HVA NOM For Leave For Direct Appeal With AFF - MOL - and Exhibits

Appeal from Van Allen v NYS Board of Elections Index No.
: 1787 -2012
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK APPELLATE DIVISION THIRD DEPARTMENT -----------------------------------------------------------------------x
CPLR Art 78 in Albany Index No.: 1787 -2012
H. William Van Allen in esse, Petitioner,

-againstNEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS; Respondents. -----------------------------------------------------------------------x PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that upon the annexed affidavit of H. William Van Allen, affirmed September 7, 2012 with exhibits and Memorandum annexed, will move for leave for a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals with CPLR 5602(b) on a constitutional issue heard at the Courtroom in the Courthouse at the State of New York Supreme Court Appellate Division Third Judicial Department Empire State Plaza Robert Abrams Building for Law and Justice State Street Room 511 Albany, NY 12223, on Monday the 24th day of September 2012, at 9:30 Oclock before Noon or at a time designated by the court or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard.
NOTICE OF MOTION
Dated:
Hurley, New York September ___, 2012
____________________________________ H. William Van Allen, petitioner Self-represented w/o an attorney 351 North Road Hurley, New York 12443 Tel: (845) 389-4366; hvanallen@hvc.rr.com
cc:
Eric T. Schneiderman Attorney General of the State of New York ATTN: Douglas J. Goglia, Assistant Attorney General Division of State Counsel, Litigation Bureau Justice Building Albany, New York 12224-0341
Petitioner Notice of Motion for leave for Direct Appeal
Appeal from Van Allen v NYS Board of Elections Index No.: 1787 -2012

-againstNEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS; Respondents. -----------------------------------------------------------------------x

PETITIONER AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE FOR DIRECT APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF ULSTER
) ) ss. )
Accordingly, I, H. William Van Allen, being duly sworn, depose and say under penalty of perjury: 1. Petitioner, H. (Harold) William Van Allen self-represented without an
attorney, (Petitioner) along with his Memorandum and Exhibits A through G herewith presents this supporting affidavit affirmed in support of his Notice of Motion to appeal under the State Constitution Article 6 Section 3 for an expedited hearing to obtain leave for a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals with CPLR 5602(b); and where the construction of the U.S. Constitution and precedents of New York Judicial dicta as to use and definition of the term of art natural-born Citizen (NBC) are involved and controlling of resolution of ongoing matters below in four (4) Trial Courts and two (2) appellate departments: Albany Index No.: 1787 -2012 with the final order herein taken on appeal (see Exhibit A) in the Article 78 matter of the Petition (see Exhibit B) Nassau Index 2764-2012 with order of therein petitioner Garvey to seek proper venue (see Exhibit C), and
Petitioner Affidavit in support of leave for Direct Appeal Page 1 of 4
Kings with Index Numbers 2008-29642, wherein Petitioner was denied intervention (see Exhibit D) that then was taken on Appeal to Second Department in Appeal case 766-2012 (active) therein Petitioner Motion was there denied a direct appeal after the Court of Appeals responded to Petitioners application for direct appeal there (see Exhibit E) and
Kings with Index No.: 2011-6500 pending a Judgment also are involved along with two (2) pending claims cases at the Court of Claims; and that Petitioner has received notice of a Second Department sua sponte dismissal in the appeal 2011-11561 of the appeal taken by Plaintiff in 2011-6500 from an interlocutory order of 2011-6500 by Notice of Appeal (see Exhibit F), and who received a questionable order to show cause dismissing that complaint without a final judgment and order as to the NBC issue (see Exhibit G).
and as all cases are related to the very same constitutional issue, e.g. is the term of art natural-born Citizen exactly the same as the term Born a Citizen in New York dicta as intended in U.S. Constitution Article 2 1 paragraph 5 in the matter of the eligibility of a natural person to hold the office of President of the United States (POTUS)? 2. That the NYS Court of Appeals as to the U.S. Constitutional Article 2 Section
1 paragraph 5 Natural Born Citizen term of art meaning has precedents in New York citations and statutes (NYS Real Property Law 18) that comprise the basis for that Court to decide in favor of natural born citizen rather than born a citizen to mean a person born on U.S. soil of U.S. Citizen parents as cited in Minor. v. Happersett 88 U.S. 162 (1875), 21 Wall. 162, and 22 L. Ed. 627 as the SCOTUS precedent. 3. That Petitioner found several cases beyond that of the SCOTUS cited in the
footnotes with a search for the term natural born citizen (emphasized by Petitioner without comment on the cases except as to Lunch v Clark) that may assist the court.
4.
That in the Second District Index No.: 29642-2008 trial court order on
appeal where Petitioner had been denied intervener status with CPLR 1012(a)(2) as shown with Exhibits D and E, then filed the case alternatively as an Article 78 in the Third District Index No.: 1787 -2012 Petition shown as Exhibit B herein, and in which both have a matter that may be resolved with review of a Constitutional issue that petitioner raised below with the appeal taken from the order with a notice of appeal shown as Exhibit A. 5. That as it may apply, Petitioner also herein applies for expedited relief from
this Court with CPLR 5601(b)(1) and or CPLR 5602(a)(1)(ii) were it applicable and request as an alternative certification of a single constitutional issue seeking review by the Court of Appeals that will resolve matters here and below to protect my own freedom, liberty and rights against an ongoing injury starting in the 2008 New York Election cycle through the present as Plaintiff is insufficiently protected by Plaintiff Christopher Earl Strunk (Strunk) and Defendants herein now into the 2012 election cycle compounding my injury; and 6. That I have made this relief request before as described above in a separate
case in the Second Department, and there is not anyone to benefit other than the referenced class. 7. A review by the Court of Appeals necessarily effects the final judgments in
all the cases referenced including the pending claims in the Court of Claim would otherwise result in a piecemeal approach to appeals from each, and that based upon Petitioners understanding of the necessarily affects requirement also contends that with Irreparable Injury apply to make an otherwise non-final order appealable, as the doctrine of irreparable injury will apply to make appealable an otherwise non-final order in those rare instances where the order sought to be appealed from directs an
irrevocable change in position that will cause immediate irreparable injury (see generally, Karger, supra, 5:2, at 103-109).
Wherefore, Preliminary to the perfection of the issue on appeal from the order shown as A, Petitioner wishes an order of the Court granting leave of direct appeal to the NYS Court of Appeals on the U.S. Constitutional Article 2 Section 1 paragraph 5 Natural Born Citizen term of art meaning that based upon the Court of Appeals own holdings will decide the status of the cases below in trial court and pending to be filed at the Court of Claims as against the New York State Board of Elections and John Does and Jane Does, and warrants for other and different relief as the Court deems necessary for justice herein; the same is true to my own knowledge, except as to the matters therein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters I believe it to be true. The grounds of my beliefs as to all matters not stated upon information and belief are as follows: 3rd parties, books and records, and personal knowledge.
___________________________ H. William Van Allen Sworn to before me This ____ day of September 2012
_____________________ Notary Public .
Appeal from Van Allen v NYS Board of Elections Index No.: 1787 -2012 Petitioner Motion for leave for Direct Appeal
Exhibit A
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF ALBANY -----------------------------------------------------------------------x H. William Van Allen in esse, Petitioner, -againstNEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
NOTICE OF APPEAL Index No.: 1787 -2012
Respondents. -----------------------------------------------------------------------x
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that H. William Van Allen, in esse hereby appeals to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York for the Third Judicial Department from each and every part of the Decision, Order and Judgment of July 9, 2012 of the New York State Supreme Court for the County of Albany by the Hon. Richard M.
Platkin, A.J.S.C. with a Notice of Entry on or about July 12, 2012 by the Clerk of the Court.
Respectfully submitted by:
Dated: Hurley, New York August ____, 2012 ___________________________________ H. William Van Allen, in esse Self-represented w/o an attorney 351 North Road Hurley, New York 12443 Telephone: (845) 389 4366 Email: hvanallen@hvc.rr.com
Cc:
ERIC T . SCHNEIDERMAN ATTORNEY GENERAL Attorney for Respondent (Douglas J. Goglia, of counsel) The Capitol Albany, New York 12224
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF ALBA Y H. WILLIAM VAN ALLEN in esse, Petitioner, -againstNEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, Respondent. NOTICE OF ENTRY Index No.1787-12 Platkin, 1.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the within is a true copy of the Decision, Order & Judgment in this action entered in the Office of the County Clerk of Albany County on July 12.20]2. Dated: Albany, New York July 17,2012 ERlC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York Attorney for Respondent
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H. William Van Allen 351 North Road Hurley, New York 12443
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STATE OF NEW YORK SUPREME COURT
ALBANY COUNTY
H. William Van Allen in esse,

Petitioner, -againstNEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, Respondent.
Index No. 1787-12
Decision, Order & Judgment
APPEARANCES:
VANALLEN H. WILLIAM Self-Represented Petitioner 3 5 1 North Road Hurley, New York 12443
ERICT. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL Attorney for Respondent (Douglas J. Goglia, of counsel) The Capitol Albany, New York 12224
Hon. Richard M. Platkin, A.J.S.C. This is a special proceeding brought by petitioner H. William Van Allen pursuant to CPLR article 78 seeking a writ of mandamus, emergency injunctive relief and declaratory relief. Respondent New York State Board of Elections ("SBOE") moves to dismiss the petition and also seeks the imposition of monetary and non-monetary sanctions upon petitioner. The United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person except a natural born Citizen
. . . shall be eligible to the Office of President" (US Const, art 11, 5 1, clause 5 ["Natural Born
Citizen Clause"]). Petitioner alleges that eligibility instructions on the SBOE internet web site erroneously advise that a candidate for the Office of President need only be "born a citizen" of the United States, rather than a "natural born Citizen", as required by the text of the Constitution. In particular, petitioner objects to the "ballot access of [President] Obarna as it is wrongfully facilitated by the [SBOE's] arbitrary use of the instruction 'Born a Citizen"'. Among other things, petitioner seeks an order: (a) enjoining the SBOE from using the term "Born a Citizen" with respect to the eligibility of presidential candidates; and (b) requiring each presidential candidate on the 2012 general election ballot to establish that he or she is a "Natural Born Citizen" of the United States in order to remain on the ballot. The standing of a party to institute or maintain a judicial proceeding is a threshold issue that must be determined by the Court at the outset of litigation (see Matter ofDairylea Coop. v Walkley, 38 NY2d 6 [1975]). To establish standing to challenge an administrative action in a proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, petitioner must show that he would suffer an injury in fact "that is in some way different fiom that of the public at large" (Society o Plastics f Indus. v County ofSuffolk (77 NY2d 76 1,773-774 [I99 11). In other words, petitioner must show that he actually will suffer a concrete and particularized harm as a result of the challenged action
(id.; New York State Assn. o Nurse Anesthetists v Novello, 2 NY3d 207,211 [2004]; Matter o f f
Hassig v New York State Dept. o Health, 5 AD3d 846 [3d Dept 20041). f In opposing respondent's motion to dismiss, petitioner maintains that he brings this proceeding "to protect[] his personal intangible vote property in this 2012 election cycle" (Petitioner's Response in Opposition, 723). However, the allegedly faulty instruction given by the SBOE regarding the Natural Born Citizen Clause in no way denies petitioner his right to vote in the 2012 general election. Petitioner, who is not an enrolled member of the Democratic party, remains free to support and vote for a candidate of his choosing (see Berg v Obama, 586 F3d 234,239-240 [3d Cir 20091; Hollander v McCain, 566 F Supp2d 63,69-70
NH 20081; see
also Crist v Comm 'n on Presidential Debates, 262 F3d 193, 195 [2d Cir 20011). And it is clear that petitioner's interest in compelling the SBOE to adopt his interpretation of the Natural Born Citizen Clause and to use his preferred terminology in its publications is in no "way different from that of the public at large" (Society o Plastics, 77 NY2d at 773-774). As such, petitioner's f interest is far too generalized and unparticularized to support standing under the facts and
circumstances of this case (see Berg at 240 [collecting authorities]).
In view of petitioner's lack of standing to maintain the instant proceeding, there is no reason to consider respondent's additional contentions that this proceeding is barred by principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel based upon prior litigation undertaken by Christopher-Earl
Strunk, an alleged privy of petitioner, and that the petition is non-justiciable insofar as the
Electoral College is the sole and exclusive forum in which objections to the selection of a President may be determined.
Finally, the branch of respondent's motion seeking the imposition of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions is denied. While respondent's counsel refers to "repetitive" and "numerous vexatious and harassing lawsuits" commenced by petitioner, nothing in the record confirms this assertion. And the mere fact that a trial court of coordinate jurisdiction rejected similar claims advanced by an alleged privy of petitioner does not render the instant petition frivolous within the meaning of Part 130 of the Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the branch of respondent's motion seeking dismissal of the petition is
granted; and it is further
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the petition is dismissed in all respects; and finally it is ORDERED that the branch of respondent's motion seeking the imposition of monetary and
non-monetary sanctions is denied. This Decision, Order & Judgment is being transmitted to the counsel for respondent and all other papers are being transmitted to the Albany County Clerk for filing. The signing of this Decision, Order & Judgment shall not constitute entry or filing under CPLR fj2220. Counsel are not relieved from the applicable provisions of that section respecting filing, entry and notice of entry.
Dated: Albany, Netv York July 9,20 12
RTCHARD M. PLATKIN A.J.S.C.
Papers Considered: Notice of Petition, dated May 30,2012; Verified Petition, sworn to May 30,2012, with attached exhibits A-H; Notice of Motion, dated June 18,2012; Respondent's Memorandum of Law, dated June 18,2012; Petitioner's Response, sworn to June 27,2012, with attached exhibits A-G; Affirmation of Douglas J. Goglia, Esq., dated June 28,2012, with attached exhibits A-B.
Exhibit B
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF ALBANY ------------------------------------------------------------------x H. William Van Allen in esse, Petitioners, -againstNEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS 40 North Pearl Street, Suite 5 Albany, NY 12207-2729
Respondent(s).
Index No.: 1787 -2012 Petitioners designate The County of Albany as the Place of trial. The basis of venue is the NYS BOEs location
NOTICE OF PETITION
-------------------------------------------------------------------x To the above-named Respondent(s): YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED to answer the petition in this action and to serve a copy of your answer, or, if the petition is not served with this notice, to serve a notice of appearance, on the Petitioner within 20 days after the service of this Notice, exclusive of the day of service; and in case of your failure to appear or answer, judgment will be taken against you by default for the relief demanded in the petition. Dated: Hurley , New York May ___, 2012 ____________________________ H. William Van Allen 351 North Road Hurley New York 12443 Phone 845-389-4366
To: Respondents as follows: The New York State Board of Elections
Attention: JAMES A. WALSH / Co-Chair, DOUGLAS A. KELLNER / Co-Chair, EVELYN J. AQUILA / Commissioner, GREGORY P. PETERSON / Commissioner,
40 North Pearl Street, Suite 5 Albany, NY 12207-2729

