WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO PERECHE, SR., Petitioners, v.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 184800. May 5, 2010 CARPIO MORALES, J.: Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. assail the issuances of Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (public respondent) Order of April 22, 2008 which denied their motion to quash the Amended Information indicting them for libel, and Joint Resolution 12, 2008 denying reconsideration of the first issuance.
[3] [2] [1]

of August

Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez (Gimenez) filed on October 18, 2005, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family (in particular, former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee (Helen) and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan), a criminal complaint, before the Makati City Prosecutors Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella Relova Santos, who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), John Joseph Gutierrez, Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortueste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche, Ricardo Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who are trustees of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a member of PEPCI (collectively, the accused), and a certain John Doe, the administrator of the website www.pepcoalition.com.
[4] [5]

PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI) - a wholly owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) - who had previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits thereunder after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments before the Makati RTC.

Decrying PPIs refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need plans, PEPCI sought to provide a forum by which their the planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under

policies by maintaining a website on the internet under the address of www.pepcoalition.com.

Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and blogspot under
[7] [6]

moderated on the internet a as well as a yahoo e-

the

website

addresswww.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com,

group at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are easily accessible to the public or by anyone logged on to the internet.

Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati on various dates from August 25 to October 2, 2005, he was appalled to read numerous articles [numbering 13], maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by [the accused] containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the Yuchengco Family, YGC, and particularly, Malayan. He cited an article which was posted/published on www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 which stated: Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation because it was done prematurely since we had not file any criminal aspect of our case. What is worse is that Yuchengcos benefited much from the nego. x x x . That is the fact na talagang hindi dapat pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos. LETS MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT, BSP AND AMLC AND WHEREVER. Pumunta tayong muli sa senado, congreso, RCBC Plaza, and other venues to air our grievances and call for boycott ng YGC. Let us start within ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga investments and deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC and I mean lahat and again convince friends to do the same. Yung mga nanonood langnoon ay dapat makisali na talaga ngayon specially those who joined only after knowing that there was a negotiation for amicable settlements.
[8]

FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE READY FOR IT BECAUSE THEY HAD SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO [9] KILL US NA. x x x (emphasis in the original)
[10]

By Resolution of May 5, 2006,

the Makati City Prosecutors Office, finding probable cause to indict the
[11]

accused, filed thirteen (13) separate Informations

charging them with libel. The accusatory portion of one

Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-876, which was raffled off to public respondent reads: That on or about the 25 day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the websitewww.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another together with John Does, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com and injurious and defamatory article as follows: Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x x x x x x For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had successfully lull us and the next time they will try to kill us na. x x x
th

A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as published/posted in www.pepcoalition.com is attached as Annex F of the complaint. That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the above defamatory article are known to the accused as trustees holding legal title to the above-cited website and that the accused are the ones

responsible for the posting and publication of the defamatory articles that the article in question was posted and published with the object of the discrediting and ridiculing the complainant before the public. CONTRARY TO LAW.
[12]

Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutors Resolution by a petition for review to the Secretary of Justice who, by Resolution of June 20, 2007,
[13]

reversed the finding of probable cause and accordingly

directed the withdrawal of the Informations for libel filed in court. The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of internet libel was non-existent, hence, the accused could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC.
[14]

Petitioners, as co-accused, Quash

[16]

[15]

thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the public respondent, a Motion to

the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the

Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the Information is fatally defective for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense of libel.
[17]

Citing Macasaet v. People,

petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular

place within the trial courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and first published.
[18]

By Order of October 3, 2006,

the public respondent, albeit finding that probable cause existed,

[19]

quashed the Information, citingAgustin v. Pamintuan.

It found that the Information lacked any allegations that

the offended parties were actually residing in Makati at the time of the commission of the offense as in fact they listed their address in the complaint-affidavit at Yuchengco Tower in Binondo, Manila; or that the alleged libelous article was printed and first published in Makati.
[20]

The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information,

insisting that the Information

[21]

sufficiently conferred jurisdiction on the public respondent. It cited Banal III v. Panganiban

which held that the

Information need not allege verbatim that the libelous publication was printed and first published in the appropriate venue. And it pointed out that Malayan has an office inMakati of which Helen is a resident. Moreover, the prosecution alleged that even assuming that the Information was deficient, it merely needed a formal amendment.

Petitioners opposed the prosecutions motion for reconsideration, contending, inter alia, that since venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases, any defect in an information for libel pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere matter of form that may be cured by amendment.
[23] [22]

By Order of March 8, 2007,

the public respondent granted the prosecutions motion for

reconsideration and accordingly ordered the public prosecutor to amend the Information to cure the defect of want of venue.

The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended Information dated March 20, 2007, accusatory portion of which reads: That on or about the 25 day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the websitewww.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring, confederating together with John Does, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati City, an injurious and defamatory article, which was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City, as follows: x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)
th

[24]

the

Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information

[25]

which, they alleged, still failed to vest

jurisdiction upon the public respondent because it failed to allege that the libelous articles were printed and first published by the accused in Makati; and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article.

By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal III, found the Amended Information to be sufficient in form.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration

[26]

having been denied by the public respondent by Joint

Resolution of August 12, 2008, they filed the present petition for Certiorari and Prohibition faulting the public respondent for: 1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW; 2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS CONTINUES TO BE DEFICIENT; and 3. NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF [27] CURING JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.

With the filing of Gimenezs Comment

[28]

to the petition, the issues are: (1) whether petitioners violated

the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition dismissible; and (2) whether grave abuse of discretion attended the public respondents admission of the Amended Information.
[29]

The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts,

as a rule, requires that

[30]

recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.

regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals. rule is not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain exceptions.
[31]

The

Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but purely legal questions.
[32]

In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority, by way of exception, in order to abbreviate the review process as petitioners raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under Article 360 of the RPC whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written defamation in light of the requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363, reading: Art. 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.

The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction.
[33]

This principle acquires even

greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.
[34] [35]

In Macasaet,

the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v. Sayo

which laid out the

rules on venue in libel cases, viz: For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our earlier pronouncement in the case ofAgbayani, to wit: In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the offending article was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City. In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first publication.

The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction in Makati becomes pronounced upon an examination of the rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of Appeals
[36]

explained the nature of these changes:

Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for criminal libel, following the amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal Code: Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for written defamations is the province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was written, printed or composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel. Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue. Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place. Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec v. De Guzman, 93 Phil. 933). To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic Act No. 4363, Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311). x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute where the offended party is a person of sufficient means or possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.

If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or

business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.

The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his firstaccess to the defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.

For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalitionwebsite is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.

Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as amended, are unduly oppressive, the Courts pronouncements in Chavez
[37]

are instructive:

For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani rule providing that a private person must file the complaint for libel either in the place of printing and first publication, or at the complainants place of residence. We would also have to abandon the subsequent cases that reiterate this rule in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet. There is no convincing reason to resort to such a radical action. These limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter was printed and first published. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to quash the Amended Information.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 and the Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008are hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and DISMISS the case.

SO ORDERED.

DR. FRANCISCA T. YOINGCO and ATTY. NESCITO C. HILARIO, complainants, vs. HON. CONCEPCION V. GONZAGA, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, respondent. [A.M. No. MTJ-03-1489. March 31, 2004] AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: In a verified complaint received by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on June 20, 2002, Dr. Francisca T. Yoingco and Atty. Nescito C. Hilario charged respondent Judge Concepcion V. Gonzaga of the Municipal Trial Court of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, with Grave Abuse of Authority and/or Oppression and Gross Ignorance of the Law, Jurisprudence and Rules relative to Criminal Cases Nos. 2000-185 to 2000-188, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Dr. Francisca T. Yoingco for Violation of BP 22. Complainant Dr. Yoingco is the accused while Atty. Hilario is her counsel in the said criminal cases. Before arraignment could be set, Dr. Yoingco filed a Motion to Quash on the ground that the MTC of Batangas has no jurisdiction because the subject checks were made, drawn and issued at the office of complainant in Makati, Metro Manila. After hearing, respondent Judge Gonzaga issued an Order dated February 19, 2002 denying the Motion to Quash, ratiocinating, thus: The ground of the Motion to Quash is improper venue. Considering that it is basic in law, as held in the case of Dacoycoy vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 195 SCRA 641 (1991) that trial court may not motu propio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue, the court deemed it wise and prudent, to schedule the Motion for hearing, in order that it may be said that all efforts were exerted, to insure compliance with due process, to which every party is entitled, towards an ideal and impartial administration of justice. ... Unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter, in these particular cases, the four checks issued by accused Dra. Yoingco to private complainant Norberto Carandang, which is conferred only by law, within the exclusive jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts, and may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court, which otherwise would have no jurisdiction, the venue of an action as fixed by statute, may be changed by consent of the parties and an objection on improper venue may be waived by the failure of the accused to raise it at the proper time. This was what actually happened in the instant cases for Violation of BP 22, when accused failed to raise the question of improper venue at the first instance that the cases were filed in court, more than a year ago. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of the parties. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional and hence may be waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties rather than restrict their access to the court, as it relates to the place of trial. In such an event, the court may still render a valid [1] judgment. In the same Order, respondent set the arraignment of Dr. Yoingco on April 2, 2002. The arraignment was reset to June 10, 2002 but no arraignment was held on the said date up to the filing of the present administrative case. Complainants charge respondent with: I. Grave Abuse of Authority and/or Oppression:

a. that Judge Gonzaga violated the Constitutional right of Dr. Yoingco to speedy trial as provided for under the enabling law, R.A. 8493, and as implemented by Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11, 1998 which provides: The arraignment, and the pre-trial if the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. . . . II. Gross Ignorance of the Law, Jurisprudence, and Rules: a. The ground raised in the Motion to Quash was that the MTC of Sto. Tomas, Batangas has no territorial jurisdiction over the case and the person of Dr. Yoingco because the alleged transaction took place in Makati City, including the issuance of the checks, the presentment to the bank of the said checks, and dishonor of the same and this was duly proven thru testimonial and documentary evidence during the hearing of her Motion to Quash; however, such findings were not included in the subject Order of February 19, 2002 in utter violation of Section 1 of Rule 36 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; Judge Gonzaga declared that the ground of the said Motion to Quash is VENUE, and NOT territorial jurisdiction over the case and person of the accused which clearly shows her incompetence and gross ignorance of the law and rules; It is gross ignorance of jurisprudence for the respondent Judge to equate the issue of territorial jurisdiction with venue, as she cited the case ofDacoycoy vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (195 SCRA 641); and It is falsification of judicial records or sheer gross ignorance on the part of Judge Gonzaga when she ruled that Dr. Yoingco failed to raise the question of improper venue at the first instance that the cases were filed in court, more than a year ago because Dr. Yoingco is NOT questioning IMPROPER VENUE as claimed by the respondent Judge, but the territorial jurisdiction of the MTC of Sto. Tomas, Batangas to try and decide the subject criminal cases since the transaction involving the issuance, presentment, and [2] dishonor of the subject checks were all done and had transpired in Makati City.

b.

c.

d.

On July 4, 2002, complainants filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Complaints with the OCA stating that respondent had explained to them the reasons for her action/inaction that justify the delay of the disposition of the criminal cases and that it would take time for them to verify the reasons given by Judge Gonzaga; and praying [3] that their complaints be considered withdrawn without prejudice. On July 25, 2002, the OCA referred the complaint to respondent for her Comment. In her Comment, respondent alleges, as follows: 1. Four (4) criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22 were filed against complainant Dr. Francisca T. Yoingco who never appeared in court and that it was her daughter-in-law who negotiated an amicable settlement in her behalf but which ended in futility. Hence, proceedings as mandated began on June 13, 2001when the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused; When the accused appeared for the first time, the court, seeing her advanced age, was moved to renew the efforts for settlement which her daughter-in-law had initiated. This was the reason the Court cited the Dacoycoy case even if it was civil in nature to support the stand that the court could motu propio dismiss the case and resolve the motion; and

2.

3.

It is not true that the delay in the arraignment of the accused was attributable to her. She points out that criminal cases were scheduled for trial once a week due to the unavailability of the public prosecutor. The trial of the case had been set but was deferred and postponed due to [4] litigated motions filed and intervening incidents caused by the accused and counsel.
[5]

In a Memorandum dated March 13, 2003, the OCA recommends that the complaints be re-docketed as a regular administrative case and that respondent be held administratively liable for acting on the criminal cases over which her court has no jurisdiction and fined in the amount ofP10,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely. In a Resolution dated April 21, 2003, the Court noted the report of the OCA and directed that the case be [7] re-docketed as a regular administrative matter. In another Resolution of even date, the Court required the parties to manifest whether or not they were submitting the case for resolution based on the pleadings [8] filed. Complainants responded in the affirmative. In her letter dated May 29, 2003, respondent likewise manifested her willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed but points out that despite the pleadings filed and the notice of withdrawal of complaints, she cannot understand why this became an administrative matter. In compliance with the Courts Resolution dated March 8, 2004, the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, furnished us with certified true copies of the four criminal complaints adverted to in the present administrative case. After going over the records of the case, the Court agrees with the findings of the OCA, except for the recommended penalty. First, as stated by the OCA, the withdrawal of a complaint by the complainant does not necessarily ensure the dismissal of the administrative case. As a general rule, the Court does not dismiss administrative cases [9] against members of the bench merely on the basis of withdrawal of charges even as the notice of withdrawal of the complaints filed by herein complainants is only a provisional withdrawal due to their assertion that they need time to verify the reasons given by Judge Gonzaga for the delay in the disposition of the criminal cases. Secondly, the Court agrees with the finding of the OCA that the charge of delay in the arraignment of Dr. Yoingco cannot be considered against Judge Gonzaga in view of the lack of public prosecutor assigned to her court and the postponements at the instance of Dr. Yoingco. Thus, respondent should be exonerated from the charge of grave abuse of authority and oppression. Thirdly, the Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA that respondent be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, jurisprudence and the rules. The Motion to Quash is primarily anchored on lack of jurisdiction considering that the subject checks were not made, drawn and issued at Sto. Tomas, Batangas but in Makati City; that the MTC of Sto. Tomas, Batangas has no jurisdiction over the criminal complaints as the elements of the offense of violation of Bouncing Checks Law occurred in Makati City which is outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the MTC of Sto. Tomas, Batangas. However, a close scrutiny of the allegations in the four criminal complaints show that all the subject checks were made, drawn and issued at Barangay San Vicente, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, all within the territorial jurisdiction of the court presided over by respondent. Unfortunately, respondent denied complainants Motion to Quash for the wrong reasons: that the ground relied upon by Dr. Yoingco is improper venue which is only procedural, not jurisdictional and can be waived by failure to raise it at the proper time; that Dr. Yoingco failed to raise the ground of improper venue at the first instance that the cases were filed in court more than a year ago; and that by virtue of the ruling of the Court in a [10] civil case, entitled, Dacoycoy vs. IAC, that when the ground is improper venue, the court cannot motu propio dismiss it but has to conduct hearing to ensure compliance with due process. Respondents denial of the motion to quash is patently erroneous. It is an exception to the hornbook doctrine that when the subject of the complaint may be subject to judicial review, the administrative complaint
[6]

shall be dismissed. In criminal proceedings, improper venue is lack of jurisdiction. Venue in criminal cases is [13] an essential element of jurisdiction. Unlike in a civil case where venue may be waived, this could not be done in a criminal case because it is an element of jurisdiction. It is basic that one can not be held to answer for any crime [14] committed by him except in the jurisdiction where it was committed. Respondents irresponsible convolution of the concept of venue in a civil case and in a criminal case exhibits ignorance of the law that caused undue confusion to the herein complainants. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the Rules of Criminal Procedure, he erodes the public confidence in the competence of our [15] courts. Such is ignorance of the law. Considering that this is her first offense and considering further that there is no allegation or proof that the [16] same was committed with malice or with bad faith or for monetary consideration, and the same did not cause undue damage or injury to complainants as the motion to quash was denied, although for the wrong reason, the Court deems it just to reprimand respondent. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Concepcion V. Gonzaga is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

[11]

[12]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE LAUREL, ET AL., defendants-appellants. G.R. No. L-7037 March 15, 1912 TORRES, J.: This appeal was raised by the four above-named defendants, from the judgment of conviction, found on page 117 of the record, rendered by the Honorable Mariano Cui. The facts in this case are as follows: On the night of December 26, 1909, while the girl Concepcion Lat was walking along the street, on her way from the house of Exequiel Castillo, situated in the pueblo of Tanauan, Province of Batangas, accompanied by several young people, she was approached by Jose Laurel who suddenly kissed her and immediately thereafter ran off in the direction of his house, pursued by the girl's companions, among whom was the master of the house above mentioned, Exequiel Castillo; but they did not overtake him. On the second night after the occurrence just related, that is, on the 28th, while Exequiel Castillo and Jose Laurel, together with Domingo Panganiban and several others of the defendants, were at an entertainment held on an upper floor of the parochial building of the said pueblo and attended by many residents of the town, it is alleged that the said Castillo and Laurel were invited by Panganiban, the former through his brother, Roque Castillo, and the latter, directly, to come out into the yard, which they did, accompanied by Panganiban and the other defendants referred to. After the exchange of a few words and explanations concerning the kiss given the girl Lat on the night of the 26th of that month, a quarrel arose between the said Jose Laurel and Exequiel Castillo, in which Domingo Panganiban, Vicente Garcia, and Conrado Laurel took part, and as a result of the quarrel Exequiel Castillo was seriously wounded. He succeeded in reaching a drug store near by where he received first aid treatment; Jose Laurel also received two slight wounds on the head. Dr. Sixto Rojas, who began to render medical assistance to Exequiel Castillo early in the morning of the following day, stated that his examination of the latter's injuries disclosed a wound in the left side of the chest, on a level with the fourth rib, from 3 to 4 centimeters in depth, reaching into the lung; another wound in the back of the left arm and in the conduit through which the ulnar nerve passes, from 10 to 11 centimeters in length, penetrating to

the bone and injuring the nerves and arteries of the said region, especially the ulnar nerve, which was served; a contusion on the right temple, accompanied by ecchymosis and hemorrhage of the tissues of the eye; and, finally, another contusion in the back of the abdomen near the left cavity, which by reaction injured the stomach and the right cavity. According to the opinion of the physician above named, the wound in the left side of the breast was serious on account of its having fully penetrated the lungs and caused the patient to spit blood, as noticed the day after he was wounded, and there must have been a hemmorhage of the lung, an important vital vascular organ; by reason of this hemorrhage or general infection the patient would have died, had it not been for the timely medical aid rendered him. The wound on the back of the left arm was also of a serious nature, as the ulnar nerve was cut, with the result that the title and ring fingers of the patient's left hand have been rendered permanently useless. With respect to the contusion on the right temple, it could have been serious, according to the kind of blows received, and the contusion on the back of the abdomen was diagnosed as serious also, on account of its having caused an injury as a result of which the wounded man complained of severe pains in the stomach and left spleen. The said physician stated that he had attended the patient fourteen consecutive days; that the contusion on the abdomen was cured in four or five days, and that on the right temple in ten or twelve days, although this latter injury was accompanied by a considerable ecchymosis which might not disappear for about three months, the time required for the absorption of the coagulated blood; that the stitches in the wound of the left arm were taken out after twelve days, and when witness ceased to attend the patient, this wound was healing up and for its complete cure would require eight or more days' time; and that the wound in the breast, for the reason that it had already healed internally and the danger of infection had disappeared, was healing, although still more time would be required for its complete cure, the patient being able to continue the treatment himself, which in fact he did. In view of the strikingly contradictory evidence adduced by the prosecution and by the defense, and in order to decide what were the true facts of the case we shall proceed to recite the testimony of the party who was seriously wounded and of his witnesses, and afterwards, that of his alleged assailants and of their witnesses, in order to determine the nature of the crime, the circumstances that concurred therein and, in turn, the responsibility of the criminal or criminals. Exequiel Castillo testified that while he, together with Primitivo Gonzalez, was in the hall of the parochial building of Tanauan, attending an entertainment on the night of December 28, 1909, he was approached by his brother, Roque Castillo, who told him, on the part of Domingo Panganiban, that Jose Laurel desired to speak with him and was awaiting him on the ground floor of the said building, to give him an explanation with regard to his (Laurel's) having kissed Concepcion Lat on the night of the 26th in the street and in the presence of the witness and other young people; that the witness, Exequiel Castillo, therefore, left the parochial building, accompanied by his brother Roque and Primitivo Gonzalez, and met Sofronio Velasco, Gaudencio Garcia, and Alfonso Torres, at the street door; that after he had waited there for half an hour, Jose laurel, Conrado Laurel, Vicente Garcia, Jose Garcia, and Domingo Panganiban, likewise came down out of the building and Jose Laurel approached him and immediately took him aside, away from the door of the building and the others; that Laurel then said to him that, before making any explanations relative to the said offense against the girl Concepcion Lat, he would ask him whether it was true that he (the witness, Castillo) had in his possession some letters addressed by Laurel to the said girl, to which the witness replied that as a gentleman he was not obliged to answer the question; that thereupon Jose Laurel suddenly struck him a blow in the left side of the breast with a knife, whereupon the witness, feeling that he was wounded, struck in turn with the cane he was carrying at his assailant, who dodged and immediately started to run; thereupon witness received another knife thrust in the left arm followed by a blow in the left side from a fist and witness, upon turning, saw Vicente Garcia and Domingo Panganiban in the act of again assaulting him; just then he was struck a blow with a cane on his right temple and, on turning, saw behind him Conrado Laurel carrying a stick, and just at the moment Primitivo Gonzalez and several policemen approached him calling of peace; his assailants then left him and witness went to the neighboring drug store where he received first aid treatment. Witness further testified that he had been courting the girl Concepcion Lat for a month; that, because his sweetheart had been kissed by Jose Laurel, he felt a little resentment against the latter, and that since then he had no opportunity to speak with his assailant until the said night of the attack.

Roque Castillo, a witness for the prosecution, testified that, at the request of Domingo Panganiban, he had suggested to his brother, Exequiel Castillo, that the latter should go down to the door of the ground floor of the parochial building, where Jose Laurel was waiting for him, so that the latter might make explanations to him with regard to what had taken place on the night prior to the 26th of December; that Exequiel, who was in the hall beside Primitivo Gonzalez, immediately upon receiving the notice sent him in Laurel's name, got up and went down with Gonzalez and the witness, though the latter remained at the foot of the stairs in conversation with Virginio de Villa, whom he found there; that, after a little while, witness saw Jose Laurel, Jose Garcia, Domingo Panganiban, Vicente Garcia, and Conrado Laurel come down from the said building, and, on observing something bulging from the back of the latter's waist he asked him what made that bulge, to which Laurel replied that it meant "peace;" witness thereupon said to him that if he really desired "peace," as witness also did, he might deliver to the latter the revolver he was carrying, and to prove that he would not make bad use of the weapon, Laurel might take the cartridges out and deliver the revolver to witness. This he did, the witness received the revolver without the cartridges, and his fears thus allayed, the witness returned to the upper floor to the entertainment; but that, at the end of about half an hour, he heard a hubbub among the people who said that there was a quarrel, and witness, suspecting that his brother Exequiel had met with some treachery, ran down out of the house; on reaching the ground floor he met Primitivo Gonzalez, who had blood stains on his arms; that Gonzalez then informed him that Exequiel was badly wounded; that he found his said brother in Arsenio Gonzalez' drug store; and that his brother was no longer able to speak but made known that he wanted to be shriven. Witness added that on that same night he delivered the revolver to his father, Sixto Castillo, who corroborated this statement. The other witness, Primitivo Gonzalez, corroborated the testimony given by the preceding witness, Roque Castillo, and testified that, while he was that night attending the entertainment at the parochial building of Tanauan, in company with Exequiel Castillo, the latter received notice from his (Castillo's) brother, through Domingo Panganiban, to the effect that Jose Laurel desired to speak with him concerning what occurred on the night of December 26; that thereupon Exequiel, the latter's brother, Roque and the witness all went down out of the house, though Roque stopped on the main stairway while witness and Exequiel went on until they came to the main door of the ground floor where they met Alfonso Torres and Gaudencio Garcia; that, after a while, Jose Laurel, Conrado Laurel, Vicente Garcia, Jose Garcia Aquino, and Domingo Panganiban came up; that when Jose Laurel met Exequiel Castillo he caught the latter by the hand and the two separated themselves from the rest and retired to a certain distance, although Vicente and Jose Garcia, Conrado Laurel, and Alfonso Torres placed themselves the nearest to the first two, Jose Laurel and Exequiel Castillo; that at this juncture witness, who was about 6 or 7 meters away from the two men last named, observed that Jose Laurel, who had his hand in his pocket while he was talking with Exequiel, immediately drew out a handkerchief and therewith struck Exequiel a blow on the breast; that the latter forthwith hit his assailant, Laurel, with a cane which he was carrying; that Laurel, upon receiving a blow, stepped back, while Exequiel pursued him and continued to strike him; that thereupon Vicente Garcia stabbed Exequiel, who had his back turned toward him and Conrado Laurel struck the said Exequiel a blow on the head with a cane; that when witness approached the spot where the fight was going on, several policemen appeared there and called out for peace; and that he did not notice what Jose Garcia Aquino and Alfonso Torres did. Lucio Villa, a policeman, testified that on the hearing the commotion, he went to the scene of it and met Jose Laurel who was coming away, walking at an ordinary gait and carrying a bloody pocketknife in his hand; that witness therefore arrested him, took the weapon from him and conducted him to the municipal building; and that the sergeant and another policemen, the latter being the witness's companion, took charge of the other disturbers. The defendant, Jose Laurel, testified that early in the evening of the 28th of December he went to the parochial building, in company with Diosdado Siansance and several young people, among them his cousin Baltazara Rocamora, for the purpose of attending an entertainment which was to be held there; that, while sitting in the front row of chairs, for there were as yet but few people, and while the director of the college was delivering a discourse, he was approached by Domingo Panganiban who told him that Exequiel Castillo wished to speak with

him, to which witness replied that he should wait a while and Panganiban thereupon went away; that, a short time afterwards, he was also approached by Alfredo Yatco who gave him a similar message, and soon afterwards Felipe Almeda came up and told him that Exequiel Castillo was waiting for him on the ground floor of the house; this being the third summons addressed to him, he arose and went down to ascertain what the said Exequiel wanted; that, when he stepped outside of the street door, he saw several persons there, among them, Exequiel Castillo; the latter, upon seeing witness, suggested that they separate from the rest and talk in a place a short distance away; that thereupon Exequiel asked witness why he kissed his, Exequiel's sweetheart, and on Laurel's replying that he had done so because she was very fickle and prodigal of her use of the word "yes" on all occasions, Exequiel said to him that he ought not to act that way and immediately struck him a blow on the head with a cane or club, which assault made witness dizzy and caused him to fall to the ground in a sitting posture; that, as witness feared that his aggressor would continue to assault him, he took hold of the pocketknife which he was carrying in his pocket and therewith defended himself; that he did not know whether he wounded Exequiel with the said weapon, for, when witness arose, he noticed that he, the latter, had a wound in the right parietal region and a contusion in the left; that witness was thereupon arrested by the policemen, Lucio Villa, and was unable to state whether he dropped the pocketknife he carried or whether it was picked up by the said officer; that it took more than a week to cure his injuries; that he had been courting the girl Concepcion Lat for a year, but that in October, 1909, his courtship ended and Exequiel Castillo then began to court her; and that, as witness believed that the said girl would not marry him, nor Exequiel, he kissed her in the street, on the night of December 26, 1909, and immediately thereafter ran toward his house. Baltazara Rocamora stated that, while she was with Jose Laurel on the night of December 28, 1909, attending an entertainment in the parochial building of Tanauan, the latter was successively called by Domingo Panganiban, Alfredo Yatco, and Felipe Almeda, the last named saying: "Go along, old fellow; you are friends now." Casimiro Tapia testified that, on the morning following the alleged crime, he visited Jose Laurel in the jail, and found him suffering from the bruises or contusions; that to cure them, he gave him one application of tincture of arnica to apply to his injuries, which were not serious. Benito Valencia also testified that, while the entertainment, he saw Domingo Panganiban approach Jose Laurel and tell him that Exequiel Castillo was waiting for him downstairs to talk to him; that Laurel refused to go, as he wished to be present at the entertainment, and that Panganiban then went away; that, soon afterwards, witness also went down, intending to return home, and, when he had been on the ground floor of the parochial building for fifteen minutes, he saw, among the many people who were there, Exequiel Castillo and Jose Laurel who were talking apart from a group of persons among whom he recognized Roque Castillo, Primitivo Gonzalez and Conrado Laurel; that soon after this, witness saw Exequiel Castillo strike Jose Laurel a blow with a cane and the latter stagger and start to run, pursued by the former, the aggressor; that at this juncture, Conrado Laurel approached Exequiel and, in turn, struck him from behind; and that the police presently intervened in the fight, and witness left the place where it occurred. The defendant Domingo Panganiban testified that, while he was at the entertainment that night, he noticed that it threatened to rain, and therefore left the house to get his horse, which he had left tied to a post near the door; that, on reaching the ground floor, the brothers Roque and Exequiel Castillo, asked him to do them the favor to call Jose Laurel, because they wished to talk to the latter, witness noticing that the said brothers were then provided with canes; that he called Jose Laurel, but the latter said that he did not wish to go down, because he was listening to the discourse which was then being delivered, and witness therefore went down to report the answer to the said brothers; that while he was at the door of the parochial building waiting for the drizzle to cease, Jose Laurel and Felipe Almeda came up to where he was, and just then Exequiel Castillo approached the former, Laurel, and they both drew aside, about 2 brazas away, to talk; that soon afterwards, witness saw Exequiel Castillo deal Jose Laurel two blows in succession and the latter stagger and start to run, pursued by his assailant; the latter was met by several persons who crowded about in an aimless manner, among whom witness recognized Roque Castillo and Conrado Laurel; and that he did not see Primitivo Gonzalez nor Gaudencio Garcia at the place where the fight occurred, although he remained where he was until a policeman was called.

Conrado Laurel, a cousin of Jose Laurel, testified that, on the night of December 28, 1909, he was in the parochial building for the purpose of attending the entertainment; that he was then carrying a revolver, which had neither cartridges nor firing pin, for the purpose of returning it to its owner, who was a Constabulary telegraph operator on duty in the pueblo of Tanauan; that the latter, having been informed by a gunsmith that the said revolver could not be fixed, requested witness, when they met each other in the cockpit the previous afternoon, to return the weapon to him during the entertainment; that, on leaving the said building to retire to his house and change his clothes, he met Roque Castillo, his cousin and confidential friend, on the ground floor of the parochial building or convent and the latter, seeing that witness was carrying a revolver, insisted on borrowing it, notwithstanding that witness told him that it was unserviceable; that, after he had changed his clothes, he left his house to return to the parochial building, and near the main door of said building he found Exequiel Castillo and Jose Laurel talking by themselves; that a few moment afterwards, he saw Exequiel strike Jose two blows with a cane that nearly caused him to fall at full length on the ground, and that Jose immediately got up and started to run, pursued by his assailant, Exequiel; that witness, on seeing this, gave the latter in turn a blow on the head with a cane, to stop him from pursuing Jose, witness fearing that the pursuer, should he overtake the pursued, would kill him; that, after witness struck Exequiel Castillo with the cane, the police intervened and arrested them; and that, among those arrested, he saw Panganiban and Vicente Garcia, and, at the place of the disturbance, Roque Castillo and Primitivo Gonzalez. Vicente Garcia denied having taken part in the fight. He testified that he also was attending the entertainment and, feeling warm, went down out of the parochial building; that, upon so doing, he saw Domingo Panganiban and Jose Laurel, but was not present at the fight, and only observed, on leaving the building, that there was a commotion; then he heard a policeman had arrested Jose Laurel. Well-written briefs were filed in first instance, both by the prosecution and by the defense; but, notwithstanding the large number of persons who must have been eyewitnesses to what occurred, it is certain that the prosecution was only able to present the witness, Primitivo Gonzalez, a relative of Exequiel Castillo, to testify as to how and by whom the assault was begun. Each one of the combatants, Exequiel Castillo and Jose Laurel accused the other of having commenced the assault. Castillo testified that Laurel, after the exchange of few words between them, suddenly and without warning stabbed him with a knife, while Laurel swore that, after a short conversation Castillo struck him two blows with a cane, on which account, in order to defend himself, he seized a pocketknife he carried in his pocket. In view, therefore, of these manifest contradictions, and in order to determine the liability of the defendant, Jose Laurel, who, it is proved, inflicted the serious wound on Exequiel Castillo, it is necessary to decide which of the two was the assailant. Taking for granted that Jose Laurel did actually kiss Concepcion Lat in the street and in the presence of Exequiel Castillo, the girl's suitor, and of others who were accompanying her, the first query that naturally arises in the examination of the evidence and the circumstances connected with the occurrence, is: Who provoked the encounter between Laurel and Castillo, and the interview between the same, and who invited the other, on the night of December 28, 1909, to come down from the parochial building of Tanauan, to the lower floor and outside the entrance of the same? Even on this concrete point the evidence is contradictory, for, while the witnesses of Exequiel Castillo swore that the latter was invited by Jose Laurel, those of the latter testified, in turn, that Laurel was invited three consecutive times by three different messengers in the name and on the part of the said Castillo. In the presence of this marked contradiction, and being compelled to inquire into the truth of the matter, we are forced to think that the person who would consider himself aggrieved at the kiss given the girl Concepcion Lat, in the street and in the presence of several witnesses, would undoubtedly be Exequiel Castillo, the suitor of the girl, and it would appear to be a reasonable conclusion that he himself, highly offended at the boldness of Jose Laurel, was the person who wished to demand explanation of the offense.

Upon this premise, and having weighed and considered as a whole the testimony, circumstantial evidence, and other merits of the present case, the conviction is acquired, by the force of probability, that the invitation, given through the medium of several individuals, came from the man who was offended by the incident of the kiss, and that it was the perpetrator of the offense who was invited to come down from the parochial building to the ground floor thereof to make explanations regarding the insult to the girl Lat, the real suitor of whom was at the time the said Exequiel Castillo. All this is not mere conjecture; it is logically derived from the above related facts. Both Jose and Exequiel were attending the entertainment that night in the upper story of the parochial building. Exequiel was the first who went below, with his cousin, Primitivo Gonzalez, knowing the Laurel remained in the hall above, and he it was who waited for nearly half an hour on the ground floor of the said building for the said Jose Laurel to come down. The latter was notified three times, and successively, in the name and on the part of Exequiel Castillo, first by Domingo Panganiban, then by Alfredo Yatco and finally by Felipe Almeda--three summonses which were necessary before Jose Laurel could be induced, after the lapse of nearly half an hour, to come down. Meanwhile, for that space of time, Exequiel Castillo was awaiting him, undoubtedly for the purpose of demanding explanations concerning the offensive act committed against his sweetheart. The natural course and the rigorous logic of the facts can not be arbitrarily be rejected, unless it be shown that other entirely anomalous facts occurred. If, in the natural order of things, the person who was deeply offended by the insult was the one who believed he had a right to demand explanations of the perpetrator of that insult, it is quite probable that the aggrieved party was the one who, through the instrumentality of several persons, invited the insulter to come down from the upper story of the parochial building, where he was, and make the explanations which he believed he had a right to exact; and if this be so, Exequiel Castillo, seriously affected and offended by the insult to his sweetheart, Concepcion Lat, must be held to be the one who brought about the encounter gave the invitation and provoked the occurrence, as shown by his conduct in immediately going down to the entrance door of the said building and in resignedly waiting, for half an hour, for Jose Laurel to come down. Moreover, if the latter had provoked the encounter or interview had on the ground floor of the building, it is not understood why he delayed in going down, nor why it became necessary to call him three times, in such manner that Exequiel Castillo had to wait for him below for half an hour, when it is natural and logical to suppose that the provoking party or the one interested in receiving explanations would be precisely the one who would have hastened to be in waiting at the place of the appointment; he would not have been slow or indisposed to go down, as was the case with Jose Laurel. If, as is true, the latter was the one who insulted the girl Concepcion Lat an insult which must deeply have affected the mind of Exequiel Castillo, the girl's suitor at the time it is not possible to conceive, as claimed by the prosecution, how and why it should be Jose Laurel who should seek explanations from Exequiel Castillo. It was natural and much more likely that it should have been the latter who had an interest in demanding explanations from the man who insulted his sweetheart. In view of the behavior of the men a few moments before the occurrence, we are of the opinion that Castillo was the first to go down to the entrance door of the parochial building, knowing that Jose Laurel was in the hall, and, notwithstanding the state of his mind, he had the patience to wait for the said Laurel who, it appears, was very reluctant to go down and it was necessary to call him three times before he finally did so, at the end of half an hour. After considering these occurrences which took place before the crime, the query of course arises as to which of the two was the first to assault the other, for each lays the blame upon his opponent for the commencement of the assault. Exequiel Castillo testified that after he had replied to Jose Laurel that he, the witness, was not obliged to say whether he had in his possession several letters addressed by laurel to the girl Concepcion Lat, Laurel immediately stabbed him in the breast with a knife; while Jose Laurel swore that, upon his answering the question put to him by Castillo as to why the witness had kissed his sweetheart, saying that it was because she was very fickle and prodigal of the word "yes" on all occasions, Exequiel said to him in reply that he ought not to act in that

manner, and immediately struck him a couple of blows on the head with a club, wherefore, in order to defend himself, he drew the knife he was carrying in his pocket. Were the statements made by Exequiel Castillo satisfactorily proven at the trial, it is unquestionable that Jose Laurel would be liable as the author of the punishable act under prosecution; but, in view of the antecedents aforerelated, the conclusions reached from the evidence, and the other merits of the case, the conclusion is certain that the assault was commenced by Exequiel Castillo, who struck Jose Laurel two blows with a cane, slightly injuring him in two places on the head, and the assaulted man, in self-defense, wounded his assailant with a pocketknife; therefore, Jose Laurel committed no crime and is exempt from all responsibility, as the infliction of the wounds attended by the three requisites specified in paragraph 4, article 8 of the Penal Code. From the evidence, then, produced at the trial, it is concluded that it was Exequiel Castillo who, through the mediation of several others, invited Laurel to come down from the upper story of the parochial building, and that it was he, therefore, who provoked the affray aforementioned, and, also, it was he who unlawfully assaulted Jose Laurel, by striking the latter two blows with a cane inasmuch as it is not likely that after having received a dangerous wound in the left breast, he would have been able to strike his alleged assailant two successive blows and much less pursue him. It is very probable that he received the said wounds after he had assaulted Jose Laurel with the cane, and Laurel, on his part, in defending himself from the assault, employed rational means by using the knife that he carried in his pocket. For all the foregoing reasons, Jose Laurel must be acquitted and held to be exempt from responsibility on the ground of self-defense. The case falls within paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, inasmuch as the defensive act executed by him was attended by the three requisites of illegal aggression on the part of Exequiel Castillo, there being a lack of sufficient provocation on the part of Laurel, who, as we have said, did not provoke the occurrence complained of, nor did he direct that Exequiel Castillo be invited to come down from the parochial building and arrange the interview in which Castillo alone was interested, and, finally, because Laurel, in defending himself with a pocketknife against the assault made upon him with a cane, which may also be a deadly weapon, employed reasonable means to prevent or repel the same. Under the foregoing reasoning, the other accused, Conrado Laurel and Vicente Garcia, who likewise, were convicted as principals of the crime under prosecution, are comprised within the provisions of paragraph 5 of the said article 8 of the Penal Code, which are as follows: He who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural, or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided the first and second circumstances mentioned in the foregoing number are attendant, and provided that in case the party attacked first gave provocation, the defender took no part therein. Conrado Laurel and Vicente Garcia, first cousins of Jose Laurel, as shown in the trial record to have been proven without contradiction whatsoever, did not provoke the trouble, nor did they take any part in the invitation extended to Jose Laurel in the name of and for Exequiel Castillo; in assisting in the fight between Castillo and Laurel, they acted in defense of their cousin, Jose Laurel, when they saw that the latter was assaulted, twice struck and even pursued by the assailant, Castillo; consequently Conrado Laurel and Vicente Garcia have not transgressed the law and they are exempt from all responsibility, for all the requisites of paragraph 4 of the aforecited article attended the acts performed by them, as there was illegal aggression on the part of the wounded man, Exequiel Castillo, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the said aggression on the part of the aforementioned Conrado Laurel and Vicente Garcia, who acted in defense of their cousin, Jose Laurel, illegally assaulted by Exequiel Castillo, neither of the said codefendants having provoked the alleged crime.

With regard to Domingo Panganiban, the only act of which he was accused by the wounded man, Exequiel Castillo, was that he struck the latter a blow on the left side with his fist, while Castillo was pursuing Laurel. Domingo Panganiban denied that he took part in the quarrel and stated that he kept at a distance from the combatants, until he was arrested by a policeman. His testimony appears to be corroborated by that of Primitivo Gonzalez, a witness for the prosecution and relative of Exequiel Castillo, for Gonzalez positively declared that Panganiban was beside him during the occurrence of the fight and when the others surrounded the said Exequiel Castillo; it is, therefore, neither probable nor possible that Panganiban engaged in the affray, and so he contracted no responsibility whatever. Exequiel Castillo's wounds were very serious, but, in view of the fact that conclusive proof was adduced at the trial, of the attendance of the requisites prescribed in Nos. 4 and 5 of article 8 of the Penal Code, in favor of those who inflicted the said wounds, it is proper to apply to this case the provision contained in the next to the last paragraph of rule 51 of the provisional law for the application of the said code. With respect to the classification of the crime we believe that there is no need for us to concern ourselves therewith in this decision, in view of the findings of fact and of law made by the court below upon the question of the liability of the defendants. By reason, therefore, of all the foregoing, we are of opinion that, with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, we should acquit, as we do hereby, the defendants Jose Laurel, Vicente Garcia, Conrado Laurel, and Domingo Panganiban. They have committed no crime, and we exempt them from all responsibility. The costs of both instances shall be de oficio, and the bond given in behalf of the defendants shall immediately be canceled.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIANO R. MARCOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants. G.R. No. L-47388 October 22, 1940 LAUREL, J.: In the elections of 1934 in which Mariano Marcos and Julio Nalundasan, both of Batac, Ilocos Norte, were rival candidates for the office of representative for the second district of said province, Nalundasan was elected. The term for which the latter was elected was, however, cut short as a result of the approval of the Constitution of the Philippines under the general elections for members of the National Assembly were by law set for September 17, 1935. In these general elections Julio Nalundasan and Mariano Marcos resumed their political rivalry and were opposing candidates for assemblyman in the same district. In the strife Nalundasan again came out triumphant over Marcos. In the afternoon of September 19, 1935, in celebration of Nalundasan's victory, a number of this followers and partymen paraded in cars and trucks through the municipalities of Currimao, Paoay and Batac, Ilocos Norte, and passed in front of the house of the Marcoses in Batac. The parade is described as provocative and humiliating for the defeated candidate, Mariano Marcos. The assemblyman-elect, Julio Nalundasan, was not, however, destined to reap the fruits of his political laurels for on the night of September 20, 1935, he was shot and killed in his house in Batac. Very intensive investigation of the crime by the Government authorities, particularly the Philippine Constabulary, followed, as a consequence of which an information was filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte charging one Nicasio Layaoen, a businessman of Batac, Ilocos Norte, with having committed the murder of Nalundasan. After trial, however, Layaoen was acquitted. This acquittal resulted in another protracted investigation and detective work by the Governmental agencies, particularly the Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice, with a view to solving the Nalundasan murder. On December 7, 1938. or more than three years after the death of Nalundasan, Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos and

Quirino Lizardo were prosecuted for the crime of murder in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte under the following information: Que en o hacia la noche del 20 de septimbre de 1935, en el Municipio de Batac, Provincia de Ilocos Norte, Filipinas, y dentrio de la jurisdiccion de este Honorable Juzgado, los acusados arriba nombrados, armados con armas de fuego, puestos de acuerdo y conspirandose entre si, voluntaria, elegal y criminalmente, con alevosia y premeditacion conocida y con intencion de matar, dispararon contra Julio Nalundasan, entonces electo Diputado por el Segundo Distrito de Ilocos Norte, tocandole en su costado derecho habiendo la bala interesado organos vitales internos, lesionandolos, las cuales lesiones causaron la muerte instantinea de dicho Julio Nalundasan. Hecho cometido con infraccion de la ley y con las circunstancias agravantes de nocturnidad y de haberse cometido el delito en la morada del occiso. On June 10, 1939, before the conclusion of the trial, Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo filed eight separate complaints before the justice of the peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, charging Calixto Aguinaldo, the principal witness for the prosecution, who was still under cross-examination in the trial against Lizardo, with the offense of false testimony allegedly committed in the preliminary investigation of December 7, 1938, and during the trial. The defense had not yet completed the presentation of its evidence, and the prosecution was preparing its rebuttal testimony. Upon motion of the provincial fiscal of Ilocos Norte, the trial court ordered the provincial dismissal of the complaints. Fiscal Higinio Macadaeg also moved said court to find the Marcoses and Lizardo guilty of contempt of court, by virtue of which the latter were ordered to show cause why the motion should not be granted. After the conclusion of the trial, the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte rendered judgment the dispositive parts of which read as follows: En su virtud, el Juzgado halla a los acusados Quirino S. Lizardo y Ferdinand E. Marcos culpables, fuera de toda duda recional, del delito de asesinato, con agravante de morada, pero compensada por la atenuante de provocacion en el caso de Quirino S. Lizardo, y por la circunstancia adicional de minoria de edad en el caso de Ferdinand E. Marcos, y condena al primero a la pena de resolucion perpectua, a las accesorias de ley, y al pago de una cuarta parte de las costas procesales; y al segundo, a la pena indeterminada de diez anos como minima a diecisiete anos y cuatro meses como maxima, a las accesorias de ley, y al pago de una cuarta parte de las costas procasales; y ambos a indemnizar mancomunada y solidtriameiite a los herederos del occiso en la cantidad de mil pesos (P1,000), pero sin prision subsidiaria en caso de Insolvencia; y se absuelve a los acusados Mariano R. Marcos y Pio Marcos, con la mitad de las costas procesales de oficio, y con la cancelacion de la fianza que han prestado para su libertad provisional. Por lo expuesto, el Juzgado declara a los acusados en el incidente reos de desacato, y les condena a cada uno a pagar una multa de P200, o a sufrir la prision subsidiaria correspondiente en caso de insolvencia o falta de pago. From this judgment the defendants Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino appealed, assigning the following errors: 1. The trial court erred in according greater credibility to the prosecution witnesses. 2. The trial court erred in convicting two and acquitting two accused upon the same evidence. 3. The trial court erred in considering the character of Quirino Lizardo against the accused. 4. The trial court erred in not crediting the electoral censo, Exhibit 84 for the defense, with any probative value. lawphil.net

5. The trial court erred in denying the motions of the accused for a reopening and a new trial. 6. The trial court erred in finding the four accused- appellant guilty of contempt.1awphil.nt The defendants Mariano Marcos and Pio Marcos have also appealed, but only from so much of the judgment as found them guilty of contempt. A three-volume brief was filed by the appellants and a comprehensive brief submitted by the Government. Both briefs are, however, more valueable for their literary value. Oral argument was had and doubtful points eliminated. In view of the importance of the case and the fact that the Government asks for the extreme penalty of death for the defendants-appellants, Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo, we have taken over the case on appeal with utmost caution and searching scrutiny of the evidence presented both by the prosecution and by the defense. As a general rule, this court will not interfere with judgment of the trial court in passing upon the weight or credibility that should be attached to the testimony of witnesses; but this court may determine for itself the guilt or innocence of the defendant and may modify or reverse the conclusions of fact laid down by the trial court if there is some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been over- looked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. The theory of the prosecution, stripped of nonessentials, is that Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo were prompted to conspire against the life of Julio Nalundasan by the latter's electoral victory over Mariano Marcos, father of Ferdinand and brother-in-law of Lizardo, on September 17, 1935; that Calixto Aguinaldo, the principal witness for the prosecution, was a trusted and loyal attendant and bodyguard of Quirino Lizardo; that the said Calixto Aguinaldo was present in various conference of the Marcoses and Lizardo, in the last of which (that held on September 20, 1935) it was decided that Nalundasan must be killed; that Ferdinand was selected as the trigger man because he was a marks- man and because, if discovered and convicted, he would only be sent to Lolomboy reformatory school in view of his age, and that Mariano Marcos, father of Ferdinand, would in the meantime be in Laoag; that about nine o'clock in the evening of September 20, 1935, Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo, the first armed with an automatic pistol and the second with a police positive revolver, and accompanied by Calixto Aguinaldo, left for the fatal mission and, upon reaching Nalundasan's yard, they posted themselves at a point where they could not be detected but where they could get a full view of the intended human target; that Calixto Aguinaldo was asked to watch while his two companions, Ferdinand and Lizardo, were to execute the act that would put an end to Nalundasan's life; that Calixto Aguinaldo, after waiting for a few minutes, was seized by fear as a result of which he proceeded to return to the house of the Marcoses, but that on his way he heard the fatal shot from the direction of Nalundasan's home; that Ferdinand fired the fatal shot at Nalundasan while the latter's back was turned towards Ferdinand and Lizardo. On the other hand, the defense is one of complete denial of participation by any of the herein defendants in the commission of the crime. It is at once apparent that the validity of the theory of the prosecution rests upon the weight that should be accorded to the testimony of Calixto Aguinaldo, the principal witness for the prosecution and the alleged companion of the defendants-appellants, Quirino Lizardo and Ferdinand Marcos on the night of the killing of Julio Nalundasan. It is important to observe that, as stated, immediately after the death of Nalundasan and as a result of the efforts exerted by the agents of the Government, particularly the Philippine Constabulary, Nicasio Layaoen, a businessman of Batac, Ilocos Norte, was prosecuted for the murder of Nalundasan. In that case the star witness, Gaspar Silvestre, identified Layaoen as the man who fired the fatal shot at Nalundasan on the night in question, and the prosecution, with the same earnestness and vehemence exhibited in the case, prayed for the imposition of the extreme penalty of death upon the accused Layaoen. In that case it was claimed that the accused Layaoen was seen on the night in question with a revolver under the house of the deceased and that in a house immediately adjoining that of Layaoen and under the care and control of his wife, the Constabulary agents discovered eighty-one rounds of ammunition of the 22 long Lubaloy Western rifle, the brand and class of bullet which was alleged in that case and is alleged in the present case to have killed Nalundasan. Nevertheless the accused Layaoen was acquitted by the court of First instance of Ilocos Norte.

According to Calixto Aguinaldo, the principal witness for the prosecution, he was present in the various stages of the conspiracy to murder Nalundasan and, as noted above, he was present at the time of the commission of the murder on the night of September 20, 1935. Aguinaldo also alleges to have been present at the meeting in the house of the Marcoses in the morning of September 15th as well as at the meetings in the morning and in the after- noon of September 20th, The very evidence for the prosecution therefore shows that Calixto Aguinaldo was a coconspirator. His testimony accordingly comes from a polluted source and should be received with a great deal of caution and, for this reason, should be closely and carefully scrutinized. A painstaking review of the evidence reveals several important considerations leading to the inescapable conclusion that the testimony of Calixto Aguinaldo does not deserve the credit that was accorded by the trial court. It is noteworthy that Aguinaldo claims to have been present at the various stages of the conspiracy and to have participated in the commission of the offense herein charged to the extent admitted by him. Nevertheless he remained silent for approximately three years, it appearing that it was only in November, 1938, that he broke his silence. The reason given the prosecution is that his loyalty to the defendant Quirino Lizardo prevented him from betraying the latter's confidence, and in this connection it was admitted in the argument by the representative of the prosecution that it was only when Aguinaldo was approached by the Constabulary agents that he decided to speak out the truth. The pretended loyalty of Aguinaldo is conspicuously disproved by the circumstance that, as the prosecution itself admits, although he was asked to watch, he returned to the house of the Marcoses before Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo has executed the alleged fatal act. But whatever might have Aguinaldo's reason, the fact is that his long continued silence creates serious doubts in the mind of this Court as to his motives for breaking that silence. The change of attitude could not have been due to a desireable impulse to serve the interest of justice and proves, if it proves anything at all, the tardy revival of stultified civic consciousness. According to the theory of the prosecution, Ferdinand was selected as the trigger man for two reasons, namely: because he is experienced in pistol shooting, having been cadet major in the University of the Philippines, and because he was below eighteen years of age and, if discovered and convicted, would be merely sent to Lolomboy reformatory school. With reference to the first reason, it is even represented that Mariano Marcos, father of Ferdinand, not only acquiesced in the arrangement but apparently encouraged his son to perform the foul task, with the simple remark that an assurance be made that the target was not missed and, if we may believe further the testimony of Calixto Aguinaldo, that he (Mariano Marcos) was to go in the meantime to Laoag, Ilocos Norte, thereby leaving his son to accomplish the dirty job while he, the person most affected by the electoral triumph of Nalundasan, was to stay away safe and sound. This is something extraordinary for a father to feel and to do, and we incline to reject the testimony of Aguinaldo and the inferences deducible therefrom, because the story is, while possible, devoid of reasonable probability and opposed to the lessons of common experience and the teachings of experimental psychology. As regards the second reason, it appears that both the prosecution and the defense agree that Ferdinand Marcos was at the time of the commission of the alleged offense already over eighteen years of age. As a matter of fact, one of the ground invoked by the SolicitorGeneral in asking for the modification of the judgment of the lower court and imposition of the death penalty upon this appellant is that he was more than eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the offense. It is of course reasonable to assume that at least his father and the interested party himself, if not his uncle Pio Marcos and Quirino Lizardo, knew this fact. The theory that Ferdinand was chosen to be the trigger man because of minority must therefore be decidedly false. We find the claim of Calixto Aguinaldo that he was present at the alleged various conferences held in the house of the Marcoses as a mere bodyguard of Quirino Lizardo to be incredible, in view of the absence of a valid reason for the latter, admitted by the prosecution to be "a domineering, blustering giant of a man" and by the trial court to be "un hombre de rebusta constitucion fisica, de caracter implusivo, val;iente y decidido," to employ as his bodyguard Calixto Aguinaldo, who is only about one-half of Lizardo in size and who has not been shown to be capable, either by experience or by nature, to discharge such office. More incredible still is alleged participation of Aguinaldo in the actual conspiracy to kill Julio Nalundasan, especially in view of the fact that, notwithstanding the attempt of the prosecution to show that he was a trusted man of Quirino Lizardo, there is evidence to prove that

the relationship between the two could not be said to be of the best, it appearing, according to the admission of Aguinaldo himself, that he lost his job in the Government by order of the University of Labor upon the strength of the findings in an administrative investigation in which Lizardo testified Aguinaldo. It is hard to believe that either the Marcoses or Quirino Lizardo would allow themselves to commit the stupidity of permitting Calixto Aguinaldo, who was a stranger to the Marcoses and who, as already stated, had reason to be antagonistic to Lizardo, to know their alleged plan to kill Nalundasan and of later asking Aguinaldo to merely play the insignificant, nay unnecessary, role of watcher, unless it was the intention of the defendant herein to facilitate the discovery of the alleged crime and to preserve the only means of their conviction. Since, according to the theory of the prosecution, Ferdinand Marcos was selected to be the trigger man, Quirino Lizardo, Mariano Marcos or Pio Marcos could easily have personally done the alleged watching. Calixto Aguinaldo testified that when he and Quirino Lizardo arrived at noon in Batac, Ilocos Norte, Ferdinand was in the house of the Marcoses to whom he was introduced. It is a fact, however, that Ferdinand was a student of the University of the Philippines and left Manila in the morning of September 15, 1935, arriving in Batac only at 8:30 p. m. of that day. Aguinaldo therefore declared falsely when he stated that he met Ferdinand in the house of the Marcoses at the time he (Aguinaldo) and Lizardo arrived in Batac at noon of September 15, 1935. The prosecution has pictured Quirino Lizardo as a person more interested and enthusiastic than his brotherin-law, Mariano Marcos, in seeing the latter win in the elections of September 17, 1935, against Julio Nalundasan at all costs. Thus it is represented that when Pio Marcos informed Lizardo prior to the elections about the imminent defeat of Mariano Marcos, Lizardo is alleged to have impulsively exclaimed " Eso no puede ser! !Si vamos a perder la eleccion ganaremos en otra cosa, y es . . . matar a Nalundasan! Con una bala voy a terminar la politica en Ilocos!" In this connection it is well to recall that after marriage of Quirino Lizardo to Maria Marcos, sister of Mariano and Pio Marcos, animosity and ill feeling arose between the Marcoses and Lizardo as a result of family questions, which culminated in the filing in court of a criminal complaint against Lizardo for attempted homicide in which the offended party was the mother of the Marcoses. In the light of this circumstance, we cannot align ourselves with the theory that Lizardo could thereafter have shown such interest in the candidacy of Mariano Marcos as to take the initiative not only of suggesting but of participating in the murder of Julio Nalundasan, even granting that previous family differences had been patched up. The trial court was of the opinion that the Marcoses and Lizardo conceived the idea of killing Nalundasan with some seriousness only in the morning of September 209, 1935, after the provocative and humiliating parade held by Nalundasan's followers and partymen in the afternoon of the preceding day. But while the defeat of Marcos, followed by such insulting parade, might have irritated the herein defendants, the existence of a motive alone, though perhaps an important consideration, is not proof of the commission of a crime, much less of the guilt of the defendants-appellants. By and large, we find the testimony of Calixto Aguinaldo to be inherently improbable and full of contradictions in important details. For this reason, we decline to give him any credit. In view of this conclusion, we find it neither necessary nor profitable to examine the corroborative evidence presented by the prosecution. Where the principal and basic evidence upon which the prosecution rests its case fails, all evidence intended to support or corroborate it must likewise fail. In passing we may state that the prosecution deserves commendation for the industry and zeal it has displayed in this case, although its failure to obtain the conviction of Nicasio Layaoen in the first case it is not necessarily vindicated by the instant effort to secure a judgment against the herein defendants-appellants, unless the latter's guilt is shown to the point of a certain degree of moral certainty and the judicial mind is set at ease as to their culpability. The judgment of the lower court, herein appealed from is accordingly reversed, and the defendantsappellants, Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo, acquitted of the charge of murder and forthwith liberated from imprisonment and discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de oficio.

