Morissey v. Procter and Gamble: Nonetheless, we must hold for the defendant.

When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that the topic necessarily requires, Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 1 Cir., 1905, 140 F. 539, 541; cf. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright, 64-65 (1967), if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited number, to permit copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the substance. In such circumstances it [*679] does not seem accurate to say that any particular form of expression comes from the subject matter. However, it is necessary to say that the subject matter would be appropriated by permitting the copyrighting of its expression. We cannot recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be checkmated. Cf. Baker v. Selden, supra. Brandir v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Applying Professor Denicola's test to the RIBBON Rack, we find that the rack is not copyrightable. It seems clear that the form of the rack is influenced in significant measure by utilitarian concerns and thus any aesthetic elements cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the utilitarian elements. This is true even though the sculptures which inspired the RIBBON Rack may well have been--the issue of originality asidecopyrightable. Brandir argues correctly that a copyrighted work of art does not lose its protected status merely because it subsequently is put to a functional use. The Supreme Court so held in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 74 S.Ct. 460, 98 L.Ed. 630 (1954), and Congress specifically intended to accept and codify Mazer in section 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976. See H.R.Rep. No. 1476 at 54-55. The district court thus erred in ruling that, whatever the RIBBON Rack's origins, Brandir's commercialization of the rack disposed of the issue of its copyrightability. Comparison of the RIBBON Rack with the earlier sculptures, however, reveals that while the rack may have been derived in part from one of more "works of art," it is in its final form essentially a product of industrial design. In creating the RIBBON Rack, the designer has clearly adapted the original aesthetic elements to accommodate and further a utilitarian purpose. These altered design features of the RIBBON Rack, including the spacesaving, open design achieved by widening the upper loops to permit parking under as well as over the rack's curves, the straightened vertical elements that allow in- and above-ground installation of the rack, the ability to fit all types of bicycles and mopeds, and the heavygauged tubular construction of rustproof galvanized steel, are all features that combine to make for a safe, secure, and maintenance-free system of parking bicycles and mopeds. Joaquin v. Drilon What then is the subject matter of petitioners' copyright? This Court is of the opinion that petitioner BJPI's copyright covers audio-visual recordings of each episode of Rhoda and Me, as falling within the class of works mentioned in P.D. 49, 2(M), to wit:

Cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous to cinematography or any process for making audio-visual recordings; The copyright does not extend to the general concept or format of its dating game show. Accordingly, by the very nature of the subject of petitioner BJPI's copyright, the investigating prosecutor should have the opportunity to compare the videotapes of the two shows. Sambar v. Levis To be entitled to copyright, the thing being copyrighted must be original, created by the author through his own skill, labor and judgment, without directly copying or evasively imitating the work of another. To be entitled to copyright, the thing being copyrighted must be original, created by the author through his own skill, labor and judgment, without directly copying or evasively imitating the work of another. Ching v. Salinas SEC. 172. Literary and Artistic Works. 172.1. Literary and artistic works, hereinafter referred to as "works," are original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation and shall include in particular: ... (h) Original ornamental designs or models for articles of manufacture, whether or not registrable as an industrial design, and other works of applied art. Related to the provision is Section 171.10, which provides that a "work of applied art" is an artistic creation with utilitarian functions or incorporated in a useful article, whether made by hand or produced on an industrial scale. But, as gleaned from the specifications appended to the application for a copyright certificate filed by the petitioner, the said Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for Automobile is merely a utility model described as comprising a generally cylindrical body having a co-axial bore that is centrally located and provided with a perpendicular flange on one of its ends and a cylindrical metal jacket surrounding the peripheral walls of said body, with the bushing made of plastic that is either polyvinyl chloride or polypropylene.31 Likewise, the Vehicle Bearing Cushion is illustrated as a bearing cushion comprising a generally semi-circular body having a central hole to secure a conventional bearing and a plurality of ridges provided therefore, with said cushion bearing being made of the same plastic materials.32 Plainly, these are not literary or artistic works. They are not intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain, or works of applied art. They are certainly not ornamental designs or one having decorative quality or value. It bears stressing that the focus of copyright is the usefulness of the artistic design, and not its marketability. The central inquiry is whether the article is a work of art.33 Works for applied art include all original pictorials, graphics, and sculptural works that are intended to be or have been embodied in

useful article regardless of factors such as mass production, commercial exploitation, and the potential availability of design patent protection.34 Trademark, copyright and patents are different intellectual property rights that cannot be interchanged with one another. A trademark is any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services (service mark) of an enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked container of goods. In relation thereto, a trade name means the name or designation identifying or distinguishing an enterprise. Meanwhile, the scope of a copyright is confined to literary and artistic works which are original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation. Patentable inventions, on the other hand, refer to any technical solution of a problem in any field of human activity which is new, involves an inventive step and is industrially applicable. Rural v. Feist This case concerns the interaction of two well-established propositions. The first is that facts are not copyrightable; the other, that compilations of facts generally are. Each of these propositions possesses an impeccable pedigree. That there can be no valid copyright in facts is universally understood. The most fundamental axiom of copyright law is that "no author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates." This protection is subject to an important limitation. The mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that every element of the work may be protected. Originality remains the sine qua non of copyright; accordingly, copyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that are original to the author. Patterson & Joyce 800-802; Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1865, 1868, and n. 12 (1990) (hereinafter Ginsburg). To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work. Harper & Row, supra, at 556-557. This principle, known as the idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy, applies to all works of authorship.