotelian concept of epagoge is something I shall come back to. At present I wish to spell out two implications of the schema on the assumption that it is adequate. First, if the schema is adequate the Aristotelian concept of epagoge will be an essentially unified one. That this is so may be seen in the following way. (1), which is pre-technical, may be left on one side. Equally the difference between, on the one hand, (5)-(6) and, on the other, (2)-(4) is inessential: whether a person's moving towards insight into something katholou or his attending to particular cases with that consequence, is induced by somebody else or not makes no difference to the basic idea. The important point to note, then, is that the reversal of emphasis that takes place between (2)-(3) and (4) does not touch the essentially unitary conception behind (2)-(4). Compare the relation between (2), (3) and (4) to that between, e.g., (21) 'building a house', (31) 'building a house by placing stones here, a door there etc.', and (41) 'placing stones here, a door there etc. with the aim and consequence that a house is built'. That there is no contrast between (2l)-(41) seems immediately clear (however we are to likewise (2)-(4) may be said to exhibit an explicate their relationship): unified conception of epagoge. essentially If, on this background, we wish to formulate the root idea of Aristotelian epagoge in its full, technical sense (where 'full' and 'technical' are intended to allow us to leave out of account (2) and (1) respectively), we should come out with something like 'attending to particular cases with the consequence that insight into some universal point is acquired' or 'acquiring insight into some universal point as a consequence of attending to particular cases'. This leads directly to the second implication of the schema that deserves to be made explicit. If the schema is adequate, clearly Aristotelian epagoge will be different from the modern concept of induction: while this concept includes the idea of an inference from particular to universal and hence raises the question of the validity of the inductive procedure, there is no trace of these ideas in the schema as given. Acquiring insight into some universal point as a consequence of attending to particular cases is different from inferring that point from the particulars. In fact nothing is either stated or implied in the root idea of epagoge that has been suggested

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as to how it comes to pass that the univeral point is seen from attending to particulars, much less that it happens by inference. But then, is the schema adequate? Does it capture everything that goes into Aristotle's concept of epagoge? Ross would deny that this is so. In his analysis of the various uses of epagoge and epagein9 he contrasts two usages that he finds reflected in the relevant passages, one ('adducing of instances') which is equivalent to the idea expressed in my item (4) and, with the usual slight modification when going from (2)-(4) to (5)-(6), in (6), and another ('passage from instances to a universal conclusion') which is based on the texts from which I take (3) and (5). Where I find no contrast between the two sets of passages, Ross does. The reason for this is, I believe, quite simply that Ross reads into the texts that yield my items (3) and (5) the modern concept of induction. Thus in his 'passage from instances to a universal conclusion' he would stress the word 'conclusion', witness his talk of "drawing of a universal conclusion " (p. 482, my emphases) or "reasoning to a general conclusion from premisses singular in form" (p. 547, my emphases) and his statement that the aim of the citation of individual examples is "to prove a general conclusion" (p. 482, my emphasis). That is, both the idea of an inference and the connected question of the validity of the inference form part of Ross' 'passage from instances to a universal conclusion'. But then Ross must find a contrast between the texts he takes to yield his 'passage' and those that yield his 'adducing of instances'. For if the latter usage is in fact equivalent to the idea contained in my items (4) and (6), then, since the idea of inferring the universal from the particulars plays no role in these items, the two usages detected by Ross must be contrasted. But then, is Ross in fact right in detecting a usage that incorporates the idea of inferring? Is he right in contrasting the two usages? And consequently, since my schema operates with no such contrast, would he be right in denying my schema to be adequate? The only way in which Ross might prove his point would be by inwork with epagoge as a type of troducing passages that unmistakably inference. And this, I contend, cannot be done: there are no such passages. The only passage, viz. Prior Analytics II 23, that might seem to work with epagoge in that way should, as I shall try to show, be interpreted differently. But then, if in fact there are no passages that prove the idea of inference to be part of at least one usage of Aristotelian epagoge, for methodological reasons it is more correct to interpret the texts that yield Ross' 'passage from instances to a universal conclusion' in such a way that they are not taken to introduce an idea of epagein and epagoge that contrasts with the 306

