G.R. No.

L-12105

January 30, 1960

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., executorappellee, vs. MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA BOHANAN, oppositors-appellants. Jose D. Cortes for appellants. Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita for appellee. LABRADOR, J.: Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Ramon San Jose, presiding, dismissing the objections filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and Edward Bohanan to the project of partition submitted by the executor and approving the said project. On April 24, 195 0, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding, admitted to probate a last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on April 23, 1944 in Manila. In the said order, the court made the following findings: According to the evidence of the opponents the testator was born in Nebraska and therefore a citizen of that state, or at least a citizen of California where some of his properties are located. This contention in untenable. Notwithstanding the long residence of the decedent in the Philippines, his stay here was merely temporary, and he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States and of the state of his pertinent residence to spend the rest of his days in that state. His permanent residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that state. Nobody can choose his domicile or permanent residence for him. That is his exclusive personal right. Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and testament, Exhibit A, is fully in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate. Accordingly, the Philippine Trust Company, named as the executor of the will, is hereby appointed to such executor and upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P10,000.00, let letters testamentary be issued and after taking the prescribed oath, it may enter upon the execution and performance of its trust. (pp. 26-27, R.O.A.). It does not appear that the order granting probate was ever questions on appeal. The executor filed a project of partition dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance with the provisions of the will, the following adjudications: (1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of testator's grandson Edward George Bohanan, which consists of several mining companies; (2) the other half of the residuary estate to the testator's brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist in the same amount of cash and of shares of mining stock similar to

those given to testator's grandson; (3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly installments; (4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000; It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate (after deducting administration expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of several mining companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000. The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them. The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be entitled to received. The will has not given her any share in the estate left by the testator. It is argued that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce secured by the testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said divorce should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction, citing the case of Querubin vs. Querubin, 87 Phil., 124, 47 Off. Gaz., (Sup, 12) 315, Cousins Hiz vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 852, Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 and Gorayeb vs. Hashim, 50 Phil., 22. The court below refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife. Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides: Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his or her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testator's debts. Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, to a share in the testator's estafa had already been passed upon adversely against her in an order dated June 19, 1955, (pp. 155-159, Vol II Records, Court of First Instance), which had become final, as Magdalena C. Bohanan does not appear to have appealed therefrom to question its validity. On December 16, 1953, the said former wife filed a motion to withdraw the sum of P20,000 from the funds of the estate, chargeable against her share in the conjugal property, (See pp. 294-297, Vol. I, Record, Court of First Instance), and the court in its said error found that there exists no community property owned by the decedent and his former wife at the time the decree of divorce was issued. As already and Magdalena C. Bohanan may no longer question the fact contained therein, i.e. that there was no community property acquired by the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan during their converture. Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had already found that there was no conjugal

property between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the estate left by the testator. The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary Lydia, who had received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given their shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws of the forum, should be two-thirds of the estate left by the testator. Is the failure old the testator to give his children two-thirds of the estate left by him at the time of his death, in accordance with the laws of the forum valid? The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in question. Says the law on this point: Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country in which it is found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.) In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and his permanent residence. (See Decision dated April 24, 1950, supra). So the question at issue is whether the estementary dispositions, especially hose for the children which are short of the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will (Sec. 9905, Complied Nevada Laws of 1925, supra). It does not appear that at time of the hearing of the project of partition, the above-quoted provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the executor's duly to do. The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form and manner provided for by our Rules, which are as follows: SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy tested by the officer having the legal custody of he record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. . . . (Rule 123). We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. was introduced in evidence by appellant's (herein) counsel as Exhibits "2" (See pp. 77-79, VOL. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said laws presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (se Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1). In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold

that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition. As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants. Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo and Endencia, JJ., concur. Barrera, J., concurs in the result.

