DISTRICTCOURT,CITYANDCOUNTYOF DENVER,STATEOFCOLORADO 1437BannockStreet,Room256 Denver,Colorado80202 COLORADOETHICSWATCHCOLORADO COMMONCAUSEDAVIDPALADINO,etal., Plaintiffs, v. SCOTTGESSLER,asSecretaryofStatefortheState ofColorado, Defendant.

EFILEDDocument CODenverCountyDistrictCourt2ndJD FilingDate:Sep04201203:13PMMDT FilingID:46248680 ReviewClerk:KyleTGustafson

COURTUSEONLY CaseNo.:2012CV2133 (consolidatedwith2012CV2153) Courtroom:280

ORDERDENYINGMOTIONFORSTAYPENDINGAPPEAL THISMATTERcomesbeforetheCourtonDefendants(Secretary)MotionforStay PendingAppeal(Motion).Forthereasonssetforthbelow,theMotionisdenied. I.Introduction TheSecretaryseeksastayofmyAugust10,2012,orderwhichinvalidatedanumberof CampaignFinanceRules.TheSecretaryarguesthatheisentitledtoastayasofrightunder C.R.C.P.62(d).Alternatively,hearguesthatunderC.R.C.P.62(c),thefourequitablefactorsall mandatethatastayissueinthesecircumstances.Plaintiffsopposeastay,essentiallyarguing thatastaywouldallowtherules,whichIfoundwereenactedinexcessoftheSecretarys authority,toremaininplacewhilethe2012generalelectionloomsevercloser,whichPlaintiffs maintainwouldbecontrarytothepublicinterestandresultinirreparableharmtotheirinterests. II.StandardofReviewunderC.R.C.P.62 Tobegin,theSecretarytakesthepositionthatunderC.R.C.P.62(d),heisentitledtoa stayasofright.Insupportofthisproposition,hecitesasinglecase,UnitedStatesv.Wylie,730 F.2d1401(11thCir.1984).InWylie,thetrialcourtquashedasubpoenafordocumentsissued bythegovernment.Duringappealthedefendantturnedtheresponsivedocumentsovertohis attorney,whichmootedtheappeal.TheEleventhCircuitobservedinafootnotethat

Fed.R.Civ.P.62governsapplicationforstaysofjudgmentinthedistrictcourt. SeeUnitedStatesv.Powell,379U.S.48,58n.18,85S.Ct.248,255,n.18, 13L.Ed.2d112(1964)(actionsunder26U.S.C.7604governedbyFederal RulesofCivilProcedure).Fed.R.Civ.P.62(a)providesforanautomatictenday stayasagainstanyexecutionuponajudgmentorenforcementproceeding.(The automaticstayisnotapplicabletoactionsforinjunctionorreceivership,or judgmentsdirectinganaccountinginanactionforpatentinfringement).The governmentdoesnotcontendthattherecordswereturnedoverduringthisten dayperiod.Fed.R.Civ.P.62(d)allowsforastaypendingappealiftheappellant filesasupercedeasbond.Thestayisamatterofright.SeeAmerican ManufacturersMutualInsuranceCo.v.AmericanBroadcastingParamount Theatres,87S.Ct.1,17L.Ed.2d37(1966)(HarlanJ.,CircuitJustice)11C. Wright&A.Miller,FederalPractice&Procedure,2905at326.Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(e)providesasfollows: WhenanappealistakenbytheUnitedStatesoranofficeroragencythereoforby directionofanydepartmentoftheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesandthe operationorenforcementofthejudgmentisstayed,nobond,obligation,orother securityshallberequiredfromtheappellant. Id.at1402,n.2.Thecourtthenobservedthatthegovernmentdidnotseekastaypendingappeal. Id.at1402.Fromthisdicta,theSecretarytakesthepositionthatC.R.C.P.62(d)mandatesastay asofrightinanonmonetarycase. Wyliedoesnotcompelthisreading,andindeeditseemsunlikelythatthecourtwould havemadesucharulingwithoutfurthercommentoranalysissinceitwouldbecontrarytothe universallyheldpropositionthataRule62(d)stayisofrightonlyinthecaseofamonetary judgment.Seee.g.AmericanMfrs.Mut.Ins.Co.v.AmericanBroad.ParamountTheatres,87 S.Ct.1,17L.Ed.2d37(1966)(itseemstobeacceptedthatapartytakinganappealfromthe DistrictCourtisentitledtoastayofamoneyjudgmentasamatterofrightifhepostsabondin accordancewithFed.R.Civ.P.62(d))Donovanv.FallRiverFoundryCo.,696F.2d524(7th Cir.1982). BecauseRule62(d)doesnotautomaticallyapplyinthiscircumstance,Imustlooktothe factorsrelatingtoadiscretionarystay.Thepartiesagreethatthefollowingfourfactorsshould beexamined:1)whethertheapplicantforastayhasmadeastrongshowingthatheislikelyto succeedonthemerits:2)whethertheapplicantwillbeirreparablyinjuredabsentastay3) whetherastaywillsubstantiallyinjureotherinterestedpartiesand4)wherethepublicinterest lies.Motionatpp.56citingU.S.FishingVesselMaylin,130F.R.D.684,686(S.D.Fla.1990). SeealsoDesktopImagesv.Ames,930F.Supp.1450,1451(D.Colo.1996)(testforstaypending appealisthesameasthatforaninjunction