one that is found in the texts that lie behind Ross' 'adducing of instances' and my items (4) and (6). It is simpler, and hence for methodological reasons preferable, to find the same basic idea expressed in both sets of passages and hence to opt for my items (3) and (5) instead of Ross' 'passage' as being the ones that express the idea of epagoge in those passages that do not fall under (4) and (6). My argument here is purely based on a point of methodology. We start, a priori, from the assumption that the various passages that contain the idea of epagoge reflect a unified conception of that notion. We then ascertain that no passage contains an idea of epagoge that must be seen to contrast with the one we have initially established. And we then conclude that in fact no passage contains an idea of epagoge that does contrast with the one we have initially established, and hence that our a priori is a fact. assumption I take it, then, that my schema is adequate; that Aristotle has a unified conception of epagoge; and that the idea of inference plays no role in that conception. If this is correct one can understand why the question of the validity of a given piece of epagoge never arises for Aristotle. There is epagoge when in a debate you make somebody accept some universal point on the basis of a review of particular cases, whether this point be true or false, and there is truth. Equally, epagoge when you make somebody see a mathematical whether you point to one particular case or to many or to all (where that is Aristotle does not distinguish between possible) is quite unimportant: those modern forms of induction ('perfect', 'intuitive' and the like), quite simply because his concept of epagoge only contains the minimal content that is common to most modern types of induction, viz. coming to see some universal point as a consequence of attending to particular cases. II We have seen that a person's attending to particular cases is only epagoge if as a consequence he comes to see some universal point, but that the of epagoge implies nothing as to how the universal point comes to concept be seen as a consequence of the person's attending to particular cases. Does Aristotle say anything about the latter question? What, according to him, will explain that in one case attending to particular cases leads to seeing a universal point, while in another case it does not? The answer, I suggest, is nous or reason. By nous I do not mean, obviously, the state of mind (hexis) that consists 307

in true knowledge of principles that cannot be deduced from anything else, which is the sense of nous that is being expressed in Posterior Analytics II 19, 100 b 5-17 and Nicomachean Ethics VI vi, 1141 a 3 and 7 (cf. VI ii, 1139 b 13 and iii, 1139 b 15). Nor, more importantly, do I mean by nous a capacity that guarantees the truth of whatever universal point it helps a man to grasp. Nous in the sense in which I wish to introduce it is not a faculty that makes good for the notorious frailty of induction by securing the truth of a given universal proposition, the truth of which cannot be adequately secured by inspection of particular cases alone. What I mean by nous is something much humbler: a generalising capacity or ability that is responsible for the fact that a universal point, something, that is, which goes beyond what is grasped in sense-perception, may come to be present to the mind - whether this point be true or false. Nous, then, is the psychic power that Aristotle discusses in his Psychology (De A nima III 4ff) after his and phantasia or 'imaging'. inquiry into sense-perception That this fairly trivial point is correct cannot, I believe, be seriously doubted by anyone familiar with Aristotle's thought. Nevertheless, for the fun of delving into the intricacies of Aristotle's text, I shall briefly discuss a couple of passages that tend to support it: Posterior Analytics I 31 and Nicomachean Ethics VI xi, 1143 a 35-b5. In Posterior A nalytics I 31 Aristotle wishes to show that it is impossible to possess knowledge of something (epistasthai) as a result of perception alone. The reason is that you cannot be said to know something unless you possess general knowledge, knowledge of some universal connection, and although sense perception is in some way directed towards something katholou, this is not the relevant sense of to katholou, which is that of `what holds in every case' (87 b 31) and 'what is always and everywhere' (87 b 32). That knowledge of something presupposes knowledge of this kind of universal and cannot therefore be obtained by sense-perception alone is then shown, in the first part of the chapter (87 b 28-88 a 8), by means of examples. In the second part of the chapter (88 a 9-17) Aristotle proceeds to show that nevertheless in some cases one may acquire 'demonstrative' knowlas a result of perception. "For with some things, if we could edge directly see them we would no longer seek for them, not because we would possess knowledge by seeing, but because we would know the universal as a result for instance if we saw the glass to be perforated and light of seeing coming through, it would also be clear (to us) why it burns, from seeing separately in the case of each piece of glass, but at the same time (viz. as any single seeing) grasping (noesai) that it is in that way with every piece." 308