March 17, 1930 G.R. No. L-32636 In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. A.W. FLUEMER, petitionerappellant, vs. ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee. C.A. Sobral for appellant. Harvey & O Brien and Gibbs & McDonough for appellee. , J.: EDWARD RANDOLPH HIX. A.W. FLUEMER vs. ANNIE COUSHING HIX Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila EN BANC G.R. No. L-32636 &nbsp &nbsp &nbsp &nbsp &nbsp &nbsp March 17, 1930 In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. A.W. FLUEMER, petitioner-appellant, vs. ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee. C.A. Sobral for appellant. Harvey & O Brien and Gibbs & McDonough for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.: The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appeals from a decision of Judge of First Instance Tuason denying the probate of the document alleged to by the last will and testament of the deceased. Appellee is not authorized to carry on this appeal. We think, however, that the appellant, who appears to have been the moving party in these proceedings, was a person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of First Instance, and so should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of the will (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 781, as amended; Villanueva vs. De Leon [1925], 42 Phil. 780). It is theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Verginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and as certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this was far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. the courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil. 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no was printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the sale of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed. In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 633.) It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West Virginia and not establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the CATHY will and the testimony of the petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings orginally in the Philippine Islands, the petitioner violated his own theory by attempting to have the principal administration in the Philippine Islands. While the appeal pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant presented an unverified petition asking the court to accept as part of the evidence the documents attached to the petition. One of these documents discloses that a paper writing purporting to be the was presented for probate on June 8, 1929, to the clerk of Randolph Country, State of West Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths of Dana Wamsley and Joseph L. MAdden, the subscribing witnesses thereto , and ordered to be recorded and filed. It was shown by another document that, in vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph Country, West Virginia, appointed Claude W. Maxwell as administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. In this connection, it is to be noted that the application for the probate of the will in

the Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929. These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make the Philippines the principal administration and West Virginia the ancillary administration. However this may be, no attempt has been made to comply with Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested. There is no showing that the deceased left any property at any place other than the Philippine Islands and no contention that he left any in West Virginia. Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce purported to have been awarded Edward Randolph Hix from Annie Cousins Hix on October 8, 1925, in the State of West specific pronouncements on the validity or validity of this alleged divorce. For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-3693 July 29, 1950 MARGARET cherubin appellant-appellant, vs. WILD cherubin turned-appellee. Manuel A. Algiers in representation of the appellant and appellant. Maximino V. Bello representation of the defendant and appellee. PAUL, J.: Querubin is Caoayan Silvestre, Ilocos Sur, Filipino parents. In 1926 he marched to the United States in order to study but for the purpose of returning to his homeland after. He earned the title of "Master of Arts and Sciences" in the "University of Southern California," institution domiciled in Los Angeles, California, where the Respondent began to live since 1934. On October 20, 1943, Silvestre Querubin married the appellant, Margaret Cherubin, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. As a result of this marriage was born Querubina Cherubin, who, at the time of the hearing of the case in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, was four years old, more or less. In 1948 the applicant instituted a divorce suit against the appeal, based on "mental cruelty." On February 7, 1948 the divorce was granted to the husband pursuant to a countersuit filed by and based on the infidelity of his wife. On April 5, 1949, and at the request of the defendant and contrademandante (used inthis Starring habeas corpus) the Los Angeles Superior Court issued an interlocutory order providing that:

It is THEREFORE ordered, adjudged and decreed That the interlocutory Judgment of divorce hereinbefore Entered on February 27, 1948, in Book 1891, page 319, be and is hereby modified the Same in the Following particulars in Connection with the custody of the minor child of the parties only: (1) The care, custody and controls of the minor child of the parties, Querubina Cherubin, is hereby Awarded to defendant and cross-complainants; (2) Said child is to be Maintained in a neutral home, subject to the right of reasonable visitation on the part of Both parties to this action; (3) Each party Shall Have the right to take said child away from said neutral home But plaintiff and cross-defendant is restrained from child said to her Taking place of residence; (4) Each party is restrained from molesting the other, or interfering in Any Way With The other's right of reasonable visitation of said child; (5) Each party is restrained from Removing the child from the State of California without first Securing the permission of the court, said parties are restrained from keeping weitere the child out of the County of Los Angeles for more than one day without first Securing the consent of the court. The defendant came out of San Francisco on November 7, 1949, arriving at Manila on 25 March. In 27 months I get to Caoayan above, Ilocos Sur, where he now lives, taking with Querubina the girl, whom he brought to the Philippines because, as a father, wanted to prevent it from reaching her knowledge of the improper conduct of its own mother. The defendant wanted his daughter to be educated in an environment of high morality. At the request of the appellant Margaret, the Superior Court of Los Angeles, California, on November 30, 1949 modified its order of April 5, 1949, providing that: Under interlocutory decree of March 7, 1949, the child, a girl now 3 1/2 years old, WAS solicitada to deft husband, But The child WAS to be Kept in a neutral home; Both parties Were Given reasonable visitation and restrained Were Both Removing the child from out of the state. Deft has taken the child with him to the Philippine Islands. At time of trial custody WAS pft Because she denied Apparently Was Then Living with another man. She is now married to this man and They Have a well equipped home. Appears to be a ptf Devoted mother. She has one child, the issue of her present marriage, and caring for a tambin That Was abandoned child by Un Certain friends of hers. Regularly ptf's husband is employed and Permanently. Witnesses testified in Behalf of the ptf in reference to her motherly Qualities and the condition of her home. She visited the child in question sufficiently It WAS When the child in the home and

neutral Brought her toys and other articles. Service of the Order to Show Cause Was Made on deft's attorneys of record. The interlocutory decree is modified so as to Provide That custody of the child Shall Be Awarded to ptf and deft Shall Have the right of reasonable visitation. Deft Marshall ptf pay for the support of the child $ 30 Each month on the 1st day thereof, commencing Jan. 1950. On the day of the hearing of this cause of habeas corpus in Ilocos Sur, the defendant stated that never try to change his citizenship, that when he came to the country had a P2, 000 of savings, that three weeks after his arrival he received offers to teach with P250 monthly salary at the school established by Dr. Sobrepea in Villasis, Pangasinan, which has never been deprived of parental rights by court decree, or declared missing in the Philippines, or subject to civil interdiction. According to the court a quo, the defendant is of irreproachable conduct. On February 10, 1950 the appellant Margaret Cherubin, through his attorney, presented in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur a petition for habeas corpus claiming custody of her daughter Querubina, citing as grounds the interlocutory decree of the court of California that she conceded to Custody. After the corresponding view, the court a quo, on February 28, 1950 denied the request. The appellant comes on appeal before this Court. The appellant contends that under Article 48 of Rule 39, Exhibit A-1 decree of the Court of Los Angeles, California, to be met in the Philippines. The operative part reads: The interlocutory decree is modified so as to Provide That the custody of the child Shall Be Awarded to ptf and deft Shall Have the right to reasonable visitation. Deft Marshall ptf pay for the support of the child $ 30 Each month on the 1st day thereof, commencing Jan. 1950. An interlocutory decree regarding custody of a child is not a final decision. By their nature is not firm. Is subject to change as circumstances change. In the first decree gave the father custody of the child. At the request of the father, was issued on 5 April decree forbidding the mother to llavase the least because I was home again in adulterous relations with another man. When the appeal was not in Los Angeles, because it had come to the Philippines, last amended the order and ordered that custody was entrusted to the appellant, paying her the $ 30 per month appealed for the maintenance of the child. The board is not fixed and is increased or decreased as needs increase or decrease of the pensioner or as conditions require economicasdel that day. Because the interlocutory decree, Exhibit A-1, does not constitute final decision can