With reference to the incident of contempt, it appears that on June 10, 1939, the four accused below filed eight separate complaints with the justice of the peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, charging the principal witness for the prosecution, Calixto, Aguinaldo, with the crime of false testimony because of alleged false declaration made by the latter in the preliminary investigation of December 7, 1938, and during the trial of the aforesaid four accused. When the several complaints for false testimony were filed, it appears that Calixto Aguinaldo was under cross-examination in the separate trial against Quirino Lizardo, and the trial of the other three accused, Mariano, Pio and Ferdinand Marcos, had not yet commenced. The judge of the Court of First Instance who was trying the murder case, upon motion of the provincial fiscal of Ilocos Norte, ordered the provincial dismissal of the various complaints filed in the justice of the peace court of Laoag against Calixto Aguinaldo and, thereafter, a motion was presented asking that the Marcos and Lizardo be declared in contempt. Lizardo and the Marcoses were ordered to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt and, simultaneously with the judgment on the principal case for murder, Quirino Lizardo, Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos were adjudged guilty of contempt and sentenced each to pay a fine of two hundred pesos, with corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. It is evident that the charges for false testimony filed by the four accused above mentioned could not be decided until the main case for murder was disposed of, since no penalty could be meted out to Calixto Aguinaldo for his alleged false testimony without first knowing the extent of the sentence to be imposed against Lizardo and the Marcoses (Revised Penal Code, art. 180). The latter should therefore have waited for the termination of the principal case in the lower court before filing the charges for false testimony against Calixto Aguinaldo. Facts considered, we are of the opinion that the action of the Marcoses and Lizards was calculated, or at least tended. directly or indirectly to obstruct the administration of justice and that, therefore, the trial court properly found them guilty of contempt. (In re Gomez, 6 Phil., 647; U.S. vs. Jaca, 26 Phil., 100.) In view of the result, however, arrived at in the principal case, and considering that the inherent power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle (Villavicencio vs. Lukban 39 Phil., 778), and on the corrective and not on the retaliatory idea of punishment (In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil., 801), it is our view that this purpose is sufficiently achieved and the principle amply vindicated with the imposition upon each of the four accused above mentioned of a fine of fifty (50) pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. So ordered.

ARTURO H. TROCIO, petitioner, vs. HON. LUIS D. MANTA, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camiguin and FRANCISCO P. CEDRO, in his capacity as Provincial Auditor formerly of Camiguin, respondents. G.R. No. L-34834 November 16, 1982 RELOVA, J.: On November 18, 1970, petitioner Arturo H. Trocio was charged by Acting Provincial Fiscal Sixto B. Tagarda before the Court of First Instance of Camiguin with the crime of malversation of public funds (Criminal Case No. 17-C) in the information which reads. That on or about July 1, 1964 to November 30, 1967 and from December 1, 1967 to June 30,1968, in the Municipality of Mambajao, province of Camiguin, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Arturo H. Trocio was then a Deputy Provincial Treasurer and at the same time a Municipal Treasurer of Mambajao, Camiguin Province and as such directly responsible for the keeping of public funds and accountable for the said public funds in the form of land taxes collection and the like and being then the custodian of such public funds and by reason of his public office and with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, embezzle, take away and convert

for his personal use and benefit from the said public funds under his custody, control and possession the total amount of Five Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty Four Pesos (P5,934.00) Philippine Currency as shown in the Municipal Voucher No. 427 and No. 428, which the accused had illegally prepared without first obtaining and g prior authorization to do it and to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Government in the aforesaid amount of P5,934.00. According to petitioner, the aforementioned information was tiled without the requisite preliminary investigation. Whereupon, he pleaded with the Acting Provincial Fiscal that he be given the opportunity to present his evidence which would prove that he did not commit the crime charged; that his petition for reinvestigation was granted by the fiscal who scheduled the hearing on April 29, 1971; and that the complainant in said case, Mr. Francisco Cedro, former Provincial Auditor of the province, failed to appear, thus, petitioner was deprived of a chance to crossexamine him, in violation of Section 14, Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court, which provides: Sec. 14. ... if the accused appears the investigation shall be conducted in his presence and he shall have the right to be heard, to cross-examine the complainant and his witnesses, and to adduce evidence in his favor. Further, petitioner alleged that when complainant failed to appear so that he may be cross-examined, he (petitioner) moved for the dismissal of the case. This motion was denied and this prompted him to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who, however, sustained the stand of the fiscal saying, among others, that: We agree with the observation of the Provincial Fiscal that the appearance of the complainant is not necessary. Furthermore, the case has been set for re-investigation so that you may present your defense. Under these circumstances, we regret that we cannot give due course to your complaint. A motion for reconsideration of the stand of the Secretary of Justice was filed by petitioner but the same was denied in a letter, dated December 17, 1971, saying that his ruling in a letter dated October 12, 1971 "stands and consequently considers this matter closed and terminated. Hence, this petition for certiorari, prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction, with prayer that respondent Judge be enjoined from trying on the merits the aforesaid Criminal Case No. 17-C until after the fiscal shall have completed his preliminary investigation or reinvestigation of the case. It is the position of petitioner that while the preliminary investigation was still pending, the fiscal peremptorily filed the information for malversation against him without affording him an opportunity to cross examine the complainant and his witnesses, pursuant to the provisions of Section 1 of Republic Act 5180. In their answer respondents, among others, alleged: 2. That the contention of the petitioner in paragraph 5 of his petition is totally malicious and wilfully groundless that he was not given a preliminary investigation before the information was filed for Malversation of Public Funds." The truth of the matter was that on April 13, 1970, the petitioner was subpoenaed to appear for preliminary investigation; he appeared before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Mambajao, Camiguin; Assistant Provincial Auditor, Mr. Ernesto Ceta, and his witnesses, Messrs. Policarpio S. Sanchez, Senior Clerk, and Candido Javier, Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Auditor of Camiguin Province, appeared and manifested their readiness for the preliminary investigation. The petitioner appeared and was not ready to testify because, according to him, the Provincial Auditor, Mr. Francisco Cedro, the complainant, was not present; he asked for postponement and it was granted. But the Acting Provincial Fiscal

proceeded investigating the witnesses for the complainant, to be cross-examined by the petitioner on the next setting of the said peliminary investigation; 3. That, even if the Provincial Auditor, Mr. Francisco Cedro, was present, the investigating Fiscal would not present him to testify on the matter, because the criminal acts committed by the petitioner was discovered by Messrs. Policarpio S. Sanchez, Senior Clerk, and Candido Javier, Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Auditor of Camiguin province, who were verbally ordered and instructed by the Assistant Provincial Auditor of Camiguin to examine the cash and accounts of the petitioner, who has been officer-in-charge of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Mambajao, Camiguin. Attached herewith is a true copy of the second indorsement, dated August 24, 1971, of acting Provincial Fiscal Sixto B. Tagarda who conducted the preliminary investigation of the complaint against the herein petitioner; and the said true copy of the 2nd indorsement consisting of two (2) pages are marked as Annexes '1' and 'l-A' and be considered as part of this Answer; xxx xxx xxx 4. That the allegation of the petitioner contained in paragraph 7 of his petition is highly malicious that 'information was filed without petitioner having been given a chance to present his side in a preliminary investigation.' The truth of the matter is that on April 13, 1970, the petitioner was duly notified and he appeared. But he wanted the presence of the Provincial Auditor Francisco Cedro, even if he is around, would not be presented to testify, because he does not know the way and manner the illegal collection was effected. The Provincial Auditor Francisco Cedro made only the complaint for he is the head of the Office of the Provincial Auditor. Messrs. Policarpio S. Sanchez, Senior Clerk, and Candido Javier, Clerk of the Provincial Auditor's Office are the complaining witnesses, representing the office of the Provincial Auditor. The petitioner petitioned the investigating Fiscal to postpone the preliminary investigation and his petition was granted. We find the petition without merit. The purpose of preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials (Hashim vs. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). In this connection, the fiscal has the power to investigate the charges irrespective of whether the person who complains is the offended party or not. A sworn written complaint is not required, except if the offense is one which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, or is private in nature, or where it pertains to those cases which need to be endorsed by specific public officers as required by Ssection 2, Rule 110 of the New Rules of Court (Hernandez vs. Albano, 2 SCRA 607). In this case filed by the fiscal against herein petitioner for the crime of malversation of public funds (Criminal Case No. 17-C), the offended party is the Philippine government. Respondents, in their ANSWER to this petition, say and it has not been denied, that Assistant Provincial Auditor Ernesto Ceta, Messrs. Policarpio S. Sanchez and Candido Javier, Senior Clerk and Clerk, respectively, in the Office of the Provincial Auditor of Camiguin Province, appeared and were investigated by the fiscal "to be cross-examined by the petitioner on the next setting of the said preliminary investigation." However, petitioner insisted that the Provincial Auditor, Mr. Francisco Cedro, be presented, and upon the latter's failure to appear and testify, petitioner claimed that the investigation has not been terminated. Answering the request of petitioner, then Undersecretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza said: In our letter of October 12, 1971, it was intimated that in the reinvestigation of the case by the fiscal, you will be accorded ample opportunity to present your defense. The presence of the provincial auditor during the hearing, is unnecessary, considering that he has no personal knowledge of the facts surrounding the malversation charge against you. The record shows that

the two employees of the provincial auditor's office are the principal witnesses against you, and not the provincial auditor himself. Accordingly, we are constrained to deny your request for reconsideration on our previous ruling in not giving due course to your complaint. The letter of this Department dated October 12, 1971, stands and consequently considers this matter closed and terminated. (p. 57, Records) Indeed, the presence of Mr. Francisco Cedro is not necessary where the latter cannot testify on his own personal knowledge regarding the facts of the case. When a fiscal investigates a complaint in order to determine whether he should file charges with the court against the person complained of, the scope of the investigation is far short of a trial of an accused before the court. It is not required that all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused must be removed; it is only required that the evidence be sufficient to establish probable cause that the accused committed the crime charged. Otherwise stated, the important thing is, the fiscal, before filing the information should hear the testimonies of witnesses who can sustain the allegations in the information. With respect to the case of petitioner, if his only problem is the declaration of Mr. Cedro and the latter would not testify, he (petitioner) can cause the issuance of a subpoena to Mr. Cedro and then present him as his own witness. WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

N.T. HASHIM, petitioner, vs. MARCELO T. BONCAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, respondents. G.R. No. L-47777 January 13, 1941 LAUREL, J.: On August 6, 1940, the petitioner, N.T. Hashim, was caught red-handed in possession of counterfeit treasury certificates of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. He was placed under arrest, without warrant, by the operatives of the Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice, but was released on the same day upon filing a bond. The following day, August 7, 1940, a complaint was filed against him with the Office of the City Fiscal, and after the corresponding investigation conducted by the respondent Fiscal under section 2465 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 537, the following information was lodged against him: The undersigned accuses N.T. Hashim of a violation of article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows: That on or about the 16th day of August, 1940, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly have in his possession and under his control five hundred sixty (560) false or falsified 50-peso treasury certificates of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, with intent to use the same contrary to law. GREGORIO S. NARVASA Assistant Fiscal

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 7th day of August, 1940, in the City of Manila, Philippines, by Gregorio S. Narvasa, Assistant Fiscal of said City. SIXTO DE LA COSTA Judge, Court of First Instance A preliminary investigation has been conducted in this case under my direction, the witness having been examined under oath in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 537. GREGORIO S. NARVASA Assistant Fiscal Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 7th day of August, 1940, in the City of Manila, Philippines, by Gregorio S. Narvasa, Assistant Fiscal of said City. SIXTO DE LA COSTA Judge, Court of First Instance The case was docketed as criminal case No. 61464 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. On the strength of the respondent fiscal's sworn statement that he had conducted a preliminary investigation and that he had examined the witnesses under oath, according to law, Judge of First Instance Sixto de la Costa issued a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner. He was later admitted to bail. Before the petitioner could be arraigned, the following incidents transpired in the trial court: On August 14, 1940, counsel for the petitioner filed a motions 11 and 13 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, asking that the respondent fiscal furnish the clerk of court with the testimony of the witnesses who testified at the preliminary investigation, or an extract thereof, as well as with the alleged 560 counterfeit treasury certificates. The respondent fiscal opposed the motion on the ground that the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on "Preliminary Investigation" do not apply to preliminary investigations conducted by the Fiscal for the City of Manila or any of his assistants, and that the said motion is not well taken. On August 19, counsel for the petitioner put in an additional motion praying that, should his motion of August 14, l940, be acted upon adversely and the respondent Fiscal's objection thereto be sustained, the Court itself immediately conduct the investigation provided in section 4 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, directing the Clerk of Court to attach to the record an abstract of the testimony of the witnesses at said investigation. The respondent Fiscal filed an objection to the additional motion on the ground, among others, that "there is no necessity for this Honorable Court to conduct a preliminary investigation in this case because the substitute therefor had already been performed in accordance with law by the office of the fiscal of the City of Manila." To this objection counsel for the petitioner filed a rejoinder on August 21, 1940. On August 22, 1940 the respondent judge denied the various motions of the petitioner on substantially the same grounds advanced by the respondent fiscal in his objections thereto. By another motion of August 26, 1940, counsel for the petitioner asked that the warrant of arrest issued in the case be cancelled and insisted that the court conduct the preliminary investigation referred to in section 1, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. This motion was followed by an opposition of the respondent fiscal, by petitioner's reply to said opposition, by a rejoinder of the respondent fiscal and by petitioner's reply to said rejoinder. The petitioner's motion of August 26, 1940, was again denied by the respondent judge on September 6, 1940. A motion for reconsideration of September 11, 1940, met a like fate on September 16, 1940. The petitions excepted to the orders of the respondent judge of August 22, 1940, September 6, 1940, September 16, 1940 and announced his intention to bring up the case to this Court of certiorari and mandamus. The petition for certiorari and mandamus filed with this court recites in greater detail the proceedings which we have just set out in briefest outline, and closes with the prayer: (a) that the order of arrest issued against the

accused in criminal case No. 61464 of the Court of First Instance of Manila be set aside; (b) that the respondent Judge conduct a preliminary investigation in the said case under section 1 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and the pertinent provision of the Constitution of the Philippines; (c) that should the preliminary investigation conducted by the respondent fiscal be upheld, that the said respondent be ordered to furnish the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Manila with an abstract of the testimony of the witnesses at said investigation and with such other evidence adduced therein; (d) that the arraignment of the petitioner be suspended during the pendency of these proceedings, and (e) for such other remedy as may be just an equitable. The Solicitor-General, on behalf of the respondent judge, and the respondent fiscal, in his own representation, are one in resisting the petition. The question for decision is whether, in a preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the City of Manila, the accused is entitled to be informed of the substance of the testimony and of the evidence presented against him. This, in turn, inevitably takes in the broader question of whether or not existing legislation under which the City Fiscal conducts preliminary investigations has been repealed and supplanted by the New Rules of Court. Section 2465 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 537, provides that "The Fiscal of the city shall cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinance and have the necessary informations or complaints prepared or made against the persons accused." Section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code (Manila Charter) pertinently provides that "In cases triable only in the Court of First Instance the defendant shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the fiscal of the city, after a due investigation of the facts, shall have presented an information against him in proper form." The power is reaffirmed and not taken away by section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court providing that "Every justice of the peace, municipal judge or city fiscal shall have jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of all offenses that alleged to have been committed within his municipality or city, cognizable by the Court of First Instance." Petitioner now contends that the power is coupled with a duty, among others, to transmit an abstract of the testimony of witnesses under section 13, Rule 108, reading: SEC. 13. Transmission of abstract. Upon the conclusion of the preliminary investigation, the judge or corresponding officer shall transmit without delay to the clerk of the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the offense (a) the warrant, if the arrest was by virtue of a warrant; (b) an abstract of the testimony of the witnesses; (c) the undertaking or bail of the defendant, and (d) the person of the defendant if not on bail. It is said that by the phrase "the corresponding officer" is meant the respondent fiscal. We do not think so. It may refer to the municipal mayor who, in stated cases, is also authorized to conduct preliminary investigation (section 3, Rule 108.) That it has no reference to the respondent fiscal will bear a little explanation. Formerly, the purpose of sending up the substance of the testimony of witnesses at the preliminary investigation was to enable the fiscal to go forward with the case by complaint or information. In U.S. vs Rafael (23 Phil., 184, 187) this purpose is elaborated as follows: "The purpose of requiring the justice of the peace to forward to the provincial fiscal a brief statement of the substance of the testimony, evidently is to enable the provincial fiscal to decide, in the first instance, whether he shall present a complaint against the defendant, and in the second, to enable him. In case he decides to prosecute, to properly formulated said complaint. It is practically impossible, in the thickly populated provinces of the Philippines Islands, for the provincial fiscal to personally attend all of the trials and preliminary investigation held before the justices of the peace. The purpose of the provisions of said section 13 is evidently to enable the provincial fiscal to have sufficient information to enable him to decide whether or not the defendant, in the trial before the justice of the peace or in a preliminary investigation, shall be further prosecuted in the Court of First Instance." If, as above shown, the abstract of testimony is intended for the fiscal, the duty of transmittal is plainly cast not upon him but upon another. Further, if the said abstract is for the use and guidance of the fiscal, failure to transmit is certainly not prejudicial to the petitioner, and he may not enjoin transmittal as of right. On the other hand, section 13 of Rule 108 assumes that "the judge or corresponding officer" is by law authorized to issue a warrant of arrest, so much so that he is there required to transmit "(a) the warrant, if the arrest was by virtue of a warrant." We know of no law authorizing the City Fiscal to issue a warrant of arrest. The section also

assumes the two-stage, preliminary investigation provided for justices of the peace and municipal judges and not for the respondent Fiscal. Thus it opens with the statement "Upon the conclusion of the preliminary investigation the judge or corresponding officer shall transmit ...," implying thereby that one investigation has already been concluded, and another is to follow or is contemplated, based on the papers sought to be transmitted. Under existing laws, the City Fiscal conducts but a single investigation, and this is a summary one. To say that the respondent fiscal is bound by the procedure provided in the cited section is to duplicate proceedings, where at present there is but one, and to flout the spirit of simplicity and dispatch underlying the new Rules. Finally, the section under scrutiny requires "the judge or corresponding officer" also to transmit "(c) the person of the defendant if not on bail." The respondent fiscal would be at a loss to comply with this requirement because he has no direct control over the person of the accused, not being empowered to order his arrest or release. All this induces one conclusion and one only that the preliminary investigation conducted by the City Fiscal is without the purview of and need not conform to the procedure marked out in section 13 of Rule 1O8. Petitioner next makes the point that his right to be informed of the substance of the testimony and evidence presented against him finds support in still another provision, that of section 11 of Rule 108 reading: SEC. 11. Rights of defendant after arrest. After the arrest of the defendant and his delivery to the court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information filed against him. He shall also be informed of the substance of the testimony and evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him. This section also has reference to the preliminary investigation conducted by justices of the peace and municipal judges, namely, the investigation before and for the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest, and that thereafter made for the purpose of their releasing the offender or filing the corresponding information against him. This examination corresponds to the preliminary investigation conducted by a justice of the peace or municipal judge after the arrest of the defendant in accordance with Acts 194, 1450 and 1627. To subject the respondent Fiscal to the provisions of this section is, as elsewhere emphasized, to prolong an otherwise brief investigation which said officer is authorized to conduct under existing laws. Hence, our persuasion that section 11, like section 13, of Rule 108 was not meant to apply to the preliminary investigations conducted by the City Fiscal. It is contended, however, that existing legislation authorized the City Fiscal to conduct preliminary investigation should be deemed repealed and supplanted by the new Rules of Court. Otherwise, it is said, there would be no uniformity in said Rules as ordained by the Constitution. we do not share this view. The power of the respondent Fiscal to proceed as he did against the petitioner first received the imprint of judicial approval in U.S. vs. Wilson, 4 Phil., 317, wherein it was held: "It is claimed, also that the judgment of conviction is erroneous because no preliminary investigation was held, as required by section 12 and 13 of General Orders, No. 58. This claim is answered by reference to Act No. 612 of the Commission, which in section 2 provides as follows: "In cases triable only in the Court of First Instance of Manila the defendant shall have speedy trial, but shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary attorney, after due investigation of the facts under section 39 of the act of which this is an amendment, shall have presented an information against him in proper form." This was followed by other cases, among them, U.S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122, and U.S. vs. Carlos, 21 Phil., 553. The reason for the rule is set out in U.S. vs. Ocampo, supra, as follows: "The prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila is presumed to be as competent to conduct a preliminary investigation as the average person designated by law to conduct a `preliminary examination' under the provisions of General Orders, No. 58. He is sworn officer of the court, and the law imposes upon him the duty of making such investigations. For such purpose the legislature may designate whom it pleases within the judicial department." The framers of the Rules could not have intended to brush aside these lessons of experience and to tear down an institution recognized by law and decision and sanctioned by years of settled practice. They could not have failed to keep intact an effective machinery in the administration of criminal justice, as expeditious and simple as any reform they have infused into the new Rules. To sustain the theory of repeal is to wipe out these advantages. Not

only this. If neither section 11 nor section 13 of Rule 108 is applicable to the preliminary investigation conducted by the City Fiscal, as we have above shown, and if existing legislation thereon is to be deemed repealed, then the matter would be left uncovered by rule or law. There would thus be a void crying for urgent reform. There would be no such void if the old and tried procedure is kept in being, untouched by the new Rules. Withal, our own knowledge of the history of this portion of the Rules here involved does not warrant an interpretation not contemplated when we drafted and deliberated upon these Rules. And while, perhaps, the language could have been clearer and the arrangement made more logical, consideration of expediency and the avowed purpose of preliminary investigation point to the already trodden path hereinabove indicated. Viewed in the light of fundamental principles, the right to a preliminary investigation is statutory, not constitutional. Its oft-repeated purpose is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him from open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless and expensive prosecutions. The new Rules were drafted in the light of the Court's experience with cases where preliminary investigations had dragged on for weeks and even months. The Court had intended to remove this clog upon the judicial machinery and to make a preliminary investigation as simple and as speedy as is consistent with the substantial rights of the accused. The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, to be followed by the trial proper. The investigating judge or prosecuting officer acts upon probable cause and reasonable belief, not upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. When all this is fulfilled, the accused will not be permitted to cast about for fancied reasons to delay the proceedings; the time to ask for more is at the trial. The petitioner's case is a good example. A preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent Fiscal at which evidence was adduced warranting the filing of an information against the petitioner. The information was filed in Court, and the presiding judge, upon the strength of the said preliminary investigation and sworn information, issued a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner. To ask for the abstract of testimony at this stage of the proceedings, ostensibly for no other purpose than to scrutinize the same evidence which convinced the respondent Fiscal and the presiding Judge that there was probable ground to proceed against the petitioner, is in effect, to ask for another preliminary investigation. Not this, however, but a trial upon the merits, is what section 4 of Rule 108 ordains. The petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby dismissed, with the costs to the petitioner. So ordered.

JOVITO R. SALONGA, petitioner, vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII (Quezon City), HON. JUDGE RODOLFO ORTIZ, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXI (Quezon City) CITY FISCAL SERGIO APOSTOL of Quezon City; COL. BALBINO DIEGO and COL. ROMAN MADELLA, respondents. G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985 GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks this Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines. The background of this case is a matter of public knowledge.

A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. On September 6, 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killed himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building in Manila. Found in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were several pictures taken sometime in May, 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures together with other guests, including Lovely. As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought by military and police authorities to the AFP Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital) where he was placed in the custody and detention of Col. Roman P. Madella, under the over-all direction of General Fabian Ver, head of the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA). Shortly afterwards, Mr. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely were charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property. On September 12, 1980, bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in the death of an American lady who was shopping at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others which caused injuries to a number of persons. On September 20, 1980, the President's anniversary television radio press conference was broadcast. The younger brother of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was presented during the conference. In his interview, Romeo stated that he had driven his elder brother, Victor, to the petitioner's house in Greenhills on two occasions. The first time was on August 20, 1980. Romeo stated that Victor did not bring any bag with him on that day when he went to the petitioner's residence and did not carry a bag when he left. The second time was in the afternoon of August 31, 1980 when he brought Victor only to the gate of the petitioner's house. Romeo did not enter the petitioner's residence. Neither did he return that day to pick up his brother. The next day, newspapers came out with almost Identical headlines stating in effect that petitioner had been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila. Meanwhile, on September 25, 1980, Lovely was taken out of the hospital's intensive care unit and transferred to the office of Col. Madella where he was held incommunicado for some time. On the night of October 4, 1980, more bombs were reported to have exploded at three big hotels in Metro Manila, namely: Philippine Plaza, Century Park Sheraton and Manila Peninsula. The bombs injured nine people. A meeting of the General Military Council was called for October 6, 1980. On October 19, 1980, minutes after the President had finished delivering his speech before the International Conference of the American Society of Travel Agents at the Philippine International Convention Center, a small bomb exploded. Within the next twenty-four hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. One of them was herein petitioner. Victor Lovely offered himself to be a "state witness" and in his letter to the President, he stated that he will reveal everything he knows about the bombings. On October 21, 1980, elements of the military went to the hospital room of the petitioner at the Manila Medical Center where he was confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest. The arresting officer showed the petitioner the ASSO form which however did not specify the charge or charges against him. For some time, the petitioner's lawyers were not permitted to visit him in his hospital room until this Court in the case of Ordoez v. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., (G.R. No. 55345, October 28, 1980) issued an order directing that the petitioner's right to be visited by counsel be respected.

On November 2, 1980, the petitioner was transferred against his objections from his hospital arrest to an isolation room without windows in an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio, Makati. The petitioner states that he was not informed why he was transferred and detained, nor was he ever investigated or questioned by any military or civil authority. Subsequently, on November 27, 1980, the petitioner was released for humanitarian reasons from military custody and placed "under house arrest in the custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga" still without the benefit of any investigation or charges. On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a "Notice of Preliminary Investigation" inPeople v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that "the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 o'clock p.m. on December 12, 1980" and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence. On February 9, 1981, the records of the case were turned over by the Judge Advocate General's Office to the Ministry of Justice. On February 24, 1981, the respondent City Fiscal filed a complaint accusing petitioner, among others of having violated Republic Act No. 1700, as amended by P.D. 885 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 in relation to Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. The inquest court set the preliminary investigation for March 17, 1981. On March 6, 1981, the petitioner was allowed to leave the country to attend a series of church conferences and undergo comprehensive medical examinations of the heart, stomach, liver, eye and ear including a possible removal of his left eye to save his right eye. Petitioner Salonga almost died as one of the principal victims of the dastardly bombing of a Liberal Party rally at Plaza Miranda on August 20, 1971. Since then, he has suffered serious disabilities. The petitioner was riddled with shrapnel and pieces still remain in various parts of his body. He has an AV fistula caused by a piece of shrapnel lodged one millimeter from his aorta. The petitioner has limited use of his one remaining hand and arms, is completely blind and physical in the left eye, and has scar like formations in the remaining right eye. He is totally deaf in the right ear and partially deaf in the left ear. The petitioner's physical ailments led him to seek treatment abroad. On or around March 26, 1981, the counsel for petitioner was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated March 12, 1981, charging the petitioner, along with 39 other accused with the violation of R.A. 1700, as amended by P.D. 885, Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 and P.D. 1736. Hearings for preliminary investigation were conducted. The prosecution presented as its witnesses Ambassador Armando Fernandez, the Consul General of the Philippines in Los Angeles, California, Col. Balbino Diego, PSC/NISA Chief, Investigation and Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command and Victor Lovely himself. On October 15, 1981, the counsel for petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges against petitioner for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. On December 2, 1981, the respondent judge denied the motion. On January 4, 1982, he issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against forty (40) people, including herein petitioner. The resolutions of the respondent judge dated December 2, 1981 and January 4, 1982 are now the subject of the petition. It is the contention of the petitioner that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to

justify the filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today. After a painstaking review of the records, this Court finds the evidence offered by the prosecution utterly insufficient to establish a prima facie case against the petitioner. We grant the petition. However, before going into the merits of the case, we shall pass upon a procedural issue raised by the respondents. The respondents call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a motion to quash or to dismiss, being interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari; that since the question of dismissal will again be considered by the court when it decides the case, the movant has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that public interest dictates that criminal prosecutions should not be enjoined. The general rule is correctly stated. However, the respondents fail to appreciate or take into account certain exceptions when a petition for certiorari is clearly warranted. The case at bar is one such exception. In the case of Mead v. Angel (115 SCRA 256) the same contentions were advanced by the respondents to wit: xxx xxx xxx ... Respondents advert to the rule that when a motion to quash filed by an accused in a criminal case shall be denied, the remedy of the accused-movant is not to file a petition for certiorari or mandamus or prohibition, the proper recourse being to go to trial, without prejudice to his right to reiterate the grounds invoked in his motion to quash if an adverse judgment is rendered against him, in the appeal that he may take therefrom in the manner authorized by law. (Mill v. People, et al., 101 Phil. 599;Echarol v. Purisima, et al., 13 SCRA 309.) On this argument, we ruled: There is no disputing the validity and wisdom of the rule invoked by the respondents. However, it is also recognized that, under certain situations, recourse to the extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus to question the denial of a motion to quash is considered proper in the interest of "more enlightened and substantial justice", as was so declared in "Yap v. Lutero, G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1969." Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. The integrity of a democratic society is corrupted if a person is carelessly included in the trial of around forty persons when on the very face of the record no evidence linking him to the alleged conspiracy exists. Ex-Senator Jovito Salonga, himself a victim of the still unresolved and heinous Plaza Miranda bombings, was arrested at the Manila Medical Center while hospitalized for bronchial asthma. When arrested, he was not informed of the nature of the charges against him. Neither was counsel allowed to talk to him until this Court intervened through the issuance of an order directing that his lawyers be permitted to visit him (Ordonez v. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., G.R. No. 55345, October 28, 1980). Only after four months of detention was the petitioner informed for the first time of the nature of the charges against him. After the preliminary investigation, the petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint but the same was denied. Subsequently, the respondent judge issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information after finding that a prima facie case had been established against an of the forty persons accused.

In the light of the failure to show prima facie that the petitioner was probably guilty of conspiring to commit the crime, the initial disregard of petitioner's constitutional rights together with the massive and damaging publicity made against him, justifies the favorable consideration of this petition by this Court. With former Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. now deceased, there are at least 38 other co-accused to be tried with the petitioner. The prosecution must present proof beyond reasonable doubt against each and every one of the 39 accused, most of whom have varying participations in the charge for subversion. The prosecution's star witness Victor Lovely and the only source of information with regard to the alleged link between the petitioner and the series of terrorist bombings is now in the United States. There is reason to believe the petitioner's citation of international news dispatches * that the prosecution may find it difficult if not infeasible to bring him back to the Philippines to testify against the petitioner. If Lovely refused to testify before an American federal grand jury how could he possibly be made to testify when the charges against the respondent come up in the course of the trial against the 39 accused. Considering the foregoing, we find it in the interest of justice to resolve at this stage the issue of whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the questioned resolutions. The respondents contend that the prosecution will introduce additional evidence during the trial and if the evidence, by then, is not sufficient to prove the petitioner's guilt, he would anyway be acquitted. Yes, but under the circumstances of this case, at what cost not only to the petitioner but to the basic fabric of our criminal justice system? The term "prima facie evidence" denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counter-balance the presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction. The question raised before us now is: Were the evidences against the petitioner uncontradicted and if they were unexplained or uncontradicted, would they, standing alone, sufficiently overcome the presumption of innocence and warrant his conviction? We do not think so. The records reveal that in finding a case against the petitioner, the respondent judge relied only on the testimonies of Col. Balbino Diego and Victor Lovely. Ambassador Armando Fernandez, when called upon to testify on subversive organizations in the United States nowhere mentioned the petitioner as an organizer, officer or member of the Movement for Free Philippines (MFP), or any of the organizations mentioned in the complaint. Col. Diego, on the other hand, when asked what evidence he was able to gather against the petitioner depended only on the statement of Lovely "that it was the residence of ex-Senator Salonga where they met together with Renato Taada, one of the brains of the bombing conspiracy ... and the fact that Sen. Salonga has been meeting with several subversive personnel based in the U.S.A. was also revealed to me by Victor Burns Lovely; 11 and on the group pictures taken at former Congressman Raul Daza's birthday party. In concluding that a conspiracy exists to overthrow by violent means the government of the Philippines in the United States, his only bases were "documentary as well as physical and sworn statements that were referred to me or taken by me personally," which of course negate personal knowledge on his part. When asked by the court how he would categorize petitioner in any of the subversive organizations, whether petitioner was an organizer, officer or a member, the witness replied: A. To categorize former Senator Salonga if he were an organizer, he is an officer or he is a member, your Honor, please, we have to consider the surrounding circumstances and on his involvement: first, Senator Salonga wanted always to travel to the United States at least once a year or more often under the pretext of to undergo some sort of operation and participate in some sort of seminar. (t.s.n., April 21, 1981, pp- 14-15) Such testimony, being based on affidavits of other persons and purely hearsay, can hardly qualify as prima facie evidence of subversion. It should not have been given credence by the court in the first place. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, -has no probative value as the affiant could not have been cross-examined on the facts stated therein. (See People v. Labinia, 115 SCRA 223; People v. Valero, 112 SCRA 661). Moreover, as Victor

Lovely, himself, was personally examined by the court, there was no need for the testimony of Col. Diego. Thus, the inquest judge should have confined his investigation to Victor Burns Lovely, the sole witness whose testimony had apparently implicated petitioner in the bombings which eventually led to the filing of the information. Lovely's account of the petitioner's involvement with the former's bombing mission is found in his sworn statement made before Col. Diego and Lt. Col. Madella and taken on October 17, 1980 at the AFP Medical Center. Lovely was not presented as a prosecution or state witness but only as a defense witness for his two younger brothers, Romeo and Baltazar, who were both included in the complaint but who were later dropped from the information. Victor Lovely was examined by his counsel and cross-examined by the fiscal. In the process, he Identified the statement which he made before Col. Diego and Lt. Col. Madella. After Lovely's testimony, the prosecution made a manifestation before the court that it was adopting Lovely as a prosecution witness. According to Lovely's statement, the following events took place: 36. Q. Did Psinakis tell you where to stay? A. Yes, at first he told me to check-in at Manila Hotel or the Plaza Hotel where somebody would come to contact me and give the materials needed in the execution of my mission. I thought this was not safe so I disagreed with him. Mr. Psinakis changed the plan and instead told me to visit the residence of ExSen. Jovito Salonga as often as I can and someone will meet me there to give the materials I needed to accomplish my mission 37. Q. Did you comply as instructed? A. Yes, I arrived in Manila on August 20, 1980 and stayed at the residence of Mr. Johnny Chua, husband of my business partner, then I went to the Hospital where I visited my mother and checked-in at Room 303 of the YMCA at Concepcion Street, Manila. 38. Q. Did you visit the residence of former Senator Jovito Salonga as directed by Psinakis? A. I visited Sen. Salonga's place three (3) times, the first visit was August 20 or 21, and the last was 4:00 P.M. of August 31, 1980. In addition to these visits, I TALKED to him on the phone about three or four times. On my first visit, I told him "I am expecting an attache case from somebody which will be delivered to your house," for which Sen. Salonga replied "Wala namang nagpunta dito at wala namang attache case para sa iyo." However, if your attache case arrives, I'll just call you." I gave him my number. On my second visit, Salonga said, "I'll be very busy so just come back on the 31st of August at 4 P.M." On that date, I was with friends at Batulao Resort and had to hurry back to be at Salonga's place for the appointment. I arrived at Salonga's place at exactly 4 P.M. 39. Q. What happened then? A. I was ushered to the sala by Mrs. Salonga and after five minutes, Sen. Salonga joined me in the sala. Sen. Salonga informed me that somebody will be coming to give me the attache case but did not tell me the name.

40. Q. Are there any subject matters you discuss while waiting for that somebody to deliver your materials? A. Yes, Salonga asked if Sen. Aquino and I have met, I explained to him the efforts of Raul Daza in setting up that meeting but I have previous business commitments at Norfolk, Virginia. I told him, however, that through the efforts of Raul Daza, I was able to talk with Ninoy Aquino in the airport telephone booth in San Francisco. He also asked about Raul Daza, Steve Psinakis and the latest opposition group activities but it seems he is well informed. 41. Q. How long did you wait until that somebody arrived? A. About thirty (30) minutes. 41. Q. What happened when the man arrived? A. This man arrived and I was greatly surprised to see Atty. Renato Taada Jovy Salonga was the one who met him and as I observed parang nasa sariling bahay si Taada nung dumating. They talked for five (5) minutes in very low tones so I did not hear what they talked about. After their whispering conversations, Sen. Salonga left and at this time Atty. "Nits" Taada told me "Nasa akin ang kailangan mo, nasa kotse." 43. Q. Were the materials given to you? A. When Sen. Salonga came back, we asked to be permitted to leave and I rode in Atty. "Nits" Taadas old Pontiac car colored dirty brown and proceeded to Broadway Centrum where before I alighted, Atty. Taada handed me a "Puma" bag containing all the materials I needed. xxx xxx xxx 45. Q. What were the contents of the Puma bag? A. Ten (10) pieces of Westclox pocket watch with screw and wirings, ten (10) pieces electrical blasting caps 4" length, ten (10) pieces non-electrical blasting caps 1 " length, nine (9) pieces volts dry cell battery, two (2) improvised electrical testers. ten (10) plastic packs of high explosive about 1 pound weight each. However, in his interview with Mr. Ronnie Nathanielz which was aired on Channel 4 on November 8, 1980 and which was also offered as evidence by the accused, Lovely gave a different story which negates the above testimony insofar as the petitioner's participation was concerned: xxx xxx xxx Q. Who were the people that you contacted in Manila and for what purpose? A. Before I left for the Philippines, Mr. Psinakis told me to check in at the Manila Hotel or the Plaza Hotel, and somebody would just deliver the

materials I would need. I disapproved of this, and I told him I would prefer a place that is familiar to me or who is close to me. Mr. Psinakis suggested the residence of Sen. Salonga. And so, I arrived in Manila on August 20, 1980, 1 made a call to Sen. Salonga, but he was out. The next day I made a call again. I was able to contact him. I made an appointment t see him. I went to Sen. Salonga's house the following day. I asked Sen. Salonga if someone had given him an attache case for me. He said nobody. Afterwards, I made three calls to Sen. Salonga. Sen. Salonga told me "call me again on the 31st of August. I did not call him, I just went to his house on the 31st of August at 4 P.M. A few minutes after my arrival Atty. Renato Taada arrived. When he had a chance to be near me, he (Atty. Tanada) whispered to me that he had the attache case and the materials I needed in his car. These materials were given to me by Atty. Tanada When I alighted at the Broadway Centrum. (Emphasis supplied) During the cross-examination, counsel for petitioner asked Lovely about the so-called destabilization plan which the latter mentioned in his sworn statement: Q. You mentioned in your statement taken on October 17, 1980, marked Exhibit "G" about the so-called destabilization plan of Aquino. When you attended the birthday party of Raul Daza wherein Jovito Salonga was also present, was this destabilization plan as alleged by you already formulated? WITNESS: A. Not to my knowledge. COURT TO WITNESS: Q. Mr. Witness, who invited you to the party? A. Raul Daza, your Honor. Q. Were you told that Mr. Salonga would be present in the party. A. I am really not quite sure, your Honor. Q. Alright. You said initially it was social but then it became political. Was there any political action taken as a result of the party? A. Only political discussion, your Honor. (TSN, July 8, 1981, pp. 69-84). Counsel for petitioner also asked Lovely whether in view of the latter's awareness of the physical condition of petitioner, he really implicated petitioner in any of the bombings that occurred in Metro Manila. The fiscal objected without stating any ground. In sustaining the objection, the Court said: Sustained . . . The use of the word 'implicate' might expand the role of Mr. Salonga. In other words, you are widening the avenue of Mr. Salonga's role beyond the participation stated in the testimony of this witness about Mr. Salonga, at least, as far as the evidence is concerned, I supposed, is only being in the house of Mr. Salonga which was used as the contact point. He

never mentions Mr. Salonga about the bombings. Now these words had to be put in the mouth of this witness. That would be unfair to Mr. Salonga. (TSN. July 8, 1981, p. 67) Respondent judge further said: COURT: As the Court said earlier, the parts or portions affecting Salonga only refers to the witness coming to Manila already then the matter of . . . I have gone over the statement and there is no mention of Salonga insofar as activities in the United States is concerned. I don't know why it concerns this crossexamination. ATTY. YAP: Because according to him, it was in pursuance of the plan that he came to Manila. COURT: According to him it was Aquino, Daza, and Psinakis who asked him to come here, but Salonga was introduced only when he (Lovely) came here. Now, the tendency of the question is also to connect Salonga to the activities in the United States. It seems to be the thrust of the questions. COURT: In other words, the point of the Court as of the time when you asked him question, the focus on Salonga was only from the time when he met Salonga at Greenhills. It was the first time that the name of Salonga came up. There was no mention of Salonga in the formulation of the destabilization plan as affirmed by him. But you are bringing this up although you are only crossexamining for Salonga as if his (Lovely's) activities in the United States affected Salonga. (TSN. July 8, 1981, pp. 73-74). Apparently, the respondent judge wanted to put things in proper perspective by limiting the petitioner's alleged "participation" in the bombing mission only to the fact that petitioner's house was used as a "contact point" between Lovely and Taada, which was all that Lovely really stated in his testimony. However, in the questioned resolution dated December 2, 1981, the respondent judge suddenly included the "activities" of petitioner in the United States as his basis for denying the motion to dismiss: On the activities of Salonga in the United States, the witness, Lovely, in one of his statements declared: 'To the best of my recollection he mentioned of some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most likely should reforms be not instituted by President Marcos immediately. It is therefore clear that the prosecution's evidence has established facts and circumstances sufficient for a finding that excludes a Motion to Dismiss by respondent Salonga. The Movement for Free Philippines is undoubtedly a force born on foreign soil it appears to rely on the resources of foreign entities, and is being (sic) on gaining ascendancy in the Philippines with the use of

force and for that purpose it has linked itself with even communist organizations to achieve its end. It appears to rely on aliens for its supporters and financiers. The jump from the "contact point" theory to the conclusion of involvement in subversive activities in the United States is not only inexplicable but without foundation. The respondents admit that no evidence was presented directly linking petitioner Salonga to actual acts of violence or terrorism. There is no proof of his direct participation in any overt acts of subversion. However, he is tagged as a leader of subversive organizations for two reasons(1) Because his house was used as a "contactpoint"; and (2) Because "he mentioned some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most likely should reforms be not instituted by President Marcos immediately." The "contact point" theory or what the petitioner calls the guilt by visit or guilt by association" theory is too tenuous a basis to conclude that Senator Salonga was a leader or mastermind of the bombing incidents. To indict a person simply because some plotters, masquerading as visitors, have somehow met in his house or office would be to establish a dangerous precedent. The right of citizens to be secure against abuse of governmental processes in criminal prosecutions would be seriously undermined. The testimony of Victor Lovely against petitioner Salonga is full of inconsistencies. Senator Salonga and Atty. Renato Taada could not have whispered to one another because the petitioner is almost totally deaf. Lovely could not have met Senator Salonga at a Manglapus party in Washington, D.C. in 1977 because the petitioner left for the United States only on November, 1978. Senator Salonga denies having known Mr. Lovely in the United States or in the Philippines. He states that he has hundred of visitors from week to week in his residence but cannot recall any Victor Lovely. The presence of Lovely in a group picture taken at Mr. Raul Daza's birthday party in Los Angeles where Senator Salonga was a guest is not proof of conspiracy. As stated by the petitioner, in his many years in the turbulent world of politics, he has posed with all kinds of people in various groups and various places and could not possibly vouch for their conduct. Commenting on the matter, newspaper columnist Teodoro Valencia stated that Filipinos love to pose with important visitors and the picture proves nothing. It is likewise probable that a national figure and former politician of Senator Salonga's stature can expect guests and visitors of all kinds to be visiting his home or office. If a rebel or subversive happens to pose with the petitioner for a group picture at a birthday party abroad, or even visit him with others in his home, the petitioner does not thereby become a rebel or subversive, much less a leader of a subversive group. More credible and stronger evidence is necessary for an indictment. Nonetheless, even if we discount the flaws in Lovely's testimony and dismiss the refutations and arguments of the petitioner, the prosecution evidence is still inadequate to establish a prima facie finding. The prosecution has not come up with even a single iota of evidence which could positively link the petitioner to any proscribed activities of the Movement for Free Philippines or any subversive organization mentioned in the complaint. Lovely had already testified that during the party of former Congressman Raul Daza which was alleged to have been attended by a number of members of the MFP, no political action was taken but only political discussion. Furthermore, the alleged opinion of the petitioner about the likelihood of a violent struggle here in the Philippines if reforms are not instituted, assuming that he really stated the same, is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and expression. No man deserves punishment for his thoughts. Cogitationis poenam memo meretur. And as the late Justice Oliver W. Holmes stated in the case of U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, " ... if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is

the principle of free thought not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate." We have adopted the concept that freedom of expression is a "preferred" right and, therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties. The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. (Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 29 SCRA 835). As explained by Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut (302 U.S. 319) this must be so because the lessons of history, both political and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom. Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. This Court is particularly concerned when allegations are made that restraints have been imposed upon mere criticisms of government and public officials. Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments. The United States Supreme Court in Noto v. United States (367 U.S. 290) distinguished between the abstract teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence and speech which would prepare a group for violent action and steel it to such action. In Watts v. United States (394 U.S. 705), the American court distinguished between criminal threats and constitutionally protected speech. It stated: We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by petitioner fits within that statutory term. For we must interpret the language Congress chose against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (376 U.S. 254). The language of the political arena, like the language used in labor disputed is often vituperative abusive, and inexact. We agree with petitioner that his only offense was a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the President. In the case before us, there is no teaching of the moral propriety of a resort to violence, much less an advocacy of force or a conspiracy to organize the use of force against the duly constituted authorities. The alleged remark about the likelihood of violent struggle unless reforms are instituted is not a threat against the government. Nor is it even the uninhibited, robust, caustic, or unpleasantly sharp attack which is protected by the guarantee of free speech. Parenthetically, the American case of Brandenburg v. Ohio (395 U.S. 444) states that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. The words which petitioner allegedly used according to the best recollections of Mr. Lovely are light years away from such type of proscribed advocacy. Political discussion even among those opposed to the present administration is within the protective clause of freedom of speech and expression. The same cannot be construed as subversive activities per se or as evidence of membership in a subversive organization. Under Presidential Decree No. 885, Section 3, paragraph 6, political discussion will only constitute, prima facie evidence of membership in a subversive organization if such discussion amounts to: (6) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof. As stated earlier, the prosecution has failed to produce evidence that would establish any link between petitioner and any subversive organization. Even if we lend credence to Lovely's testimony that a political discussion took

place at Daza's birthday party, no proof whatsoever was adduced that such discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow the government through illegal means. The alleged opinion that violent struggle is likely unless reforms are instituted by no means shows either advocacy of or incitement to violence or furtherance of the objectives of a subversive organization. Lovely also declared that he had nothing to do with the bombing on August 22, 1980, which was the only bombing incident that occurred after his arrival in Manila on August 20, and before the YMCA explosion on September 6, 1980. (See TSN, pp. 63-63, July 8, 1981). He further testified that: WITNESS: Actually, it was not my intention to do some kind of bombing against the government. My bombing mission was directed against the particular family (referring to the Cabarrus family [TSN, p. 11, July 9, 1981] [Rollo, p. 10]. Such a statement wholly negates any politically motivated or subversive assignment which Lovely was supposed to have been commissioned to perform upon the orders of his co- accused and which was the very reason why they answer charged in the first place. The respondent judge also asked Lovely about the possible relation between Cabarrus and petitioner: COURT: Q. Did you suspect any relation between Cabarrus and Jovito Salonga, why did you implicate Jovito Salonga? A. No, your Honor. I did not try to implicate Salonga. It should be noted that after Lovely's testimony, the prosecution manifested to the court that it was adopting him as a prosecution witness. Therefore, the prosecution became irreversively bound by Lovely's disclaimers on the witness stand, that it was not his intention "to do some kind of bombing against the government" and that he "did not try to implicate Salonga", especially since Lovely is the sole witness adopted by the prosecution who could supposedly establish the link between the petitioner and the bombing incidents. The respondent court should have taken these factors into consideration before concluding that a prima facie case exists against the petitioner. Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. (People v. Dayad, 56 SCRA 439). In the case at bar, the prosecution cannot even present a credible version of the petitioner's role in the bombings even if it ignores the subsequent disclaimers of Lovely and without relying on mere affidavits including those made by Lovely during his detention. The resolution dated January 4, 1982 suffers from the same defect. In this resolution, Lovely's previous declarations about the bombings as part of the alleged destabilization plan and the people behind the same were accorded such credibility by the respondent judge as if they had already been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not only the

purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reasons (See La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so. Mercado v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93). The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court's judgment had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution. We were constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Court's crowded agenda for further deliberations. Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution. Respondent Fiscal Sergio Apostol correctly points out, however, that he is not precluded from filing new charges for the same acts because the petitioner has not been arraigned and double jeopardy does not apply. in that sense, the case is not completely academic. Recent developments in this case serve to focus attention on a not too well known aspect of the Supreme Court's functions. The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions. The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. In dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail bond as excessive and, therefore, constitutionally void, escaped from the provincial jail while his petition was pending. The petition became moot because of his escape but we nonetheless rendered a decision and stated: The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.

In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center's new charter pursuant to the President's legislative powers under martial law. Stan, this Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution). In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), during the pendency of the case, 26 petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner was facing charges of murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports. In this case, the respondents agree with our earlier finding that the prosecution evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie case against the petitioner, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of any subversive organization. They have taken the initiative of dropping the charges against the petitioner. We reiterate the rule, however, that this Court will not validate the filing of an information based on the kind of evidence against the petitioner found in the records. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic. SO ORDERED.

JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE MILLS JR., LEONARDO GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS, ELVIE CASTILLO, and CYNTHIA SABIDO LIMJAP, petitioners, vs. THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by and through the CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAADA, respondents, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, intervenor. G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991 PADILLA, J.:p This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injuective relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations. On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.", for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. The complaint was amended several times by impleading new defendants and/or amplifying the allegations therein. Under the Second Amended Complaint, 1 the herein petitioners were impleaded as party defendants. The complaint insofar as pertinent to herein petitioners, as defendants, alleges among others that:

14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their relationship, influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and strategems to unjuestly enrigh themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people, among others: (a) Obatained, with the active collaboration of Defendants Sene J. Gabaldon, Mario D. Camacho, Mamerto Nepomuceno, Carlos J. Valdez, Cesar C. Zalamea and Francisco Tantuico, Atty. Jose Bengzon, Jr. and his law partners, namely: Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose Vicente E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz; Jose S. Sandejas and his fellow senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings groups of companies such as Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Abelardo S. Termulo, Rex C. Drilon II and Kurt Bachmann, Jr., control of some of the biggest business enterprises in the Philippines, such as the Manila Corporation (MERALCO), Benguet Consolidated and the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) by employing devious financial schemes and techniques calculated to require the massive infusion and hemorrhage of government funds with minimum or negligible "cashout" from Defendant Benjamin Romualdez... xxx xxx xxx (m) manipulated, with the support, assistance and collaboration of Philgurantee officials led by chairman Cesar E.A. Virata and the Senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings, Inc. led by Jose S. Sandejas, Jr., Jose M. Mantecom and Kurt S. Bachmann, Jr., among others, the formation of Erectors Holdings, Inc. without infusing additional capital solely for the purpose of Erectors Incorporated with Philguarantee in the amount of P527,387,440.71 with insufficient securities/collaterals just to enable Erectors Inc, to appear viable and to borrow more capitals, so much so that its obligation with Philgurantee has reached a total of more than P2 Billion as of June 30, 1987. (n) at the onset of the present Administration and/or within the week following the February 1986 People's Revolution, in conspiracy with, supoort, assistance and collaboration of the abovenamed lawyers of the Bengzon Law Offices, or specifically Defendants Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., V.E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., manipulated, shcemed, and/or executed a series of devices intended to conceal and place, and/or for the purpose of concealing and placing, beyond the inquiry and jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) herein Defendant's individual and collective funds, properties, and assets subject of and/or suited int he instant Complaint. (o) manuevered, with the technical know-how and legalitic talents of the FMMC senior manager and some of the Bengzon law partners, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Amando V. Faustino, Jose Vicente E. Jimenez and Leonardo C. Cruz, the purported sale of defendant Benjamin Romualdez's interests in the (i) Professional Managers, (ii) A & E International Corporation (A & E), (iii) First Manila Managerment Corporation (FMMC), (iv) Philippine World Travel Inc. (PWTI) and its subsidiaries consisting of 36 corporations in all, to PNI Holdings, Inc. (wjose purported incorporations

are all members of Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon's law firm) for only P5 million on March 3, 1986 or three days after the creation of the Presidential Commission on Good Government on February 28, 1986, for the sole purpose of deceiving and preempting the Government, particularly the PCGG, and making it appear that defendant Benjamin Romualdez had already divested himself of his ownership of the same when in truth and in fact, his interests are well intact and being protected by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. and some of his law partners, together with the FMMC senior managers who still control and run the affiars of said corporations, and in order to entice the PCGG to approve the said fictitious sale, the above-named defendants offered P20 million as "donation" to the Government; (p) misused, with the connivance, support and technical assitance of the Bengzon law firm represented by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. as legal counsel, together with defendants Cesar Zalamea, Antonio Ozaeta, Mario D. Camacho amd Senen J. Gabaldon as members of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Commercial International bank (PCIB), the Meralco Pension Fund (Fund, for short) in the amount of P25 million by cuasing it to be invested in the PCIB and through the Bank's TSG, assigned to PCI Development and PCI Equity at 50% each, the Fund's (a) 8,028.011 common shares in the Bank and (b) "Deposit in Subscription" in the amount of P4,929.972.50 but of the agreed consideration of P28 million for the said assignment, PCI Development and PCI Equity were able to pay only P5,500.00 downpayment and the first amortization of P3,937,500.00 thus prompting the Fund to rescind its assignment, and the consequent reversion of the assigned brought the total shareholding of the Fund to 11,470,555 voting shares or 36.8% of the voting stock of the PCIB, and this development (which the defendants themselves orchestrated or allowed to happen) was used by them as an excuse for the unlawful dismantling or cancellation of the Fund's 10 million shares for allegedly exceeding the 30percent ceiling prescribed by Section 12-B of the General Banking Act, although they know for a fact that what the law declares as unlawful and void ab initio are the subscriptions in excess of the 30% ceiling "to the extent of the excess over any of the ceilings prescribed ..." and not the whole or entire stockholding which they allowed to stay for six years (from June 30, 1980 to March 24, 1986); (q) cleverly hid behind the veil of corporate entity, through the use of the names and managerial expertise of the FMMC senior manager and lawyers identified as Jose B. Sandejas, Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Abelardo S, Termulo, Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Rex C. Drilon II, Kurt Bachmann, Jr. together with the legal talents of corporate lawyers, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Jose V.E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz, the ill-gotten wealth of Benjamin T. Romualdez including, among others, the 6,229,177 shares in PCIB registered in the names of Trans Middle East Phils. Equities, Inc. and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr. which they refused to surrender to PCGG despite their disclosure as they tried and continue to exert efforts in getting hold of the same as well as the shares in Benguet registered in the names of Palm Avenue Holdings and Palm Avenue Realty Development Corp. purportedly to be applied as payment for the claim of P70 million of a "merger company of the First Manila Managerment Corp. group" supposedly owned by them although the truth is that all the said firms are still beneficially owned by defendants Benjamin Romualdez.

xxx xxx xxx On 28 September 1988, petitioner (as defendants) filed their respective answers. 2 Meanwhile, from 2 to 6 August 1988, conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the "Romualdez corporations" were carried in various metropolitan newspapers. Thus, one newspaper reported that the Romuladez firms had not been sequestered because of the opposition of certain PCGG officials who "had worked prviously as lawyers of the Marcos crony firms." Another daily reported otherwise, while others declared that on 3 March 1986, or shortly after the EDSA February 1986 revolution, the Romualdez companies" were sold for P5 million, without PCGG approval, to a holding company controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the President's brother-in-law, had effectively taken over the firms, even pending negotiations for the purchase of the corporations, for the same price of P5 million which was reportedly way below the fair value of their assets. 3 On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flaship of the First Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." 4 On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). 5 Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez." At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to testify involing his constitutional right to due process, and averring that the publicity generated by respondents Committee's inquiry could adversely affect his rights as well as those of the other petitioners who are his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry and directed the petitioners to file their memorandum on the constitutional issues raised, after which, it issued a resolution 6 dated 5 June 1989 rejecting the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying, and the Committee voted to pursue and continue its investigation of the matter. Senator Neptali Gonzales dissented. 7 Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and required their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damager, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraning order and/or injunctive relief. Meanwhile, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan, Jose S. Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention, 8 which the Court granted in the resolution 9 of 21 December 1989, and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in intervention. In compliance, therewith, respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed its comment 10 thereon. Before discussing the issues raised by petitioner and intervenor, we will first tackle the jurisdictional question raised by the respondent Committee.

