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Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program

September 2012

Summary: Uzbekistans departure from the CSTO was the latest move in that countrys longstanding efforts to enhance its security, sovereignty, and freedom of action. To view Tashkent as simply tacking erratically back and forth between Moscow and Washington would be to underestimate the nuances of Uzbek diplomacy. Changes in Uzbekistans foreign policy orientation generally followed changes in the perceived calculation of costs and benefits from the perspective of Tashkent. Even when tilting toward one great power, Uzbekistan has taken care never to burn its bridges entirely with the others.

Tashkent Maneuvers between Moscow, Washington, and Beyond


by Richard Weitz

On August 30, Uzbekistans Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov confirmed that its government would not host any foreign military bases, military facilities, or military units on its soil. This principle reaffirms the broadest interpretation of the governments recently adopted foreign policy strategy, its first widely available specific foreign policy document. A major reason for the affirmation was to reassure Russia that Uzbekistans suspension of its membership in the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in late June does not signify a decision by Tashkent to try to move toward Washington or Beijing. Uzbekistans departure from the CSTO was the latest move in that countrys longstanding efforts to enhance its security, sovereignty, and freedom of action. To view Tashkent as simply tacking erratically back and forth between Moscow and Washington would be to underestimate the nuances of Uzbek diplomacy. Changes in Uzbekistans foreign policy orientation generally followed changes in the perceived calculation of costs and benefits from the perspective of Tashkent. Even when tilting toward one great power, Uzbekistan has taken care never to burn its bridges entirely with the others, a prudent move followed

by most states located on Europes periphery, though sometimes with different tactics. Uzbekistan is by the size of its population and strength of its military potentially the most powerful of the five Central Asian countries. In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, all the leaders of Central Asia, including Uzbekistan, supported various measures to preserve the economic, security, and other ties they inherited from the Soviet Union. Uzbekistan was an original signer of the May 1992 Collective Security Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Tashkent, where the inaugural summit occurred. But in a few years, Uzbekistani authorities, led by President Islam Karimov, who began leading Uzbekistan during the end of the Soviet era, started to see minimal value in engaging in fruitless regional integration schemes that were never implemented due to the weakness of the multinational institutions in the former Soviet space. This was especially true of the inchoate Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as well as the continuing economic and security turmoil in most of these legacy countries. In 1999, Uzbekistan joined a coalition of westward leaning former Soviet republics, identified as the GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine,

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Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova). This potentially competing institution never gained much influence and soon fell into disuse The September 2001 terrorist attacks resulted in the United States and its NATO allies deploying large numbers of military forces in greater Central Asia, and Uzbekistan proved to be an ardent backer of NATOs intervention in Afghanistan. Tashkent allowed the United States and other NATO members to establish military bases on its territory. But Uzbekistans leaders soon came to see the growing Western presence in their region more as a security liability than a benefit. Like many of the former Soviet republics, Uzbekistan assessed developments from the perspective of regime preservation against both external and internal threats. Although NATO militaries helped fight terrorist groups active in the region, and the Western presence provided welcome balance to Moscows primacy in the region, Western support for the color revolutions in the former Soviet republics popular protests that overthrew the governments of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan in the early 2000s aroused fears in Uzbekistan that their allies democracy promotion efforts threatened their rule. The break between Washington and Tashkent came in 2005, when the Uzbek military suppressed popular protests in Andijan, one of Uzbekistans largest cities, probably using some weapons and training provided by NATO. Western leaders denounced the attack and, most annoyingly to Tashkent, urged neighboring governments to respect the asylum claims of the governments opponents.

In a retaliatory move that reflected a mixture of calculation and pique, Uzbekistan expelled the Pentagon from its national territory and joined the CSTO in June 2006. Nonetheless, Tashkent never was comfortable remaining so close to Moscow and refused to ratify many CSTO agreements or fully integrate Uzbekistan into the organization. Uzbekistan resisted Russian-backed initiatives to strengthen the CSTO, and Uzbek officials skipped important CSTO meetings, citing their ineffectiveness. The Uzbek government also soon indicated a desire to restore its ties to the United States and NATO. Indeed, it took care to allow Germany to continue using its base in Uzbekistan even after the Pentagon was expelled. Uzbek strategists sought Western ties for a number of reasons to balance Moscow, have a greater influence on the Afghan endgame (where Karimov was offering his own 6+3 proposal and NATO remained the dominant security actor), and to receive economic and security benefits from the Western powers. At the April 2008 NATO heads-of-state summit in Bucharest, Karimov offered the alliance permission to trans-ship goods through Uzbekistan to Afghanistan. Uzbekistan has since found its new role of allowing Western countries to send non-lethal supplies through its territory to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan especially lucrative for generating transit fees from this new Northern Distribution Network (NDN). It also provided Tashkent with greater attention in the West as well as some leverage over Western government policies in the region. Senior U.S. military and political officials, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, resumed visiting Tashkent. Nonetheless, Uzbekistani officials have also cultivated relations with the Peoples Republic of China, whose authoritarian government declined altogether to criticize Uzbekistans domestic policies and offered to pay top yuan for Uzbekistans natural gas exports. Chinese investors are financing improvements in Uzbekistani infrastructure related to the production and transportation of energy. In June 2012, Uzbekistan and China signed a Declaration on Strategic Partnership in which they pledged to intensify mutual ties. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in which Beijing provided a counterweight to Moscow, also