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of New York State The Capitol Albany, New York 12224
Van Allen v. NYS BOE Article 78 NYSSC Albany County Index No. 1787-2012
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF ALBANY Index No.: 1787 -2012 -----------------------------------------------------------------------x No. issued 03/26/12 H. William Van Allen in esse, Petitioner, VERIFIED PETITION -againstNEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS WITH TRO AND INJUNCTION
Respondents. -----------------------------------------------------------------------x Petitioner, H. William Van Allen in esse being self-represented without an attorney, as and for his Petition under jurisdiction of the CPLR Article 78 to comply with the United States Constitution Article 2 Section 1 Paragraph 5 as to eligibility inherent in the New York State Legislature and or its public officer agents instructions to each prospective candidate seeking the office of President of the United States (POTUS), to be eligible shall be a natural-born Citizen (NBC), at least 35 years of ages and 14 years resident by the respective November 6, 2012 New York State General Election, and that Petitioner seeks emergency equity relief with a CPLR 7805 injunction and mandamus of the New York State Board of Elections (NYS BOE) and its agents to publish the true and correct eligibility instructions as at the webpage entitled Running for Office for each POTUS candidate selected at a Party Convention or otherwise for the New York State 2012 General Election for Office POTUS shall be a natural-born Citizen instead of the Born a Citizen misinformation now shown (see Exhibit A), and a declaratory judgment under CPLR 7806 in compliance with the exclusive power of the NYS Legislature over the New York Electoral College slate with an eligible candidate for office of POTUS as a compelling State interest, that based upon information and belief and at all times hereinafter mentioned, Petitioner respectfully alleges of captioned Respondent and its agents as follows:
Van Allen v. NYS BOE Article 78 Petition Page 1 of 27
1.Petitioner Harold (H.) William Van Allen in esse (Bill Van Allen) is a duly registered voter at 351 North Road Hurley New York 12443 and an enrolled member of the New York State Independence Party able to participate at the General Election on November 6, 2012. 2.That Petitioner contends that the NYS BOE and its agents have improperly instructed any person intending to become a proposed candidate for office of the President of the United States (POTUS) by posting on the NYS BOE website at Running for Office with Citizenship qualifications, only has to be Born a Citizen as a 14th Amendment eligibility qualification, rather than the U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 1 Paragraph 5 express eligibility using the term of art natural born Citizen (NBC) shown as Exhibit A and http://www.elections.ny.gov/RunningOffice.html. 3.That in December 2011 Petitioner filed a Notice of Intent to file a claim with the Court of Claims (see Exhibit B) as a compelling State interest in that the NYS BOE arbitrary and capricious refusal to change the disinformation Born a Citizen at the NYS BOE website at Running for Office shown as Exhibit A facilitating fraud, confusion and misprision of felony. 4.That Petitioner contends that the NYS BOE continued the arbitrary and capricious use of the invented term Born a Citizen to facilitate persons who are not NBC to certify for the 2012 Presidential Election cycle illegally, and that Petitioner along with those similarly situated have been denied equal treatment under the law and denied fundamental substantive due process by the NYS BOE actions that deprives Petitioner along with those similarly situated a reasonable expectation of effective participation at the General Election to be held on November 6, 2012 were these alleged ineligible persons to be permitted to remain on the ballot and that petitioner along with those similarly situated would suffer a taking of personal property and individual rights were the ballots formed and election held with ineligible candidates .
5.That on or about January 9, 2012 the Respondent NYS BOE issued a schedule for the 2012 Presidential election cycle (see Exhibit C). 6.That the deadline for the Democratic party to file a certificate of candidacy for creation of the electoral slate of the proposed Democratic Party candidate for the office of president of the United States (POTUS) was February 21, 2012; and the deadline for the Republican party to file a certificate with candidates of the electoral slate of the proposed Republican Party candidate(s) for the office of POTUS was February 21, 2012, as shown on Exhibit C. 7.That on February 10, 2012 pursuant to correcting NYS BOE state action Petitioner filed a set of specific objections to the NBC status of BARACK OBAMA (BHO) and the First Electoral slate delegate ROBERT DIAMOND (see Exhibit D). 8.That Petitioner bases his objection to ballot access of Barack Obama as it is wrongly facilitated by the NYS BOE arbitrary use of the instruction Born a Citizen shown at Exhibit A rather than natural-born Citizen ; and that Barack Obama at best is merely Born a Citizen if that no matter where he is born, is not a natural-born Citizen, and Petitioner is supported with evidence and based upon BHOs admissions against interest that he is merely Born a Citizen at best as defined by the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution rather than a NBC, in that Barack Obama did not have both parents who were U.S. Citizens at his birth on or about August 4, 1961, and that the INS record, see Exhibit E, proves his father Barack Hussein Obama Sr. was a British Subject Foreign alien on a student visa attending college in Hawaii at the time while married to the mother Stanley Ann Obama as later shown by the Divorce decree (see Exhibit F). 9.That as a matter of public record and based upon personal conversations with both Christopher Earl Strunk and Christopher B. Garvey in their endeavor to have the NYS BOE and its agents change the aforementioned use of Born a Citizen to natural born Citizen, and in
which the NYS BOE Co-Chairmen and Co-Commissioners on February 28, 2012 at the public hearing formally refused to change the offending language; and that both Mr. Garvey and Mr. Strunk duly filed formal complaints with the NYS BOE for its facilitation of fraud to no avail. 10. That Mr. Garvey has been ordered without prejudice to file his individual Article 78 to bar the NYS BOE in Albany County not in Suffolk County; and that Mr. Strunk having also filed a notice of intent to file a Claim for the NYS BOE for use of the term Born a Citizen rather than NBC is barred from ever filing a complaint in New York State without prior approval. 11. That on Tuesday February 28, 2012 based upon the Notice given by the NYS BOE (see Exhibit G), Petitioner attended and recorded the internet televised meeting of NYS BOE agents JAMES A. WALSH / Co-Chair, DOUGLAS A. KELLNER / Co-Chair, EVELYN J. AQUILA / Commissioner, GREGORY P. PETERSON / Commissioner; and heard the Commissioners and Chairmen hearing defend the continued use of Born a Citizen rather than NBC; 12. That on February 28, 2012 at the meeting televised on the internet Petitioner witnessed the NYS BOE agents JAMES A. WALSH / Co-Chair, DOUGLAS A. KELLNER / Co-Chair, EVELYN J. AQUILA / Commissioner, GREGORY P. PETERSON / Commissioner the NYS BOE vote to dismiss the objections shown above as Exhibit D, among others and granted ballot access to the proposed Candidate(s)s elector slate(s) Petitioner objected to as not being eligible for the Office of POTUS for the reason that each was not NBC or questionable as a result of misinstruction by the NYS BOE in regards to Born a Citizen rather than natural born Citizen that is not forthcoming with the proof of NBC status by the law of the land. 13. That after the February 28, 2012 hearing and determination announcement, Petitioner received by mail the NYS BOE determination on all objections as shown in Exhibit D above and variously contended that Petitioner:
A. In regards to Barack Obama (see Exhibit H) quote: After an examination of the designating petition of the Democratic Party purporting to nominate BARACK OBAMA as a candidate for the office of President of the United States, and the matter having been considered by the Commissioners of the State Board of Elections on February 28, 2012, the State Board finds that the objector has no standing to object to the party position as the objector is not an enrolled member of the Democratic Party (Election Law 6-154(2)). Further, the objection raises issues which are beyond the ministerial scope of the State Board to determine and such objection is made in the incorrect venue, as no direct election for President of the United States occurs via election day ballots. Rather, the April 24, 2012 Presidential Primary is the ballot access process which provides for the election of delegates to a national party convention or a national party conference in 2012. the objector has adhered to a rule of the State Board of Elections which requires service of the objections upon the candidates for party position or the first person named on the petitions committee to fill vacancies (NYCRR Part 6204.1 (b)). Proof of such service was provided to the State Board by provision of Certified Return Receipt numbers.. 14. That Petitioner contends that his right to challenge the wrongful ballot access of any prospective candidate for Office of POTUS in creation of the New York State Electoral College that is wrongfully facilitated by the NYS BOE for Barack Obama is accrued as of February 10, 2012, and that Petitioner has continuing standing to bar any candidate from ballot access for the Office of POTUS when not eligible, even when facilitated by the arbitrary and capricious use of the instruction Born a Citizen rather than NBC as a compelling New York State matter of interest of the State Legislature under U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 1 with exclusive power as unanimously held by the SCOTUS in McPherson v Blacker . 146 U.S. 1 (October 17, 1892). 15. That Petitioner objection to the ballot access of Barack Obama shown as Exhibit D never questioned the place of birth of Barack Obama per se as purported in the April 25, 2011 Long Form Birth Certificate of Live Birth (CoLB) merely asserted the fact admitted to by all parties that Barack Hussein Obamas father married to Stanley Ann Obama was a British Subject on a
foreign alien student visa, as shown on Exhibit E and F, in itself precluding a path to citizenship and therefore Barack Hussein Obama Jr. is not a Natural-born Citizen at best Born a Citizen as defined by the 14th Amendment the birthplace in the Complaint is not at issue the issue is dual allegiance with Barack Obama being a British Subject at Birth, as well as a Kenyan citizen thereafter, and a triple allegiance when Barack Obama Soebarkah gained Indonesian relinquished USA allegiance too! 16. The NYS BOE and its agents willful disregard of both history and facts herein is outrageous, and as such requires Petitioner to recite the history of what dual allegiance associated with the de facto Born a Citizen versus the single allegiance of the de jure naturalborn Citizen means is the controlling subject before this Court that must be resolved as a matter of provision of substantive due process herein to afford equal protection to Petitioner and among others similarly situated, and as for the de facto born a citizen of the 14th amendment and the term anchor baby per se without full and complete allegiance and jurisdiction of the State and USA is contrary to the U.S. Constitution and New York State Constitution too, goes to NYS BOE, agents and quasi State Officer candidates breach of fiduciary duty, shifts the strict burden of responsibility for their arbitrary acts to use the term Born a Citizen . 17. In the matter of what does Born a Citizen mean in relation to the questionable term Anchor Baby means in regards to who is to be considered an inhabitant for the purpose of seeking office of the POTUS according to the U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 1 Paragraph 5 is germane herein before this Court. The truth about the 14th amendment has been out there for so long but no one seems to care what the framers said, and the facts are 100% ignored WE do not need the courts to figure out what a naturalized and natural-born Citizen (NBC) means as used in NYS Real Property Law 18 or do we need Congress to do an investigation because the
truth is already available all we need to do is look at the facts. No amendment to the term exists. 18. For the record: the 13th Amendment to abolish slavery was adopted on December 6, 1865; The Civil Rights Act of 1866 which granted former slaves citizenship was enacted April 9 1866; and, the 14th amendment which made the Civil Rights Act constitutional was proposed on June 13, 1866 and after much debate, as adopted on July 9, 1868. 19. So the question then raised were all dealt with, during the same time frame, with the same Congressman involved, in each bill. The 14th amendment represented the overruling of the Dred Scott decision ruling that black people former slaves were not, and could not become, citizens of the United States or enjoy any of the privileges and immunities of citizenship. 20. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 had already granted U.S. citizenship to all persons born in the United States, as long as those persons were not subject to a foreign power; the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment added this principle into the Constitution to prevent the Supreme Court from ruling the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to be unconstitutional for lack of congressional authority to enact such a law and to prevent a future Congress from altering it by a mere majority vote. Which means the Civil Rights Act of 1866 still stands because the 14th amendment was never repealed. 21. The left/progressives, associates and Defendants agents with propagandists including Justia.org and Findlaw.org have willfully totally perverted the 14th Amendment with their Birthright Citizenship lie. Therefore, to truly understand the 14th Amendment and what the framers original intent was when writing it, you must go back to the framers writings and the congressional debates. 22. Obviously the logical people to research in regard to debates would be Senator Lyman Trumbull who was the author of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and Co-author of the 14th
Amendments citizenship clause and co-author of the 13th Amendment to abolish slavery was an Illinois Supreme Court Justice 1848-1853. 23. Senator Jacob Howard worked with Lincoln to draft the 13th amendment. Served on the Joint Committee on Reconstruction which drafted the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and was co-author of the 14th Amendments Citizenship Clause. 24. The Honorable John Bingham was the principle Framer of the 14th Amendment, Judge advocate in the Lincoln assassination trial and prosecutor on the impeachment of Andrew Johnson. So getting to the facts, and the easiest way is established by the chronological order of the legislative debate presentation starting with Representative John Bingham in 1862 recorded in the Congressional Globe of the 37th Congress 2nd session page 1639 stated: There is no such word as white in your Constitution. Citizenship, therefore, does not depend upon complexion any more than it depends upon the rights of election or of office. All from other lands, who, by the terms of your laws and the compliance with their provisions become naturalized, are adopted citizens of the United States; all other persons born Within the Republic, of parents owing allegiance to no other sovereignty, are natural-born citizens. Gentlemen can find no exceptions to this statement touching natural-born citizens except what is said in the Constitution relation to Indians... 25. The next would be the Civil Rights Act of 1866; the original bill was introduced on January 5, 1866 according to the 39th Congress 1st session Senate 62, that was reported out of Committee on January 11, 1866 A BILL to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and furnish the means of their vindication. And it read: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any State or Territory A week later there was an amendment offered by Mr. Trumbull to wit: In section 1, line 3, after the word That, insert, that all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States with distinction of color; and,
26. On the question to agree to the amendment proposed by Mr. Trumbull, It was determined in the affirmative, Yeas 31 Nays 10. The Bill as an Act went over to the House of Representatives where it passed, along with Howard and Trumbulls amendment. John Bingham, speaks on the amendment to the bill : I find no fault with the introductory clause, which is simply declaratory or what is written in the Constitution, that every human being born within the jurisdiction of the United States of parents not owing allegiance to any foreign sovereignty is, in the language of your Constitution itself, a natural-born citizen; 27. The bill was then sent, to President Andrew Johnson and Johnson vetoed it. It was sent back to Congress, where both houses, passed the bill, overriding the Presidents veto. 28. Next Chronologically on to the 14th Amendment, as the congressional debates while they were debating the 14th Amendment as with that for the Civil Rights act will reveal how the present use has been 100% perverted. The Bill as proposed for the 14th amendment at first did not provide for a jurisdictional statement in Article 1 Section 1 quote: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities if citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. During the debates in 1866 Congressional Globes at 2883 Mr. Latham stated quote: Mr. Speaker, we seem to have fallen upon an age of theories. We are told from day to day with much seeming sincerity and an air of the most profound political sagacity that the Union when restored must be restored upon the basis which will make it as permanent as the everlasting hills and as invulnerable as the throne of the Eternal, and with such safeguards that even treason will no longer be possible within its jurisdiction.
29. Then Senator Edgar Cowen gave a speech telling why the citizenship clause was needed and certainly was not to be used to make anyone born here a citizen, stated Mr. Cowen. The honorable Senator from Michigan has given this subject, I have no doubt, a good deal of his attention, and I am really desirous to have a legal definition of citizenship of the United States. What does it mean? What is its length and breath? I
would be glad if the honorable Senator in good earnest would favor us with some such definition. Is the child of the Chinese Immigrant in California a citizen? Is the child of a Gypsy born in Pennsylvania a citizen? If so, what rights have they? Have they any more rights than a sojourner in the United States? If a traveler comes here from Ethiopia, from Australia, or from Great Britain, he is entitled, to a certain extent, to the protection of the laws. You cannot murder him with impunity. It is murder to kill him, the same as it is to kill another man. You cannot commit an assault and battery on him, I apprehend. He has a right to the protections of the laws; but he is not a citizen in the ordinary acceptation of the word. It is perfectly clear that the mere fact that a man is born in the country has not heretofore entitled him to the right to exercise political power. He is not entitled, by virtue of that, to be an elector. .. And he goes further to state: I have supposed, further, that it was essential to the existence of society itself, and particularly essential to the existence of a free State, that it should have the power, not only of declaring who should exercise political power within its boundaries, but that if it were overrun by another and a different race, it would have the right to absolutely expel them. I do not know that there is any danger to many of the States in this Union; but is it proposed that the people of California are to remain quiescent while they are overrun by a flood of immigration of the Mongol race? Are they to be immigrated out of house and home by Chinese? I should think not. It is not supposed that the people of California, in a broad and general sense, have any higher rights than the people of China; but they are in possession of the country of California, and if another people of a different race, of different religion, of different manners, of different traditions, different tastes and sympathies are to come there and have free right to locate there and settle among them, and if they have an opportunity of pouring in such an immigration as in a short time will double or treble the population of California, I ask are the people of California powerless to protect themselves? I do not know that the contingency will ever happen, but it may be well to consider it while we are on this point. As I understand the right of the States under the Constitution at present, California has the right, if she deems it proper, to forbid the entrance into her territory of any person she chooses who is not a citizen of some one of the United States I think the Honorable Senator from Michigan would not admit the right that the Indians of his neighborhood would have to come in upon Michigan and settle in the midst of that society and obtain the political power of the State, and wield it, perhaps, to his exclusion. I do not believe anybody would agree to that. 30. Now who among the framers of the 14th Amendment had no clue or inclination on the issue of illegal immigration and inclusion of anchor babies? Howard and Trumbull argued for the
inclusion of the term and subject to the jurisdiction would be applied and agreed that there would not be a new definition of the term jurisdiction to be interpreted and applied in the proposed amendment to be declaratory of the current law, the Civil Rights Act, and that as such Mr. Howard said of the citizenship clause quote: This amendment which I have offered is simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already that every person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law and national law a citizen of the United States. This will not, of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the United States, but will include every other class of persons. It settles the great question of citizenship and 31. What exactly did subject to the jurisdiction thereof mean to the framers of the 14th Amendment? Mr. Lyman Trumbull in 1866, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and author of 13th Amendment, in the Congressional Globe 2893 said The provision is, that all persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens. That means subject to the complete jurisdiction thereof. Now does the Senator from Wisconsin pretend to say that the Navajoe Indians are subject to the complete jurisdiction of the United States? What do we mean by subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.? Not owing allegiance of anybody else. That is what it means. 32. In response Senator Jacob Howard responds in concurrence: I concur entirely with the honorable Senator from Illinois, in holding that the word jurisdiction, as here employed, ought to be construed so as to imply a full and complete jurisdiction on the part of the United States, coextensive in all respects with the constitutional power of the United States, whether exercised by Congress, by the executive, or by the judicial department; that is to say, the same jurisdiction in extent and quality as applies to every citizen of the United States now. Certainly, gentlemen cannot contend that an Indian belonging to a tribe, although born within the limits of a State, is subject to this full and complete jurisdiction. That question has long since been adjudicated, so far as the usage of the Government is concerned 33. The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) in Minor v Happersett (1875) states The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a
country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens. As distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their (p168) parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case it not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient for everything we have not to consider that all children born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction are themselves citizen (Emphasis added) 34. The SCOTUS Case Respublica v DE LONGCHAMPS 1 US 111 (1784) 1 Dall. 111 MKean, Chief Justice. This is a case of the first impression in the United States. It must be determined on the principles of the laws of nations, which form a part of the municipal law of Pennsylvania; and , if the offenses charged in the indictment have been committed, there can be no doubt, that those laws have been violated. The Chief Justice goes on to say: Therefore, we conclude, that the Defendant cannot be imprisoned, until his most Christian Majesty shall declare, that the reparation is satisfactory 3. The answer to the last question is rendered unnecessary by the above answer to the second question. The foregoing answers having been given, it only remains for the Court to pronounce sentence upon you. This sentence must be governed by a due consideration of the enormity and dangerous tendency of the offences you have committed, of the willfulness, deliberation, and malice, wherewith they were done, of the quality and degree of the offended and offender, the provocation given, and all other circumstances which may anyway aggravate or extenuate the guilt. The first crime in the indictment is an infraction of the law of Nations. This law, in its full extent, is part of the law of this State, and is to be collected from the practice of different Nations, and the authority of writers. 35. Further search will verify that the term Law of Nations is mentioned at least a
dozen times on the page and the author Vattel is sighted along with each and no other authorities related to law of nations is cited only that of Vattel. 36. That in the SCOTUS case The Venus, 12 U.S. 8 Cranch 253 (1814) Mr. Chief Justice Marshal stated Vattel who, though not very full to this point, is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says: The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantage. The natives or natural-born citizens are those born in the country of parents who are citizens. As the
society cannot exist and perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights. 37. As is to be found in The Law of Nations: or, Principles of the law of nature by Emer de Vattel and Joseph Chitty at Section 212. reads: The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to it authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. As the society cannot exist and perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights. The society is supposed to desire this, in consequence of what it owes to its own preservation; and it is presumed as matter of course, that each citizen , on entering into society, reserve to children the right of becoming members of it. The country of the fathers is therefore that of the children; and these become true citizens merely by their tacit consent. 38. That the question posed is why do Barack Obamas propagandists use the decision in regards to U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) where the law went astray? They are pulled towards corruption in that 100 years earlier then usurper Chester Arthur (1) appointed Justice Gray to chief justice to succeed Oliver Wendell Holms, Jr. and Gray had sabotaged his later ruling in Wong Kim Ark from that held in Minor v. Happersett: 88 U.S. 162 (1875). That in Elk v Wilkins 112 US 94 (1884) Argued April 28, 1884 and Decided November 3, 1884 it seems that Justice Horace Gray knew the law in 1884 but by the time Wong Kim Ark came along 15 years later he had forgotten it! Quoting Justice Gray from the SCOTUS Elk v. Wilkins: The distinction between citizenship by birth and citizenship by naturalization is clearly marked in the provisions of the Constitution, by which no person, except a natural born citizen or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this Constitution shall be eligible to the office of President. And The Congress shall have power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization. Constitution, Article II Section 1; Article 1, Section 8. By the Thirteenth Amendment of
1
Chester Arthur was born in Fairfield Vermont in 1829, but looking at his fathers naturalization papers he didnt become a citizen until August 31, 1843 meaning that Chester Arthur was not born to citizen parents therefore was not a natural-born Citizen. It seems that the people challenging Chester Arthur then were right all along.
the Constitution, slavery was prohibited. The main object of the opening sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment was to settle the question, upon which there had been a difference of opinion throughout the country and in this Court, as to the citizenship of free negroes (Scott v Sanford, 19 Howard 393) , and to put it beyond doubt that all persons, white of black, and whether formerly slaves or not, born or naturalized in the United States, and owing no allegiance to any alien power, should be citizens of the United States and of the state in which they reside. Slaughterhouse Cases 16 Wall 36, 83 US 73; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 US 303, 100 US 306. 39. In the matter of the immigrant taking the Oath to be a citizen of the United States of America: I hereby declare, an oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentiate, state or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United states of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same , that I will bears arms on behalf of the United States when required by the law, that I perform noncombatant service in the armed forces of the United states when required by the law that I will perform work of national importance under civilian direction when required by the law; and that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion so help me God. 40. Immigrants becoming citizens must take an oath of sole allegiance to the USA. Now why would that not be expected also of citizens born here? If you are born to two citizens parents, your allegiance is passed down. If you are not born to two citizen parents, you must take the oath, simple as that! Vattels authority as an institutional writer extended to the USA where he was cited in court cases between 1789 and 1820 no less than 92 times on matters pertaining to the law of nations. 41. That in July 1787 the New York Judiciary Chief Justice Lansing withdrew from the Constitutional Convention convened in Philadelphia and reported to Governor George Clinton that New York had better not participate in the proposed Federal Union as New York had too much to lose; and thereafter New York recommended that any Federal officer eligibility requires each be a natural-born Citizen as a matter of express New York state interest, and that resulted
in the 1788 changes made to the draft of the U.S. Constitution merely for the Office of POTUS without including members of Congress too; and 42. That in the Federalist No. 68, Alexander Hamilton of the New York delegation explained that the President was a person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. He advocated that the Electoral College will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to so complicate an investigation. Further said that because the President was so an important agency in the administration of the government, tumult and disorder were to be avoided in selecting the President. What better way than for the states to aid in this complex investigation of that person who should want to run for that most important office. Surely by requiring any such candidate to produce documentary evidence of his or her identity and place of birth is a first step in producing that needed information which is so vital to such a complicated investigation. The states therefore serve a vital role in the beginning stages of the vetting of any presidential candidate. Such vetting should start as soon as possible so as to avoid parties becoming entrenched in their selections and wanting to win at all costs at the expense of the people and their Constitution. 43. That Petitioner correctly argues that "born a Citizen" is not the same as "natural born Citizen.". 44. That the first step in constitutional interpretation is textual analysis of the clause in question. In that analysis, we have to look at each and every word of the clause which includes "natural" and define that word. By using born a Citizen rather than natural born Citizen, would be saying that we do not need to consider and define "natural," that the Framers just threw that word in as surplusage.
45. On the contrary, the word "natural" is part and parcel of the full clause, "natural born Citizen." The clause as a whole is a word of art, an idiom. The historical record shows that it has always been used as such and that it has never been used in some expanded way as born a Citizen suggests. Indeed, the clause is a unitary phrase with a unitary meaning. Hence, "natural" cannot be separated from the clause. Rather what needs to be done is to search for the meaning of the whole clause and not its parts. 46. In this textual analysis, we cannot simply take that idiom and say that it means some other manufactured definition of the clause. We cannot simply proclaim without evidence that the meaning of that idiom equates to the manner in which Congress and the Fourteenth Amendment allows persons to acquire the status of a citizen of the United States as of the moment of birth. No U.S. Supreme Court case or Justice has adopted such a manufactured definition or even said that such a meaning prevailed at the time of the Founding. That someone acquires his or her citizenship from the moment of birth simply does not equate to that person being a "natural born Citizen." Even Wong Kim Ark and Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971) tell us that persons may be naturalized from the moment of birth. We accept that naturalized person are not natural born Citizens. Furthermore, that Wong Kim Ark included the clause natural born subject in the context of its discussion of what is a Fourteenth Amendment citizen of the United States does not through some amazing feat of logic convert a citizen of the United States into a natural born Citizen. As Minor aptly explained, a natural born Citizen is neither created by the Constitution nor depended upon it. Hence, neither Fourteenth Amendment nor its debates on who shall be a citizen of the United States does not control who shall be natural born Citizens.
47. Hence, simply having a status of a citizen from the moment of birth does not necessarily equate to one being a natural born Citizen. The fact that the Framers included the word natural as an additional qualifier tells us that quite plainly, for if such an interpretation were correct the Framers would simply have said born Citizen. So, any person that is a born Citizen who claims to be a natural born Citizen still has to show that he or she satisfies the idiomatic meaning of the clause which the historical record and U.S. Supreme Court case law show to be a child born in the country to parents who are citizens of that country. This definition is exactly what our United States Supreme Court in Minor v. Happersett in 1875 and Wong Kim Ark in 1898 confirmed is the correct American common law definition of a natural born Citizen. 48. For this time-honored natural law/law of nations/American common-law and New York State definition of a natural born Citizen, also see Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875) (decided after the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868 and holding that "all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners"). What Minor said about a natural born Citizen was confirmed in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (acknowledging and confirming Minors American common law definition of a natural-born citizen but adding based on the English common law that since [t]he child of an alien, if born in the country, is as much a citizen as the natural-born child of a citizen, and by operation of the same principle [birth in the country] (bracketed information supplied), a child born in the United States to domiciled alien parents was a Fourteenth Amendment citizen of the United States). This American common law definition of a natural born Citizen has never been changed, not even by the Fourteenth Amendment (only uses the
clause "citizen of the United States" and does not mention "natural born Citizen") or Wong Kim Ark, and therefore still prevails today. Both those U.S. Supreme Court cases define a "natural born Citizen" as a child born in a country to parents who are citizens of that country. 49. This American common law definition of a natural born Citizen has also been recognized and accepted by a Founder and member of our U.S. Supreme Court as early as 1814 in The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 289 (1814) (Chief Justice John Marshall dissenting and concurring for other reasons). It was also again confirmed by Inglis v. Sailors Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99 (1830) and Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. 242, 245 (1830). It was again confirmed by Justice Daniels in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 50. Arguendo Petitioner has shown that the original American common-law definition of a natural born Citizen was not changed by either the Fourteenth Amendment or Wong Kim Ark, which only deal with a citizen of the United States and not a natural born Citizen. Hence, the same original definition of a natural born Citizen was again expressly confirmed by the whole U.S. Supreme Court in Minor and Wong Kim Ark, and a lower federal court in Ex parte Reynolds, 20 F.Cas. 582, 5 Dill. 394, No. 11,719 (C.C.W.D.Ark 1879) and United States v. Ward, 42 F.320 (C.C.S.D.Cal. 1890). Finally, this same definition was implicitly confirmed by Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884), Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939) and Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964). 51. Given the meaning of the clause since time immemorial; the enlightened intellectual mindset of the Founding period which focused on natural law and the law of nations as commented upon by Cicero, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, John Locke, Rousseau, Emer de Vattel; the motivating spirit of the American Revolution; the Founders and Framers desire to preserve the constitutional republic for Posterity; the way that founding era legal scholars such as Chief
Justice John Marshall, David Ramsay, St. George Tucker, and James Wilson defined American citizenship; Congressional acts on naturalization; U.S. Supreme Court case law; and the historical record as a whole, this is the most natural interpretation of the clause.
52. Regarding the citizenship status of the parents of a natural born Citizen, the
Constitution and Congressional Acts clearly and without question show that a citizen may be one either by being natural born or naturalized either at birth or after birth. 53. Furthermore, recently in Tennessee, the Federal District Court just recently stated: The Court finds that the federal question presented, the meaning of the phrase 'natural born citizen' as a qualification for the Presidency set out in Article II of the Constitution, is important and not trivial. The issue of whether President Obama is constitutionally qualified to run for the Presidency is certainly substantial. It is clear that the stated federal issue of President Obamas qualifications for the office are actually disputed and substantial. It is also clear that there will be a legal dispute over the Constitutions definition of natural born citizen and the Supreme Courts decision in Minor. the Liberty Legal Foundation et al v. National Democratic Party of the USA, Inc. et al, Case No. 12-2143-STA. federal court found the issue of whether Obama is a natural born Citizen to be important and not trivial, substantial, and disputed. 54. That were the Court to disagree with Petitioners definition of a natural born Citizen, because the Constitution does not define the clause, were to cite Hollander v. McCain at 65 which cited Minor and Charles Gordon from Who can be President of the United States: An Unresolved Enigma, 28 Md. L.Rev. 1, 5 (1968). If that were a valid reason for disagreeing with someones definition of a constitutional clause, we basically would have virtually no interpretation of the Constitution at all. As is often said, the Constitution is not a dictionary of legal terms. Its meaning has to be gleaned from its text, if possible, and when not possible, from sources outside the Constitution. For example, the Fourteenth Amendment does not tell us what subject to the jurisdiction means. Yet, our nation has arrived at a meaning of the clause by
looking outside the Constitution. That the Constitution does not define a natural born Citizen were is the only argument that the Court were to make to discount Petitioners position as to what is the meaning of a natural born Citizen were to offer no other authorities showing that Petitioner is wrong despite the long record of New York State related actions as to the use of the term natural-born Citizen as with use of the NYS Real Property Law Section 18 and as to surrogate matters. Also, we should know that Charles Gordon in the very same article states that neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor Wong Kim Arks holding defined a natural born Citizen. Surely, all this shows that Petitioner properly alleges a particular cause of action and gave sufficient notice of both the facts and the law that support his cause of action. 55. Petitioners pursuant to the requirements of CPLR 7801 as to the nature of proceeding for relief by writ of mandamus or prohibition that shall in be obtained in a proceeding under this article and is made for a writ or order of mandamus or prohibition, in which such reference shall, so far as applicable, be deemed to refer to the proceeding authorized by this article. 56. Even though the State Legislature has the exclusive power to form the New York Electoral College with an eligible candidate(s) for the Office of POTUS with votes for which New York is entitled, the New York State Legislature or its agent the NYS BOE and or its agents delegated responsibility to form the New York Electoral College may not change eligibility and or qualifications of any candidate for Federal office including the office of POTUS candidate as the SCOTUS held in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) says: Second, the provisions governing elections reveal the Framers' understanding that powers over the election of federal officers had to be delegated to, rather than reserved by, the States. It is surely no coincidence that the context of federal elections provides one of the few areas in which the Constitution expressly requires action by the States, namely that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof." This duty parallels the duty under Article II that "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors." Art II., 1, cl. 2. These Clauses are express delegations of power to the States to act with respect to federal elections. (2) This conclusion is consistent with our previous recognition that, in certain limited contexts, the power to regulate the incidents of the federal system is not a reserved power of the States, but rather is delegated by the Constitution. Thus, we have noted that "[w]hile, in a loose sense, the right to vote for representatives in Congress is sometimes spoken of as a right derived from the states, . . . this statement is true only in the sense that the states are authorized by the Constitution, to legislate on the subject as provided by 2 of Art. I." United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941). Cf. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920) ("[T]he power to ratify a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution has its source in the Federal Constitution. The act of ratification by the State derives its authority from the Federal Constitution to which the State and its people have alike assented"). In short, as the Framers recognized, electing representatives to the National Legislature was a new right, arising from the Constitution itself. The Tenth Amendment thus provides no basis for concluding that the States possess reserved power to add qualifications to those that are fixed in the Constitution. Instead, any state power to set the qualifications for membership in Congress must derive not from the reserved powers of state sovereignty, but rather from the delegated powers of national sovereignty. In the absence of any constitutional delegation to the States of power to add qualifications to those enumerated in the Constitution, such a power does not exist
57. That Petitioner challenge the determinations shown as Exhibits H and on the Public hearing record of February 28, 2012 that the NYS BOE and or its agents would not change the instructions for ballot access for a candidate to the Office of POTUS for Citizenship status from Born a Citizen back to the inherent requirement mandate of the State Legislature natural-born Citizen as each is final or can be adequately reviewed by appeal to a court or to some other body or officer or where the body or officer making the determination is expressly authorized by statute to rehear the matter upon the petitioners application unless the determination to be reviewed was made upon a rehearing, or a rehearing has been denied, or the time within which the petitioner can procure a rehearing has elapsed;
2
The Clauses also reflect the idea that the Constitution treats both the President and Members of Congress as federal officers.
58. That Petitioner pursuant to the requirements of CPLR 7802 as to Parties includes the NYS BOE and agents JAMES A. WALSH / Co-Chair, DOUGLAS A. KELLNER / Co-Chair, EVELYN J. AQUILA / Commissioner, GREGORY P. PETERSON / Commissioner and their agents, with due notice under CPLR 1012 to the NYS Attorney General as a challenged Statutory / Constitutional compliance matter under its direct authority listed herein in part in keeping with the definition of "body or officer", and the expression "body or officer" that includes every court, tribunal, board, corporation, officer, or other person, or aggregation of persons, whose action may be affected by a proceeding under this article; and that Petitioner contends that RESPONDENTS and NYS BOE and its agents have maliciously acted contrary to the prohibition in favor of another and where this proceeding is brought to restrain the RESPONDENTS and NYS BOE body or officers from proceeding without or in excess of jurisdiction in favor of another, the latter shall be joined as a party; and that Petitioner understands that other interested persons in adequately represented by Petitioners actions herein by order of the court may direct that notice of the proceeding be given to any person, and may allow other interested persons to intervene. 59. That Petitioner pursuant to the requirements of CPLR 7803 raises Questions that may be raised in a proceeding under this article are: a. That New York State Legislature has a compelling State interest that its POTUS candidate(s) given the electoral votes New York is entitled are to be eligible candidate(s), and that to suggest otherwise that the New York state choice would not get counted by Congress were it determined later by Congress that the candidate(s) chosen by the legislature were not eligible would be injurious to the State of California; and therefore the inherent State legislative mandate is that every state
official and the State Legislature ensure compliance with compelling State interest that the various POTUS candidates are NBC before they are placed on the ballot be eligible? b. Is a candidate who is born in the USA whose parent(s) one or both are not citizen(s) at that date of birth raise the doubt that the child is NOT NBC; and that notwithstanding the suspicion of BHO not being born in the USA by his own admission with a minor aged U.S. Citizen only, when Barack Obama has a British Subject father at his birth means that both of his parents are not citizens, and therefore, BHO not NBC or eligible for POTUS? c. Is there a compelling State Legislative interest that requires the POTUS candidate that would receive the Electoral College votes the State is entitled be eligible? d. Does New York State have a compelling interest to prevent a declared candidate from willfully posing as if an eligible candidate and thereby fund raise fraudulently? e. Do the declared candidate(s) and or his agents have an obligation to abide with the compelling interests of the State of New York and U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 1 and instructions provided by Respondent NYS BOE and or its agents when declaring for POTUS candidacy and fund raising to sway the electors for votes? f. Does the NYS BOE conduct elections in New York or does the federal government? g. Does the FEC conduct the New York Elections including ballot access as a compelling state interest of New York or does it merely grant matching funds and ensure participation in the POTUS national debates? h. Do the electors (voters and Electors college voters) have individual authority to determine eligibility for ballot access?
i. May the elector challenge the eligibility by having the State provide a proper ballot as a compelling State interest within a time-frame allowed as was done February 10, 2012? j. When the NYS BOE and or its agents are provided proof that a candidate is not eligible in time is there an inherent duty to protect compelling New York States interest? k. Are the RESPONDENTS NYS BOE and agents JAMES A. WALSH / Co-Chair, DOUGLAS A. KELLNER / Co-Chair, EVELYN J. AQUILA / Commissioner, GREGORY P. PETERSON / Commissioner and their agents the bodies and or its officers and or agents of the State Legislature that failed to perform the inherent duty enjoined upon it by the law of the land to conform to the eligibility mandate of U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 1 and as delegated by the exclusive power of the NYS Legislature for the NYS Electoral College? l. Does the NYS BOE and or its agents with the delegation of responsibility to form a proper ballot for the Office of POTUS have an inherent mandate from the NYS Legislature to comply with the inherent provisions of election law as relates to the express provisions of the US Constitution Article 2 Section 1 paragraph 5 eligibility requirement to use the term of art natural-born Citizen in all instructions? m. Is there an inherent mandate of the NYS BOE and or its agents to comply with the open meeting law provisions in regard to decisions to change the eligibility requirements of the Office of POTUS from natural-born Citizen to Born a Citizen?
n. Does the NYS BOE and or its agents JAMES A. WALSH / Co-Chair, DOUGLAS A. KELLNER / Co-Chair, EVELYN J. AQUILA / Commissioner, GREGORY P. PETERSON / Commissioner and their agents have the delegated authority to create the idiom Born a Citizen as is related to the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as if it were equivalent to the express term of art natural-born Citizen of the US Constitution Article 2 Section 1 paragraph 5 as to eligibility? o. May any candidate and or his/her agents for the Office of POTUS rely upon the instructions issued by the NYS BOE as to eligibility for ballot access? p. Does a tentative candidate for the office of POTUS have an inherent parallel delegation of responsibility as a quasi agent of the New York State Legislature under its exclusive power to form the New York Electoral College to conform to the law of the land with a duly qualified eligible candidate inherent?
WHEREFORE, Petitioner wishes a temporary restraining order with mandate to comply with eligibility instructions with preliminary injunction hearing, and request for declaratory judgment under CPLR 7806 for a permanent injunction against the Respondent NYS BOE and its related agents with reference to ongoing actions by NYS BOE and or its agents and or any ineligible candidate(s) and political party wrongfully seeking ballot access with a candidate not NBC and or eligible per se, and such other relief as the Court deems just including a TRO Order: a. That the State Legislature has exclusive power over the creation of the NYS Electoral College with inherent duty to determine eligibility of each candidate as a compelling State interest delegated as responsibility to the NYS BOE, its agents and to each declared candidate for Office of POTUS under U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 1;
b. That the State of New York Legislature and or its delegated agents do not have the authority to change the express eligibility requirements the U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 1 for any candidate for office of the POTUS. c. That the NYS BOE shall forthwith change the arbitrary term of eligibility Born a Citizen to the express law of the land natural-born Citizen and thereafter duly notify each and every declared or actual candidate and or Party proffering a candidate for the Office of POTUS in the 2012 Presidential election cycle comply forthwith and certify that each candidate for office of POTUS including the Office of Vice President is a person is born in the USA of citizen parents. d. And for further and different relief as the Court may deem necessary herein.
Dated:
Hurley, New York May ___, 2012 ____________________________ H. William Van Allen 351 North Road Hurley New York 12443 Phone 845-389-4366
PETITION VERIFICATION AFFIDAVIT STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF ULSTER ) ) ss. )
Accordingly, I, H. William Van Allen, being duly sworn, depose and say under penalty of perjury:
I have read the foregoing Petition for writ of mandamus of the NYS BOE and its agents to comply with the United States Constitution Article 2 Section 1 Paragraph 5 as to eligibility inherent in the New York State Legislature and or its public officer agents instructions to each prospective candidate seeking the office of POTUS, to be eligible shall be a natural-born Citizen rather than merely Born a Citizen, at least 35 years of ages and 14 years resident by the respective November 6, 2012 New York State General Election, and that Petitioner seeks emergency equity relief with a CPLR 7805 TRO, injunction and mandamus of the New York State Board of Elections and its agents to publish the true and correct eligibility instructions as at the webpage entitled Running for Office for each POTUS candidate selected at a Party Convention or otherwise for the New York State 2012 General Election for Office POTUS shall be a natural-born Citizen instead of the arbitrary use of Born a Citizen as misinformation request a TRO, Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory Judgment for equity relief with time being of the essence with irreparable harm; and know the contents thereof apply to me by misapplication and administration of laws and that has a question of first impression as a State question involving the creation of the New York Electoral College going into the General Election from November 6, 2012 thru December 25, 2012; the same is true to my own knowledge, except as to the matters therein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters I believe it to be true. The grounds of my beliefs as to all matters not stated upon information and belief are as follows: 3rd parties, books and records, and personal knowledge. ___________________________ H. William Van Allen Sworn to before me This ____ day of May 2012
_____________________ Notary Public Van Allen v. NYS BOE Article 78 Petition Page 27 of 27
H. William Van Allen against New York State Board of Elections Index No: 1787 -2012 Petition for Writ of Mandamus with TRO and Injunction
Exhibit A
Exhibit B
NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE CLAIM