In its comment, respondent Committee claims that this court cannot properly inquire into the motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations, much less cna it enjoin the Congress or any its regular and special commitees like what petitioners seek from making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers, which obtaines in our present system of government. The contention is untenable. In Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 11 the Court held: The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not hrough express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters wihtin its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government... xxx xxx xxx But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The ovelapping and interlacing of funcstions and duties between the several deaprtments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated, in cases of conflict, the judicial departments is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. xxx xxx xxx The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries; it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not inr eality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by tyhe Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to established for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantess to them. This is in thruth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even the, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More thatn that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also becuase the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government. The "allocation of constituional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perfomr under the Constitution. Moreowever, as held in a recent case, 12 "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this

Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with kthe applicability of the principle in appropriate cases." 13 The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private affirs in purported aid of legislation. Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process. The 1987 Constition expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 14 Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. 15 The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self. The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or reexamination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante alone. As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the exervise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member. Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in tis judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made. A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement which was published in various newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of "having taken over the FMMC Group of Companies." As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988 categorically denying that he had "taken over " the FMMC Group of Companies; that former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself categorically stated in a telecast interview by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988 that there has been no takeover by him (Lopa); and that theses repeated allegations of a "takeover" on his (Lopa's) part of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious. The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on 13 September 1988, to avail of the privilege hour, 17 so that he could repond to the said Lopa letter, and also to vindicate his reputation as a Member of the Senate of the Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his (Enrile's) charges that he (Lopa) had

taken over the FMMC Group of Companies are "baseless" and "malicious." Thus, in his speech, 18 Senator Enrile said, among others, as follows: Mr. President, I rise this afternnon on a matter of personal privilege; the privilege being that I received, Mr. President, a letter dated September 4, 1988, signed by Mr. ricardo A. Lopa, a.k.a. or Baby Lopa, wherein he denied categorically that he has taken over the First Manila Management Group of Companies which includes SOLOIL Incorporated. xxx xxxx xxx In answer to Mr. Lopa, I will quote pertinent portions from an Official Memorandum to the Presidential Commission of Good Government written and signed by former Governor, now Congressman Jose Ramirez, in his capacity as head of the PCGG Task Force for Region VIII. In his memorandum dated July 3, 1986, then Governor Ramirez stated that when he and the members of his task force sought to serve a sequestration order on the management of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte, management officials assured him that relatives of the President of the Philippines were personally discussing and representing SOLOIL so that the order of sequestration would be lifted and that the new owner was Mr. Ricardo A. Lopa. I will quote the pertinent portions in the Ramire's memorandum. The first paragraph of the memorandum reads as follows and I quote, Mr. President: "Our sequestration work of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte was not heeded by management because they said another representation was being made to this Commission for the ventual lifting of our sequestrationorder. They even assured us that Mr. Ricardo Lopa and Peping Cojunangco were personally discussing and representing SOLOIL, so the order of sequestration will finally be lifted. While we attempted to carry on our order, management refused to cooperate and vehemently turned down our request to make available to us the records of the company. In fact it was obviously clear that they will meet us with forcethe moment we insist on doing normally our assigned task. In view of the impending threat, and to avoid any untoward incident we decided to temporarily suspend our work until there is a more categorical stand of this Commission in view of the seemingly influential represetation being made by SOLOIL for us not to continue our work." Another pertinent portion of the same memorandum is paragraph five, which reads as follows, and I quote Mr. President: "The President, Mr. Gamboa, this is, I understand, the President of SOLOIL, and the Plant Superintendent, Mr. Jimenez including their chief counsel, Atty. Mandong Mendiola are now saying that there have been divestment, and that the new owner is now Mr. Ricardo Lopa who according to them, is the brotherin-law of the President. They even went further by telling us that even Peping Cojuangco who we know is the brother of her excellency is also interested in the ownership and management of SOLOIL. When he demanded for supporting papers which will indicate aforesaid divestment, Messrs. Gamboa, Jimenez and Mendiola refused vehemently to submit these papers to us, instead they said it will be submitted directly to this Commission. To our mind their continuous dropping of names is not good for this Commission and even

to the President if our dersire is to achieve respectability and stability of the government." The contents of the memorandum of then Governor and now Congressman Jose Ramirez were personally confirmed by him in a news interview last September 7, 1988. xxx xxxx xxx Also relevant to this case, Mr. President, is a letter of Mr. Ricardo Lopa himself in August 11, 1988 issue of the newspaper Malaya headlined "On Alleged Takeover of Romualdez Firms." Mr. Lopa states in the last paragraph of the published letter and I quote him: 12. As of this writing, the sales agreement is under review by the PCGG solely to determine the appropriate price. The sale of these companies and our prior rigtht to requires them have never been at issue. Perhaps I could not make it any clearer to Mr. Lopa that I was not really making baseless and malicious statements. Senator Enrile concluded his privilege speech in the following tenor: Mr. President, it may be worthwhile for the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5 of which reads as follows and I quote: Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for nay relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, that this section shall not apply to any person who prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application filed by him for approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession. Mr. President, I have done duty to this Senate and to myself. I leave it to this august Body to make its own conclusion. Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." I other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon commitee was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopaa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.

The Court is also not impressed with the respondent Committee's argument that the questioned inquiry is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212. The said resolution was introduced by Senator Jose D. Lina in view of the representaions made by leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of non-governmental organizations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development, to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by three (3) stockholders of Oriental petroleum, i.e., that it has adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm.The pertinent portion of Senate Resolution No. 212 reads as follows: xxx xxx xxx WHEREAS, recent developments have shown that no less than the Solicitor-General has stated that the PCGG Chairman and at least three Commissioners should resign and that the agency should rid itself of "ineptness, incompetence and corruption" and that the Sandiganbayan has reportedly ordered the PCGG to answer charges filed by three stockholders of Oriental Petroleum that it has adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm; WHEREAS, leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of non-governmental organization had made representations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development to look into the charges against the PCGG since said agency is a symbol of the changes expected by the people when the EDSA revolution took place and that the ill-gotten wealth to be recovered will fund priority projects which will benefit our people such as CARP, free education in the elementary and secondary levels reforestration, and employment generation for rural and urban workers; WHEREAS, the government and the present leadeship must demonstrate in their public and private lives integrity, honor and efficient management of government services lest our youth become disillusioned and lose hope and return to an Idelogy and form of government which is repugnant to true freedom, democratic participation and human rights: Now, therefore, be it. Resolved by the Senate, That the activities of the Presidential Commission on Good Government be investigated by the appropriate Committee in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution. 19 Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolution No. 212 is to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by the three (3) stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution. It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens. It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" becuase it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the ralatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case. In John T. Watkins vs. United States, 20 it was held held:

... The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. it encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed, or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social,economic, or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. But broad asis this power ofinquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs ofindividuals without justification in terms of the functions of congress. This was freely conceded by Solicitor General in his argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress. Investigations conducted soly for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to "punish" those investigated are indefensible. (emphasis supplied) It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to conduct its investigation of the petitioners, the complaint in Civil No. 0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Since the issues in said complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioner's respective answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent Commitee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had been pre-empted by that court. To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments betweena legislative commitee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted. In fine, for the rspondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in. In Baremblatt vs. United States, 21 it was held that: Broad as it is, the power is not, howevern, without limitations. Since congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into mattes that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it suplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. ... Now to another matter. It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to inquire is 'subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,' including "'the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights'." 22 In another case ... the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights. The critical element is the exeistence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that over-balances any private rights affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroah upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly. 23

One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against selfincrimination. 24 Thir right constured as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but kit may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of them. This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al. 25 thus Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is hot at him, an accused may altother refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any all questions. Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs. Pamaran, 26the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapuanan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the right against self-incrimination not only in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit It was held that: We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness stand and testify, and that he can invoke his right against selfincrimination only when a question which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is propounded to him. Clearly then, it is not the characeter of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The privilege has consistenly been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not. We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may not be compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidenc before it, it is only becuase we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court holds that, under the facts, including the circumtance that petitioners are presently impleaded as defendants in a case before the Sandiganbayan, which involves issues intimately related to the subject of contemplated inquiry before the respondet Committee, the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is hereby enjoined from compelling the petitioners and intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence at the said inquiry. SO ORDERED.

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK (Philippine Branch), PAUL SIMON MORRIS, SUNDARA RAMESH, OWEN BELMAN, SANJAY AGGARWAL, RAJAMANI CHANDRASHEKAR, MARIVEL GONZALES, MA. ELLEN VICTOR, CHONA G. REYES, ZENAIDA IGLESIAS, RAMONA BERNAD, MICHAELANGELO AGUILAR, and FERNAND TANSINGCO, Petitioners, v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, as represented by its Chairperson, HON. EDGARDO J. ANGARA, Respondent. G.R. No. 167173 December 27, 2007 NACHURA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Prohibition (With Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunction) dated and filed on March 11, 2005 by petitioners against respondent Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, as represented by its Chairperson Edgardo J. Angara (respondent).

Petitioner Standard Chartered Bank (SCB)-Philippines is an institution incorporated in England with limited liability and is licensed to engage in banking, trust, and other related operations in the Philippines. Petitioners Paul Simon Morris, Sundara Ramesh, Owen Belman, Sanjay Aggarwal, Rajamani Chandrashekar, Marivel Gonzales, Ma. Ellen Victor, Chona G. Reyes, Zenaida Iglesias, Ramona Bernad, Michaelangelo Aguilar, and Fernand Tansingco are the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operations Officer, Country Head of Consumer Banking, General Manager for Credit Card and Personal Loans, Chief Financial Officer, Legal and Compliance Officer, former Trust and Investment Services Head, Country Tax Officer, Head of Corporate Affairs, Head of Banking Services, Head of Client Relationships, and the Head of Global Markets of SCB-Philippines,

respectively. Respondent, on the other hand, is one of the permanent committees of the Senate of the Philippines.

The petition seeks the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin respondent from (1) proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to Philippine Senate (P.S.) Resolution No. 166; (2) compelling petitioners who are officers of petitioner SCB-Philippines to attend and testify before any further hearing to be conducted by respondent, particularly that set on March 15, 2005; and (3) enforcing any hold-departure order (HDO) and/or putting the petitioners on the Watch List. It also prays that judgment be rendered (1) annulling the subpoenae ad testificandum and duces tecum issued to petitioners, and (2) prohibiting the respondent from compelling petitioners to appear and testify in the inquiry being conducted pursuant to P.S. Resolution No. 166.

The facts are as follows:

On February 1, 2005, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent, delivered a privilege speech entitledArrogance of Wealth before the Senate based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo denouncing SCBPhilippines for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799)
[1]

and urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. Upon motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, the speech was referred to respondent. Prior to the privilege speech, Senator Enrile had introduced P.S. Resolution No. 166, to wit: RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, INTO THE ILLEGAL SALE OF UNREGISTERED AND HIGH-RISK SECURITIES BY STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, WHICH RESULTED IN BILLIONS OF PESOS OF LOSSES TO THE INVESTING PUBLIC WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7721, otherwise known as the "Law Liberalizing the Entry and Scope of Operations of Foreign Banks in the Philippines, was approved on May 18, 1994 to promote greater participation of foreign banks in the Philippine Banking Industry that will stimulate economic growth and serve as a channel for the flow of funds into the economy; WHEREAS, to promote greater competition in the Philippine Banking Industry, foreign banks were accorded the same privileges, allowed to perform the same functions and subjected to the same limitations under relevant banking laws imposed upon domestic banks; WHEREAS, Standard Chartered Bank was among the foreign banks granted the privilege to do business in our country under Republic Act No. 7721; WHEREAS, there are complaints against Standard Chartered Bank whose actions have reportedly defrauded hundreds of Filipino investors of billions of pesos through the sale of unregistered securities in the form of high-risk mutual funds falsely advertised and marketed as safe investment havens; WHEREAS, there are reports that Standard Chartered Bank clearly knew that its actions were violative of Philippine banking and securities laws but cleverly disguised its illegal acts through the use of pro-forma agreements containing waivers of liability in favor of the bank; WHEREAS, there are reports that in the early stages of conducting these questionable activities, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas warned and eventually fined Standard Chartered Bank a measly P30,000 for violating Philippine banking laws; WHEREAS, the particular operations of Standard Chartered Bank may constitute "conducting business in an unsafe and unsound manner,punishable under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 7653 and should have drawn the higher penalty of revocation of its quasibanking license; WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 8791 or the "General Banking Act of 2000" deems a particular act or omission as conducting business in an unsafe and unsound manner as follows: "Section 56.2 The act or omission has resulted or may result in material loss or damage or abnormal risk to the institution's depositors, creditors, investors, stockholders or to the Bangko Sentral or to the public in general." WHEREAS, the sale of unregistered securities is also a clear violation of Republic Act No. 8799 or "The Securities Regulation Code of 2000"which states:
[2]

"Section 8.1 Securities shall not be sold or offered for sale or distribution within the Philippines, without a registration statement duly filed with and approved by the Commission. Prior to such sale, information on the securities, in such form and with such substance as the Commission may prescribe, shall be made available to each prospective purchaser." WHEREAS, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reportedly issued a Ceaseand-Desist Order (CDO) against Standard Chartered Bank for the sale of these unregistered securities but the case was reportedly settled administratively and dismissed after Standard Chartered Bank paid a fine of P7 Million; WHEREAS, the SEC reportedly made an official finding that Standard Chartered Bank actively engaged in promoting and marketing the so-called"Global Third Party Mutual Funds to the investing public and even set revenue quotas for the sale of these funds; WHEREAS, existing laws including the Securities Regulation Code seem to be inadequate in preventing the sale of unregistered securities and in effectively enforcing the registration rules intended to protect the investing public from fraudulent practices; WHEREAS, the regulatory intervention by the SEC and BSP likewise appears inadequate in preventing the conduct of proscribed activities in a manner that would protect the investing public; WHEREAS, there is a need for remedial legislation to address the situation, having in mind the imposition of proportionate penalties to offending entities and their directors, officers and representatives among other additional regulatory measures; Now, therefore, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, to direct the Committee on Banks, Currencies, and Financial Institutions, to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the reported sale of unregistered and high-risk securities by Standard Chartered Bank which resulted in billions of losses to the investing public.

Acting on the referral, respondent, through its Chairperson, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, set the initial hearing on February 28, 2005to investigate, in aid of legislation, the subject matter of the speech and resolution filed by Senator Enrile.

Respondent invited petitioners, among others, to attend the hearing, requesting them to submit their written position paper. Petitioners, through counsel, submitted to respondent a letter dated February 24, 2005 presenting their position, particularly stressing that there were cases pending in court allegedly involving the same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent to continue with the inquiry.
[3]

On February 28, 2005, respondent commenced the investigation. Senator Enrile inquired who among those invited as resource persons were present and who were absent. Thereafter, Senator Enrile moved that subpoenae be issued to those who did not attend the hearing and that the Senate request the Department of Justice, through the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, to issue an HDO against them and/or include them in the Bureaus Watch List. Senator Juan Flavier seconded the motion and the motion was approved.

Respondent then proceeded with the investigation proper. Towards the end of the hearing, petitioners, through counsel, made an Opening Statement that brought to the attention of respondent the lack of proper authorization from affected clients for the bank to make disclosures of their accounts and the lack of copies of the accusing documents mentioned in Senator Enrile's privilege speech, and reiterated that there were pending court cases regarding the alleged sale in the Philippines by SCB-Philippines of unregistered foreign securities.
[4]

The February 28, 2005 hearing was adjourned without the setting of the next hearing date. However, petitioners were later served by respondent with subpoenae ad testificandum and duces tecum to compel them to attend and testify at the hearing set on March 15, 2005. Hence, this petition.

The grounds relied upon by petitioners are as follows: I. THE COMMITTEE ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION, PURPORTEDLY IN AID OF LEGISLATION, BUT IN REALITY PROBING INTO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE STANDARD CHARTERED BANK HAD SOLD UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES. SAID ISSUE HAS LONG BEEN THE SUBJECT OF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ACTIONS NOW PENDING BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MAK ATI CITY AND THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE OF MAKATI CITY. II. THE COMMITTEE ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION BY CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION, PURPORTEDLY IN AID OF LEGISLATION, BUT IN REALITY IN AID OF COLLECTION BY A HANDFUL OF TWO (2) CLIENTS OF STANDARD CHARTERED BANK OF LOSSES WHICH WERE FOR THEIR ACCOUNT AND RISK. AT ANY RATE, SUCH COLLECTION IS WITHIN THE PROVINCE OF THE COURT RATHER THAN OF THE LEGISLATURE. III.

THE COMMITTEE ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN COMPELLING PETITIONERS, SOME OF WHOM ARE RESPONDENTS IN THE PENDING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ACTIONS BROUGHT BY SAID CLIENTS, IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND RIGHT TO PURSUE AND DEFEND THEIR CAUSE IN COURT RATHER THAN ENGAGE IN TRIAL BY PUBLICITY A CLEAR VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS, RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND TO TRAVEL. IV. THE COMMITTEE ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF [5] JURISDICTION BY DISREGARDING ITS OWN RULES.

Petitioners argue that respondent has no jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry because its subject matter is the very same subject matter of the following cases, to wit: (a) CA-G.R. SP No. 85078, entitled Manuel V. Baviera vs. Hon. Esperanza P. Rosario, et th al., pending before the 9 Division of the Court of Appeals. In the petition, Mr. Baviera seeks to annul and set aside the dismissal by the Department of Justice of his complaint against Standard Chartered Bank and its officers accusing them of SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES IN VIOLATION OF P.D. NO. 1869 (SYNDICATED ESTAFA) AND ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. (b) CA-G.R. SP No. 86200, entitled Manuel V. Baviera vs. Hon. Rafael Buenaventura, et al., th pending before the 15 Division of the Court of Appeals. In the petition, Mr. Baviera seeks to annul and set aside the termination for lack of probable cause by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) of the investigation of Standard Chartered Bank for money laundering activities BY SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES. (c) CA-G.R. SP No. 87328, entitled Manuel V. Baviera vs. Hon. Esperanza Paglinawan Rozario, et th al., pending before the 16 Division of the Court of Appeals. The petition seeks to annul and set aside the dismissal by the Department of Justice of Mr. Baviera's complaint accusing SCB and its officers of violation of the Securities Regulation Code by SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES. (d) Civil Case No. 70173, entitled Mr. Noel G. Sanchez, et al. vs. Standard Chartered Bank, pending before Branch 155 of the Regional TrialCourt of Pasig City. Plaintiff seeks damages and recovery of their investment accusing the bank of SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES. (e) Criminal Case No. 332034, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Manuel V. Baviera, pending before Branch 64 of the Metropolitan Trial Courtof Makati City. Petitioner Morris is the private complainant in this information for extortion or blackmail against Mr. Baviera for demanding the payment of US$2 Million with the threat to EXPOSE THE BANK'S LARGE SCALE SCAM CONSISTING [OF] ILLEGAL SELLING OF UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES BY THE BANK, before various government offices, such as the Department of Justice, the BIR, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Regional Trial Courts, and both houses of Congress.

(f) Criminal Case No. 331395, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Manuel V. Baviera, pending before Branch 64 of the Metropolitan Trial Courtof Makati City. Petitioners Victor and Chona Reyes are the private complainants in this information for perjury committed by Mr. Baviera in securing a hold departure order against the petitioners herein from the Department of Justice for their alleged involvement in syndicated estafa and swindling BY SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES. (g) I.S. No. 2004-B-2279-80, entitled Aurelio Litonjua III and Aurelio Litonjua, Jr. vs. Antonette de los Reyes, et al., pending before the Office of the Prosecutor, Makati City. This is a criminal complaint accusing SCB and its officers of estafa for SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN [6] SECURITIES.

Citing Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the petitioners claim that since the issue of whether or not SCB-Philippines illegally sold unregistered foreign securities is already preempted by the courts that took cognizance of the foregoing cases, the respondent, by this investigation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in these courts.

[7]

The argument is misplaced. Bengzon does not apply squarely to petitioners case.

It is true that in Bengzon, the Court declared that the issue to be investigated was one over which jurisdiction had already been acquired by the Sandiganbayan, and to allow the [Senate Blue Ribbon] Committee to investigate the matter would create the possibility of conflicting judgments; and that the inquiry into the same justiciable controversy would be an encroachment on the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had set in much earlier.

To the extent that, in the case at bench, there are a number of cases already pending in various courts and administrative bodies involving the petitioners, relative to the alleged sale of unregistered foreign securities, there is a resemblance between this case andBengzon. However, the similarity ends there.

Central to the Courts ruling in Bengzon -- that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was without any constitutional mooring to conduct the legislative investigation -- was the Courts determination that the intended inquiry was not in aid of legislation. The Court found that the speech of Senator Enrile, which sought such investigation contained no suggestion of any contemplated legislation; it merely called upon the Senate to look into possible violations of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019. Thus, the Court held that the requested probe failed to comply with a fundamental requirement of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

Accordingly, we stopped the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from proceeding with the legislative investigation in that case.

Unfortunately for the petitioners, this distinguishing factual milieu in Bengzon does not obtain in the instant case. P.S. Resolution No. 166 is explicit on the subject and nature of the inquiry to be (and already being) conducted by the respondent Committee, as found in the last three Whereas clauses thereof, viz.: WHEREAS, existing laws including the Securities Regulation Code seem to be inadequate in preventing the sale of unregistered securities and in effectively enforcing the registration rules intended to protect the investing public from fraudulent practices; WHEREAS, the regulatory intervention by the SEC and BSP likewise appears inadequate in preventing the conduct of proscribed activities in a manner that would protect the investing public; WHEREAS, there is a need for remedial legislation to address the situation, having in mind the imposition of proportionate penalties to offending entities and their directors, officers and representatives among other additional regulatory measures; (emphasis supplied)

The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said resolution, exposes the error in petitioners allegation that the inquiry, as initiated in a privilege speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simply to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities x x x. This fallacy is made more glaring when we consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.

Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.

As succinctly stated in the landmark case Arnault v. Nazareno [T]he power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who possess it.

[8]

Neither can the petitioners claim that they were singled out by the respondent Committee. The Court notes that among those invited as resource persons were officials of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). These officials were subjected to the same critical scrutiny by the respondent relative to their separate findings on the illegal sale of unregistered foreign securities by SCBPhilippines. It is obvious that the objective of the investigation was the quest for remedies, in terms of legislation, to prevent the recurrence of the allegedly fraudulent activity.

Still, petitioners insist that the inquiry conducted by respondent was, in fact, in aid of collection. They claim that Atty. Bocobo and Manuel Baviera, the latter a party to the pending court cases cited by petitioners, were only seeking a friendly forum so that they could recover their investments from SCB-Philippines; and that the respondent has allowed itself to be used as the conveniently available vehicle to effect this purpose.

However, as correctly pointed out by respondent in its Comment on the petition, Atty. Bocobo did not file a complaint before the Senate for the purpose of recovering his investment. On the contrary, and as confirmed during the initial hearing on February 28, 2005, his letter-complaint humbly requested the Senate to conduct an inquiry into the purportedly illegal activities of SCB-Philippines, with the end view of preventing the future occurrence of any similar fraudulent activity by the banks in general.
[9]

Baviera, on the other hand, was not

a complainant but merely a witness in the investigation, invited to testify on the alleged illegal sale of unregistered foreign securities by SCB-Philippines, being one of the supposed victims thereof.

The Court further notes that when it denied petitioners prayer for the issuance of a TRO to restrain the hearing set on March 15, 2005,
[10]

respondent proceeded with the investigation. On the said date, outraged by

petitioners imputation that it was conducting the investigation in aid of collection, respondent held petitioners, together with their counsel, Atty. Reynaldo Geronimo, in contempt and ordered their detention for six hours.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of this Courts Resolution dated March 14, 2005 only with respect to the denial of the prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction, alleging that their being held in contempt was without legal basis, as the phrase in aid of collection partakes of an absolutely privileged allegation in the petition.

We do not agree. The Court has already expounded on the essence of the contempt power of Congress and its committees in this wise The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each departments authority to be full and complete, independently of each others authority or power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by [11] itself to punish or deal therewith, with affronts committed against its authority or dignity.

The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation. As the branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it. Such power is sui generis, as it attaches not to the discharge of legislative functionsper se, but to the sovereign character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government.
[12]

In this case, petitioners imputation that the investigation was in aid of collection is a direct challenge against the authority of the Senate Committee, as it ascribes ill motive to the latter. In this light, we find the contempt citation against the petitioners reasonable and justified.

Furthermore, it is axiomatic that the power of legislative investigation includes the power to compel the attendance of witnesses. Corollary to the power to compel the attendance of witnesses is the power to ensure that said witnesses would be available to testify in the legislative investigation. In the case at bench, considering that most of the officers of SCB-Philippines are not Filipino nationals who may easily evade the compulsive character of respondents summons by leaving the country, it was reasonable for the respondent to request the assistance of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation to prevent said witnesses from evading the inquiry and defeating its purpose. In any event, no HDO was issued by a court. The BID instead included them only in the Watch List, which had the effect of merely delaying petitioners intended travel abroad for five (5) days, provided no HDO is issued against them.
[13]

With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon,
[14]

we have held that

the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc,
[15]

there is no infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure

information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.
[16]

As regards the issue of self-incrimination, the petitioners, officers of SCB-Philippines, are not being indicted as accused in a criminal proceeding. They were summoned by respondent merely as resource persons, or as witnesses, in a legislative inquiry. As distinguished by this Court [An] accused occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to [17] take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions.

Concededly, this right of the accused against self-incrimination is extended to respondents in administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are analogous to criminal proceedings. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law; and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.
[18]

However, in this case, petitioners neither stand as accused in a criminal case nor will they be subjected by the respondent to any penalty by reason of their testimonies. Hence, they cannot altogether decline appearing before respondent, although they may invoke the privilege when a question calling for an incriminating answer is propounded.
[19]

Petitioners argument, that the investigation before respondent may result in a recommendation for their prosecution by the appropriate government agencies, such as the Department of Justice or the Office of the Ombudsman, does not persuade.

As held in Sinclair v. United States

[20]

--

It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel disclosures for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending suits; but the authority of that body, directly or through its Committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own constitutional power is not abridged because the information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such suits. x x x It is plain that investigation of the matters involved in suits brought or to be commenced under the Senate resolution directing the institution of suits for the cancellation of the leases might directly aid in respect of legislative action.

The prosecution of offenders by the prosecutorial agencies and the trial before the courts is for the punishment of persons who transgress the law. The intent of legislative inquiries, on the other hand, is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be enacted into law.

Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the respondent, as with the other Committees of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, cannot penalize violators even if there is overwhelming evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation, respondent can only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its Report a recommendation for the criminal

indictment of persons who may appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such a Report would be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.

Finally, petitioners sought anew, in their Manifestation and Motion

[21]

dated June 21, 2006, the issuance

by this Court of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to prevent respondent from submitting its Committee Report No. 75 to the Senate in plenary for approval. However, 16 days prior to the filing of the Manifestation and Motion, or on June 5, 2006, respondent had already submitted the report to the Senate in plenary. While there is no showing that the said report has been approved by the Senate, the subject of the Manifestation and Motion has inescapably become moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Prohibition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Manifestation and Motion dated June 21, 2006 is, likewise, DENIED for being moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992 FELICIANO, J.: According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, on 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go. The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had come from; they were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the same
1

person who had shot Maguan. Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt for petitioner. On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the 2 gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver. On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s). Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an 3 information for murder before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion 4 for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation, alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on the last page of the motion itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00. On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle in order to expedite action on the Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge, who, on the same date, 6 7 approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release. Petitioner was in fact released that same day. On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct preliminary 8 investigation and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended. He stated that petitioner had filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation, which motion had been granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to recommend cash bail of P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion of 11 July 1991. Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary investigation. On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order, embodying the following: (1) the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the Order to surrender himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled; (3) petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11 July 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991. On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order, contending that the information was null and void because no preliminary
10 9 5

investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of his right to due process. Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this motion was, however, denied by respondent Judge. On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police. By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to the Court of Appeals. On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the arraignment of petitioner on 23 August 1991. On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his arraignment. On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, petitioner was arraigned. In view, however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty. The Trial court then set the criminal case for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 11 15, 21 and 22 November 1991. On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court of Appeals. He alleged that in view of public respondent's failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier filed by him, after the lapse of more than a month, thus prolonging his detention, he was entitled to be released on habeas corpus. On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the other, were subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to restrain his arraignment on the ground that that motion had become moot and academic. On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution presented its first witness. On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision on the following grounds:
14 13

dismissing the two (2) petitions,

a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was arrested and charged had been "freshly committed." His identity had been established through investigation. At the time he showed up at the police station, there had been an existing manhunt for him. During the confrontation at the San Juan Police Station, one witness positively identified petitioner as the culprit. b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest. He waived his right to preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly and seasonably under the Rules. c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order because the trial court had the inherent power to amend and control its processes so as to make them conformable to law and justice.

d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid commitment order (issued by the trial judge after petitioner surrendered to the authorities whereby petitioner was given to the custody of the Provincial Warden), the petition for habeas corpus could not be granted. On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Counsel for petitioner also 15 filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" with the trial court, with petitioner's conformity. On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14 October 1991, the Court issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below until further orders from this Court. In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first, whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go; and second, whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. We consider these issues seriatim. In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case, petitioner had been validly arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had been sufficiently established by police work, petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at the San 16 Juan Police Station. The Solicitor General invokes Nazareno v. Station Commander, etc., et al., one of the seven (7) cases consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc., v. Ramos, et 17 al. where a majority of the Court upheld a warrantees arrest as valid although effected fourteen (14) days after the killing in connection with which Nazareno had been arrested. Accordingly, in the view of the Solicitor General, the provisions of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court were applicable and because petitioner had declined to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing the information for murder even without preliminary investigation. On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal knowledge" required for the lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner. The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the circumstances of this case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen days after the actual commission of the offenses, upon the ground that such offenses constituted "continuing crimes." Those offenses were subversion, membership in an outlawed organization like the New People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and completed at one definite location in time and space. No one had pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime." Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows: Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, 18 constitute "personal knowledge." It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides: Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting office or person However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception. If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule. (Emphasis supplied) is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary

investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation. Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation, we note that petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out, on the same day that the information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General contends that that omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial court and not with the Prosecutor, and that the petitioner should accordingly be held to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. We do not believe that waiver of petitioner's statutory right to preliminary investigation may be predicated on such a slim basis. The preliminary investigation was to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial Court. It is true that at the time of filing of petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for murder had already been filed with the Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the record whether petitioner was aware 19 of this fact at the time his omnibus motion was actually filed with the Prosecutor. In Crespo v. Mogul, this Court held: The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists to warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasijudicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused., or the right of the People to due process of law. xxx xxx xxx The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case 20 before it. . . . (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied) Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation and not for a re-investigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a re-investigation), and since the Prosecutor himself did file with the trial court, on the 5th day after filing the information for murder, a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion), we conclude that petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed with the trial court. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was five (5) days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary investigation. Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct preliminary investigation. Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable, the 5day reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must be held to have been substantially complied with.

We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation. While that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a 21 component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure of his right to due process. The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary investigation in the instant case considering that he was already arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at 22 arraignment. In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial. Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had waived his right to 23 preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, we did hold that appellants there had waived their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without 24 previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation." In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one. We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord preliminary investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of criminal justice, did not 25 impair the validity of the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to bail. This was equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his hands was not strong. Accordingly, we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of respondent Judge recalling his own order granting bail and requiring petitioner to surrender himself within forty-eight (48) hours from notice, was plainly arbitrary considering that no evidence at all and certainly no new or additional evidence had been submitted to respondent Judge that could have justified the recall of his order issued just five (5) days before. It follows that petitioner was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in the instant case, trial on the merits has already commenced, the Prosecutor having already presented four (4) witnesses, impact upon, firstly, petitioner's right to a preliminary investigation and, secondly, petitioner's right to be released on bail? Does he continue to be entitled to have a preliminary investigation conducted in respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner remain entitled to be released on bail? Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner remains entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has already began. Trial on the merits should be suspended 26 or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner. It is true that the Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he may at this time have on hand, conclude that probable cause exists; upon the other hand, the Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand does not warrant a finding of probable cause. In any event, the constitutional point is that petitioner

was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of procedural due process. Petitioner was forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary investigation, with extraordinary haste, to the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. If he submitted to arraignment at trial, petitioner did so "kicking and screaming," in a manner of speaking . During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August 1991, the date set for arraignment of petitioner, and just before arraignment, counsel made very clear petitioner's vigorous protest and objection to the arraignment precisely because of the denial of preliminary 28 investigation. So energetic and determined were petitioner's counsel's protests and objections that an obviously angered court and prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout, promising to replace him with counsel de oficio. During the trial, before the prosecution called its first witness, petitioner through counsel once again reiterated his objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation: petitioner's counsel made of 29 record his "continuing objection." Petitioner had promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari and prohibition to challenge the lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of his 30 detention. If he did not walk out on the trial, and if he cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses, it was because he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de oficio selected by the trial judge, and to run the risk of being held to have waived also his right to use what is frequently the only test of truth in the judicial process. In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence already of record concerning petitioner's guilt be, in the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then be up to the trial court, after a careful and objective assessment of the evidence on record, to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail. To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the record would be to legitimize the deprivation of due process and to permit the Government to benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point. It may be that to require the State to accord petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this point, could turn out ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. But the Court is not compelled to speculate. And, in any case, it would not be idle ceremony; rather, it would be a celebration by the State of the rights and liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation and determination to respect those rights and liberties. ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Order of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be without prejudice to any lawful order that the trial court may issue, should the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

27

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., vs. PANFILO M. LACSON. [G.R. No. 149453. May 28, 2002] RESOLUTION Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of [2] Appeals dated August 24, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034. The said Decision of the appellate court granted respondent Lacsons Second Amended Petition for Prohibition with application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, (1) assailing the Order issued by Judge Herminia Pasamba of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, that allowed the continuation of the re-investigation of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q99-81689 or the Kuratong Baleleng cases; and (2) praying for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-01-101102 to Q-01-101112 entitled People of the Philippines v. Panfilo Lacson, et al. pending before Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City. The following appear in the records of this case: (1) On May 18, 1995, then PNP Director-General Recaredo Sarmiento II announced, in a press conference, the killing of eleven (11) members of theKuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) in a shootout with police [3] elements near the fly-over along Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City at about 4:00 A.M. that day. (2) On May 22, 1995, morning papers carried the news that SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had claimed [4] that the killing of the eleven (11) gang members was a rub-out or summary execution and not a shootout. (3) In an affidavit he executed the following day, delos Reyes stated, among others, that he was part of a composite police team called the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Force Group (ABRITFG) composed of elements of the National Capital Region Command (NCRC) and headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson; Traffic Management Command, headed by Senior Superintendent Francisco Subia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), headed by Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command, headed by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and Criminal Investigation Command (CIC), headed by Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop. Delos Reyes claimed that the police team arrested the eleven (11) gang members in early morning of May 18, 1995 at the gangs safe house in Superville Subdivision, Paraaque; that after their arrest, the gang members were made to board two vans, their hands tied behind their backs, and brought initially to Camp Crame where a decision to summarily execute them was made, and later to Commonwealth Avenue [5] where they were shot to death by elements of ABRITFG. (4) On May 26, 1995, SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, another CIC investigator, executed an affidavit corroborating the material allegations of delos Reyes. Dela Cruz claimed that she was with delos Reyes from the [6] time the eleven (11) KBG members were arrested up to the time they were killed in Commonwealth Avenue. (5) On May 31, 1995, Armando Capili, a reporter of Remate, executed an affidavit stating that he was [7] present when the KBG members were arrested in Superville Subdivision. (6) On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director for Investigation, filed murder charges with the Office of the Ombudsman against ninety-seven (97) officers and personnel of ABRITFG. The [8] next-of-kin of the slain KBG members also filed murder charges against the same officers and personnel. (7) Ombudsman Aniano Desierto then created a panel of investigators to conduct a preliminary investigation of the murder charges. The panel was headed by Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs Bienvenido Blancaflor. On October 20, 1995, the panel issued a resolution recommending the dismissal of the charges for lack of probable cause. (8) Ombudsman Desierto referred the resolution for review by a panel composed of Over-all Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa as head, and Special Prosecutor Leonardo Tamayo and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera as members. On November 20, 1995, the review panel reversed the Blancaflor resolution and found probable cause for the prosecution of multiple murder charges against twenty-six (26) officers and [9] personnel of ABRITFG.
[1]

(9) On November 2, 1995, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eleven (11) Informations for MURDER, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057, against respondent Panfilo M. Lacson and twenty-five [10] (25) other accused. All twenty-six (26) of them were charged as principals. The following appear to be the victims: Meleubren Sorronda in Crim. Case No. 23047; Welbor Elcamel in Crim. Case No. 23048; Carlito Alap-ap in Crim. Case No. 23049; Jevy Redillas in Crim. Case No. 23050; Ray Abalora in Crim. Case No. 23051; Joel Amora in Crim. Case No. 23052; Alex Neri in Crim. Case No. 23053; Rolando Siplon in Crim. Case No. 23054; Manuel Montero in Crim. Case No. 23055; Sherwin Abalora in Crim. Case No. 23056; and Pacifico Montero in Crim. Case No. 23057. (10) Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman for reinvestigation. On March 1, 1996, Amended Informations were filed against the same twenty-six (26) suspects but the participation of respondent Lacson was downgraded from principal to accessory. Arraignment then [11] followed and respondent entered a plea of not guilty. (11) With the downgrading of charges against him, respondent Lacson questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to hear the criminal cases as none of the principal accused in the Amended Informations was a government official with a Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, citing Section 2 of R. A. No. 7975 then prevailing. [12] Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred to the Regional Trial Court. (12) The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of the transfer. Pending resolution of the motion, R. A. No. 8249 took effect on February 23, 1997, amending R. A. No. 7975. In particular, the amendatory law deleted the word principal in Section 2 of R. A. No. 7975, thereby expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to include all cases where at least one of the accused, whether principal, accomplice or accessory, is a government official of Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher. The amendment is made applicable to all [13] cases pending in any court in which trial has not yet begun as of the date of its approval. (13) In Lacson v. Executive Secretary, respondent Lacson challenged the constitutionality of the amendment and contended that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the criminal cases. This Court, while dismissing the constitutional challenge, nonetheless ordered the transfer of the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court on the ground that the Amended Informations for murder failed to indicate that the offenses charged therein were committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the official functions of the respondent, as required by R. A. No. 8249. (14) Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 were raffled off to Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, then presided by Judge, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Wenceslao Agnir, Jr., and redocketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. (15) Before the accused could be arraigned, prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes, Corazon de la Cruz, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez recanted their affidavits which implicated respondent Lacson in the murder of the KBG members. On the other hand, private complainants Myrna Abalora, Leonora Amora, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda [18] [19] [20] [21] Montero, Margarita Redillas, Carmelita Elcamel and Rolando Siplon also executed their respective [22] affidavits of desistance declaring that they were no longer interested to prosecute these cases. (16) Due to these developments, the twenty-six (26) accused, including respondent Lacson, filed five separate but identical motions to (1) make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants, and (3) dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack of probable cause. (17) The records of the case before us are not clear whether the private offended parties were notified of [23] the hearing on March 22, 1999 held by Judge Agnir to resolve the motions filed by respondent Lacson and the other accused. (18) During the said hearing, the private offended parties who desisted do not appear to have been presented on the witness stand. In their stead, Atty. Godwin Valdez testified that he assisted them in preparing their affidavits of desistance and that he signed said affidavits as witness. On the other hand, Atty. Aurora
[15] [16] [17] [14]

Bautista of the Philippine Lawyers League presented the affidavits of recantation of prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez. Only prosecution witness Corazon de la Cruz testified to [24] affirm her affidavit. (19) On March 29, 1999, Judge Agnir issued a Resolution to Q-99-81689, as follows:
[25]

dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679

As already seen, the documents attached to the Informations in support thereof have been rendered meaningless, if not absurd, with the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants. There is no more evidence to show that a crime has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof. Following the doctrine above-cited, there is no more reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose them to an open and public accusation. It is time to write finis to these cases and lay to rest the ghost of the incident of May 18, 1995 so that all those involved--- the accused, the prosecution witnesses and the private complainants alike--- may get on with their lives. The Court is not unmindful of the admonition in the recent case of People vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999) where the Supreme Court said that the general rule is that if the Information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for want of evidence, because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial, and that the ruling in Allado vs. Diokno is an exception to the general rule and may be invoked only if similar circumstances are clearly shown to exist. This Court holds that the circumstances in the case at bench clearly make an exception to the general rule. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds no probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest against the accused or to hold them for trial. Accordingly, the Informations in the above-numbered cases are hereby ordered dismissed. SO ORDERED.
[26]

(20) On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice the new affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos regarding the Kuratong Baleleng incident for preliminary investigation. On the strength of this indorsement, Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez formed a panel to investigate the matter. On April 17, 2001, the respondent was subpoenaed to attend the investigation of [27] Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. (21) On May 28, 2001, respondent Lacson, et al., invoking, among others, their constitutional right against double jeopardy, filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, primarily to enjoin the State prosecutors from conducting the preliminary investigation. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-100933 and raffled [28] to Branch 40, presided by Judge Herminia V. Pasamba. (22) 2001, viz: The plea for temporary restraining order was denied by Judge Pasamba in an Order
[29]

dated June 5,

After a study, this Court submits that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 is not one on the merits and without any recorded arraignment and entered plea on the part of the herein petitioners. The dismissal was a direct consequence of the finding of the Quezon City RTC that no probable cause exists for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein and to hold them for trial. The arraignment had with the Sandiganbayan does not put the case in a different perspective since the Sandiganbayan was adjudged to be without any jurisdiction to try the cases. It is the People of the Philippines who is the complainant in the Kuratong Baleleng case and remains to be the complainant in the present investigation initiated thru a letter of PNP Chief

Mendoza dated March 27, 2001 (Exhibit B) together with the sworn statements of witnesses Ramos and Yu (Exhibits 2 and 3 - supportive of the refiling of the case (Exhibit 9). xxx xxx xxx

Above considered, this Court finds petitioners have not preliminarily established that they have a right to be preserved pending hearing on the injunctive relief. WHEREFORE, the prayer for temporary restraining order is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.
[30]

(23) On June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder involving the killing of the same members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112. The new Informations charged as principals thirty-four (34) people, including respondent Lacson and his twenty-five (25) other co-accused in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q99-81689. The criminal cases were assigned to Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao. (24) On the same day, respondent Lacson filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for [31] certiorari against Judge Pasamba, the Secretary of Justice, the PNP Chief, State Prosecutors Ong and Zacarias, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Jamolin, and the People of the Philippines. The said petition was amended to implead as additional party-respondents State Prosecutor Claro Arellano and the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 81 in [32] which the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were filed. (25) The Second Amended Petition 26, 2001, alleged:
[33]

dated June 14, 2001 and admitted by the Court of Appeals on June

The reliefs of certiorari, prohibition and injunction against the questioned Order (Annex A) and the new Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 pending before respondent Yadao (Annex B) are founded upon the grave abuse of discretion by respondent Judge Pasamba of her discretion in its issuance, the illegality of the proceedings of the respondent State Prosecutors as they cannot revive complaints which had been dismissed over two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was issued, and the invalidity of the new Informations for Murder filed against petitioners and others, all in defiance of law and jurisprudence as shown by the following: (a) Respondent judge had ruled on the merits of the main prohibition action a quo rendering the same moot and academic by concluding that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679-Q-99-81689 by the QC RTC was not final and executory, hence [i] the complaints therein can be reinvestigated, and [ii] petitioners arraignment while the case had not yet been remanded to the QC RTC and while the Sandiganbayan had valid jurisdiction thereover [Criminal Cases No. 23047-2048] was void, notwithstanding that the only issue in the TRO application was the existence or lack of a valid complaint as defined in S1 and S3, Rule 110. (b) Respondent Judge ruled that respondent State Prosecutors could proceed to re-investigate and thereafter file new Informations on June 6, 2001 covering those offenses subject of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679-Q-9981689 on the basis of affidavits filed after said cases were dismissed on March 29, 1999, despite the fact that under Section 8, Rule 117, cases similar to those filed against the petitioner and others (where the penalty imposable is imprisonment of six (6) years or more) cannot be revived after two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was issued. (c) Respondent Judge held that the petitioner had not shown a right to be preserved despite evidence showing the short cuts taken by respondent State prosecutors in re-investigating a dismissed case, in not complying with Rules in respect of its re-opening, and in insisting that a valid complaint was filed in clear violation of the Rules and

case law thereon, and despite the fact that the petitioner had shown that an inextendible deadline of June 5, 2001 was given him to file his counter-affidavit without which his indictment for a non-bailable offense is assured [34] because of DOJ Secretary Hernando Perezs political schemes. (26) In the meantime, on June 8, 2001, respondent Lacson also filed with the RTC-QC Branch 81 (presided by Judge Ma. Theresa Yadao), a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and in the absence thereof, to dismiss the cases outright. Respondent Lacson, however, filed a Manifestation and Motion dated June [35] 13, 2001 seeking the suspension of the proceedings before the trial court. (27) The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Yadao from issuing a [36] warrant of arrest or conducting any proceeding or hearing in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112. (28) On August 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals (Special Third Division), rendered the now assailed Decision. It characterized the termination of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 as provisional dismissal, and considered Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 as mere revivals of the same. Applying Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it dismissed the criminal cases against the respondent, viz: In sum, this Court is of the considered view that the subject dismissal of [the] criminal cases was provisional in nature and that the cases presently sought to be prosecuted by the respondents are mere revival or re-opening of the dismissed cases. The present controversy, being one involving provisional dismissal and revival of criminal cases, falls within the purview of the prescriptive period provided under Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The second paragraph of the said provision is couched in clear, simple and categorical words. It mandates that for offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, as the subject criminal cases, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after the issuance of the order without the case having been revived. It should be noted that the revival of the subject criminal cases, even if reckoned from the DOJs issuance of subpoenas to petitioner, was commenced only on April 19, 2001, that is, more than two (2) years after the issuance, on March 29, 1999, of RTC-Quezon Citys Resolution, provisionally dismissing the criminal cases now sought to be revived. Applying the clear and categorical mandate of Section 8, Rule 117, supra, such efforts to revive the criminal cases are now definitely barred by the two-year prescriptive period provided therein. xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. As prayed for, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued against the conduct of further proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, including the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioner, PANFILO M. LACSON, is hereby made PERMANENT. Accordingly, with respect to said accused, the proceedings conducted by respondent State Prosecutors in respect of the said criminal cases are declared NULL AND VOID and the corresponding Informations, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Panfilo M. Lacson, et al.and filed before respondent Judge Maria Theresa L. Yadao of Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, are hereby ordered DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
[37]

The issue is whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of theKuratong Baleleng gang. This rule which took effect on December 1, 2000 provides: SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal.- A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. Like any other favorable procedural rule, this new rule can be given retroactive effect. However, this Court cannot rule on this jugular issue due to the lack of sufficient factual bases. Thus, there is need of proof of the following facts, viz: (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party, (3) whether the 2-year period to revive has already lapsed, and (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period. There is no uncertainty with respect to the fact that the provisional dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson bears his express consent. It was respondent Lacson himself who moved to dismiss the subject cases for lack of probable cause before then Judge Agnir, hence, it is beyond argument that their dismissal bears his express consent. The records of the case, however, do not reveal with equal clarity and conclusiveness whether notices to the offended parties were given before the cases against the respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir. It appears from the resolution of then Judge Agnir that the relatives of the victims who desisted did not appear during the hearing to affirm their affidavits. Their affidavits of desistance were only presented by Atty. Godwin Valdez who testified that he assisted the private complainants in preparing their affidavits and he signed them as a witness. It also appears that only seven (7) persons submitted their affidavits of desistance, namely: a. Myrna Abalora, mother of the victims Sherwin Abalora and Rey Abalora b. Carmelita Elcamel, wife of Wilbur Elcamel; c. Leonora Amora, mother of victim Joel Amora; d. Nenita Alap-ap, wife of victim Carlito Alap-ap; e. Imelda Montero, wife of victim Manuel Montero; f. Margarita Redillas, mother of victim Hilario Jevy Redillas; and g. Rolando Siplon. From the records of the case before us, it cannot be determined whether there were affidavits of desistance [38] executed by the relatives of the three (3) other victims, namely: Meleubren Soronda, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Alex Neri. The same records do not show whether they were notified of the hearing or had knowledge thereof. To be sure, it is not fair to expect the element of notice to be litigated before then Judge Agnir for Section 8, Rule 117 was yet inexistent at that time. The fact of notice to the offended parties was not raised either in the petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction filed by respondent Lacson in the RTC of Manila, presided by Judge Pasamba, to enjoin the prosecutors from reinvestigating the said cases against him. The only question raised in said petition is whether the reinvestigation will violate the right of respondent Lacson against double jeopardy. Thus, the issue of whether or not the reinvestigation is barred by Section 8, Rule 117 was not tackled by the litigants. Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of proof after the eleven (11) informations for murder against respondent Lacson and company were revived in the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge Yadao. There was hardly any proceeding conducted in the case for respondent Lacson immediately filed a petition for certiorari in the appellate court challenging, among others, the authority of Judge Yadao to entertain the revived informations for multiple murder against him. This is not to be wondered at. The applicability of Section 8, Rule 117 was never considered in the trial court. It was in the Court of Appeals where respondent Lacson raised for the first time the argument that Section 8, Rule

117 bars the revival of the multiple murder cases against him. But even then, the appellate court did not require the parties to elucidate the crucial issue of whether notices were given to the offended parties before Judge Agnir ordered the dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson and company. To be sure, there is a statement in the Decision of the appellate court to the effect that records show that the prosecution and the private offended [39] parties were notified of the hearing x x x. It is doubtful whether this finding is supported by the records of the case. It appears to be contrary to Judge Agnirs finding that only seven (7) of the complainants submitted affidavits of desistance. Indeed, the records of this case are inconclusive on the factual issue of whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar. The reckoning date of the 2-year bar has to be first determined - - - whether it is from the date of the Order of then Judge Agnir dismissing the cases or from the dates the Order were received by the various offended parties or from the date of the effectivity of the new rule. If the cases were revived only after the 2-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with said timeline. The new rule fixes a timeline to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in courts. It can therefore present compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the 2-year bar. In light of the lack of or the conflicting evidence on the various requirements to determine the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is not in a position to rule whether or not the re-filing of the cases for multiple murder against respondent Lacson should be enjoined. Fundamental fairness requires that both the prosecution and the respondent Lacson should be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the predicate facts upon which the application of the new rule depends. They involve disputed facts and arguable questions of law. The reception of evidence on these various issues cannot be done in this Court but before the trial court. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the case at bar is remanded to the RTC - Quezon City, Branch 81 so that the State prosecutors and the respondent Lacson can adduce evidence and be heard on whether the requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 have been complied with on the basis of the evidence of which the trial court should make a ruling on whether the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 should be dismissed or not. Pending the ruling, the trial court is restrained from issuing any warrant of arrest against the respondent Lacson. Melo and Carpio, JJ., take no part. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent. [G.R. No. 149453. April 1, 2003] CALLEJO, SR., J.: Before the Court is the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 28, 2002, remanding this case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 filed against the respondent and his co-accused with the said court. In the aforesaid criminal cases, the respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male persons identified as Manuel Montero, a former Corporal of the Philippine Army, Rolando Siplon, Sherwin Abalora, who was 16 years old, Ray Abalora, who was 19 years old, Joel [3] Amora, Jevy Redillas, Meleubren Sorronda, who was 14 years old, Pacifico Montero, Jr., of the 44th Infantry
[1] [2]

Batallion of the Philippine Army, Welbor Elcamel, SPO1 Carlito Alap-ap of the Zamboanga PNP, and Alex Neri, former Corporal of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army, bandied as members of the Kuratong [4] Baleleng Gang. The respondent opposed petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were with the express consent of the respondent as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of witnesses. The Court also held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its application are attendant. The trial court was thus directed to resolve the following: ... (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party; (3) whether the 2-year period to revive it has already lapsed; (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period; (5) whether notices to the offended parties were given before the cases of respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir; (6) whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3) other victims; (7) whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar. The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-year bar had to be first determined whether it shall be from the date of the order of then Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases, or from the dates of receipt thereof by the various offended parties, or from the date of effectivity of the new rule. According to the Court, if the cases were revived only after the two-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with the said time-bar. It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in court. However, the State is not precluded from presenting compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the two-year bar. In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively. The Court shall resolve the issues seriatim. I. SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-99-81679 TO Q-99-81689. The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 because the essential requirements for its application were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of March 29, 1999. Disagreeing with the ruling of the Court, the petitioners maintain that the respondent did not give his express consent to the dismissal by Judge Agnir, Jr., of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The respondent allegedly admitted in his pleadings filed with the Court of Appeals and during the hearing thereat that he did not file any motion to dismiss said cases, or even agree to a provisional dismissal thereof. Moreover, the heirs of the victims were allegedly not given prior notices of the dismissal of the said cases by Judge Agnir, Jr. According to the petitioners, the respondents express consent to the provisional dismissal of the cases and the notice to all the heirs of the victims of the respondents motion and the hearing thereon are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The petitioners further submit that it is not necessary that the case be remanded to the RTC to determine whether private complainants were notified of the March 22, 1999 hearing on the respondents motion for judicial determination of the existence of probable cause. The records allegedly indicate clearly that only the handling city prosecutor was furnished a copy of the notice of hearing on said motion. There is allegedly no evidence that private prosecutor Atty. Godwin Valdez was properly retained and authorized by all the private complainants to represent them at said hearing. It is their contention that Atty. Valdez merely identified the purported affidavits of desistance and that he did not confirm the truth of the allegations therein.

The respondent, on the other hand, insists that, as found by the Court in its Resolution and Judge Agnir, Jr. in his resolution, the respondent himself moved for the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases. He cites the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. stating that the respondent and the other accused filed separate but identical motions for the dismissal of the criminal cases should the trial court find no probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against them. The respondent further asserts that the heirs of the victims, through the public and private prosecutors, were duly notified of said motion and the hearing thereof. He contends that it was sufficient that the public prosecutor was present during the March 22, 1999 hearing on the motion for judicial determination of the existence of probable cause because criminal actions are always prosecuted in the name of the People, and the private complainants merely prosecute the civil aspect thereof. The Court has reviewed the records and has found the contention of the petitioners meritorious. Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely: 1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; 2. 3. 4. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.