Like many of the former Soviet republics, Uzbekistan assessed developments from the perspective of regime preservation against both external and internal threats.
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offered Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries an institutional alternative to the CSTO. Belarus, another country detached from Europes core but uneasy about falling completely under the Kremlins control, initially joined Uzbekistan in resisting Moscows proposals. But the 2010 upheavals in the Kyrgyz Republic and the subsequent Arab Spring transformed Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko into one of the most ardent champions of using the CSTO to combat threats to its authoritarian regimes. During Belarus one-year stint as CSTO chair in 2011, Lukashenko read Tashkent the riot act, calling for Uzbekistans expulsion from the organization over its singlehanded blockage of CSTO reform measures. The head of the Moscow-based Institute of Contemporary Development, a think tank close to then-President Dmitri Medvedev, told Kommersant that ending Uzbekistans veto was essential for enacting the reforms needed for strengthening the CSTO sufficiently to deal with the growing regional security challenges. Notwithstanding Tashkents opposition, Moscow proceeded to push for a relaxation of the CSTOs consensus decisionmaking procedures (weakening Uzbekistans veto powers) and to develop a new rapid reaction force that could intervene in Central Asia to fight terrorists and support CSTO-mediation and peacekeeping efforts between CSTO members in conflict. The example of the August 2008 Georgia War had made clear to Tashkent and others the dangers of relying on the neutrality of Russian-dominated peacekeeping units. Conversely, Uzbekistan also castigated the inability of the CSTO to respond to the pogroms against the ethnic Uzbek population in neighboring Kyrgyzstan in June 2010. Karimov exercised admirable restraint in not sending Uzbekistans armed forces into the Kyrgyz Republic to protect its Uzbek minority. Russian attempts to secure additional bases in southern Kyrgyzstan, where the oppression was concentrated, only poured salt into Uzbekistans wounds. The Uzbekistan Foreign Ministry notified the CSTO secretariat of its withdrawal decision on June 20, and the contents became public ten days later. The note complained that the CSTO was unduly constraining Tashkents diplomatic options in Afghanistan. The timing of the departure may have been prompted by the (non) results of Putins June

The example of the August 2008 Georgia War had made clear to Tashkent and others the dangers of relying on the neutrality of Russian-dominated peacekeeping units.
4 visit to Tashkent a few days earlier. The Russian president must not have overcome Karimovs concerns or met his requirements for staying in the CSTO. The impending reopening of NATOs supply lines through Pakistan may have also explained the timing, since over time the resumption would have weakened Tashkents bargaining leverage by reducing the value of the NDN to the West. Uzbekistan is now negotiating with NATO over how its members can remove their equipment from Afghanistan through its territory. The fastest and easiest route would be by rail across the Amu-Darya River separating Afghanistan from Uzbekistan. The Pentagon also is discussing with Tashkent the possible cost-free transfer of many of the defense items now in Afghanistan to Uzbekistan. The U.S. preference would be to leave behind only non-lethal military equipment such as night-vision goggles, communication systems, and logistics technologies, but the Uzbekistani armed forces could also want some combat equipment. This handover would save the U.S. Defense Department the costs of returning the items to the United States or Europe. But it has also alarmed Moscow since it could undercut Russian arms sales to the recipient countries and orient their militaries toward NATO rather than CSTO standards. Despite Uzbekistans recent Westward pivot, Uzbek officials have repeatedly indicated that they will continue to work with Russia bilaterally and within the CIS, a less constraining multinational institution than the CSTO. The Uzbek Defense Ministry made the point of attending a meeting of the CIS Defense Ministers Council in Kaliningrad soon after leaving the CSTO. It cannot be excluded that Uzbekistan might again seek to join the CSTO or

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another Moscow-led regional security institution if NATO seems unable to defend Uzbekistans vital interests, if human rights issues became a major irritant in bilateral relations, or following Karimovs eventual departure from office. And Uzbekistan is probably the Central Asian country most interested in seeing China establish a greater presence in the former Soviet space, which could prove attractive to Beijing policymakers interested in further developing Uzbekistans natural gas resources.

About the Author


Richard Weitz is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for New American Security (CNAS) and an expert analyst at WikiStrat.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between North America and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

About the On Wider Europe Series


This series is designed to focus in on key intellectual and policy debates regarding Western policy toward Wider Europe that otherwise might receive insufficient attention. The views presented in these papers are the personal views of the authors and not those of the institutions they represent or The German Marshall Fund of the United States.

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