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SEISMIC PERFORMANCE OF ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS

Eric Fujisaki, P.E. Pacific Gas and Electric Company, San Francisco, CA

Overview
Introduction Historic performance of electric transmission systems Substation buildings Substation equipment/ components Underground transmission cables Recent R&D activities Research needs

PG&Es Electric Transmission System


Mix of old and new equipment, structures, buildings, nearly 1,000 substations Transmission lines mostly overhead, some underground in Oakland and SF Peninsula Older BuildingsIndoor substations mostly in urban areas

URM

or Lightly-reinforced masonry Non-ductile reinforced concrete shear wall Most have steel gravity frames

Seismic capability varies


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Seismic Hazard

Bay Area
Several

systems High concentration of substations High concentration of customers

active fault

Mapsource:USGS,2008

Recent Historic Performance


One large earthquakeLoma Prieta Several moderate earthquakes, e.g., Morgan Hill, Coalinga, San Simeon Substation damage

Loma Prieta (6.9Mw), 1989


19 phases of live tank breakers damaged, 500kV, several 230kV 25 poles of disconnect switches damaged, 500kV Several radiator leaks on transformers, 500 and 230kV 15 current transformers, 500kV 7 CCVTs damaged, 500kV Numerous 230kV switches damaged Rigid bus work damage 500, 230kV

Coalinga & Morgan Hill Earthquakes


Coalinga (6.4Mw), 1983

Morgan Hill (6.2Mw), 1984

Transformer bushing leaks, 500/230kV 2 transformers sheared anchors, shifted, uplifted 2 support frames of OCBs damaged 2 PTs shifted 1 OCB with friction clips shifted, 60kV 1 battery rack shifted

12 phases of live tank circuit breakers damaged, 500kV

Historic Performance Live Tank Breakers

Historic Performance Instrument Transformers

Historic PerformanceBuses, Switches

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Historic PerformanceRadiators

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Historic Performance Connectors at Elevated Switches

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Historic Performance Elevated Switches

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Underground Transmission Cables


Type High pressure gas filled (HPGF) High pressure oil (fluid) filled (HPFF) Vintage 1950s-1960s Typical Installation 6-8 steel pipe casing, pressurized with N2 gas 6-8 steel pipe casing, pressurized with oil Cables in PVC conduits, encased in concrete duct bank
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1970s-1980s

Solid dielectric Late 1990s(XLPE) Present

Underground Transmission Cables Likely Failure Modes

Cable Type Failure Modes HPGF HPFF XLPE

Loss of pressure boundary Excessive curvature (short bend radius) Cable crushing/ pinching Excessive curvature (short bend radius)
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Liquefaction Zones

Segments of underground transmission lines pass thru high risk liquefaction zones Best addressed by contingency planning and system redundancy

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Mitigation Efforts
Substation building retrofit Seismic qualification standards implementation Targeted equipment replacement Equipment anchorage retrofit Capital improvementsnew equipment procurement, system redundancy Contingency planning

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Building Retrofit

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Seismic Qualification Standards Implementation

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New and Replacement Equipment

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Equipment Anchorage

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Current R&D Activities


Application guide for connected equipment Network studies of seismic performance Transformer bushing test protocols Station post insulator studies

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Application Guide for Connected Equipment


Interaction between connected equipment recognized as a likely cause of failure in past earthquakes IEEE 1527, Recommended Practice for Design of Flexible Buswork approved in 2006 Complex methodology, limited acceptance Application guide to supplement IEEE 1527 has been drafted (Dastous and Der Kiureghian)

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Recommended Shapes

Triple curvature

Double curvature

Inverse parabola

Catenary

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Terminal Force
Conventional wisdomSufficient cable slack leads to Seismic Terminal Force 0 Experiments and nonlinear analysesNontrivial Seismic Terminal Force may occur even if slack is sufficient Further work needed

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Network Seismic Risk Assessment SERA*

Simulate/ assess post-earthquake damage state of a network Motivation:


Identify potential weaknesses in the system Asset management, benefit/ cost analysis Emergency resource planning Loss estimation for insurance

* System Earthquake Risk Assessment

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SERA AnalysisModeling

System topology (limited model, includes 46 important substations in SF Bay Area)


System

geographic information Equipment connectivity Substation connectivity (transmission lines/ towers)

Component fragilities
Different

failure modes for each equipment Based on historic data, tests, judgment

Seismic hazard
Scenario

earthquakes Geotechnical hazards (e.g. liquefaction, landslide)


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Research Needs
Interaction effects (particularly terminal loading issues) Deformation capacities of buried transmission cables Base isolation/ supplemental damping technologies for substation equipment Insulator post-shaking test damage detection, porcelain and composites

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