CERTIFIED RETURN RECEIPT ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of New York State The Capitol Albany, New York 12224
STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF ULSTER )
) SS.
Accordingly, I, Harold William Van Allen being duly sworn, depose and say under penalty of
perjury:
Claimant is located for service at 351 North Road Hurley, New York 12443 Telephone: (845) 389 4366 Email: hvanallen@hvc.rr.com Pursuant to the requirement under law this is my Notice of Intent to File a Claim with the NYSCourt of Claims to recover damages caused by the arbitrary and capricious acts of the New York State Board of Elections that gave instructions for qualifications for a candidates for the Office of President of the United States at the 2008 and 2012 election cycles as to the "citizenship" requirement using the term "Born a Citizen" rather than "natural born Citizen" as required by the US Constitution Article 2 Section 1. See http://www.scribd.com/doc/72199261 /Van-Allen-NOM-to-Intervene-in-Strunk-vPaterson-NYSSC-Index-29642-08-w-AFF-Exhibits-MOL-and-Amended-Summons-wSupplement-to-the-Complaint-with-Plai
That Claimant discovered the Official NewYork State Board of Elections website at "Running for Office"on October 17, 2011 and as such intends to recover damages in the amount of no less than $400,000.00 plus the cost of this action. That Claimant knows the damages of say $400,000.00 thereof apply to me by misapplication and administration of laws; the same is true to my own knowledge, except as to the matters therein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters I believe it to be true. The grounds of my beliefs as to all matters not stated upon information and belief are as follows: 3rd parties, books and records, pe onal knowledge.
Sworn to before me This k day of December 2011

JUOITH S MAYHON " !RLle STATEOF NEW
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CC: NYSBOE General Counsel New York State Board of Elections 40 Steuben Street Albany, New York, 12207-2109
Exhibit C
STATE OF NEW YORK
STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS
CALENDAR FOR THE APRIL 24, 2012

PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY ELECTION for SELECTING DELEGATES to a NATIONAL CONVENTION Requirements and dates herein are provided for in Chapter 147 of the Laws of 2011
40 STEUBEN STREET ALBANY, NY 12207 (518) 474-6220 www.elections.ny.gov
January 9, 2012
DELEGATE SELECTION PLAN:
DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION PLAN FILING DATES:
REGISTRATION FOR PRIMARY ELECTION

3/30/12; 4/4/12 Mail Registration: Last day to postmark application and last day it must be received by board of elections. 5-210 (3) In Person Registration: Last day application must be received by board of elections to be eligible to vote in primary election. 5-210, 5-211 & 5-212 Change of address. 5-208 (3)
Pursuant to Chapter 147 of the Laws of 2011, a state committee providing for the selection of delegates and alternate delegates to a national party convention or conference must select either the 3 plan or the 4 plan contained in the act.
2/14/12
Last day for candidates to decline designations. 2-122-a(2) 3/30/12 Last day for CBOE to notify SBOE candidates which filed at CBOE. 2-122-a(6)(h) Last day for party committee to file certificate of candidacies for delegate and alternate delegate candidates. 2-122-a(7)(a-b) Last day for SBOE to notify party committee of candidates who will appear on ballot. 2-122-a(7)(d) Last day for boards of election to notify party committee of candidates who will appear on ballot. 2-122-a(7)(d)
2/14/12 12/6/11 Last day for other political parties to choose Republican plan. 2-122-b(1) Last day for a party to select the delegate selection method. 2 Ch. 147 of 2011 3/1/12
2/21/12
4/4/12
11/1/11
ABSENTEE VOTING FOR PRIMARY ELECTION:

4/17/12 Last day to postmark application for ballot. 8-400 (2)(c) Last day to apply in person for ballot. 8-400 (2)(c) Last day to postmark ballot and date it must be received by the board of elections. 8-412 (1) Last day to deliver ballot in person to county board. 8-412 (1)
3/2/12
4/23/12
REPUBLICAN DELEGATE SELECTION PLAN FILING DATES: THE FOLLOWING DATES APPLY TO ALL DELEGATE SELECTION PLANS:
2/21/12 Last day for matching funds candidate to file certificate with State Board requesting ballot access. 2-122-b(3)(a)
4/23/12; 5/1/12 4/24/12
DESIGNATING PETITIONS
1/31/122/21/12 Dates for nationally known candidate to file certificate with State Board requesting to appear on ballot. 2-122-b(3)(b) Last day for party to certify the number of delegates for the convention. 2-122-b(2) Last day for presidential candidate to certify slate of delegates and alternate delegates. 2-122-b(3)(d) Last day for presidential candidate to invalidate their candidacy. 2-122-b(3)(e) 1/3/12 First day for signing designating petitions. 6-134 (4) Dates for filing designating petitions. 6-158 (1)(a) Last day to decline a designation. 6-158 (2) 4/17/12 2/21/12 4/17/12 Last day to fill vacancy after declination. 6-158 (3) 4/23/12
MILITARY/SPECIAL FEDERAL VOTERS FOR PRIMARY ELECTION:
1/31/12
2/6/12 2/9/12 2/14/12
3/30/12
2/21/12
Last day for a BOE to receive application for ballot if not previously registered. 10-106 (5) & 11-202 (1)(a) Last day for a BOE to receive application if previously registered. 10-106 (5) & 11-202(1)(b) Last day to apply personally if previously registered. 10-106 (5) Date for county boards to send out Military/Special Federal ballots. 10-108 (1) & 11-204 Last day to postmark ballot and date it must be received by the board of elections. 10-114(1) & 11-212
CERTIFICATION
3/9/12 3/1/12 Certification of Primary ballot by SBOE of designations filed in its office. 4-110 Certification of Primary ballot by CBOE of designations filed locally. 4-110 4/23/12; 5/1/12
3/2/12
Exhibit D
Specific Objections to the OBAMAFOR AMERICAFiling with the NYS Board of Elections on February 9, 2012
CERTIFIEDRETURNRECEIPT No:
NEWYORKSTATEBOARDOF ELECTIONS, 40 Steuben Street Albany New York 12207 Attention: JAMES A. WALSH/ Co-Chair, DOUGLASA. KELLNER/ Co-Chair, EVELYN AQUILA/ Commissioner, J. GREGORYP. PETERSON/ Commissioner, )
) 55.
Accordingly, I, H. William Van Allen in esse being duly sworn, depose and say under penalty of perjury: 1. Objector is located for service at 351 North Road Hurley, NewYork 11238 (845) 894-4366 email: hvanallen@hvc.rr.com; and is a duly registered voter in the 2008 and 2012 election cycle. 2. That Objector as with Election Law (EL)3-104 demands a hearing on the objections of the declared candidate Barack Hussein Obama II as not being eligible for the Office of President of the United States (POTUS)on 2/14/12 or as soon thereafter as the Chairman and Commissioners may chose to convene to take evidence and testimony to bar Barack Hussein Obama II from the 2012 Presidential Election cycle ballots as time is of the essence. 3. That Objector references the NYSBOE notice that agents of the OBAMA FOR AMERICA campaign filed designating petitions on February 9, 2012 that designates Barack Hussein Obama II for ballot access at the Democratic Party Primary in the start of the DEMOCRATIC DELEGATESELECTION PLANFILING. 4. That Objector challenges the Certification of both the declared candidate BHO II and all the petitions and filing documents as a nullity against public policy in that Barack Hussein Obama II is not eligible for the Officeof the President of the United States (POTUS)because he is not a "Natural Born Citizen'" (NBC)as is required under New York State law in compliance with the U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 1 paragraph 5 and New York provision of law defining "Natural born Citizen" and therefore all the designating petitions must be rejected as defective. 5. Those objections are based upon the admission of Barrack Hussein Obama II with the release of his autobiography. "Dreams From My Father" (1995) the British subject at his birth was Barack Hussein Obama Sr. - as such BHO II is not NBC and ineligible for POTUS. 6. That objections are based upon the INS record signed by Barrack Hussein Obama Sr. that BHO II's father was a Foreign Alien non-immigrant with a student visa and never was at anytime a US Citizen or even had a "Green Card" - as such BHO II is not NBC and ineligible for POTUS. 7. That objections are based upon the record of the divorce decree issued from the Hawaii court of competent jurisdiction British subject Barack Hussein Obama Sr. was married to the U.S. Citizen Stanley Ann Obama being of minor age at the time of the birth of Barack Hussein Obama II; 8. That objections are based upon the supposed Certificate of Live Birth (COLB)released by Barack Hussein Obama II during a press conference in April 2011, alleging BHO II was born in Hawaii to U.S. Citizen Stanley Ann Dunham Obama, the mother, and British Subject Barack Hussein Obama Sr. the father on August 8, 1961. 9. The evidence shows that at best, Barack Hussein Obama II may merely be a native born naturalized citizen not a "Natural-Born Citizen", a person born in the country of US Citizen parents as defined by the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS)in the precedent set in Minor. v. Happersett 88 U.S. 162 (1875),21 Wall. 162, and 22 L. Ed. 627. by Justice Waite holding that natural born citizens (NBC) per se are so by virtue of birth on United States soil when both parents were Citizens of the Van Allen Objections and Demand for Hearing Page 1 of 2
United States according to the US Constitution Article 2 Section 1 paragraph 5 de jure citizens without reaching the need of use of the 14thAmendment or the power of Congress granted with Article 1 Section 8 paragraph 4 to define naturalization and immigration status person other than NBC persons; and as upheld by NewYork State jurisprudence as to NBC defined in state law. 10. That Barack Hussein Obama II is not a Natural- born Citizen however may be classified as "Born a Citizen" depending upon the power of Congress granted to define such status other than NBC. 11. That objector challenges Barack Hussein Obama II and or his agents to prove both the place of birth and that both of his parents at the time of his birth were US Citizens. 12. That on February 3,2012, Objector duly filed with the NYSCourt of Appeals in re: Case Strunk v. David A. Paterson et al. 2008-29642 for an appeal as of right along with a notice of motion for leave of the NYSSupreme Court Appellate Division 2ndDepartment in appeal 2012-00766 for appeal to the New York State Court of Appeals as of right with a stay of the trial court proceedings until the sole U.S. Constitutional issue being Barack Hussein Obama II's ineligibility is settled.
/ H. William Van Allen
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Sworn to before me This day of February 2012
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NOTAR i PU!:luC SlAT ~ OF NEW YORK NO 01MA6095585
QUALIFIED IN ULSTER COUNTY /' COMMISSIONEX.f'IRES JULY 14, 20 _
CC:
OBAMA FOR AMERICA (OF A) Headquarters 25 E. 21st St New York, NY, 10010
Office of the District Attorney
Albany County Judicial Building 6 Lodge Street Albany, NY 12207 ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of New York State The Capitol Albany, New York 12224
Van Allen Objections and Demand for Hearing
Page 2 of 2
Specific Objections to the OBAMAFOR AMERICAFiling with the NYS Board of Elections on February 9, 2012
NEWYORKSTATEBOARDOF ELECTIONS, 40 Steuben Street Albany New York 12207 Attention:
JAMES A. WALSH/ Co-Chair, DOUGLASA. KELLNER/ Co-Chair, EVELYN AQUILA/ Commissioner, J. GREGORYP. PETERSON / Commissioner,
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Accordingly, I, H. William Van Allen in esse being duly sworn, depose and say under penmty of R$tiury: 1. Objector is located for service at 351 North Road Hurley, NewYork 11238 (845) 894-4366 ernail: hvanallen@hvc.rr.com; and is a duly registered voter in the 2008 and 2012 election cycle. 2. That Objector as with Election Law (ELI3-104 demands a hearing on the objections of the declared candidate Barack Hussein Obama I1as not being eligible for the Officeof President of the United States (POTUS)on 2/14/12 or as soon thereafter as the Chairman and Commissioners may chose to convene to take evidence and testimony to bar Barack Hussein Obama II from the 2012 Presidential Election cycle ballots as time is of the essence. 3. That Objector references the NYSBOE notice that agents of the OBAMAFOR AMERICA campaign filed designating petitions on February 9, 2012 that designates Barack Hussein Obama II for ballot access at the Democratic Party Primary in the start of the DEMOCRATIC DELEGATESELECTION PLANFILING. 4. That Objector challenges the Certification of both the declared candidate BHO II and all the petitions and filing documents as a nullity against public policy in that Barack Hussein Obama II is not eligible for the Office of the President of the United States (POTUS)because he is not a "Natural Born Citizen" (NBC)as is required under New York State law in compliance with the U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 1 paragraph 5 and New York provision of law defining "Natural born Citizen" and therefore all the designating petitions must be rejected as defective. 5. Those objections are based upon the admission of Barrack Hussein Obama 11with the release of his autobiography. "Dreams From My Father" (1995) the British subject at his birth was Barack Hussein Obama Sr. - as such BHO II is not NBC and ineligible for POTUS. 6. That objections are based upon the INS record signed by Barrack Hussein Obama Sr. that BHO II's father was a Foreign Alien non-immigrant with a student visa and never was at anytime a US Citizen or even had a "Green Card" - as such BHO II is not NBC and ineligible for POTUS. 7. That objections are based upon the record of the divorce decree issued from the Hawaii court of competent jurisdiction British subject Barack Hussein Obama Sr. was married to the U.S. Citizen Stanley Ann Obama being of minor age at the time of the birth of Barack Hussein Obama II; 8. That objections are based upon the supposed Certificate of LiveBirth (COLB)released by Barack Hussein Obama II during a press conference in April 2011, alleging BHO II was born in Hawaii to U.S. Citizen Stanley Ann Dunham Obama, the mother, and British Subject Barack Hussein Obama Sr. the father on August 8, 1961. 9. The evidence shows that at best, Barack Hussein Obama II may merely be a native born naturalized citizen not a "Natural-Born Citizen", a person born in the country of US Citizen parents as defmed by the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS)in the precedent set in Minor. v. Happersett 88 U.S. 162 (1875), 21 Wall. 162, and 22 L. Ed. 627. by Justice Waite holding that natural bani. citizens (NBC) per se are so by virtue of birth on United States soil when both parents were Citizens of the Van Allen Objections and Demand for Hearing Page] of 2
Specific Objections to the OBAMAFOR AMERICA Filing with the NYS Board of Elections on February 9, 2012
NEWYORKSTATEBOARDOF ELECTIONS, 40 Steuben Street Albany New York 12207 Attention: JAMES A. WALSH/ Co-Chair, DOUGLASA. KELLNER/ Co-Chair, EVELYN AQUILA/ Commissioner, J. GREGORYP. PETERSON / Commissioner,
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Accordingly, I, H. William Van Allen in esse being duly sworn, depose and say under penalty of perjury: 1. Objector is located for service at 351 North Road Hurley, New York 11238 (845) 894-4366 email: hvanallen@hvc.rr.com; and is a duly registered voter in the 2008 and 2012 election cycle. 2. That Objector as with Election Law (EL)3-104 demands a hearing on the objections of the declared candidate Barack Hussein Obama II as not being eligible for the Office of President of the United States (POTUS)on 2/14/12 or as soon thereafter as the Chairman and Commissioners may chose to convene to take evidence and testimony to bar Barack Hussein Obama II from the 2012 Presidential Election cycle ballots as time is of the essence. 3. That Objector references the NYSBOE notice that agents of the OBAMAFOR AMERICAcampaign filed designating petitions on February 9, 2012 that designates Barack Hussein Obama II for ballot access at the Democratic Party Primary in the start of the DEMOCRATIC DELEGATESELECTION PLANFILING. 4. That Objector challenges the Certification of both the declared candidate BHO II and all the petitions and filing documents as a nullity against public policy in that Barack Hussein Obama II is not eligible for the Office of the President of the United States (POTUS)because he is not a "Natural Born Citizen'" (NBC)as is required under New York State law in compliance with the U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 1 paragraph 5 and New York provision of law defining "Natural born Citizen" and therefore all the designating petitions must be rejected as defective. 5. Those objections are based upon the admission of Barrack Hussein Obama II with the release of his autobiography. "Dreams From My Father" (1995) the British subject at his birth was Barack Hussein Obama Sr. - as such BHO II is not NBC and ineligible for POTUS. 6. That objections are based upon the INS record signed by Barrack Hussein Obama Sr. that BHO II's father was a Foreign Alien non-immigrant with a student visa and never was at anytime a US Citizen or even had a "Green Card" - as such BHO II is not NBC and ineligible for POTUS. 7. That objections are based upon the record of the divorce decree issued from the Hawaii court of competent jurisdiction British subject Barack Hussein Obama Sr. was married to the U.S. Citizen Stanley Ann Obama being of minor age at the time of the birth of Barack Hussein Obama II; 8. That objections are based upon the supposed Certificate of Live Birth (COLB)released by Barack Hussein Obama II during a press conference in April 2011, alleging BHO II was born in Hawaii to U.S. Citizen Stanley Ann Dunham Obama, the mother, and British Subject Barack Hussein Obama Sr. the father on August 8, 1961. 9. The evidence shows that at best, Barack Hussein Obama II may merely be a native born naturalized citizen not a "Natural-Born Citizen", a person born in the country of US Citizen parents as defined by the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS)in the precedent set in Minor. v. Happersett 88 U.S. 162 (1875), 21 Wall. 162, and 22 L. Ed. 627. by Justice Waite holding that natural born citizens (NBC) per se are so by virtue of birth on United States soil when both parents were Citizens of the Van Allen Objections and Demand for Hearing Page 1 of 2
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Exhibit B-4
Exhibit B-5
Exhibit G
James A. Walsh Co-Chair
Douglas A. Kellner Co-Chair
Gregory P. Peterson Commissioner Todd D. Valentine Co-Executive Director
40 STEUBEN STREET ALBANY, N.Y. 12207-2108 Phone: 51 81474-6220 www.elections.state.ny.us
Evelyn J. Aquila Commissioner Robert A. Brehm Co-Execative Director
NOTICE Board of Commissioners Meeting Tuesday, February 28,2012,12:00 p.m. State Board Offices, 4th Floor 40 Steuben Street Albany, New York AGENDA
I.
Minutes of January 12,20 12 Robert Brehm and Todd Valentine Kim Galvin Anna Svizzero Update on Voting System Certzjcation Findings Update on Ballot Redesign and Usability Project John Conklin William McCann Dan Valvo
TI. Unit Updates: Executive: Legal: Election Operations:

NVRA/PIO: Campaign Finance: ITU:
111.
Old Business
A.
DISCUSS 2012 Proposed Legislation (Kim Galvin and Paul Collins)
IV.
New Business VOTE on petition rulings - (Kim Galvin and Paul Collins) A. Any prima facie matters Determinations on objections Determinations without hearings DISCUSS Meeting with Chief Administrative Judge re: 2012 Calendar Issues B. (Robert Brehm and Todd Valentine) VOTE on Resolution to Authorize Additional Expenditure of HAVA Funds for Court -Ordered C. Voting Machine Modifications and Testing (Anna Svizzero and Joe Burns)
V.
Executive Session
Board meetings are open to the public For additional information, contact John Conklin or Tom Connolly (518) 474-1 953.
Exhibit H
February 28, 2012 STATE OF NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS
In the Matter of the objections of H. WILLIAM VAN ALLEN, to the designating petition of the Democratic Party purporting to designate BARACK OBAMA as a candidate for the office of President of the United States
DETERMINATION
After
an examination
of the designating
petition
of the Democratic
Party
purporting to nominate BARACK OBAMA as a candidate for the office of President of the United States, and the matter having been considered by the Commissioners of the
State Board of Elections on February 28, 2012, the State Board finds that the objector has no standing to object to the party position as the objector is not an enrolled member of the Democratic Party (Election Law 6-154(2)). Further, the objection raises issues and such
which are beyond the ministerial scope of the State Board to determine
objection is made in the incorrect venue, as no direct election for President of the United States occurs via election day ballots. Rather, the April 24, 2012 Presidential
Primary is the ballot access process which provides for the election of delegates to a national party convention or a national party conference in 2012. Lastly, the objector has failed to adhere to a rule of the State Board of Elections which requires service of the objections upon the candidates for party position or the first person named on the petitions committee to fill vacancies (NYCRR Part 6204.1 (b)). Proof of such service was not provided to the State Board. valid. Therefore the objection is void and the petition is
STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF ALBANY Index No.: 1787 -2012 -----------------------------------------------------------------------x H. William Van Allen in esse, Petitioner, -againstNEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
Respondents. -----------------------------------------------------------------------x
NOTICE OF PETITION PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS WITH TRO AND INJUNCTION PETITION VERIFICATION AFFIDAVIT EXHIBITS A through H
Dated:
Hurley , New York May ___, 2012 ____________________________ H. William Van Allen 351 North Road Hurley New York 12443 Phone 845-389-4366
Exhibit C
Exhibit D
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF ALBANY -----------------------------------------------------------------------x H. William Van Allen, Petitioner, -againstNEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
Index No.: 1787 -2012
Respondent. -----------------------------------------------------------------------x
NOTICE OF APPEAL NOTICE OF ENTRY with DECISION, ORDER AND JUDGMENT AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
Dated:
Hurley , New York Augustl ___, 2012 ____________________________ H. William Van Allen in esse 351 North Road Hurley New York 12443 Phone 845-389-4366
Exhibit E
~~,t~
~,
qj/~
/~~tJ7-/{/95
February 10,2012
Mr. H. William Van Allen 351 North Road Hurley, New York 12443 Re: Strunk v Paterson Dear Mr. Van Allen: The Court has received your preliminary appeal statement and will examine its subject matter jurisdiction with respect to whether you have simultaneously appealed to the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court order (see Parker v Rogerson, 35 NY2d 751, 753-754), the order appealed from finally determines the action within the meaning of the Constitution, and any basis exists for a direct appeal pursuant to CPLR 5601 (b)(2). This examination of jurisdiction shall not preclude the Court from addressing any jurisdictional concerns in the future. You should file within ten days after this letter's date your comments in letter fonnatjustifying the retention of subject matter jurisdiction, By copy of this letter, your adversary is likewise afforded the opportunity to comment in letter format on the Court's subject matter jurisdiction within the same ten-day period after this letter's date. All letters shall be filed with proof of service of one copy of the letter on each party. The times within which briefs on the merits must be filed are held in abeyance during the pendency of this jurisdictional inquiry. If this inquiry is terminated by the Court, the Clerk will notify counsel in writing and set a schedule for the perfecting of the appeal. This communication is without prejudice to any motion any party may wish to make.
Strunk v Paterson -Page 2February 10,2012
If you have any questions regarding this letter, you may contact either Susan Dautel (518-455-7701) or James Costello (518-455-7702). Very truly yours,
~tJlZw
AWK/jac/ai cc: Christopher Earl Strunk Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman
Exhibit F
Exhibit G
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KING$ IAS PART 27 CHRISTOPHER EARL STRUNK, Plaintiff,
----------------------------------------X
Index No. 6500/2011
?
(Hon. Arthur M. Schack)
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.
ORDER WITH NOTICE OF ENTRY
----------------------------------------X
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the within is a true copy of an o,rder of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County (Hon. Arthur M. Schack), duly filed and entered in the office of the Clerk of Kings County on the 13th day of April,
. .
~ated':
New York, New York May 10, 2012 ERIC Ti SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York Attorney for S t a t e Defendan
JOEL GRABER Special Litigation Counsel Litigation Bureau 120 Broadway - 24th Floor New York, NY 10271-0332 (212) 416-8645
Page 1
1 of 1 DOCUMENT
[** 11 Christopher-Earl Strunk, in esse ,Plaintiff, against New York State,Board of, Elections; JAMES A. WALSWCo-Chair, DOUGLAS A. KELLNERlCo-Chair, EVELYN J. AQUILA, Commissioner, GREGORY P. PETERSON, Commissioner, Deputy Director TODD D. VALENTINE, Deputy Director STANLY ZALEN; ANDREW CUOMO, ERIC SCHNEIDERMAN, THOMAS P. DINAPOLI, RUTH NOEMI COLON, in their Official and individual capacity, Fr. JOSEPH A. O'HARE, S.J.; Fr. JOSEPH P. PARKES, S.J.; FREDERICK A. 0. SCHWARZ, JR.; PETER G. PETERSEN; ZBIGNIEW KAIMIERZ BRZEZINSKI; MARK BRZEZINSKI; JOSEPH R BIDEN, JR.; SOEBARKAH ( a k a Barry Soetoro, a k a . Barack Hussein Obama, a.ka Steve Dunham); NANCY PELOSI; DEMOCRATIC STATE COMMITTEE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK; STATE COMMITTEE O F THE WORKING FAMILIES PARTY OF NEW YORK STATE; ROGER CALERO; THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY; LAN J. BRZEZINSKI; JOHN SIDNEY MCCAIN 111; JOHN A. BOEHNER; THE NEW YORK STATE REPUB LICAN STATE COMMITTEE; THE NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE OF THE INDEPENDENCE PARTY; STATE COMMITTEE O F THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF NEW YORK STATE; PENNY S. PRITZKER; GEORGE SOROS; OBAMA FOR AMERICA; OBAMA VICTORY FUND; MCCAIN VICTORY 2008; MCCAIN-PALIN VICTORY 2008; JOHN AND JANE DOES; and XYZ ENTITIES., Defendants.
SUPREME COURT O F NEW YORK, KINGS COUNTY 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1635; 2012 NY Slip Op 50614U April 11,2012, Decided NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE PRINTED OFFICIAL REPORTS. COUNSEL: [*I] Christopher Earl Strunk, plaintiff, Pro se, Brooklyn NY.
Obama, VP Biden Obama for America, Obama Victory Fund, Nancy Pelosi and Penny Pritzker, Uniondale NY; Daniel S. Reich, Esq., Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman, PC, NY NY. For John McCain 111:. Rita C. Tobin, Esq., Caplin and Drysdale, NY NY. For John A. Bohner: Thomas W. Kirby, Esq., Wiley Rein, LLP. For George Soros: Washington DC, John R. Oller, Esq., Wilkie Farr & Gallagher, LLP, NY NY.
JUDGES: HON. ARTHUR M.'SCHACK, J. S. C. OPINION BY: ARTHUR M. SCHACK OPINION
For all NYS Govenunent Defendants: Joel Graber, Esq., State of NY, Ofice of Attorney General, NY NY. For F A 0 Schwarz and O'Hare, Defendants: Chlarens Orsland, Esq., NYC Law Department, NY NY. For Peter Peterson: Sarah Dunn, Esq., Simpson Thacher
& Bartlett, LLP, NY NY.
For Brzezinskis: Marshall Beil, Esq., McGuire Woods, LLP, NY NY. For Socialist Workers and Roger Calero: Thomas J. Gany, Esq., Harris Beach, PLLC Atty for President
Arthur M. Schack, J.
2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1635, *; 2012 NY Slip Op 50614U, **
Page 2
If the complaint in this action was a movie script, it would be entitled The Manchurian Candidate Meets The Da Vinci Code. Pro se plaintiff CHRISTOPHER- EARL STRUNK brings this action against numerous defendants, including President BARACK [*2] OBAMA, Vice President JOSEPH BIDEN, Senator JOHN MCCAIN, Speaker of the House of Representatives JOHN BOEI-INER, fonner House of Representatives Speaker NANCY PELOSI, Governor ANDREW CUOMO, Attorney General ERIC SCHNEIDERMAN, Comptroller THOMAS DI NAPOLI, the NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, billionaires PETER PETERSEN, PENNY PRITZKER, GEORGE SOROS and six New York State political parties. Thirteen motions are pending before the Court. Plaintiff STRUNK's complaint is a rambling, fortyfive page variation on "birther" cases, containing 150 prolix paragraphs, in at times a stream of consciousness. Plaintiffs central allegation is that defendants President OBAMA and Senator McCAIN, despite not being "natural born" citizens of the United States according to plaintiffs interpretation of Article 11, Section 1, [**2] Clause 5 of the U.S. Constitution, engaged with the assistance of other defendants in an extensive conspiracy, on behalf of the Roman Catholic Church to defraud the American people and usurp control of the Presidency in 2008. Most of plaintiff STRUNK's complaint is a lengthy, vitriolic, baseless diatribe against defendants, but most especially against the Vatican, the Roman Catholic [*3] Church, and particularly the Society of Jesus (the Jesuit Order). Plaintiff STRUNK alleges seven causes of action: breach of state constitutional fiduciary duty by the NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS and public officer defendants; denial of equal protection for voter expectation of a correct ballot; denial of substantive due process for voter expectation of a correct ballot; interference with the right to a republican form of government by the two Jesuit defendants and defendant F.A.O. SCHWARZ, JR., who were all members of the New York City Campaign Finance Board; interference with plaintiffs election fianchise; a scheme to defraud plaintiff of a reasonable expectation of successful participation in the sufllage process; and, a scheme by all defendants for unjust enrichment. Plaintiff requests a declaratory judgment and a preliminary injunction against defendants, including: enjoining the NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS from putting Presidential candidates on the ballot for 2012 unless they provide proof of eligibility, pursuant to Article 11, Section 1, Clause 5 of the U. S. Constitution; ordering that this eligibility certification be submitted to the Court for proof of compliance; [*4] enjoining the Jesuits from interfering with the 2012 elections; ordering expedited discovery to determine the scope of damages,
alleged to be more than $12 billion; and, ordering a jury trial for punitive treble damages. Various defendants or groups of defendants, all represented by counsel, present eleven motions to dismiss and one motion to admit an attorney pro hace vice for this action. The eleven individual defendants or groups of defendants are, in chronological order of filing their motions to dismiss: defendants President BARACK OBAMA, Vice President JOSEPH BIDEN, OBAMA FOR AMERICA and the OBAMA VICTORY FUND; defendants MCCAIN VICTORY 2008, MCCAINPALIN VICTORY 2008 and Senator JOHN MCCAIN; defendants MARK BRZEZINSKI and IAN BRZEZMSKI; defendant Representative NANCY PELOSI; defendant GEORGE SOROS; defendants THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY and ROGER CALERO; defendant Speaker JOHN BOEI-INER; defendant ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI; defendants Father JOSEPH A. O'HARE, S.J., Father JOSEPH P. PARKES, S.J. and FREDERICK A. 0. SCHWARZ, JR.; defendant PENNY PRITZKER; and defendant PETER G. PETERSEN. The eleven motions to dismiss assert: plaintiff STRUNK lacks standing; plaintiff STRUNK fails to state [*5] a claim upon which relief can be granted; plaintiff STRUNK fails to plead fraud with particularity; the action is frivolous; plaintiff STRUNK is barred by collateral estoppel fiom pursuing this action; and, the Court lacks both personal and subject matter jurisdiction in this action. The motion to admit counsel pro hace vice for the instant action, by counsel for defendants MCCAIN VICTORY 2008, MCCAIN-PALIN VICTORY 2008 and Senator JOHN MCCAIN, for Todd E. Phillips, Esq., a member in good standing of both the California and District of Columbia bars, is granted. Further, plaintiff STRUNK cross-moves to consolidate the instant action with a similar "birther" action filed by him, Strunk v Paterson, et al, Index No. 29642108, in the Kings County Special Election Part, before Justice David Schmidt. Many of the defendants oppose [**3] consolidation because Strunk v Paterson, et al, Index No. 29642108, is a disposed case. The cross-motion to consolidate this action with Strunk v Paterson, et al, Index No. 29642108, is denied. Defendants who oppose plaintiffs cross-motion are correct. Justice Schmidt disposed of Strunk v Paterson, et al, Index No. 29642108, on the.grounds of collateral estoppel, [*6] failure to join necessary parties and laches. The eleven motions to dismiss are all granted and plaintiff STRUNK's instant complaint is dismissed with prejudice. It is clear that plaintiff STRUNK: lacks standing; fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; fails to plead fraud with particularity; and, is barred by collateral estoppel. Also, this Court lacks sub-
Page 3
ject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over most. if not all. defendants. Furthermore, plaintiff STRUNK's instant action is frivolous. As will be explained, plaintiff STRUNK alleges baseless claims about defendants which are fanciful, fantastic, delusional and irrational. It is a waste of judicial resources for the Court to spend time on the instant action. Moreover, the Court will conduct a hearing to give plaintiff STRUNK a reasonable opportunity to be heard, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 5 130- 1.1, as to whether or not the Court should award costs andlor impose sanctions upon plaintiff STRUNK for his frivolous conduct. At the hearing, an opportunity will be given to counsel for defendants to present detailed records of costs incurred by their clients in the instant action. Therefore, plaintiff STRUNK, who is not [*7] a stranger in the courthouses of New York, is enjoined from commencing future litigation in the New York State Unified Court System against: the NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, JAMES A. WALSW Co-Chair, DOUGLAS A. KELLNERICoChair, EVELYN J. AQUILAlCommissioner, GREGORY P. PETERSONlCommissioner, Deputy Director TODD D. VALENTINE, and Deputy Director STANLY ZALEN; ANDREW CUOMO, ERIC SCHNEIDERMAN, THOMAS P. DINAPOLI and RUTH NOEMI COLON, in their Official and individual capacity; Father JOSEPH A. O'HARE, S.J.; Father JOSEPH P. PARKES, S.J.; FREDERICK A. 0. SCHWARZ, JR.; PETER G. PETERSEN; ZBIGNIEW KAIMIERZ BRZEZINSKI; MARK BRZEZINSKI; JOSEPH R BIDEN, JR.; BARACK H. OBAMA, NANCY PELOSI; the DEOMCRATIC STATE COMMITTEE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK; the STATE COMMITTEE OF THE WORKING FAMILIES PARTY OF NEW YORK STATE; ROGER CALERO; the SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY; IAN J. BRZEZMSKI; JOHN SIDNEY MCCAIN 111; JOHN A. BOEHNER; the NEW YORK STATE REPUBLICAN STATE COMMITTEE; the NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE OF THE MDEPENDENCE PARTY; the STATE COMMITTEE OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF NEW YORK STATE; PENNY S. PRITZKER; GEORGE SOROS; OBAMA FOR AMERICA; OBAMA VICTORY FUND; MCCAIN VICTORY 2008; and MCCAIN-PALIN [*8] VICTORY 2008; without prior approval of the appropriate Administrative Justice or Judge. Background Plaintiff STRUNK previously commenced similar actions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York and this Court, the Supreme Court of [**4] the State of New York, Kings County. In Strunk v New York State Board o Elections, et al., Index f
No. 08-CV4289 (US Dist Ct, EDNY, Oct. 28, 2008, Ross, J.1, the Court dismissed the action because of plaintiffs lack of standing,. failure to state a claim and frivolousness. In that action, plaintiff STRUNK accused the NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS of "misapplication and misadministration of state law in preparation for the November 4, 2008 Presidential General Election" by, among other things, in 7 51 of the complaint, of "failure to obtain and ascertain that Barrack Hussein Obama is a natural citizen, otherwise contrary to United States Constitution Article 2 Second 1 Clause 5 [sic]" and demanded "Defendants are to provide proof that Barrack Hussein Obama is a natural born citizen and if not his electors are to be stricken from the ballot [sic]." Judge Ross, at page 6 of her decision, held "the court finds that portions [*9] of plaintiffs affidavit rise to the level of the irrational" and, in footnote 6, Judge Ross cited two prior 2008 Eastern District cases filed by plaintiff STRUNK in which "the court has determined that portions of plaintiffs complaints have contained allegations that have risen to the irrational." My Kings County Supreme Court colleague, Justice Schmidt, in Strunk v Paterson, et al, Index No. 29642108, as cited above, disposed of that matter, on March 14,201 1, by denying all of plaintiffs motions and noting that the statute of limitations expired to join necessary parties President OBAMA and Senator MCCAM. Further, Justice Schmidt denied plaintiff an opportunity to file affidavits of service nunc pro tunc and to amend the complaint. Then, plaintiff STRUNK, eight days later, on March 22, 201 1, commenced the instant action by filing the instant verified complaint. Plaintiff STRUNK's complaint recites numerous baseless allegations about President OBAMA. These allegations are familiar to anyone who follows the "birther9'movement: President OBAMA is not a "natural-born": citizen of the United States; the President is a radical Muslim; the President's Hawaiian Certificate of Live Birth [* 101 does not prove that he was born in Hawaii; and, President OBAMA is actually a citizen of Indonesia, the United Kingdom, Kenya, or all of the above. For example, Plaintiff STRUNK alleges, in 7 24 of the complaint, that President OBAMA: is a Madrasah trained radical Sunni Muslim by birth right . . . practices, Shariah law . . . with the full knowledge and blessing of Defendants: Peter G. Peterson; Zbigniew Brzezinski; his sons Mark and Ian; Penny S. Pritzker; George Soros; Jesuits Fathers: Joseph P. O'Hare, Joseph P. Parkes; Brennan Center Executive Frederick A. 0 . Schwarz, Jr.; Nancy Pelosi, John Sidney,McCain 111; John A.
Page 4
Boehner; Hillary Clinton; Richard Durbin and others. [sic]
Then, in 7 28 of the complaint, plaintiff STRUNK alleges that President OBAMA "or his agent@)as part of the scheme to defraud placed an image of Hawaiian Certification of Live Birth [**5] (COLB) on the Interest . . . and as a prima facie fact means the Hawaii issued COLB does not prove natural born' citizenship or birth in Hawaii, only a long form document would [sic.]" Plaintiffs alleged vast conspiracy implicates dozens of political and religious figures, as well as the 2008 presidential candidates from both major [*I11 parties, with numerous absurd allegations. They range from claiming that an associate at the large law fm of Kirkland and Ellis, LLP masterminded the conspiracy because she wrote a law review article about the U. S. Constitution's natural born citizen requirement for the office of President to the assertion that Islam is a seventh century A.D. invention of the Vatican. Further, plaintiff STRUNK alleges, in 7 129 of the complaint, that he: is the only person in the USA to have duly fired fired fired BHO [President OBAMA] on January 23, 2009 by registered mail (rendering BHO the USURPER as Plaintiff is entitled to characterize BHO as) on the grounds that he had not proven himself eligible . . and all acts by the usurper are void ab initio -- a serious poblem! [sic]
about Senator MCCAIN'S eligibility to run for President. However, plaintiff STRUNK alleges, in 7 43 of the complaint, that Senate Resolution 5 1 1 "is part of the scheme to defraud" and "a fraud upon Congress and the People of the several states and territories contrary to the facts." Then, plaintiff STRUNK, in 7 44 of the complaint, cites Senate Resolution 51 1's text as evidence that President OBAMA concedes that the defmition of natural born citizenship for President requires both parents of a candidate be U.S. citizens at birth. Further, the complaint alleges that JOHN MCCAIN and ROGER CALERO, [*13] presidential candidate of the SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY, were also ineligible, like thenSenator OBAMA, for President because of their failure to qualify under the natural born citizen requirement. [**61 Plaintiffs alleged injury, in 7 47 of the complaint, is "[tlhat on November 4, 2008, Plaintiff, as a victim of the scheme to defraud, voted for the electors representing . . . McCain . . . not a natural-born U.S. citizen." Further, in 7 49 of the complaint, "as part of the scheme to defraud, Plaintiff voted for Candidate McCain despite the fact that his wife is a most devoted Roman Catholic whose two sons were educated by Jesuit priests." Plaintiff alleges, in 7 5 1 of the complaint, that Senator MCCAM, was born in Colon Hospital, Colon, Panania, which was not irr the Panama Canal Zone. Further, plaintiff alleges, in 7 52 of the complaint, that according to the November 18, 1903 Hay-Bunau.Varilla Treaty, by which the United States obtained the Canal Zone, Senator MCCAIN is not a natural-born citizen. Plaintiff STRUNK, in his final twenty pages of the complaint, alleges that the massive conspiracy to d e h u d American voters was perpetrated by hundreds of individuals, at the behest of the Roman Catholic Church and especially the Jesuits, [*I41 with the aim of bringing about the Apocalypse through the destruction of the A1 Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem and the re-building a new Jewish Temple on that site. Among the entities that Plaintiff STRUNK implicates in his alleged conspiracy are: the Muslim Brotherhood; the Carlyle Group; the CFR; Halliburton; Kirkland and Ellis, LLP; and, the Brennan Center for Justice at N W . For example, in 7 9 1 of the complaint, plaintiff STRUNK states: That members of the Council on For-, eign Relations including Peter G. Petersen as then Chairman that act with the Jesuit Order by the oath of allegiance superior to the United States Constitution, Treaties, and various States' Constitutions that starting no later than January 2006 sought to usurp the executive branch of government using Barack Hussein Obama I1 and
Plaintiffs allegations are strongly anti-Catholic, antiMuslim and xenophobic. The complaint weaves the occasional true but irrelevant fact into plaintiffs rambling stream of consciousness. Moreover, plaintiff STRUNK alleges, in 1 2 2 of the complaint, that defendant Vice President BIDEN knew that President OBAMA was "not eligible to run for, president because he is not a Natural-Born Citizen with a British Subject Father [*12] with a student visa, however in furtherance of CFR [Council on Foreign Relations] foreign policy initiatives in the mid-east supported Soebarkah [President OBAMA] as a Muslim [sic]." Also, Plaintiff STRUNK discusses, in the complaint, then-Senator OBAMA's April 2008 co-sponsorship of Senate Resolution 5 1 1. This resolved unanimously that Senator MCCAIN, born in 1936 in Panama, while his father was on active duty in the United States Navy at Coco Sola Naval Air Station, is a natural born citizen of the United States. This resolution put to rest questions
,
Page 5
John S. McCain 111, as a matched set of contenders then under joint command and control. to vreclude any other contender in for a b a n k g and sub-prime mortgage collapse that requires subsuming the sovereignty of the people of the united States of America and New York to International Monetary Fund conditionality with loss of the dollar reserve currency status, and collapse of the [* 151 living standards of the vast majority of the Americans to that of a third world status. [sic]
MR. STRUNK: My injury, I voted for McCain. THE COURT: Is that an injury?
MR. STRUNK: My injury is he did not challenge Mr. Obama after he went through the whole exercise.
THE COURT: You're saying he should have challenged Mr. Obama's presidency?
Plaintiff STRUNK, in 7 139 of the complaint, alleges that defendant GEORGE SOROS "proves his allegiance to Rome by promoting Muslim Brotherhood overt control of Egypt . . . We cannot forget that the Jesuits in Cairo created the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, the same year the Order created Opus Dei in Spain [sic]." Further, plaintiff STRUNK, in 7 145 of the complaint alleges that "Defendants Pritzker and Soros have managed a crucial role for the Vatican State as a member of the CFR and high level Freemasonry and in conjunction with King Juan Carlos (the King of Jerusalem) to create global regionalism that subsumes national [**7] sovereignty of the USA and the People of New York state to the detriment of plaintiff and those similarly situated [sic]."
MR. STRUNK: Absolutely, and the ballot. The onus is on me because [*17] he violated his agreement with me. You can't challenge the eligibility until he's up to be sworn. McCain, since everybody in Congress, since they didn't want to know about anything, so it was my responsibility. I fired him by registered mail within 72 hours.
THE COURT: I saw your letter that you fued the President. I guess he didn't agree with you because he's still there.
lev en defendants or groups of defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff STRUNK: lacks standing; failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; failed to plead fraud with particularity; and, is barred by collateral estoppel. Further, defendants argue that the Court lacks both personal and subject matter jurisdiction and the instant [*16] complaint is frivolous. Plaintiff, in response, filed an affidavit in opposition to the motions to dismiss and moved to consolidate the instant action with Strunk v Paterson, et al, Index No. 29642108.
On August 22, 20 11, I held oral arguments on the record with respect to the thirteen instant motions. At the hearing, plaintiff STRUNK agreed with the Court that President OBAMA, with the release of his long-form Hawaiian birth certificate, was born in Honolulu, Hawaii [tr., p. 231. However, plaintiff STRUNK, at tr., pp. 30 3 1, argued that a "natural born citizen," eligible to run for President of the United States, pursuant to Article 11, Section 1, Clause 5 of the U.S. Constitution, means that not only the candidate is natural born, but both of the candidate's parents are natural born.
A discussion ensued as to how plaintiff STRUNK alleges that President OBAMA is a Muslim [tr., pp. 36 381. The following colloquy took place at tr., p.'37, lines 4-8: THE COURT: How could you come to the conclusion that he's a radical Sunni Muslim? [**8] MR. STRUNK: Because that's what his records show and that's what the testimony of individuals who were in class with him show.
The following portions of the exchange, at tr., p. 39, line 9 p. 43, line 8 demonstrates the irrational antiCatholic bias of plaintiff STRUNK:
The following exchange at the oral arguments took place, at tr., p. 34, line 25 p. 35, line 16:
THE COURT: What I find fascinating, first of all you said there was a connection there where you say Cindy McCain says she's a Catholic. I don't know if she is. I think you said she's Catholic faith, Cindy McCain.
Page 6
MR. STRUNK: She is the largest distributor of Budweiser. THE COURT: I know that. That doesn't [* 181 make.her a Catholic necessarily.
MR: STRUNK: It's the connection that counts. Your don't get those connections.
school of the Vatican, by that way it describes the gist of your argument. MR. STRUNK: Frankenheimer? THE COURT: He directed the original Manchurian Candidate movie. MR. STRUNK: The old? THE COURT: With Frank, not Denzel. MR. STRUNK: Frankenheimer? THE COURT: 1962 movie. MR. STRUNK: I was aware of the movie at that point, but .,
THE COURT: . . . I don't know if the Busch family is Catholic. I don't care. MR. STRUNK: That's big business. THE COURT: That's big business selling beer . . . Let's put Anheuser-Busch to the side. You said she's a Catholic and you get into this whole riff or rant, whatever you want to call it, about the Catholic Church and Father O'Hare, the Vatican. You go on and on about the Vatican . . . but it seems to me you have this theory that everything is a conspiracy and it always falls back to Rome. MR. STRUNK: That's a matter of public record. THE COURT: Oh, okay. MR. STRUNK: What the key is here, Ms. McCain is on the Board of Directors for a Jesuit run school where her children are going to school. THE COURT: Could very well be. I don't know. MR. STRUNK: . . . In fact, it turns out in the discovery of the connection to the Jesuits it was so compelling that when I started really digging .into the background of this scheme of defraud, putting up two [**9] Manchurian candidates at once, which would take advantage of New York State's weakness in our law which required honesty. .We require to have [* 191 honesty and didn't get it. THE COURT: Your case is more The Da Vinci Code. MR. STRUNK: The Da Vinci Code is a phoney book. THE COURT: With all due respect to John Frankenheimer, The Manchurian Candidate according to you and the
'
THE COURT: Okay, forget it. MR. STRUNK: This is the one with Frank Sinatra? THE COURT: And Laurence Harvey. MR. STRUNK: The Queen of DiamondsMow you've brought -
THE COURT: You mentioned The Manchurian Candidate. They have it in the movie. MR. STRUNK: I've used it as a pejorative. THE COURT: I understand that, and I think that The Da Vinci Code, to make some interesting argument, that's a work of fiction. At least I think it's a work of fiction. M R STRUNK: The Manchurian Candidate was not a work of fiction. The work - I didn't want to get into this area.
I
THE COURT: Let's not get into analogies. I understand you have various arguments but it seems [*20] to all come back to Rome. MR. STRUNK: No, it comes back to New York State and whether I have stand-. ing in the Supreme Court of the State of New York [**lo] on the question of who's going to take responsibility to enforce the law which has not been done. THE COURT: Okay, that's your argument.
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Standard for a motion to dismiss "When determining a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffsthe benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory' (see Arnav Indus., Inc. Retirement Trust v Brown, Raysman, Milstein, Felder & Steiner, 96 NY2d 300, 303 [2001]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]) [Emphasis added'J." (Goldman v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 5 NY3d 561, 570-571 [2005]). Further, the Court, in Morris v ~ o r r (306 AD2d 449,451 [2d Dept 2003]), instructed h that: In determining whether a complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion pursuant to CPLR 321 1 (a) (7), "the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable [*21] at law a motion for dismissal will fail" (Guggenheimer v Ginsburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]. The court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint to be true and determine only whether the facts alleged jit within any cognizable legal theory (see Dye v Catholic Med. Ctr. o Brooklyn & Queens, 273 f AD2d 193 [2000]). However, bare legal conclusions are not entitled to the benefit o the presumption o truth and are not f f accorded every favorable inference (see Doria v Masucci, 230 AD2d 764 [2000]). [Emphasis added]
Plaintiff [*22] STRUNK's complaint must be dismissed because the "Court need not, and should not, accept legal conclusions, unwarranted inferences, unwarranted deductions, baseless conclusions of law, or sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations; (Ulmann v Norma Kamali, Inc., 207 AD2d 691 [Id Dept 19941; Mark [** 111 Hampton, Inc. v Bergreen, 173 AD2d 220 [Id Dept 1991])." (Goode v Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 8 Misc 3d 1023[A], at 2 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 20051). It is clear that the facts alleged by plaintiff STRUNK do not fit into any cognizable legal theory. Plaintiff STRUNK'S complaint is more of a political manifesto than a verified pleading. Similar lawsuits challenging the eligibility of President OBAMA and Senator MCCAM for the presidency based upon plaintiffs incorrect interpretation of the tenn "natural born Citizen" in Article 11, Section 1, Clause 5 of the U.S. Constitution have been dismissed as a matter of law. (See Drake v Obama, 664 F 3d 774 [9th Cir 201 11; Barnett v Obama, 2009 WL 3861788 [US Dist Ct, CD CA 20091; Berg v Obama, 574 F Supp 2d 509 [ED Pa 20081, afld 586 F3d 234 [3d Cir 20091; Robinson v Bowen, 567 F Supp 2d 1144 WD Ca 20081; Hollander v McCain, 566 F Supp 2d 63 [D NH 20081). . Plaintiff [*23] STRUNK lacks standing Plaintiff STRUNK lacks standing to sue in state court, having suffered no injury. "Standing to sue is critical to the proper functioning of the judicial system. It is a threshold issue. If standing is denied, the pathway to the courthouse is blocked. The plaintiff who has standing, however, may cross the threshold and seek judicial redress." (Saratoga County Chamber o Commerce, Inc. v f Pataki, 100 NY2d 801 8 12 [2003], cert denied 540 U.S. 1017 [2003]). Professor David Siegel, in NY Prac, 4 136, at 232 [4d ed] instructs that: [i]t is the law's policy to allow only an aggrieved persen to bring a lawsuit . . . A want of "standing to sue," in other words, is just another way of saying that this particular plaintiff is not involved in a genuine controversy, and a simple syllogism takes us from there to a "jurisdictional" dismissal: (1) the courts have jurisdiction only over controversies; (2) a plaintiff. found to lack "standing" is not involved in a controversy; and (3) the courts therefore have no jurisdiction of the case when such a plaintiff purports to bring it.
For a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the factual allegations in the claim cannot be "merely conclusory and speculative in nature and not supported by any specific facts." (Residentsfor a More Beautiful Port Washington, Inc. v Town o North Hempstead, 153 AD3d 727, 729 [2d Dept f 19891). "The allegations in the complaint cannot be vague and conclusory." (Stoianofv Gahona, 248 AD2d 525 [2d Dept 19981, app dismissed 92 NY2d 844 [1998], cert denied by Stoianoffv New York Times, 525 U.S. 953 [1998]). (See LoPresti v Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 30 AD3d 474 [2d Dept 20061; Levin v Isayeu, 27 AD3d 425 [2d Dept 20061; Hart v Scott, 8 AD3d 532 [2d Dept 20041).
"Standing to sue requires an interest in the claim at issue in the lawsuit that the law will recognize [*24] as a
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suff~cient predicate for determining the issue at the litigant's request." (Caprer v Nussbaum, 36 AD3d 176, 181 [2d Dept 20061). "An analysis of standing begins with a determination of whether the party seeking relief has sustained an injury (see Society o Plastic Indus. v f County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761, 762-773 [19911)." v Etaki, 98 NY2d 45,52 [2002]). "The C& of Appeals has defined the standard by which standing is measured, explaining that a plaintiff, in order to have standing in a particular dispute, must demonstrate an injury in fact that falls within the relevant zone of interests sought to be protected by law." (Caprer v Nussbaum at 183). [**I21 A plaintiff, to have standing, "must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." (Allen v Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 [1984]). If a plaintiff lacks standing to sue, the plaintiff may not proceed in the action. (Stark v Goldberg, 297 AD2d 203 [Ist Dept 20021).
