JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.

: QUESTION OF FACT
The question of whether a tenancy relationship exists is basically a question of fact which, as a general rule, is beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The question of whether there was an implied tenancy and sharing are basically questions of fact and the findings of the Court of Appeals and the Boards a quo are, generally, entitled to respect and nondisturbance, as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Such findings of fact may be reviewed by the Court when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures, or if the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. (ESTATE OF PASTOR M. SAMSON VS. MERCEDES R. SUSANO & NORBERTO R. SUSANO, G.R. NO. 179024, MAY 30, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

Under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced in writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof. Rudlin argues that under Section 9, Rule 130, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if it is put in issue in the pleading, "[t]he failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and the agreement of the parties thereto." Assuming as true Rudlins claim that Exhibit "7" failed to accurately reflect an intent of the parties to fix the total contract price at P6,006,965.00, Rudlin failed to avail of its right to seek the reformation of the instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed.

Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. (Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 466 Phil. 53, 62 (2004), citing MC Engineering, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104047, April 3, 2002, 380 SCRA 116, 137). SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: (a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;

(c) The validity of the written agreement; or (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the execution of the written agreement. The term "agreement" includes wills (emphasis supplied). Rudlin cannot invoke the exception under (a) or (b) of the above provision. Such exception obtains only where "the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument." (Seaoil Petroleum Corporation v. Autocorp Group, G.R. No. 164326, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 387, 396397, citing Ortaez v. CA, 334 Phil. 514, 519-520 (1997) & Heirs of Amparo del Rosario v. Aurora Santos, et al., 194 Phil. 670, 687 (1981). Under the fourth exception, however, Rudlins evidence is admissible to show the existence of such other terms agreed to by the parties after the execution of the contract. But apart from the Bar Chart and Cash Flow Chart prepared by FBC, and the testimony of Rodolfo J. Lagera, no competent evidence was adduced by Rudlin to prove that the amount of P6,006,965.00 stated therein as contract price was the actual decreased amount that FBC and Rudlin found mutually acceptable. As to the affidavits executed by Architect Quezon and his associate Roberto R. Antonio, the same do not serve as competent proof of the purported actual contract price as they did not testify thereon. Significantly, the June 5, 1986 Letter-Agreement did not at all mention the total contract price. Likewise, there is nothing in the various letters sent by Rudlin to FBC while construction was in progress and even subsequent to the execution of the said Letter-Agreement indicating that Rudlin corrected the contract price of P6,933,268.00 which FBC had repeatedly mentioned in its letters and documents (FINANCIAL BUILDING CORPORATION VS. CORPORATION, BLOOMFIELD EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, INC., RODOLFO J. LAGERA, MA. ERLINDA J. LAGERA AND JOSAPHAT R. BRAVANTE, RUDLIN INTERNATIONAL, G.R. NO. 164186, OCTOBER 4, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: A RE-EXAMINATION OF FACTUAL FINDINGS CANNOT BE DONE THROUGH A PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF COURT
It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because this Court is not a trier of facts; it reviews only questions of law. The Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. (Id. at 460-461.)

Now, superior courts are not triers of facts. When the findings of fact of the Ombudsman are supported by substantial evidence, it should be considered as conclusive.( Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 118533, October 4, 1995, 248 SCRA 700, 715). This Court recognizes the expertise and independence of the Ombudsman and will avoid interfering with its findings absent a finding of grave abuse of discretion.( See Jao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 104604 & 111223, October 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 35, 42 and Yabut v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 111304, June 17, 1994, 233 SCRA 310, 314.) Hence, being supported by substantial evidence, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the Ombudsman which are affirmed by the CA. The general rule is that factual findings of the CA are not reviewable by this Court, we find that Olaivars case falls in one of the recognized exceptions laid down in jurisprudence since the CAs findings regarding his liability are premised on the supposed absence of evidence but contradicted by the evidence on record.( See Hyatt Elevators and Escalators Corporation v. Cathedral Heights Building Complex Association, Inc., G.R. No. 173881, December 1, 2010, 636 SCRA 401, 405-406.) (Gemma P. Cabalit vs. Commission on Audit-Region VII, G.R. No. 180236, Filadelfo S. Apit vs. Commission on Audit (COA) Legal and Adjudication, Region VII, G.R. No. 180341; LEONARDO G. OLAIVAR VS. HON. PRIMO C. MIRO ET AL., G.R. NO. 180342, JANUARY 17, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
As a general rule, in petitions for review, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing questions of law which involves no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; it is not its function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. (Heirs of Marcelino Cabal v. Cabal, G.R. No. 153625, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 301, 312, citing Hanopol v. Shoemart, Incorporated, G.R. Nos. 137774 & 148185, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 439, 447; St. Michaels Institute v. Santos, G.R. No. 145280, December 4, 2001, 371 SCRA 383, 396; Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158922, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 358, 364.) x x x x Accordingly, findings of fact of the appellate court affirming those of the trial court are generally conclusive on this Court.