The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal [5] case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein. Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the [6] public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal. Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, [7] unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing [8] amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or silence

of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to object to a provisional [10] dismissal does not amount to express consent. A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional [11] dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose [12] the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of [13] limitations. The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no [14] need of a new preliminary investigation. However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary [15] investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence. After all, the fiscal is not called by the Rules of Court to wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute but essentially to do justice to every man and to assist the court in dispensing [16] that justice. In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-9981689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the decision [17] of this Court in Allado v. Diokno, among other cases, there was a need for the trial court to conduct a personal determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent and to have the prosecutions witnesses summoned before the court for its examination. The respondent contended therein that until after the trial court shall have personally determined the presence of probable cause, no warrant of arrest should be issued against the respondent and if one had already been issued, the warrant should be recalled by the trial court. He then prayed therein that: 1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted by this Honorable Court, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to present the private complainants and their witnesses at a hearing scheduled therefor; and 2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until the resolution of this incident. Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for.
[18]

[9]

The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases. In fact, in his reply filed with the Court of Appeals, respondent emphasized that: ... An examination of the Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and for Examination of Prosecution Witnesses filed by the petitioner and his other co-accused in the said criminal cases would show that the petitioner did not pray for the dismissal of the case. On the contrary, the reliefs prayed for therein by the petitioner

are: (1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution; and (2) that warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or if issued, recalled in the meantime until the resolution of the motion. It cannot be said, therefore, that the dismissal of the case was made with the consent of the petitioner. A [19] copy of the aforesaid motion is hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex A. During the hearing in the Court of Appeals on July 31, 2001, the respondent, through counsel, categorically, unequivocally, and definitely declared that he did not file any motion to dismiss the criminal cases nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof, thus: JUSTICE SALONGA: And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was provisional in nature? ATTY. FORTUN: It was in (sic) that the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted at the onset was simply a judicial determination of probable cause for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge Agnir, upon the presentation by the parties of their witnesses, particularly those who had withdrawn their affidavits, made one further conclusion that not only was this case lacking in probable cause for purposes of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it did not justify proceeding to trial. JUSTICE SALONGA: And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed except when it is with the express conformity of the accused. ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor. JUSTICE SALONGA: And with notice to the offended party. ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor. JUSTICE SALONGA: Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused? ATTY. FORTUN: There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any order, or any statement, which would normally be required by the Court on pre-trial or on other matters, including other provisional dismissal. My very limited practice in criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught me that a judge must be very careful on this matter of provisional dismissal. In fact they ask the accused to come forward, and the judge himself or herself explains the implications of a provisional dismissal. Pumapayag ka ba dito. Puwede bang pumirma ka? JUSTICE ROSARIO: You were present during the proceedings? ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor. JUSTICE ROSARIO:

You represented the petitioner in this case? ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort which the good Judge Agnir, who is most knowledgeable in criminal law, had done in respect of provisional dismissal or the matter of Mr. Lacson agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the case. JUSTICE GUERRERO: Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion for a judicial determination of probable cause? ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor. JUSTICE GUERRERO: Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there is no probable cause what should the Court do? ATTY. FORTUN: That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only prayer that we asked. In fact, I have a copy of that particular motion, and if I may read my prayer before the Court, it said: Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to present the private complainants and their witnesses at the scheduled hearing for that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until resolution of this incident. JUSTICE GUERRERO: There is no general prayer for any further relief? ATTY. FORTUN: There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for. JUSTICE GUERRERO: Dont you surmise Judge Agnir, now a member of this Court, precisely addressed your prayer for just and equitable relief to dismiss the case because what would be the net effect of a situation where there is no warrant of arrest being issued without dismissing the case? ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice, but what is plain is we did not agree to the provisional dismissal, neither were we asked to sign any assent to the provisional dismissal. JUSTICE GUERRERO: If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal did you not file any motion for reconsideration of the order of Judge Agnir that the case should be dismissed? ATTY. FORTUN: I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that my client had already been arraigned, and the arraignment was valid as far as I was concerned. So, the dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir operated to benefit me, and therefore I did not take any further step

in addition to rocking the boat or clarifying the matter further because it probably could prejudice the interest of my client. JUSTICE GUERRERO: Continue.
[20]

In his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of Appeals, the respondent declared in no uncertain terms that: Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the cases. The records were remanded to the QC RTC: Upon raffle, the case was assigned to Branch 81. Petitioner and the others promptly filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause (Annex B). He asked that warrants for his arrest not be issued. He did not move for the dismissal of the Informations, [21] contrary to respondent OSGs claim. The respondents admissions made in the course of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive on him. The respondent is barred from repudiating his admissions absent evidence of palpable [22] mistake in making such admissions. To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 would be to add to or make exceptions from the new rule which are not expressly or impliedly included therein. This the Court cannot and [23] should not do. The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before said hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended party or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The proof of such service must be shown during the hearing on the motion, otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will become illusory. Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between the prosecution and the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case thereby depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to make witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with the consequent release of the accused from detention would enable him to threaten and kill the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or flee from Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction or loss of the prosecutions physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended party to recover on the civil liability of the accused by his concealment or furtive disposition of his property or the consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment against his property. In the case at bar, even if the respondents motion for a determination of probable cause and examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce as his motion for a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-9981679 to Q-99-81689, however, the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior to the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. It must be stressed that the respondent filed his motion only on March 17, 1999 and set it for hearing on March 22, 1999 or barely five days from the filing thereof. Although the public prosecutor was served with a copy of the motion, the records do not show that notices thereof were separately given to the heirs of the victims or that subpoenae were issued to and received by them, including those who executed their affidavits of desistance who were residents of Dipolog City or Pian, Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon, [24] Leyte. There is as well no proof in the records that the public prosecutor notified the heirs of the victims of said motion or of the hearing thereof on March 22, 1999. Although Atty. Valdez entered his appearance as private [25] prosecutor, he did so only for some but not all the close kins of the victims, namely, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda Montero, Margarita Redillas, Rufino Siplon, Carmelita Elcamel, Myrna Abalora, and Leonora Amora who (except

for Rufino Siplon) executed their respective affidavits of desistance. There was no appearance for the heirs of Alex Neri, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Meleubren Sorronda. There is no proof on record that all the heirs of the victims were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said cases. In fine, there never was any attempt on the part of the trial court, the public prosecutor and/or the private prosecutor to notify all the heirs of the victims of the respondents motion and the hearing thereon and of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing said cases. The said heirs were thus deprived of their right to be heard on the respondents motion and to protect their interests either in the trial court or in the appellate court. Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-9981679 to Q-99-81689 or file new Informations for multiple murder against the respondent. II. THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY. The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly consented to a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 and all the heirs of the victims were notified of the respondents motion before the hearing thereon and were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the States substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder. They posit that under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the State had twenty years within which to file the criminal complaints against the accused. However, under the new rule, the State only had two years from notice of the public prosecutor of the order of dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-9981679 to Q-99-81689 within which to revive the said cases. When the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000, the State only had one year and three months within which to revive the cases or refile the Informations. The period for the State to charge respondent for multiple murder under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code was considerably and arbitrarily reduced. They submit that in case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code and the new rule, the former should prevail. They also insist that the State had consistently relied on the prescriptive periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. It was not accorded a fair warning that it would forever be [28] barred beyond the two-year period by a retroactive application of the new rule. Petitioners thus pray to the Court to set aside its Resolution of May 28, 2002. For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State that may be impaired by its application to the criminal cases in question since [t]he States witnesses were ready, willing and able to provide their testimony but the prosecution failed to act on these cases until it became politically [29] expedient in April 2001 for them to do so. According to the respondent, penal laws, either procedural or [30] substantive, may be retroactively applied so long as they favor the accused. He asserts that the two-year period commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and lapsed two years thereafter was more than reasonable opportunity for [31] the State to fairly indict him. In any event, the State is given the right under the Courts assailed Resolution to justify the filing of the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the time-bar under the new rule. The respondent insists that Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not broaden the substantive right of double jeopardy to the prejudice of the State because the prohibition against the revival of the cases within the one-year or two-year periods provided therein is a legal concept distinct from the prohibition against the revival of a provisionally dismissed case within the periods stated in Section 8 of Rule 117. Moreover, he claims that the effects of a provisional dismissal under said rule do not modify or negate the operation of the prescriptive period under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. Prescription under the Revised Penal Code simply becomes irrelevant upon the application of Section 8, Rule 117 because a complaint or information has already been filed against the accused, which filing tolls the running of the prescriptive period [32] under Article 90.

[26]

[27]

The Court agrees with the respondent that the new rule is not a statute of limitations. Statutes of limitations are construed as acts of grace, and a surrender by the sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its discretion. Such statutes are considered as equivalent to acts of amnesty founded on the liberal theory that prosecutions should not be allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the government to explode only after witnesses and proofs necessary for the protection of the accused have by sheer lapse of time passed beyond [33] availability. The periods fixed under such statutes are jurisdictional and are essential elements of the offenses [34] covered. On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the [35] accused. The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a [36] substantive law. It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its right to revive the case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal becomes ipso facto permanent. He can no longer be charged anew for the same crime or another crime necessarily included [37] [38] therein. He is spared from the anguish and anxiety as well as the expenses in any new indictments. The State may revive a criminal case beyond the one-year or two-year periods provided that there is a justifiable necessity [39] for the delay. By the same token, if a criminal case is dismissed on motion of the accused because the trial is not concluded within the period therefor, the prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal Code are not thereby [40] diminished. But whether or not the prosecution of the accused is barred by the statute of limitations or by the lapse of the time-line under the new rule, the effect is basically the same. As the State Supreme Court of Illinois held: This, in effect, enacts that when the specified period shall have arrived, the right of the state to prosecute shall be gone, and the liability of the offender to be punishedto be deprived of his libertyshall cease. Its terms not only strike down the right of action which the state had acquired by the offense, but also remove the flaw which the crime had created in the offenders title to liberty. In this respect, its language goes deeper than statutes barring civil remedies usually do. They expressly take away only the remedy by suit, and that inferentially is held to abate the right which such remedy would enforce, and perfect the title which such remedy would invade; but this statute is aimed directly at the very right which the state has against the offenderthe right to punish, as the [41] only liability which the offender has incurred, and declares that this right and this liability are at an end. The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. As applied to criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which one who has committed a crime is to be [42] punished. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that: Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure. It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the Court. In a per [43] curiam decision in Cipriano v. City of Houma, the United States Supreme Court ruled that where a decision of

the court would produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis for avoiding [44] the injustice of hardship by a holding of nonretroactivity. A construction of which a statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, and injurious [45] consequences. This Court should not adopt an interpretation of a statute which produces absurd, [46] unreasonable, unjust, or oppressive results if such interpretation could be avoided. Time and again, this Court has decreed that statutes are to be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. In construing a statute, the reason for the enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be [47] construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and implement the constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be applied retroactively or prospectively depending upon several factors, such as the history of the new rule, its purpose and effect, and whether the retrospective application will further its operation, the particular conduct sought to be remedied and the effect thereon in the [48] [49] administration of justice and of criminal laws in particular. In a per curiam decision in Stefano v. Woods, the United States Supreme Court catalogued the factors in determining whether a new rule or doctrine enunciated by the High Court should be given retrospective or prospective effect: (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards. In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years under the new rule should not be applied retroactively against the State. In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the [50] rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar. The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State [51] and the accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings. It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in his [52] favor, especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the [53] hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to expire. The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more [54] difficult. The accused may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.

On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He [55] continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his [56] capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system. The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for thebenefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only. The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice. The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the computation of the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or that it was negligent for not reviving them within the two-year period under the new [57] rule. As the United States Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People: We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law and, therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights . The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the State and adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of criminal laws in particular. To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to the revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused before the effective date of the new rule is to assume that the State is obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new rule before it took effect. This would be a rank denial of justice. The State must be given a period of one year or two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive the criminal case without requiring the State to make a valid justification for not reviving the case before the effective date of the new rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is entitled to justice and fairness, so is the State. As the United States Supreme Court said, per Mr. Justice Benjamin Cardozo, [58] in Snyder v. State of Massachussetts, the concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a [59] filament. We are to keep the balance true. In Dimatulac v. Villon, this Court emphasized that the judges action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused nor the right of the State and offended party to due process of law. This Court further said: Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice,

for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other. In this case, the eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were filed with the Regional Trial Court on June 6, 2001 well within the two-year period. In sum, this Court finds the motion for reconsideration of petitioners meritorious. IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Resolution of this Court, dated May 28, 2002, is SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 24, 2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034 is REVERSED. The Petition of the Respondent with the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 01-100933 is DISMISSED for being moot and academic. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81, is DIRECTED to forthwith proceed with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with deliberate dispatch. No pronouncements as to costs. SO ORDERED. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Plaintiff, - versus JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, Former President of the Republic of the Philippines, JOSE "JINGGOY" ESTRADA, CHARLIE "ATONG" TIU HAY SY ANG, EDWARD S. SERAPIO, YOLANDA T. RICAFORTE, ALMA ALFARO, JOHN DOE also known as ELEUTERIO RAMOS TAN or MR. UY, JANE DOE also known as DELIA RAJAS, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, Accused. Criminal Case No. 26558 For: PLUNDER

PRESENT: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, PJ, Chairperson VILLARUZ, JR., and PERALTA, JJ.

PROMULGATED: September 12, 2007 x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x DECISION Republic Act (RA) No. 7080 as amended was approved on July 12, 1991, creating and introducing into our criminal legal system the crime of plunder. This law penalizes public officers who would amass immense wealth through a series or combination of overt or criminal acts described in the statute in violation of the public trust. RA No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law was a consolidation of Senate Bill no. 733 and House Bill No. 22752. The Explanatory Note of Senate Bill No. 733, quoted in the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538, 555), explains the reason behind the law as follows: Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the possible recurrence of the depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting influence of power. The majority opinion in the above-cited case, penned by Honorable Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, further explained the rationale behind the Anti-Plunder Law in this manner: Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to milk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office. These are times that try mens souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioners ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment. [Emphasis Supplied] The present case is the first of its kind to be filed charging the highest official of the land, a former President, among others, of the offense of plunder. Needless to state, the resolution of this case shall set significant historical and legal precedents. Throughout the six years over which the court proceedings in this case unfolded, this Court confronted numerous novel and complicated legal issues (including the constitutionality of the plunder law, propriety of house arrest, among others), heard lengthy testimonies from several dozens of witnesses from both sides and perused voluminous documentary evidence and pleadings from the parties. Considering the personalities involved and the nature of the crime charged, the present case aroused particularly intense interest from the public. Speculations on the probable outcome of the case received unparalleled attention from the media and other sectors of society.

Indeed, the factual and legal complexities of the case are further compounded by attempts to sensationalize the proceedings for various ends. However, this Court is ever mindful of its imperative duty to act as an impartial arbiter: (a) to serve the interest of the State and the public in punishing those who would so severely abuse their public office and those private individuals would aid them or conspire with them and (b) to protect the right of the accused to be only convicted upon guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the decision of this Court follows, upon no other consideration other than the law and a review of the evidence on record. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE PROCEEDINGS __________________________ This case for plunder commenced with the filing on April 4, 2001 of the Information which is quoted hereunder: INFORMATION The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former Joseph Ejercito Estrada, together with Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows: That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, by himself and in conspiracy with his co-accused, business associates and persons heretofore named, by taking advantage of his official position, authority, connection or influence as President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth, and unjustly enrich himself in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, through a combination and series of overt and criminal acts, described as follows: 1. by receiving, collecting, directly or indirectly, on many instances, so-called jueteng money from gambling operators in connivance with co-accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte and Edward Serapio, as witnessed by Gov. Luis Chavit Singson, among other witnesses, in the aggregate amount of FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), more or less, in consideration of their protection from arrest or interference by law enforcers in their illegal jueteng activities; and by misappropriating, converting and miusing for his gain and benefit public fund in the amount of ONE HUNDRRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, in conspiracy with co-accused Charlie Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, as witnessed by Gov. Luis Chavit Singson, among other witnesses; and by directing, ordering and compelling the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase and buy a combined total of 681,733,000 shares of stock of the Belle Corporatiion in the aggregate gross value of One Billion Eight Hundred Forty-Seven Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Fifty Seven Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P1,847,578,057.50), for the purpose of collecting for his personal gain and benefit, as in fact he did collect and receive the sum of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P 189,700,000.00), as commission from said stock purchase; and by unjustly enriching himself in the amount of THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN

2.

3.

4.

CENTAVOS (P 3,233,104,173.17) comprising his unexplained wealth acquired, accumulated and amassed by him under his account name Jose Velarde with Equitable PCI Bank; to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. CONTRARY TO LAW. Various motions were filed by accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada (FPres. Estrada), Jose Jinggoy Estrada (Jinggoy Estrada), and Edward S. Serapio (Serapio). Accused Serapio filed his Urgent Omnibus Motion (a) to Hold in abeyance the issuance of warrant of arrest and further Proceedings; (b) to conduct a determination of probable cause; (c) for leave to file accuseds motion for reconsideration and /or reinvestigation; and (d) to direct the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the charges against accused Serapio dated April 6, 2001. While accused FPres. Estrada filed three (3) motions; (1) Urgent Motion to Defer Proceedings, dated April 9, 2001, (2) Position Paper Re: Probable Cause (ex abundante ad cautelam) dated April 9, 2001 which was joined by accused Jinggoy Estrada, and (3) Motion to (a) remand the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation consistent with the Honorable Supreme Courts Resolution in G.R. No. 147512-19 (Joseph E. Estrada v. Hon. Aniano Desierto, et al.); and (b) hold in abeyance judicial action in the case particularly the issuance of a warrant of arrest and steps leading thereto until after the conduct of a proper preliminary investigation, dated April 11, 2001. In a Resolution promulgated on April 16, 2001, the Court directed the prosecution to submit to the Court not later than April 18, 2001 the required affidavits, counter-affidavits, and supporting evidence as well as other supporting documents accompanying the Information, which were needed to determine the existence of probable cause for the issuance or non-issuance of a warrant of arrest. As directed, the prosecution filed on April 18, 2001 its Manifestation and Compliance. On April 19, 2001, the prosecution filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to admit Amended Information, which is quoted hereunder: AMENDED INFORMATION The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. ASIONG SALONGA AND a.k.a. JOSE VELARDE, together with Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows: That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:

1.

by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ATONG ANG, JOSE Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING; by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000.00] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR inCONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES; by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE, 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE; by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND AND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.

2.

3.

4.

CONTRARY TO LAW. On April 20, 2001, the Court in its Minute Resolution granted and admitted the prosecutions Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Information dated April 18, 2001. On April 25, 2001, the Court promulgated its Resolution which stated: Xxx xxx xxx the Court finds and so hold that probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify issuance of warrants for the arrest of accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas. No bail is fixed for the provisional liberty of the accused for the reason that the penalty imposable for the offense of plunder under RA No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of RA No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua to death. Director General Leandro R. Mendoza, Chief of the Philippine National Police, shall implement the warrant of arrest upon service to him by Mr. Edgardo A. Urieta, Chief of the

Sheriff and Security Services Division of the Sandiganbayan. Once arrested, all the accused shall undergo the required processes and be detained at the PNP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City subject to, and until, further orders from this Court. th On the 25 day of April 2001, on the basis of the said resolution, the Court issued an Order of Arrest and Hold Departure Order for all the named accused in the present information. The Philippine National Police (PNP) submittd its Report of Compliance dated April 25, 2001 which stated: 1. That in compliance with the Order of Arrest issued by the Honorable Court in the above captioned criminal case, accused Joseph E. Estrada and Jose Jinggoy Estrada, both residence of no. 1 Polk Street, North Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila voluntarily surrendered to the undersigned on 25 April 2001 at about 3:00 oclock PM at said residence in the presence of their counsels.

2. That right after their surrender, they were brought inside Camp Crame, Quezon City for the required processes and pending further orders from this Honorable Court they shall be kept in Camp Crame; A Compliance/Return of Warrant of Arrest was also filed on April 26, 2001 by P/Chief Superintendent Nestor B. Gualberto. As to accused Serapio, the PNPs Report of Compliance reads in part: 2. That one of the accused named therein, Atty. Edward S. Serapio, surrendered to the Chief, Philippine National Police, through the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City on April 25, 2001 at about 9:45 PM where the required processes were administered to him and pending further orders from this Honorable Court he shall be kept in Camp Crame; The Court, in its Minute Resolution dated April 26, 2001, set the arraignment of the detained accused on May 3, 2001 which was cancelled due to the different motions filed by the accused. Accused Jinggoy Estrada filed his Motion to Quash or Suspend dated April 24, 2001 and a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion dated April 30, 2001. Among other motions, accused FPres. Estrada filed his Motion to Quash dated June 7, 2001 and accused Serapio filed his Motion to Quash (Re: Amended Information dated April 18, 2001) dated June 26, 2001. In its Resolution dated July 9, 2001, the Court denied all the aforesaid motions to quash and accused Jinggoy Estradas Very Urgent Omnibus Motion dated April 30, 2001. The Courts Resolution dated July 9, 2001 was sustained by the Honorable Supreme Court in the Decisions rendered in Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001) and Jose Jinggoy Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002). On July 10, 2001, the Court denied the motion to defer filed by accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada and proceeded with the arraignment of accused FPres. Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada, and Serapio under the Amended Information. The accused having refused to enter a plea, the Court entered a plea of not guilty for all the three (3) accused. Petitions for Bail / House Arrest With the detention of accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada in Camp Crame on April 25, 2001, both accused filed on the same day an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Place on House Arrest. The Court on June 9, 2001, issued a Resolution denying accused FPres. Estradas Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Place on House Arrest and issued an Order for the confinement of accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada at Fort Sto. Domingo, Sta. Rosa, Laguna, subject to the need for their continued confinement at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center (VMMC) where they were then confined. In view of the said resolution, accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada, on June 13, 2001, filed an Omnibus Motion (Re: Resolution promulgated on June 9, 2001) pressing in the alternative a Motion for Detention in Tanay, Rizal. On March 17, 2004, FPres. Estrada filed a Motion to Modify Custodial Arrangement dated March 17, 2004 and, on March 30, 2004, the counsel de officio of accused FPres. Estrada filed a Manifestation dated March 29, 2004 informing the Court, among others, that the said accused was willing to have his property in Tanay, Rizal placed under the control and supervision of the Court and the Philippine National Police for the duration of his detention. On July 12, 2004, the Court issued a joint resolution granting FPres. Estradas motion to modify Custodial Arrangement dated March 29, 2004 subject to the conditions imposed by the Court. Accused FPres. Estrada filed

a Compliance and Acceptance of Conditions on July 13, 2004. Since then, accused FPres. Estrada has been detained in his property at Tanay, Rizal. When the Court ordered the arrest and detention of the accused in these cases, accused Serapio filed his petition for bail on April 27, 2001. Accused Jinggoy Estradas petition for bail was included in his Very Urgent Omnibus Motion dated April 30, 2001. Accused Serapios Petition for Bail was deferred indefinitely as prayed for by the said accused while, on August 14, 2001, accused Jinggoy Estrada filed an Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons dated August 16, 2001 which the prosecution opposed. On December 20, 2001, the Court issued its Resolution denying accused Jinggoy Estradas Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons. Considering the denial of the said motion for bail for medical reasons, accused Jinggoy Estrada, on April 17, 2002, filed an Omnibus Application for Bail dated April 16, 2002. After hearing, the Court issued a Resolution on March 6, 2003 which granted accused Jinggoy Estradas Omnibus Application for Bail. The prosecutions Motion for Reconsideration dated March 13, 2003 was denied in this Courts Resolution dated April 30, 2003. The aforesaid Resolutions granting bail to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada were upheld by the Honorable Supreme Court in a Decision promulgated in G.R. No. 158754, People vs. Sandiganbayan (Special Division) and Jose Jinggoy Estrada (August 10, 2007). As to accused Serapio, the Courts Resolution dated September 12, 2003 also granted accused-movant Serapios Urgent Petition for Bail dated April 27, 2001. The Court fixed the amount of bail of accused Serapio and Jinggoy Estrada at Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each which was to paid in cash. While the case was already in the trial stage, on January 4, 2002 the counsels for the accused Estradas wrote a letter to the Acting Presiding Justice requesting for a re-raffle of the cases against the accused, citing as grounds the continuing uncertain composition of the justices handling the cases against the accused Former President, et al., at that time. The prosecution filed its Opposition to Request for Re-Raffle On January 9, 2002 and its Comment/Suggestion on January 10, 2002 that a Special Third Division be constituted to be composed of the present Presiding Justice, the only remaining member of the Third Division to which the case was raffled, and two other Sandiganbayan Justices who are not retirables within the next three (3) years. Justice Anacleto Badoy, the Chairman of the Third Division, was due to retire on October 2002, while Justice Ilarde, the other member, retired on November 27, 2001. On January 11, 2002, the Sandiganbayan En Banc issued its Resolution 01-2002 recommending to the Supreme Court that the cases against accused FPres. Estrada, et al., be referred to a Special Division. The Supreme Court on January 21, 2002 promulgated its Resolution Creating the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan which shall hear, try and decide with dispatch the Plunder Case and all related cases filed or may hereafter be filed against accused FPres. Estrada, and those accused with him, until they are resolved, decided and terminated. In the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court retained, as Junior Member, the present Presiding Justice who was then the only remaining member of the Third Division to which the Plunder Case was raffled, and designated the then Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, as Chairperson, and Associate Justice Edilberto G. Sandoval as Senior Member. This was not the first time that a Special Division of the Sandiganbayan was constituted to try a case. A Special Division was previously constituted to try and decide the Aquino-Galman cases in that composition of the said Division was also maintained until the case was decided notwithstanding the subsequent changes in the composition of the Division due to promotions and/or retirement of its members. During the same year, the counsel de parte of accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada all withdrew their appearances. The Court on March 1, 2002, in order to protect the rights and interest of the accused, appointed the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) and those who have been recommended by the Board of Governor of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to represent accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada as counsel de oficio, namely, Former Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan Manuel Pamaran, Atty. Prospero Crescini, Atty. Irene Jurado and Atty. Manuel Malaya. The PAO lawyers mentioned their duration as counsel de oficio, hence, (Ret.) Presiding Justice Pamaran and the private practitioners represented accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada up to the time the prosecution rested its case and submitted to the Court its Formal Offer of Evidence. However, before the presentation of the evidence for the defense, accused FPres. Estrada, in a Letter dated September 1, 2004, informed the Court that he have decided to re-engage the services of the members of his original de parte panel of lawyers. Upon conclusion of the presentation of prosecution evidence and after the Court have ruled on the offer of evidence of the prosecution, accused FPres. Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and Serapio filed their respective motion

for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence. In a Joint Resolution dated March 10, 2004, the Court granted accused FPres. Estradas Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence in Criminal Case Nos. 26905 and 26565 while it denied the same motion of all the accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 for lack of merit. Subsequently, the Demurrer to Evidence of accused FPres. Estrada was filed. In its Joint Resolution dated July 12, 2004, the Court resolved to deny FPres. Estradas Demurrer to Evidence in Criminal Case No. 26905 but granted the Demurrer to Evidence of FPres. Estrada in Criminal Case No. 26565. After the presentation of the evidence for accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada, accused Serapio manifested that he opted not to present his own evidence but adopted the evidence presented by FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada. The said accused then formally offered their evidence. The Court issued its resolution on the formal offer of evidence for accused FPres. Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and Serapio. On the other hand, the prosecution manifested that it was not presenting any rebuttal evidence but formally offered additional evidence and tendered excluded evidence in its Supplemental Formal Offer of Exhibits [Re: Exhibits Identified, Presented, and Marked during the Cross Examination of Defense Witnesses] with Tender of Excluded Evidence dated March 29, 2007. The Court issued its Minute Resolution dated April 19, 2007 on the said additional offer of evidence of the prosecution. In an Order dated May 9, 2007, the Court gave the parties a period of time to file their respective memoranda and scheduled the Oral Summation requested by accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada on June 15, 2007. After the Oral Summation, the case was submitted for decision. Incidentally, on November 10, 2006, the National Bureau of Investigation filed its Return of Alias Order of Arrest, informing the Court that one of the accused in this case, Atong Ang was extradited from the United States of America and was already under the custody of the said agency. At his arraignment, accused Atong Ang refused to enter a plea and the Court entered a plea of not guilty for the said accused. On January 24, 2007, when the case was scheduled for Pre-Trial only for accused Atong Ang, the prosecution and the said accused, assisted by his counsel, manifested in open court that they had executed a Plea Bargaining Agreement. The Courts Resolution dated March 14, 2007 approved the Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into by the parties. On March 19, 2007, during accused Atong Angs re-arraignment, the said accused pleaded guilty to a lesser offense of Corruption of Public Officials under Article 212 in relation to Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code. On the same day, the Court rendered its decision against accused Atong Ang sentencing said accused to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional minimum, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as maximum, and to pay the amount of P25,000,000.00 to the Government as his civil liability. Accused Atong Ang immediately filed a Petition for Probation (with Motion to Deduct Period of Preventive Imprisonment from the Term of Imprisonment and to Post Bail Pending Resolution thereof) which the Court granted in a Resolution dated May 25, 2007. Accused Atong Ang is now under probation. STATEMENT OF THE STIPULATIONS OF THE PARTIES AT PRE-TRIAL ________________________________ After the arraignment of the accused, the pre-trial was conducted which led to the issuance of the Amended PreTrial Order dated June 14, 2001, quoted in part hereunder: When this case was called for pre-trial on September 3, 2001, accused JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, JOSE Jinggoy P. ESTRADA appeared, assisted by counsels, Atty. Jose B. Flaminiano, Atty. Cleofe Villar-Verzola, Atty. Rene A. V. Saguisag and Atty. Raymond Parsifal A. Fortun. Accused Edward S. Serapio likewise appeared, assisted by his counsels, Atty. Sabino Acut, Jr. and Atty. Martin Israel L. Pison. The People was represented by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr., Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos, Ombudsman Prosecutor III Antonio T. Manzano and Humphrey T. Monteroso. The accused Estradas and Edward S. Serapio submitted their WAIVER OF APPEARANCE dated September 3, 2001 stating as follows: Accused Joseph Estrada, Jose Jinggoy Estrada and Edward S. Serapio hereby waive their appearance during the pre-trial and the trial of this case subject to the conditions that:

1.

whenever his/her/their name/s/are mentioned at any stage of the proceedings of this/ these case/s whether in testimonial or documentary evidence, such name/s refer/s to his/her/them; and whenever his/her/their appearance shall be require by the Court at any time, they will appear, otherwise warrant/s shall issue for their arrest. The aforementioned three (3) accused verbally manifested in open Court that they fully understand and agree with their conditions contained in their Waiver of Appearance. Xxx xxx xxx The prosecution, the accused Estradas and accused Serapio agreed to stipulate on the following facts, as proposed by the prosecution to wit:

2.

1.

That accused Joseph Estrada (Estrada for short) took his oath of office as President of the Republic of the th Philippines on 30 June 1998, [cf. Proposal No. 1(For all specifications) of accused Estradas Proposed Stipulation of Facts of the defense dated 01 August 2001]; That accused Joseph Estrada is married to Dra. (now Senator) Luisa P. Ejercito; [cf. Proposal No. 2 (For all Specifications) of accused Estradas Proposed Stipulation of Facts of the defense dated 01 August 2001]; That accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Jr. (Jinggoy for short) is the son of accused Joseph Estrada; [cf. Proposal No. 3 (For all Specifications) of accused Estradas Proposed Stipulation of Facts of the defense dated 01 August 2001; Edward S. Serapio is a lawyer and a former professor of law at the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law; [cf. Proposal No. 1 of accused Atty. Edward Serapios Request for Stipulation of Facts and Admission of Documents dated 01 August 2001; On April 29 1999, Atty. Serapio was appointed by President Joseph Estrada as Presidential Assistant for Political Affairs with the rank of Undersecretary. [cf. Proposal No. 2 of accused Atty. Edward Serapios Request for Stipulation of Facts and Admission of Documents dated 01 August 2001; He accepted such appointment. [cf. Proposal No. 2. 1 of specification of accused Atty. Edward Serapios Request for Stipulation of Facts and Admission of documents dated 01 August 2001. The other stipulations of facts proposed by the accused Estradas and admitted by the prosecution were:

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

1.

2.

That From 1998-2001, Mr. Luis Chavit Singson was elected Governor of the province of Ilocos Sur; [cf. Proposal No. 6 (For all Specifications) of accused Estradas Proposed Stipulation of Facts of the defense dated 01 August 2001]; That the amount of P40 Million was withdrawn by a person representing herself to be accused Alma Alfaro th from Land Bank of the Philippines-Shaw Branch on 28 August 1998; [cf. Proposal No. 5 of specification (b) of accused Joseph E. Estrada and Jose Jinggoy Estradas Stipulation of Facts and Admission of Documents dated 01 August 2001. The accused Estradas proposed and the prosecution admitted the following stipulation of facts:

1.

That accused Joseph Estrada personally knows Mr. Rodolfo Bong Pineda; [cf. Paragraph 13 of the Prosecutions Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001];

2.

That accused Joseph Estrada personally knows Atong Ang; [cf. Paragraph 17 of the Prosecutions Additional stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001]; That accused Joseph Estrada personally knows Mr. Lucio Co; [cf. Paragraph 23 of the Prosecutions Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001]; That accused Joseph Estrada personally knows Mr. Jaime Dichaves; [cf. Paragraph 24 of the Prosecutions Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001]; That accused President Estrada is a close and childhood friend of Carlos A. Arellano; [cf. Paragraph 1 Re: Belle case of the Prosecutions Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001]; That accused President Estrada appointed Carlos A. Arellano as Chairman of the Social Security System on July 1, 1998; [cf. Paragraph 2 re: Belle case of the Prosecutions Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001]; That Carlos A. Arellano was appointed by accused President Estrada as President and Chief Executive Officer of the Social Security System; [cf. Paragraph 3 re: Belle case of the Prosecutions Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001]; That accused President Estrada knew of the existence of Belle Corporation; [cf. Paragraph 7 re: Belle case of the Prosecutions Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001]; Proposed Stipulation of Facts of the prosecution admitted by accused Serapio:

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

1.

That Erap Muslim Youth Foundation (hereinafter the Foundation) has a huge fund of more than P211 Million.

The only issue that was raised by the parties for resolution is whether or not accused JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, JOSE Jinggoy P. ESTRADA and ATTY. EDWARD S. SERAPIO are guilty of the offense charged in the Amended Information. The accused Estradas raise also the issue of whether or not the allegations in the information would constitute the crime of plunder as defined by R.A. No. 7080. (COMMENT ON, AND MOTION TO CORRECT PRE-TRIAL ORDER DATED SEPTEMBER 13, 2001, filed by accused Estradas on September 21, 2001) The evidence submitted by the prosecution and the defense in support of, or in denial, of the speculations of the predicate acts adverted to in each of the paragraphs are discussed hereunder in seriatim: EVIDENCE PRESENTED: RE: SUB-PARAGRAPH A OF THE AMENDED INFORMATION ____________________________ (a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ATONG ANG, JOSE Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING; The alleged co-conspirators of accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada named in this paragraph (a) are: Charlie Atong Tiu Hay Sy Ang (Atong Ang), Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte

(Ricaforte) and Edward S. Serapio. The paragraph also refers to unidentified co-conspirators by the usual Jane Does and John Does. I. EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION The principal witness of the prosecution in this first specification of the predicate acts of plunder is Former Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit C. Singson. He testified extensively on the charge that FPres. Estrada accumulated ill-gotten wealth in the above-mentioned amount through the monthly remittance to him of seems of money collected from operations of illegal gambling, commonly known as jueteng, based in the different provinces of the country allegedly in consideration of the prosecution or unimpeded operation of said illegal gambling. The gist of the testimony of Singson relative to paragraph (a) of the Amended Information is set forth hereunder: GOVERNOR LUIS CHAVIT CRISOLOGO SINGSON (Gov. Singson) was 61 years old, married, a businessman, and a resident of Mabini Street, Poblacion, Vigan, Province of Ilocos Sur at the time he took the witness stand as prosecution witness. The examination of the witness was done by Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo under the control and supervision of the Ombudsman who was present. The counsel de oficio of accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada, (Ret.) Justice Manuel R. Pamaran, objected to the appearance of the Solicitor General, which the Court noted. [TSN dated July 17, 2002, pp. 166-167] The testimony of Gov. Singson was presented to corroborate the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Maria Carmencita Itchon, Emma B. Lim and the Equitable PCI Bank Branch Managers where Ricaforte opened accounts, and to prove that accused FPres. Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada, Atong Ang, Ricaforte, Serapio and the other accused, in conspiracy with one another, amassed and accumulated ill-gotten wealth for principal accused FPres. Estradas benefit while he was the th 13 President of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Four Billion Ninety Seven Million Eight Hundred Four Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Three Pesos and Seventeen Centavos (P4,097,804,173.17), part of which was derived from: (1) the collection of jueteng protection money from November 1998 to August 2000, in the amount of Five Hundred Forty Five Million Pesos (P545,000,000.00) more or less and the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) also from the said illegal gambling protection money; and (2) misappropriation, diversion and conversion for his personal gain as benefit public funds in the amount of One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) more or less, representing a portion of the Two Hundred Million pesos (P200,000,000.00) Tobacco Excise Share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under Republic Act No. 7171. Gov. Singson was also presented by the prosecution to prove that Jinggoy Estrada and Serapio conspired with and/or acted as co-principals by indispensable cooperation of FPres. Estrada in the running of the illegal numbers game of jueteng and in the receipt by FPres. Estrada of jueteng protection money; that accused Jinggoy Estrada regularly collected jueteng protection money every month from January of 1999 to August 15, 2000, as an indispensable part of the amassing and accumulating ill-gotten wealth by principal accused FPres. Estrada and as part of the series and/or combination of overt or criminal acts constituting the crime of plunder; that Serapio conspired with FPres. Estrada and the other accused in receiving the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) which came from jueteng operations and in hiding and/or laundering the same through the banking system and that Serapio was the personal lawyer of FPres. Estrada and that in furtherance of the conspiracy he set up various juridical entities to mask and/or hide various illegal proprietary and business interests of FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson would also identify certain documents, checks, pictures and other facts relevant to the foregoing, which tend to prove the combination and/or series of overt and criminal acts, constitutive of the crime of plunder (and to oppose the petition for bail of Jinggoy Estrada. Gov. Singsons testimony was also offered to prove the illegal use of alias). [TSN dated July 17, 2002, pp. 168-174] Gov. Singson testified that he was called by FPres. Estrada at his house in Polk Street, Greenhills, on August of 1998. Gov. Singson was then the Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur. Gov. Singson went to Polk Street in the evening. He was assisted by a security guard towards the kitchen where he found Atong Ang and FPres. Estrada talking how to expand the operations of jueteng, an illegal numbers game, in the provinces where there was yet no jueteng protection money. Shortly, Bong Pineda arrived. Gov. Singson heard FPres. Estrada told Bong Pineda that starting on that day not to bring money at his house because it was very obvious. Gov. Singson did not know Bong Pineda very much but he saw Bong Pineda in Congress when he was investigated regarding

jueteng. The jueteng money would protect jueteng operator from being arrested. FPres. Estrada then instructed Bong Pineda to give the money to Atong Ang or to Gov. Singson because the latter was a Governor so it would not be obvious if he brought money to FPres. Estrada. [TSN dated July 17, 2002, pp. 178-187] According to Gov. Singson, the day after the aforementioned meeting, Atong Ang started meeting with the jueteng operators in his office near the municipal hall of San Juan. [Ibid, p. 188] Atong Ang and the operators were bargaining how much protection money from each province will be given to FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, p. 193] After the final talk, they started collecting jueteng protection money, specifically from August of 1998. [Ibid, p. 203] Gov. Singson knew FPres. Estrada for almost thirty (30) years before August of 1998. FPres. Estrada was not yet a mayor but a movie actor as Gov. Singsons mother was a producer. [Ibid, p. 191] Gov. Singson first met Atong Ang at the cockpit and gambling places. He had known Atong Ang for a long time even when FPres. Estrada was still the Vice President. According to Gov. Singson, Bong Pineda was a close compadre of FPres. Estrada while his son, Jinggoy Estrada, was Bong Pinedas godson by marriage. [Ibid, p. 197] Gov. Singson claimed that he was present in not all but several meetings of Atong Ang with the jueteng collectors. He was present when there was an agreement on the three percent (3%) of total collections in every province, as fixed by Atong Ang. [TSN dated July 22, 2002, pp. 12-13] Jueteng money was delivered to FPres. th Estrada initially every end of the month, starting September of 1998 and later every 15 and at the end of the month. [Ibid, p.14] On October of 1998, Gov. Singson and Atong Ang brought the jueteng protection money of about Nine Million Pesos (P9,000,000.00) for the said month to FPres. Estrada at his house, in No. 1 Polk Street in Greenhills, but FPres. Estrada and Atong Ang had a nasty quarrel about the sugar allocation request of Atong Ang which was denied by FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson brought home the said P9,000,000.00 but, the following day, FPres. Estrada called him up asking him to pay F.P. Estradas obligations which went on until the said amount was consumed and Gov. Singson was instructed by FPres. Estrada to continue the collection of the jueteng money. [Ibid, pp. 26, 22-23] Gov. Singson continued the collection as instructed by FPres. Estrada, still with the help of Atong Ang, from November of 1998 until August of 2000. The amounts of money collected from jueteng during the said period were listed in the ledger per month and per province. The ledger also listed the expenses paid for using the jueteng protection money. [Ibid, pp. 24-27] Every fifteen (15) days, Gov. Singson himself delivered protection money to FPres. Estrada in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) or a total of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) every month. Emma B. Lim delivered once the jueteng money to FPres. Estrada in Malacaang. The protection money was delivered usually in cash but sometimes in check. Chavit Singon presented to this court two (2) sets of ledger. The first set 7 8 consisted of nine (9) pages covering the month of November of 1998 up to July of 1999 (Exh. W to Exh. E ). The September 1998 and October 1998 collections were not reflected in the said ledger since the ledger was done only after FPres. Estrada and Atong Ang quarreled in October 1998. The second set of ledger covered the months of August of 1999 to August of 2000 (Exh.A-4 to Exh. A-4-d). [TSN dated July 22, 2002, p. 27-31] 7 8 Gov. Singson prepared the pages of the first set of ledger (Exh. W to E ) with the help of Emma B. Lim and Ma. Carmencita Itchon and on the following year, Ricaforte joined them. [Ibid, pp. 35-36] The pages of the second set of ledgers starting August of 1999 to August of 2000 [Exhibit A-4 and submarkings] were prepared by Ricaforte under the supervision of Gov. Singson who also checked the said ledger. [Ibid, pp. 36-37] Ricaforte was introduced to Gov. Singson by FPres. Estrada before his birthday on April 19, 1999. She was designated by FPres. Estrada as auditor because FPres. Estrada was strict with money. Gov. Singson was thankful for Ricafortes designation because he did not want FPres. Estrada to distrust him. [Ibid, p. 40] Gov. Singson considered Ricaforte as the employee of FPres. Estrada with respect to the jueteng collections because not only was she introduced to Singson by FPres. Estrada, the latter also told Singson to give her Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80, 000.00) monthly salary. Ricaforte held office at LCS Building owned by Gov. Singson. [Ibid, pp. 42-43] Gov. Singson did not know Yolanda Ricaforte or her husband Orestes Ricaforte before April of 1999. Gov. Singson identified Ricaforte from a picture (Exh. A-6-b-1) where she was seated beside Menchu Itchon, the assistant of Gov. Singson. The picture was taken during the wedding of Raquel, the daughter of Gov. Singson where FPres. Estrada and his wife Senator Loi Ejercito stood as wedding sponsors. [Ibid, p. 45-48]

According to Gov. Singson, the jueteng collections were placed in a scratch paper as they came every fifteen (15) days, at the middle and the end of the month or five (5) days after the end of the month. When all the collections had arrived, the list was finalized and then transferred to the computer. The ledgers were prepared upon instructions of FPres. Estrada because the latter was strict with money. [Ibid, pp. 37-40, 41-42] Gov. Singson explained in detail the entries on the left hand portion of the ledger for November of 1998 up to July of 1999. In the province of Ilocos Sur, the total collection for fifteen (15) days was Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P750,000.00), in the province of La Union for 15 days, Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) total collection, while in Bulacan for 15 days, One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) total collection 7 (Exh. W ) of protection money for FPres. Estrada. The entries for the other provinces were similar. On the left side column were the names of the provinces, the middle column pertained to the number of days, i.e., whether for 15 or 30 days and the right column, the total amount of collections of jueteng protection money, in order that jueteng operators will not be arrested or apprehended. There was one (1) collector for three (3) provinces. [Ibid, pp. 53-54] In the second set of ledger (Exh. A-4 to A-4-d) Ricaforte gave a code name for every province below the title Theme. The number of days, either 15 or 30, under the title days and the total amount of protection money for FPres. Estrada below the title points were indicated in the ledger. [Ibid, pp. 55-56] Gov. Singson narrated that when FPres. Estrada was still the Vice President, they were already collecting jueteng money but not in all provinces. When FPres. Estrada assumed the presidency, he called Gov. Singson and Atong Ang to start jueteng collections in provinces without protection money. Atong Ang talked to certain persons in the said provinces so that the collection of protection money could start. Every province had a collector but sometimes there was one collector for three (3) provinces. The collections were submitted to Gov. Singson but sometimes they would get the money from the house of the collectors. The jueteng collections which FPres. Estrada asked Gov. Singson to operate for FPres. Estradas own benefit was at the national level, meaning nationwide. They did not interfere with jueteng operations at the lower level. Before there were Kangaroo type of jueteng operations or Guerilla Type. They did it on their own and they did not pay protection money. When the jueteng operators gave protection money to FPres. Estrada, they were not apprehended anymore although there were instructions to the contrary which were for show or for record purposes only. [Ibid, pp. 59-64] There were local officials who did not allow jueteng like Governor Lina in Laguna. He changed the Provincial Commander several times but jueteng still continued. In the other places the protection money for jueteng given to the local officials was different from that given to the higher levels. [Ibid, pp. 65-66] In Exhibit A-4, ULAC stands for Bulacan and the figure 1.00 means One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) for fifteen (15) days, as protection money for FPres. Estrada. If the number of days was blank it meant 15 days, otherwise the number 30 was indicated. In the ledger (Exh A-4-C up to A-4-I) covering the periods of January of 2000 up to August of 2000, the same figures appeared but the code names of the provinces were replaced by their original names as instructed by FPres. Estrada who was confused with the code names. Under the sub-title amount, the total amount of protection money given to FPres. Estrada was reflected. For instance, in Ilocos Sur, the amount of 500 meant Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 67-68] The other entries were similar, except for the substitution of the code names with actual names of the provinces. For instance, the amount of protection money given to FPres. Estrada corresponding to Ilocos Sur entered as 500, was Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). For the province of Bulacan the number of days was blank and the figure 1,000 was entered. This means that for Bulacan for 15 days the total protection money given to FPres. Estrada was One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00). According to Gov. Singson, the collections were delivered in exact amount so they removed the zeroes in the ledger so as not to lengthen the entries. [Ibid, pp. 6970] The two boxes of entries at the right bottom of the ledger marked as Exhibits A-4 to A-4-l, reflected the 7 expenses to show where some of the money collected went. [Ibid, p. 70] The first entry (Exh. W -1) showed that Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) went to Jimpol, which referred to then Secretary Jimmy Policarpio. The latter confirmed to Gov. Singson this receipt of the said amount from Bong Pineda which Secretary Policarpio, then a political liaison officer for Congress, would use for the media. [Ibid, pp. 74-75] In the ledger for November of 7 1998, the entry 300 Goma (Exh W -2) means that Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) was given to the Office of the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP). [Ibid, pp.74-76] Gov. Singson himself brought the money at first to General Lastimoso, the Chief of the PNP but he refused to receive the money. Later Atong Ang identified the

persons from PNP who will pick up the money and help them in the operation. Gov. Singson called up FPres. Estrada to inform him that Lastimoso refused to receive the money. Gov. Singson was worried Lastimoso may not coordinate with them. One time, Gov. Singson was called to Malacanang and he met General Lastimoso there and FPres. Estrada told the latter to coordinate with Gov. Singson about the operation of jueteng. General Lastimoso expressed the need to coordinate with the Regional Commanders to apprehend jueteng operations for show only (kunwari). [Ibid, pp. 77-80] 7 The entry November 1998, 5.00, AS Sunday (Exh W -3) means that the amount for Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) protection money was given to FPres. Estrada, whose code name was Asiong Salonga on a 7 Sunday. Gov. Singson himself gave the money to FPres. Estrada. The next entry 1.000 Jing (Exh W -4), would show that One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was given to Jinggoy Estrada, whose code name was Jing. According to Gov. Singson, Jinggoy Estrada was the collector of protection money for the Province of Bulacan which should be Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) for every month but Jinggoy Estrada kept the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) and remit to Gov. Singson only Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) or One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) for every 15 days. [Ibid, pp. 80-82] Atong Ang told Gov. Singson that Jinggoy Estrada got One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) and Jinggoy Estrada confirmed it but when they told FPres. Estrada about it, he instructed them not to give Jinggoy Estrada money and he will be the one to give money to Jinggoy Estrada. Gov. Singson removed the name of Jinggoy Estrada from the list and they kept it a secret from FPres. Estrada that Jinggoy Estrada was taking jueteng money because Jinggoy Estrada will get angry too if he was not given a share. Jinggoy Estrada was then the Mayor of the Municipality of San Juan. Jinggoy Estrada collected money from the Province of Bulacan at the later part of January of 1999. [Ibid, p. 82-85] 7 The entry 500 JD (Exh W -5) means that Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) went to Jude Estrada, a son of FPres. Estrada. Jude confirmed to Gov. Singson that he received the said amount of jueteng 7 protection money from Atong Ang who reported that to Gov. Singson. The entry 1.800 ad check (Exh W -6) refers to One Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,800,000.00) covered by a bad check, part of jueteng 8 money, which bounced. This was PCI Bank Check No. 0019063 (Exh. F ) given to Gov. Singson by one Celso De 7 Los Angeles. The entry 17.300 total expenses (Exh. W -7) represents the Seventeen Million Three Hundred Pesos (P17,300,000.00) the amount of total expenses for the month of November of 1998. The total expenses every 7 8 month were entered in the ledger (Exh. X to E , and Exh. A-4 to A-4-d. [Ibid, pp. 85-92]) 7 7 In the entry for December of 1998 (Exh. X ), the first entry 5.00, AS (Exh. X -1) shows the Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) that was given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada from the collection of jueteng protection 7 money. The ledger for January 1999 bearing as first entry 6.00 cash January 2, AS (Exh Y -1), reflected the Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) cash from the same source given personally by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada. The 7 entry 3.00 check, February 1, 1999, AS (Exh. W -2) shows that Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) in check was given to FPres. Estrada on February 1, 1999 as part of protection money. [Ibid, pp. 93-95] Another entry 5.00 7 check, February 1, 1999 AS (Exh Y -3), refers to the Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) Check given by Gov. 8 Singson to FPres. Estrada from jueteng protection money. This check (Metrobank Check No.0000917, Exh G -1) was deposited in the account of Paul Boghart, who was mentioned during the impeachment trial at the Senate as a foreigner assisting in the PR of FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 93-97] 7 The entry 3.500 cash, January 19, AS (Exh. Y -4) pertains to Three Million Five Hundred Pesos (P3,500,000.00) cash from the protection money given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada on January 19 (1999). 7 The entry 5.00, February 18, AS (Exh. Z -1) refers to the Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) given by Gov. Singson to FPres. on February 18, 1999 from the same protection money. Gov. Singson explained that the entry 7 7 400 tax (Exh Z -2) at the right hand portion of Exhibit Z , refers to the Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) which he got for reimbursement of the expenses that he paid or would pay but were not recorded 8 8 8 8 in the ledger. In the ledger for March 1999 (Exh. A ), April 1999 (Exh. B ), May 1999 (Exh. C ), June 1999 (Exh. D ), 8 July 1999 (Exh. E ), and August 1999 (Exh A-4) there were similar entries of tax which were also intended for the same purpose. Gov. Singson called them butal. Gov. Singson had the permission of FPres. Estrada that all amounts less than One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) were considered butal which Gov. Singson kept for reimbursement of expenses which FPres. Estrada would ask Gov. Singson to pay. If the total amount collection was Four Million Two Hundred Pesos (P4,200,000.00), Gov. Singson got Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) of the said collection as butal and included the same in the ledger as tax. [Ibid, pp. 98-101]

In the ledger for February 1999 collection appears a handwritten entry + 4.00 capitol February 3, 1999. This entry pertains to the Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) kickback which FPres. Estrada asked Gov. Singson to give him on February 3, 1999 out of the Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) allotted for the repair of the capitol of Ilocos Sur. This P4 Million was added to the total to date of the collection which consequently amounted to Thirty Eight Million Pesos (P38,000,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 102-103] 8 8 In the ledger for March 1999 (Exh. A ), the first entry 5.00, 4/6/99, AS (Exh. A -1) shows that Five Mllion Pesos (P5,000,000.00) that Gov. Singson gave FPres. Estrada on April 6, 1999. Gov. Singson wrote on the ledger AS, i.e. Asiong Salonga, the code name of FPres. Estrada [Ibid, p. 103] 8 Regarding the entry 500 3/23 c/0 Malou AS (Exh A -2), Gov. Singson explained that Malou Florendo, the Secretary of FPres. Estrada, coordinated with Gov. Singson by telephone for the delivery of the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to FPres. Estrada. Emma B. Lim delivered the money as Gov. Singson was in the province when FPres. Estrada called up Gov. Singson to tell him he needed money very badly. [Ibid, pp. 104-106] On April 1, 1999, Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) were given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada from 8 jueteng protection money as shown by the entry 5.00 4/1/99 AS (Exh B -1). The next entry, 1.00, William 8 Gatchalian (Exh B -2), refers to the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) given by Gov. Singson to William Gatchalian upon instruction of FPres. Estrada. Gatchalian had a Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) check but FPres. Estrada won only Nineteen Million Pesos (P19,000,000.00) in their mahjong game, so FPres. Estrada asked Gov. Singson to give to Gatchalian the change of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) charged to the jueteng protection money. Gov. Singson gave Gatchalian the said amount through a Metrobank Check No. 0001066 (Exh 8 8 H and H -1). [Ibid, pp.106-109] 8 8-3 The entry in Exhibit B which reads 200 Jerry and Len (Exh B ) reflects the One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) each given to then Secretary Lenny De Jesus and Secretary Jerry Barican, or a total amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), as balato as instructed by FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 109-110] Senator Tessie Oreta and Sonny Osmena were also given One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) each or a total of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) in Cebu aboard the Presidential Yatch Ang Pangulo as shown by the 8 entry 2.00 Tessie and Sonny (Exh. B ). Gov. Singson gave the said sums of money to the Senators, which he 8 8 funded through the jueteng protection money, in the form of Metrobank Check No. 0001081 (Exhs. I and I -1 and 8 8 Metrobank Check No. 0001082 (Exhs. J and J -1) upon instruction of FPres. Estrada, as their balato for the winning of the latter in Mahjong. [Ibid, pp. 112-114] The amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) was given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada from the jueteng protection money on each of the following dates as shown by the entries in the ledger: (1) May 1, 1999 8 8 (5.00 5/1/99 AS Exh. C -1); (2) May 18, 1999 (5.00 5/18/99 AS Exh. C -2); (3) June 1, 1999 (5.00 6/1/99 AS 8 8 8 Exh. D -1); (4) June 18, 1999 (5.00 6/18/99 AS Exh. D -2); (5) July 31, 1999 (5.00 7/1/99 AS Exh. E -1); and (6) 8 July 19, 1999 (5.00 7/19/99 AS Exh. E -2). From May 1, 1999 to July 19, 1999, the total amount of money given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada would amount to Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) based on the ledger. [Ibid, pp.115-118] 8 The entry reading 123,000 total to date (Exh E -3) represents the total amount of One Hundred Twenty Three Million Pesos (P123,000,000.00) that remained as of July 1999. [Ibid, pp. 118-119] After July 1999, particularly on August 1999, FPres. Estrada called Gov. Singson, Ricaforte and Serapio to a meeting at Mandaluyong. Gov. Singson was instructed by FPres. Estrada in the presence of Ricaforte and Serapio to turn-over all the balance of the money from jueteng to the account of Ricaforte. Gov. Singson was keeping most of the above-mentioned P123,000,000.00 in the bank and the others in cash in his office because FPres. Estrada would ask for money from time to time. Gov. Singson turned-over the aforementioned balance of the jueteng money partly in check and partly in cash in the office of FPres. Estrada. Ricaforte and Serapio were there with the Former President. [Ibid, pp.119-123] 8 8 Part of the aforesaid P123,000,000.00 was covered by Metrobank Check No. 0001360 (Exh K and K -1) of Gov. Singson in the amount of Seventeen Million Two Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P17,210,000.00) [Ibid, p. 123]. The second and third checks (Exhs A-2-b and A-7-c) were PCI Bank checks in the account name of William Gatchalian each in the amount of Thirty-Five Million Pesos (P35,000,000.00) or a total of Seventy Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00). Gov. Singson narrated that the amount of Sixty-Two Million Pesos (P62,000,000.00) from the jueteng protection money was lent to William Gatchalian. Out of this transaction, FPres. Estrada earned Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00) such that William Gatchalian paid a total of Seventy Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 124-125]

Gov. Singson presented Metrobank Check No. 0001332 with account name Governor Luis Chavit Singson, in the amount of Forty-Six Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P46,350,000,00) payable to 8 8 William Gatchalian (Exh L and L -1). This check, according to Gov. Singson was part of the jueteng protection money lent to William Gatchalian. The rest of the P62,000,000.00 were in cash and covered by other checks. [Ibid, pp. 126-127] The Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00) earned from the loan by FPres. Estrada was taken as advance by the latter before due date of the P70,000,000.00 of Gatchalian. For this reason, the P8,000,000.00 was not anymore added to the balance of P123,000,000.00 of jueteng money. [Ibid, pp. 127-130] The advance of P8,000,000.00 was covered by Metrobank Check No. 0001388 with the account name Governor Luis Chavit 8 8 Singson (Exhs. M and M -1). During the impeachment trial at the Senate, it turned out that the P8,000,000.00 was deposited in the account of Senator Loi Estrada [Ibid, pp. 130-131,139] The fourth check which covered part of the total balance of P123,000,000.00 jueteng protection money was a Far East bank Check in the amount of Thirty-Four Million Six Hundred Forty Two Thousand Four Hundred 6 Forty Two Pesos (P34,642,442.00) payable to the order of Fontain Bleau, Inc. (Exh B ). [Ibid, p. 124] According to Gov. Singson, the Far East Bank check payable to the order of Fontaine Bleau, Inc. was paid by Fontana to Fontaine Bleau, Inc. which was a casino owned by FPres. Estrada and built with the use of jueteng protection money. The bulk of the P123,000,000.00 were turned-over by Gov. Singson in the form of checks. The cash amounted only to Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) only. [TSN dated July 24, 2002, pp.8-9] In the second set of ledger covering the months of August 1999 to August 2000 (Exh A-4) are found the following entries: (1) 3.00 AS 9/6 8 oclock a.m. (Exh A-4.1) and (2) 5.00 AS 8/16/99 (Exh A-4.2). The entries represent the two (2) Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada on September 6 at 8 oclock in the morning and on August 16, 1999 or a total of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as part of jueteng collection. [Ibid, pp. 10-13] The other entries in the said ledger are: (1) 16.310 August 1-15 (A-4-3); (2) 13.150 August 16-31 (Exh. A-4-4); (3) 29.460 total for August (Exh. A-4-5); (4) 15.200 expenses (Exh. A-4-6); (5) 14.260 subtotal (Exh. A4-7); (6) .260 tax (Exh. A-4-8); (7) 14.000 total to date (Exh. A-4-9). Gov. Singson explained that the entries mean (1) that the total collection for August 1-15, 1999 amounted to Sixteen Million Three Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P16,310,000.00); (2) that from August 16-31, 1999 the total collection was Thirteen Million One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P13,150,000.00); (3) that the total collection for the whole month of August 1999 was Twenty Nine Million Four Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos (P29,460,000.00) which all went to FPres. Estrada. The expenses for the said month reached Fifteen Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P15,200,000.00). The said amount of expenses was deducted from the total collection for the same month. The remainder, described as subtotal, amounted to Fourteen Million Two Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos (P14,260,000.00). Of the latter sum of money, Two Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos (P260,000.00) was treated as butal and taken by Gov. Singson to be used as reimbursement for expenses which Gov. Singson was requested by FPres. Estrada to pay. The balance of Fourteen Million Pesos (P14,000,000.00) was deposited in the bank for President Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 14-18] The tax entries in the ledger, starting Exhibit Z to Z-7, covered the amounts less than One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) which were treated as butal that remained with Gov. Singson to reimburse him for expenses which were not recorded in the ledger but should be deducted from the money of FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 19-21] Gov. Singson mentioned that he personally gave or handed to FPres. Estrada even if Malou Florendo, FPres. Estradas secretary, was around. Gov. Singson either left the money beside FPres. Estrada or behind the latters chair. FPres. Estrada would count the money by the bundle [Ibid, pp. 22-23]. The Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) delivered by Emma B. Lim to Malou Florendo not to FPres. Estrada personally was confirmed by the latter to have been received by him. Emma B. Lim delivered the money to the Malacaang Palace because of the changes in the instructions given by FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 23-24] The net balance of Fourteen Million Pesos (P14,000,000.00) for August 1999 was deposited by Ricaforte at Equitable PCI Bank. The same was done to the net monthly balances for September 1999, October 1999, November 1999, December 1999, January 2000, February 2000, March 2000, April 2000 and May 2000. [Ibid, pp. 25-27] The other entries in the second set of ledger for September 1999 and October 1999 as follows: (1) AS 11:30 am/258 5.000 (Exh A-4-a-1); (2) 10/29 AS/258 5.000 (Exh A-4-b-1); (3) 10/14 AS/258 5.000 (Exh A-4-b-2), mean that Gov. Singson whose code name was 258 gave FPres. Estrada, referred to as AS, which stands for

