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The methodology that I have presented and the proposition of aims for this study have raised some

key issues that need further consideration. In the exploration of masculinity and heterosexuality, I have constructed a system that enforces potential binary opposites: Masculine/feminine, male/female, and heterosexual/homosexual. Because these binaries are the product of a dominant language, and because they are hierarchical, they conflict with my interrogation of masculinity; how can I as a white, heterosexual male use this type of language structure to articulate my own position? This question is important also, because such binaries operate on a metaphysical level in that they are reductive to a sense of origin, for example, it is natural to be heterosexual. In addition to this, the mapping of masculinity in performance has an uncomfortable alignment with a historical account of masculinity in performances. Such terms masquerade my own agenda and privileged position with objectivity (Foucault, 1998). However, these binaries have been deliberately presented in this study, so this form can be used against itself. This is a Post-structuralist approach to critical analysis and relies on the fluidity of the signifier to the signified. Such an approach is articulated by Derrida. In addition to this, rather than presenting a history of masculinity in performance, I instead wish to propose a genealogy of masculinity as proposed by Foucault and Nietzsche. The concepts of structure and meaning bed down deep into the soil of ordinary language, creating a strong emphasis on the relationships between signifier and signified. Such is so that what defines a sign is its relationship to other signs. This centralises the system and gives it a fixed origin and a presence, which comes in the form of essence, existence, substance, subject and truth (Derrida, 2005: 351). This structure presents concepts as homogenous and totalizing, in that all meaning can be rendered down to the naturalized centre (365). Anything conceived outside of this binary is unthinkable and scandalous (354). Within the context of this study, anything that falls outside of the masculine/feminine binary fails to be categorised and can be deemed deviant. This emphasis on binaries creates a tradition of episteme where meaning is derived from the source, the original principle. There is a sense then that knowledge, in this respect, comes from nowhere, it is engineered and created from nothing (362). Post-structuralism is the collapse of these binaries, but it is not the opposition to them. Instead, it searches for and uses these binaries against the centralising origin as a way to highlight the ambiguity within the argument itself. This critical approach to thought is emphasized by Derridas articulation of diffrance (Derrida, 1973). Diffrance is what makes movement of signification possible (Derrida, 1973:129). It is the combination of two French verbs: to differ from and to defer, in this respect it indicates a distinction of identity and a delay or interval of spacing and as such, it appears within the articulation of meaning between signifier and signified (130). It is the play: on the centralised origins of dominant language, between sign and signifier, and absence and presence (160). The first verb, allows Derridas position to be articulated as Poststructuralist. It is clear that diffrance is not in opposition to structuralist articulations of signs and signifiers. It recognises that a signified is so because it is

different from another signified. However this concept is expanded further with the spatial and temporalising attributes of the second verb. The sign of the signified is only temporary because once the signified is present the sign disappears. In this respect there is a simultaneous absence and presence within the signifier and signified the sign only exists in the absence of the signified and thus represents the thing itself, whilst not actually being it (Derrida, 1973:136 - 138). To defer and difference, is taken further when space is considered in the form of a chain. If the signified is never present in itself, in that the signified cannot be its own sign, [e]very concept is necessarily and essentially inscribed in a chain or system, within which it refers to another, and to other concepts, by the systematic play of differences (140). I interpret this reading as inferring that play in this chain has the potential at displacing concepts. Within the context of this study, diffrance has the potential to disrupt the origin, sign and signification of masculinity. It plays between the chain of signification and highlights the ambiguities of male, maleness, and masculinity. It questions the text employed to articulate these signs and underscores everything that is absent (and thus present) within its signification. However there is a problem with diffrance, the word is as such not a word, but rather the combination of two French terms. In being not a word also means that it is not a concept and therefore it does not exist, but it does so within the movement of binary oppositions. In this respect whilst diffrance breaks down binary oppositions by underscoring ambiguities, paradoxically, the moment we speak about it is the moment it disappears (Derrida, 1973:140). Diffrance is a trace (142). To play within the binary of absence and presence further, diffrance is present, and has always been present, even before it was ever articulated (as noted by Derrida). It can be traced within the work of other philosophers and academics. To continue with sign and signification, the term performative has been used to explore the relational phenomena of saying and doing. There are many forms of sentence structure, but Austin identifies constative utterances as descriptions, or truth/fact statements (although not exclusively) (Austin, 1976). He also notes that there are also statements that do not fall into this category, but do masquerade as it, he refers to these as performative utterances. These utterances paradoxically do not describe or report and the uttering of the sentence is, or is part of, the doing of an action, which again would normally be described as, or as just, saying something (5). The uttering of these words is usually a, or is the, leading incident in the performance of the act (8). Examples include I name this ship... or I bet you it will rain tomorrow, without the performative utterance, the actions do not happen. The utterance of these examples is the uttering of doing there is now a movement between the binary of doing and speaking as it can only operate in the immediate presence. Unlike constative utterances, it cannot be true or false (7). It does not operate within origins and because it has to be spoken by the subject and that moment, the performative, as with diffrance, disappears when spoken about. There are conditions of the performative, if I were to name a ship, I would have to be the designated person with that authority, or if I was to say I promise, then there would have to be some sense of sincerity in that statement. If I lack