Nonetheless, jurisprudence has recognized certain exceptions to the general rule that findings of the fact by the Court of Appeals are not reviewable by the Supreme Court. One such exception is when such findings are not sustained by the evidence. Sarmiento v. Yu, G.R. No. 141431, August 3, 2006, 497 SCRA 513, 517. Another is when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts or overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. (Estate of Edward Miller Grimm v. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C. Parsons, G.R. No. 159810, October 9, 2006, 504 SCRA 67, 75-76, citing Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156360, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 220, 229.) (HEIRS OF MARGARITO PABAUS VS. HEIRS OF AMANDA YUTIAMCO, G.R. NO. 164356, JULY 27, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: THE APPELLATE COURT DOCKET AND OTHER LAWFUL FEES MUST BE PAID WITHIN THE PERIOD FOR TAKING AN APPEAL
The rule that appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid within the period for taking an appeal is stated in Section 4, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended:
SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal. Likewise, Section 3, Rule 41, of the same Rules state: SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal, x x x. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. x x x xxxx It bears stressing that payment of docket and other fees within this period is mandatory for the perfection of the appeal. Otherwise, the right to appeal is lost. This is so because a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action only upon the payment of the correct amount of docket fees regardless of the actual date of filing of the case in court. The payment of appellate docket fees is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement, without which the decision or final order appealed from becomes final and executory as if no appeal was filed.( Caspe v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142535, June 15, 2006, 490 SCRA 588, 591.)

The Supreme Court held in one case that the CA correctly dismissed the appeal where the docket fees were not paid in full within the prescribed period of fifteen (15) days but were paid forty-one (41) days late due to inadvertence, oversight, and pressure of work. (Guevarra v. Court of Appeals, No. L-43714, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 32. ) In another case, we ruled that no appeal was perfected where half of the appellate docket fee was paid within the prescribed period, while the other half was tendered after the period within which payment should have been made.( Lee v. Republic, No. L-15027, January 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 65, 67.
Evidently, where the appellate docket fee is not paid in full within the reglementary period, the decision of the trial court becomes final and no longer susceptible to an appeal. For once a decision becomes final, the appellate court is without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. (Province of Camarines Sur v. Heirs of Agustin Pato, G.R. No. 151084, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 644, 652, citing M.A. Santander Construction, Inc. v. Villanueva, 484 Phil. 500, 505 (2004).

Moreover, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the CA, on its own motion or that of the appellee, may dismiss the appeal on the ground that appellant failed to pay the docket and other lawful fees. (See Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137761, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 208, 210.) Section 1(c), Rule 50 of the Rules provides that:
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds: xxxx

(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in Section 4 of Rule 41; xxxx

Pertinently, this Courts ruling in Cu-Unjieng v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 139596, January 24, 2006, 479 SCRA 594, 603-604.) is instructive:
With the reality obtaining in this case that payment of the appellate docket fees was belatedly made four (4) months after the lapse of the period for appeal, it appears clear to us that the CA did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioners appeal except to order its dismissal, as it rightfully did. Thus, the September 1, 1998 decision of the RTC has passed to the realm of finality and became executory by operation of law. (Underscoring ours.) The right to appeal is not a natural right. It is also not part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.