III.Analysis A.LikelihoodofSuccessontheMerits Inmyorder,IruledthatcertainoftheSecretarysrulesexceededhisrulemaking authoritybecausetheyredefinedorimposedadditionalrestrictionsonstatutoryand constitutionalprovisions.Sangerv.Dennis,148P.3d404,412(Colo.App.2006).Inhis Motion,theSecretaryessentiallyreargueshispositionandpresentsnothingsubstantiallynewor different.Hehasnotconvincedmethathislikelihoodofsuccessonappealissosubstantialthat astayofmyrulingisinorder. Moreover,inColoradoCommonCausev.Gessler,2010COA147(Aug.30,2012),the CourtofAppealsappliedananalysissimilartothatcontainedinmyorder.Specifically,the CourtofAppealsheldthat theagencydoesnothavetheauthoritytopromulgaterulesthatmodifyor contravenestatutoryauthority.See244103(4)(b)(IV),(8)(a),C.R.S.2011(no rulemayconflictwithotherprovisionoflaw,andanyrulethatconflictswitha statueshallbevoid)Colo.ConsumerHealthInitiativev.Colo.Bd.ofHealth,240 P.3d525,528(Colo.App.2010)(Arulemaynotmodifyorcontravenean existingstatute,andanyrulethatisinconsistentwithorcontrarytoastatueis void.)Sangerv.Dennis,148P.3d404,413(Colo.App.2006)(recognizingthe lackofauthoritytopromulgaterulesthatmodifyorcontraveneconstitutional provisions). ColoradoCommonCausev.Gessler,2010COA147at18. TheSecretaryhasestablishedonlythepossibility,notastronglikelihood,ofsuccesson themerits.Thisfactorthereforeweighsagainstissuingastayofmyorder. B.IrreparableInjury TheSecretarydoesnotseriouslyarguethateitherheorthestatewillbeirreparably harmedabsentastay.Instead,theSecretarypointstovariousorganizationsandindividuals whomheclaimswillbeharmedabsentastay.Irejectthiscontentionforanumberofreasons. First,asPlaintiffspointout,insomewaysthisisaconundrumoftheSecretarysown making.Ratherthanwaitingfortheendoftheelectioncycle,heimplementednewruleswhich departedsubstantiallyfromstatestatuesandconstitutionalprovisionsvirtuallyontheeveofthe 2012generalelection.Theseruleswereineffectforonlyfivemonths,whereastheexisting statutoryschemehasbeeninplacesincebeforethe2004election. Second,citingtoa2007case,theSecretaryarguesthatorganizationsrelyingonthenew ruleswouldbesubjecttomassiveretroactivepenalties.Becausetheruleswereinplacefora 3