The idea is clear. One does not, in the imagined case, see the reason why the glass burns, one sees that the given piece of glass is perforated and at the same time understands or grasps (noesai) that all glasses as perforated and hence will allow light to come through. And by understanding this universal fact one eo ipso knows why the glass burns, since, as is clearly presupposed in the chapter as a whole (and cf. 88 a 1-2 and 5-6), knowing the relevant universal proposition is knowing why.l What is special about the imagined case is, then, that since one can see with one's eyes the fact that explains the phenomenon to be explained and (we must add) since the explanation is so obvious that even a single (imagined) glance at a piece of glass is sufficient to make one grasp the universal fact, a single case of and experception will make one come to possess truly demonstrative to be explained but only via planatory knowledge of the phenomenon the noetic grasp of the universal connection. If we now turn back to the examples Aristotle has provided earlier in the chapter it is noteworthy that one of these (given in 87 b 39-88 a 5) resembles the example of the burning-glass with regard to the fact that in both cases one is thought to be able directly to see the fact that explains the phenomenon to be explained. Thus in the example of 87 b 39-88 a 5 the idea is that if we were on the moon, we should be able to see the earth screening, which is the fact that accounts for an eclipse. But here Aristotle's point is that even though we should see this fact, nevertheless we would not know the reason why 'our' moon is eclipsed, since we would not possess the universal fact that whenever and only when the earth is screening is the moon eclipsed. True enough, we would perceive that the moon is eclipsed and we would see the earth screening, but precisely because perception does not grasp a universal fact we would not possess knowledge of the eclipse. But Aristotle goes on like this: "However, from observing this often happening, we might have hunted down the universal and might then for from several particulars the universal bepossess a demonstration; comes clear". As Ross sees (note ad loc.), Aristotle is here clearly, if only implicitly, talking of epagoge and the idea evidently is that repeated observations of eclipse and screening by the earth might have made us see the universal connection between the two and hence might have made us come to possess explanatory knowledge of eclipses. But now, if we ask what word Aristotle might have used instead of 'hunting down' (thereusai) to express our imagined grasp of the universal connection between eclipse and screening, it seems impossible, in view of the close similarity of the two examples, to doubt that that word is the one that was used in the example of the burning-glass, viz. noesai (grasping). If so, it is the generalising ability 309

of nous that is responsible for our coming to entertain that universal proposition. Obviously the passage does not say so, but can it really be doubted? Now the second passage: Nicomachean Ethics VI xi, 1143 a 35-b 5. Nous is of the ultimates (ta eschata) in both directions, viz. of the 'first' terms (protoi horoi) and the 'last' ones (eschatoi), the former in connection with demonstrations (proper), the latter in connection with practical (presum'demonstrations'. ably :) In the two lines that conclude the piece Aristotle explains why, in connection with practical demonstrations, nous is of the 'last thing' (to eschaton) and that which admits of being otherwise (to endechomenon sc. all5s echein) and that which belongs to the second premiss (tes heteras protaseos). These lines are notoriously difficult, but fortunately I am in a position to sidestep what is perhaps the biggest difficulty, viz. that of deciding what it is about these 'last things' that is grasped by nous. Suffice it to say that nous is said to be concerned with the 'last things'. Why? "The reason is that they (i.e. the 'last things'll are starting-points for that-for-the-sake-of-which" (1143 b 4). That is, nous is of the 'last because it is from these that that-for-the-sake-of-which comes into things' being. In this it is already implied that nous is of the 'last things' in the practical case, not because these things must be grasped by some faculty or other and that for whatever reasons nous seems a proper candidate, but because they serve as starting-points for But that-for-the-sake-of-which. of course, one wishes to know more about the latter thing, and the then, next sentence provides a clue: "For universals come into being from particulars" (1143 b 4-5). This sentence is best seen as providing a reason why what was stated in the first sentence is true. That is, the 'last things' form a starting-point for that-for-the-sake-of-which because universals come into being from particulars. is If so, that-for-the-sake-of-which something universal and the 'last things' that are grasped by nous in the practical case are particulars. The third and final sentence runs: "Of these, then, one must have perception, and this perception is nous" ( 1143 b 5). The word 'these' in this sentence is best taken to refer back to the 'last things' (hautai) of the first sentence, whereby the second sentence becomes So: Because (cf. b 5 oun) the 'last things' are the startingparenthetical. therefore one must have perception points for that-for-the-sake-of-which, of these things, and this perception is nous. Now this will make sense only on the assumption that the question that lies behind the passage as a whole is that of how one comes to possess knowledge ofthat-for-the-sake-of-which and the argument of the passage may therefore be reconstructed as follows. 310