Asiong Salonga Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) on each of the following dates: (a) in September 1999 at 11:30 in the morning; (b) on October 29, 1999; and (c) on October 14, 1999. In the November 1999 ledger (Exh A-4-c), the following entries appear (1) 11/30 laptop comp./print.105,850 (Exh. A-4-c-1) (2) 11/30 2 Starex 800 each/258 1.600 (Exh. A-4-C-2); (3) 11:30 AS/258 12p.m PG5.000 (Exh. A-4-C-3); (4) 11/15 AS/258 at 4p.m 5.000 ( Exh. A-4-C-4 ), and (5) 11/08 Jimpol 2.400. Gov. Singson explained the foregoing entries in the November 1999 ledger as follows: On November 30, 1999, the amount of P105,850.00 was used to buy the laptop computer with printer of Ricaforte. On November 30, 1999, Gov. Singson purchased Two (2) units of Starex at Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos each or a total amount of One Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,600,000.00). One unit of Starex went to Ricaforte and was registered in her name. The other was left in their office. At 12:00 noon on November 30, 1999, Gov. Singson brought Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to FPres. Estrada in his house at P. Guevarra St. at Greenhills as part of jueteng protection money. At that time, Guia Gomez, one of the most loved of FPres. Estrada, resided at the said house. Gov. Singson also gave Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to former FPres. Estrada on November 15, 1999 at 4:00 oclock in the afternoon. On November 8, 1999, the amount of Two Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,400,000.00) was given by Bong Pineda to Secretary Jimmy Policarpio, as confirmed by both of them to Singson. During the prior months, only Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) per month were given to Policarpio, as shown by the ledger, but this was increased by Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) because Policarpio told Gov. Singson that the Media was costly (Magastos). [Ibid, pp. 30-39] The ledger for December 1999 (Exh. A-4-d), contains the following entries: (1) 12/30 AS/258 5.000 (Exh A-4-d-1) and (2) 12/04 AS/258 5.00 (Exh A-4-d-2). According to Gov. Singson the aforesaid entries show that he gave to FPres. Estrada, as part of Jueteng protection, the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) on December 30, 1999 and another Five Million Pesos (P5 Million) on December 4, 1999. [Ibid, pp.39-41] The ledger for January 2000 (Exh A-4-E) contains the following entries: (1) 1/31/00 AS at PR 5.000 (Exh A-4-E-1); and (2) 1/15/00 AS at Pr 5.000. According to Gov. Singson PR stands for Presidential Residence and AS for Asiong Salonga, that he gave to FPres. Estrada the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) twice, one on January 31, 2000 and the other January 14, 2000, at the Presidential Residence. [Ibid, pp.41-43] According to Gov. Singson, he was ordered by FPres. Estrada to give to him Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) of the jueteng collection every fifteen (15) days of the month. All the jueteng collections were for FPres. Estrada. The total amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) were given to him every month plus the expenses (gastos) and the remainder or the rest of the collection were deposited in the bank for FPres. Estrada in the name of Ricaforte. A total amount of Two Hundred Sixteen Million Pesos (P216,000,000.00) were deposited in the bank for FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 43-44] Gov. Singson agreed at first that he would not earn anything from jueteng, provided that the share of Ilocos Sur from the excise tax under R.A. No. 7171 amounting to billions of pesos would be released to them for their projects. Gov. Singson testified that, after the One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) were taken from him, the release of the funds did not continue. The Former President did not comply with the agreement. [Ibid, pp. 44-46] In the ledger for February 2000 (Exh A-4-F), the following entries appear: (1) AS/258 5.000 (Exh A-4-F1); and (2) 2/17/00 AS 258 5.000 (Exh A-4-F-2). Gov. Singson testified that these entries mean that he gave to FPres. Estrada, Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) as part of jueteng protection money in an unspecified day in February of 2000 and another Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) of the same money on February 17, 2000. [Ibid, pp. 48-49] The ledger for March 2000 (Exh A-4-G), bears the following entries: (1) 3/16/00 AS/258 5.000 (Exh A-4g-1); and (2) 4/3/00 AS/258 5.000 (Exh A-4-G-2). According to Gov. Singson the entries mean that he gave Five Million Pesos (P5 Million) on March 16, 2000 and another Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) on April 3,2000, both as part of jueteng protection money. [Ibid, pp. 49-50] Gov. Singson explained that 258 was his code name which he had been using even in their radio communication and that later, FPres. Estrada would kid him with his code name when they played mahjong. [Ibid, p. 52] In the April 2000 ledger (Exh A-4-H), the entry 4/14/00 AS/258 5.000 appeared twice, (Exh A-4-H-1) because according to Gov. Singson he gave Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) twice, one in the morning and another in the afternoon on the same day, April 14, 2000, or a total of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) from jueteng protection money collection, because FPres. called him up twice on the said date as his birthday on April 19, 2000 was nearing. [Ibid, pp. 53-54]

At the ledger for May 2000 (Exh A-4-i), the first entry also at the right hand portion was 5/31 AS/258 5.000 (Exh A-4-i-1) and next entry was 5/13 AS/258 5.000 (Exh A-4-i-2). Gov. Singson explained that the entries meant that he gave Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) on May 31, 2000 and another Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to FPres. Estrada on May 13, 2000, both part of the jueteng protection money. Gov. Singson also mentioned that the entries sometimes were not in chronological order, but they were for the same month. [Ibid, pp. 55-56] The June 2000 ledger (Exh A-4-j), the entry at the right hand portion reads: 6/30 AS/258 3.300, and the next entry is 6/15 AS/258 5.000 (Exh A-4-j-2). According to Gov. Singson, these means that he gave to FPres. Estrada Three Million Three Hundred Thousand (P3,300,000.00) from jueteng protection money collection on June 30, 2000, and Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) from the same collection, on June 15, 2000. [Ibid, pp. 56-57] The succeeding ledgers for July 2000 (Exh A-4-k) the following entries appear: (1) 7/14 AS/258 2.650 (Exh. A-4-k-1) and (2) 8/12 AS/258 3.600 (Exh.A-4-k-2). Gov. Singson explained that the entries mean respectively that he gave the amount of Two Million Six Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P2,650,000.00) on July 14,2000 and Three Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P3,600,000.00) to FPres. Estrada as part of jueteng protection money collection. [Ibid, pp.57-58] To the question of why the amounts were less than P5,000,000.00 on the said occasions, Gov. Singson replied that it so happened that those were the only cash in his possession when the requests for money were made and that they stopped jueteng collection because Atong Ang started with Pick 2 and later Bingo 2 Balls which according to FPres. Estrada would have a semblance of legality. [Ibid, pp. 59-60] The ledger for the month of August 2000 (Exh.A-4-L) contains the entry 8/16 AS/258 3.050 (Exh. A-4-L1). Gov. Singson testified that he gave FPres. Estrada on August 16, 2000 the amount of Three Million Fifty Thousand Pesos (P3,050,000.00) as part of protection money collected from jueteng. [Ibid, pp. 62-63] According to Gov. Singson the President was very strict with money and so they had an auditor and he checked the ledger monthly so that they could not make any kickback (Kupit) from the jueteng collection. [Ibid, pp. 63-64] Gov. Singson testified that the jueteng collector for Bulacan on November and December 1998 was Jessie Viceo. In January 1999 the jueteng collector for Bulacan was Jinggoy Estrada as shown by the ledger where he was identified as Jing who got One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) (Exh. W7). Viseo and Jinggoy Estrada were friends so the latter supervised the jueteng collection in Bulacan, although he was residing in San Juan. When FPres. Estrada instructed Gov. Singson not to give money to Jinggoy Estrada and so that the latter will not get mad at him, Gov. Singson and Jinggoy Estrada agreed to keep it a secret from the FPres. that Jinggoy Estrada managed the jueteng collection in Bulacan and that out of the total monthly collection of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) from Bulacan, Jinggoy Estrada gave only Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to Gov. Singson and he retained One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00). The money was either picked-up from the office or house of Jinggoy or the latter sent the money to Singson. The secret arrangement started in November 1999 and lasted until the end of August 2000. [Ibid, pp. 69-70] However, the arrangement did not appear in the ledger because they will be scolded by FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, p. 71] When asked whether Jinggoy Estrada personally collected the jueteng money, Gov. Singson replied that it was Jinggoy Estrada and Jessie Viceo who talked with each other, sometimes they got the jueteng money from the office of Jinggoy Estrada or sometimes the latter sent it to the office of Singson, but Gov. Singson knew that Jinggoy was in charge of the jueteng collection. The secret arrangement came about because jueteng collection in Bulacan was a problem from the start as there were delays or sometimes the checks paid by Jessie Viceo bounced. Viceo agreed to the arrangement because he was a close friend of Jinggoy Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 71-72] Gov. Singson knew Viceo personally because he would see Viceo in the cockpits which the latter frequented. [Ibid, p. 74] Gov. Singson considered the biggest among the expenses charged to the Tax the One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000.00) given to Laarni Enriquez whom Gov. Singson described as the most beloved or favorite of FPres. Estrada [Ibid, p. 75]. According to Gov. Singson, he was assessed, like other persons who attended the birthday party of Laarni, the aforesaid P1,200,000.00 as his share in the price of the necklace birthday gift amounting to Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00) for Laarni. Jaime Dichaves collected the said amount from Gov. Singson after the party. Gov. Singson paid by check which was deposited in the account of Laarni at PSBank. [Ibid, pp. 76-81] It was Congressman Mark Jimenez who pinpointed the guests who would share (P1,200,000.00) each for the gift for Laarni after they had just finished playing mahjong with FPres. Estrada during the party. [Ibid, p. 84] Gov. Singson charged the P1,200,000.00 as tax in the jueteng collection because it was a big amount of money. [Ibid, pp. 87-88]

In the early part of the year 2000, FPres. Estrada instructed Gov. Singson to transfer Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) of jueteng money to Serapio. The instruction was given by FPres. Estrada to Gov. Singson in Malacaang Palace in the presence of Ricaforte and Serapio. According to Gov. Singson, Serapio said Ako na ang bahalang magpa-ikot-ikot which Gov. Singson took it to mean that Serapio would see to it that the Two Huundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) jueteng money would not be traced before it reached him. FPres. Estrada checked Gov. Singson in April 2000 when FPres. Estradas birthday was approaching, whether the money was so transferred. The transfer of funds was confirmed to Gov. Singson by both Ricaforte and Serapio. The jueteng money delivered to Serapio initially amounted to One Hundred Twenty Three Million Pesos (P123,000,000.00) but it was increased later to Two Hundred Sixteen Million Pesos (P216,000,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 88-94] Gov. Singson testified that Serapio was the trusted lawyer of FPres. Estrada who formed fake corporations for FPres. Estrada which Serapio would narrate to Gov. Singson when they often see each other in Malacaang Palace. Serapio was introduced to Gov. Singson in 1999 after the birthday of FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson delivered jueteng money to FPresident Estrada in a black bag, like an attach case. He delivered money at the houses of FPres. Estrada, particularly once at P. Guevarra Street, twice or thrice or four times or five times at Polk Street. [Ibid, pp. 95-98] Atty. Kenneth S. Tampal of the office of the Senate Legal Counsel brought the black bag referred to by Gov. Singson which was marked as Exhibit MMM at the Senate Impeachment Proceedings and the set of ledgers for the period beginning August 1999 to August 2000 (Exhibits A-4 to A-4-l). The bag was a leatherette attach case with two (2) combination locks numbered 000. [Ibid, pp. 103-105] According to Atty. Tampal, the exhibits are in the custody of the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel. [Ibid, p. 110] 8 Gov. Singson testified that the abovementioned black bag (Exh. O ) was one of the black bags which they used to deliver money to FPres. Estrada in Malacaang Palace. [Ibid, p. 113] The said black bag can contain five or even six million pesos. [Ibid, pp. 115, 118] He would leave the bag with money and brought with him the bag without money. The bag contained two (2) combination locks. The combination of both was 000 although he change it to 419, representing the birthdate of FPres. Estrada, April 19, at the time he delivered money in Malacaang Palace to FPres. Estrada, but the latter asked him to revert to 000 combination because FPres. Estrada could not open the lock. [Ibid, pp. 118-119] There were four (4) pieces of this type of bag. [Ibid, pp. 115116] The bills placed in the bag were in One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) denomination. Many times Singson himself delivered the jueteng money to FPres. Estrada in Malacaang Palace. To go to the Presidential Residence (PR), he passed through the main gate where there were guards. At first, the Secretary would call to give the guards instruction not to inspect the bag. Later on, the guards came to know Gov. Singson and allowed him to enter without inspecting the bag. Jueteng money was either delivered to Gov. Singsons office or picked-up by Gov. Singson, or his driver or his security or the people in his office. [Ibid, pp. 121-124] The total amount of money Gov. Singson collected from jueteng operations for FPresident Estrada starting November 1998 to August 2000 was Five Hundred Forty Million Pesos (P540,000,000.00) more or less, according to Gov. Singson. Gov. Singson personally delivered about Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) to FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, p. 124-125] In the ledger for March 1999 (Exh AAAAAAAA), the entry Bicol15 1.100 means in the Province of Bicol for fifteen (15) days the protection money collection for FPres. Esrada was One Million One Hundred Thousand 7 Pesos (P1,100,000.00). In the ledger for the month of November 1998 (Exh. W ), there was an entry 1.500 Anton and 2.500 Anton. According to Gov. Singson, the entry was made because Atong Ang told him the amounts of One Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,500,000.00) and Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00), or a total of Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00), collected from Bicol were recorded / listed in the name of Presidential Assistant Anton Prieto. Atong Ang informed Gov. Singson that FPres. Estrada knew about it and the latter so confirmed to Gov. Singson. [Ibid, pp. 125-127] While jueteng protection money collection started in September 1998, the ledger started only in November 1998 when Gov. Singson alone was asked to continue the jueteng collection. [Ibid, pp. 128-129] In the July 2000 ledger (Exh. A-4-k), the total amount of jueteng collection and the total amount of expenses were the same so the balance at the end of the month was zero because Pick 2 replaced jueteng, as Gov. Singson, Dante Tan and FPres. Estrada discussed in Malacaang and in his new home at New Manila called

Boracay. Pick 2 was the brainchild of Dante Tan and Bingo 2 Ball was the brainchild of Atong Ang. [Ibid, pp. 129-132] In Boracay, Bong Pineda told Dante Tan, Gov. Singson and FPres. Estrada that Pick 2 may be hard to be understood by the people because there will be 75 numbers. [Ibid, p. 134] In August 2000, Pick 2 started and, in September 2000, before his departure for the United States, FPres. Estrada asked Gov. Singson to hasten the start of Bingo 2 Balls. Atong Ang called Gov. Singson when he was in Malaysia in September 6, 2000 and told him that FPres. Estrada would like to rush the start of Bingo 2 Balls. Gov. Singson replied that was nice and asked that Atong Ang reserve Ilocos Sur for him. However, the following day the son of Gov. Singson informed him that the other half of the franchise was given to his political opponent, Eric Singson, whom he defeated in the election. Eric Singson was his distant relative. [Ibid, pp. 138-141] According to the son of Gov. Singson, Atong Ang told him that he had the provincial commander transferred and the Chief of Police replaced. His father could not do anything to stop Bingo 2 Balls as it was decided by FPres. Estrada and his political career was finish. Gov. Singson talked with Atong Ang when he was in Malaysia and told him that they should wait for FPres. Estrada to return. FPres. Estrada returned from the United States on September 13, 2000. Gov. Singson also arrived from Malaysia the following day. The following day, Gov. Singson asked FPres. Estrada over the phone why the franchise was given to his political enemy. Gov. Singson told him that all the mayors will be embarrassed. FPres. Estrada replied that he had nothing to do with it. Gov. Singson thought that FPres. Estrada was fooling him. He told FPres. Estrada that it was a matter of pride, that all his mayors were getting embarrassed. FPres. Estrada replied that he did not care, so Gov. Singson told him Kung dahil lang dyan pagkatapos ng lahat bibitawan mo ako, bibitaw na rin ako sa iyo. [Ibid, pp. 142-146] Gov. Singson then asked his lawyers to prepare his affidavit because he knew that his life would be in danger if he would part ways with FPres. Estrada, who was very powerful and Gov. Singson had no evidence. Gov. Singson then called Ricaforte and asked her to fax to him the ledger. Ricaforte asked if they were going to Malacaang. Gov. Singson knew that Ricaforte did not know yet what was happening. After she faxed the ledger from her house to Gov. Singson, the latter asked his lawyer to continue with the preparation of his affidavit. Gov. Singson said he prepared the affidavit so that if anything happened to him it would be known who was responsible. When asked if he was threatened, Gov. Singson replied that he knew FPres. Estrada and the men around him so he knew that his life was in danger. [Ibid, pp. 146-150] The first set of ledgers was faxed to Singson, while the second set (Exhs. A-4 to A-4-1) was in the possession of Ricaforte which she produced during the impeachment proceedings. The prosecution would have the latter subpoenaed fom the Senate. Everyone that Gov. Singson consulted gave the same comment. Nobody will believe Gov. Singson because FPres. Estrada was the most popular President elected. Gov. Singson talked with Jinggoy Estrada. Gov. Singson told Jinggoy Estrada that his family got One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) from him and that Jinggoy Estrada got part of the said money. Gov. Singson also told Jinggoy Estrada that jueteng money all went to his father and that Jinggoy Estrada also had a part of it. Jinggoy Estrada told Gov. Singson, they would fix it. [Ibid, pp. 147-155] Nothing happened so Gov. Singson talked with JV Ejercito, another son of FPres. Estrada. JV Ejercito asked Gov. Singson not to come out and that he will talk with his father. Again nothing happened so Gov. Singson approached Secretary Ronnie Zamora and showed him the ledger. The latter reacted that the ledger was a serious matter, Delikado ito. Zamora asked Gov. Singson not to come out and he told Gov. Singson that he would see FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson then went to see Former Secretary Edgardo Angara at the latters GMA Farm in Batangas and showed to him the ledger. Secretary Angara asked Gov. Singson not to come out publicly because the ledger was a serious matter and even they, the cabinet members may be affected. After that first meeting in Batangas, Chavit Singon saw Secretary Angara at the Philippine Plaza and he latter told Gov. Singson that it was alright as he was able to talk to FPres. Estrada. Secretary Angara, according to Gov. Singson, told FPres. Estrada that Gov. Singson was a big help to them in politics and that he was just asking for a small favor. Secretary Angara also asked FPres. Estrada not to embarrass Gov. Singsons mayors. This matter might be known by the media. Secretary Angara informed Gov. Singson that FPres. Estrada got mad and replied Sinong tinakot nya? Before Secretary Angara left, he told FPres. Estrada that he saw Gov. Singsons jueteng ledger and he found it a ground for impeachment. FPres. Estrada appeared surprised (Nagulat) but did not say anything. Secretary Angara assured FPres. Estrada, he will first talk with Gov. Singson and fix it. For the third time, Gov. Singson saw Secretary Angara at New World Hotel. He asked Gov. Singson to give him until the end of September 2000 because the FPres. was a macho and would not easily give in. However, Gov. Singson replied that he was

already decided because his mayors kept on calling him. Incidentally according to Gov. Singson, these political enemies were operating the Bingo 2 Balls. [Ibid, pp. 156-164] After Secretary Angara, Gov. Singson also approached Congressman Mark Jimenez, who said after he met with FPres. Estrada, General Lacson and Secretary Ronnie Zamora that Bingo 2 Balls will not stop in Ilocos Sur but that Gov. Singson should lie low first. Gov. Singson replied that he had decided already to come out and he informed his mayors that he will expose the anomalies involving FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson talked with Jimenez over the phone when he was then at Holiday Inn on October 3, 2000. There was a conference of the Mayors League in the Philippines. Gov. Singson left Holiday Inn together with twenty-two mayors. According to Gov. Singson, armed men followed him at about 11:30 that evening at San Marcelino Street and that his vehicle was blocked by three cars and one motorcycle, all passengers by which were fully armed by armalite. Two of the cars were TMG cars and the other, a civilian red car. Gov. Singson told the mayor with whom he was talking over the phone that they should all go to San Marcelino, behind Jai-Alai because of an emergency. His driver was instructed by Gov. Singson not to open the door of his vehicle. [TSN dated July 29, 2002, pp. 11-19] PAOC men signaled Gov. Singson to get out of his vehicle, a bullet-proof Ford Super Van but he refused. He went out of the van after the mayors arrived one after another. The PAOC team told Gov. Singson that they received information that he had a blinker that, although he did not use it, mere possession was already a violation and that they wanted to bring this to Crame and after he suggested that he be given a ticket of the volation but he instead asked that they go to the police precincts at the United Nations Avenue. Only the two TMG Officers went to the police precinct with Gov. Singson who rode in his own van. There were media people at the police precinct. When asked why he was being harassed although he was influencial to the FPres. Estrada, Gov. Singson replied to the media that he will expose the anomalies of FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 20-26] The following day the incident was published in the newspapers and shown on television. The group of FPres. Esrada tried to settle with Singson. JV Ejercito was the first to call repeatedly (every two minutes) to ask Gov. Singson to return the call of FPres. Estrada, Gov. Singson called the latter who asked that they talk because he was confused with the problems of the Abu Sayyaf and the First Lady. Gov. Singson replied he had already given his word. They talked for the second time and then third time, it was FPres. Estrada himself who called. The next person to call was Atong Ang who was pleading to Gov. Singson to fix the matter. Gov. Singson brought up the P130 Million from the excise tax which Gov. Singson said was taken by Atong Ang and FPres. Estrada. Atong Ang promised that the said amount will be returned to Gov. Singson and that the Bingo 2 Balls will be given to Gov. Singson. Gov. Singson informed him that it was too late. Atong Ang called Gov. Singson about twenty (20) times [Ibid, pp. 27-37] After Atong Ang, Former Secretary Alfredo Lim called to convince Gov. Singson to settle and to see FPres. Estrada. Alfredo Lim asked Gov. Singson to proceed with the press conference but he should put the blame on Atong Ang and that they will take care of Atong Ang. Alfredo Lim gestured with his right fist thumb down. Gov. Singson understood this to mean that Atong Ang will be killed. Gov. Singson did not agree because he might be implicated. He asked them to look for a good reason. [Ibid, pp. 38-42) The next to call Gov. Singson was Jinggoy Estrada. The latter and Gov. Singson talked on October 8, 2000. Jinggoy Estrada also sent many emissaries to talk with Gov. Singson. That evening Gov. Singson went to Cardinal Sin at his San Miguel Residence. Gov. Singson explained to Cardinal Sin the situation and left to him the evidences so that in case anything happens to Gov. Singson, he would know who will be responsible. Gov. Singson saw the Cardinal with his sisters. Cardinal Sin told Gov. Singson to go ahead that he will pray for Gov. Singson and that God will be with them. [Ibid, pp. 42-26] Gov. Singson returned to his house at 10:00 oclock in the evening where Jinggoy Estrada called him and sent emissaries again to Gov. Singson. At 12:00 midnight Jinggoy Estrada and some friends of his arrived at Gov. Singsons house in Blue Ridge, Quezon City. Jinggoy Estrada pleaded to Gov. Singson until 3:00 oclock the following morning. Gov. Singson told Jinggoy Estrada that it was too late because his press conference will happen in a while and all that the Estradas could do was to deny what Gov. Singson will reveal at the press conference. He further said to Jinggoy Estrada that he will not mention the latters name. [Ibid, pp. 46-51] Gov. Singson proceeded with his press conference on October 9, 2000 at Club Filipino. He gave the two reasons: first, FPres. Estrada insulted him and wanted him killed so he was not a true friend anymore; and second, he already had the evidence and they will kill him even if he did not pursue his planned press conference. It was better for him to be killed with honor and to show how corrupt the government was under the Estrada Administration. According to Gov. Singson, FPres. Estrada wanted to replace jueteng with Bingo-2-Balls

because he will earn more, about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) a day. Gov. Singson explained how much FPres. Estrada would receive from Bingo 2 Balls. [Ibid, pp. 51-59] Gov. Singson also mentioned that FPres. Estrada owned the Boracay Mansion in New Manila. He 8 identified this property through a computer generated picture (Exh. P ). [Ibid, pp. 60-67] Gov. Singson also described the house of FPres. Estrada at Polk St., Greenhills which he had visited frequently as well as the house of the FPres. in P. Guevarra Street which was just 2 to 3 kilometers away from Polk Street. [Ibid, pp. 68-72] Gov. Singson testified as to the other properties of FPres. Estrada like Fontainbleau, Inc., a casino. A 6 check (Exh. V ) payable the order of Fonteinbleau, Inc. was among the checks turned over to Ricaforte. Gov. Singson helped put up the said casino for FPres. Estrada. However, his name does not appear as an incorporator of the said company in its Articles of Incorporation (Exh. 22). According to Gov. Singson, the shares in the company were distributed as follows: five percent (5%) to Butch Tenorio, the President of the casino; twenty-five percent (25%) for Gov. Singson; seventy percent (70%) for FPres. Estrada which were placed in the names of Jaime Dichaves and his classmate Susie Pineda. [Ibid, pp. 72-76] To prove his close relationship with FPres. Estrada, Gov. Singson mentioned that Jacob, a son of the FPres. Estrada by Laarni Enriquez, was his baptismal godson while FPres. Estrada stood as sponsor (in the wedding with his two children, Racquel and Randy). [Ibid, pp.76-78] On cross examination, Gov. Singson was confronted with his testimony during the Senate impeachment trial, contained in the transcript of the stenographic notes of the proceedings held on December 13, 2000 at pages 234 and 235 (Exh. 28-Serapio and submarkings). In the said testimony, Gov. Singson did not mention that Serapio was present when he turned over to Ricaforte the jueteng protection money, partly in cash and partly in check. [TSN dated July 29, 2002, pp. 147-150] Gov. Singson insisted that Serapio was present but he was being confused by the Senators sympathetic to FPres. Estrada. It appears, however, that Singson was not asked during impeachment proceedings who were present during the aforementioned turn-over of jueteng protection money. [Ibid, pp. 150-151] Gov. Singson also testified that he did not know if Ricaforte withdrew the amount in cash. Gov. Singson was only told by Ricaforte that she gave the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) to Serapio. [Ibid, pp. 153-156 Gov. Singson also admitted that the P200,000,000.00 were transferred to the Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. [Ibid, p. 156] and that he likewise testified before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on October 17, 2000, as shown by the transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing of that Committee (Exh. 29 and submarkings). Ibid, pp. 158-159]. Gov. Singson acknowledged that he had came across the Certificate of Incorporation and By-Laws of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. (Exh 1-Serapio and submarkings). The said foundations Certificate of Incorporation was dated November 17, 2000, and that the Articles of Incorporation was dated February 15, 2000. [Ibid, pp. 167-168] Gov. Singson saw for the first time during his cross-examination the certification of the Branch Manager of Equitable-PCI Bank that the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. maintained an account in the total amount of Two Hundred Three Million One Hundred Thirty-Six Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-One Pesos and Twenty Seven Centavos (P203,136,931.27) (Exh 17; 17-a-Serapio). [Ibid, p. 169] EMMA BARBON LIM (Emma Lim) worked for Gov. Singson since July 1987 as Liaison Officer at the latters private office in LCS Building, San Andres corner Diamante Street, San Andres Bukid, Metro Manila. LCS stood for Luis Chavit Singson. Emma Lim did personal errands for Gov. Singson, like collecting jueteng money from different persons for FPres. Estrada pursuant to the instructions of Gov. Singson. As early as January 1999, Emma Lim was already receiving deliveries of jueteng money. Gov. Singson told her to take care of the money that she was receiving because it was not the money of Gov. Singson but of FPres. Estrada. She started collecting jueteng money sometime in April 1999. She personally went to the person from whom she collected the money. She knew that it was jueteng money because Gov. Singson told her so and that it was also confirmed by Ricaforte. She also knew that it was jueteng money because there was an instance that Ricaforte scolded her for opening an envelope. Ricaforte told her that it was strictly confidential and it was intended for FPres. Estrada. Emma Lim also personally delivered jueteng money to Malacaang. According to Emma Lim, Ricaforte was the accountant-auditor of FPres. Estrada. This was how she was introduced by Gov. Singson to her and how she introduced herself when she reported at the LCS Office. Ricaforte also held office in the same address. Emma Lims other co-employee was Menchu Itchon. [TSN dated July 1, 2002, pp. 12-17] Witness testified that she collected jueteng money from Undersecretary (USec) Anton Prieto, Jinggoy Estrada and Bong Pineda.

USec Anton Prieto was the Presidential Assistant for Bicol Affairs. He was the one in charge of jueteng collection in the Bicol Area. Witness met Prieto personally and he introduced himself to the witness as such. Every time he called the office, he always said that he was an Undersecretary in Malacaang. Sometime on April 1999, Emma Lim met Prieto at the lobby of Dusit Hotel Nikko in Makati. Usec Prieto handed to her a sealed mailing envelope which she brought to their office at LCS Building. Emma Lim called Gov. Singson who asked her to open the envelope to know how much she received. The envelope contained a post 7 7 7 7 7 dated check (Exh F , F -1 to F -5) in the amount of P1,190,000.00. Emma Lim deposited the check (Exh G , G -1 to 7 G -4) in the account of Gov. Singson at the Metrobank, Ayala Center Branch on April 7, 1999. Three days after the check was deposited, the New Accounts Department of the Metrobank Ayala branch informed Emma Lim that the check was dishonored because the signature was different. The check was returned through Usec Prietos messenger. Emma Lim usually deposited the PNB Naga Branch checks from Prieto in the Account No. 0963011682260 of Gov. 7 7 Singson. The deposit slips (Exhibits I to Q and submarkings) listed the deposits. At one time, Ricaforte scolded her for opening the envelope because it was strictly confidential and that it was for FPres. Estrada. Ricaforte took the check from the Emma Lim. [Ibid, pp. 17-56] Ricaforte first reported at the LCS building on April 16, 1999. She introduced herself as the accountant-auditor of FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson also introduced her as such. Emma Lim collected jueteng money twice from Bong Pineda, who was in charge of the jueteng collections in Pampanga because Gov. Singson told her so. Sometime on January 2000, upon instruction of Gov. Singson, Emma Lim and Gov. Singsons driver Faustino Prudencio went to the house of Bong Pineda at No. 2 Albany Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila to pick-up money. At Pinedas house, Pinedas secretary, Marty, asked her to enter an office room to wait for Bongs brother Romy Pineda. When Romy Pineda arrived, he placed a shopping bag on top of the table and asked Emma Lim to count the contents. The money was P5,000,000.00 in P1,000 denominations. After counting the money, they returned the money inside the shopping bag and Mr. Pineda made her sign a half sheet of bond paper evidencing that she received the money. Emma Lim then kept the money inside the vault at the LCS office and informed Gov. Singson that she had picked up the money. The second time Emma Lim collected money from Bong Pineda was sometime on February 2000. They were on their way home after collecting money from Jinggoy Estrada. Menchu Itchon called her and told her that Gov. Singson wanted her to drop by the house of Mr. Bong Pineda to pick-up money. Emma Lim proceeded and Marty again ushered her to the office room. Romy Pineda arrived. He opened what appeared to be a bookshelf and 7 came out with a red Salvatore Ferragamo shopping bag (Exhibit R ) containing P5,000,000.00. The money was in P1,000 bills and in 5 bundles containing P1,000,000.00 each. Romy Pineda asked her to sign a paper that she received the amount. She kept the money in the vault assigned to her at the LCS office. She informed Gov. Singson that she received the money from Bong Pineda, and Gov. Singson told her that he will pass by for it. [Ibid, pp. 58-80] She collected jueteng money from Jinggoy Estrada three times. These were sometime in January, February 2000 and March 17, 2000. For the first collection, Gov. Singson called her up at the LCS office and told her to call the office of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to inquire if she can pick up what was to be picked up. The staff of Jinggoy Estrada who answered the phone told her to go there after lunch. Witness left the office at 1:00 oclock with the driver of Gov. Singson and proceeded to the office of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada at the second floor of the Municipal Hall of San Juan, Metro Manila. When she arrived at the office, the staff at the receiving section gave her a sheet of paper where she wrote her name and office. The bodyguard of Jinggoy Estrada arrived and handed to her something which was wrapped in a magazine and sealed with scotch tape. The bodyguard told her not to count the money because there were many people around. She then brought the package back to the LCS office and kept it in the vault. She called Gov. Singson and told him that she already picked up the money from Jinggoy Estrada. When Gov. Singson arrived, witness counted the money in his presence and it was P1,000,000.00 which she turned over to Gov. Singson. Sometime in February 2000, she again collected jueteng money from Jinggoy Estrada. Gov. Singson called her up and instructed her to call up the office of Jinggoy Estrada. She was able to talk to Jinggoy Estradas secretary Josie and was told to go to their office after lunch.

Josie ushered her inside the office of Jinggoy Estrada. Jinggoy Estrada was there. Witness greeted him a good afternoon and he smiled. Josie asked her to sit in front of her table which was about 4 to 5 meters away from Jinggoy Estrada. Josie took up a paper bag from under her table and placed it on top of the table. She asked the witness to count the contents. The witness counted that there were ten (10) bundles of P1,000.00 bills. Each bundle had 100 pieces and the total amount was P1,000,000.00. She then asked permission to leave. After coming from the office of Jinggoy Estrada, they proceeded to the house of Bong Pineda. She collected jueteng money for the third time from Jinggoy Estrada on March 17, 2000. She again went to the office of Jinggoy Estrada after lunch after contacting Josie. When she arrived there, she was ushered inside the office of Jinggoy Estrada. She can no longer remember the number of staff inside the office. It was Josie who told her to sit down in front of the table of Jinggoy Estrada. Jinggoy Estrada took out a check from his wallet and gave it to her saying, Sabihin mo kay Gob tseke na lang. Emma Lim then kept the check inside her bag. The amount was P1,000,000.00 with United Overseas Bank Philippines, San Juan Branch as the drawee bank. The witness deposited the check to the account of Gov. Singson at Metrobank, Ayala Center. The deposit slip (Exhibit 7 S ) was presented. According to the witness, the check was personalized because it bore the picture of Jinggoy Estrada at the background. Emma Lim had seen this kind of check of Gov. Singson. [Ibid, pp. 82-111] Emma Lim maintained her testimony notwithstanding that she was shown a certification dated December 11, 2000 issued by Isabelita M. Papa, Executive Vice President of United Overseas Bank of the Philippines, stating that Mr. Jose P. Estrada, also known as Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada, never had a current or checking account with the said bank. [TSN dated July 10, 2002] She knew that the money she kept in the vault assigned to her were jueteng collections because Governor Singson and Ricaforte told her so. [TSN dated July 1, 2002, p. 81] On July 3, 2002, Emma B. Lim continued her direct examination and testified that she personally met FPres. Estrada when she delivered jueteng money to Malacanang. As instructed by Gov. Singson, she was fetched by Singsons driver, personal aide and security guard at Singsons office at LCS. She boarded the Ford Expedition when they passed by the LCS office.Singson called to ask Emma Lim to double check the money inside the car if it was Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00). Gov. Singsons driver Faustino Prudencio, personal aide Jemis Singson and security guard Frederico Artates were inside the car too when she bundle count the money. They proceeded to the residence of FPres. Estrada at Polk Street, Greenhills. However, Artates and Jamis Singson were informed by the security guards that Malou Florendo and FPres. Estrada were not at home. They waited outside and decided to take their lunch in a restaurant in Greenhills. They brought the black bag containing the money with them at the restaurant. Gov. Singsons personal aide was holding the bag. Driver Faustino Prudencio received instruction from Singson for them to proceed to Malacanang. It was already 1:00 oclock, after lunchtime in 1999 during the Maslog book scam in Malacanang. She recalled it because her companion warned her not to open the bag because Baka ma-maslog ka . In that incident, Maslog was caught bringing money inside Malacanang. Emma Lim was dropped-off at the circle inside Malacanang. She carried the black bag containing P5,000,000.00. Emma Lim introduced herself to the security guard as Emma from the office of Governor Gov. Singson and told him Malou Florendo was expecting her. The amount of P5,000,000.00 was in One thousand (P 1,000.00) peso bills. [TSN dated July 3, 2002, pp. 190-207] The security guard allowed her to enter, without passing the bag through the x-ray. The guard was not strict and pointed to her the Presidential Residence. There was another security guard in front of the house and Emma Lim gave the same introduction and that Malou Florendo was expecting her. Emma was allowed to enter. She was met by Malou inside the residence, Emma Lim saw FPres. Estrada, wearing a cream polo. Emma Lim handed the black bag to Malou Florendo. Emma Lim and FPres. Estrada were within each others view. Malou placed the black bag beside an office table. Emma Lim heard Malou told Gov. Singson over the phone that she was already there. Emma Lim left for the LCS office. [Ibid, pp. 242-261] Emma Lim described the black bag as rectangular with numbered combination lock. The width was about 8 inches, the length, 18 inches and the height was 12 inches. It was made of canvass or synthetic material. Emma demonstrated in court that she could carry a bag of similar size with P 5,000,000.00 inside. Five bundles of bills weighed four (4) kilos and eight (8) grams. [Ibid, pp. 263-279,280] The bag weighed 2 kilos and 6 grams. The bag and its contents weighed 7 kilos and 4 grams. [Ibid, p. 288] On cross-examination, Emma Lim testified that she worked for Gov. Singson since 1987. She started living at LCS Office since 1989 until she got married in 1996. She did not pay rent just like the other employees of Singson. She was not related to Singson. Her brother Roy Barbon worked as driver for Singson between 1990 and

1992. She did not feel beholden to Gov. Singson because she worked for her salary. She did not owe him a debt of gratitude but it should be the other way around because she got embroiled in this trouble because of jueteng collections. [Ibid, pp. 296-308] Emma Lim attended a dinner at Malacaang Palace on February 16, 2001. [TSN dated July 17, 2002, pp. 75-77] She was appointed at John Hay Development Corporation during the term of President Arroyo. She received Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00) per board meeting. Emma Lim also worked as liaison officer of Gov. Singson for overseas workers. [Ibid, pp.87-88] She knew that she was collecting jueteng money because Gov. Singson said so and Ricaforte comfirmed. Further the money delivered was bundled by millions and no money of that amount arrived their office when Gov. Singson was not yet a collector. [Ibid, p. 99] MARIA CARMENCITA ANCHETA ITCHON (Itchon), a Certified Public Accountant, testified that she was hired by Gov. Singson to be an accountant of Fountain Bleau Incorporated (later renamed Fontain Bleau Incorporated) on February 19, 1999. According to Itchon, the said corporation, which was set-up to build a casino in Clark Air Base, Pampanga, was owned by former President Estrada. Witness knew that this was owned by Estrada because Gov. Singson said so and it was confirmed by Mrs. Ricaforte. [TSN, June 17, 2002, pp. 115-118] She allegedly knew that Fontain Bleau Incorporated got its funding from the jueteng collections of FPres. Estrada because Gov. Singson would always tell her to wait for the jueteng collection of FPres. Estrada every time she asked for funds. [Ibid, pp. 119-122] As Accountant, she was the one who made the listings of the pre-operation and expenses of Fontain Bleau and during that time she was the Accountant, she already received jueteng collections for FPres. Estrada. Itchon further testified that she received jueteng collections, amounting to a total of around Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) in cash and check, about six (6) times. She received these jueteng collections from the messengers of Mr. Anton Prieto and former San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada or Jingle Bells. After receiving the collections, she would inform Gov. Singson and then either Gov. Singson took the collection from her or they turned it over to Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte. 6 Itchon identified Fontain Bleus original Certificate of Incorporation (Exh. P ) and the Articles of 6 Incorporation and By Laws attached (Exh. P -1), which were in her possession. These incorporation documents showed the date of Fontain Bleaus registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (April 5, 1999), the nd names of its incorporators, and its office address at the 2 Floor, LCS Building, San Andres Bukid, Manila. Itchons 6 sketch of the office was marked as Exh. Q . [Ibid., pp. 123-124,132-137] Itchon averred that before she personally met Yolanda Ricaforte at the office in LCS, Ricaforte used to call their office and introduced herself as the Accountant Auditor for FPres. Estrada. As early as March 19, 1999, Singson told Itchon that she would be working with Yolanda Ricaforte, the Accountant of FPres. Estrada. Ricaforte began to report for work in the same office as Itchon on April 16, 1999. [Ibid, pp. 129-132, 138-141] Singson and Ricaforte told Itchon that Ricaforte will be her [Itchons] immediate supervisor. Ricaforte checked Itchons entries in her journal. Ricaforte signed the check that Itchon prepared for payment for the supplier of Fontain Bleau and Ricaforte brought Itchon every time she went to the Pampanga office. Itchon proceeded to narrate how in the course of their work she and Ricaforte became close and had many conversations including among others how FPres. Estrada came to appoint Ricafortes husband Orestes Ricaforte as undersecretary of Tourism and how FPres. Estrada gifted Orestes with the Black Lexus that Yolanda and Itchon usually used in traveling to the Pampanga office. Itchon had photographs of gatherings she attended with Ricaforte (Exh. A-6-vvvvv). [Ibid, pp. 143-152] Itchon knew Ricaforte to be the AccountantAuditor of FPres. Estrada in Fontain Bleau Incorporated and for jueteng collections because Ricaforte reported directly to FPres. Estrada. Itchon then narrated how on June 15, 1999, she and Mrs. Regina Lim (one of the incorporators of Fontain Bleau) brought Ricaforte to Malacaang at around 3:30 p.m. They brought her there because Ricaforte said she would report to FPres. Estrada. Before going to Malacaang, Ricaforte took their records of Fontain Bleau, got Itchons journal and the list of expenses and then Itchon briefed her regarding their expenses. [Ibid, pp. 155-162] Itchon also testified that Ricaforte also reported to FPres. Estrada by phone, sometimes using the landline in the office and sometimes using her [Ricafortes] cell phone. Itchon knew that the calls were made to FPres. Estrada because she was around when Ricaforte was making calls, and Ricaforte would ask her to keep quiet because she was calling the President. The calls were made inside the LCS office. Itchon explained that she knew that the cell phone number of Ricaforte was 0918-9021847 because the number was originally issued in Itchons name. The cell phone was supposed to be hers. When they were in

Fontain Bleau, they bought cell phones and the application form for the number was under Itchons name. Itchon was the one who assigned it to herself. But when the cell phones came, Itchon testified that Ricaforte took the cell phone no. 0918-9021847 and the number 0918-9021849 originally assigned to Ricaforte went to Itchon. Itchon also testified that Ricaforte called up Estrada in her presence about five times. 6 Itchon prepared a summary of the calls (Exh. R with submarkings) made by Ricaforte. Itchon explained that these were the summary of phone calls of Ricaforte to FPres. Estrada at the presidential residence; to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada or Jingle Bells, to Mr. Edward Serapio, to Governor Singson and to Mr. Romy Pineda, the brother of Bong Pineda. She took the information from the fifteen (15) Statements of Account of Ricaforte for her cell number 0918-9021847. The phone billings of Ricaforte particularly with reference to cell phone no. 0918-9021847 were with Itchon. [Ibid, pp. 163-175] Itchon averred that she prepared or came up with a summary of calls made by Mrs. Ricaforte upon the advice of her lawyer Atty. Pablito Sanidad because when she and Mrs. Ricaforte testified in the Senate Blue Ribbon Hearing Committee, Mrs. Ricaforte testified that she seldom or never called up President Joseph Estrada, Mr. Jinggoy Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio, Governor Singson and Mr. Romy Pineda. Itchon also testified that when she prepared the summary based on the entries on the particular phone billings, she found out several phone calls to those persons mentioned. [TSN, June 19, 2002, pp. 8-12] 6 6 6 Fifteen (15) Statements of Account (Exhs. S , S -1 up to S -14) issued by Smart communications were also identified by Itchon purporting to be statements of account of Cell phone No. 0918-9021847. The Statements of Account covered the billing period ending July 1999 and billing period ending August 31, 2000. The billing statements of account were received by Itchon from the company for her to pay. The cell phone bills were being paid by Fontain Bleau, but when Fontain Bleau ceased to exist, the phone bills were paid by Ricaforte with money from jueteng collections. [Ibid, pp. 15-18] Itchon affirmed that she was present during Mrs. Ricafortes phone call to the presidential residence in five instances. During these times, Mrs. Ricaforte was at the LCS office and Itchon was either beside her or in front 6 of Mrs. Ricafortes office table. Itchon pointed out in the sketch (Exh. Q ) she prepared where she was during the five times when the calls were made in her presence. The number or numbers Ricaforte called up were 736-8855 and 736-8858. Itchon testified that she knew that the numbers pertain to the numbers in the Presidential Residence because they had office records and she also tried calling the number. When she dialed the numbers she asked if it was the PMS. The answer was it was the Presidential Residence. When asked why Itchon checked and called the numbers in the first place, she answered that when she checked Mrs. Ricafortes cell phone bills, she found out that the numbers were there so she tried calling to check whether it was the Presidential Residence. When asked what was the nature or gist of the conversation from the end of Mrs. Ricaforte when she called up the Presidential residence, Itchon answered that Mrs. Ricaforte said: Malou, this is Yolly. Is the President already calling for me? If he needed me, just call me on the cell phone. According to Itchon, Malou was the secretary of FPres. Estrada and Itchon knew this because it was Mrs. Ricaforte who told her. [Ibid., pp. 18-23] According to Itchon, there were also calls made to former San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada and, in her summary, Ricaforte called up Mayor Jinggoy Estrada twenty-four (24) times. On at least five occasions, Itchon testified that she was present when Ricaforte called up Jinggoy Estrada while they [Itchon and Ricaforte] were both in the LCS office. Itchon distinctly remembered two dates of Ricafortes phone calls to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada (a) August 16, 1999 when Ricaforte called up Jinggoy in his residence because that was the first call of Ricaforte when she started concentrating as the accountant-auditor of former President Estrada in his jueteng collections; and (b) November 15, 1999 because Ricaforte called up Mayor Jinggoy several times as they were waiting for Mayor Jinggoys jueteng collection from which they would get their salaries. The cell phone number of Jinggoy Estrada was 0917-526-0217 and his landline number was 724-4736. Itchon knew that these numbers pertain to Jinggoy Estrada because she got the numbers from Gov. Singson. She got the number because she wanted to check the cell phone bills of Ricaforte because there were times that she remembered that Ricaforte had been calling the number of Jinggoy Estrada which Itchon was not aware of. [Ibid, pp. 23-28] Based on Itchons as well as the phone billings, Ricaforte called up Atty. Edward Serapio six (6) times at cell phone No. 0918-9012071. Itchon also got the number of Atty. Serapio from Gov. Singson. Based on the Smart Communications phone billings, Ricaforte called up Atty. Serapio on March 23 and 24, 2000, and April 3, 12, 13, 6 and 14, 2000. (Exh. S with submarkings) [Ibid., pp. 29-35]

According to Itchons summary, Mrs. Ricaforte called up Gov. Singson 209 times at cell phone nos. 09178387171 and 0918-9002443. Itchon was present several times when Ricaforte called up Gov. Singson. Itchon knew that these numbers pertained to Gov. Singson because she was familiar with these cell phone numbers. [Ibid, pp. 37-38] Itchon also testified to calls made by Ricaforte to a certain Romy Pineda, the brother Bong Pineda, whom she knew was a jueteng lord. Itchon testified that Ricaforte called up Romy Pineda in his landline number, 7227366. Based on the Summary that Itchon prepared, Ricaforte called up Romy Pineda twice. [Ibid, pp. 38-39] Itchon further testified that Fontain Bleau, Inc. was not able to operate because Fontain Bleau could not comply with PAGCORs requirement for a 200-room hotel accommodation so it was not issued a license to operate. After the non-issuance of the license to operate, Fontain Bleau entered into a Memorandum of 6 6 6 Agreement with RN Development Corporation on July 19, 1999 (Exhs. T , T -1 to T -2). The Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) stipulated that RN Development Corporation will reimburse all the pre-operations expenses of Fontain Bleau and that Fontain Bleau will have a 10% share from the casino that will be established by RN Development Corporation. Itchon was present during the signing of the MOA. She identified the signatures of the 6 witnesses to the MOA; namely, a certain Pax who was introduced to Itchon as Atong Angs sister (Exh. T -2-c) and 6 Yolanda Ricaforte (Exh. T -2-d). Itchon testified that she came to know Atong Ang during the negotiation of the MOA and that Atong Ang was present during the signing. As far as Itchon knew, the pre-operational expenses of Fontain Bleau was around Sixty Five Million Pesos (P65,000,000.00). This was reimbursed by RN Development Corporation to Fontain Bleau pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement. Itchon brought with her a copy of RN's deposit slip and their first payment in the 6 amount of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) (Exh. U ) and testified that the depositors signature therein was Emma Lims, one of the secretaries in the LCS office. Itchon also had a photocopies of the second check that RN paid to Fontain Bleau in the amount of Thirty Four Million Six Hundred Forty Thousand Four Hundred and Forty 6 6 Two Pesos (P34,640,442.00) (Exh. V ) and of the acknowledgement receipt (Exh. V -1) signed by Ricaforte and Atty. Manuel Singson, as Director and Corporate Secretary, respectively of Fontain Bleau. Itchon further testified that Ricaforte got the originals of these documents but Itchon had them photocopied for her record before Ricaforte took the originals. Since Fontain Bleau was unable to operate, all the employees of Fontain Bleau in the Pampanga office were terminated. It was only Itchon and Mrs. Ricaforte who were retained. [Ibid, pp. 39-58] In August 1999, Ricaforte already concentrated on being the accountant-auditor of FPres. Estrada in his jueteng operation and then Itchon was told by Gov. Singson to help Ricaforte. Nothing happened to Fontain Bleau anymore. Itchon allegedly knew that in August 1999, Ricaforte concentrated in the jueteng collection because Itchon was there when Gov. Singson briefed Ricaforte regarding the collection of the jueteng operation and she [Ricaforte] was given the code name Madam Auring by Gov. Singson. [Ibid, pp. 58-60] Itchons testimony then detailed how she participated in the jueteng collections. She was tasked to receive the jueteng collections that were brought to the office. There were also times when Itchon or Emma Lim were called by Ricaforte to help compute and count the money turned over to Ricaforte such as double checking through a calculator. Collections that Itchon received were brought by messengers of Mr. Anton Prieto and sometimes by the messengers of Gov. Singson who picked up the jueteng collections from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. Itchon knew Prietos messenger because when the messenger came, the checks were inside the white envelope with markings Menchu/Emma and then the messenger introduced himself as messenger of Anton Prieto. Itchon was also present when Gov. Singson was giving instructions to his messengers to get jueteng collections from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. Gov. Singsons messengers were Mr. Jamis Singson and Edward Iverra. Each collection was One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) per collection in cash. She remembers these collections from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada on two (2) occasions because it was from there that they (Ricaforte, Lim, Itchon and Iverra) took their salary. th th According to Itchon, these jueteng collections came in around 15 and 30 of the month. From the time that they started concentrating on the jueteng collection for the former President on August 1999, Itchon received these collections about six (6) times, covering the period August 1999 to August 2000. The total collections she received after August 1999 was around Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00). With respect to the Seven Million Peso collections that she received, there were times when Gov. Singson took the collection directly from her and there were times when Gov. Singson instructed her to turn over the collection to Ricaforte. As Accountant of Fontain

Bleau, she also received six (6) collections, for the period February 1999 to July 1999. All in all Itchon averred she received twelve (12) collections. [Ibid, pp. 61-66] Itchon also testified that Emma Lim was the secretary of Governor Singson and also a co-employee at the LCS Office. Since Emma Lim was also helping in the jueteng collections, she also received salary from Ricaforte. [Ibid, pp. 71-72] On cross examination, Itchon explained that the name of the former President allegedly did not appear in the Articles of Incorporation of Fontain Bleau because of his public position and because the source of its funds was illegal [TSN, June 24, 2002, pp. 19-20]. Emma Lim, Jamis Singson, Edward Iverra and sometimes Ricaforte collected jueteng money from Jinggoy Estrada. Jamis Singson turned over to Itchon the jueteng collection about once or twice in 2000 between January to August 2000. Itchon testified that they helped Gov. Singson count Five Million pesos (P5,000,000.00) from the jueteng collections sent through the messengers and some from the collections of Gov. Singson himself and placed the said amount of money in a black bag to be brought to FPres. Estrada but she admitted she did not see the delivery to President Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 23-30, 101] Itchon and the others at the office would allegedly wait for the call of Ricaforte to Jinggoy every pay day because their salaries would come from Jinggoys jueteng collection. Itchon was only present around five (5) times that Ricaforte called Jinggoy, although Ricaforte called Jinggoy 24 times. (Ibid, pp. 39-46) Itchon also mentioned during her cross-examination that Gov. Singson was reimbursed for the jueteng money advanced to Fontain Bleau when the latter was acquired by RN Development Corporation. RN Development Corporations partial payment in the amount of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) was deposited in the account of Fontain Bleau by Ricaforte and Ricaforte thereafter returned to Singson the said amount through a Metrobank check payable to 6 6 6 Singson. (Exhs. X , X -1, X -2) [Ibid, pp. 125-127; TSN, June 26, 2002, pp. 25-26] According to Itchon, the use by Ricaforte of the cell phone no. 0918-9021847 in the name of Itchon was proven by the cell phone number declared by Ricaforte in the bank where she deposited money (Ibid, p. 19). She admitted that she and Emma Lim were appointed by President Arroyo as Director of John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation on September 2001. (Exh. 26, 26-a to 26-c-1) [TSN, June 26, 2002, pp. 51-56] On redirect, Itchon referred to the acknowledgement receipt dated March 12, 1999 (Exh. Y-6) for the advance 7 7 7 rental of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000) as well as the landscape plan of said company (Exhs. E , E -1 to E -6) as proof that that original name of Fontain Bleau was spelled Fountain Bleau Holding, Inc. [Ibid, p. 100] 6 6 6 Smart Communications billings identified by Itchon were marked as Exhs. X , X -1 to X -2 [Ibid, pp. 1017 7 7 7 7 105]. Itchon also brought to court the journal (Exhs. A -1 to A -5) and computerized list (Exh. B , B -1 to B -3) of the pre-operation expenses of Fountain Bleau amounting to Sixty Five Million (P65,000,000.00) which were reimbursed by RN Development Corporation. She also presented the computerized list of said expenses with 7 7 7 specifics (Exh. C , C -1 to C -4) and some of the checks of Gov. Singson which were used to pay the expenses of 7 7 7 Fountain Bleau from March 3, 1999 to June 20, 1999 (Exh. D , D -1 to D -95) The funds of Fountain Bleau were taken by Gov. Singson from jueteng collections. The check covering part of the reimbursement to Fountain Bleau in the amount of Thirty Four Million Six Hundred Forty Thousand Four Hundred and Forty Two Pesos 6 (P34,640,442.00) was marked as Exh. V (with submarkings). [Ibid, pp. 106-117] VICENTE RAGIL AMISTAD (Amistad) was a Philippine National Police (PNP) officer stationed at Vigan City Police Station, assigned to former Gov. Singson since 1989 until the time of his testimony. On three (3) occasions in 1999 and 2000, Amistad was instructed by Gov. Singson to go to the house of Bong Pineda at Albany Street, Northeast Greenhills and received from Romy Pineda, Bong Pinedas brother, the followings sums of money: Seven Million Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P7,750,000.00); Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) and Three Million Two Hundred Fifty Pesos (P3,250,000.00). Amistad would bundle count, place the money in a plastic bag and bring it to Gov. Singson at LCS building, after signing a receipt prepared by Romy Pineda. [TSN, September 16, 2002, pp. 15-56] Amistad also testified that upons instruction of Singson, he went to the office of then Mayor Jinggoy Estrada at the second floor of the Municipal Hall of San Juan in 1999. After Mayor Jinggoy Estrada called up someone, he [Jinggoy] asked Amistad to go down and get what Jinggoy would give him in front of the Municipal Hall. At the ground floor, the security guard of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada gave him a package wrapped in a newspaper with scotch tape, which he brought to Gov. Singson at LCS Building. Amistad testified that he was was scolded by Gov. Singson because the money inside the package was short. Gov. Singson called up Jinggoy and informed the latter about the shortage. The following day Amistad was informed by Gov. Singson that the shortage of Jinggoy was already given to him.