shortduration,itishardtoknowjusthowmassiveanypenaltiesmightbe.Nevertheless,an administrativelawjudgemayconsidersuchrelianceandimposeanyappropriatesanction. PattersonRecallComm,Inc.v.Patterson,209P.3d1210,121819(Colo.App.2009) (discussingALJsdiscretioninimposingfinesandsanctions). Third,theSecretarysmotionignoresthesignificantcountervailinginterestofthose Coloradocitizens,includingPlaintiffs,whohaveaninterestinthedisclosuresmandatedbystate statuteandconstitution.ThoseinterestsareembodiedintheColoradoConstitution,whichstates that...theinterestsofthepublicarebestservedbylimitingcampaign contributions,encouragingvoluntarycampaignspendinglimits,providingforfull andtimelydisclosureofcampaigncontributions,independentexpenditures,and fundingofelectioneeringcommunications,andstrongenforcementofcampaign financerequirements. Colo.Const.Art.XXVIII1. TheSecretaryhaspointedtonospecificgroupwhichmayfaceirreparableharmifastay isnotgranted.Anysuchgroupislikelyprotectedbythesubstantialdiscretionpossessedbythe administrativelawjudgeswhowouldinitiallyhearelectionlawcomplaints.Moreover,the interestsofthosegroupsareoffsetbythosethathaveaninterestindisclosure.Astaywould deprivethosegroupsofinformation,andtheylikelywouldhavenoremedyuntilnearto,oreven after,theupcomingelection,atwhichpointitwouldbetoolate.Ofmostrelevance,the Secretaryandhisdepartmentfacenoharmintheabsenceofastay. C.SubstantialInjurytoOtherInterestedParties Theinterestofotherpartiesisaddressedabove.Bothsidesofthedebatehavelegitimate, countervailinginterests.However,ifastayenters,thosefavoringmoredisclosurewouldbe effectivelydeprivedofasignificantamountofinformationundertheSecretarysrules.Ifmy rulingisupheld,thosesameinterestswouldthenbeentitledtodisclosure,butthedisclosure wouldcometoolate.TheSecretarysrulesthenwouldhavedeprivedthosepartiesofthevery informationtowhichtheyareentitled,andtheywouldbewithoutaremedy. ThereisnosuchriskofpermanentinjurytothoseinterestedinupholdingtheSecretarys rules.Theworstthatmayhappenisthatsomedisclosureswillbemadebetweennowandthe timethattheCourtofAppealsissuesitsdecision.Simplyput,IdisagreewiththeSecretarys propositionthatthoseseekingtoupholdhisruleswillsufferirreparableharmiftheyareforced tocomplywithstateelectiondisclosurelawsthathavebeenonthebooksforyears.Itisthe precipitousreductionofmandateddisclosures,lessthannineweeksbeforeElectionDay,which couldworkseriousandirreparableinjurytoPlaintiffsandothersinterestedinsuchinformation.

D.PublicInterest IbelievethatthisfactorhasbeenaddressedsufficientlyelsewhereinthisOrder.AsI notedinmypriorrulingandhere,thecitizensofthisstatehaveloudlydeclaredaninterestin greatercampaignfinancedisclosure.TheSecretarysruleslimitthisdisclosure,andthose limitationsarecontrarytostatestatutoryandconstitutionallaw.Astayiscontrarytothepublic interest. IV.Conclusion Forthereasonssetforthabove,theSecretarysMotionisDENIED. ENTEREDthis4thdayofSeptember,2012. BYTHECOURT:

J.EricElliff DistrictCourtJudge