In order

to acquire knowledge of that-for-the-sake-of-which, which is universal, one must, since the universal comes to be present something from the particular, have a sense of the 'last things', which are the relevant is someparticulars, and since the result (viz. that-for-the-sake-of-which) thing universal, this sense (aisthesis) is nous. This can only mean one thing: that nous is the name of the faculty that explains our ability to come to entertain some universal proposition. By having particulars presented to us (whatever, in the practical case, these particulars are taken to be) we come to possess knowledge of that-for-thesake-of-which, which is something universal, and the faculty that explains that we may in this way grasp a universal fact is nous. On the basis of these two passages I conclude that Aristotelian epagoge is 'intuitive induction', but only in the sense that follows from the restricted role that has been assigned to nous. Nous is not a faculty that guarantees the truth of a universal proposition that is grasped on the basis of inspection of particular cases, it is only a faculty that makes possible that grasp, whether the result be true or false. But now, can we say that on the basis of only two passages I have made probable the truth of my suggestion that Aristotelian epagoge is intuitive induction in the sense stipulated? Of course not. Nevertheless I claim it to be true and if the reader is not prepared to accept my point, he must produce counter-examples (enstasis, cf. Topics 157 a 34-35). I shall now try to show that the idea of claiming some point to be universally true on the basis of only a few examples that I have just made use of in the preceding paragraph is itself one that forms part of the Aristotelian concept of epagoge. III Prior A nalytics II 23

It is normally held that in this chapter Aristotle is talking of 'perfect induction' and analysing that species of induction in such a way that it comes out as a proof or valid argument. But then, it is asked, how does that view of induction go with his normal view, if "in most cases he evidently thinks of the argument as a dialectical argument, in which knowledge about the particulars tends to produce the corresponding belief about the universal, without producing certainty"12? And, in the context of this paper, if I claim there to be no other form of epagoge in Aristotle than the one that consists in attending to particular cases with the consequence that 311

some general point is seen (for which nous considered as a generalising capacity is responsible), what do I have to say about Prior Analytics II 23? What Aristotle sets out to do in the chapter is to 'reduce' the dialectical argument of epagoge to the syllogistic schemata of the Prior Analytics, and the question to be answered is how this reduction should be understood. He starts (68 b 15) by saying that epagoge or to be more precise (kai) the syllogism that depends on epagoge consists in showing (in syllogistic terminology) by means of C that A belongs to B. "For that is the way we practise epagogai" (68 b 18). His example is this: A is 'long lived', B is 'gall-less', C is (the group of) long-lived species. So far there is no problem: by epagoge, i.e. by inspection of long-lived species, we may in fact show that 'long-lived' belongs to 'gall-less'. (That Aristotle is talking of species raises no problem: inspection of species consists in inspection of the individuals that fall under those species.) Aristotle continues (68 b 21), in my very free paraphrase: "It follows (cf. b 21 1 d%) from the way we set up our example, more precisely: from the fact that C is the group of species that are long-lived (A), that A belongs to all C." Very well, we say, but our goal is to show that A belongs to B: how can we do that? "It is also the case (cf. b 22 alla kai) that B belongs to all C." All right, but how can we know? Of course only by inspecting all C's. Very well, but how does the fact of B's belonging to all C's help us towards our goal? "Now look, if (cf. b 23 ei oun) C is convertible with B, i.e. if B does not go beyond C, then with logical necessity A will belong to B. "Logical necessity? Yes, for there exists a rule of inference (see 68 a 21-25) that (68 b 25-27:) if A and B belong to the same thing (C) and C is convertible with either A or B (here: B), then the other initial predicate (here: A) belongs to that (here: B) which is convertible with C." Pausing here for a moment, we may note that the 'epagogic' syllogism that shows by means ofc that A belongs to B with logical necessity may be constructed if two conditions are fulfilled: (1) It must be true to say that B belongs to all C, and (2) it must be true to say that C is convertible with B or, in other words, that B does not go beyond C. In order to be certain that these conditions are in fact fulfilled one must know all C's and all individuals (or species) that belong under B (call them D). Aristotle himself notes that one must know all C's: 68 b 27-29. He does not explicitly say that one must know all D's, but one can see why: his example is after all concerned with C's only (cf. 68 b 17-18). But then one would like to ask: is it Aristotle's doctrine that in order to be able to practise epagoge one must inspect all C's, in order to make sure that condition (1) is fulfilled, and all D's, in order to make sure that condition 312