authority then the act does not happen, if I lack sincerity then the act may still happen, but the intent is void, however in both cases the performative utterance is not false, it still exists (Austin, 1976:15). Whilst Austins (1976) focus is on linguistics, Post-structuralists have appropriated this term in exploration of other types of text. In Critically Queer (Butler, 1993), Butler rearticulates her position on the performativity of sex and gender, which was first explored by her in Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (Butler, 1990). In the latter, an argument is set up noting that the body is always a cultural sign, and whilst it sets up the limits to imaginary meanings, it is never free of imaginary construction (1990:96). Later, this is framed around the drag artist, which Butler notes that the performance of drag plays upon the distinction between the anatomy of the performer and the gender that is being performed (187). However in Critically Queer (1993) Butler recognises that there has been a misinterpretation of what readers understand by her definition of gender performativity. She articulates, as she does in Gender Trouble, that drag is not performative because of its mimesis of gender, gender is not a choice, or a role, or a construction that one puts on like a coat. Gender is performative insofar as it is the effect of a regulatory regime of gender differences in which genders are dived and hierarchized under constraint (21). The organisational structure of the heterosexual matrix requires the constant repetition of gender norms, this is gender performativity, not the radical adoption of gender fabrication. In this respect I am heterosexual, male and masculine, because of the acts that I am required to repeat. Austins (1976) and Butlers (1990 and 1993) definitions of performativity are not different as [g]ender norms operate by requiring the embodiment of certain ideals of femininity and masculinity, ones which are always related to the idealization of the heterosexual bond (Butler, 1993:22). The initiatory performative Its a girl! carries with it the eventual I pronounce you man and wife. However the similarities between the two performatives do not stop here, Butler (1993) also notes that the repetition of gender performatives as an assignment do not always translate, this, as with Austin (1976) does not mean that the performative of gender does not exist, rather that it is an unhappy performative (Austin, 1976: 16). In this case gender cannot be a constative utterance, it cannot be a true or false statement, and it has no central origin. It only appears to have these qualities because of the language used to enforce it. If the inner truth of gender is a fabrication and if a true gender is a fantasy instituted and inscribed on the surface of bodies, then it seems that genders cannot be true or false, but are the truth effects of a discourse of primary and stable identity (Butler, 1990:186) There is then a strong correlation between language and the body within a Post-structuralist framework, and it is this articulation that provides the primary critical lens for my study. In her chapter The Wedding between the Body and Language (2000) Irigaray constructs a number of binaries in order to deconstruct the hierarchical relationship between the abstract language and the object body in male philosophical discourse on carnality. There are three characteristics of the heterosexual male 1. He is always interested in the relationship between subject and object, 2. These relationships are always experienced through instruments such as touch, sight and language, 3. He is only interested in the Masculine-I and the

feminine Other (17). In a Post-structuralist fashion, these three hierarchical binaries are systematically set up and then deconstructed in order to highlight that the language used by the male in discussing carnality evokes power, dominance, control and ownership (20). She uses the three male philosophical arguments against the philosophers that articulated them. In this respect, Irigaray, as with Derrida in Diffrance (1973), cannot oppose their positions, as this undermines her deconstruction of their binaries by creating her own binary, but rather underscores the ambiguities of their own arguments. Using Merleau-Pontys The Phenomenology of Perception Irigaray simultaneously makes visible his reliance on Subject/Object and Consciousness/Body relationships as well rearticulating the Subject/Object binary. Merleau-Ponty refers to being seen as object, but feeling as subject. The attraction of carnality is the capturing of the object of desires subjective consciousness. Here the body is to be looked at, and is object, whilst the subject is knowing. Irigaray, however takes away the power of looking, by understanding herself as both object and subject, rather than just subject and made object: I belong to a gender, my body represents an objectivity for me. Belonging to a gender allows me to realize, in me, for me and equally towards other a dialect between subjectivity and objectivity which escapes the dichotomy between subject and object (Irigaray, 2000: 21). Here she is taking away the male ability to objectify, to own and control, by identifying that she is already in her own dialogic activity between subjectivity/objectivity. She is also breaking down the active masculine subject and the passive feminine object binary. The recognition of masculine-I as subject and the action as gazing as a tool for owning object is also underscored. Through the actions of gazing, the male fails to see anything but him, he only experiences his subjectivity. Irigaray offers a different term, perception, which relies on perceiving the world around us that we learn to perceive each other and what exists between us. Perception is the recognition of life, freedom and difference (Irigaray, 2000: 23). This recognition of difference through perception creates an intersubjective relationship between bodies as consciousness, and does not focus on the objects of desire. Finally, to encourage inter-subjectivity the instruments of experience are deconstructed. Rather than touching, gazing, and grasping the object, caressing is offered. Caressing is a gesture which is and awakening for both two and communal, it is an awakening of inter-subjectivity. It is not active or passive, but is rather an awakening of perception which is simultaneously acts, intentions and emotions. This encouragement of perception offers an awareness of difference, which in turn offers awareness to the masquerade of language (26). The masquerading of language can also be demonstrated within the characteristics of the historian who uses objectivity to mask demagogy. (Foucault, 1998: 383). There are three attributes to history, which allow it to be reductive to essence it attempts to capture an exact essence, which promotes the birth of something as its most pure and it uses objectivity in its search for truth. These three characteristics can be seen as the products of power particularly as truth and origin rely on language, which is enforced by the ruling class (369). This becomes more problematic as, just as Irigaray (2000) notes, the dominant class only see their