With regard to petitioners plea for a liberal treatment of the rules in order to promote substantial justice, the Supreme Court finds the same to be without merit. It is true that the rules may be relaxed for persuasive and weighty reasons to relieve a litigant from an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedures. (Navarro v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No. 138031, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 439, 446.) However, it must be stressed that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed. (Meatmasters International Corporation v. Lelis Integrated Development Corporation, G.R. No. 163022, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 626, 633, citing Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, supra note 20 at 214.) In this case, petitioner has not shown any reason such as fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar supervening casualty which should justify the relaxation of the rules.(See Yambao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140894, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 141, 147) The explanation advanced by petitioners counsel that the failure to pay the appellate docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period was due to his extremely heavy workload and by excusable inadvertence does not convince us (D.M. WENCESLAO AND ASSOCIATES, INC. VS. CITY OF PARANAQUE ET AL., G.R. NO. 170728, AUGUST 31, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

IT IS A WELL-SETTLED RULE THAT A PARTY WHO DELIBERATELY ADOPTS A CERTAIN THEORY UPON WHICH THE CASE WAS DECIDED BY THE LOWER COURT WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO CHANGE [IT] ON APPEAL.
It is a well-settled rule that a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case was decided by the lower court will not be permitted to change [it] on appeal.( Pasco v. Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 165501, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA 514, 523.) Petitioner is bound by the statements and stipulations he made while the case was being heard in the lower courts.( Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres v. Heirs of Manuel

Abella, G.R. No. 143510, November 23, 2005, 476 SCRA 1, 8.) In Manila Electric Company v. Benamira,( 501 Phil. 621 (2005).we said: [I]t is a fundamental rule of procedure that higher courts are precluded from entertaining matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below, but ventilated for the first time only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal. The individual respondents are bound by their submissions that AFSISI is their employer and they should not be permitted to change their theory. Such a change of theory cannot be tolerated on appeal, not due to the strict application of procedural rules but as a matter of fairness. A change of theory on appeal is objectionable because it is contrary to the rules of fair play, justice and due process. (Id. at 638.) (RODOLFO MORLA VS. CORAZON NISPEROS BELMONTE ET AL., G.R. NO. 171146, DECEMBER 7, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:)

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: RIGHT TO APPEAL

The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules, failing in which the right to appeal is lost. (Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126620, April 17, 2002, 381 SCRA 185, 197.) (HEIRS OF AGAPATIO T. OLARTE AND ANGELA A. OLARTE ET AL. VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL., G.R. NO. 177995, JUNE 15, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PRO FORMA

The Supreme Court has held that mere reiteration of issues already passed upon by the court does not automatically make a motion for reconsideration pro forma. What is essential is compliance with the requisites of the Rules. Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the motion was so held because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration, or (2) it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the evidence, or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or (4) it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law, or (5) the adverse party was not given notice thereof. (FERNANDO V. GONZALES VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 192856, MARCH 8, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT

It is a fundamental legal principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the

highest court of the land. The only exceptions to the general rule on finality of judgments are the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable (Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128967, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 586, 599. x x x Indeed, litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, even at the risk of occasional errors (Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo, G.R. No. 136228, January 30, 2001 cited in LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SEVERINO LISTANA, G.R. NO. 168105, JULY 27, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS

Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.( Associated Bank v. Pronstroller, G.R. No. 148444, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 113, 133, citing Romero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142406, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 483, 492.) The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. Id., citing Romero v. Court of Appeals, id. at 492-493 and Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 146262, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 173, 186. Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any subsequent transaction affecting the land involved would have to be subject to the outcome of the litigation. (Vicente v. Avera, G.R. No. 169970, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 634, 643.)
Petitioner being a mere transferee at the time the decision of the RTC of Pasig in Civil Case No. 35305 had become final and executory on December 6, 1988, it is bound by the said judgment which ordered the heirs of Emilio Gregorio to convey Lots 1, 2, 3 & 4, Psu-204875 in favor of private respondent and Trinidad.

It is to be noted that the notation of the lis pendens on the back of the owners duplicate is not mentioned for the purpose of constituting a constructive notice because usually such owners duplicate certificate is presented for the purpose of the annotation later, and sometimes not at all

until [it is] ordered by the court. (A. H. Noblejas and E. H. Noblejas, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS, 2007 Ed., pp. 436-437.) Strictly speaking, the lis pendens annotation is not to be referred to as a part of the doctrine of notice; the purchaser pendente lite is affected, not by notice, but because the law does not allow litigating parties to give to others, pending the litigation, rights to the property in dispute so as to prejudice the opposite party. The doctrine rests upon public policy, not notice. (Id. at 437, citing 2 Bouviers Law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia, p. 2033, SCRA Annotation on Civil Law, the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree, 1983 Ed., pp. 118-119 quoted in Tirado v. Sevilla, G.R. No. 84201, August 3, 1990, 188 SCRA 321, 326-327.) Thus we have held that one who buys land where there is a pending notice of lis pendens cannot invoke the right of a purchaser in good faith; neither can he have acquired better rights than those of his predecessor in interest. (Yu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109078, December 25, 1995, 251 SCRA 509, 513514, citing Constantino v. Espiritu, No. L-23268, June 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 557, 563 and Tanchoco v. Aquino, No. L-30670, September 15, 1987, 154 SCRA 1, 15; see Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, No. L-34404, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 207, 232.) (TOP MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS CORPORATION VS. LUIS FAJARDO & THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PINAS CITY, G.R. NO. 150462, JUNE 15, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING

There is forum shopping when the following elements are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions[;] (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts[;] and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars[,] such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration; said requisites [are] also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens.( Mondragon Leisure and Resorts Corporation v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 154187, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 585, 590, citing Saura v. Saura, Jr., 372 Phil. 337, 349 (1999). The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment, through means other than by appeal or certiorari. (Melo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123686, November 16, 1999, 318 SCRA 94, 100; Ligon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127683, August 7, 1998, 294 SCRA 73, 88, citing Washington Distillers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118151, August 22, 1996, 260 SCRA 821, 835.) With respect to identity of cause of action, a cause of action is defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. This Court has laid down the test in determining

whether or not the causes of action in the first and second cases are identical, to wit: would the same evidence support and establish both the present and former cause of action? If so, the former recovery is a bar; if otherwise, it does not stand in the way of the former action. (Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163433, August 22, 2011, 655 SCRA 707, 714, citing Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) v. Group Management Corporation (GMC), G.R. Nos. 167000 & 169971, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 279, 313.) Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court requires every litigant to notify the court of the filing or pendency of a complaint involving the same or similar action or claim within five days of learning of that fact. While both Civil Case Nos. B-6242 and B-7110 were raffled to the same court, the RTC of Bian, Laguna, Branch 25, respondent did not report the filing of Civil Case No. B-7110 in the proceedings of Civil Case No. 6242. This fact clearly established respondents furtive intent to conceal the filing of Civil Case No. B7110 for the purpose of securing a favorable judgment. For this reason, Civil Case No. 6242 was correctly dismissed with prejudice. (Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc., G.R. No. 190231, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 691, 696-697.) (Emphasis supplied.)
Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff is required under oath to certify, among others, his undertaking to report to the court the fact of filing of a similar case, failing which shall be cause for the dismissal of the case, to wit: (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

The totality of circumstances considered, plaintiffs forum shopping committed in multifarious fashion cannot but be willful and deliberate. Hence, consistent with established rule and jurisprudence, the same is punishable by and results in the summary dismissal of the actions filed. Both Civil Case No. 03-045 and Civil Case No.06-1032 are therefore dismissed with prejudice. x x x(Id. at 527-528.) (Emphasis supplied.) The CA concurred with the RTC that petitioners act of forum shopping was deliberate and malicious considering that it knowingly filed Civil Case No. 06-1032 despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 03-045. The appellate court said that petitioner unscrupulously took advantage of the availability of competent tribunals and tried its luck in different fora for a favorable result.
We concur with the CAs finding that a decision in either case will amount to res judicata in the other considering that both courts were called upon to rule on the same issue of whether the REM was falsified. Indeed, the possibility of conflicting rulings or decisions rendered by different courts on such issue militates against petitioners posture that it never intended to conceal the subsequent filing of Civil Case No. 06-1032.

Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.( Spouses Marasigan v. Chevron Phils., Inc., G.R. No.

184015, February 8, 2012, p. 12, citing Benedicto v. Lacson, G.R. No. 141508, May 5, 2010, 620 SCRA 82, 98.) Litis pendentia is a Latin term, which literally means a pending suit and is variously referred to in some decisions as lis pendens and auter action pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, it refers to the situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits. (Id., citing Dotmatrix Trading v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 155622, October 26, 2009, 604 SCRA 431, 436.
Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.(Id.)