(2) is fulfilled? No, that cannot be his point. But doesn't Aristotle say that all C's and D's must be inspected (although he is only explicit about the C's)? The answer is again negative: PriorAnalytics II 23 says nothing about what one must actually do in order to be able to practise epagoge properly. The aim of the chapter is a quite different one: it is to bring out what is implied in asserting a universal proposition on the basis of attending to a few particular cases. The point Aristotle wishes to make is, I suggest, that when, on the basis of attending to particular cases, we assert some universal connection to hold, we claim that, in Aristotle's terms, ( I ) B belongs to all C, i.e. belongs to all individuals past, present and future, that are A - and of course without attempting to fulfil the impossible task of making sure that this claim holds true (that Aristotle was aware of the impossibility of this task seems indicated by Posterior Analytics I 1, 71 a 30-b 5). Similarly we claim (2) that C is convertible with B - and of course without attempting to prove the truth of this claim by inspecting all D's past, present and future. The idea is quite simple. I inspect seven long-lived individuals, i.e. C's that are A. I find that all of the seven individuals are gall-less (have B true of them). I then confidently assert that all gall-less animals are long-lived, i.e. that A is true of B. But then, what is implied in this assertion? Surely (1) that all long-lived individuals (C) are gall-less (B) and (2) that B does not go beyond C. In asserting on the basis of inspection of seven C's that B is A I subscribe to the truth of the argument one gets by inserting A, B and C into the argument-places of the rule of inference mentioned in 68 a 21-25 and b and in order to subscribe to the truth of this argument I must claim 25-27, (1) that B is in fact true of all C's and (2) that B and C are in fact convertible. If this interpretation is correct, Aristotle is not talking, in Prior Analytics II 23, about one species of induction, viz. perfect induction. Rather he is talking about any kind of epagoge (from one particular case or more, to a dialectical 'truth' or to a mathematical one) and what he is wishing to bring out is what we imply when on the basis of attending to particular cases we assert a universal proposition.13 But then, is this actually what Aristotle wishes to say? What is the argument that he is not talking of perfect induction? First, and most weakly, there is the argument of onus of proof. If it creates problems vis-a-vis Aristotle's doctrine and practice in other passages to see him as talking of perfect induction in this one, it is up to an adherent of that to prove that it must be adopted. interpretation and more powerfully, on the normal reading it seems imposSecondly, sible to make the chapter itself cohere. For in that chapter Aristotle several 313

times speaks as if the kind of epagoge he is talking about is the normal one, i.e. the one that is so often used or invoked in his writings. Thus in 68 b 18 he seems to be referring to the normal practice of epagoge ("for that is how we practice epagogai') and in b 30-37 he contrasts epagoge and demonstrative syllogism in his normal way, without even the slightest hint that he is talking of some special type of epagoge. If, then, one sticks to the claim that in the chapter as a whole he is talking of perfect induction as a special type of epagoge, then one must conclude either that the wording of b 30-37 is seriously misleading or that the chapter itself is incoherent. I decline to accept either view. But now, if the proposed interpretation of Prior Analytics II 23 is correct, there is absolutely no inconsistency between the doctrine of that chapter and the point I have made earlier that one necessary condition for the practicability of epagoge is the presence of the generalising ability that is nous. For while there might be such a contrast if (a) nous were the ability that guarantees the truth of a universal proposition even in cases where the inductive basis for the assertion of that proposition does not warrant its truth and (b) if Prior Analytics II 23 contained a doctrine of a type of induction, viz. perfect induction, where the inductive basis for the assertion of the universal proposition does warrant its truth, neither condition is fulfilled. Nous, as introduced by me in this context, is no such ability and Prior A nalytics II 23 is not concerned with any such type of induction.