not be fulfilled in the Philippines ask. In the United States itself can not be ordered compliance with an interlocutory order in the court of another state. The rule of Common Knowledge That is the definitive Judgment of a court of another state parties on the Same Between the Same cause of action, on the Merits of the case is conclusive, But It Must Be to Judgment on the Merits definitive only. Where the interlocutory Judgment is Merely, the determination of the question by the court it did not rendered Which settle and finally adjudge the rights of the parties. "(National Park Bank vs. Old Colony Trust Co., 186 NYS, 717.) As Already Stated the Minnesota decree, to the Extent That it is not subject to the end and modification, is Entitled to the protection of the full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution and enforced In This Must Be state. If, however, a part of the Minnesota decree in not final, is subject to modification But by the court rendered Which it, Then Neither the United States Constitution nor the Principle of comity compels the courts to enforce state of This That part of the decree , for no court other than the one the original Granting the decree Could undertake to administer relief without Bringing About a conflict of authority. (Vs. Levine. Levine, 187 Pac., 609.) A Judgment rendered by a Competent court, HAVING jurisdiction in one state, is conclusive on the Merits in the courts of every other state, when to made the basis of an action and can not be reinvestigated the Merits. Our own Supreme Court so holds. Vs Cook. Thornhill, 13 TEX. 293, Dec. 63 65 Am. But Before Judgment rendered Such a state is in one Entitled to Acceptance, in the courts of another state, as conclusive on the Merits, it Must Be a Final Judgment and not an interlocutory decree Merely. Freeman on Judgment, Section 575, Baugh vs. Baugh, 4 Bibb (7 Ky.) 556; Brinkley vs. Brinkley, 50 N.Y. 184, 10 Am Rep. 460; Griggs, vs. Becker, 87 Wis.. 313, 58 N.W. 396. (Walker vs. Garland et al., S.W. 235, 1078.) Generally, a divorce decree entrusting the custody of a child of the marriage to one of the spouses is respected by the courts of other states "at the time and under the Circumstances of STI rendition But That Such a decree has no controlling effects in another state as to facts or subsequently to the Conditions Arising date of the decree, and the courts of the Latter state may, in proper proceedings, the award upon proof of custody Otherwise Matters Subsequent to the decree Which justify the change in the interest of the child . " (20 A.L.R., 815.) In the present case the circumstances have changed. Querubina is no longer in Los Angeles but Caoayan, Ilocos Sur. Under the care of his father. There is an enormous distance from Los Angeles and present address of the child and the cost of travel to that city would be very high, and it is still possible that this outside the scope of the appellant. There is no evidence that she is able to pay the travel expenses of the child and to accompany it. She is a cigarette pack that can be sent by mail to Los Angeles.

No evidence that the circumstances that occurred in November 1949 in Los Angeles, in the same condition prevailed until the time the case was heard in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. Nor is there evidence that the applicant has sufficient funds to cover the girl's journey from Caoayan Querubina, Ilocos Sur, to Los Angeles, California, and to answer for their feeding, care and education, and consisting in the record that the father, more than anyone, is interested in the care and education of his daughter, and have savings of more than P2, 000 deposited in a bank, we believe the Court a quo did not err in refusing the request. The court could not, without sufficient evidence, without remorse of conscience have delivered the child to the attorney for the appellant: it is their obligation to ensure the safety and welfare of it. It is not just to solve the preferential right of the father and the mother in custody. The vital and momentous question of the future of the child is above every consideration. The State ensures its citizens. Article 171 of the Civil Code provides that "the courts may deprive parents of parental rights, or suspend the exercise of this, if trataren their children with excessive harshness or if they dieren orders, advice or examples corrutores." In Cortes against Castillo and other (41 Phil., 495), the Court stated that no errors the District Court to appoint grandmother as guardian of two minors, instead of his mother who was convicted of adultery. Article 154 of the Civil Code provides that "The father and mother in their absence, have authority over their legitimate children not emancipated." However, if done improper exercise of this power, the courts, as we have said, it can privarie and entrust the child a citizen of other institutions, as required by Article 6 of Rule 100, which is reproduction of Article 771 Act No. 190. In the case of Lozano against Martinez and De Vega (36 Phil., 1040), in which the first, in a habeas corpus, claiming against his wife custody of their child under 10 years, this Court, in appeal, stated that the court a quo no abuse of discretion granted to it by Article 771 of the Code of Civil Procedure to deny the request. This interpretation of the article as a proper exercise of the discretion of a court of first instance has been reaffirmed in the case of Pelayo against Lavin (40 Phil., 529). In the request, even no allegation that the court a quo has abused its discretion. This Court should not revoke his performance. At the hearing of the case in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, the defendant stated that he had brought his daughter to the Philippines because I wanted to prevent her knowing about the misconduct and infidelity committed by the mother, preventing the saw live with the man who had offended his father. The defendant said he wanted her daughter to be bred in an atmosphere of high morale, and not indirectly punish the infidelity of the wife. Under the Divorce Act No. 2710, the guilty spouse is not entitled to the custody of minor children. The current legislation, morality and public order interesesdel advise that the girl must be beyond the care of a mother who has violated the oath of fidelity to her husband. We believe that this