JAMIS BATULAN SINGSON (Jamis) was the personal aide of Gov. Singson, who was not related to him. Jamis Singson knew FPres Estrada and Gov. Singson to be close friends who played mahjong and drank together. Jamis Singson was constantly with Gov. Singson when he delivered jueteng money to FPres Estrada. [TSN, September 18, 2002, pp. 25-31] Jamis Singson saw Gov. Singson counting the jueteng money before he placed them in a black bag which he would carry. Jamis also testified that in March 1999, he, Artates and driver Prudencio went to the house of Bong Pineda. Artates went inside the house and when he went out, he was carrying a shopping bag full of money. Jamis then transferred the money to a black bag which Gov. Singson used to deliver money to FPres. Estrada. Jamis described the black bags measurements and how it was opened from the top with a combination (lock) ( Exh. 8 0 ). The money totalled Five Million Pesos (P 5,000,000.00 ) in five (5) bundles of One Million Pesos ( P1,000,000.00 ) each. They proceed to LCS Building in San Andres to pick up Emma Lim as instructed by Gov. Singson. Inside the vehicle, Emma Lim counted the money. [Ibid, pp. 68-81] They went to the Polk Street house of FPres. Estrada but the latter was not home. While having lunch at a restaurant, Emma Lim received a call from Gov. Singson instructing them to go to Malacaang. Emma Lim alighted from the vehicle with the black bag and entered passing through the guard house in going to the Presidential residence. They waited outside. Emma Lim asked to be fetched later and she was no longer holding the black bag. [TSN, ibid, pp. 83-90] Jamis also testified to one occasion in the middle of 1999 when he himself was instructed by Gov. Singson to collect money from the house of Bong Pineda. That time Jamis received Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00) in a shopping bag from Romeo Romy Pineda. Romy made Jamis sign a blue book and then Jamis brought the money to Gov. Singson in the latters office. [Ibid, pp. 91-101] Jamis also testified he collected jueteng money from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada twice on Gov. Singsons instructions. For the first occasion, on or about October 1999 Jamis went to the office of then Mayor Jinggoy Estrada at the second floor Municipal Hall of San Juan at around 4pm to 5 pm. Inside the said office, Jinggoy Estradas bodyguard Nestor showed a sando plastic bag to Jinggoy Estrada and after that Jamis saw Jinggoy pointing to him [Jamis]. Jamis brought the plastic bag, which Jamis subsequently saw contained an indeterminable amount of money, to Singson at the latters office. [Ibid, pp. 105-121] The second time Jamis collected jueteng money from Jinggoy Estrada was immediately after the first time, in the evening.Thus, Gov. Singson instructed Jamis to proceeed to the house of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada in Greenhills. At Mayor Jinggoys house, Jamis again received a plastic sando bag from Nestor. Jamis brought the bag to Gov. Singsons office and handed it to Menchu (Ma. Carmencita) Itchon as Gov. Singson instructed. Jamis identified Menchu in Court. He said she was the companion of Ricaforte in the office. [Ibid., pp. 121-132] ATTY. DAVID JONATHAN YAP (Atty. Yap), the Senate Legal Counsel, testified that he acted as the Deputy Clerk of the Senate Impeachment Court. Among others, his office was in charge of receiving all documents and pleadings relating to the impeachment trial. He was in charge of marking the Exhs. requested by the parties and keeping them in custody. He brought to this Court in compliance with a subpoena a fifteen (15)paged document marked in this case as prosecutions Exhs. A-4 to A-4-L [TSN, September 25, 2002, p. 63] He identified his signatures that he affixed on the Exhibits on December 7, 2002. He testified that he saw Yolanda Ricaforte when she brought those documents to the Senate Impeachment Court in compliance with a subpoena dated December 5, 2000 (Exh. E) issued by Chief Justice Davide. Atty. Yap was present when Ricaforte took her 5 oath on the witness stand on December 7, 2000 He identified Ricaforte from a photograph (Exh. A6-V -1). The Original documents were placed in a vault inside his office, where they had been kept and deposited since they were turned to him during the impeachment trial, except only when they were sent over to the Sandiganbayan as requested. [Ibid., p. 77] Atty. Yap was at the back of Yolanda Ricaforte at the Senate Impeachment Trial when she gave her testimony that the ledger she brought is an ordinary listahan. [TSN, Senate Impeachment Trial, p. 144; see also TSN of these cases,September 25, 2002, pp. 78-79] EDELQUINN DE GUZMAN NANTES (Nantes) was the Branch Manager of Equitable-PCI Bank, Scout Tobias-Timog Branch on September 1, 1999. Nantes knew Yolanda Ricaforte because the latter was a client of the bank. Ricaforte told Nantes that she [Ricaforte] was in the real estate and fish pond business. Nantes personally attended to Ricaforte when the latter opened checking and savings account with the branch on September 1, 1999. She asked Ricaforte to fill up all the required documents for opening current and savings accounts such as the signature cards for Current Account No. 0107-00638-9 and Savings Account No. 0157-04227-0. (Exhs. A-6, A-6-a and A-6-b) [TSN, May 22, 2002, pp. 67-72]

Ricaforte opened one checking account, one savings account, seven special savings accounts and a PCI Emerald Fund. The initial amount of deposit in the savings account was Seventeen Million Two hundred Five Thousand Pesos (P17,205,000.00) as shown by the deposit slip for Savings Account No. 0517-042227 (Exh. A-6-aa). The Seventeen Million Two Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P17,210,000.00) was in check payable to cash. The Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) was deposited in the checking account No. 0107-001638-9 (Exh. A-6-bb) and the balance of Seventeen Million Two Hundred Five Thousand Pesos (P17,205,000) was deposited in the savings account. [Ibid, pp. 80-85] There were deposits made on the savings account of Ricaforte after the initial deposit. Nantes presented and identified the deposit slips and the statement of accounts of Ricaforte (Exh. A-6 and submarkings) which were: Deposit Slip dated September 1, 1999 (Exh. A-6-aa) with the amount of Seventeen Million Two Hundred Five Thousand Pesos (P17,205,000.00); Deposit Slip dated September 7, 1999 (Exh. A-6-cc) with the amount of Three Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P3,700,000.00); Deposit Slip dated September 29, 1999 (Exh. A-6dd) with the amount of One Million Six Hundred Ninety Seven Thousand Pesos (P1,697,000.00); Deposit Slip dated September 7, 1999 (Exh. A-6-ee) with the amount of Ten Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P10,400,000.00); Deposit Slip dated September 15, 1999 (Exh. A-6-ff) with the amount of Five Million Seven Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P5,775,000.00); Deposit Slip dated September 17, 1999 (Exh. A-6-gg) with the amount of Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P750,000.00); Deposit Slip dated October 4, 1999 (Exh. A-6hh) with the amount of Nine Million Fifty Thousand Pesos (P9,050,000.00); Deposit Slip dated October 19, 1999 (Exh. A-6-ii) with the amount of Six Million Six Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P6,650,000.00); Deposit Slip dated November 4, 1999 (Exh. A-6-jj) with the amount of Six Million Nine Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (P6,930,000.00); Deposit Slip dated November 16, 1999 (Exh. A-6-kk) with the amount of Four Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P4,600,000.00); Deposit Slip dated November 19, 1999 (Exh. A-6-ll) with the amount of One Million Seven Hundred Eleven Thousand Pesos (P1,711,000.00); Deposit Slip dated December 7, 1999 (Exh. A-6-mm) with the amount of Nine Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P989,150.00); Deposit Slip dated January 10, 2000 (Exh. A-6-2) with the amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00); and a deposit slip (Exh. A-6-3) with the amount of Two Million Four Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos (P2,460,000.00). Bank statements reflected withdrawals (Exhs. A-6-nn to A-6-zz) from the savings account for the period September 30, 1999 to October 31, 2000. [Ibid, pp. 87-97] With respect to the Current Account No. 0107-00638-9, witness identified the specimen signature card (Exh. A-6-a and A-6) to show that the initial deposit slip was Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) (Exh. A-6-bb). [Ibid, p. 98] Ricaforte signed in the presence of Nantes the Authority to Debit and Transfer Funds (Exh. A-6-G) which allowed funds to be automatically transferred from savings to current account to cover checks issued. [TSN dated May 27, 2002, pp. 11-16] The initial deposit for the First Special Savings Account No. 0157-90392-6 was Seventy Million Pesos 3 (P70,000,000.00) as shown by the Special Savings Passbook (Exh. A-6-S ) of Ricaforte dated December 2, 1999. The account was closed on April 13, 2000. It had a balance of Seventy One Million Three Hundred Ninety Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy Five and Eight Centavos (P71,390,875.08) which was transferred to Ricafortes regular Savings Account. [Ibid, pp. 22-24, 43] In the Second Special Savings Account covered by Special Savings Passbook No. 392093 dated February 7, 2000 3 (Exh. A-6-X ) showed the initial deposit of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) was taken from the regular savings account. A withdrawal of the whole amount of Ten Million One Hundred Thirteen Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty Six Pesos and Fifty Seven Centavos (P10,113,836.57) was made on April 13, 2000 reflected in the Credit Advice dated April 13, 2000 (Exh. A-6-ZZZ). [Ibid, pp. 49-60] The Third Special Savings Account was opened on March 29, 2000 for Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00). The money was taken from her regular Savings Account No. 0157-04427-0. The amount of Two Million Five Hundred One Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Six Pesos and Sixty Six Centavos (P2,501,666.66) was withdrawn from the special savings account as shown by the certified true copy of the Credit Advice dated April 4 13, 2000 (Exh. A-6-C ). [Ibid, pp. 84, 93-95] The Fourth Special Savings Account No. 3157-00073-9 covered by the Special Savings Passbook No. 4 392178 (Exh A-6-E ) had an initial deposit of Nine Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P9,700,000.00) as 4 found in the deposit receipt dated April 5, 2000 (Exh A-6-D ). On April 13, 2000, the Special Savings was cancelled and preterminated. The amount of Nine Million Seven Hundred Three Thousand (P9,703,000) was credited to Savings Account No. 0157-04227-0. [Ibid, pp. 115-124]

The Fifth Special Savings Account (Exh. A-6-G ) which was opened on May 29, 2000 under the name of Yolanda T. Ricaforte had an initial deposit of Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00). The initial deposit was withdrawn from her regular Savings Account. The Special Savings was closed on September 4, 2000 and the amount of Two Million Five Hundred Fifty Nine Thousand Four Hundred Eleven Pesos and Twenty Centavos (P2,559,411.20) was credited to her Regular Savings Account 0157-04227-0. [Ibid, pp. 128-129, 135, 138] 4 The Sixth Special Savings Account (Exh. A-6-L ), under the name of Yolanda T. Ricaforte, was opened on May 4, 2000 for One Million Nine Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,900,000.00). The account was closed on 4 September 4, 2000 as per Debit Advice dated September 4, 2000 (Exh. A-6-P ) for the matured Special Savings Account worth Two Million Twenty Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty Nine Pesos and Eighteen Centavos (P2,022,429.18). [Ibid, pp. 147153] 4 The Seventh Special Savings Account No. 3157-00088-7 dated June 1, 2000 (Exh. A-6-Q ) was worth Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) in cash. The account was closed on September 4, 2000 and the proceeds were 4 credited to the Regular Savings Account No. 0157-04227-0. The balance (Exh. A-6-T ) then was Two Million Thirty Five Thousand Thirty Five Pesos and Ninety One Centavos (P2,035,035.91). [Ibid, pp. 156, 166] The PCI Emerald Fund was in the amount of Six Million Six Hundred Sixteen Thousand Six Hundred 4 4 Seventy Six Pesos and Nineteen Centavos (P6,616,676.19) (Exh. A-6-U and Exh. A-6-V ). The fund was then 4 rolled-over monthly as evidenced by the Confirmation letter (Exh. A-6-Z ) dated December 6, 2000. It was again rolled-over several times until it was redeemed on June 5, 2002. [Ibid, p. 168, 176 -193] The first four Special Savings Accounts were all debited on April 13, 2000 and Ricaforte purchased a Cashiers Check payable to Cash for Ninety One Million Pesos (P91,000,000). The Application for Cashiers check 5 5 5 (Exh. A-6- R ) was signed by Ricaforte as purchaser. The Cashiers check (Exh. A-6- S and Exh. A-6-U ) was cleared and accepted by Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Pacific Star Branch, based on the dorsal portion of the check. The last three Special Savings Accounts (Special Savings Account Nos. 3157-00077-1, 3157-00080-1, and 3157-00088-7) were closed on September 4, 2000 and all the proceeds were credited to the regular savings account, and then invested in the PCI Emerald Fund for Six Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P6,600,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 168, 206-207] Nantes met Ricaforte more than twenty times and identified the latter through a picture shown by the 5 prosecution. (Exh. A-6-V ) [TSN, May 29, 2002, pp. 16-20] 5 The current account balance is at Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) (Exh. A-6-W ) and that of the Savings Account is One Hundred Ninety Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Six and Sixty Nine Centavos (P197,736.69) 5 (Exh. A-6-X ). The last withdrawal from the savings account was made on October 5, 2000 for automatic transfer to the current account in the amount of Seventy Nine Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Four and Eighty Centavos (P79,664.80). The last deposit was on October 4, 2000, through a credit memorandum of Thirty Seven Thousand Twenty Nine Pesos and Seventeen Centavos (P37,029.17) which represented the interest of the PCI Emerald Fund. After October 5, 2000 there were no more counter transactions, only the entry of interest earned and withholding tax. [Ibid, pp. 23-27] ROSARIO SALUDO BAUTISTA (Bautista) is the Senior Branch Manager of the Equitable, PCI Bank, Diliman, Matalino Branch. Bautista personally attended to Yolanda Ricaforte who was a walk-in client of the branch on November 19, 1999. Ricaforte opened a savings account and used her California drivers license and passport for identification. The duly accomplished specimen signature card (Exh. A-7-z) was presented to show the existence of the savings account. It was personally accomplished by Mrs. Ricaforte in the presence of Bautista. The initial deposit of Mrs. Ricaforte was Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) in cash. [TSN, May 29, 2000, pp. 93-96] Ricaforte returned to the branch on November 22, 1999. She opened a combo account and closed the savings account she opened on November 19, 1999. The combo account was Savings Account Number 028802037-0 and Current Account Number 0238-00853-0. As a new account, Bautista required Mrs. Ricaforte to accomplish signature cards (Exh. A-7 and A-7-a). When the combo account was already opened, Ricaforte presented for deposit two (2) checks totaling Seventy Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00). Each check (Exh. A-7-B and A-7-C) was payable to cash for Thirty Five Million Pesos (P35,000,000.00). The drawer was William T. Gatchalian and the drawee bank was PCI Bank, main office in Makati City. Ricaforte told Bautista that the money came from the proceeds of the sale of a prime property sold to Mr. Gatchalian. As precautionary measure, the branch of Bautista checked with the drawee bank PCI Makati and they learned that Gatchalians account was a good account.

There were additional deposits made to the account. One deposit made on November 23, 1999 was a check (Exh. A-7-h) issued by Governor Luis Gov. Singson dated November 22, 1999 for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) payable to cash. The drawee bank was Metro Bank, Ayala. The second check deposit made was on December 16, 1999 payable to cash with PNB, Naga Branch as drawee bank. The check (Exh. A-7-i) was dated December 9, 1999. The check was deposited and subsequently cleared. On December 2, 1999, Ricaforte deposited Three Million Fifty Thousand Pesos (P3,050,000.00) in cash (Exh. A-7-d). The cash was in big bills, P1,000 and P500 denominations. Ricaforte explained to Bautista that the amount came from other accounts in other banks because she planned to transfer all her other accounts to Equitable, Diliman, Matalino Branch. Another cash deposit (Exh. A-7-f and Exh. A-7-aa) was made on January 28, 2000 for One Million Pesos. [Ibid, pp. 100-130] Ricaforte also opened a special saving account number 3288-00079-3 in the amount of Seventy Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00). The initial deposit was taken from Ricafortes savings account (Exh. A-7-j). The account was opened with passbook number 394979 (Exh. A-7-bb) and the specimen signature card (Exh. A-7-cc). The account has already been closed. [Ibid, pp. 132-135] On February 24, 2000, Mrs. Ricaforte again transferred Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000) from her ordinary savings account to a special savings account deposit (Exh. A-7-w) with Account Number 3288-00087-4. Ricaforte also accomplished a specimen signature card (Exh. A-7-dd) for the Special Savings Account. On April 13, 2000 Mrs. Ricaforte applied for a Sevety Seven Million Peso (P77,000,000) cashiers check against her special savings deposit account. She accomplished an application form (Exh. A-7-l) for the transaction. Ricaforte had to accomplish a deed of undertaking (Exh. A-7-n) because the cashiers check was payable to cash. The cashiers check (Exh. A-7-ee) was deposited on April 25, 2000 at the Pacific Star Branch of Equitable PCI Bank in Makati. The name and account number were not indicated on the check. [Ibid, pp. 148 -159] Mrs. Ricaforte always dealt with Bautista as the Bank Manager for her transactions. Bautista identified Ricaforte as the one wearing red (Exh. A-6-vvvvv-1) when shown a group picture. Bautista also identified the girl beside Mrs. Ricaforte as Mrs. Itchon, one of the witnesses in the impeachment proceedings. Aside from the personal visits of Mrs. Ricaforte, Bautista also called her on cell phone no. 0918-9021847 or home landline 9518854 whenever there was a maturity or an updating of interest. [Ibid, pp. 162-168] At the time of Bautistas testimony, the balance in the account of Ricaforte was around Two Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,200,000.00). It is still earning interest. SHAKIRA CASTRILLO YU (Yu) was the Manager of Equitable PCI Bank, Pedro Gil-Robinsons Branch since it opened on August 1999. Yu knew Yolanda T. Ricaforte as she was one of their depositors. Ricaforte told Yu that she was connected with Fil-East Travel and Tours which is located at the second floor of the Manila Midtown Hotel. Ricaforte first opened a Regular Savings Account, participated in the Reverse Repurchase Agreement and subsequently opened a Special Savings Account. Ricaforte opened the Regular Savings Account on January 6, 2000. It was Ms. Evelyn Ponce, the Cash Operations Officer who attended to her as Yu was not around. Yu brought with her the specimen signature card (Exh. A-8-P) for Savings Account No. 027602029-3 and the New Accounts Record (Exh. A-8-Q) which were filled out by Ricaforte. [TSN, June 3, 2002, pp. 85-92] The initial deposit (Exh. A-8-Q-3) of the Regular Savings Account was Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) in cash (Exh. A-8-R). When witness asked Ricaforte where the initial deposit came from, Ricaforte said it was proceeds of a sale of a property. [Ibid, pp. 97-100] Other deposits made to the Regular Savings Account were the following: a check deposit amounting to Two Million Nine Hundred Sixty-Five Thousand (P2,965,000) with Governor Luis Chavit Singson as drawer; a cash deposit of One Million Five Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (P1,540,000) deposited on January 25, 2000 and a One Million Three Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (P1,340,000) check deposit (Exh. A-8-D) with Governor Singson as drawer (Exh. A-8-D-1). [Ibid, pp. 101-112] On January 31, 2000, Ricaforte told Yu that she wanted to earn higher interest so witness advised her to participate in the Reverse Repurchase. Ricaforte asked Yu to debit her Regular Savings Account for about Eight Million Nine Hundred Thousand Pesos (P8,900,000.00) (Exh. A-8-P). On February 29, 2000 Ricaforte informed Yu that she did not want the Reverse Repurchase and she wanted a bank product that earned a higher interest with passbook as documentation. The Certificate of Participation without Recourse (Exh. A-8-F) was then paid on February 29, 2000 in the amount of Eight Million Nine Hundred Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty-Two Pesos and Eighty Two Centavos (P8,940,752.82).

Yu then advised Ricaforte to open a Special Savings Account. They took out her participation in the Reverse Repurchase for P8,900,000.00 plus interest and Ricaforte asked them to debit more or less One Million Fifty-One Thousand Pesos (P1,051,000.00) from her Regular Savings Account because she wanted her Special Savings Account to be in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). The specimen signature card of the Special Savings Account and the Credit Memo (Exh. A-8-G) under the account name Yolanda Ricaforte for the Account No. 276-90238-5 dated 2/29/2000 were shown as evidence of the existence of the account. The three signatures appearing in the card belonged to Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte signed in front of Yu. Subsequently, Ricaforte withdrew her Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) plus interest from the Special Savings Account and transferred the amount to her Regular Savings Account. The Special Savings passbook of Mrs. Ricaforte (Exh. A-8-H) contained the entry Out of Return P10,019,555,55. [Ibid, 113-120] On April 13, 2000, Ricaforte applied for a cashiers check in the amount of Eleven Million Pesos (P11,000,000) debited to her Regular Savings Account. The application for Cashiers check (Exh. A-8-I), the receiving copy of the Cashiers check, the Letter of Undertaking and Cashiers check (Exh. A-8-T) were all presented. The Application for Cashiers Check stated that the Cashiers Check is allowed to be payable to cash except that the bank will not be held responsible for the loss thereof or a demand for a refund or replacement. It is no longer allowed starting around July or August 2000. Ricaforte instructed Yu to transfer Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) from her Regular Savings Account on May 23, 2000 to her Special Savings Account to earn higher interest. A Special Savings Account Passbook (Exh. A-8-L) was issued to Mrs. Ricaforte which credited the Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) to the Special Savings Account. [Ibid, pp.120-127] At present, the outstanding balance of the Special Savings Account is more or less Six Hundred Thirty Four Thousand Pesos (P634,000.00). The regular Savings Account has an outstanding balance of more or less Sixty-Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P69,800.00). After being shown a photograph, Yu identified Yolanda Ricaforte as the person wearing maroon or red in 5 the picture (Exh. A-6-Z ). Yu was able to talk to Mrs. Ricaforte over the phone around six (6) times. She used the cell phone number indicated in the records. [Ibid, pp. 128-132] VERGEL LEJARDE PABILLON (Pabillon) knew a person by the name of Yolanda Ricaforte because Ricaforte opened regular Savings Account No. 0193-61496-8 and Special Savings Account No. 02193-15050-3 with Equitable PCI Bank T.M. Kalaw Branch on February 8, 2000 while Pabillon was still manager of the branch. Ricaforte mentioned to Pabillon that she was connected with a certain company under the name of Phil. East Travel and Tours located at Ramada Hotel, Mabini. She handed her California Drivers license as identification card and signed the specimen signature cards about one foot away from the witness. Pabillon brought the Individual Account Record (Exh. A-9-C) and the signature cards signed by Mrs. Ricaforte as evidence of the Account. The initial deposit made were in the form of a PNB Managers Check (Exh. A-9-A) in the amount of Ten Million Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Seven Pesos and Seventy-Eight Centavos (P10,007,777.78) and One Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,400,000.00) in cold cash. Eleven Million Pesos (P11,000,000.00) of that amount was placed in the Special Savings Account and Four Hundred Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Seven Pesos and Seventy Eight Centavos (P407,777.78) was placed under the Regular Savings Account. [TSN, June 5, 2002, pp. 98-109] On April 13, 2000, Mrs. Ricaforte went to the bank and informed the witness that she needed Eleven Million Pesos (P11,000,000.00) in the form of managers check, payable to cash, to be taken out from the existing Special Savings Account No. 02193-6-15050-3. The managers check dated April 13, 2000 payable to cash was presented (Exh. A-9-B). Ricaforte had to sign a Purchasers Undertaking bearing her name as purchaser. (Exh. A9-F) [Ibid, pp. 113-127] Mrs. Ricaforte opened a third account, Special Savings Accounts No. 02-193-15177-1, in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). A debit memo (Exh. A-9-G) showed the transfer of the P500,000 from the regular Savings Account 0193-64196-8 to the special savings account. On August 31, 2000, Mrs. Ricaforte went to the bank and requested for another Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Peso (P250,000.00) managers check payable to her to be deducted from Special Savings Account No. 02193-15177-1. A bank document which served as a registered copy of the issuance of the managers check was presented. (Exh. A-9-H) [Ibid, pp. 128-129] 5 Pabillon identified Ricaforte from a group photograph (Exh. A-6-B ) [Ibid, pp. 133-134]

The witness availed of the early retirement offered by Equitable PCI. He testified in the impeachment trial even if he was already supposed to go on early retirement because he just wanted to tell the truth regarding what transpired to the opening of the account of Mrs. Ricaforte. [TSN, June 10, 2002, pp. 54-56] EDGARDO LIM ALCARAZ (Alcaraz) was the branch manager of Equitable PCIBank, Scout Albano branch for almost three years. He met Yolanda Ricaforte because she was one of their clients. She opened three accounts with the bank on March 2, 2000 and he was the one who personally attended to her. These were savings account and current account under the automatic transfer facility and a special savings account. Alcaraz testified on documents to show that Yolanda Ricaforte opened these three accounts, such as the individual account record which showed information about Ricaforte, her special instructions and the summary of the accounts that she opened. The other documents pertained to the specimen signature cards signed by Ricaforte for Checking Account No. 5732-01-975-7, Savings Account No. 5733-15154-3 and Special Savings Account No. 5733-00721-0. Ricaforte submitted her local drivers license and her California drivers license for identification. She told witness that she was engaged in the prawn business in Iloilo. Alcaraz contacted Ricaforte two or three times using the numbers she wrote in the account record. He also had a calling card from Ricaforte (Exh. A-10-F). [TSN, June 10, 2002, pp. 79-84] The initial deposit in cash for the savings account opened by Ricaforte was One Million Nine Hundred Ninety Five Thousand (P1,995,000.00). The initial deposit for Checking Account 5732-01-975-7 was Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). The initial deposit for Special Savings Account No. 5733-0721-0 was Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000). Copies of the deposit slips (Exhs. A-10-G, A-10-H, A-10-I) [Ibid. pp. 97-99] On April 12, 2000, Ricaforte pre-terminated the special savings account. This is shown by its passbook (Exh. A-10J). A credit memo (Exh. A-10-L) showed that Ricaforte requested that the proceeds of the special savings account be credited under the Savings Account No. 5733-15154-3. On the same day, Mrs. Ricaforte applied for a managers check in the amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) payable to bearer. The application form for managers check (Exh. A-10-C), the proof sheet copy of the managers check (Exh. A-10-K) and the copy of the check were presented (Exh. A-10-M). [Ibid, pp.102-108] As of the time of Alcaraz testimony, the regular savings account still existed with an outstanding balance of One Hundred Three Thousand Pesos (P103,000.00). The checking account was still active with an outstanding balance of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). With respect to the checking account, Ricaforte issued a check in the amount of P500,000.00 on March 12, 2000. Since the accounts are automatic transfer accounts, the funds from the savings account were automatically transferred to the checking account. [Ibid, pp. 100-101] EMMA AVILA GONZALES (Gonzales) had been the Branch Manager of Equitable Savings Bank, Isidora Hills Branch for more than three years up to time she testified in this Court. Gonzales knew a person by the name of Yolanda Ricaforte who was one of the clients of the bank. She first met Ricaforte on March 15, 2000 when she opened a special savings account with the branch. She walked into the bank, approached the witness and told her that she wanted to open an account and that she was a valued client of other branches of Equitable Savings Bank. The specimen signature card (Exh. A-11) and deposit slip (Exh. A-11-A) were shown to prove the opening of the special savings account. The initial deposit was Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) cash, in ten bundles of five hundred (500) peso bills. Ricaforte said she was a businesswoman but did not specify the kind of business she was engaged in. With respect to the initial deposit of Ricaforte, the account is still outstanding. The original copy of the Equitable Special Savings Passbook No. 123727 (Exh. A-11-I) shows the outstanding balance to be Five Hundred Ninety Three Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Six Pesos and Thirty Two Centavos (P593,496.32) as of June 10, 2002. The difference in the amount was the interest earned from the time it was opened. There was no movement of the fund except for the interest. [TSN, June 10, 2002, pp. 162-169, June 17, 2002, p. 10] Ricaforte also opened Special Savings Account No. 077090498-6 (Exh. A-11-H and Exh. A-11-D) amounting to Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00). The initial deposit was an MBTC (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.) Ayala Branch Check No. 1070. It was payable in cash and the drawer was Governor Luis Chavit Singson. It was cleared after three days. The account was pre-terminated on April 14, 2000. The withdrawal slip (Exh. A-11-E) showed that the amount withdrawn was Seven Million Nineteen Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Six Pesos and Eleven Centavos (P7,019,736.11). Ricaforte received the payment in the form of a Cashiers check (Exh. A-11-F) payable to cash in the amount of Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00) and cash in the amount of Nineteen Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Six Pesos and Eleven Centavos (P19,736.11). The dorsal portion of the Cashiers check showed that it was deposited in Equitable Banking Corporation, Makati Pacific Star. On the other hand, the amount of

Nineteen Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Six Pesos and Eleven Centavos (P19,736.11) cash was used to open regular Savings Account No. 0770009375 (Exh. A-11-I). The latest bank statement (Exh. A-11-J) showed that the account still existed but the balance was no longer Nineteen Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Six Pesos and Eleven Centavos (P19,736.11). [TSN, June 10, 2002, pp. 172-189] Witness was able to verify the phone number given by Mrs. Ricaforte because when she called the number, Mrs. Ricaforte answered the phone. [TSN, June 17, 2002, pp. 11-13] ANTONIO MARTIN SAGRITALO FORTUNO (Fortuno) was the Bank Operations Officer of Equitable PCI Bank, Pacific Star Branch since January 28, 2002. The witness averred that he handled the opening of accounts; supervised the investment section; the foreign telegraphic transfer as well as the domestic telegraphic transfer and the safekeeping of the records of deposits; and other transactions which transpired in their branch. Fortuno brought with him documents relating to the deposit of six (6) cashiers/managers checks in the total amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) to the Pacific Star Branch and the transfer of these funds from cashiers checks to the account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation in the 100 Strata Branch of Equitable PCI Bank. [TSN dated September 27, 2002, p. 127] 9 He identified an Acknowledgement Letter [Exh. I , with sub markings; Exh. 16-a (Serapio)] dated April 25, 2000 addressed to Atty. Edward Serapio from Beatriz L. Bagsit, who was then Division Head of the Makati Area. The letter acknowledged receipt of six (6) checks for deposit on a staggered basis and on various different dates to the account of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation maintained at the Ortigas Strata Branch. The checks were as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. PCIBank Managers Check NO. 573-000035822 dated April 12, 2000 for P3 Million (Exh. A-10-m); PCIBank Managers Check No. 019L-000061146 dated April 13, 2000 for P11 Million (Exh. A-9-b); Equitable Bank Cashiers Check No. 0226-00949 dated April 13, 2000 for P11 Million (Exh. A-8-t); Equitable Bank Cashiers Check No. 0238-000941 dated April 13, 2000 for P77 Million (Exh. A-7-ee); 5 Equitable Bank Cashiers Check No.107-013064 dated April 13, 2000 for P91 Million; (Exh. A-6-r ) Equitable Bank Cashiers Check No.6720-00042 dated April 14, 2000 for P7 Million; (Exh. A-11-g)
9

Fortuno also identified the passbook for Bearer Account No. 0279-04225-5 (Exh. J , with sub markings) which was opened on April 25, 2000. A bearer account is an account wherein there is no name mentioned in the account. According to Fortuno, the six (6) managers checks were the managers checks that were deposited on April 25, 2000 in the bearer account for the total amount of Two Hundred Million (P200,000,000.00). According the witness, the instruction in the letter was to deposit the funds on a staggered basis and they can do so if they first deposit all the checks simultaneously for the three-day clearing. On the basis of debit memos, managers check applications, detailed report transaction and deposit slips or receipts, the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) was gradually withdrawn from the bearer account and transferred to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation from April 27, 2000 to May 11, 2000. The six (6) checks were deposited in Bearer Account No. 0279-04225-5 of which fourteen (14) 9 9 withdrawals in Managers Checks (Exh. K to X , with sub markings) were made in various amounts and these withdrawals were further divided into twenty-eight (28) deposits into the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Each withdrawal was divided into two deposits, as shown by the Account Information Slips, Deposit Receipts and 9 9 Detailed Report for Transfers and Debit/Credit Memos (DRTM) (See Exhs. K to X , with sub markings) brought by the witness. [Ibid, pp. 32-96] The bearer account was closed on November 14, 2000 as evidenced by the Fund Transfer Memo (Exh. 9 Z ), and contained the interest for Ninety Seven Thousand Three Hundred Ninety Two Pesos (P97,392) which was transferred to the account of the Foundation. [Ibid, pp. 97-98] AIDA TUAZON BASALISO (Basaliso) was the operations officer of Equitable PCIBank, Ortigas-Strata 100 Branch since July 1997. She brought with her bank documents on the accounts of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation maintained at the Equitable PCIBank, Strata-Ortigas Branch including the inter-branch deposits from the Equitable PCIBank, Pacific Star Branch for the total amount of P200 million to the Account No. 0192-85835-6 in the name of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. 10 The signature card for Savings Account No. 0192-85702-3 (Exh. A ) of the Treasurer-in trust has the signature of 10 Mr. George Go, the former Chairman of the Board of the bank. The list of Contribution (Exh. B ) also had the

signature of the treasurer, Mr. George Go. The two documents were given to Basaliso by Catherine Mercado, someone who usually transacted business at the branch. Witness also identified the Signature Cards of the Savings and Checking Accounts of the Erap Muslim Youth 10 Foundation. On the signature cards (Exh. C ) pertaining to the Savings Account No. 0192-85835-6, the signatures of Mr. Raul De Guzman, Mr. George Go, Mr. Edward Serapio and Mr. Danilo Reyes, Ms. Mila Reforma appear. Two signature cards were needed for the same account because the corporation consisted of five (5) signatories. 10 10 The signature cards (Exh. D and Exh. D -1) for current Account No. 0142-62890-2 showed the signatures of the same five persons. 10 She identified the Secretarys Certificate (Exh. E ) showing that the Corporate Secretary was Edward S. 10 Serapio, the Certificate of Incorporation with SEC Registration No. 2000002526 (Exh. F ) and the Articles of 10 10 Incorporation (Exh. G ) and the by-laws (Exh. H ). 10 Witness also testified on a debit memo (Exh. I ) dated April 20,2000 in Savings Account No. 019285702-3 amounting to One Hundred Thousand Two Hundred One Pesos and Ten Centavos (P100,201.10) and credited 10 (Exh. I -2) to 014262890-2 the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for the opening of the checking 10 account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation and a Credit Advice (Exh. I -1) to Savings Account No. 0192858356 amounting to Ninety Thousand Two Hundred One Pesos and Ten Centavos (P90,201.10) to open the savings account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Basaliso also testified on no book cash deposits made to the savings account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. No book meant that the deposit was made by the depositor without bringing his savings passbook. 10 10 DRTM (Detailed Report of Transfer Debit and Credit memos) (Exhs. J to R ) were presented to show the transactions. The following deposits were made: Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) total deposit on April 27, 2000, Six Million Seven Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P6,725,000.00) and Eight Million Two Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P8,275,000.00) on April 28, 2000, Five Million One Hundred Eight Thousand Pesos (P5,108,000.00) and Nine Million Eight Hundred Ninety Two Thousand Pesos (P9,892,000.00) totaling Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) on May 2, 2000, Three Million Ninety One Thousand Four Hundred Fifty Pesos (P3,091,450.00) and Six Million Nine Hundred Eight Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P6,908,550.00) totaling Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) on May 3, 2000, Six Million One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Two Hundred Twenty Five Pesos (P6,118,225.00) and Eight Million Eight Hundred Eighty One Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Five Pesos (P8,881,775.00) totaling Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) on May 4, 2000, Five Million Nine Hundred Thirty Six Thousand Pesos (P5,936,000.00) and Nine Million Sixty Four Thousand Pesos (P9,064,000.00) totaling Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) on May 8, 2000, Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00) and Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00) totaling Fifteen Million Pesos on May 9, 2000, Seven Million Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P7,250,000.00), Seven Million Three Hundred Ninety Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P7,399,800.00), Nine Million Three Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P9,375,000.00), Nine Million Four Hundred Forty Nine Thousand Four Hundred Pesos (P9,449,400.00), Nine Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P9,600,000.00) and Eleven Million Nine Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P11,925,800.00) totaling to Fifty Five Million (P55,000,000.00) on May 10, 2000, Six Hundred Thirty Four Thousand Pesos (P634,000.00), Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00), Three Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P3,800,000.00), Five Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P5,200,000.00), Nine Million One Hundred Thirty Nine Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Pesos (P9,139,280.00), Nine Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P9,500,000.00), Nine Million Eight Hundred Thirty Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P9,836,500.00) and Nine Million Eight Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty Pesos (P9,889,720.00) totaling about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) on May 11, 2000. There was also a credit memo made on November 14, 2000 amounting to Ninety Seven Thousand Three Hundred Ninety Two Pesos and 10 Fifty Centavos (P97,392.50) (Exh. S ). Bank statements pertaining to the periods April 1-28, 2000 up to December 2000, except statements for July, August and October were presented. At the time of Basalisos testimony, the current account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation with a 10 balance of Eight Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P8,600.00) (Exh. T ) was dormant. The Savings Account No. 019285835-6 was inactive with a balance of Two Hundred Seven Million One Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Three 10 Pesos and Fifty Three Centavos (P207,001,883.53) (Exh. U ). Witness also testified that any two persons out of the five signatories of the Foundation were authorized to transact regarding the accounts. Based on record, the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) 10 was deposited into the account without a single centavo being lost. The passbook [See Exh. U ,36(Serapio)] had

a balance of Two Hundred Seven Million One Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Three Pesos and Fifty Three Centavos (P207,001,888.53) because it already earned interest. There were no withdrawals from the Savings and Current Account from the time they were opened. [TSN dated October 2, 2002 and October 7, 2002] ATTY. CECILIO ALEJANDRO VILLANUEVA (Villanueva) is the assistant Corporate Secretary of PAGCOR. Witness brought with him the Minutes No. 36 of PAGCORs Regular Board Meeting dated September 5, 2000, under Agenda Item No. 002646 of the Best World Gaming and Entertainment Corporation Cancellation of 15 Quick Pick bingo and conduct of PAGCORs Two Balls Bingo Games (Exh. S ). Witness brought with him pp. 2830 with referred to Item Agenda No. 002646. Villanuevas testimony was offered corroborate the testimony of Gov. Singson that the consultancy firm of Atong Ang will receive 6% of the gross income from Bingo Two Balls. On cross examination, witness testified that he has no personal knowledge whether the Bingo 2 Balls was actually implemented. [TSN dated December 2, 2002 and TSN dated December 4, 2002] MARIANITO MANIGBAS DIMAANDAL (Dimaandal) was the Assistant Director of the Malacaang Records Department since 1993. Dimaandal identified the appointment papers of Atty. Serapio as Presidential Assistant 10 for Political affairs, Office of the Presidential Adviser for Political Affairs (Exh. V ) and Mr. Orestes Ricaforte as 10 Undersecretary, Department of Tourism (Exh. W ) and the assumption into office by Ms. Yolanda Ricaforte to the 10 PCGG representing the San Miguel Campo Creo Group (Exh. X ). 10 Witness also brought a Certification (Exh. Y ) issued by the Office of the President that the phone numbers 7368856 and 736-8858 were in fact the telephones assigned to and connected to the presidential residence during the incumbency of FPres. Estrada. On December 16, 2002, Dimaandal was recalled to the witness stand. He further presented and identified the Appointment of Edward S. Serapio as Member Ad Interim of the Judicial and Bar Council representing the 17 Private Sector dated July 1, 2000 (Exh. I ) issued by FPres. Estrada; a Memorandum to All Heads of Office and 17 Units signed by Former Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora (Exh. J ); and a Memorandum to All Heads of Office 17 and Units from the Office of the President dated April 29, 1999 (Exh. K with submarkings) with the subject title Special Instructions to the Presidential Assistant for Political Affairs and with the contents read as follows: Be informed that I have given special instructions to Atty. Edward S. Serapio, Presidential Assistant I for Political Affairs, to undertake, in addition to his regular duties and responsibilities, the following functions: 1) provide prompt objective and independent advice on any legal question, matter, or issue which may be of special concern to the President; 2) update the President on recent developments in law or jurisprudence on such subjects, areas, or issues which the President may so specify; 3) study and review documents, deeds, contracts, memoranda or other papers which the President may opt to refer to him for study and review; 4) coordinate with various units of the Office of the President, Departments, and other agencies and instrumentalities of the government on any legal matter which the President may refer to him; and 5) perform other duties and responsibilities as may be directed by the President. Atty. Serapio will be directly reporting to the President on any of the foregoing matters. For your information and guidance. On March 31, 2003, witness Dimaandal was again recalled to the witness stand. He presented and 19 identified copies of Proclamation No. 145 dated July 17, 1999 (Exh. X ), Proclamation No. 194 dated October 11, 19 Z19) 1999 (Exh. Y ), Proclamation No. 202 dated October 21, 1999 (Exh. , Proclamation No. 205 dated October 25, 20 20 1999 (Exh. A ), Proclamation No. 225 dated January 30, 2000 (Exh. B ), Proclamation No. 234 dated January 28, 20 20 20 2000 (Exh. C ), Proclamation No. 273 dated April 23, 2000 (Exh. D ), Proclamation No. 355 (Exh. E ), 20 20 Administrative Order Nos. 28, 29, 32, 50, 59, 69, 73, 87, 89 (Exhs. F N ), Memorandum Order Nos. 82, 88, 89 20 20 20 (Exhs. O -Q ) and memorandum Circular No. 45 (R ) . These documents were signed by FPres. Estrada and his signatures were marked accordingly. [TSN dated October 7, 2002; December 16, 2002; and March 31, 2003] SALVADOR ROSAL SERRANO (Serrano) was the Vice-President of Security Bank Corporation and the head of its Centralized Operation and Control Division. [TSN dated November 25, 2002] He was responsible for the day to day operations of one hundred nineteen (119) branches of the Security Bank Corporation; supervised the record keeping and accounting of the branch transactions; ensured the compliance of their branches to bank policies and procedures; supervised the safekeeping of all documents of all branch transactions; and issued certified true copies of documents in relation to the original documents kept by the bank. Serrano was called by the prosecution to corroborate the testimony of prosecution witness Gov. Singson that he issued a check payable to cash from funds of jueteng protection money to accused FPres. Estrada and that the said accused, in turn, delivered the check to Mr. Paul Bograd who subsequently deposited the check to his

account at the Security Bank Corporation; and to identify and authenticate the documents he was subpoenaed to bring. Serrano identified a microfilm copy of Metro Bank Check No. 0000917 for the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) that was deposited through Security Bank Corporation on February 2, 1999. The maker of this check was Gov. Singson and which check was deposited to Account No. 061-0-14636-7 whose account holder was 14 14 14 14 14 Paul Gary Bograd as evidenced by a deposit slip of Security Bank Corporation (Exhs. N ; N -1; N -2; N -3; O ; 14 14 14 O -1; O -2; and O -3). Also presented was a statement of account showing that an amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000) was 14 14 credited on February 2, 1999 to the account of Paul Gary Bograd (Exhs. P and P -1). Serrano also identified the specimen signature card of Paul Gary Bograd showing that the latter was a depositor in their bank and that he 14 14 14 [Bograd] held the Account No. 061-0-14636-7 of Security Bank Corporation (Exhs, Q ; Q -1; and Q -2). PATRICK DEE CHENG (Cheng), an employee of CITIBANK for 12 years, became the Branch Banking Head of CITIBANK on November 2001. [TSN dated October 7, 2002 and TSN dated October 9, 2002] As banking head, he had overall supervision and responsibility for all the branch banking operations of CITIBANK in all of its six (6) branches. Cheng presented and identified the following: 10 (1) deposit slip (Exh. Z , with sub markings) dated October 4, 1999 for the account of Luisa P. Ejercito (Mrs. Ejercito) under Account No. 166820 covering the deposit of Metrobank Check 8 11 No. 00138 (See Exh. M as original and Exh. A as micro film copy) dated September 29, 1999 by Gov. Singson in the amount of Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000) and another check in the amount of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000); 11 (2) Account Opening Form (Exh. B ) for Account No. 166820 of Mrs. Ejercito; 11 (3) Hold-all-Mail Agreement (Exh. C , with sub markings) dated March 9, 2000 of Mrs. Ejercito which designated Ms. Lucena Baby Ortaliza to be her authorized representative; 11 (4) deposit slip (Exh. D , with sub markings) of William T. Gatchalian dated August 20, 1999 with Account No. 8131201377 for Forty Six Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P46,350.000.00) which covered the deposit of Metrobank Check No. 000132 dated August 21, 1999 of Gov. Singson in the amount of P46,350,000.00; (5) certified copy of the microfilm of the Metrobank Ayala Center Branch Check NO. 000132 (See 11 Exh. E , with sub markings) dated August 21, 1999 drawn by Gov. Singson, payable to William Gatchalian in the amount of P46,350,000; 11 (6) Relationship Opening Form Personal (Exh. F , with sub markings) of Mr. William T. Gatchalian; and 11 (7) Signature Card (Exh. G , with sub markings) of Mr. William T. Gatchalian for a Peso Checking Account with Account No. 8131201377 opened on March 13, 1996. MELCHOR SUAREZ LATINA (Latina) is head of Remedial Management, Globe Telecommunication in charge of terminated accounts. [TSN dated October 9, 2002] 11 He brought with him a certification (Exh. H ) October 4, 2002 issued by Atty. Melchor S. Latina, and subscribed before Atty. Gilbert Escolo that Globe Cellular Phone No. 0917-5260217 was registered in the name of Jinggoy Estrada. The certification was supported with the Service Agreement for Cellular Mobile Phone Service 11 (See Exh. H -1, with sub markings) executed by the applicant Jinggoy Estrada and the supporting documents required in connection with the subscription of cell phone; specifically, a photocopy of Jinggoy Estradas drivers 11 11 license (Exh. H -2) and statement of his Philippine National Bank Visa (Exh. H -3) as proof of billing. The cellular phone issued to Jinggoy Estrada has already been cut-off since December 15, 2000 based on Globe Telecom 11 records (Exh. H -4). ATTY. OSWALDO CHONG SANTOS (Atty. Santos) was a partner of the De Borja Santos Law Firm during the time of the impeachment proceedings against the accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. [TSN dated January 6, 2003 and TSN dated January 8, 2003] In a letter dated December 22, 2000, the De Borja Santos Law Firm was requested by the Prosecution Panel of the House of Representatives to conduct an investigation regarding the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. (Exhibit A-12-a) Atty. Santos testified that the commissioned law firm of which he was a member started conducting research and investigation on the alleged foundation on December 28, 2000. They gathered available documents pertaining to

the Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. from the Records Division of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). On January 5, 2001, witness Santos then went to the corporate address of the subject foundation indicated in the 17 th SEC documents (Exh. V ) that the investigating team gathered which was at 15 Floor, Strata 100 Building, Emerald Avenue, City of Pasig. He found out from his inquiries that the said office address was occupied by the law firm of De Borja Medialdea Bello Guevarra and Jerodias. Atty. Santos clarified that his partner named De Borja was not the same person indicated in the aforementioned law firm and that the witness had no idea if they were related. Thereafter, the witness contacted the phone number of the subject foundation indicated in the SEC documents that the investigating team had but got the response that the phone number belonged to the aforesaid law firm and not to the subject foundation. 12 The witness then presented and identified a copy of the Report (Exh. A ) of the investigating team on the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. He said that the original copy was submitted to the Prosecution Panel of the House of Representatives and he attested as to the truth of the contents of the report. Atty. Santos mentioned that the said report stated that the law firm occupying the supposed corporate office of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. used to be the law firm of the Acting Corporate Secretary Atty. Edward S. Serapio. Atty. Santos also identified the SEC documents that the investigating team had gathered which were previously produced and identified by prosecution witness Atty. David Jonathan Villegas Yap. These SEC documents were as follows: a Certificate of Corporate Filing / Information dated December 28, 2000 pertaining to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.; a Certificate of Incorporation of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. dated February 17, 2000 with SEC Reg. No. A20002526; a Covering Sheet of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.; the Articles of Incorporation of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.; a Certificate of Filing of the Amended By-Laws of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. dated April 3, 2000; another Covering Sheet of the Erap Muslim Youth 17 17 17 Foundation, Inc.; and the Amended By-Laws of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. (Exhs. T , U V , 17 17 17 17 W with submarkings, X , Y and Z with submarkings) The witness testified on cross examination that the Erap Muslim Foundation, Inc. was duly organized and obtained a juridical personality in accordance to law. The Amended By-Laws of the subject corporation, which was approved by the SEC, allegedly provided that the members of the Board of Trustees were not entitled to receive allowances or honoraria in the performance of their duties. Atty. Santos was not, however, familiar to the Minutes of the Organizational Meeting of the Board of Trustees held on March 22, 2000 (Exh. 4-Serapio); the Community Tax Certificate (Exh. 5-Serapio) of the foundation; and the Mayors Permit (Exh. 6-Serapio) as well as the Business Permit (Exh. 9-Serapio) of the foundation. He qualified that he verified from the Office of the Bureau of Permit of Pasig City that the foundation had registered its Business License though he did not see the Mayors Permit of the foundation and mentioned the same in the report. Atty. Santos likewise admitted that he did not come across documents relating to the operations of the foundation but testified consistently on matters pertained the report. (Exhs. 7-Serapio, 8-Serapio, 10-Serapio to 15-Serapio, and 21-Serapio to 27-Serapio, inclusive of submarkings) CAROLINA SANTIAGO GUERRERO (Guerrero) is the Branch Manager of PS Bank Murphy Branch, Quezon City. 13 She brought with her a deposit slip (Exh. A ) processed on December 23, 1999. The deposit involved a Metrobank 8 Ayala Center Check No. 001547 (Exh. N ) issued by Luis Chavit Singson in the amount of One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000). The check was deposited to the account of Laarni Enriquez with Account No. 13 0180409000-3. The account statement for the month of December 1999 (Exh. C , with sub markings) of Laarni Enriquez showed that the amount of One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000) was credited to her account on December 24, 1999. 13 The signature card (Exh. B ) showed that the account was opened on July 18, 1996. The card contained th Enriquezs address as 95 8 Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City and her description as Filipino, 55, 34 years old, brown, medium built and tiny mole on the right cheek. Guerrero further testified that the biggest single check deposit of Ms. Enriquez in the particular savings account was made on August 4, 1998 for P40 Million. This was shown through a bank statement of account (Exh. 13 D ) brought by the witness. The subject account was already closed as shown by the December 27, 2000 bank statement. The address given in the statement had changed to 771 Harvard Street, Wac-wac Subdivision, Mandaluyong. (TSN dated October 30, 2002, pp. 6-28) DR. ROGELIO V. QUEVEDO (Dr. Quevedo) was, at the time of his testimony, the Head of the Legal and Carrier Business of Smart Communications, Incorporated. The prosecution offered his testimony to corroborate the Itchons testimony regarding the Smart cellular phone numbers used by Atty. Serapio and Ricaforte.