IV Posterior A nalytics II 19. The structure of the chapter is well known. In 99 b 17-18 Aristotle poses two questions, (A) how principles become known and (B) what (the name of) the knowing state is. In the following 'aporematic' passage (99 b 20-34) he first (b 22-23 and 23-25) raises two sub-questions that concern the second (B) of the two guiding questions and are answered, with that question, at the end of the chapter (100 b 5-17). He then introduces (b 25-26) and discusses (b 26-32) a third sub-question that bears on the former (A) of the two guiding questions, and provides an answer in 99 b 34-100 b 5. Let us consider this passage. The guiding question is (A) how principles come to be known and the sub-question (of 99 b 25-26) is whether the state of knowledge is innate but unconscious (for clearly we are not aware of possessing it during the whole of our lives), or whether it is not innate but comes to be present. The 314

sub-question contains a problem, since (as Aristotle argues in b 26-34) we wish to say neither that the knowledge is innate with the necessary consequence that it is unconscious, nor that it comes to be present without some knowledge (in a wide sense: gnosis) being already there from which the knowledge in question may be seen to arise. This problem Aristotle next proceeds to solve, by pointing out (in b 34-35) that we do in fact possess (as do all animals) a capacity (dynamis) for making judgments which on the one hand is innate and on the other hand satisfies the requirement that it be not a fully developed state, which would necessitate its being unconscious. This capacity is perception. The sub-question, then, is answered: what about the guiding one (A)? This question is in fact, though not explicitly, answered in 99 b 36-100 b 3 where Aristotle shows, in four different ways (99 b 36-100 a 3, a 3-9, 12-13, 15-b 3 - the so-called 'genetic account'), how principles come to be known from perception. Hamlyn (pp. 175-180) objects to this interpretation of the point of the four passages that by itself what is described in them will never serve fully to explain how principles come to be known. This is surely correct, but it is not clear that Aristotle claims that much for his genetic account. In 100 a 13-14 he adds the important remark "and the soul is in fact such that it is capable of undergoing this". That is, the advance towards greater generality that has been metaphorically described in the third passage (100 a 12-13) is possible only because the soul is of a certain kind - and presumably the same goes for what is said in the other three passages. We can see what this means if we recall the distinction Aristotle draws in Nicomachean Ethics II v between psychic abilities or capacities (dynameis) on the one hand and states of mind (psychic hexeis) on the other. What is in a certain state is different from the state it is in. Take for instance the term aisthesis or perception. In some passages aisthesis clearly denotes the faculty of perception, the ability that accounts for cases of perception. Thus, e.g., in our chapter of the Posterior Analytics (99 b 35). In other passages, however, the term denotes not the faculty of perception but a given state or occurrence of perception. Thus, e.g., in 99 b 36. Now if we apply this distinction to the genetic account it seems clear that what Aristotle is talking about in these passages are states, not faculties. Thus mneme or memory ( 1 00a 3) is a state of mind, not a faculty thereof, since, as is clear from the work On Memory (De Memoria 450 a 22-23), the faculty that is responsible for mneme is the faculty of phantasia or 'imaging' (in some places called to phantastikon). Again, the logos that is mentioned in 100 a 2 certainly is not 'rationality' but rather a 'rational account' or the insight that is expressed in such an account, precisely 315