Court should not enforce a decree issued by a foreign court, which contravenes our laws and the sound principles of morality that inform our social structure on family relationships. In Case of Manuela Gonzales Barretto against Augusto Gonzales (58 Phil., 72), were asked by the applicant that the divorce obtained by the defendant in Reno, Nevada, on November 28, 1927, be confirmed and ratified by the Court of First Instance of Manila. This court issued a ruling on the basis of the request. Taking into account Article 9 of the Civil Code which provides that "The laws concerning the rights and duties of family or the state, condition and legal capacity of individuals, forcing the Spaniards (Filipino), although residing in a foreign country" and Article 11 of the code that reads in part qye "... prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and aimed at the public order and decency, not cease to have effect by laws or judgments, or by rules or conventions acordades in a foreign country, "the Court, on appeal, stated," Litigants, by mutual agreement, can not compel the court to approve their own actions, or to allow personal relationships of the citizens of these islands are affected by decrees of foreign countries in a way that our government believes it is contrary to public policy and good morals, "and reversed the lower court decision. The judgments of foreign courts can not properse into force in the Philippines they are contrary to the laws, customs and public order. If such decisions, for the simple theory of reciprocity, international comity and civility as grounds for our courts to decide on the basis of the same, then our courts would be in the poor position of having to make judgments contrary to our laws, customs and public order. This is absurd. In Ingenohl against Olsen & Co. (47 Phil., 199), was discussed the alcanse of international courtesy. Article 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure is now Article 48, Rule 39, was the basis for action by Ingenohl. Requested in its application that the Court of First Instance of Manila issue a ruling in accordance with that dictated by the Supreme Court of Hong Kong. After the corresponding view, the court issued a ruling in favor of the plaintiff with a legal interest and costs. On appeal, they alleged that the lower court erred in not declaring that the decision and judgment of the Supreme Court of Hongkong was dictated and registration as a result of a manifest error of fact and law. The Court stated that "It is a principle well established that, in the absence of a treaty or law, and under the comity and international law, a conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction of a foreign country in which the parties have appeared and discussed an issue in the background, will be recognized and enforced in any other foreign country. " But taking into account Article 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that "the judgment may be rejected by evidence of lack of competition, or that it is delivered without prior notice to the party, or that there was collusion, fraud or manifest error of law or fact, "concluded:" Under the Act when a person tries to enforce a foreign judgment, the defendant is entitled to exercise any such defense, and if there were to demonstrate that any of them properly, destroy