Dr. Quevedo identified a Certification signed by him that Smart Cellular Phone Nos. 0918-9012071 and 091812 9021847 were registered in the names of Atty. Edward Serapio and Fontain Bleu, Inc., respectively. (Exh. G ) [TSN dated October 28, 2002, p. 74] With respect to Smart Cellular Phone No. 0918-9012071, witness identified the application form accomplished by 12 an Edward S. Serapio of the De Borja Medialdea Bello Guevarra Serapio Law Office (Exh. H ), Certification 12 12 regarding mobile phone number, phone model, INEI and ICCID (Exh. I ), Official Receipt No. 82116771 (Exh. J ), 12 12 Sales Invoice No. A0161625 (Exh. K ), Account Summary dated March 6, 1999 (Exh. L ), photocopy of Statement 12 for Atty. Serapios Philippine National Bank Visa Card (Exh. M ), photocopy of Atty. Serapios Citibank card (Exh. 12 12 12 N ), Customer Inquiry Menu (Exh. O ), Customer Address Inquiry (Exh. P ), On Line Aging Information (Exh. 12 Q ), Service Disconnection document showing termination of the account upon request of the customer on 12 12 December 20, 2000 (Exh. R ) and Certification Account Memo Inquiry (Exh. S ). [Ibid., pp. 75-90] With respect to Smart Cellular Phone No. 0918-9021847, Dr. Quevedo presented and identified the application form of Fontain Bleau, Inc. for two (2) cellular phones for Yolanda Ricaforte and Maria Carmencita Itchon showing that the number 0918-9021847 was issued to Itchon while the number 0918-9021849 was issued to Ricaforte (Exh. 12 12 12 T ), Customer Inquiry Menu (Exh. U ), Customer Address Inquiry (Exh. V ), Account Maintenance Inquiry (Exh. 12 12 W ), On Line Aging Information (Exh. X ) and audio recording for the voice mail of 0918-9021847 by a certain 12 Yolly (portion of TSN marked as Exh. Y ). [Ibid., pp. 91-115] Dr. Quevedo further testified that the account for 0918-9021847 had already been disconnected. II. EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE The following are the witnesses for the defense under paragraph (a): FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA (FPres. Estrada) took the witness stand on March 22, 2006, March 29, 2006, April 5, 2006, April 19, 2006, April 26, 2006, May 24, 2006, May 31, 2006, June 7, 2006, June 14, 2006, June 21, 2006 and June 28, 2006. At the outset, FPres. Estrada denied that Gov. Singson was his close friend because he had only one close friend, the late actor Fernando Poe, Jr. Gov. Singson was just an ordinary friend and a political ally to him. He seldom saw Gov. Singson when he was a Mayor of San Juan. Although he admitted that they sometimes went out, as they had common friends. FPres. Estrada stated that all allegations in specification (a) of the Amended Information were lies, as he did not receive a single centavo from any form of illegal gamling, even when he was still a mayor and he never conspired with jueteng lords. As mayor of San Juan, his policy ws to make San Juan jueteng free so he directed the Chief of Police of San Juan to go all out against all forms of gambling. He even personally raided all gamling dens and had all indulging in jueteng and other forms of gamling arrested and jailed. However, their wives and children came to him and explained that their husbands could not find other jobs. He promised to put up a livelihood program for them. (TSN, April 5, 2006, morning session, pp.20-26) FPres. Estrada also cited national artist Nick Joaquins book Joseph Estrada and other Sketches (Exh. 457), particularly the article in the said book Erap In a New Role (Exh. 457-a), which narrated an incident when he padlocked a gambling den when he was still mayor. (Exhs.457-a-1; and 457-a-2) [TSN, April 5, 2006, pp.35-36] FPres. Estrada asserted that his policy against gambling had not changed, even when he was a senator, Vice President and President. However, he realized when he was a mayor that jueteng which was a gambling for the poor was illegal and its collectors were harassed while the casino for the rich was legal. He delivered his first privilege speech at the senate on November 25, 1987 (Exh. 458) where he advocated the legalization of jueteng in order that the government through PAGCOR could earn Twelve Million Pesos (P 12, 000,000.00) everyday or Three Hundred Sixty Million Pesos (P 360, 000,000.00) a month which could be used to provide essential services for the poor instead of the enrichment of the police and illegal operators. Although when he was Vice-President and appointed by President Fidel V. Ramos as Chairman of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission, jueteng was not part of his mandate but he was to go against kidnapping, carnapping and illegal drugs. As President, he appointed Justice Cecilia Munoz-Palma as Chairperson of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and asked her to study how to legalize jueteng. She retired only after less than two (2) months to take care of her sick husband. Later it was assigned to her successor Rosario Lopez, who begged off as she was new on the job. Chairperson Alice Reyes of PAGCOR took over and finished the study. Chairperson Reyes reported to former FPres. Estrada that the answer to jueteng was Bingo-2-Balls and that if jueteng was to be legalized the government could earn no less than Five Billon Pesos (P5,000,000,000.00). The study of jueteng showed that from Regions I to V only the collectors, cabos and runners numbering one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) benefit from jueteng whereas if jueteng is legalized, the jueteng cobradors will became

members of the SSS or GSIS, they would have decent jobs, ceased to be harassed and victims of extortion. First Lady Loi Ejercito woud have funds to provide dialysis machines for the poor. The legalization of jueteng will minimize if not totally eradicate corruption among police officials and local government officials (Ibid, pp.43-48) According to Alice Reyes, the Presidential social funds could be augmented if jueteng was to be legalized. However, FPres. Estrada told Reyes that instead the Mayors and governors social fund should be created because these local officials are besieged with requests for medicines, funerals, bills, bills for tuition fees etc. [Ibid, pp.4750] FPres. Estrada instructed Chairperson Reyes to implement right away the Bingo-2-Balls. There was a dry-run in Bulacan and it was very successful. It earned Twenty Four Million Pesos (P24, 000,000.00) in less than three (3) weeks in a few towns in Bulacan. Unfortunately, the jueteng lords who were against it caused trouble and it was stopped. There were allegations that FPres. Estrada was receiving jueteng money. [Ibid, pp.53-54] FPres. Estrada denied that in August 1998 he had a meeting with Atong Ang at the kitchen of his residence at Polk Street, Greenhills, which was allegedly witnessed by Gov. Singson who arrived later, followed by Bong Pineda. From the start, FPres. Estrada had told Ang to distance himself from the former President, Ang never stepped into his house nor in Malacaang except during the wedding of his daughter where he did not even see Ang. Bong Pineda too had never stepped into his house. Gov. Singson only fabricated the alleged meeting. His testimony in the impeachment that he saw Bong Pineda when he arrived at Estradas house and the testimony in this trial that Pineda arrived later were conflicting. [Ibid, pp.55-62] FPres. Estrada also belied the testimony of Singson that he told Bong Pineda that he should not be the one to bring the jueteng money because it would be very obvious. FPres. Estrada denied that he entered into any transaction regarding any illegal form of gambling specially jueteng. [Ibid, pp.57-70] He admitted that Bong Pineda was his kumpadre. The father of the wife of his son Jinggoy, Precy, was a friend of Bong Pineda. They were from Pampanga. The family of Precy, not the Estradas, got Mrs. Pineda, the wife of Bong, as principal sponsor at the wedding of Jinggoy and Precy. He wondered why Bong Pineda was not presented by the prosecution as witness when Singson kept on referring to him. [Ibid, pp.7074] On the delivery to him of jueteng money, FPres. Estrada denied Singson delivered jueteng protection money to him at his house at Polk Street, the Presidential Residence in Malacaang and at P. Guevara Street. He also denied that Emma Lim delivered jueteng money to his Secretary Malou Florendo at Malcaang and that contrary to the testimony of Emma Lim, it was hard for anybody, including his dentist, to enter the Presidential Residence in Malacaang without passing through the strict security check. He never heard of Emma Lim except during the impeachment trial. He never asked Singson to pay his obligations, as he did not have any debt, nor did he ask Singson to buy any appliance for him. He refused gifts like appliances which he would just raffle off during Christmas. He had never seen Carmencita Itchon, who he learned was a relative of Singson. Emma Lim and Carmencita Itchon were rewarded for testifying against him at the trial with their appointment as member of the Board of Directors of Camp John Hay [Poro Point Development Corporation, now Poro Point Management Corporation] (Exh. 459-A-2, 459-A-3) He emphatetically stated that he did not receive a single centavo of jueteng money. [TSN, April 5, 2006, afternoon session, pp.3-19] FPres. Estrada denied any knowledge of the ledgers of jueteng money testified to by Singson. He stated he had not seen said ledgers, he had nothing to do with them and he could not understand them. He first saw the ledgers on television during the impeachment trial. Acording to him, Singson only fabricated the ledgers; like the documents pertaining to the excise tax. [Ibid., pp.24-35, 46, 49, 52-55] FPres. Estrada also called a lie the testimony of Singson that he instructed Singson to pay Mr. Paul Bograd Five Million Pesos (P 5, 000,000.00) from the jueteng money. He did not ask Singson to keep money from him, so he could not order Singson to pay Paul Bograd and he did not owe the latter anything. [TSN, April 19, 2006, p.14] He 8 explained that the check for P1,200,000.00 (Exh. N ) which Singson allegedly gave as birthday gift for Laarni Enriquez was actually intended for his son Jacob and his two siblings, specifically, P1,000,000.00 for Jacob, the godson of Singson and P100, 000.00 each for Jacobs two (2) siblings, as Christmas gift. The check was dated December 22, 1999 whereas the birthday of Laarni was September 22, 1999, Former President Estrada was surprised at the big amount and he thought that Singson was trying to ingratiate himself to him. [TSN, April 19, 2006, pp.15-16] FPres. Estrada also belied the claim of Singson that he advanced the Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00) interest from the Sixty-Two Million Pesos (P62, 000,000.00) of jueteng money lent to Wlliam Gatchalian. He denied too

that he ordered Singson to lend the said amount of money to Gatchalian because he did not ask Singson to keep any money for him. [Ibid., pp.23-25] Regarding Yolanda Ricaforte, former President Estrada admitted he knows Yolanda, who is the wife of the Former Tourism Attache in Tokyo, Orestes Ricaforte. Orestes met him when he arrived at the airport for a speaking engagement for Overseas Filipino Workers in Tokyo. He met Orestes again after four (4) or five (5) years when he, then already the Vice-President, had a speaking engagement with the Filipino community in Los Angeles. There Orestes introduced his wife Yolanda to FPres. Estrada. He met Yolanda again during the oathtaking of Orestes as Undersecretary of Tourism. He appointed him Undersecretary as he promised if he would become President when they were in Los Angeles. He also appointed Yolanda as director of Campo Carne as requested by Orestes because their income was not enough as they had two (2) children studying in Los Angeles. [Ibid., pp.27-30] FPres. Estrada however denied that Yolanda at any time was his employee. He seldom saw Yolanda after the oath-taking of her husband. He did not approve her auditor for jueteng as claimed by Singson. He had nothing to do with the money deposited by Yolanda, as he did not have in his possession any bank documents. [Ibid., pp.3033] Regarding the testimony of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Former President Estrada testified that even before he became mayor and when he was a mayor, he was giving scholarships to poor deserving students, since he believed that education would give them the opportunity to rise above poverty. His number one program as mayor was to put up the first municipal high school, which as cited by national artist Nick Joaquin in his book (Exhs. 457 and 457-A-3), was the project closest to his heart as it will offer free education to the needy young. He said that 60% of elementary graduates could not afford to go to high school and thereby they could become a potential trouble group. This is the root cause of criminality and he would rather spend money on free high school than spend it to enlarge the municipal jail. [Ibid., pp.33-35] Former President Estrada also established the Movie Workers welfare Foundation (MOWELFUND) when he was still an actor (Exh. 460). The MOWELFUND sent to the United States to study film making seven (7) scholars who were shown in The Evening Post, June 1, 1981 edition (Exh. 461). He also put up the ERAP Foundation in 1988 to give scholarship to poor but deserving students. ERAP is the acronym of Education Research and Assistance Program. It was registered with the SEC as shown by its Articles of Incorporation (Exh. 462) The incorporators of the Foundation were: former Senate President Joverto Salonga; former President Estradas brother-in-law, Raul P. de Guzman, former Vice-President of the University of the Philippines and member of its Board of Regents; Mr. Anthony Dee, former owner of China Banking; Mr. Dee K Chong, member of the Board of Directors of China Banking; Mr. Manuel Zamora, a businessman and bar topnotcher; Mr. Antonio Abacan, now President of Metrobank; Mr. Ronald Allan Poe, also known by his screen name Fernando Poe, Jr.; Mr. Iigo Zobel of Makati; Mr. Carlos Tuason, a former Chairman of the Philippine Sports Commission and a cousin of Mr. Jose Mike Arroyo; Mr. Danny Dolor, a businessman; Mr. Hermogenes Tantoco, a big fishpond owner in Malolos, Bulacan; and Mdme. Maria Clara Lobregat former City Mayor of Zamboanga (Exh. 462-B). According to the memorandum of Executive Director of the ERAP Foundation, Jing Ancheta (Exh. 463), for school year 1988-1989 to 2005-2006, a total of 6,574 availed of the scholarship of the said Foundation, of which 2,512 graduated, 2,251 discontinued and 811 then currently enrolled. There were scholars from Cordillera Administrative Region. (Exh. 464); National Capital Region (Exh. 464-A); Regions I to XIIb (Exhs. 464-B, 464-C, 464-D, 464-E, 464-F, 464-G, 464-H, 464-I, 464-J, 464K, 464-L, and 464-M); ARMM (Exh. 464-N); CARAGA Region (Exh. 464-O). The list of schools attended by the scholars and the attachment to the memorandum of Mr. Ancheta which was a Report of the e-Cares Program of Fr. Larry Faraon, dated March 19, 2006 re: Students and Profile were marked as Exhs. 463-C and 465 (with submarkings) respectively. [TSN, ibid, pp.43-58]. According to Former President Estrada, the seed money for the foundations came from his salary as mayor. He said that from the time that he was a mayor, then Senator, VicePresident and President, he never received a single centavo from his salary. They all went to the Foundations. [Ibid, p.60] FPres. Estrada testified that he devoted his salaries as public official to scholarship for the poor because without them, there would be no Erap. The poor patronized his movies and supported him in his political career. He solicited donations for his scholarship programs but donors wanted to remain anonymous. He put up the ERAP Muslim Youth Foundation because it was his campaign promise for the people of Mindanao. In the Mindanao State Colleges, in Marawi City, he promised to send one hundred (100) Muslim Youth yearly to Australia and America. When he was elected President, he spoke on January 25, 1999 of his project Muslim Youth Foundation in

Smokey Mountains (Exh. 466) and in Angelicum College in Sto. Domingo Church at Quezon City during the launching of the Educational Reentry, Agenda for the President to the Poor (Exh. 467 and 467-a). To comply with this promise, he asked his brother-in-law, Dr. Raul de Guzman to put up the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, 10 17 whose articles of Incorporation was duly registered with the SEC (Exh. 252 [also Exhs. G , W17 to W -6 of Prosecution]) [TSN, April 26, 2006, pp.11-24] Aside from Dr. de Guzman, the other incorporators of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation were Professor Danilo Reyes of the University of the Philippines (UP) who had a Masteral and Doctorate Degree in Pulic Administration at UP, another UP Professor, Mila Reforma, Mr. George Go, one of the owners PCI-Equitable Bank, and Atty. Edward Serapio, a valedictorian of the Ateneo de Manila College of Law and a bar topnotcher. The latter was introduced to him in 1999 by then Secretary Lito Banayo of the Philippine Tourism Authority. He appointed Serapio as Presidential Assistant on Political Affairs because he was impressed by his bio-data. Serapio is not that close to him as he dealt with Serapio on an official and professional level. He denied that Serapio established a fictitious (kalokohan) corporation for him. He described Serapio as an ex-seminarian, a scholar, a very respectable person, very conservative, very professional, a family man and of unquestionable integrity [Ibid., pp.24-28]. Former President Estrada was automatically the Chairman Emeritus of the foundations that he established. He was the number one fund-raiser but he is not a signatory to the checks of the foundation. The seed money of the foundation came from his salary. He sponsored an Erap Golf Tournament which raised P27,000,000.00, some part of which went to MOWELFUND and most of it to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Funds were also raised from Valentines Ball at Manila Hotel and from solicitations from his businessman friends and classmates. [Ibid., p.29] Regarding the meeting allegedly attended by him, Singson, Ricaforte and Serapio where he instructed Singson to give to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, through Serapio, jueteng money in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200, 000,000.00. former President Estrada claimed that no such meeting took place. He only learned from Atty. Serapio that Singson gave P200,000,000.00 to the foundation which he said came from an anonymous donor. He ordered Atty. Serapio to return the money to Singson because his immediate reaction was that it was jueteng money. The Former President Estrada emphatically stated: Im sure its from jueteng. [Ibid., p.34] He knew because Singson had been offering this to him a long time ago. According to Serapio he did not know it was jueteng money and that he received the money in good faith. When the former President told Serapio to take all possible means to return the money, Serapio replied that he would consult the Board of Trustees first. Former President Estrada did not know what happened after that because rallies and the impeachment started. (Ibid, pp.34-36). He learned later that the money was intact at the Equiatble-PCI Bank and that it earned interest, per bank certification (Exh. 257-C) and passbook (Exh. 257, 257-A and 257-B). At the time of the testimony, the money based on the aforesaid documents amounted to P 213, 000,000.00. (Exh. 257-B) [TSN, ibid, pp.41-45] Dr. Raul d Guzman informed him that the scholarship was continuing but the foundation could not send scholars to the US but only to the universities in the Philippines. One of the scholars, Janice Halim Negrosa was in the courtroom, at the time of this testimony of the former President [Ibid., p.46]. He was happy with the continuation of the scholarship because it was his vow to help the poor who supported him in his election as Mayor, Senator, Vice-President and President. [Ibid, pp.47-48] He established two (2) foundations, the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation and the Erap Para sa Mahirap Foundation to emphasize the assistance to our Muslim brothers, the true pure-blooded Filipinos who defended us from foreign invaders. It was impossible to use the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation for money laundering because he was not a signatory to the checks of the foundation. Its treasurer was the Chairman of the bank who would not allow his name to be used in money laundering. If the Foundation would be dissolved, all its assets would go to the government. [Ibid., pp.50-55; and Exh. 252-C] In support of his policy to go after illegal gambling, former President Estrada cited the memorandum and verbal directives that he issued to the PNP to implement this policy. In a memorandum dated August 3, 1998 (Exh. 132) of Acting PNP Chief Roberto Lastimoso pertaining to the aforesaid directives, he reported that he conducted 1,600 operations resulting in the arrest of 807 suspects, confiscation of P320,039.70 in cash and jueteng paraphernalia, the filing of 253 cases in court with 13 cases still under investigation. The report gave the statistics of illegal gambling for the semester 1998 and informed the former President that he [Lastimoso] gave an ultimatum to all PRO Directors to pursue the anti-illegal gambling campaign without end, until finally stopped and eradicated. Another report of the PNP Acting chief stated in part:

Dear President Estrada: This pertains to our compliance with the presidential directive dated August 14, 1998, regarding the resurgence of illegal gambling operations in the country. Please be informed that the directive was sent to all PNP Regional Directors to identify, find, arrest and file charges appropriate in Court against individuals who are using the name of President Estrada, or supposed connection with his office to promote these illegal activities, and to come up with rigid measures and tangible results and immediately stop all forms of illegal gambling, particularly jueteng and masiao. (Exh. 134) [TSN, April 26, 2006] On October 7, 2000, Former President Estrada issued a Memorandum to the Secretary of Inetrior and Local Government, the Director General of PNP that pending review of PAGCORs Bingo-Two-Ball which was in the meantime suspended, they were directed to intensify anti-jueteng operations to prevent unscrupulous individuals from taking advantage of the situation. (Exh. 468) He also issued another memorandum to the incoming Director General Panfilo Lacson reiterating his directive against illegal gambling and requiring periodic and timely reports on all actions relative thereto. (Exh. 469) [TSN, ibid., pp.56-64] On the testimony of Gov. Singson that he was used and humiliated by the former President and ordered killed by the latter, the former President testified that on the contrary, it was Singson who used his name specifically in jueteng collections and Singson made it appear that he could influence him, that Singson was close to him, and that Singson joined his state visits even if he was not invited. Singson was accosted by the Traffic Management Group (TMG) because he was illegally using sirens and blinkers, as testified to by TMGs General Paredes. [Ibid, pp.65-66] According to Former President Estrada, Singson leveled the serious accusations against him because of his mounting problems. Singson had only two (2) sources of income, the tobacco excise tax under R.A. No. 7171 and jueteng. Singson could not liquidate his cash advance from the tobacco excise tax share of Ilocos Sur. He told Singson that he could not help him because COA was an independent constitutional body. Singson was also against Bingo-2-Ball which was already conceptualized because he would lose his source of income. [TSN, April 26, 2006, pp.64-69] Former President Estrada was informed that Singson talked to then Secretary Alfredo Lim seeking his intercession to seek a meeting with Former President Estrada so that jueteng would not be legalized or that if legalized (through Bingo-2-Ball) the franchise be given to him, otherwise it would mean his [Singsons] political death. Former President Estrada refused to talk with Singson and told Secretary Lim to talk to Chairperson Alice Reyes. Singson approached also other persons aside from Secretary Lim and Senator Edgardo Angara. Senator Angara told FPRes. Estrada that Singson went to see him on a Sunday asking help about jueteng and Bingo-2-Ball. He told Senator Angara to tell Singson not to talk to him but to Chairperson Alice Reyes. Angara mentioned that Singson threatened to expose him but he said he had nothing to hide and if Singson wanted so, to let him do it. Former President Estrada then immediately had the accusations investigated as he had confirmed that for a long time, Singson had already been using his name, specifically in jueteng collection. He was hurt by the accusations of Singson as he was turned from being a President, with the biggest mandate in a clean election, into a prisoner because of a big lie started by one person, Governor Singson. Moreover his son Jinggoy and Atty. Serapio were also detained for two (2) years when they knew nothing about jueteng [TSN, April 26, 2006, pp.6977.] JOSE JINGGOY ESTRADA was elected Vice Mayor of San Juan in 1988 and Mayor of San Juan in 1992. [ TSN, November 17, 2004, pp. 15-16.] Mayor Jinggoy stated that he first got to know Gov. Singson, whom he considered as an acquaintance, during the presidential campaign of his father, FPres. Estrada, in the 1998 elections. At that time, Gov. Singson supported FPres. Estrada and hosted a lunch for FPres. Estradas entourage when they campaigned in Ilocos Sur. After the presidential campaign, he said he met Gov. Singson only occasionally. [Ibid., pp. 16-17] Mayor Jinggoy denied the testimony of Gov. Singson that he was the collector for jueteng protection money in the province of Bulacan starting January 1999 to August 2000. Witness also stated that he has never been called Jingle Bell nor had he received or heard communication where he was called Jingle Bell. Witness also denied the statement of Gov. Singson that a certain Jessie Viceo was the collector of jueteng protection money in the province of Bulacan from January 1999 to August 2000, because witness had never been a collector or protector of jueteng. However, Mayor Jinggoy admitted that he came to know Jessie Viceo when the latter was running for congressman since Viceo was also aligned with their political party during the time witness was assigned to campaign for his father in the province of Bulacan. After that, witness stated that he met Viceo three times in social functions. Again, witness considered Viceo as an acquaintance. [Ibid., 18-22]

Mayor Jinggoy also denounced for being untrue the allegation that as collector of jueteng protection money in Bulacan, he collected Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) monthly of which One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was retained by him and the other Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) was sent to Gov. Singsons office or was picked up by Gov. Singsons aides from witness office in the municipal hall of San Juan or from witness residence. [Ibid., p. 22] He further added that he had never used a personalized check with his picture printed on the check as testified to by Emma Lim who allegedly deposited such check drawn against the United Overseas Bank of the Philippines, San Juan Branch to Gov. Singsons account with Metro Bank Ayala Branch. Mayor Jinggoy presented a certification to prove that he does not maintain a current account with the said bank. [Ibid., pp. 25-26] Witness also denied the testimony of prosecution witnesses Vicente Amistad and Jamis Singson who both claimed to have collected/received jueteng protection money from the witness. With respect to the statements of Jamis Singson, Mayor Jinggoy asserted they were untrue since he did not have a security aide named Nestor. Further, the testimony of Jamie Singson that on other occasion, the latter got protection money from witness residence at Polk St., Greenhills is also not true because he does not live in Polk St. but in 97 Kennedy St., North Greenhills. [Ibid., pp. 26-28] As regards the rest of the testimony of Gov. Singson, Mayor Jinggoy also stated that following were totally untrue: that in his conversation with Gov. Singson, witness confirmed that he received a part (or Fifteen Million Pesos) of the One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos that came from the tobacco excise funds because witness was never involved nor did he know anything about it; that before the press conference held on October 9, 2000 at the Club Filipino, witness tried to dissuade Singson from making the expose because at that time witness was in Australia watching the Sydney Olympics. [Ibid., pp. 29-32] Witness, however, admitted that three weeks before he left for Australia, Singson called him up before meeting him at the Kamayan, EDSA where witness was having dinner with his basketball team to ask if witness can convince his father or Atong Ang to give Singson the franchise of Bingo 2 Ball and not to his (Singson) political enemies, to which Mayor Jingoy replied that he will try to talk to Atong Ang. Witness also denied the allegation that he called up Gov. Singson at midnight of October 8, 2000, on the eve of the press conference where according to Gov. Singson, witness told Gov. Singson that baka naman isama mo pa ako dito, Governor, because witness was then shooting a movie with Judy Ann Santos. [Ibid., pp. 34-39, 102] Bong Pineda was an acquaintance of Jinggoy Estrada. He denied having known Orestes Rusty Ricaforte and Yolly Ricaforte, while he admitted having known Bonito Singson whom he met once or twice. [Ibid., 65-68] Jinggoy Estrada testified that the Municipality of San Juan maintained a current account with the Philippine National bank and Land Bank and not with the United Overseas Bank. He, himself maintained a personal account with United Coconut Planters Bank. [Ibid., pp. 86-88] Mayor Jinngoy knew Atong Ang personally, whose real name was Charlie and he first come to know him even before the 1998 presidential elections. He testified that he did not know Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan, Victor Tan Uy, or a Jojo Uy, and a yatch by the name of Escalera. [Ibid., 99-104] ALICIA PEREZ LLAMADO REYES (Reyes) was the Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer of PAGCOR since January 2, 1987. She was appointed by Former President Corazon C. Aquino, reappointed by Former President Fidel V. Ramos, and again reappointed by Former President Joseph E. Estrada. [TSN, March 7, 2005] The witness testified that Atong Ang proposed to her the operation of Bingo Two Balls sometime in the year of 2000. She welcomed the idea since Atong Ang successfully handled the Jai-Alai operations of PAGCOR. Witness Reyes then suggested for a written proposal from Atong Ang. In a Letter dated September 1, 2000 addressed to the Director of PAGCOR Jose Rodriguez III (Exh. 286), Atong Ang proposed the feasibility of the Bingo Two Balls. The proposal was duly approved for negotiation by the Board of Directors of PAGCOR in a Memorandum dated September 5, 2000 (Exh. 287 with submarkings). Witness Reyes added that the proposal had the confirmation of FPres. Estrada who even told her to study the proposal and if it will displace Jueteng then he [was] all for it. For the purpose of implementing the initial operation of Bingo Two Balls, the officers of PAGCOR called a meeting in Paraaque Casino and invited several personalities knowledgeable in number gaming operations in the Philippines. Gov. Singson did not attend the meeting since the latter was not interested according to Atong Ang. The operation of Bingo Two Balls in Ilocos Sur was nonetheless offered to three relatives of Gov. Singson. Among the conditions for the operation of Bingo Two Balls was the drawing of winning numbers in public and that no payments will be made under the table. It was agreed that 23% of the total revenue will be remitted to PAGCOR and 77% of the total revenue will inure to the benefit of the operators. The Bingo Two Balls nationwide

operation was estimated to gain P50 to 65 Million of sales a day. Atong Ang was supposed to be given a management fee of 8% but was reduced to 7% and then to 5%. The management fee was finally recommended to be reduced at 2% by the head of the Bingo Department of PAGCOR in a Recommendation Letter dated November 30, 2000 (Exh. 290). The dry-run operation of Bingo Two Balls lasted for 20 days particularly in the Province of Bulacan. According to witness Reyes, PAGCOR got P24 Million from the initial operation of Bingo Two Balls from the Province of Bulacan alone. FPres. Estrada then ordered for the suspension of the operation of Bingo Two Balls allegedly because of adverse publicity and criticisms from the press. On cross examination, witness Reyes clarified that there was no written agreement for the dry-run operation of the Bingo Two Balls and that the conditions set forth in the initial operation was not final. She also stated that the P24 Million that was remitted to PAGCOR represented the 23% share that was agreed upon and that part of this share was remitted to the Social Fund of the Office of the President. The 77% share of the income was returned to the operators. On re-direct examination, the witness testified that the Social Fund of the Office of the President was created during the term of Former President Aquino. During her administration, this fund was utilized mostly for building school houses which policy was also adopted during the administration of Former Presidents Ramos and Estrada. ATTY. EMILIA SAMONTE PADUA (Padua) was the Managing Head of the Entertainment and Bingo Department of PAGCOR since July of 1996 to June of 2001. She managed, supervised, and controlled the nationwide commercial bingo operations and bingo derivatives, such as Quick-Pick Games and Bingo Two Balls. [TSN, March 9, 2005] The witness testified that her department reviewed and evaluated the Bingo Two Ball Project Proposal of Atong Ang to PAGCOR. The said project proposal was approved for an initial operation and that the Officer-In Charge for the project was Jose Rodriguez III while the Consultant of the project was the Prominent Marketing Consultancy Group, Inc. of which Atong Ang was the General Manager. Atong Ang also served as the Marketing Agent of PAGCOR for the project and, as such, he identified the operational areas and the pre-qualified applicants. The Bingo Two Ball Project was partially implemented from September 18, 2000 to October 7, 2000 in the provinces of Bataan, Bulacan, CAR, Cordillera Administrative Region, Albay, Bicol, Cavite, Marinduque, Lucena, Batangas, Northern and Southern Luzon, and in Visayas. PAGCOR allegedly attained its financial goals and objectives in the organizational stage of the project. Witness Padua presented and identified PAGCORs Share Based on Reported Sales Quota (Exh. 288) prepared by the consultancy group of Atong Ang to corroborate the success of the initial operation of the Bingo Two Balls Project. Based on a Memorandum dated November 14, 2000 (Exh. 290) approved by the Board of Directors of PAGCOR, the 20-day operation of the Bingo Two Ball Project aggregated a gross sale of P106,206,661.00 and that P24,427,532.00 was collected by PAGCOR which represented its 23% share. The consultancy group of Atong Ang gained 2% from the 23% share of PAGCOR. Though there was no written agreement between PAGCOR and the consultancy group of Atong Ang as regards the payment of the latters 2% share, the Board of Directors of PAGCOR decided that the consultancy group of Atong Ang was entitled to such share. Witness Padua also testified that among the objectives of the Bingo Two Ball Project were to eradicate the illegal number games such as Jueteng and to create employment opportunities. However, the said project was ordered suspended by the Office of the President because of adverse criticisms and questions of legality from the public. On cross examination, witness Padua admitted that there was no bidding conducted by PAGCOR in awarding the operation of the Bingo Two Ball Project to Prominent Marketing Consultancy Group, Inc. She explained that since Atong Ang also headed the Power Management Corporation which successfully handled the Jai-Alai Operations of PAGCOR, the Board of Directors of PAGCOR decided to engage the services of the Prominent Marketing Consultancy Group, Inc. of Atong Ang to handle the Bingo Two Ball Project. The witness further testified that some of the appointed operators of the Bingo Two Ball Project were reputed as Jueteng Operators but qualified that she only knew them as such after the initial operation of the said project. On re-direct examination, witness Padua testified that assuming the Bingo Two Ball Project was not suspended and a contract was perfected between PAGCOR and the operator the contract would nonetheless pass the review and approval of the Office of the Government Corporate Council (OGCC) and the Office of the President.

SENATOR ALFREDO SIOJO LIM (Sen. Lim) was appointed as the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) on January 8, 2000. [TSN, March 14, 2005] On October 7, 2000, Sen. Lim read in the newspaper the alleged attempted ambush on the life of Gov. Singson and discussed the issue with Congressman Luis Baby Asistio during their breakfast meeting at the Manila Yacht Club. Thereafter, Sen. Lim and Baby Asistio visited Gov. Singson at his residence in Blue Ridge, Quezon City. Governor Casimiro Ynares, Jr. later arrived and joined their conversation. According to Lim, Gov. Singson related to them the details of the attempted plot against the life of Gov. Singson on the late evening of October 3, 2000. On said date, members of the Traffic Management Group (TMG) armed with long rilfes and not wearing proper uniforms, accosted the vehicle occupied by Gov. Singson along San Marcelino Street, for beating a red light and having a blinker on top of his vehicle. Gov. Singson initially refused to alight from his vehicle and got down only when the mayors that he just had a meeting with arrived on the scene. Singson argued with the TMG Officers and refused to be brought to Camp Crame. The dispute ended when the TMG Officers finally agreed that they will no longer force Gov. Singson to be brought to Camp Crame since the blinker of the vehicle of Gov. Singson was surrendered to them. Gov. Singson allegedly said that Atong Ang and Ping Lacson were the persons responsible for the attempted ambush on his life, and that both conspired to have him killed because Gov. Singson was against the Bingo Two Balls gaming proposal of Atong Ang and that there was an arrangement for the raising of campaign funds for the presidential candidacy of Ping Lacson. Sen. Lim further related that Gov. Singson also implicated FPres. Estrada on the alleged attempted ambush on his life on the theory that Atong Ang and Ping Lacson will not have the courage to have him killed without the approval of FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson also grumbled about the awarded franchises for the operation of the Bingo Two Balls in Ilocos by Atong Ang to the political opponents of Gov. Singson. Gov. Singson also mentioned that FPres. Estrada did not help him sort out his problems with the Commission on Audit (COA). Sen. Lim further testified that on the following day, October 8, 2000, he and Congressman Baby Asistio went to the Malacaang Palace and met FPres. Estrada. The witness relayed to FPres. Estrada the sentiments and allegations of Gov. Singson. FPres. Estrada denied Gov. Singsons accusations that he had something to do with the attempted ambush and that he would initiate an investigation on the matter. FPres. Estrada said that Gov. Singson was his good friend and that he was with Lim in Cebu City and Cagayon de Oro during the alleged incident. As to the issue regarding the Bingo Two Ball Project of Atong Ang, FPres. Estrada said that he was convinced by PAGCOR that it could triple its proceeds as compared to the operations of Jai-Alai. FPres. Estrada would also trigger an investigation regarding Gov. Singsons allegation that Atong Ang had planned to divert the proceeds of the Bingo Two Ball Project of PAGCOR. Witness Lim added that FPres. Estrada admitted that he left Gov. Singson to explain to COA because he had no control and supervision over the said constitutional body. The witness also refuted the testimony of Gov. Singson that he conveyed the impression to Gov. Singson that FPres. Estrada gave the signal to kill Atong Ang. Witness Lim claimed that his thumbs down gesture to Gov. Singson meant that FPres. Estrada would have Atong Ang ordered investigated and not to have the latter killed. On cross examination, witness Lim testified that he had no personal knowledge as to the purchase of shares from Bell Corporation by GSIS and SSS; as to the matters regarding the Ilocos Sur Excise Taxes; and as to the Jueteng collection ledger of Yolanda Ricaforte. VIOLETA SUAREZ DAMITAN (Damitan) was the Executive Assistant of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation employed by Raul P. De Guzman on January 1, 2004 (Exh. 278). [TSN, March 16, 2005] She was responsible, among others, for the safekeeping of the records of the said corporation such as the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, and the records of applicants to the scholarship program of the foundation. Damitan testified that the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation provided scholarship education programs to the less privileged Muslim youth Filipinos. The applications and recommendations filed were reviewed by the Screening Committee and approved by the Board of Trustees of the foundation. Damitan presented and identified the credentials and pertinent records of Sittie Shahani Laminero who was one of the applicants granted a scholarship program by the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation (Exhs. 295, 296, 297 and submarkings). She likewise presented and identified several documents enumerating and showing other grantees of the said scholarship program, namely, Salvador Ongay Domona, Sohayle Hadji Abdul Rachman, Janice Halim Negrosa, Roque Santos Morales, and Ahmad Robert (Exhs. 279, 280, 298, 299 and submarkings). The witness further presented and identified a Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Erap

Muslim Youth Foundation on July 21, 2000 to show the appointment of the other employees of the foundation and the accounts of the scholarship program (Exh. 274 and submarkings). SALVADOR ONGAY DOMONA [TSN, March 16, 2005], JANICE HALIM NEGROSA [TSN, March 30, 2005], ROQUE SANTOS MORALES[TSN, March 30, 2005] and H. SOLAYHE A.A. MARANGIT [TSN, March 28, 2007], all similarly testified that they were granted scholarships by the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Witness Domona applied and was admitted for the scholarship program on the year 2003; witness Negrosa applied and was admitted to the said program on the year 2004; witness Morales applied and was admitted to the same program on the year 2004 and witness Marangit applied and was admitted to the same program in 2004. These witnesses also presented and identified their respective credentials and pertinent documentary evidence. (see also Exhs. 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, and submarkings) ATTY. CARINA JAVIER DEMAISIP (Demaisip) was appointed Assistant Corporate Secretary of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. on January 1, 2004 (Exh. 277). She assisted the release of funds and prepared the minutes of the meetings of the Board of Trustees of the foundation. [TSN dated March 30, 2005 and TSN dated April 4, 2005] Demaisip testified that Raul P. De Guzman solicited her services for the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation sometime on July of 2003 which was after the incarceration of Atty. Edward S. Serapio, the Corporate Secretary. th The foundation was located at the 4 Floor of VAG Building in Greenhills, Ortigas Avenue. The witness then identified several minutes of the meetings approved by the Board of Trustees of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation (Exhs. 279, 281, 312, and submarkings) and corroborated the testimony of witness Violeta S. Damitan regarding the approved and awarded scholarship programs by the foundation (Exh. 313 and submarkings). She also testified that among the reasons why the foundation had no scholars for the years 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, except for Salvador O. Domona, were because of (a) the ineffectiveness of the Board of Trustees brought by the charges against FPres. Estrada, (b) the lack of funds to operate the foundation due to the freeze orders, and (c) the failure of the institutions to comply with the requirements of the scholarship program. The funds of the foundation became available on November 11, 2003. Hence, the foundation started releasing checks only thereafter although some of the applications for the scholarship program were already reviewed and approved before the availability of the funds. MARIA LOURDES LOVERO FLORENDO (Florendo) was an Executive Assistant in the Office of the Vice President and the Confidential Secretary of accused FPres. Estrada. [TSN, April 20, 2005 and April 25, 2005] Florendo testified that she did not know and had never met on any occasion Emma Lim. The witness said that she was shocked when she read from the newspaper that Emma Lim allegedly gave her a black bag containing P5,000,000.00 at the Presidential Residence. She refuted the statements that Emma Lim gave during the Impeachment Trial on December 11, 2000 that the latter went straight to her and handed a black bag which contained P5,000,000.00; that Emma Lim was not required at the guardhouse of the Presidential Residence to have her black bag examined in the X-Ray Machine; that there were no furniture or sala sets at the right side of the entrance of the Presidential Residence; that witness Florendo received the black bag and placed it near a table and that she talked to Gov. Singson and told him that they already arrived; and that Emma Lim went out running towards her vehicle after giving the black bag to witness Florendo (Exh. 320-C and submarkings). NORMAN DELOS SANTOS BORDADORA (Bordadora) was a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer since July of 1996. He testified that he was the author of an article in the Philippine Daily Inquirer Newspaper entitled Chavit, I Have Never Been Into Jueteng which was published on May 21, 2005 (Exh. 335). The source of the contents of his article was allegedly Governor Luis Chavit Singson whom witness Bordadora had interviewed through a cellular phone which was not recorded. The witness clarified that he interviewed Gov. Singson on the alleged jueteng involvement of Archbishop Cruz and not on the jueteng expose in the year 2000. [TSN, June 22, 2005] ATTY. JOSEPH QUION ORSOS (Orsos), P/SUPT. ARTURO LACSINA PAGLINAWAN (Paglinawan), P/SUPT. RODOLFO SANTOS AZURIN, JR. (Azurin), POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR NOEL BIACA VALLO (Vallo), P/SUPT. ELISEO DECENA DE LA PAZ (Dela Paz), JONIRO FORMILLEZA FRADEJAS (Fradejas) and RENATO MENDOZA PAREDES (Paredes), all testified to matters related to the October 3, 2000 traffic incident involving Gov. Singson and the Traffic Management Group (TMG). Orsos, a Police Officer and the Chief of the Legal Services of the TMG, presented and identified a Roster of Troops dated October 3, 2000; a Disposition of Personnel as of August 28, 2000 dated October 31, 2000; a Memorandum dated October 4, 2000 regarding the apprehended motor vehicle of Gov. Singson; and another

Memorandum dated October 4, 2000 (Exh. 360) regarding the traffic violation of the driver of Gov. Singson. He admitted he had no personal knowledge of the incident. [TSN, July 13, 2005, Exhs. 358-61 with submarkings] Paredes, Director of the TMG, identified a Memorandum dated October 4, 2000 signed by him and previously marked as Exh. 360. [TSN dated August 17, 2003] Paglinawan, Chief of the General Assignment Section of the Western Police District, testified that there were no records in the WPD that Gov. Singson filed a case in relation to the October 3, 2000 incident. [TSN, July 18, 2005] Azurin, Chief of the Special Operations Division of the TMG, testified that, on October 3, 2000, he was called by Vallo for assistance in some misunderstanding with Gov. Singson. He also testified to what happened after they proceeded to the WPD headquarters in UN Avenue and related that the agents of the TMG Group were wearing proper uniform but admitted that he himself was not in proper uniform. Azurin testified that the blinker and siren found in the vehicle of Gov. Singson were confiscated for violation of a Memorandum dated July 14, 1998 issued by the Office of the President. [TSN, July 18, 2005, and Exh. 362 with submarkings] Vallo, Chief of the Operation Task Force Limbas of the TMG, testified to the TMGs spotting of an accelerating vehicle (Gov. Singsons), the chase and the accosting of the vehicle for a traffic violation. Dela Paz, Police Chief Superintendent of the Philippine National Police, identified his signature in a Memorandum sent to relevant offices pertaining to the use of blinkers [TSN, August 8, 2005, Exh. 364] Fradejas, Executive Assistant II of the Traffic Engineering Center of the Metro Manila Development Authority, identified a Certification pertaining to the DPWH Phase I installation of traffic lights in Metro Manila. [TSN dated August 8, 2005, Exh. 384] DR. GEMMA BAULA DAVID (David) had been the dentist of FPres. Estrada since the latter was still a Senator. David testified that she provided dental treatments to FPres. Estrada at the latters residence in No. 1 Polk Street, Greenhills, and at the Presidential Residence in Malacaang. The witness related that, every time she visited FPres. Estrada at his residence in Greenhills as well as in the Presidential Residence in Malacaang for the scheduled dental appointment, she had to pass the strict security protocols conducted at the entrance of both locations. She further related that at there was a walk-through metal detector at the Presidential Residence in Malacaang. [TSN, May 30, 2005] MARICHU ANDUEZA VILLANUEVA (Villanueva) was a Journalist of the Philippine Star Newspaper and a member of the Malacanang Press Group. She authored the article entitled Palace Backs Ping on Anti-Jueteng Drive in the June 17, 2000 issue of the said newspaper which was based on a press conference she attended in Malacaang Palace on June 16, 2000. [TSN, September 26, 2005; Exh. 415 and submarkings] ATTY. RICARDO VILLANUEVA PUNO, JR., a practicing lawyer, testified that he joined the government as Press Secretary and Presidential Spokesperson on or about March 16, 2000 and stayed in that position until January 20, 2001. In such position, he would only speak of information that he was authorized to disseminate to the public or the media at that particular time. His position gave him the privilege of being present at discussions on policies, which included Presidential meetings. [TSN, October 3, 2005] To the best of his recollection, the policy of the FPres. Estrada then was always to fight illegal gambling. That has been the declared policy even during the tenure of the witness as Press Secretary and Presidential Spokesperson. He had a general recollection of this policy, but he had no specific recollection of the times it was actually mentioned. He could not recall specifically a press conference held on June 16, 2000, although he saw the June 17, 2000 issue of the Philippine Star attached to the subpoena [Exh. 415], but there was a time when he held a series of briefings for media at 2:00 p.m., and it was probably during one of those briefings that the points in the article were raised. The article referred to a drive by the then Director General of the Philippine National Police against jueteng. The question asked of the witness at the time was probably, whether FPres. Estrada in fact prescribed jueteng reduction. It was very clear that it was in fact the policy at that time, based on their previous conversations. The article, however, referred to the drive allegedly initiated by then PNP Director Panfilo Lacson. Up to the time that the witness left in January 2001, he could not remember any reversal of that policy. He would not know, however, if jueteng continued despite the campaign against it, because his office as Press Secretary was not monitoring the situation. ATTY. HILARIO PAUL HAVOC RAGUNJAN, JR. was a commissioned Notary Public who notarized the Letter dated May 28, 2005 of Rodolfo Q. Pineda (Exh. 331) addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Games and Amusements of the House of the House of Representatives, Hon. Mario Z. Almario. Witness Ragunjan, Jr. testified that he personally knew the affiant of the letter but had no personal knowledge as to the contents of the said letter. [TSN, June 6, 2005]

MARIBETH ANG ESCOBAR, Officer-in-Charge of the United Overseas Bank (UOB) San Juan Branch, testified on a Certification dated June 28, 2002 addressed to Atty, Irene Jurado issued by Ms. Elma Gutierrez, who was no longer connected with UOB. Witness had been the OIC of UOB San Juan since Ms. Gutierrez resignation. (TSN, November 22, 2004, p. 48) The said Certification stated: This is to certify that based on our records from 1999 up to the present, we have no current account listed under the name of the client Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estrada. She verified the facts stated in the Certification by personally checking the records on file in their system and there was no reading of an account under the name of Senator Jose Jinggoy Estrada, upon receipt of the subpoena. (Ibid., p. 54) Escobar also testified that she was not aware and has not seen any check with photo of the client on the face of the check. She has never processed a customized check but has seen one with the logo of a company like Sunlife. Witness stated that the Certification was issued based on the letter dated June 28, 2002 of Atty. Irene D. Jurado to the Manager of UOB San Juan. (Ibid., pp. 54-58) Witness testified that although the certification stated only that Jose Jinggoy Estrada had no current account, her verification of their their records showed that there was no Jose Jinggoy Estrada on the list of active accounts of UOB San Juan, as well as in the dormant accounts. Similarly, the Municipality of San Juan had no account with the UOB San Juan, more so the Municipality of Marikina. (Ibid., pp. 94-98) ROSEMARIE J. SAN GREGORIO, Community Affairs Officer II of the Municipal Government of San Juan, testified that she didnt know personally a lady by the name of Emma Lim, but has seen her testify before the Impeachment Court on television. She remembered particularly the testimony of Emma Lim because Emma Lim mentioned the name of her officemate, Josie, who was with the witness when they were watching the proceedings in the television along with Lauro Quirino, who was their receptionist in the Mayors Office. Witness remembered that among the testimony of Emma Lim was that she went to the Municipal Office to collect money. Witness stated that she and Josie Ramos were surprised and amazed with Emma Lims testimony since she [Emma Lim] did not go to the Mayors Office. Josie Ramos was the one handling papers for the signature of the Mayor. [TSN, November 24, 2004, pp. 26-42] JOSEFINA QUIAZON RAMOS worked as one of the secretaries in the Office of the Mayor, Municipality of San Juan for 1998 to 2001, preparing documents for signature of then Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. Witness Ramos corroborated the testimony of Rosemarie San Gregorio that Emma Lim did not go to the Office of then Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estrada in January, February and March 2000 to pick up allegedly jueteng money from the Office of the Mayor. Ramos described as untrue the testimony of Emma Lim that Emma Lim talked to Ramos and was asked to sit in front of Ramos table in the Office of the Mayor on February and March 2000. Witness stated that Emma Lim never went to the Office of the Mayor in San Juan. Witness was surprised when Emma Lim mentioned her name during the impeachment trial, and that she told this to Mayor Estrada who called her up after Emma Lim testified. Mayor Estrada was also surprised and told her that what is that woman saying, that woman is a liar. [TSN, December 6, 2004] SUSAN MACALLA AVILES was the Social Secretary of Ms. Guia Gomez and a resident of No. 1 Ibuna Street corner P. Guevarra Street, San Juan, Metro Manila. She testified that, as social secretary, she was the one who received guests, entertained them and was the one who would call to serve the visitors coffee or juice at the house of Guia Gomez at No. 1 Ibuna Street corner P. Guevarra Street, San Juan. Aviles asserted that Gov. Singson never went to the house at P. Guevarra. [TSN, December 1, 2004, p.16-17] She clarified that the house on P. Guevarra and Ibuna were one and the same because their address was No. 1 Ibuna Street corner P. Guevarra Street, San Juan. (Ibid., p.44) NOEL ISRAEL BUENDIA was previously a security guard assigned at the residence of Guia Gomez at No. 1 Ibuna corner P. Guevarra Streets, San Juan, from February 26, 1998 up to 2002, and as such, was stationed at the gate along Ibuna St. from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. and the one assigned in the front and in-charge of asking visitors. During his assignment at Guia Gomezs residence, Buendia testified that he did not see Gov. Singson go there. [TSN, December 1, 2004] CONGRESSMAN LUIS A. ASISTIO (Cong. Asistio) testified that he was at San Francisco, California on July 24, 2000 as part of the official Philippine Delegation accompanying then President Joseph E. Estrada in his state visit to the United States of America, and that it was there that he saw Gov. Singson, at the lobby of the Fairmont Hotel where they stayed, telling him of the latters problem that FPres. Estrada did not want to see him. Cong. Asistio, together with Gov. Singson, went to the room of FPres. Estrada, and Gov. Singson asked FPres.

Estrada to call the Chairman of the COA for the relief of the Auditor assigned in his province to which FPres. Estrada replied that he might get into trouble as the Chairman of the COA is a constitutional appointee and suggested that Gov. Singson instead talk to then Executive Sectary Ronaldo Zamora to resolve his problem. Witness also testified that after returning from the U.S. and prior to the expose or press conference made by Gov. Singson in October 2000, he received a call from the latter asking him if they could meet it Manila Peninsula, and, at the same time, Gov. Singson told him of his problem and his grievances (sama ng loob) against FPres. Estrada, including placing his political opponents in positions of power in his province, such as, the relief of the Provincial Commander and conferring on his brother, Bonito, who is his mortal enemy, a position regarding jueteng. Cong. Asistio clarified that in the many meetings he had with Gov. Singson during the period late August to September 2000, they mainly talked about the state of the Ilocos Sur provincial leadership and occasionally Gov. Singsons suspicions regarding Atong Angs designs to corner bingo two balls and ease him out. According to Cong. Asistio, Gov. Singson is worried that his continued provincial leadership will be affected by the developments. Cong. Asistio also testified they never talked about jueteng, or receipt of jueteng monies or the alleged receipt of money from R.A. 7171 since according to him, he knew of these issues only during the Impeachment Trial and he thinks that these are mere figments of Gov. Singsons imagination. Cong. Asistio also testified that he, together with Mayor Lim, went to the house of Gov. Singson to persuade the latter not to push through with the press conference. Cong. Asistio also testified that in his visits to Malacaang during the time of FPres. Estrada, at least three times a week, he never saw Atong Ang there because Atong Ang was banned by the FPres. Estrada from entering Malacaang. [TSN, October 11, 2004 and October 13, 2004] ATTY. ESTELITA D. CORDERO (Cordero) testified that she was a close friend Mrs. Lydia Honey Girl Singson, sister of Gov. Singson, and worked as a legal consultant for Mrs. Honey Girl Singson when the latter was appointed as Director General of the Technology and Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC) until October 12, 2000. [TSN, November 8, 2004, pp. 9, 11-12, 14] Cordero testified that in October 2001, members of the Save Ilocos Sur Alliance (SISA) visited her in her office and requested her to go over several audit reports (1999 to 2000, SAO Special Report 1999) of the province and to find out if there is any basis for filing any action against responsible public officials of the province. [Ibid., p. 38] After going through the documents, witness Cordero, together with members of SISA and other concerned citizens, decided to file criminal complaints against Gov. Singson and other responsible officers of the province who did some anomalous transactions to the detriment of the province. [Ibid., pp. 44-45] Witness thought that the testimony of Emma Lim in the impeachment trial were all lies because from the statement of Gov. Singson, he did not have anything to do with jueteng and the delivery of the money. Thus, witness claimed that all of these were fabricated statements on the part of Emma Lim. [TSN, November 10, 2004, pp. 26-28] Witness Cordero also testified that Gov. Singson was the jueteng lord in their province and neighboring provinces, and all matters relating to jueteng, such as, employment, people, operations were under the control of Gov. Singson. [Ibid., pp. 29-30] BRIG. GEN. RODOLFO DOCTOR DIAZ, a retired military officer, was assigned as the Commanding Officer of the Presidential escorts, one of the major units of the Presidential Security Group, in 1998 when FPres. Estrada assumed office. He testified that he was familiar with the private residence of FPres. Estrada in No. 1 Polk Street. Quezon City. According to Gen. Diaz, only the First Familys vehicles were allowed to park in the garage. Only five vehicles could be accommodated there and usually the cars parked there were the Presidents primary and secondary car, as well as an SUV and two more cars. Witness also detailed the security measures followed in Polk Street. In Polk Street, visitors were never allowed to park their cars inside the garage. [TSN, June 1, 2005, pp. 50-56] The witness did not see Atong Ang either at No. 1 Polk Street or in Malacanang since the President has been elected. He had seen Mr. Jaime Dichaves twice; Mr. Baby Asistio, once or twice. He did not see Governor Singson in No. 1 Polk Street [Ibid., pp. 81-83] RICARDO GREY GOLPEO, General Manager of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) from February 2000 to February 2001, testified that he and then PSCO Chairman Rosario Lopez were summoned by FPres. Estrada to Malacaang in March 2000. On that occasion, FPres. Estrada informed them

that jueteng had become a big problem to him and wanted to know if the PCSO can do something to fight jueteng. The witness replied that they will study the instruction of the President. Chairman Lopez instructed witness to personally handle the matter. At the time the witness left PCSO, he testified that the PCSO had not come up with a suggestion to the President on how to eradicate jueteng. [TSN, April 11, 2005, pp. 11-17, 19, 30)] DANILO DELA ROSA REYES was a Member of the Board of Trustees of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. and the Acting Treasurer of the said foundation. He was also an Associate Professor at the National College of Public Administration and Governance in the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman and the Vice President for Educational Services for the Erap Para sa Mahirap Foundation Reyes testified that the Erap Para sa Mahirap Foundation was duly established in 1988 and had 14,000 recipients of scholarships as of the year 2000. Among the Incorporators of the said foundation was FPres. Estrada. The Erap Para sa Mahirap Foundation, however, encountered financial constraints so the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. came into existence. Reyes related that Raul P. De Guzman, a brother-in-law of FPres. Estrada, invited him to join in establishing a foundation for the poor and deserving Muslim students in line with the vision of FPres. Estrada of developing a new generation of Muslim leaders. He then identified the documents related to the registration of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. (Exhs. 251 to 255, 262 to 271, inclusive of submarkings) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. was duly organized in accordance with law and had conducted its business upon incorporation for bona fide purposes as stated in its Articles of Incorporation (Exh. 252) and Amended By-Laws (Exh. 255). The original Members of the Board of Trustees were: Prof. Mila Reformina, Dr. Raul P. De Guzman, Atty. Edward S. Serapio, Dr. Danilo Reyes, and Mr. George L. Go, who later resigned. The word ERAP affixed to the name Muslim Youth Foundation was allegedly an acronym for Education, Research, and Assistance Program. The funding of the said foundation was provided by the Erap Golf Cup, which donated the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00); the contributions of the Board of Trustees in the amount of P20,000.00 each; and a Two Hundred Million Peso (P200,000,000.00) donation from a donor which, according to Serapio, would like to remain anonymous. The amount of Ten Million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P10,100,000.00) was deposited with the UCPB and eventually transferred to Metrobank while the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) was deposited with Equitable PCI Bank. The Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) was the source of the foundations operating expenses and for minimal scholarship program during the time material in this case. According to Reyes, the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. had (four (4) scholars for MA in Islamic Studies in the University of the Philippines for school year 2004-2005. For the second semester of that school year, the foundation added four (4) more scholars for Masters Degree, two in the University of the Philippines and the other two in the Philippine Normal University. The scholars were only given Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) per semester. Reyes explained that the foundation was in hiatus for three (3) years because its funds were frozen by a court order and that they conducted meetings after the recuperation of Dr. De Guzman who got sick, and after the release on bail of Atty. Serapio. Reyes also testified as to the appointment papers of the employer of the foundation, such as the Executive Assistant, the Assistant Corporate Secretary and the Utility Messenger. The office address of the foundation was transferred from Pasig to the VAG Building in San Juan. [TSN, February 21, 2005; February 23, 2005; and March 2, 2005] EUGENE MACAMASBAD, a Police Senior Inspector with the Philippine National Police, brought with him the documents required in the subpoena addressed to Gen. Arturo Lomibao of the PNP or his authorized representative. He produced a certified true copy of a Memorandum Circular 2000-003, certified by Celia Redison (Exh. 365). As to the memorandum dated July 19, 2000 which was subpoenaed, the same could not be located as shown by a certification dated 29 July 2005 issued by the Deputy Chief of the PACER. (Exh. 380) [TSN, August 1, 2005, pp. 60-69] The witness came to Court and produced the above documents only upon verbal instruction from his officers. He was not the records custodian and he did not have any knowledge about records being maintained by their office. [Ibid., pp. 70-72, id.]

SEN. EDGARDO ANGARA, a lawyer and a senator when he testified in Court, knew Gov. Singson. They were compadres, being godfathers at the wedding of Singsons niece. In September 2000, Gov. Singson made an unexpected visit at Senator Angaras farm to request that the witness talk to President Estrada about the 2-balls game. Gov. Singson told the witness that the franchise for the said game in Ilocos Sur was given to his political opponent and he was losing face with his supporters. Gov. Singson wanted the franchise to go to him or if it cannot be granted, that the game of 2-balls not be allowed altogether in Ilocos. The witness replied that he would go down to Manila and call the President to relay Gov. Singsons message. [TSN, June 1, 2005, pp. 13-15] Sen. Angara remembered Gov. Singson saying that the franchise was given to Eric Singson. Gov. Singson even mentioned a list of of jueteng payoffs and that one of the beneficiaries was the President. When Sen. Angara mentioned to FPres. Estrada Gov. Singsons request regarding 2-balls and statements regarding jueteng, the President denied that he was a recipient of any payoff, saying he had nothing to do with it [2-balls] but that it was Atong Angs jurisdiction [Ibid., pp.16 and 24] FINDINGS OF FACT Re: Sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information With respect to the alleged acts of receiving or collection of sums of money from illegal gambling, commonly known as jueteng, in the form of share or percentage, the Court finds credible material portions of Gov. Chavit Singsons testimony insofar as they are corroborated by independent and competent evidence. The Court concedes that Gov. Chavit Singson did not have the purest of motives in exposing the jueteng collections which he testified were done for the benefit of FPres. Estrada. Undoubtedly and by his own admission, he resented not being given the franchise for the Bingo Two Balls, the government sanctioned numbers game, in his home province of Ilocos Sur. He feared the demise of his political career as the said franchise was given to his political opponents, Eric Singson and his brother Bonito Singson, to the embarrassment of the mayors who were affiliated to him. Gov. Chavit Singson was disappointed to say the least that Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, JV Ejercito, the other son of FPres. Estrada, Secretary Edgardo Angara, Secretary Alfredo Lim, friends like Luis Asistio and Mark Jimenez, whom Gov. Chavit Singson approached to intercede to FPres. Estrada to help him secure the franchise, were unsuccessful. Gov. Chavit Singson was also displeased that FPres. Estrada would not use the Office of the Presidency to help him with his trouble with the Commission on Audit which was demanding his liquidation of the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) share of Ilocos Sur in the excise taxes collected under RA No. 7171. The Court will not cite the alleged attempt on the life of Gov. Chavit Singson in the evening of October 3, 2000 considering the contradictory evidence on this matter consisting of the testimony of the enforcement officers on the incident. The acts of collection of jueteng protection money for FPres. Estrada from various provinces nationwide per month as well as the payments to him and to various persons from such sums of money with his approval or acquiescence were methodically detailed in two sets of ledgers: the first set covering the period beginning 7 8 November 1998 to July 1999 (Exh. W to E ), and the second set for the period starting August 1999 to August 2000 (Exh. A-4 to A-4-l). The first set of ledgers were personally prepared by Gov. Chavit Singson, aided by Emma Lim and Carmencita Itchon, while the second set of ledgers were prepared by Yolanda Ricaforte, under the supervision of Gov. Chavit Singson and also with the help of Lim and Itchon. Insofar as the collection of jueteng money is concerned, Emma Lim and Carmencita Itchon, by their own admission performed similar roles as Yolanda Ricaforte except that the latter received double the amount of the monthly salary of Lim and Itchon by virtue of her supervisory status. The accused would have this Court dismiss the ledgers as hearsay and/or mere fabrications. However, there are 7 8 circumstances which lend credibility to the said ledgers. The first set of ledgers (Exh. W to E ) was faxed by Ricaforte to Singson just before Gov. Chavit Singson made his expose while the second set of ledgers (Exh. A-4 to A-4-l) was in the possession of Ricaforte, which she produced during the Senate Impeachment proceedings, as testified to by Atty. David Jonathan Yap, the Senate Legal Counsel. Yolanda Ricaforte was closely associated to FPres. Estrada, being the wife of Orestes Ricaforte, who was appointed by FPres. Estrada as Undersecretary of Tourism. Ricaforte opened several accounts in the different branches of Equitable PCI Bank with unusually huge deposits and investments in multiple of millions of pesos during the period covered by the second set of ledgers.