it functions as a principle of art or science (technes arche kai epistemes, 100 a 8). But then the point of 100 a 13-14, quoted above, must be that the advance from occurrences of perception via memory and experience to the state of insight into the principles of art or science is possible only because the soul has the corresponding abilities (dynameis cf. dynasthai in 100 a 14). What these abilities are, is clear for perception and memory: they are the faculty of perception and that faculty plus that of phantasia respectively. What it is for experience is more difficult, since the answer to be given depends on how one construes Aristotelian empeiria (experience). Without going into that problem, let me just state my view that as described in Posterior Analytics II 19 and Metaphysics A I empeiria contains no universal element (other than the one that goes with perception), but is closely connected with memory. It is a state of mind that at one moment connects the memory of a number of individual cases, e.g. that when Socrates suffered from that illness he was cured by that treatment; when Kallias suffered from that illness he was cured by that treatment; etc. If this is correct, the ability that is responsible for Aristotelian empeiria will be, once again, that of phantasia. Be that as it may: what, to proceed, is the faculty that accounts for logos? Only one answer seems possible: nous, reason, rationality. If so, we may conclude that the point of the genetic account is to show how various states of mind come into being from perception, and that it is implied, and stated explicitly in 100 a 13-14, that these states come into being only because the soul possesses the corresponding abilities: aisthesis, phantasia and nous. However, there is one more point to the genetic account, viz. that of showing that the states of mind (at least those of empeiria and logos) come into being as a result of repeated cases of perception. Hence, if we go back to the two questions that guide lines 99 b 34-100 b 5, we may conclude that the sub-question is answered in 99 b 34-35, as we saw, and again in 100 a 10-11, while the guiding question (A) is answered by the genetic account: principles come to be known when the soul advances from the state of perception via those of memory and empeiria to that of logos, and there are two conditions on this, ( I) that the soul is such that it can advance in that way, i.e. has the necessary abilities, and (2) that the soul undergoes into which rational insight is repeated perception of the phenomenon because eventually acquired. This brings us to the notorious lines 100 b 3-5: "Consequently it is clear that we must come to know the primitives by epagoge; for perception instils the universal in this way". On the basis of what has been said of the 316

immediately preceding passage (99 b 25-100 b 3) these lines may be given a In relation to the two questions that guide that simple interpretation. the point of the three lines is to spell out one element in the answer passage to the guiding question (A) that is contained in the genetic account. This element is the one about repetition (cf. (2) above) as a necessary condition for the advance towards knowledge of principles, and the way in which Aristotle emphasises that element is by bringing in the concept of epagoge. Thus considered the lines may be seen to contain the following argument. As described in the genetic account the universal comes into being from perception as a result of epagoge (= repeated perceptions, where `repeated perceptions' are understood as repeated cases of attending to a perceptible fact); hence, <since principles are universal>, the principles become known as a result of epagoge (= repeated attention being given to the phenomenon whose principle one comes to know). On this reading of the lines "in this way" (houto) of line 100 b 5 refers back to the mention of epagoge in 100 b 4. Hamlyn rejects this interpretation and thinks that "in this way" refers back to the genetic account as a whole (pp. 1 80- 1 8 1 ). disagree for two reasons. First, it seems exceedingly I difficult to make the lines contain an argument proper if "in this way" is not interpreted in the normal way, which is the one I have adopted. viz. that perSecondly, Hamlyn's argument against that interpretation, could not be said to instil the universal by epagoge since perception ception already is of the univeral, will hardly do. It is of course quite true that, as we have seen earlier, Aristotelian perception is in some way of the universal, but this only means that there are two kinds of universal, the one that is grasped in perception (however we are to understand that idea) and the other that is only grasped by animals that have abilities that go beyond that of perception alone. Evidently, it is the latter kind Aristotle is thinking of in 100 b 5.14 Finally, in 100 b 5-17, Aristotle answers the second guiding question (B) of the chapter by stating that the name of the knowing state is nous. This statement raises no problem for the interpretation that has been given of Aristotle's answer to his first guiding question. On the contrary it is quite natural that, as aisthesis may denote both a faculty and a state, so nous, in addition to denoting the faculty that is responsible for the universal principle's being seen as a result of 'epagogic' attention being given to particular cases, is now stated to denote the state that obtains when the principle is seen.