own history through their own language. This causes my study some serious problems, how can I explore and map masculinity, a term which is too readily applied to my body because it embodies certain of masculinity (Butler, 1993: 22), using the language that is dominated by white heroic masculinity? Foucault offers forward an alternative to history, which he terms, through Nietzsche, genealogy (Foucault, 1998). Genealogy uses two techniques descent and emergence (Foucault, 1998: 373). Descent often involves race and social type, but it does not aim to identify generic qualifying characteristics of an individual. Rather descent aims to seek subtle and singular marks that form a network around the individual (374). This is far from categorisation, like Irigaray (2000) and Derrida (1973), it identifies small differences in traits of the specific subject. Rather than focussing on a generic masculinity, I aim to use descent, to identify the multiplicity of masculinities and the traits that exhibit in performance. In this respect, like the genealogist, I need find masculinities within multiple spaces and not just in the lineage of time and space. In this respect rather than focussing on a chronology of masculine performances, in which I may start with Vito Acconci and end with Andr Stitt, I aim to recount the heterogeneous practices of masculinity within their isolated scenes. In this respect I am looking for masculine practices not in the archive of institutions, but in subjective spaces, in performances, in letters and in actions (Foucault, 1998: 369 370). Descent attaches itself to the body, which gives rise to feelings, desires and errors, ultimately it exposes a body which is imprinted by history. In addition to masculinities, which appear, I also need to discuss instances of masculinity, when they are absent (Foucault, 1998: 372). Genealogy uses descent to identify the fragments of the concept that is being explored. The artists that I want to find are those which do not necessarily deliberately explore masculinity in their practice. If descent is used by genealogists to explore the multiplicity of, for example, masculinities, then emergence focuses on the force of these masculinities. Force imposes limits, inflicts torments and mortifications; it masks these actions as a higher morality and, in exchange, regains its strength (Foucault, 1998: 377). This focus is not meant to imply a mapping of strength versus weak, a binary which is inappropriate to this study. Instead it is interested in the space that operates between forces. When Halberstam (1998) discusses alternative and heroic masculinities, emergence is interested in the force between them. What is the result of these forces, how have they emerged and how have they been enforced. Genealogy [...] seeks to reestablish the various systems of subjection: not the anticipatory power of meaning, but the hazardous play of dominations (Foucault, 1998: 376). It aims to identify the dominant rewritings of history. Foucault (1998) offers two warnings though. Genealogy does not aim to prove that the past is still very much present. It cannot fix the past and it certainly does not map the future (374). Genealogy is used to map the power at play within a given concept. It aims to uncover the multiplicity of events, rather than the historical reliance upon objectivity and the search of origin. It recognises the privileges of specific bodies, particularly the genealogists own.

His second warning is very much a Post-structuralist one, genealogy is not opposed to history. Instead it uses it against itself in order to create an effective history (Foucault, 1998: 381). Rather than taken an objective and distanced approach, like the historian, effective history shortens its vision to the things nearest to it the body, the nervous system, nutrition, digestion and energies [...] it looks from above and descends to seize the various perspectives, to disclose dispersions and differences [...] (381-382). The critical lens of Post-structuralism offers me the ability to use heroic masculinity and the binaries against itself. I can do this both in practice and in writing. Practice is particularly important within this concept as the performativity of my body becomes a tool to unpack the organisational structure of heterosexuality. I hope it will allow me the ability to underscore the ambiguities and play that operates within the binaries that masculinity creates. In addition to this it encourages a mapping of masculinity outside of that, which is dominant and it allows recognition of my own body, within the work. Ultimately I hope that by using this lens, I can underscore the multiplicity of masculinities, and identify how mine operates within the spaces that dominant