What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues. (Municipality of Taguig v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142619, September 13, 2005, 469 SCRA 588, 595, citing First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115849, January 24, 1996, 252 SCRA 259, 289 and Borromeo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73592, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 75, 84.) (GOOD COMPANY, INC. VS. ASIA UNITED BANK ET AL., G.R. NO. 195546, MARCH 14, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: VERIFICATION OF A PLEADING IS ONLY A FORMAL REQUIREMENT. IT IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL
It is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading, and non-compliance therewith does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served (MEDISERV, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. G.R. NO. 161368, APRIL 5, 2010, FIRST DIVISION, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: -EVERY ACTION MUST BE PROSECUTED OR DEFENDED IN THE NAME OF THE REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party

who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. (RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2). A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action (ALLAN C. GO, VS. MORTIMER F. CORDERO, G.R. NO. 164703, MAY 4, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION

The rule on joinder of actions under Section 5, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that the joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules. Section 6 of Rule 2 explicitly provides that misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action (ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF SAN FERNANDO PAMPANGA VS. FERNANDO SORIANO JR., ET AL., G.R. NO. 153829, AUGUST 17, 2011,VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR TIME IS CONSIDERED A SUBMISSION TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT:
A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. (United Coconut Planters Bank v. Ongpin, G.R. No. 146593, October 26, 2001, 368 SCRA 464, 470). In this case, however, although the Motion to Dismiss filed specifically stated as one (1) of the grounds the lack of "personal jurisdiction," it must be noted that defendant had earlier filed a Motion for Time to file an appropriate responsive pleading even beyond the time provided in the summons by publication. Such motion did not state that it was a conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of summons, but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the summons by publication issued by the court and praying for additional time to file a responsive pleading. Consequently, defendant having acknowledged the summons by publication and also having invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure affirmative relief in his motion for additional time, he effectively submitted voluntarily to the trial courts jurisdiction. He is now estopped from asserting otherwise, even before this Court. (ALLAN C. GO, VS. MORTIMER F. CORDERO, G.R. NO. 164703, MAY 4, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLLARAMA, JR.: MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASE

In Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Orient Commercial Banking Corporation, the Supreme Court held that with the final settlement of the claims of petitioner against herein respondents, the issues raised in the present petition regarding the propriety of the issuance of writ of attachment by the trial court and the grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed by the appellate court in reversing the orders of the trial court, have now become moot and academic. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value (See Lacson v. MJ Lacson Development Company, Inc., G.R. No. 168840, December 8, 2010, p. 10, citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA 510, 522-523). x x x In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition (Chuidian v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 156383 & 160723, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 327 cited in BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS VS. ORIENT COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 148483, JUNE 29, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: VERIFICATION OF A PLEADING IS ONLY A FORMAL REQUIREMENT. IT IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL
It is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading, and non-compliance therewith does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served (MEDISERV, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. G.R. NO. 161368, APRIL 5, 2010, FIRST DIVISION, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: CAUSE OF ACTION

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another (Section 2, Rule 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended). A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and whatever law it arises; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff. If any of these elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action (Heirs of Loreto C. Maramag v. Maramag, G.R. No. 181132, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 774, 784 and Bank of America NT & SA v. Court of

Appeals cited in DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILS. VS. HON. SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO & CRISTINA TRINIDAD ZARATE ROMERO, G.R. NO. 163827, AUGUST 17, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: POWER AND JURISDICTION OF COA

The COA, under the Constitution, is empowered to examine and audit the use of funds by an agency of the national government on a post-audit basis. For this purpose, the Constitution has provided that the COA shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties. As such, CDAs decisions regarding procurement of equipment for its own use, including computers and its accessories, is subject to the COAs auditing rules and regulations for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant expenditures. Necessarily, CDAs preferences regarding brand of its equipment have to conform to the criteria set by the COA rules on what is reasonable price for the items purchased. We stress anew that it is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. (Sanchez v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 127545, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 471, 489, citing Cuerdo v. Commission on Audit, No. L-84592, October 27, 1988, 166 SCRA 657, 661 further citing Tagum Doctors Enterprises v. Apsay, No. L-81188, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 154, 155-156.) Findings of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence, (Laysa v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 128134, October 18, 2000, 343 SCRA 520, 526.) and the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion (CANDELARIO L. VERSOZA, JR. VS. GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE ET AL., G.R. NO. 157838, FEBRUARY 7, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR TIME IS CONSIDERED A SUBMISSION TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. (United Coconut Planters Bank v. Ongpin, G.R. No. 146593, October 26, 2001, 368 SCRA 464, 470). In this case, however, although the Motion to Dismiss filed specifically stated as one (1) of the grounds the lack of "personal jurisdiction," it must be noted that defendant had earlier filed a Motion for Time to file an appropriate responsive pleading even beyond the time provided in the summons by publication. Such motion did not state that it was a

conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of summons, but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the summons by publication issued by the court and praying for additional time to file a responsive pleading. Consequently, defendant having acknowledged the summons by publication and also having invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure affirmative relief in his motion for additional time, he effectively submitted voluntarily to the trial courts jurisdiction. He is now estopped from asserting otherwise, even before this Court. (ALLAN C. GO, VS. MORTIMER F. CORDERO, G.R. NO. 164703, MAY 4, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: THE EXCLUSION OF THE TERM DAMAGES OF WHATEVER KIND IN DETERMINING THE JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT
THE EXCLUSION OF THE TERM DAMAGES OF WHATEVER KIND IN DETERMINING THE JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT UNDER SECTION 19 (8) AND SECTION 33 (1) OF B.P. BLG. 129, AS AMENDED BY R.A. NO. 7691, APPLIES TO CASES WHERE THE DAMAGES ARE MERELY INCIDENTAL TO OR A CONSEQUENCE OF THE MAIN CAUSE OF ACTION. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court (Administrative Circular No. 09-94) (IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDOSANTE vs. HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, G.R. NO. 173915, FEBRUARY 22, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: SUSPENSION AND RELAXATION OF THE RULES OF COURT:
Procedural rules may be relaxed for persuasive reasons to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. More so, when to allow the assailed decision to go unchecked would set a precedent that will sanction a violation of substantive law (PHIL. ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, ET AL. VS. JOSEPH JUDE CARATES, ET AL. G.R. NO. 181274, JUNE 23, 2010, THIRD DIVISION, VILLARAMA, JR. J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: Findings of quasi-judicial agencies

IT IS THE GENERAL POLICY OF THE COURT TO SUSTAIN THE DECISIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES, ESPECIALLY ONE WHICH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY-CREATED, NOT ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BUT ALSO FOR THEIR PRESUMED EXPERTISE IN THE LAWS THEY ARE ENTRUSTED TO ENFORCE (Sanchez v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 127545, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 471, 489, citing Cuerdo v. Commission on Audit, No. L-84592, October 27, 1988, 166 SCRA 657, 661 further citing Tagum Doctors

Enterprises v. Apsay, No. L-81188, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 154, 155-156.) Findings of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence, (Laysa v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 128134, October 18, 2000, 343 SCRA 520, 526) and the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion (Sanchez v. Commission on Audit, supra note 14.) x x x There being no grave abuse of discretion in the findings and conclusions of the COA in this case, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from these long-settled rules (CANDELARIO L. VERSOZA VS. GUILLERMO S. CARAGUE, G.R. NO. 157838, FEBRUARY 7, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY LAW

JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY LAW BASED ON THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs causes of action (IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDOSANTE VS. HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, G.R. NO. 173915, FEBRUARY 22, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: FINDINGS OF QUASIJUDICIAL AGENCIES

IT IS THE GENERAL POLICY OF THE COURT TO SUSTAIN THE DECISIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES, ESPECIALLY ONE WHICH IS CONSTITUTIONALLYCREATED, NOT ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BUT ALSO FOR THEIR PRESUMED EXPERTISE IN THE LAWS THEY ARE ENTRUSTED TO ENFORCE (Sanchez v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 127545, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 471, 489, citing Cuerdo v. Commission on Audit, No. L-84592, October 27, 1988, 166 SCRA 657, 661 further citing Tagum Doctors Enterprises v. Apsay, No. L-81188, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 154, 155-156.) Findings of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence, ( Laysa v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 128134, October 18, 2000, 343 SCRA 520, 526) and the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion (Sanchez v. Commission on Audit, supra note 14.) x x x x There being no grave abuse of discretion in the findings and conclusions of the COA in this case, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from these long-settled rules. (CANDELARIO L. VERSOZA VS. GUILLERMO S. CARAGUE, G.R. NO. 157838, FEBRUARY 7, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN ARE CONCLUSIVE UPON THE SUPREME COURT

Well-entrenched is the rule that factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court except where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts and the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. (Ong v. People, G.R. No. 176546, September 25, 2009, 601 SCRA 47, 53, citing Suller v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 153686, July 22, 2003, 407 SCRA 201, 208.) (VIRGINIA M. GUADINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILS., G.R. NO. 164891, JUNE 6, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.:)