the effects of the judgment. " Decision reversed the lower court ruling and declared that "the judgment of the Court of Hong Kong against the defendant, constitute manifest error of fact and law, and for that reason should not be enforced in the Philippines . " If granted the request, the less would be under his mother cuidadode fued judicially declared guilty of marital infidelity, would live together under one roof with the man who dishonored his mother and offended his father would play and would grow with the fruit of love adultery of his mother would come to puberty with the idea that a woman who was unfaithful to her husband is entitled to custody of his daughter. In such an environment can not a girl growing up in a proper way: if you come to know during his teens that his father was betrayed by his mother with the man she lives, that child would live under an impression of moral inferiority of incalculable consequences and therefore would never be happy, and if, under the influence of his mother, came to believe that infidelity of a wife is just one incident change so fleeting as touched, she would go on the road to perdition. And the moral education that can give your stepfather can hardly be better. If the request is refused, the girl would live with his father the benefit of exclusive paternal care, not the divided attention of a mother who has to attend to her husband, her two daughters and a third girl, the protegee. For the welfare of the child Querubina, which is what matters most in this case, the custody of the father should be considered preferential. In the United States itself, the cardinal point with regard to the courts, not the claim of the parties or the strength of the interlocutory decree, but the welfare of the child. A consideration of all the facts and Circumstances leads to the Conclusion That comity does not require the state courts of This, Regardless of the well-being of the child, to lend Their aid to the enforcement of the Iowa decree by Winifred Returning to the custody of her grandmother. A child is not a chattel to Which title and the right of possession may be secured by the decree of Any court. If the decree rendered by HAD Been a domestic court of Competent jurisdiction, it would not conclusively Have Established the right to the custody of the child. Between rival in a contest Claimants, This court would Have Been free, notwithstanding the decree, to award the custody Solely With An eye to the child's welfare. (State ex rel. Aldridge vs. Aldridge, 204 NW 324.) On habeas corpus by the mother to Obtain possession from the father of two children aged four and six years, she Alleged HAD custody Whose Been Awarded in her divorce proceedings in another state, it Appeared That WAS the mother without property, and HAD no means of support staff save her earnings of $ 15 per month, in poor health WAS, and Lived With Her mother, in immoral surroundings, And That Was an industrious the father and sober man, earnings $ 100 per month. Held, That the

welfare of the children Was The only thing to be Considered, and a Judgment Awarding custody to the mother Their Should Be reversed. (Vs Kentzler. Kentzler, 28 Pac., 370.) The appellant, as a last resort, it invokes the comity of nations. Reciprocity, comity among nations is not absolute. Applies when there is no treaty and equality legislation. It takes the doctrine of reciprocity when the foreign court has jurisdiction to hear the case, the parties appeared and discussed the matter at the bottom. Sometimes granted as a privilege but not as strict law. The requested courtesy has not been recognized by this Court when he declared that the rights and duties of family, state, condition and legal capacity of persons are governed by the laws of the Philippines and not those of America (against Gonzales Gonzales, supra) and not validated the decision of the Supreme Court of Hong Kong because it was erroneous in its findings of fact and law (Ingenohl against Olsen and Co., supra). Reciprocity between the states of the American Union is not absolute. Not unbreakable rule. The several cases cited above demonstrate. This is another case: On the question of comity, This court said in the habeas corpus case of In re Stockman, 71 Mich. 180, 38 N.W. 876: "Comity can not be Considered in a case like this, when to the future welfare of the child is the vital question in the case. The good of the child is superior to all other considerations. It is the polar star to guide to the Conclusion in all cases of infants, the question is raised Whether upon a writ of habeas corpus or in a court of chancery. " (Ex parte Leu, 215 N.W., 384.) We have seen that the interlocutory order awarding custody of the child to the appellant is in conflict with the express provisions of the legislation in force in the Philippines. In the first decree and the amendatory entrusted with the custody of the child's father and was banned in the amended order, the mother carrying the child to his home because he was again in illegal relations with another man. But the last amendatory decree, contrary to the sense of justice, law and morality, charged with the custody of the child to the wife was unfaithful because she was married to who committed adultery. And under the doctrine of comity of nations, the appellant contends that must be met in the Philippines that decree. We believe that for various reasons stated above, the pretension is unsustainable. The ruling is upheld on appeal. The appellant pay the costs. Ozaeta, Bengzon, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., Concur. Tuason, J., concurs in the result.