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V To sum up, the doctrine of Posterior Analytics II 19 in no way contradicts the interpretation of epagoge that I have put forward. Epagoge is attending to particular cases with the consequence that a universal point is seen, for which the faculty of nous taken as a generalising ability is responsible, and Posterior Analytics II 19 can be seen more or less explicitly to say that much. Equally, the doctrine of Prior Analytics II 23 is perfectly consistent with this way of understanding epagoge. In Aristotle epagoge raises no as to the certainty of the universal proposition that is asserted as questions a result of attending to particular cases. Hence he is not tempted to toy with the idea of an 'epagogic' inference (this much for Prior Analytics II 23), nor does he wish to introduce nous as an ability that guarantees the truth of the universal proposition (this much for one traditional interpretation of Posterior Analytics II 19). His epagoge is a simple notion that never betrays its connection with the dialectical situation, where its aim is to generate acceptance, and no more, of a universal proposition. It does not touch on the complicated question as to the certainty of that proposition. But as far as it goes, it has the advantage of being clear and having a point.15 University of Copenhagen 1 Kurt von Fritz, 'Die epagoge bei Aristoteles', SB d. Bayer. Akad. d. Wiss., Philos.-hist. Kl., Jg. 1964,H. 3, MJnchen ( 1 964). 2 Walter Hess, 'Erfahrung und Intuition bei Aristoteles', Phronesis 15 (1970) 48-82. 3 D. W. Hamlyn, 'Aristotelian Epagoge', Phronesis 21 (1976) 167-184. - Also relevant to the Aristotelian concept of epagoge, and most enjoyable too is L. A. Kosman, 'Understanding, Explanation and Insight in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics in E. N. Lee, A. P. D. ; Mourelatos, R. M. Rorty (edd.), Exegesis and Argument, Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos, (Phronesis, Suppl. vol. I Assen: Van Gorcum 1973) 374-392. 4 Sir David Ross, Aristotle, London (1923, 19495)pp. 38-41. 5 id., Aristotle's Prior and PosteriorAnalytlcs, Oxford (1949) pp. 47-51, 481-483. 6 Ross, Analytics, p. 47; v. Fritz, p. 23; Hamlyn, p. 170. 7 The fact that 1 in 71 (B) is deduced from (A) and (C) accounts for 11 UVXXO-YLGR6v a 25. I paraphrase freely: 'Before the person has been led to see (C) or rather (since from knowing (A) in advance and having come to see (C) he will instantly deduce (B) and hence come to 'possess the syllogism' that proves (C) before he comes to possess the syllogism, his relation in terms of knowledge (episteme)to this figure in the semi-circle is as follows: , 8 For a clear example of this use of epagein see Metaphysics A 8, 989 a 33. (I owe this reference to J. L. Ackrill.) 318

9 Ross, A nalytics,pp. 47, 481-482. 'o In the passage translated I have employed Ross' text. Jonathan Barnes, in his 'Aristotle's Posterior A nalytics, Clarendon Aristotle Series, Oxford ( 1 975p. 47, reads xai. ) and translates "even if seeing occurs separately for each <pieceof T6 EL instead ofxaiev TM at glass>while comprehending < grasps> one time that it is thus in every case". But first, on this reading Aristotle does not explain why in the imagined case one may come to possess the universal explanation as a result of seeing, while on the preferred reading he does: one sees the relevant fact, and seeing is something that takes place separately for each single piece of glass, and at the .sametime as one sees (any single piece) one grasps the fact that it is in the same way with all pieces. Secondly, cannot mean 'at one time', since it implies the existence of some other thing that is brought into relation with the event that is stated to occur &f.L0:, accordingly, means 'at the same time' as something else. li I take a-ro:L b4 to refer back to Tov in in xav ?9)(&TOV v8Exoplvov b3, not to TilTlps The ?rpoTaoeWS. feminine gender should be explained as a case of attraction caused by the grammatical predicate lz Ross, A nalytics,p. 48. For remarks about the special status of Prior A nalytics I I 23that point in my direction, see J. M. le Bland, Logique et methode chez Aristote, Paris (1939) pp. 127-128and W. Wieland, Die aristotelische Physik, G6ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht ( 1 962, 19702) p. 100. 14 This distinction between two kinds of katholou may be hinted at in the fourth passage of the genetic account (100 a 15-b 3): when there is perception and one of the indistinguishables (the colour red or the thing man?) has taken a stand, there is a first katholou in the soul (l00 a 15-b I ); next a stand is made among these (sc. the first katholou things), and so on until the indivisibles and universals have come to a stand, e.g. (from perception of red or man as described in 100a 15-b I to the grasp of) 'red' or 'man' (cf. b 2-3: TOLov8i, and from 'red', 'blue' etc. man 'man', 'horse' etc. to 'colour' and 'animal' (cf. b 3: Ews and so forth (100 b 1-3). I am grateful to J. L. Ackrill, Oxford, for valuable criticism of an earlier version of this paper, and to the members of the Copenhagen Aristotelian group, for comments on the first version that helped to clarify a number of points.

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