ahon on&
Morris v Morris at 451, "bare legal conclusions are not entitled to the benefit of the presumption of truth and are not accorded every favorable inference." Moreover, plaintiff has failed to plead any facts that fit within any cognizable legal theory. (Goldman v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., at 570-571). Further, plaintiff STRUNK's often rambling and almost incomprehensible complaint fails to satisfy the pleading requirements of CPLR 53013 and CPLR Rule 3014. CPLR 5 3013 requires statements in a pleading to be "sufficiently particular to. give the court and parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved and the material elements of each cause of action or defense." CPLR Rule 3014 [*27] imposes additional pleading requirements that "[elvery pleading shall consist of plain and concise statements in consecutively numberedparagraphs. Each paragraph shall contain, as far as practicable, a single allegation . . . Separate causes of action or defenses shall be separately stated and numbered and may be stated regardless of consistency." In Sibersky v New York City (270 AD2d 209 [Id Dept 20001, the Court dismissed an amended petition for its "complete failure to follow the dictates of CPLR 30 13 or 3014." The Sibersky complaint consisted of "seven pages of single-spaced, unnumbered paragraphs, the import of which is unascertainable," and the Court held that "[plleadings that are not particular enough to provide the court and the parties with notice of the transaction or occurrences to be [**I31 proved must be dismissed." Complaints that do not meet the pleading requirements of CPLR 5 3013 and CPLR Rule 3014 will be dismissed if "devoid of specific factual allegations" and do not "indicate the material elements of a claim and how they would apply to the case." (Megna v Becton Dickinson & Co., 215 AD2d 542 [2d Dept 19951). In Peri v State (66 AD2d 949 [3d Dept 1979]), affd 48 NY2d 734 [1979]), [*28] a pro se plaintiffs complaint was dismissed for failure to comply with CPLR 4 3013. The Court instructed that "[alt a minimum, a valid complaint must include all material elements of the cause of action." Plaintiff STRUNK's rambling, forty-five page prolix complaint, with its irrelevant, scatter-shot morass of alleged historical references, virulent anti-Catholic rhetoric and extensive political rant fails to plead his alleged causes of action in a manner that is "sufficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved and the material elements of each cause of action [CPLR 5 30131" and organized in "plain and concise statements in consecutively numbered paragraphs [CPLR Rule 30141." "While a refined and attenuated analysis might arguably spell out a shadow of a cause of action, neither the defendants nor the trial court
Plaintiff STRUNK clearly lacks standing to sue because he cannot establish an injury in fact. Plaintiffs claim that his November 2008 vote for Senator MCCAIN for President [*25] was his injury is the type of generalized grievance that is foreclosed by the U.S. Constitution's particularized injury requirement. "We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government-claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at largedoes not state an Article 111 case or controversy." (Lujan v Defenders o Wildlife, f 504 U.S. 555, 572 [1992]). "Thus, a private citizen who does not show any special rights or interests in the matter in controversy, other than those common to all taxpayers and citizens, has no standing to sue." (Matter o Meehan f v County o Westchester, 3 AD3d 533, 534 [2d Dept f 20041). (See Diederich v Rockland County Police Chiefs' Ass'n, 33 AD3d 653, 654 [2d Dept 20061; Concerned f Taxpayers o Stony Point v Town o Stony Point, 28 f AD3d 657, 658 [2d Dept 20061). Plaintiff STRUNK's complaint alleges nothing more than non-justiciable abstract and theoretical claims. Therefore, the instant complaint, failing to state any allegation of a particularized injury, is dismissed [*26] with prejudice. (Silver v Pataki at 539; Mahoney v Pataki at 52). Plaintiff Strunk's failure to state a cause of action Alternatively, plaintiff STRUNK's complaint must be dismissed for his failure to state a cause of action. The Court is under no obligation to accept as true plaintiffs complaint, full of legal conclusions and bald assertions cloaked as facts. (Ruftino v New York City Tr. Aurh., 55 AD3d 817, 818 [2d Dept 20081). As noted above, in
should be subject to the difficulties." (Kent v Truman, 9 AD2d 649 [Id Dept 19591). (See Geist v Rolls Royce Limited, 18 AD2d 63 1 [Id Dept 19621; Safer Beef Co., Inc. v Northern Boneless Beej Inc., 15 AD2d 479.[Id Dept 19611). In a case, such as this one, in which [*29] "the amended complaint is prolix, confusing, and difficult.to answer" and the complaint contains "a confusing succession of discrete facts, conclusions, comments . . . and considerable other subsidiary evidentiary matter whose relevance to a particular cause of action is frequently obscure . . . Defendants should not be required to answer such a jumble." (Rapaport v Diamond Dealers, Club, Inc., 95 AD2d 743, 744 [Id Dept 19831). (See.Etu v Cumberland Farms, Inc., 148 AD2d 821,824 [3d Dept 19891). Plaintiff STRUNK fails to plead fraud with particularity "The elements of fraud are narrowly defined, requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence ( c j , Vermeer Owners v Guterman, 78 NY2d 1114, 1116 [1991])." (Guidon v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 94 NY2d 330, 349-350 [1999]). Mere conclusory statements alleging the wrong in the pleadings are insufficient. (McGovern v Nassau County Dept. of Social Services, 60 AD3d 1016 [2d Dept 20091; Sargiss v Magarelli, 50 AD3d 1117 [2d Dept 20081; Dumas v Firoito, 13 AD3d 332 [2d Dept 20041; Sforza v Health Ins. Plan of Greater New York, 2 10 AD2d 2 14,2 15 [2d Dept 19941).
*
ments of defendants and fails to allege that he suffered any pecuniary loss as a result of the statements of any defendant. Actual pecuniary loss must be alleged in a fraud action. (Dress Shirt Sales, Inc. v Hotel Martinique Assoc., 12 NY2d 339, 343 [1963]; Rivera v Wyckofl Heights Hosp., 184 AD2d 558, 561 [2d Dept 19921). [*311 The mere use of the word "fraud" in a complaint is not sufficient to comply with the specific requirements of CPLR 4 30 16 (b) that fraud be plead with particularity. Therefore, plaintiff STRUNK fails to allege the necessary elements for a fraud cause of action. This Court lacks jurisdiction Plaintiffs complaint essentially challenges the qualifications of both President OBAMA and Senator MCCAM to hold the office of President. This is a nonjusticiable political question. Thus, it requires the dismissal of the instant complaint. "The "nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers." (Baker v Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 [1962]). Under separation of powers, "[tlhe constitutional power of Congress to regulate federal elections is well established." (Buckley v Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13 [1976]). (See Oregon v Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 [1970]; Burroughs v United States, 290 U.S. 534 119341). Under New York law, "[tlhis judicial deference to a coordinate, coequal branch of government includes one issue of justiciability generally denominated as the political question' doctrine." (Matter of New York State Inspection, Security & Law Enforcement Employees, District Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 233,239 [ 19841). The [*32] framework for the Electoral College and its voting procedures for President and Vice President is found in Article 11, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution. This is fleshed out in 3 USC 4 1 et seq., which details the procedures for Presidential elections. More specifically, the counting of electoral votes and the process for objecting for the 2009 Presidential election is found in 3 USC 15, as modified by Pub L 110-430, 4 2, 122 U.S. Stat 4846. This required the meeting of the joint session of Congress to count the 2008 electoral votes to be held on January 8, 2009. On that day, after the counting of the Electoral College votes, then-Vice President Dick Cheney made the requisite declaration of the election of President, OBAMA and Vice President BIDEN,. (155 Cong Rec H76 [Jan. 8 20091). No objections were made by members of the Senate and House of Representatives, which would have resolved these objections if made. This is the exclusive means to resolve objections to the electors' selection of a President or a Vice President, including objections raised by plaintiff STRUNK. Federal courts have no role in this process. Plainly, state courts have no role.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, in Giurdanella v Giurdanella (226 AD2d 342, 343 [1996], [*30] held that: to establish a prima facie case of fraud, the plaintiff must establish (1) that the defendant made material representations that were false, (2) that the defendant knew the representations were false and made them with the intent to deceive the plaintiff, (3) that the plaintiff justifiably relied on the defendant's representations, and (4) that the plaintiff was [** 141 injured as a result of the defendant's representation. (See Kerusa Co., LLC v WIOZ/515 Real Estate Ltd. Partnership, 12 NY3d 236 [2009]; Small v Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc. 94 NY2d 43 [1999]; Channel Master Corp. v Aluminum Limited Sales, Inc., 4 NY2d 403 [1958]; Smith v Ameriquest Mortg. Corp., 60 AD3d 1037 [2d Dept 20091; Cash v Titan Financial Services, Inc. 58 AD3d 785 [2d Dept 20091). Plaintiff STRUNK presents in his complaint fraud accusations that can be, at best, described as bare assertions. He does not allege that he relied upon aiy state-
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Thus, this Court lacks subject matter [*33] jurisdiction to determine the eligibility and qualifications of President OBAMA to be President, as well as the same for Senator MCCAIN or ROGER CALERO. If a state court were to involve itself in the eligibility of a candidate to hold the office of President, a determination reserved for the Electoral [* * 151 College and Congress, it may involve itself in national political matters for which it is institutionally ill-suited and interfere with the constitutional authority of the Electoral College and Congress. Accordingly, the political question doctrine instructs this Court and other courts to refrain from superseding the judgments of the nation's voters and those federal'government entities the Constitution designates as the proper forums to determine the eligibility of presidential candidates. Justice Robert Jackson, concurring in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer (343 U.S. 579,635 19521, in discussing separation of powers stated that "the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty." Justice Thurgood Marshall, in his majority opinion in U.S.v Munoz-Flores (495 U.S. 385,394 [1990]), on the subject of separation of powers, quoted from Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent in [*34] Morrison v Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 [1988], in which Justice Scalia observed that "[tlhe Framers of the Federal Constitution . . . viewed the principle of separation of powers as the absolutely central guarantee of a just Govenunent." This Court will not disrupt the separation of powers as enunciated in the U.S. Constitution and articulated by Justices Jackson, Marshall and Scalia. Further,. plaintiff STRUNK has failed to properly serve defendants, including President OBAMA and Senator MCCAIN, pursuant to the CPLR. With numerous other grounds present for dismissing the instant action, the Court will not elaborate upon how plaintiff STRUNK failed to obtain personal jurisdiction over defendants. Plaintiff STRUNK is precluded by collateral estoppel Collateral estoppel or "issue preclusion," as observed by Prof. Siegel, in NY Prac $443, at 748-749, [4th ed], "scans the first action and takes note of each issue decided in it. Then if the second action, although based on a different cause of action, attempts to reintroduce the same issue, collateral estoppel intervenes to preclude its relitigation and to bind the party, against whom the doctrine is being invoked, to the way the issue was decided [*35] in the first action." In Ryan v New York Telephone Company (62 NY2d 494, 500 [1984]), the Court of Appeals, held that "[tlhe doctrine of collateral estoppel, a narrower species of res judicata, precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and'decided
against that party or those in privity, whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same [Emphasis added]." Two prerequisites must be met before collateral estoppel can be raised. The Court of Appeals, in Buechel v Bain (97 NY2d 295 [2001], cert denied 535 U.S. 1096 [2002]), instructed at 303-304, that: There must be an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action, and there must have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling (see, Gilberg v Barnieri, 53 NY2d 285,291 [1981]). The litigant seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel must [** 161 demonstrate that the decisive issue was necessarily decided in the prior action against a party, or one in privity with a party (see, id.). The party to be precluded from relitigating the issue bears the [*36] burden of demonstrating the absence of a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination. [Emphasis added] (See D'Arata v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 NY2d 659,664 [1990]; Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v Lopez, 46 NY2d 481, 485 supra; Westchester County f Correction 'Wcers Benevolent Ass'n, Inc. v County o Westchester, 65 AD3d 1226, 1227 [2d Dept 20091; Franklin Dm. Co. Inc. v Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 897, 899 [2d Dept 20091; Luscher ex. re1 Luscher v Arrua, 2 1 AD3d 1005 [2d Dept 20051). Plaintiff STRUNK litigated many of the issues in the inslant action in U.S. District Court, but also in the previously cited Strunk v Paterson, et al, Index No. 29642108, before Justice Schmidt. He acknowledged this, in 7 2 of the instant complaint, by stating: That this complaint is fairly traceable to the events and actions leading up to the Party primaries during the 2008 election cycle for the ballot access of the Presidential slates at the November 4, 2008 General Election as complained of in the related election law case, Strunk v Paterson, ' et al. NYS Supreme Court in the County of Kings with Index No. 29642-08 before the Honorable David I Schmidt of Part 1 as an [*37] election law matter. [sic] As mentioned above, Justice Schmidt disposed of Strunk v Paterson, et al, Index No. 29642108, on March 14,
1.
Page 11
20 11, by denying all of plaintiffs motions and noting that the statute of limitations expired to join necessary parties President OBAMA and Senator MCCAIN. Therefore, collateral estoppel precludes plaintiff STRUNK from pursuing the instant action. Denial of plaintiffs cross-motion to consolidate Plantiffs cross-motion to consolidate this action with Strunk v Paterson, et al, Index No. 29642108, and transfer the instant action to Justice Schmidt is denied. Justice Schmidt, on November 19, 2008, in Strunk v Paterson, et al, declined to sign plaintiff STRUNK's order to show cause to enjoin Governor Paterson from convening New York's December 2008 meeting of the Electoral College, because "plaintiff is collaterally estopped." This refers to the Eastern District action dismissed by Judge Ross, in which she found the complaint frivolous. After a hiatus of several years, plaintiff STRUNK, by order to show cause, attempted to amend his complaint. Justice Schmidt, in his January 11, 201 1 shortform order, denied this motion in its entirety. [** 171 Then, plaintiff STRUNK [*38] moved to reargue. On March 14, 2011, Justice Schmidt, in a short-form order, denied reargument because plaintiff "failed to join a necessary party President OBAMA and Senator MCCAIN and the statute of limitations to do so expired." Finally, on November 9,201 1, H. William Van Allen, an ally of plaintiff STRUNK, moved to intervene as a plaintiff to challenge President OBAMA's placement on the upcoming 20 12 ballot. In his November 22, 201 1 shortform order, Justice Schmidt denied Mr. Van AllenVs.intervention "in all respects." Further, Justice Schmidt held "[tlhis is an action that was commenced in 2008 and has remained inactive for several years and it would be improper to allow plaintiff to raise new matters before the Court after the extended period of inactivity." Plaintiffs frivolous conduct "A complaint containing as it does both factual allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis" and "embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation." (Neitzke v Williams, 490 U.S. 3 19, 325 [1989]). Plaintiff STRUNK, as cited above, alleges numerous fanciful, fantastic, delusional, irrational and baseless claims about [*39] defendants. The U.S. Supreme Court, citing Neitzke, held in Denton v Hernandez (504 U.S. 25,32-33 [ 1992]), that: A court may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only if the facts alleged are "clearly baseless," 490 ,US. at 127, 109 S
Ct at 1833, a category encompassing allegations that are "fanciful," id., at 325, 109 S Ct at 1831, "fantastic," id., at 328, 109 S Ct at 1833, and "delusional," ibid. As those words suggest, a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.
In Denton, the plaintiff alleged that he had been repeatedly raped by a number of inmates at several different prisons, all using the same modus operandi. The Court concluded that these allegations were "wholly fanciful" and dismissed the claim as frivolous as a result. In Shoemaker v U S . Department of Justice (164 F 3d 6 19, 619 [2d Cir 1998]), plaintiff alleged that the government and television stations conspired to: "(1) broadcast information about his feces on national television; and (2) file and publicized false charges of child abuse against him." The Court, citing Neitzke and Denton, dismissed the action as frivolous because [*40] plaintiffs "factual claims are irrational and incredible." Another case applying the frivolous standards of Neitzke and Denton is Perri v Bloomberg (2008 WL 2944642 [US Dist Ct, ED NY 2008]), in which plaintiff alleged that a secret unit of the NYPD was attempting to kill him and his cats. The court dismissed the case, finding that plaintiff's complaint has "a litany of sensational allegations pertaining not only to the NYPD, but also to various arms of government, both state and federal. Accordingly, Perri has not established that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction, because his allegations of irreparable harm are unsupported and [** 181 bizarre."
. Plaintiff STRUNK'S complaint, as well as his opposition to defendants' motions to dismiss, alleges that the correct interpretation of the natural born citizen clause of the U.S. Constitution requires a natural born citizen to have been born on United States soil and have two United States born parents. Despite plaintiffs assertions, Article 11, Section 1, Clause 5 does not state this. No legal authority has ever stated that the natural born citizen clause means what plaintiff STRUNK claims it states. "The phrase natural born Citizen' is [*4l] not defined in the Constitution, see Minor v Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 167 [1875]), nor does it appear anywhere else in the document, see Charles Gordon, Who Can Be President of the United States:' An Unresolved Enigma, 28 Md. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1968)." (Hollander v McCain at 65). Plaintiff STRUNK cannot wish into existence an interpretation that he chooses for the natural born citizen clause. There is no arguable legal basis for the proposition that both parents of the President must have been
born on U.S. soil. This assertion is as frivolous as the multitude of alleged allegations outlined above.
President OBAMA is the sixth ". President to have had one or both of his parents not born on U.S. soil. Plaintiff STRUNK and his fellow "birthers" might not realize that: both parents of President Andrew wen born in what is now No*ern Ireland; President James Buchanan's father was born in County Donegal, Ireland; President Chester A. Arthur's father was born in what is now Northern Ireland; President Woodrow Wilson's mother was boni in Carlisle, England; and, President Herbert Hoover's mother was born in Norwich, Ontario, Canada.
Therefore, the prosecution of the instant action [*42] by plaintiff STRUNK, with its fanciful, fantastic, delusional, irrational and baseless claims about defendants appears is frivolous. 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (a) states that "the Court, in its discretion may impose financial sanctions upon any party or attorney in a civil action or proceeding who engages in frivolous conduct as defined in this Part, which shall be payable as provided in section 130-1.3 of this Subpart." 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (c) states: conduct is frivolous if: (1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law; (2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or (3) it asserts material factual statements that are false. Conduct is frivolous and can be sanctioned, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 5 130-1.1 (c), if "it is completely without merit . . . and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law." (Gordon v Marrone, 202 AD2d 104, 110 [2d Dept 19941 Iv denied 84 NY2d 8 13 [1995]). (See RKO Properties, Inc. v Boymelgreen, 77 AD3d 721 [2d Dept 20 101; Finkelman v SBRE, LLC, 7 1 AD3d 1081 [2d Dept 20101; [*43] Glenn v Annunziata, 53 AD3d 565, [2d Dept 20081; Miller v Dugan, 27 AD3d 429 [2d Dept 20061; Greene v Dora1 Conference Center Associafes, 18 AD3d 429 [2d Dept 20051; Ofman v Campos, 12 AD3d 581 [**I91 [2d Dept 20041). It is clear that plaintiff STRUNK's complaint: "is completely without merit in law;" "is undertaken primarily . . . to harass" defendants; and, "asserts material factual statements that are false."
Several years before the drafting and implementation' of the Part 130 Rules for costs and sanctions, the Court of Appeals (A. G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v Lezak, 69 NY2d 1, 6 [1986]) observed that "frivolous litigation is so serious a problem the proper ahinism tion of justice, the courts may proscribe such and impose sanctiom in this exercise of thei mlemaking powers, in the absence of legislation to the contrary (see NY Const, art VI, 5 30, Judiciary Law 5 21 1 111 [bl)." Part 130 Rules were subsequently created, effective January 1, 1989, to give the courts an additional remedy to deal with frivolous conduct. In Levy v Carol Management Corporation (260 AD2d 27, 33 [Ist Dept 19991) the 'court stated that in determining if sanctions are a p propriate the Court must [*44] look at the broad pattern of conduct by the offending attorneys or parties. Further, "22 NYCRR 130-1.1 allows us to exercise our discretion to impose costs and sanctions on an errant party." (Lay at 33). Moreover, "[s]anctions are retributive, in that they punish past conduct. They also are goal oriented, in that they are useful in deterring future frivolous conduct not only by the particular parties, but also by the Bar at large." (Levy at 34). The Court, in Kernisan, M.D. v Taylor (17 1 AD2d 869 [2d Dept 199I]), noted that the intent of the Part 130 f Rules "is to prevent the waste o judicial resources and to deter vexatious litigation and dilatory or malicious f litigation tactics (4 Minister, Elders & Deacons o f f Refm. Prof. Church o City o New York v 198 Broadway, 76 NY2d 4 11;see Steiner v Bonhamer, 146 Misc 2d 10) [Emphasis added]." To adjudicate the instant action, with the complaint replete with fanciful, fantastic, delusional, irrational and baseless allegations about defendants, combined with plaintiff STRUNK's lack of standing, the barring of this action by collateral estoppel and the Court lacking personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction over many of the defendants, [*45] is "a waste of judicial resources." This conduct, as noted in Levy, must be deterred. In Weinstock v Weinstock (253 AD2d 873 [2d Dept 19981) the Court ordered the maximum sanction of $10,000.00 for an attorney who pursued an appeal "completely without merit," and holding, at 874, that "[wle therefore award the maximum authorized amount as a sanction for this conduct (see, 22 NYCRR 130-1.1) calling to mind thatfiivolous litigation causes a substantial waste ofjudicial resources to the detriment of those litigants who come to the Court with real grievances [Emphasis added." Citing Weinstock, the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Bernadette Panzella, P.C. v De Santis (36 AD3d 734 [2d Dept 20071) affirmed a Supreme Court, Richmond County $2,500.00 sanciion, at 736, as "appropriate in view of the plaintiffs waste o f judicial resources [Emphasis added]."
,
2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1635, *; 2012 NY Slip op50614U, **
Page 13
In Navin v Mosquera (30 AD3d 883, 883 [3d Dept 20061) the Court instructed that when considering if specific conduct is sanctionable as frivolous, "courts are required to examine whether or not the conduct was continued when its lack of legal or factual basis was apparent [or] should have been apparent' (22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [cl)." Therefore, [*46] the Court will examine the conduct of plaintiff STRUNK in a hearing, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 5 130-1.1, to determine if plaintiff STRUNK engaged in frivolous conduct, and to allow plaintiff STRUNK a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Further, at the hearing, an opportunity will be given to counsel for defendants to present detailed records of [**20] costs incurred by their clients in the instant action. Plaintiff precluded from relitigation of the same claims The Court is concerned that plaintiff STRUNK continues to use the scarce resources of the New York State Unified Court System to fruitlessly pursue the same claims. He is no stranger to litigation in Supreme Court, Kings County, Civil Tern. Further, plaintiff STRUNK has had several bites of the same apple in U.S. District Court, which resulted in findings of his engagement in frivolous conduct with, as stated by Judge Ross, complaints that "have contained allegations that have risen to the irrational." The Court should not have to expend resources on the next action by Mr. STRUNK that will be a new variation on the same theme of defendants' alleged misdeeds and misconduct. The continued use of the New York State Unified Court System for [*47] the personal pursuit by plaintiff STRUNK of irrational complaints against defendants must cease. Ow courts have an interest in preventing the waste of judicial resources by a party who knows that his or lawsuit has no legitimate basis in law or fact and continues to attempt to relitigate resolved claims and issues. (Martin-Trigona v Capital Cities/ABC. Inc., 145 Misc 2d 405 [Sup Ct, New York County 19891). The Court, in Sassower v Signorelli (99 AD2d 358, 359 [2d Dept 1984]), noted that "public policy mandates free access to the courts . . . and, ordinarily, the doctrine of former adjudication will serve as an adequate remedy against repetitious suits." Then, the Sassower Court observed, in the next paragraph, that: "[nlonetheless, a litigious plaintiff pressing a frivolous claim can be extremely costly to the defendant and can waste an inordinate amount of court time, time that this court and the trial courts can ill afford to lose (see Harrelson v United States, 6 13 F2d 114)." Pro se litigants whom abuse judicial process have had their access to the courts limited. In Spremo v Babchik (155 Misc 2d 796 (Sup Ct, Queens County 1996]), the Court, in enjoining a pro se litigant from instituting
[*48] any fbrther actions and proceedings in any court in the New York State Unified Court System, citing Sassower and Kane v City o New York, 468 F Supp 586 [SD f NY 19791, afd 614 F2d 1288 [2d Cir 19791). The Kane Court, at 592, held: The fact that one appears pro se is not a license to abuse the process of the Court and to use it without restraint as a weapon of harassment and libelous bombardment. The injunction herein ordered is fully warranted to put an end to such activity . . . Commencement of action upon action based on the same facts dressed in different garb, after thrice being rejected on the merits and having been repeatedly warned that the claims were barred by res judicata, can only be explained as malicious conduct.
In 'Muka v New York State Bar Association (120 Misc 2d 897 [Sup Ct, Tompkins County 1983]), a pro se plaintiff commenced a fourth unsuccessfbl lawsuit against the State Bar Association upon various conspiracy theories. The Court in dismissing the action, based upon [**21] res judicata, observed, at 903, that "all 'litigants have a right to impartial and considered justice. Insofar as any litigant unnecessarily consumes inordinate amounts of judicial time and energy, he [*49] or she deprives other litigants of their proper share of these resources. A balance must be kept." Therefore, plaintiff STRUNK, with his history of abusing the civil justice system, by bringing pro se actions devoid of merit against the same defendants, is precluded from relitigating the same claims and issues which waste court resources and is enjoined fiom bringing any future actions in the New York State Unified Court System against: the NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, JAMES A. WALSW Co-Chair, DOUGLAS A. KELLNERICo-Chair, EVELYN J. AQUILA/Commissioner, GREGORY- P. PETERSON/Commissioner, Deputy Director TODD D. VALENTINE, and Deputy Director STANLY ZALEN; ANDREW CUOMO, ERIC SCHNEIDERMAN, THOMAS P. DINAPOLI and RUTH NOEMI COLON, in their Official and individual capacity; Father JOSEPH A. O'HARE, S.J.; Father JOSEPH P. PARKES, S.J.; - FREDERICK A. 0. SCHWARZ, JR.; PETER G. PETERSEN; ZBIGNIEW KAIMIERZ BRZEZINSKI; MARK BRZEZINSKI; JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.; BARACK H. OBAMA, NANCY PELOSI; the DEOMCRATIC STATE COMMITTEE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK; the STATE COMMITTEE OF THE WORKING FAMILIES PARTY OF NEW YORK STATE; ROGER CALERO; the SOCIAL-
Page 14
IST WORKERS PARTY; IAN J. BRZEZINSKI; JOHN SIDNEY MCCAIN [*50] 111; JOHN A. BOEHNER; the NEW YORK STATE REPUBLICAN STATE COMMITTEE; the NEW YORK STATE COMMITTJZE OF THE INDEPENDENCE PARTY; the STATE COMMITTEE OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF NEW YORK STATE; PENNY S. PRITZKER; GEORGE SOROS; OBAMA FOR AMERICA; OBAUA VICTORY FUND, MCCAIN VICTORY 2008; and MCCAIN-PALIN VICTORY 2008; without the prior approval of the appropriate Administrative Justice or Judge. The Court instructed, in Vogelgesang v Vogelgesang (71 AD3d 1132, 1 134 [2d Dept 20 1O]), that: The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in enjoining the appellant fiom filing any further actions or motions in the . . . action without prior written approval. Public policy generally mandates free access to the courts (see Sassower v Signorelli, 99 AD2d 358, 359 [1984]). However, a party may forfeit that right if he or she abuses the judicial process by engaging in meritless litigation motivated by spite or ill will (see Dufi v Holt-Harris, 260 AD2d 595 [2d Dept 19991; Shreve v Shreve, 229 AD2d 1005 [2d Dept 19961). There is ample basis in this record to support the Supreme Court's determination to prevent the appellant from engaging in fbrther vexatious litigation.
by: defendants President BARACK OBAMA, Vice President JOSEPH BIDEN, OBAMA FOR AMERICA and the OBAMA VICTORY FUND; defendants MCCAM VICTORY 2008, MCCAIN-PALIN VICTORY 2008 and Senator JOHN MCCAIN; defendants MARK BRZEZINSKI and IAN BRZEZINSKI; defendant Representative NANCY PELOSI; defendant GEORGE SOROS; defendants THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY and ROGER CALERO; defendant Speaker JOHN BOEHNER; defendant ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI; defendants [*52] Father JOSEPH A. O'HARE, S.J., Father JOSEPH P. PARKES, S.J. and FREDERICK A. 0 . SCHWARZ, JR.; defendant PENNY PRITZKER; and defendant PETER G. PETERSEN; are all granted, with the instant complaint dismissed with prejudice; and it is further ORDERED, that the cross-motion 'of plaintiff CHRISTOPHER EARL-STRUNK to consolidate the instant action with Strunk v Paterson, et al, Index No. 29642f08, before Justice David Schmidt, is denied; and it is further ORDERED, that plaintiff CHRISTOPHER EARL-, STRUNK is hereby enjoined fiom commencing any future actions in the New York State Unified Court System against: the NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, JAMES A. WALSW Co-Chair, DOUGLAS A. -KELLNER/Co-Chair, EVELYN J. AQUILA.Commissioner, GREGORY P. PETERSON/Commissioner, Deputy Director TODD D. VALENTINE, and Deputy Director STANLY ZALEN; ANDREW CUOMO, ERIC SCHNEIDERMAN, THOMAS P. DINAPOLI and RUTH NOEMI COLON, in their Official and individual capacity; Father JOSEPH A. O'HARE, S.J.; Father JOSEPH P. PARKES, S.J.; FREDERICK A. 0. SCHWARZ, JR.; PETER G. PETERSEN; ZBIGNIEW KAIMIERZ BRZEZINSKI; MARK BRZEZINSKI; JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.; BARACK H. OBAMA, NANCY PELOSI; the DEOMCRATIC STATE COMMITTEE OF THE [*53] STATE OF NEW YORK; the STATE COMMITTEE OF THE WORKING FAMILIES PARTY OF NEW YORK STATE; ROGER CALERO; the SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY; IAN J. BRZEZINSKI; JOHN SIDNEY MCCAIN 111; JOHN A. BOEHNER; the NEW YORK STATE REPUBLICAN STATE COMMITTEE; the NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE OF THE-INDEPENDENCE PARTY; the S W T E COMMITTEE OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF NEW YORK STATE; PENNY S. PRITZKER; GEORGE SOROS; OBAUA FOR AMERICA;. OBAUA VICTORY FUND; MCCAIN VICTORY 2008; and MCCAIN-PALIN VICTORY 2008; without prior approval of the appropriate Administrative Justice or Judge; and it is further
:
'
(See Scholar v Timinsky, 87 AD3d 577 [2d Dept 201 11; [*51] Dimeryv Ulster Sav. Bank, 82 AD3d 1034 [2d Dept 20 111; Capogrosso v Kansas, 60 AD3d 522 [Id Dept 20091; Simpson v Ptaszynska, 4 1 AD3d 607 [2d Dept 20071; Pignataro v Davis, 8 AD3d 487 [2d Dept 20041; [**22] Cangro v Cangro, 288 AD2d 417 [2d Dept 20011; Mancini v Mancini, 269 AD2d 366 [2d Dept 20001; Braten v Finkelstein, 235 AD2d 513 [2d Dept 19971). Conclusion Accordingly, it is ORDERED, that the motion by counsel for defendants MCCAIN VICTORY 2008, MCCAIN-PALIN VICTORY 2008 and Senator JOHN MCCAIN, to admit Todd E. Phillips, Esq., a member in good standing of both the California and District of Columbia bars, for the instant action pro hace vice is granted; and it is further ORDERED, that the .motions to dismiss - plaintiff CHRISTOPHER-EARL STRUNK's instant complaint
Page 15
ORDERED, that any violation of the above injunction by CHRISTOPHER-EARL STRUNK may subject CHRISTOPHER-EARL STRUNK to costs, sanctions and contempt [**23] proceedings; and it is hrther ORDERED, that it appearing that plaintiff CHRISTOPHER EARL-STRUNK, engaged in "frivolous conduct," as defined in the Rules of the Chief Administrator, 22 NYCRR 5 130-1.1 (c), and that pursuant to the Rules of the Chief Administrator, 22 NYCRR 130.1.1 (d), "[aln award of costs or the imposition of sanctions may be made . . . upon the court's own initiative, after a reasonable opportunity to be heard," this Court will conduct a hearing affording [*54] plaintiff CHRISTOPHER EARL-STRUNK "a reasonable opportunity to be heard" and counsel for all defendants may present to the Court
detailed records of costs incurred by their clients in the instant action, before me in Part 27, on Monday, May 7, 2012, at 2:30 P.M., in Room 479, 360 Adarns Street, Brooklyn, NY 11201;and it is further ORDERED, that Ronald D. Bratt, Esq., my Principal t a w Clerk, is directed to serve this order by first-class mail, upon CHRISTOPHER EARL-STRUNK, 593 Vanderbilt Avenue, No. 281, Brooklyn, New York, 11238 and upon counsel for all defendants in this action. This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. ENTER HON. ARTHUR M. SCHACKJ. S. C.

-againstNEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS; Respondents. -----------------------------------------------------------------------x

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE FOR DIRECT APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner, H. (Harold) William Van Allen self-represented without an attorney, (Petitioner) presents this Memorandum with supporting affidavit affirmed September 7, 2012 in support of his Notice of Motion to appeal under the State Constitution Article 6 Section 3 for an expedited hearing to obtain leave for a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals with CPLR 5602(b); and where the construction of the U.S. Constitution and precedents of New York Judicial dicta as to use and definition of the term of art natural-born Citizen (NBC) are involved and controlling of resolution of ongoing matters below in four (4) Trial Courts and two (2) appellate departments: Albany Index No.: 1787 -2012 with the final order herein taken on appeal (see Exhibit A) in the Article 78 matter of the Petition (see Exhibit B) Nassau Index 2764-2012 with order of therein petitioner Garvey to seek proper venue (see Exhibit C), and Kings with Index Numbers 2008-29642, wherein Petitioner was denied intervention (see Exhibit D) that then was taken on Appeal to Second Department in Appeal case 766-2012 (active) therein Petitioner Motion was there denied a direct appeal after the Court of Appeals responded to Petitioners application for direct appeal there (see Exhibit E) and
Petitioner Memorandum in support of leave for Direct Appeal Page 1 of 10
Kings with Index No.: 2011-6500 pending a Judgment also are involved along with two (2) pending claims cases at the Court of Claims; and that Petitioner has received notice of a Second Department sua sponte dismissal in the appeal 2011-11561 of the appeal taken by Plaintiff in 2011-6500 from an interlocutory order of 2011-6500 by Notice of Appeal (see Exhibit F), and who received a questionable order to show cause dismissing that complaint without a final judgment and order as to the NBC issue (see Exhibit G).
and as all cases are related to the very same constitutional issue, e.g. is the term of art natural-born Citizen exactly the same as the term Born a Citizen in New York dicta as intended in U.S. Constitution Article 2 1 paragraph 5 in the matter of the eligibility of a natural person to hold the office of President of the United States (POTUS)? That the NYS Court of Appeals as to the U.S. Constitutional Article 2 Section 1 paragraph 5 Natural Born Citizen term of art meaning has precedents in New York citations and statutes (NYS Real Property Law 18) that comprise the basis for that Court to decide in favor of natural born citizen rather than born a citizen to mean a person born on U.S. soil of U.S. Citizen parents as cited in Minor. v. Happersett 88 U.S. 162 (1875), 21 Wall. 162, and 22 L. Ed. 627 as the SCOTUS precedent. That Petitioner found several cases beyond that of the SCOTUS cited in the footnotes with a search for the term natural born citizen (emphasized by Petitioner without comment on the cases except as to Lynch v Clark) that may assist the court, are as follows with results sorted in reverse chronological order: New York Miscellaneous Reports PEOPLE v. QUIROGA-PUMA, 18 Misc.3d 731 (2007) No. LX6701631. December 20, 2007. English at all. Our perception of immigrants, however, remains very
intolerant. [fn22] Sixty percent of natural-born citizens surveyed would favor allowing illegal immigrants who have not committed a crime MATTER OF BROWN, 132 Misc.2d 811 (1986) July 7, 1986 ... in the company of the petitioner, who had been born there, and, in time, their child, a naturalborn citizen of Korea. On the other hand, there is merit to the argument that the proper inference from ... AGOSTINI v. DE ANTUENO, 199 Misc. 191 (1950) February 20, 1950. .. Code of the United States (now U.S. Code, tit. 28, 1251). The tenant is a national and natural born citizen of the Republic of Argentina. He is the Third Secretary of the Permanent Delegation of ... PEOPLE EX REL. CHOOLOKIAN v. MISSION OF IMMAC. VIRGIN, 192 Misc. 454 (1947) December 30, 1947. ... in 1942, by the department of welfare of New York City, pursuant to law, that they are natural born citizens of this country; that the father is unable to properly maintain, care for and educate the ... New York Appellate Division Reports WILLIAMS v. VILLAGE OF PORT CHESTER, 97 App. Div. 84 (1904) July, 1904in so far as their civil rights were concerned, be placed upon an equal, not a better, footing than natural born citizens? Could the language have any other purpose than to read into every statute New York Court of Appeals Reports MUNRO v. MERCHANT, 28 N.Y. 9 (1863) September Term, 1863 ... born and always residing in Venice, and consequently Austrian subjects, and two nieces, natural born citizens of the United States; and the general question was whether the land descended to these ...
LUDLAM v. LUDLAM, 26 N.Y. 356 (1863) March Term, 1863 that may be born beyond the sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens." (1 U.S. Statutes at Large, 103.) In 1795 the following provision was substituted . . . the children of English parents, though born abroad, are, nevertheless, regarded by the common law as natural born citizens of England. The decision upon the plea in Calvin's case, which was merely rep . . . in obtaining, by an exhibition of force, the surrender from an Austrian frigate, of Martin Koszta, a natural born citizen of Austria, claiming the rights of naturalization here, who had been forcibly . . . parents belonged, without any intention of ever returning to England, or of claiming any rights as a natural born citizen of that country, he would still be claimed as a subject of the British crown, . . . latter part of the year 1822, voluntarily expatriated himself from the United States, where he was a natural born citizen, for the purpose of becoming a permanent resident of Lima, in Peru, South America
WADSWORTH v. WADSWORTH, 12 N.Y. 376 (1855) March Term, 1855 ... Wadsworth, deceased, in the same manner and with the like effect as if he had been a natural born citizen; and releasing to him all the interest of the state in such lands. This statute, with the aid ...
McCARTHY v. MARSH, 5 N.Y. 263 (1851) September Term, 1851 ... were in that condition. In England the common law rule was abolished in favor of natural born citizens one hundred and fifty years ago by the statute of 11th and 12th Wm. III. ch. 6, and it applied ... words, is more comprehensive than the English act. It enables naturalized as well as natural-born citizens to inherit through alien ancestors; and if there be any such things known in the law as ... no distinction between lineal and collateral ancestors; and if a naturalized Page 283 or natural
born citizen had to trace his descent through an alien ancestor, lineal or collateral, he could not ... permit the alienage of any ancestor, lineal or collateral, to deprive a naturalized, or natural born citizen of this state of his inheritance therein. This conclusion is strongly confirmed by the ... HOYT v. THOMPSON, 5 N.Y. 320 (1851) September Term, 1851 They do not affect or bind property out of its territory, or persons not resident therein, whether natural born citizens or (Page 349) others. Whatever extra territorial force these statutes and laws The case history of LYNCH v. CLARK, that by special emphasis was a trial court case heard and decided in error of use of the NBC term that resulted in the State legislature enacted statute clarification, that then was heard by the New York State Court of Appeals in support of enactment and NBC definition. Historical record of the New York Legislature ratification of the 14th Amendment Historical Congressional record of the enactment of the 14th Amendment That in the Second District Index No.: 29642-2008 trial court order on appeal where Petitioner had been denied intervener status with CPLR 1012(a)(2) as shown with Exhibits D and E, then filed the case alternatively as an Article 78 in the Third District Index No.: 1787 -2012 Petition shown as Exhibit B herein, and in which both have a matter that may be resolved with review of a Constitutional issue that petitioner raised below with the appeal taken from dismissal order shown as Exhibit A. That Petitioner also herein applies for expedited relief from this Court with CPLR 5601(b)(1) and or CPLR 5602(a)(1)(ii) were it applicable and request as an alternative certification of a single constitutional issue seeking review by the Court of Appeals that will resolve matters here and below to protect my own freedom, liberty and rights against an ongoing injury starting in the 2008 New York Election cycle
through the present as Plaintiff is insufficiently protected by Plaintiff Christopher Earl Strunk (Strunk) and Defendants herein now into the 2012 election cycle compounding my injury as there was a decision in the Petition with Index 2008-29641 un-appealed that set the law of the case with Index 2008-29642 requiring leave to amend denied. Petitioner also uses Appeal as of Right with CPLR 5601(b)(1) That Petitioners understanding of CPLR 5601(b)(1) is that on a Constitutional Question -- CPLR 5601(b)(1) In an Appeal from Final Appellate Division Order, The constitutional question must be both directly involved in the Appellate Division order and substantial. The appellant has the burden of establishing the direct involvement of the constitutional question (see, Karger, supra 39, at 245). a. Direct Involvement (see, Karger, supra, 7:8; 7:9-7:10, at 231-243). i. The constitutional question must have been properly raised in the courts below. Thus, the issue must be preserved before the court of original instance (Matter of Schulz v State of New York, 81 NY2d 336, 344 [1983]; Matter of Shannon B., appeal dismissed 70 NY2d 458, 462 [1987]), and raised again at, or at least be passed upon by, the Appellate Division on an appeal to that court, if one was taken (see, Matter of Skenesborough Stone, Inc. v Village of Whitehall, appeal dismissed 95 NY2d 902 [2000]). And that subsection ii. Requires that The Appellate Division must have taken a view of the case that necessarily required it to pass upon the constitutional issue raised. Thus, an appeal will be dismissed where the Appellate Division's decision rests on an independent non-constitutional ground (Marwanqa v Human Resources Admin., mot to dismiss appeal granted 69 NY2d 1037 [1987] [Statute of Limitations]; Matter of Fossella v Dinkins, appeal dismissed 66 NY2d 162,168 [1985] [statutory grounds]; Matter of Cioffi v Town of Guilderland, appeal dismissed 69 NY2d 984 [1987]; Burns v Egan, appeal dismissed 68 NY2d 806 [1986] [res judicata, laches, standing]).
And that as for subsection b. must have Substantiality (see, Karger, supra, 7:5, at 226-228) Whether a substantial constitutional question is presented is a determination that must be made on a case by case basis. The Court has examined the nature of the constitutional interest at stake, the novelty of the constitutional claim, whether the argument raised may have merit, and whether a basis has been established for distinguishing a state constitutional claim (if asserted) from a federal constitutional claim. The Court has stated that questions that have been "clearly resolved against an appellant's position * * * lack the degree of substantiality necessary to sustain an appeal as of right under CPLR 5601(b)(1)" (Matter of David A.C., 43 NY2d 708, 709 [1977]). On the other hand, a constitutional argument need not prevail on the merits to support an appeal on constitutional grounds (see, Rose v Moody, 83 NY2d 65, 69 [1993]). Petitioner understands that how Jurisdictional Review Works Within the Court under the authority of Rule 500.10, is that the Clerk of the Court screens all appeals taken as of right pursuant to CPLR 5601 or by permission of the Appellate Division pursuant to CPLR 5602 (b) to determine the validity of the jurisdictional predicate and timeliness of the appeal. If a jurisdictional question arises, a jurisdictional inquiry letter is sent to counsel inviting written comment. After comments are received or the period for counsels comment expires, the Court determines whether to retain or dismiss the Appeal; however, Petitioner asks that the court has discretion to expedite this matter as time is of the essence based upon the ongoing schedule to form a General Election ballot by the NYS BOE starting no later than say October 6, 2012. Petitioner also Appeals by leave with CPLR 5602(a)(1)(ii) In that the Petitioner appeal involves an arbitrary abuse of discretion of the trial court below in denial of any opportunity to file an amended complaint or supplement
to that case would resolve the objections raised by the lower court on defects of service in which Petitioner was a material witness to the defendants service, however with extenuating circumstances not allowed nunc pro tunc for filing with the clerk of the court, that were with a certification of the subject constitutional issue resolved at the Court of Appeals, such finding would allow petitioner to proceed to fully brief the appeal denied solely on the matter of intervention status; and therefore, renders this a Motion for Leave To Appeal To Obtain Review of Prior Non-final Orders with CPLR 5602(a)(1)(ii) allows a litigant to by-pass a second appeal to the Appellate Division when the movant only seeks review of the Appellate Division's prior non-final order and not the subsequent final order made by the nisi prius court after the Appellate Division's remittal.; and in Petitioner understanding CPLR 5602(a)(1)(ii) is the parallel to CPLR 5601(d), which applies to appeals as of right. In order for a motion seeking leave to appeal pursuant to CPLR 5602(a)(1)(ii) to lie, requirements must be met: That the Cases with Index No. 2008- 29642 remains an active case related to the case 2011-6500 maintained by the Clerk of the Trial Court, and does not have a final order as to Plaintiff in that both therein do apply to the denial of Petitioners intervention taken on appeal to 2nd Dept in Appeal Case 766-2012 in the judgment sought as an ongoing unresolved injury to be appealed from must be a final judgment as it effects both cases ad this matter herein too, as the parties cannot simply enter a "non-final" judgment on the Appellate Division order (Burnside Coal & Oil v City of New York, lv dismissed 73 NY2d 852 [1988]). And furthermore, to the extent that there is a motion with a judgment pending in the case 2011-6500 for consolidation with the related matter of 2008-29642 remains unresolved, all would be assisted by a review of the constitutional issues on which both cases are controlled, and at least to the extent that there is a compelling interest of the trial justices to use discretion to favor both
Plaintiff and or Petitioner; and wherein, the prior non-final Appellate Division order in the appeal 2011-11561, shown as Exhibit E must necessarily affect the final order or judgment herein too. Petitioners understanding of the necessarily affects requirement, contends that with the Merits were Not Addressed in the constitutional matter of Natural Born Citizen as apply in finalizing both the trial court cases as well as the pending claims at the Court of Claims because with the precedents of the New York State Court of Appeals comply with the Supreme Court of the United State (SCOTUS) precedent in Minor. v. Happersett 88 U.S. 162 (1875), 21 Wall. 162, and 22 L. Ed. 627. by Justice Waite as natural born citizens (NBC) per se are so by virtue of birth on United States soil when both parents were Citizens of the United States ( 1 ). A review by the Court of Appeals necessarily effects the final judgments in all the cases referenced including the pending claims in the Court of Claim would
1
[T]he Constitutionprovides that no person except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of PresidentThe Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their [88 U.S. 162, 168] parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient for everything we have now to consider that all children born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction are themselves citizens. The words all children are certainly as comprehensive, when used in this connection, as all persons, and if females are included in the last they must be in the first. That they are included in the last is not denied. In fact the whole argument of the plaintiffs proceeds upon that idea. (Emphasis added.)
Cases citing Minor: Boyd. v. Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135 (1892); Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S 55 (1980); Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commm of Montana, 436 U.S 371 (1978) ; Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937); US v. CLASSIC, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911); Hague v. Committee For Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Harris v. Mcrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S 47 (1907); Kepner v. U.S., 195 U.S. 100 (1904); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962); N.Y. Ex Rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928); Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1 (1982); Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 816 (1971); Schick v. U.S., 195 U.S. 65 (1904); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944); South Carolina v. US, 199 U.S. 437 (1905); In Re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945); U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark,169 U.S. 649 (1898); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Ex Parte Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894), that is essentially the holy grail of support for Minor v. Happersett.
otherwise result in a piecemeal approach to appeals from each, and that based upon Petitioners understanding of the necessarily affects requirement also contends that with Irreparable Injury apply to make an otherwise non-final order appealable, as the doctrine of irreparable injury will apply to make appealable an otherwise non-final order in those rare instances where the order sought to be appealed from directs an irrevocable change in position that will cause immediate irreparable injury (see generally, Karger, supra, 5:2, at 103-109). In Conclusion Preliminary to the perfection of the issue on appeal from the order shown as A, Petitioner wishes an order of the Court granting leave of direct appeal to the NYS Court of Appeals on the U.S. Constitutional Article 2 Section 1 paragraph 5 Natural Born Citizen term of art meaning that based upon the Court of Appeals own holdings will decide the status of the cases below in trial court and pending to be filed at the Court of Claims as against the New York State Board of Elections and John Does and Jane Does, and warrants for other and different relief as the Court deems necessary for justice herein. Respectfully submitted by:
Dated:
Hurley, New York September ____, 2012
SIGNATUREOFAUTHORIZEDREPRESENTATIVEOFHAROLDWILLIAMVANALLEN
H. William Van Allen in esse Self-represented w/o an attorney 351 North Road Hurley, New York 12443 Telephone: (845) 389 4366 Email: hvanallen@hvc.rr.com

-againstNEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS; Respondents. -----------------------------------------------------------------------x Notice of Motion for Leave for Direct Appeal Affidavit in Support of Motion for Leave for Direct Appeal
Exhibit A: Notice of Appeal from Albany Index No.: 1787 -2012 Exhibit B: Verified Petition with Albany Index No.: 1787 -2012 Exhibit C: Nassau Index 2764-2012 with order of therein petitioner Garvey Exhibit D: Kings Index Numbers 2008-29642, Petitioner was denied intervention Exhibit E: Appeal case 766-2012 denied Petitioner Motion a direct appeal Exhibit F: Kings Index No.: 2011-6500 Second Department sua sponte dismissal in the appeal 2011-11561 of the appeal taken by Plaintiff in 2011-6500 from an interlocutory order of 2011-6500. Exhibit G: Kings Index No.: 2011-6500 order to show cause dismissing that complaint without a final judgment Memorandum of Law Affidavit of Service Hurley, New York September ___, 2012 ____________________________________ H. William Van Allen, petitioner Self-represented w/o an attorney 351 North Road Hurley, New York 12443 Telephone: (845) 389 4366 Email: hvanallen@hvc.rr.com
Dated:

HVA NOM For Leave For Direct Appeal With AFF - MOL - and Exhibits

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CPLR Art 78 in Albany Index No.: 1787 -2012

STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF ULSTER

Petitioner Affidavit in support of leave for Direct Appeal Page 1 of 4

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_____________________ Notary Public .

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NOTICE OF APPEAL Index No.: 1787 -2012

STATE OF NEW YORK SUPREME COURT

H. William Van Allen in esse,

Decision, Order & Judgment

Dated: Albany, Netv York July 9,20 12

RTCHARD M. PLATKIN A.J.S.C.

40 North Pearl Street, Suite 5 Albany, NY 12207-2729

FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS WITH TRO AND INJUNCTION

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PETITION VERIFICATION AFFIDAVIT STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF ULSTER ) ) ss. )

NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE CLAIM

Sworn to before me This k day of December 2011

'Au.Ij'/f~; I, i (t.-L-'j'L-/''1_ {.it!

)!v1MISSIONEXPiRES'JUl.Y 14, 20~

STATE OF NEW YORK

STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS

CALENDAR FOR THE APRIL 24, 2012

DELEGATE SELECTION PLAN:

DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION PLAN FILING DATES:

REGISTRATION FOR PRIMARY ELECTION

ABSENTEE VOTING FOR PRIMARY ELECTION:

4/23/12; 5/1/12 4/24/12

MILITARY/SPECIAL FEDERAL VOTERS FOR PRIMARY ELECTION:

2/6/12 2/9/12 2/14/12

STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF ULSTER

/ H. William Van Allen