Per testimony of Nantes, in Scout Tobias-Timog Branch, Ricaforte opened a savings account, a current account, seven special savings account and a PCI Emerald account. In the Savings Account No. 0157-04227-0 alone, after the initial deposit of P17,205,000.00 on September 1, 1999, she deposited from September 7, 1999 to January 10, 2000, a staggering total amount of P57,712,150.00. The initial deposits for each of the seven (7) Special Savings Accounts were: P70,000,000.00 (December 2, 1999); P10,000,000.00 (February 7, 2000); P2,500,000.00 (March 29, 2000); P9,700,000.00 (April 5, 2000); 2,500,000.00 (May 29, 2000) P1,900,000.00 (May 4, 2000); and P2,000,000.00 (June 1, 2000). The deposit in the PCI Emerald Fund was P6,616,676.19 (December 6, 2000). According to Rosario S. Bautista, in Diliman-Matalino Branch, Ricaforte opened on November 19, 1999 a combo account: Savings Account No. 0288-02037-0 and Current Account No. 0238-00853-0 with an initial deposit of P70,000,000.00 covered by two (2) PCI Bank Checks payable to cash each in the amount of P35,000,000.00, drawn by William T. Gatchalian. Additional deposits were: a check (Exh. A-7-h) issued by Gov. Chavit Singson on November 22, 1999 for P1,000,000.00; another check dated December 9, 1999 with PNB Naga as drawee bank (Exh. A-7-j); cash deposit of P3,050,000.00 (Exh. A-7-d) on December 2, 1999; and cash deposit of P1,000,000.00 on January 28, 2000. In the Pedro Gil-Robinsons Branch, according to Shakira C. Yu, Ricaforte opened on January 6, 2000, a Regular Savings Account with an initial deposit of P6,000,000.00. Other deposits consisted of: (1) check drawn by Gov. Chavit Singson for P2,965,000.00; (2) cash deposit of P1,540,000.00 on January 25, 2000; and check drawn by Gov. Chavit Singson in the amount of P1,340,000.00. In the T.M. Kalaw Branch, Pabillon testified that Ricaforte opened Regular Savings Account No. 0193-61496-8 and Special Savings Account No. 02193-15050-3 on February 8, 2000, with the initial deposits in PNB Managers Check (Exh. A-9-A) in the amount of P10,007,777.78 and cash of P1,400,000.00. In the Scout Albano Branch, Alcaraz testified that Ricaforte opened on March 2, 2000 three accounts with initial deposits as follows: Savings Account No. 5733-15154-3, P1,995,000.00; Special Savings Account No. 5733-0721-0, P2,000,000.00; and Checking Account No. 5732-01-975-7, P5,000.00. In Isidora Hills Branch, Gonzales testified that Ricaforte opened on March 15, 2000, among others, Special Savings Account No. 077090498-6 with the initial deposit of P7,000,000.00 in the form of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. Check drawn by Gov. Chavit Singson payable to cash. Bank officials, such as Salvador R. Serrano, Patrick Dee Cheng, and Carolina S. Guerrero, testified to the existence of checks paid by Chavit Singson which landed in the accounts of persons associated with FPres. Estrada: (1) Metrobank Check No. 0000917 of Gov. Chavit Singson for P5,000,000.00 which was deposited on February 2, 1999 in Account No. 061-0-14636-7 of Paul Gary Bogard at Security Bank; (2) Metrobank Check No. 00138 drawn by Chavit Singson on September 29, 1999 in the amount of P8,000,000.00 deposited in the account of Mrs. Luisa P. Ejercito; (3) Metrobank Ayala Center Check No. 000132 drawn by Gov. Chavit Singson payable to William Gatchalian in the amount of P46,350,000.00; (4) Metrobank Check No. 001547 issued by Gov. Chavit Singson in the amount of P1,200,000.00 which was deposited in the Account No. 0180409000-3 of Laarni Enriquez on December 23, 1999. The Erap Muslim Youth Foundation The paper trail of the P200,000,000.00 deposited for the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. incontrovertibly established that the said sum of money came from jueteng collections through the cashiers / managers checks purchased by Ricaforte using the deposits in the accounts that she opened in the different branches of Equitable PCI Bank described above, as follows: Cashiers Check for P91,000,000.00, Scout Tobias-Timog Branch, April 13, 2000 (Exh. A-6-S); Cashiers Check for P77,000,000.00, Diliman-Matalino Branch, April 13, 2000 (Exh. A-7-ee); Cashiers Check for P11,000,000.00, Pedro Gil-Robinsons Branch, April 13, 2000 (Exh. A-9-B); Managers Check for P3,000,000.00, Scout Albano Branch, April 12, 2000 (Exh. A-10-K); and Cashiers Check for P7,000,000.00, Isidora Hills Branch, April 14, 2000. Antonio Fortuno, Bank Operations Officer of Equitable PCI Bank Pacific Star Branch, testified that the aforementioned six (6) checks were deposited in Bearer Account No. 0279-04225-5. From the said bearer account, 9 9 fourteen (14) withdrawals in Managers Checks (Exh. K to X with submarkings) were made in various amounts. Each withdrawal was divided into two deposits or a total of twenty eight (28) deposits of various amounts into the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, as shown by the Account Information Slips, Deposit Receipts, and Detailed 9 9 Report for Transfers and Debit / Credit Memos (DRTM) (Exh. K to X with submarkings). 9 Fortuno identified the Acknowledgement Letter (Exh. I ) dated April 25, 2000 addressed to Atty. Serapio from Beatriz Bagsit, Division Head of Makati Area, acknowledging receipt of the said six (6) checks for deposit on

staggered basis and on different dates to the account of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. at Ortigas-Strata Branch. Aida T. Basaliso corroborated the testimony of bank officer Fortuno as to the inter-branch deposits at Equitable PCI Bank Strata Ortigas Branch in Savings Account No. 0192-85835-6 of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. from the Pacific Star Branch of the same bank in the amount of P200,000,000.00 on staggered basis. The slew of bank documents, involving mind-boggling amounts of money and authenticated by competent and credible bank officers, convinces the Court that collection of jueteng money for FPres. Estrada indeed took place and the entries in the ledger were not manufactured by Gov. Chavit Singson. Payments or disbursements of the jueteng protection money to persons related to or closely associated with FPres. Estrada belie his denial that the funds accounted for in the ledgers belong to him. Indeed, the Court cannot see why Gov. Chavit Singson would make such large and substantial payments in the form of checks drawn from his Metrobank account, to personalities such as William Gatchalian, Laarni Enriquez, Loi Estrada, or other intimate associates of FPres. Estrada unless the money belonged to FPres. Estrada and the funds were being disbursed according to his instructions. The evidence does not show why Gov. Chavit Singson would choose Ricaforte to take over the supervision of the jueteng collection and let her deposit millions of pesos into Ricafortes accounts in the different branches of the Equitable PCI Bank when Ricaforte had no prior association nor relation to Gov. Singson and that the latter had his own trusted associates. As admitted by the accused, it was FPres. Estrada who had a long standing and close relationship with Ricaforte and her husband. This fact would explain Ricafortes vital participation in the preparation of the second set of ledgers. The said ledgers were prepared and later produced before the Senate by Ricaforte and not by Gov. Singson. The first set of ledgers show that P72,500,000.00 of jueteng money were handed to FPres. Estrada, alias Asiong Salonga from November 1998 to July 1999. Based on the second set of ledgers, the total amount of jueteng money that FPres. Estrada received was P112,800,000.00 from August 1999 to August 2000. For the entire duration or period covered by the 2 sets of ledgers of the total amount of P185,300,000.00. was handed by Gov. Chavit Singson to FPres. Estrada bi-monthly. The balance, after these amounts were given to FPres. Estrada and the deduction of expenses, were deposited by Ricaforte in her bank accounts. Based on the two (2) sets of ledgers the total jueteng collections for FPres. Estrada from November 1998 to August 2000 amounted to P545,291,000.00. The P200,000,000.00 of these sums of money found their way into the account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. With respect to Jinggoy Estrada, according to Gov. Singson, he was the Jing listed as an expense in the ledger for P1,000,000.00. It was Gov. Singsons testimony that FPres. Estrada (after discovering that entry) forbade Gov. Chavit Singson from giving any further share in the jueteng protection money to Jinggoy Estrada and that it will be up to FPres. Estrada to give Jinggoy Estrada a share. For this reason, Gov. Chavit Singson and Jinggoy Estrada hid the fact that Jinggoy Estrada was the collector for the Province of Bulacan and that the latter was receiving P1,000,000.00. To begin with, the prosecutions theory that Jinggoy Estrada had to keep his participation in the jueteng collection a secret from his own father belied the allegation that Jinggoy Estradas participation in the jueteng scheme was that of a principal or a conspirator. The grant of bail to Jinggoy Estrada was anchored on this fact advanced by Gov. Singson in his very own testimony. Although prosecution witness Gov. Singson, and the other witnesses who were under his employ, testified that there were instances that they collected or received money from Jinggoy Estrada, there was no testimony to the effect that they saw Jinggoy Estrada subtracted his share from jueteng collections or in any other way received a share from the jueteng collections. This Court further found it difficult to believe that Jinggoy Estrada, who was not even a resident of Bulacan, was the collector for Bulacan. Gov. Singson associates Jinggoy Estrada with Viceo allegedly from Bulacan. Who is Viceo? Why was Viceo not charged if it was true that jueteng collections from Bulacan came from him before they passed the hands of Jinggoy? There was no evidence at all that the money Jinggoy Estrada turned over to Gov. Singson or the latters representatives was part of the jueteng protection money collected from Bulacan or that he received funds from a certain Viceo. The prosecution did not also rebut the bank certification presented by the defense that Jinggoy Estrada did not have an account with the United Overseas Bank. The certification disproved the testimony of Emma Lim that the deposit slip in the amount of P1,000,000.00 said to be part of jueteng money was turned over to her by Jinggoy Estrada in the form of a personalized check with his photograph, from his account at the United Overseas Bank. The gaps in the prosecutions evidence as to Jinggoy Estrada create uncertainty in the mind of the Court as to the participation of Jinggoy Estrada in the collection and receipt of jueteng money. This Court had already

brushed aside prosecutions reliance on the telephone calls and billing statements for such calls between Ricaforte and Jinggoy Estrada to prove that he was a jueteng collector for Bulacan, for being highly speculative. The Courts ruling remains firm to this day. With respect to Serapio, neither Gov. Chavit Singsons testimony nor the ledger entries proved that Serapio was involved in any way in the collection or disbursement of jueteng protection money. Certainly, Serapios involvement appears to have begun and was limited to the funds of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Serapio is being charged with laundering or concealing a portion of the jueteng protection money in the amount of approximately P200,000,000.00 which was deposited in the account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. To this Courts mind, while the P200,000,000.00 was clearly illegally amassed wealth, the evidence on record is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Serapio was aware that the questioned funds were in fact amassed from jueteng protection money collections and that the fact of the unusually large amount of the deposits into the foundations account was with criminal intent on the part of Serapio to launder or conceal the illegal nature of the funds to serve the purpose of the acquisition or amassing of ill-gotten wealth by FPres. Estrada. The only evidence presented on this point is the uncorroborated testimony of Gov. Chavit Singson that Serapio was present during the meeting wherein FPres. Estrada instructed the transfer of the amount of P200,000,000.00 to the foundation. The Court has reservations as to the credibility of Gov. Singsons assertion in this regard because Gov. Singson failed to mention Serapios presence on that occasion during his testimony at the Senate Impeachment trial. Neither can the Court consider from the single fact alone that he arranged the staggered deposit of the said sum of money to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation that he had a criminal intent to conceal ill-gotten wealth in furtherance of the accumulation of such wealth by the principal accused. More so, this Court is not prepared to conclusively rule that the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation is not a legitimate foundation or that it was set up purely to hide his illegally amassed wealth. The incorporation papers and business permits of the Foundation are authentic and regular. The personalities behind the said foundation appear to be well-respected academicians. Fortunately or unfortunately, the public revelation of the nature of the P200,000,000.00 as part of jueteng protection money collected for FPres. Estrada came too soon after the organization of the Foundation. The Court is not in a position to ascertain with moral certainty if this controversy preempted any legitimate charitable activities it could have undertaken soon after its incorporation as it was explained by defense witnesses or whether it was as the prosecution asserted a money laundering entity. Premises considered, it is difficult to presume any criminal intent on the part of Serapio to conceal or launder jueteng protection money in order to contribute to the amassing and accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by FPres. Estrada in connection with the transfer of the P200,000,000.00 to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, notwithstanding that the evidence on record demonstrate indisputably that the said sum of money form part of ill-gotten wealth obtained though the predicate acts charged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information. RE: SUB-PARAGRAPH B OF THE AMENDED INFORMATION _____________________________ (b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000.00] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES; I. EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION GOVERNOR LUIS CHAVIT CRISOLOGO SINGSON also testified to prove the second charge in the amended Information involving the diversion of excise taxes under Republic Act (RA) No. 7171. [TSN dated July 29, 2002, pp. 78-80] According to Gov. Singson, Ilocos Sur was not getting its rightful share as a beneficiary of the excise tax. He reminded FPres. Estrada of his campaign promise that he would release all the funds to Ilocos Sur in advance, amounting more or less to Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) including interest. FPres. Estrada promised to comply but he said that because of the huge election expenses he hoped that Gov. Singson would

help. Since, Gov. Singson was afraid not to get the funds, he said: Why not? when FPres. Estrada asked: How much? Gov. Singson replied Maybe Ten Percent (10%) of what you can release. FPres. Estrada instructed Gov. Singson to prepare his request and he will approve it. Gov. Singson brought the request addressed to Secretary Diokno of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). FPres. Estrada wrote a marginal note on the request addressed to the DBM with instruction to approve it. The original of the letter was submitted to Secretary Diokno. Gov. Singson produced in court a Xerox copy with the original stamp mark of receipt dated 8/7. The marginal note reads: Aug. 3, 98. To Secretary Ben Diokno, Please see if you can accommodate the request of 8 Governor Singson (Exh. Q and submarkings). [Ibid, pp. 81-96] According to Gov. Singson, Jinggoy Estrada and Atong Ang kept on following up the release of the 8 money from DBM. A notice of funding check issued (Fund 103 dated August 25, 1998) (Exh. R ) was received by Gov. Singson. Gov. Singson immediately informed Jinggoy Estrada and Atong Ang. The latter told Gov. Singson that the President needed One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00). Gov. Singson was surprised because their agreement was only ten percent (10%). Atong told him there will be billions of pesos, so they should be the first one to deliver to FPres. Estrada and thus be the strongest and more influential (to the Former President). Gov. Singson then caused the preparation of a Provincial Board resolution appropriating the sum of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00). The Board approved the appropriation of One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170 Million) for the flue curing barn and Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) for infrastructure. Atong Ang gave Gov. Singson three (3) names to whom the money would be sent, which they did. Landbank Vigan transferred One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) to Landbank Mandaluyong which credited the accounts of the three (3) persons named by Atong Ang as follows: Account No. 0561043-38, Alma Alfaro, August 27, 1998, P40,000,000.00; Account No. 0561-0445-97, Delia Rojas, August 28, 1998, P50,000,000.00; and Account No. 0561-0446-00, Eleuterio Tan, August 28, 1998, P40,000,000.00. The total amounted to P130,000,000.00. The above data were contained in a certification of Landbank Branch Head Ma. Elizabeth Balagot (Exh. 8 S ). [Ibid, pp. 96-108] Gov. Singson did not personally know Delia Rajas, Alma Alfaro or Eleuterio Tan. In a 8 photograph (Exh. V ), Gov. Singson identified Jojo Uy as the Eleuterio Tan who showed up at the bank to withdraw the money. Jojo Uy, according to Gov. Singson was very close to FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 109-110] Gov. Singson narrated that Atong Ang called him up from his mothers house and asked Gov. Singson to go there where they will wait for the money. Gov. Singson went to the house of Atong Angs mother at 10:00 oclock in the morning and waited there until 3:00 to 4:00 oclock in the afternoon. When the money arrived, Gov. Singson noticed that Atong Ang left some money in the house. Atong Ang and Gov. Singson boarded Atong Angs vehicle, and Gov. Singsons vehicle with the security and driver followed them. At the corner near the house of FPres. Estrada at Polk St., Atong Ang asked Gov. Singson to alight from his vehicle so that it would not be obvious to the people in the vicinity. Gov. Singson alighted from the vehicle and saw Atong Angs car entered inside the house of FPres. Estrada. Atong Ang was the one driving the car. After 15 to 20 minutes, Gov. Singson followed Atong Ang to the house of FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson then met the First Lady, Dr. Loi Estrada who thanked Gov. Singson, saying Chavit, thank you very much we really needed it. Gov. Singson took the money which he and Atong Ang brought. [Ibid, pp. 111-114] When FPres. Estrada came out, Gov. Singson asked him how much Atong Ang gave him. FPres. Estrada answered Seventy Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00). Gov. Singson informed him that the total amount was One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00). FPres Estrada got mad at Atong Ang who explained that he gave Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) to Dr. Loi Estrada, and Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to Jinggoy Estrada. Atong Ang found it hard to explain the remaining Twenty Five Million Pesos (P25,000,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 114-116] Gov. Singson frequented the house of FPres. Estrada. At one time, the latter asked him again to make a request for the excise tax allocation which he will approve. Gov. Singson explained that the release of the money must be continued in big amount so that they could cover up the One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00). FPres. Estrada agreed but he did not give the billions promised. Hence, Gov. Singson could not cover up the (P130,000,000.00). When told by Gov. Singson that the Commission on Audit (COA) was pestering them, FPres. Estrada asked Gov. Singson to cover it up in the meanwhile. The amount of Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) out of the One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) was paid to the supplier of the flue curing barn which were delivered by the supplier and inaugurated by FPres. Estrada as shown by the pictures 8 8 taken on that occasion (Exhs.T and U ). The flue curing barn was needed by the tobacco farmers to save time and money. [Ibid, pp. 116-121]

Gov. Singson referred to the inaugural speech of FPres. Estrada where the latter stated walang kamakamaganak, walang kai-kaibigan, walang kumpa-kumpadre. Gov. Singson said after what happened that it would mean even friends should pay to FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 122-124] Gov. Singson demonstrated in Court, from the witness stand up to the door of the courtroom and back in more or less twenty (20) seconds, that he, who had smaller built than Atong Ang, could carry a box containing Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) in demonetized bills from the Central Bank in One Thousand Pesos (P1, 000.00) denomination each. There were twenty bundles of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) per bundle inside the box. The distance between the witness stand and the door of the courtroom was thirteen (13) meters. [Ibid, pp. 124-135] The box carried by Gov. Singson weighed more than ten (10) kilos and five bundles of cash amounting to P5,000,000.00 weighed 4.8 kilos. [Ibid, pp. 172-173] JAMIS BATULAN SINGSON (Jamis) further testified that he, Gov. Singson, his escort Federico Artates, and Driver Faustino Prudence, left the office of Gov. Singson on August 31, 1998 to fetch Atong Ang in his office at Pinaglabanan. They all proceeded to the house of the mother of Atong Ang. Gov. Singson and Atong Ang went inside the house while the rest waited outside. Later, Atong Ang, Gov. Singson and William Ang, the brother of Atong Ang, went out. Gov. Singson instructed them to accompany William to Westmont Bank, Shaw Boulevard. Jamis, Artates, William Ang and the driver of Atong Ang rode the Mitsubishi Van owned by Atong Ang. William Ang went inside the bank and after 3 hours came out with Jojo Uy and two security guards carrying two boxes each or a total of four (4) boxes. Jojo Uy was a family friend of Atong Ang, whom Jamis often saw in the office of 8 Atong Ang. Jamis identified Jojo Uy in a photograph (Exh. V ). Each of the boxes were brown in color, with a length of more than ten (10) inches, height of twelve (12) inches and thickness of eight (8) to ten (10) inches. [TSN dated September 18, 2002, pp. 38-55] Jamis and Artates each brought two (2) boxes inside the vehicle and went back to the house of the mother of Atong Ang, with an armored van following them. The four boxes were brought inside the house where Gov. Singson and Atong Ang were seated on a sofa. After lunch, Jamis saw the men of Atong Ang loading something in the vehicle of Atong Ang. Gov. Singson boarded the car of Atong Ang and instructed Jamis to just follow them to FPres. Estradas house at Polk Street in Greenhills, but they were instructed by Gov. Singson to wait at the corner. William Ang earlier informed them that the boxes contained money for FPres. Estrada. Jamis did not actually see the money. After an hour, Gov. Singson asked to be fetched from FPres. Estradas house. [Ibid, pp. 59-68] MARIA ELIZABETH GOZO BALAGOT testified that she was the Manager of Land Bank Vigan Branch from August 3, 1998 to December 31, 2000 and had over-all supervision and control of the accounts of said Branch. According to witness Balagot, on August 27, 1998, Land Bank Vigan Branch received a Facsimile of Inter18 Office Debit Advice (Exh. L and submarkings) dated August 27, 1998 from Land Bank Malacaang Branch with instruction to credit Current Account No. 04021045-70 of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Sur the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00). Land Bank Vigan Branch complied with the instruction and 18 correspondingly sent an Inter-Office Credit Advice (Exh. M and submarkings). Later in the afternoon of August 18 27, 1998, authorized (Exh. N ) representatives from the Office of the Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur, namely, 18 18 Maricar Paz and Marina Atendido, presented Check No. 0000097650 (Exhs. O and P and submarkings) dated August 27, 1998 in the amount of One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) issued to the order of 18 Luis Chavit Singson accompanied by an Accountants Advice for Local Check Disbursement (Exh. Q and submarkings) dated August 27, 1998. Witness Balagot confirmed that on August 27, 1998, the Provincial Administrator of Ilocos Sur called up Land Bank Vigan Branch requesting for encashment of the One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) that had been credited to the account of the province. She asked for three (3) days for encashment as a matter of bank policy but since the Provincial Administrator told her the money is immediately needed, she suggested for them to apply for a demand draft payable and encashable in Land Bank Makati Branch. Maricar Paz advised witness Balagot that the demand drafts should be payable to Delia Rajas, Alma Alfaro, Nuccio Saverio, and Eleuterio Tan, although she was not given the reason why the drafts had to be issued in their names. She never received any call from FPres. Estrada instructing her as to the said names. On August 28, 1998, witness Balagot called up Gov. Singson to inform him that Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan were trying to deposit their demand drafts in Westmont Bank and the governor responded that it was okay with him. She made a second call to the governor in the afternoon to inform him of the presence of Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan in Land Bank Shaw Branch and they were insisting that the checks be encashed there. Witness Balagot informed the governor that she could not accept the encashment at the said branch, but Gov. Singson

told her to do what they wanted. She testified that she called the governor instead of Maricar Paz because she knew for a fact that the one giving instructions to Maricar Paz was the governor himself. Witness Balagot then advised Land Bank Shaw Branch to cancel the demand drafts and the amounts covered will just be coursed through the individual accounts by inter-branch transaction. Witness Balagot then prepared an 18) 18 Inter-Branch Transaction Advice for Eleuterio Tan (Exh. Z and Delia Rajas (Exh. Y ) and credited the amount of Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000,00) and Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) to their respective accounts. The 19 cancelled demand drafts were returned to Land Bank Vigan Branch with a Memorandum (Exh. A ) dated August 31, 1998. The demand draft issued to Nuccio Saverio, on the other hand, was encashed in Land Bank Makati Branch. 19 Witness Balagot also identified and affirmed her Sworn Affidavit (Exhibit B and submarkings) dated November 6, 2000 relative to the foregoing facts. [TSN dated January 20, 2003 and TSN dated January 22, 2003] MARIA CARIDAD MANAHAN RODENAS was the cashier at Land Bank Shaw Branch. She testified that she knew a person by the name of Alma Alfaro as the authorized representative of valued clients, Mrs. Catalina Ang and Yolanda Uy, and as an account holder of the branch. [TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 13-16] According to witness Rodenas, Alfaro claimed to be an employee of Power Express and that Power Express was owned by Catalina Ang. [TSN, November 11, 2002, pp. 21-25] Witness Rodenas testified that on August 27, 1998, she assisted Alma Alfaro open her own savings 13 account with the branch with an initial deposit of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) (Exh. H ). Alfaro presented her 13 13 school ID (Exh. F -2) and SSS card (Exh. F -1) as valid IDs and personally accomplished the signature card (Exh. 13 G ). Alfaro indicated her business address to be c/o Power Express and residence address as Capt. Savy Street, Zone IV-A, Talisay, Negros Occidental. After complying with requirements, Alfaro told witness Rodenas that Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) coming from Land Bank Vigan Branch will soon be credited to her account. [TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 16-27] True enough, Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) from Land Bank Vigan Branch was credited online to Alfaros newly created account. When Alfaro told witness Rodenas that she wanted to withdraw the money right away, the latter told Alfaro to just come back the following day as she will still have to prepare the money. Witness Rodenas then requested from Land Banks Greenhills Cash Center the amount of Forty Six Million Pesos (P46,000,000.00) to cover the amount needed by Alfaro as well as to cover other 13 withdrawals for the day as shown by the Fund Transfer Request (Exh. I ). When Alma Alfaro returned to the bank on the following day, she proceeded to withdraw Forty Million Pesos 13 (P40,000,000.00) (Exh. J ) in cash from her account. [TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 27- 43] In that same afternoon, Alma Alfaro asked witness Rodenas to help her two friends, whom she introduced as Eleuterio Tan and Delia Rajas, with their demand drafts. Delia Rajas brought two demand drafts, Demand Draft No. 099435 in the amount 13 of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) (Exh. L ) and Demand Draft No. 09936 in the amount of Twenty Million 13 Pesos (P20,000,000.00) (Exh. K ). Eleuterio Tans Demand Draft, on the other hand, was in the amount of Forty 13 Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) (Exh. M ). Witness Rodenas testified that Tan and Rajas asked that they be accommodated in Land Bank Shaw Branch because they considered it too risky to encash their demand drafts in the cash department in Buendia, Makati and thereafter to bring it back to Mandaluyong since they were from Mandaluyong. [TSN, November 11, 2002, p. 136] After examining the demand drafts presented, witness Rodenas advised Rajas and Tan that she could not accommodate their request because Land Bank Shaw Branch was not the paying unit of the drafts and that she did not have the amount with her at that time. Due to their insistence, however, witness Rodenas conferred with Elizabeth Balagot and Lawrence Lopez, the Branch Manager and Branch Accountant of Land Bank Vigan Branch, who told her to just cancel the demand drafts and let Rajas and Tan open accounts with their branch so that they could credit the amounts online. [TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 44-51] 13 13 Eleuterio Tan presented two IDs (Exh. N ) and accomplished a specimen signature card (Exh. O ) and 13 cash deposit slip (Exh. P ) for One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00). Witness Rodenas identified Eleuterio Tan in a 9 13 picture (Exh. F ). Delia Rajas also presented two IDs (Exh. Q ) and accomplished a specimen signature card (Exh. 13 13 R ) and deposit slip (Exh. S ) for One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00). Witness Rodenas sent the cancelled demand drafts by facsimile to Land Bank Vigan Branch and after sometime the Vigan Branch credited online the proceeds of the demand drafts to the newly created accounts of Tan and Rajas. The original of the demand drafts were later returned to the Vigan Branch. [TSN, November 11, 2002, p. 13 13 133] Tan and Rajas then accomplished withdrawal slips (Exh. T & Exh. U ) to withdraw Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) and Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00), respectively. Thereafter, Eleuterio Tan filed three (3)

applications for cashiers check (Exhs. W , V & X ) causing Land Bank Shaw Branch to issue THREE (3) cashiers 13 13 13 checks (Exhs. W -1, V -1 & X -1) in his name in the amount of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) each. The three (3) cashiers checks were later deposited at Westmont Bank, Mandaluyong Branch to Savings Account No. 2011-00772-7. [TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 52-91] SPO2 FREDERICO APENES ARTATES was a policeman since 1988. At the time of his testimony, he was assigned at the Vigan City Police Station but detailed to Gov. Singson as security escort. Witness Artates testified that on August 31, 1998, he was in the office of Gov. Singson at the LCS Building in San Andres Bukid, Manila, together with Gov. Singson, Jamis Singson and driver Faustino Prudencio. According to him, Gov. Singson instructed them to go to the apartment of Atong Angs mother and while there they accompanied William Ang, Atongs brother to Westmont Bank at Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong City where they got four (4) boxes of cash from the said bank and returned back to the house of Atong Angs mother and later on proceeded to FPres. Estradas house at Polk Street. He described each of the boxes to be 10 inches in length, 12 inches in height 15 inches in width [TSN, September 25, 2002, pp.90-107]. [TSN dated September 25, 2002] ILONOR ANDRES MADRID testified that she was the Chief of License Section, Operations Division, Land 11 Transportation Office. Madrid presented and identified certifications dated January 2, 2001 (Exh. I ) and 9 December 6, 2000 (Exh. D ) pertaining to the data in the drivers license of Victor Jose Tan Uy, and identified 11 9 computer generated photographs of Victor Jose Tan Uy (Exhs. J & D -1). [TSN, October 9, 2002, pp. 127-148] GWEN MARIE JUDY DUMOL SAMONTINA was the Assistant Vice-President and Head of Records and Information Management Center of the Social Security System (SSS) since January 1998. She was the official records custodian of the SSS and in-charge of ensuring that all records received by the branches were archived. 11 Witness Samontina brought with her the Social Security Form E-1 (Exh. V -1 and sub markings) filed by Delia Ilan Rajas. This form showed that her address was No. 48 Calbayog Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and SSS number was 33-2365508-7. Witness also brought several SSS Form R-1 and R1-A filed by the employers of Rajas with SSS namely (1) Admate Company, Inc., (2) Energetic Security and Specialists, Inc. (3) Jetro Construction and 11 11 11 Development Inc., (4) Power Management and Consultancy Inc. The forms (Exhs. W , X , & Y , and sub markings) filed by Admate Company, Inc. showed the company address to be No. 46 Calbayog Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. The first R1-A Form filed on December 8, 1994 showed Rajas as the only employee. The R1-A Form filed on May 6, 1998 showed that Rajas as listed as one of the employees. The forms were accomplished by the employers representative and treasurer, Yolanda A. Uy. The forms submitted by Energetic 11 12 Security and Specialists, Inc. (Exhs. Z and A , with sub markings) showed the business address to be No. 46 Calbayog Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. The forms showed that Charlie T. Ang and Delia Rajas appeared as 12 employees. The forms were accomplished by Ma. Rosanie U. Ang. The Form R-1 (Exh. B , with sub markings) of Jetro Construction and Development, Inc. filed on October 9, 1990 showed that it had two employees. This 12 document was accomplished by Yolanda Ang. Its Form R1-A (Exh. C , with sub markings) filed on March 15, 1995 showed that it had 18 employees, including Delia Rajas. The address is still No. 46 Calbayog Street, Mandaluyong, 12 12 12 Metro Manila and it was prepared by Yolanda A. Uy. The forms (Exhs. D , E & F , with sub markings) of Power Management and Consultancy Incorporation were received by SSS on June 8, 2000. It had an office address at 188 Captain Manzano Street, Corner N. Domingo, San Juan, Metro Manila. Among the officers listed were Charlie T. Ang, Nerissa S. Ang, and William T. Ang. Delia Rajas appeared as one of its employees. [TSN, October 23, 2002, pp. 25-60] II. EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE During his testimony, accused FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA vehemently denied that he asked Gov. Singson to give him part of Ilocos Surs share on the tobacco excise tax imposed by Republic Act No. 7171; that when he was approached by Gov. Singson regarding the said share of his province, he told Singson to make a formal request, and that Singson already had a prepared request (Exh. Q) to which FPres. Estrada wrote his marginal note addressed to then Budget Secretary Diokno, stating: Please see if you can accommodate. FPres. Estrada explained that he could not have alluded to his election expenses because contributions to his 1998 Presidential Campaign were overflowing; that he rejected many contributions which kept pouring in as it was the case with a very popular candidate like him; that he even asked his party treasurers to distribute campaign funds to their candidates for Mayor, Congressman and Governor, that Gov. Singson got a big share of the campaign funds, that Gov. Singsons testimony on the percentage he allegedly asked for was a lie as he would

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not take away funds intended for farmers and that in fact during his term as President he rejected an offer of Fourteen Million Dollars (US $14,000,000) for him to sign a sovereign guaranty; that he did not know Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan or Mr. Uy, and Delia Rajas, that being the President, he could not have conspired with Delia Rajas whom he heard was a cook; that he met Charlie Atong Ang sometime in 1993 or 1994, when the latter was introduced to him by his friend, Jojo Antonio; that he was not that close to Ang; that Atong Ang never went to his house at Polk Street, Greenhills, San Juan to deliver money from the excise tax as testified to by Gov. Singson; that the garage in his house could not accommodate Atong Angs vehicle since the Presidential Car was parked there and there were security arrangements if he was at home and that Gov. Singson was merely passing the blame to him because he would not help Gov. Singson with his problem with the Commission on Audit. [TSN, March 22, 2006, pp. 63-113] On March 29, 2006, FPres. Estrada testified that Atong Ang did not go to his residence at Polk Street, Greenhills nor at Malacaang except when Atong Ang attended the wedding of his daughter; that in the reenactment at the Bangko Sentral, it was shown that One Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) in bills could not fit into four (4) boxes contrary to the testimony of Gov. Singson, and that the weight of the said sum of money was equivalent to two and one half sacks of rice which could not be carried by one person. 19, 18 18 FPres. Estrada disclaimed any knowledge of Prosecutions Exhibits A X and Y and also Landbank check dated August 27, 1998 for Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) and Gov. Singsons September 3, 1998 letter to Elizabeth Balagot, Landbank Manager of Vigan Branch in Ilocos Sur. He also testified that the Notice of Funding Check Issued, Fund 103 dated August 25, 1998 signed by DBM Secretary Benjamin Diokno 8 addressed to the Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur, [Exh. R ] did not reach the Office of the President. According to FPres. Estrada, he did not know, nor have seen, Alma Alfaro, the person mentioned in the certification that inter-branch deposits made by the provincial government of Ilocos Sur from August 27 to 28, 1998, particularly on August 27, 1998 to Account No. 0561-0445-38 in the name of said Alma Alfaro in the amount of Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00). He said that he saw her for the first time only during the Impeachment Trial. [TSN, March 29, 2006, pp.42-49] He also did not know, nor have seen, Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan, the owners of the bank accounts at Land Bank Shaw Branch who were recipients of the online credit from Land Bank Vigan Branch on August 28, 1998 in the amounts of Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) and Forty MiIlion Pesos (P40,000,000.00) respectively [TSN, ibid, pp.50-51]. The persons shown in the photographs marked as 9 8 prosecutions Exhibits F, G , and T were not known to him. He was able to identify the photograph marked 8 as Exhibit U which was the inauguration of the flue-curing plant in Ilocos Sur, which he later on learned was a mere show-off (pakitang tao) because the project did not push through. FPres. Estrada likewise denied any knowledge of prosecutions exhibits presented to identify Victor Jose 9 13 11 13 11 Uy (a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan) (Exhs. N , N , T & J); Delia Rajas (Exhs. V, W, H, H , Y, Y-3, Z , 12 12 12 12 13 12 13 A , B -4, C , D & Q ) and Alma Alfaro (Exhs. F & F ). [TSN, March 29, 2006, pp.59-68,79,80] FPres. Estrada likewise disclaimed any knowledge of prosecutions exhibits regarding the 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 P130,000,000.00 excise tax share of Ilocos Sur [Exhs. H , I , J , K , M , L , O , P -1, R , S , E , U , V , V -1, 13 13 13 13 13 13 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 19 18 W , W -1, X , X -1, Y , Z , M , N , O , P , Q , R , S , L , M , N , O , P , Q , R , S , T , B , Z . [TSN, March 29, 2006, pp.76-95] FPres. Estrada also belied Gov. Singsons testimony of that he ordered Gov. Singson to cover up his unliquidated cash advances by countering that Gov. Singson tried to cover up his own cash advances as the Commission on Audit was already going after him and he wanted to pass the blame to FPres. Estrada. [TSN, March 29, 2006, pp. 98-100] When he learned about the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) excise tax share of Ilocos Sur, he instructed then Justice Secretary Artemio G. Toquero to investigate the matter. Secretary Toquero, in turn, referred the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). After one week, NBI Regional Director Carlos Saunar submitted a report through a Memorandum dated October 20, 2000 (Exh. 199) to Secretary Toquero. Director Saunar also submitted to FPres. Estrada a December 12, 2000 letter (Exh. 201); another document (Exh. 204) addressed to Secretary Toquero on the subject Governor Luis Chavit Singson, et al. for malversation of public funds Twenty Million Pesos (P20, 000,000.00) and for violation of Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 3019; an affidavit of Agustin D. Chan, Jr. (Exh. 202) and to which is an attached letter dated December 3, 2000 of Agustin T. Chan, Jr. (Exh. 202-D) with attached certification (Exh. 206-C) demanding that Gov. Singson settle his outstanding cash advance in the amount of One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) and Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) under Check Nos. 98397 and 42364 dated December 29, 1999 and March 19, 1999, pursuant to paragraph 9.1 and 9.3.3.3 of COA Circular No. 97-002 and Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445;

an affidavit of Elizabeth Arabello dated January 12, 2001 (Exh. 205); a document entitled WP, item Singson cash advances (Exh. 208), which details the unliquidated cash advances of Gov. Singson at year end 1999 amounting to One Hundred Thirty Five Million Five Hundred Eighty Four Thousand Eight Hundred Eighteen Pesos and Seventeen Centavos (P135,584,818.17); and NBI Disposition Form, Subject Results of Evaluation and Evidence in Support of COA Reports on the provincial government of Ilocos Sur for the years 1997 and 1998 (Exh. 198), stating that the amount of Four Hundred Thirty Five Million One Hundred Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Ninety Eight Pesos (P435,190,298.00) was spent by Gov. Singson on the Tomato Paste Plant which COA found to be a nonfunctioning and non-operational project and to have incurred the loss of more than Twenty Million Six Hundred Fifty-five Thousand and Seventy-four Pesos (P20, 655, 074.00) as of June 30, 1998 [TSN, March 29, pp.106-131] and that there were ELEVEN (11) other cases of unsettled, unliquidated or dissolved cash advances of Gov. Singson which included the One Hundred Seventy Million (P170,000,000) unliquidated cash advances for the purchase of equipment for the Tobacco Flue Curing Plant involved in this case. [TSN, ibid, pp.143-144] FPres. Estrada narrated that Director Saunar informed him that the case against Gov. Singson was clear and should be filed right away with the Office of the Ombudsman. Director Saunar gave him a copy of the complaintaffidavit of the NBI (Exh. 200, 200-N, 200-0, 200-P, 200-Q) recommending the filing of the appropriate charges against Gov. Singson and other Ilocos Sur provincial officials among others for the non-delivery of the supplier NS International, Inc. of the equipment for the flue curing barn and re-drying plant in the amount of One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) (Exh. 200-R). [TSN, March 29, 2006, pp. 7-18] However, Gov. Singson was granted immunity from criminal prosecution and Gov. Singson was able to pass on the case against FPres. Estrada by implicating the latter as the one who ordered him and testifying against him. [TSN, ibid, pp.1925] The last time FPres. Estrada talked to Gov. Singson was when he stopped over at San Francisco USA for a speaking engagement on his way to an official visit to Washington he was surprised that Gov. Singson who was not a member of his delegation fetched him at the airport. After his speaking engagement, he went up to his room where Congressman Asistio and Gov. Singson had a big problem with the COA in Ilocos Sur because the provincial auditor did not want to cooperate with him. Gov. Singson asked FPres. Estrada to help transfer the said auditor, which request he refused because COA is an independent constitutional body. Gov. Singson insisted that FPres. Estrada call the COA Chairman to interfere in his behalf. He reminded Gov. Singson that he should not look after himself but he should protect the name of the Office of the President. Gov. Singson then abruptly stood up and grudgingly left. FPres. Estrada came to know of the name of the COA provincial auditor during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee hearing and he was Atty. Agustin Chan who testified at the hearing and demanded that Gov. Singson liquidate his cash advances. Later, FPres. Estrada read from the newspaper that Chan was ambushed and killed in a town in Ilocos Sur. [TSN, ibid, pp.31-44] ATTY. AGATON S. DACAYANAN was the State Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA) assigned at the Province of Ilocos Sur for the years 1995 to 1999. He examined, audited and settled all accounts of the Province of Ilocos Sur based on the documents submitted by, and gathered from the Provincial Accountant, Provincial Treasurer, Budget Officer and other officials who have access to the financial transactions of the provincial government. He submitted Annual Audit Reports at the end of every year. Witness Dacayanan then presented and identified the Annual Audit Reports for the years ended December 31, 1995 (Exh. 187 and submarkings); December 31, 1996 (Exh. 188 and submarkings); December 31, 1997 (Exh. 189 and submarkings); and, December 31, 1998 (Exh. 190 and submarkings). [TSN dated September 20, 2004, TSN dated Septebmer 22, 2004 and TSN dated September 29, 2004] BONIFACIO M. ONA was Director III of COA and the Officer-In-Charge of its Special Audit Office. Witness Ona testified that one of his duties as OIC of the Special Audit Office was to transmit the Report prepared by their audit teams to the different auditing units and as such he had the chance to review as to its form the Special Audit Report for the Province of Ilocos Sur for the period 1999 (SAO Report No. 99-31) (Exh. 191 and submarkings), which he presented to the Court by virtue of a subpoena duces tecum, and after which he transmitted the same to the Governor of Ilocos Sur. [TSN dated October 4, 2004] ELVIRA JAVIER FELIX was State Auditor IV of the COA. Witness testified that she was the Officer-inCharge of the Provincial Auditors Office from October 5, 2001 to July 31, 2002, and she presented and identified Annual Audit Reports for the Province of Ilocos Sur for the years ended December 31, 2001 (Exh. 192 and submarkings), and December 31, 2002 (Exh. 193 and submarkings).

Witness Felix also presented and identified copies of the Annual Audit Reports of the Province of Ilocos Sur for the years ended December 31, 1999 (Exh. 194 and submarkings) and December 31, 2000 (Exh. 195 and submarkings) which she secured from the Provincial Auditors Office, and which were prepared during the term of then Provincial Auditor Atty. Agustin Chan who was killed in an ambush on October 4, 2001. [TSN dated October 4, 2004 and TSN dated October 6, 2004] ELIZABETH M. SAVELLA was an Auditor of the Corporate Government Sector of the COA. Savella testified that she was assigned previously with the Special Audit Office of the Commission of Audit and was designated in 1999 as the Team Leader of a Special Audit Team that conducted a special audit of the Province of Ilocos Sur for the period from 1996 to 1999. Being the Team Leader, witness Savella was the one assigned to consolidate all the audit findings submitted by the team members to come up with the audit report. The said audit report was SOA Report No. 99-31 (Exh. 191 and submarkings). Witness stated that the scope of the audit was the financial transaction and operation of the Province of Ilocos Sur for the period 1996 to 1999. They looked, particularly, into the utilization of R.A. 7171 funds and the utilization of the PNB loan specifically the implementation of the Tomato Flue Curing Plant Project, stating that the audit aims to evaluate the regularity of the implementation of the provinces projects. [TSN dated October 6, 2004 and TSN dated October 11, 2004] CONGRESSMAN LUIS A. ASISTIO testified that he knows Gov. Singson and met him several times. He said that on July 24, 2000, he accompanied Gov. Singson to see FPres. Estrada at his room at the Fairmont Hotel at San Francisco, California where Gov. Singson requested FPres. Estrada to call the Chairman of the Commission on Audit to ask for the relief of the Auditor assigned to his province to which FPres. Estrada declined. Asistio clarified that in the many meetings he had with Gov. Singson during the period late August to September 2000, they never talked about alleged receipt of monies from R.A. 7171 and he knew of these issues only during the Impeachment Trial. He thinks that these are mere figments of Gov. Singsons imagination since they never talked of anything except the provincial leadership. Gov. Singson also did not mention the name of accused Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. He added that Gov. Singson at one time went to his house when there was an ongoing rally at Makati prior to the press conference and told him that he (Gov. Singson) does not consider FPres. Estrada as his friend anymore. Asistio added that he watched the Impeachment Trial against FPres. Estrada and thinks that it is a farce because in all their conversations, Gov. Singson never mentioned about R.A. 7171 nor talked about jueteng, except probably when he said kunin na nilang lahat huwag lang yung liderato. Asistio stated that in his visits to Malacaang during the time of FPres. Estrada, at least three times a week, he never saw Atong Ang there because Atong Ang was banned by FPres. Estrada from entering Malacaang. [TSN dated October 11, 2004 and TSN dated October 13, 2004] CARLOS P. SAUNAR was Regional Director of the National Bureau of Investigation. In October 2000, he was the Chief of the Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, assuming the position from 1997 or 1998 up to July 2001, and as such was tasked to investigate the public disclosures made by then Gov. Singson as per instructions of then NBI Director Federico Opinion, who was, in turn, directed by then Justice Secretary Artemio G. Tuquero in a Memorandum dated October 10, 2000 (Exh. 199 and submarkings). In the conduct of their investigation, Saunar and his team of investigators secured documents from the COA, such as, the Audit Reports of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Sur and the Schedule of Unliquidated Cash Advances, and subpoenaed the concerned public officials and employees of the Province of Ilocos Sur. [TSN, October 13, 2004, pp. 67-69] After evaluating the reports and evidence, witness submitted an Evaluation Disposition Form (Exh. 198 and submarkings) dated 16 October 2000 which made mention of 11 cases (Annex A of Disposition Form) (Exh. 198-B) of irregularities that were assigned to different teams for investigation. [TSN, October 13, 2004, pp. 80, 84] The result of Saunars investigation on the P170,000,000.00 alleged unliquidated cash advances of Governor Singson and some other cash advances was contained in a Revised Report of Investigation which became the subject of a Complaint-Affidavit (Exh. 200 and submarkings) dated 10 January 2001 signed by Carlos S. Caabay, then acting Director, NBI, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. Witness explained that the Revised Report of Investigation traced the P170,000,000.00 from its source up to its liquidation. [TSN, October 13, 2004, p. 96] Saunar testified that they made a record check and searched, as requested by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, for the whereabouts of accused Alma Alfaro, accused Eleuterio Tan and accused Delia Rajas but failed to locate them. [TSN, October 13, 2004, pp. 107-110] The NBI filed two (2) other cases involving cash

advances of the Gov. Singson with the Office of the Secretary of Justice, one of which is contained in a case transmittal (Exh. 201 and submarkings) dated 12 December 2000 addressed to Honorable Artemio G. Tuquero relating to the P100,000,000.00 cash advance of Gov. Singson and supported by a Report of Investigation dated 12 December 2000 (Exh. 201-B). The other case transmittal (Exh. 204 and submarkings) they filed with the Department of Justice on December 14, 2000 was in connection with the cash advance of Gov. Singson in the amount of P20,000,000.00, and supported by another Report of Investigation dated 14 December 2000 (Exh. 204B). In all the investigations conducted by the NBI on the cash advances of Gov. Singson, Saunar said that they prepared an analysis, WP-Singson Cash Advance (Exh. 208 and submarkings) (WP stands for working paper), and that based on the working paper, Gov. Singson had accumulated cash advances of Three Hundred Five Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P305,600,000.00) between the period January 1997 to January 2000. From this total, the amount of P170,015,181.83 appears to have been settled, leaving a balance of unliquidated cash advances of Gov. Singson of P135,584,818.70 as of January 2000. [TSN, October 25, 2004, pp. 53-54] The amount of P163,663,636.27 as appearing in the working paper, which was also the subject matter of the complaint-affidavit filed with the Ombudsman (Exh. 200), is supposed to be the amount that was the settlement of the cash advance of P170,000,000.00 less 30% withholding tax supposed to be remitted to the BIR. The P170,000,000.00 pesos came from the P200,000,000.00 representing the share of the Province of Ilocos Sur from the excise taxes collected pursuant to R.A. 7171 that was released by the DBM. The P170,000,000.00 was then cash advanced by Gov. Singson from the account of the Province of Ilocos Sur in LBP Vigan Branch, wherein a certain Marina Atendido deposited the amount of P40,000,000.00 in favor of the account of Alma Alfaro at the LBP Shaw Boulevard Branch through an inter-branch accommodation. The same was withdrawn in cash by Alma Alfaro. [TSN, October 25, 2004, pp. 57-63] As to the remaining P130,000,000.00, four (4) demand drafts were applied for by Maricar Paz, one of which was issued in favor of Luccio Saberrio in the amount of P40,000,000.00 which was withdrawn in LBP Makati, where the amount of P35,000,000.00 was deposited to another savings account (the account number is indicated in the demand draft) in the same LBP Makati while the P5,000,000.00 was cashed. The second demand draft pertains to another P40,000,000.00 pesos in favor of Eleuterio Tan which was negotiated at the LBP Shaw Boulevard Branch but was cancelled, and in lieu of this, the corresponding amount was wire transferred from LBP Vigan to LBP Shaw Boulevard. The two remaining demand drafts pertain to Delia Rajas, one in the amount of P20,000,000.00 and the other in the amount of P30,000,000.00, and were negotiated in LBP Shaw Boulevard but were also cancelled, the corresponding total amount of P50,000,000.00 was then wire transferred and deposited to the account of Delia Rajas in LBP Shaw Boulevard. [TSN, October 25, 2004,, pp. 64-70] Saunar reiterated that they conducted an in-depth investigation of the expose made by Gov. Singson, which includes alleged violations on the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices, malversation of public funds and violation of R.A. 4200, pursuant to the memorandum issued by the Secretary of Justice. However, their investigation so far has not reached the point of illegal jueteng or illegal gambling. They did not conduct an in-depth investigation on the activities of Mr. Atong Ang and FPres. Estrada because they have not reached that point where the evidence would show that they have participated. [TSN, October 25, 2004, pp. 102-104] However, they already filed a complaint-affidavit dated January 10, 2007 which referred to the One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) that was cash advanced by Gov. Singson based on the evidence they gathered so far in their investigation. Saunar further testified that on November 2000, Director Opinion directed him to accommodate interviews on the result of their investigation in connection with the P170,000,000.00 alleged cash advance of Gov. Singson which was done in his office when he was still the Chief of the NBI Anti-Graft Division, and the result of which appeared in a VCD. [TSN, November 3, 2004, pp. 18, 26-27] [TSN dated October 13, 2004, TSN dated October 25, 2004, TSN dated October 27, 2004 and TSN dated November 3, 2004] BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP) OCULAR INSPECTION On May 25, 2005, the Court conducted another ocular inspection at the Money Museum of the BSP upon the request of the accused Estradas. The Court observed that if the P130,000,000.00 were all in P1000.00 denominations and divided into 130 bundles with each bundle consisting of 1000 pieces of P1000.00 peso bills amounting to P1 Million pesos, only a maximum of 20 bundles amounting to P20 Million pesos would fit in a box (Exh. X-Ocular Inspection), with an inner or interior dimensions of 12 inches width, 10 inches height and 15 inches

length which measurement was given by prosecution witnesses Artatez and a certain OJ Singson during their testimony. Thus, the P130 Million pesos would fit in 6 and boxes. If the P130,000,000.00 were in P500.00 denominations and divided into 260 bundles with each bundle consisting of 1000 pieces of P500.00 bills amounting to P500,000.00, the P130,000,000.00 pesos would fit in 13 boxes. A Certification issued by the BSP that the P1,000,000.00 pesos in P1000.00 bills would weigh about just under a kilo has already been submitted by the accused in the previous hearing. [TSN dated May 25, 2002, pp. 10-11] FINDINGS OF FACT Re: Sub-paragraph (b) of the Amended Information With respect to the predicate act of divesting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur, this Court finds that indeed an amount of P130,000,000.00 out of the P200,000,000.00 share in tobacco excise taxes of the Province of Ilocos Sur was withdrawn from the provincial coffers and misappropriated and misused to the damage and prejudice of the said province. The evidence presented before this Court establish beyond doubt that Gov. Singson initiated the process that eventually led to the allocation and release of funds by the national government to the Province of Ilocos Sur of the amount of P200,000,000.00 from the excise tax imposed pursuant to Republic Act No. 7171. As chief executive of the Province of Ilocos Sur, Gov. Singson personally handed a letter to FPres. Estrada requesting the release of 8 Ilocos Surs share in the tobacco excise taxes [Exh. Q ] to pin him on his campaign promise to the people of Ilocos Sur during the 1998 Presidential Elections. FPres. Estrada, through a marginal note on Gov. Singsons letter, endorsed the request to then Sec. Benjamin Diokno of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) [Exh. 8 Q -1]. The DBM released the amount of P200,000,000 to the Province of Ilocos Sur as its share in tobacco excise taxes as shown in the Notice of Funding Check Issued, Fund 103 dated August 25, 1998 signed by DBM Sec. 8 Benjamin Diokno and addressed to the Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur [Exh. R ]. Gov. Singson forthwith caused the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Sur to enact a Resolution appropriating the sum of P200,000,000.00, of which P170,000,000.00 was intended for flue-curing barns and P30,000,000.00 for infrastructure. Gov. Singson caused the release of P170,000,000.00 from the said fund as shown by the Authorization he issued to Maricar Paz and Marina Atendido, employees of his office to officially transact with Land Bank Vigan Branch, in behalf of the 18 Provincial Government of Ilocos Sur dated August 27, 1998 [Exh N ], Check No. 0000097650 dated August 27, 18 18 1998 issued to the order of Luis Chavit Singson in the amount of P170,000,000.00 [Exhs. O and P ], and an 18 Accountants Advice for Local Check Disbursement dated August 27, 1998 [Exh. Q ]. This amount, however, was broken down into smaller amounts and deposited/transferred to the accounts of individuals identified with or known associates of Atong Ang, namely Alma Alfaro, Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan, as shown by a certification of 8 Land Bank Vigan Branch Manager Ma. Elizabeth Balagot [Exh. S ], Demand Draft Application Nos. 656 and 712 in 18 18 the name of Delia Rajas [Exhs. R and S ], Demand Draft Application No. 734 in the name of Eleuterio Tan [Exh. 18 T ], and Demand Draft Application No. 722 in the name of Nuccio Saverio [Exh. U18], and the four demand drafts 18 13 13 13 issued pursuant thereto [Exhs. V , K , L and M ]. A fifth demand draft in the name of Gov. Singson was inexplicably cancelled albeit the amount covered by it was deposited in the account of Alma Alfaro through an 18 Inter-Branch Deposit Accomodation Slip [Exh. X ] as instructed by Maricar Paz to Land Bank. The demand drafts issued to Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan were similarly cancelled and the amounts of P40,000,000.00 and P50,000,000.00 covered by the demand drafts were deposited in the accounts of Eleuterio Tan and Delia Rajas, respectively, at Land Bank Shaw Branch. Alma Alfaros P40,000,000.00 was withdrawn by her in cash a day after it was deposited in her account at Land Bank Shaw Branch on August 27, 1998 [TSN, November 4, 2003, pp. 27-43]. On the other hand, Tan and Rajas withdrew on the same day P40,000,000 and P50,000,000, respectively, from their accounts and Tan used the proceeds to buy Three (3) cashiers check in the amount of P30,000,000 each or a 13 13 13 total of P90,000,000 [Exhs. W -1, V -1 & X -1]. The Three (3) cashiers check were deposited in Savings Account No. 2011-00772-7 at Westmont Bank, Mandaluyong Branch [Ibid, pp. 52-91]. The P40,000,000.00 originally covered by the demand draft in the name of Gov. Singson which was cancelled and subsequently withdrawn by Alma Alfaro was not shown to have been deposited at Westmont Bank. Who profited from this sum of money? The Court can only surmise given the dearth of even the prosecutions evidence on what happened to the money after it was received by Alma Alfaro. Significantly, it appears that of the P170,000,000.00 appropriated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Sur for flue-curing barns only the amount of P40,000,000.0 went to the supplier of the flue-curing barn, Nuccio Saverio who encashed his demand draft at Land Bank Makati Branch. Saverio could collect only the said amount in view of the testimony of Gov. Singson that he delivered only one module of flue curing barns costing P40,000,000.00.

According to Jamis Singson and Artates, they accompanied William Ang, the brother of Atong Ang, to Westmont Bank to withdraw money but they just waited outside the bank. They helped carry the four (4) boxes to the vehicle when William and the security guards brought the said boxes outside the bank. Thereafter, they joined William transport the boxes to the home of Catalina Ang, and later to the residence of FPres. Estrada at Polk Street. Jamis and Artates were told by William Ang that the boxes contained money for FPres. Estrada. The prosecutions evidence that only the amount of P90,000,000.00 was deposited in Westmont Bank created a loophole in the impression given by the testimony of Gov. Singson that he and Atong Ang were supposed to bring the P130,000,000.00 withdrawn from Westmontbank to the residence of FPres. Estrada. The Court can only speculate that this could have been the reason why during the Ocular Inspection at the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) the amount of P130,000,000.00 could not fit the four (4) boxes described by Gov. Singson and the other prosecution witnesses. There are also gaps in the prosecutions evidence on the alleged delivery to FPres. Estrada of the diverted funds or a portion thereof. It was not established how much cash was allegedly stashed in the boxes that came from Westmont Bank and which were unloaded/reloaded at the house of Catalina Ang or how much cash was in the boxes allegedly brought to FPres. Estradas house. No one testified that he saw cash being handed to FPres. Estrada, Sen. Loi Estrada or Jinggoy Estrada. Serious doubts are engendered by the bare testimony of Gov. Singson, the prosecutions star witness, who, by his own account, did not even touch the boxes of money, nor count the money inside the boxes that arrived at the home of Catalina Ang and allegedly reloaded for delivery to Polk Street. Gov. Singson did not also see the alleged turnover of the money by Ang to FPres. Estrada, Dr. Loi Estrada or Mayor Jinggoy as he stayed at the corner of Polk Street, so many meters away from the highly fenced and gated house of FPres. Estrada. The Court finds it queer that Gov. Singson would stay only at the corner of the street where FPres. Estradas residence is located instead of accompanying Ang to witness the delivery of money that, according to him, was important to him and his constituents in Ilocos Sur. Only Atong Ang could have credibly testified on the alleged delivery of money but the prosecution did not present him as a witness, despite his plea of guilt to a lower offense and his admission that he partook of P25,000,000.00 of the P130,000,000.00 of the excise tax share of Ilocos Sur. This Court could not admit without corroborating evidence Gov. Singsons bare testimony that FPres. Estrada purportedly got mad that Atong Ang gave him only P70,000,000.00 and that Atong Ang had given P20,000,000.00 and P15,000,000.00 to Dr. Loi Estrada and Mayor Jinggoy respectively. In this Courts view, certain details of Gov. Singsons testimony on this point are rather incredible and far-fetched. Gov. Singson had not offered any explanation why and how Atong Ang had the temerity or the guts to divide the money among FPres. Estrada and the members of the First Family and decide by himself the amount of their respective shares without prior clearance of FPres. Estrada, then the highest executive official of the land. Furthermore, the record is bereft of evidence to confirm Gov. Singsons testimony that FPres. Estrada was interested in the diversion of tobacco excise taxes or that there was an agreement between Gov. Singson and FPres. Estrada that 10% of any amount released to the Province of Ilocos Sur would be turned over by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singsons statements that Atong Ang and Mayor Jinggoy kept following up the release of the money and that Atong Ang informed Gov. Singson that FPres. Estrada wanted not just 10% but P130,000,000.00 of the P200,000,000.00 are likewise uncorroborated. Regarding the testimony of Gov. Singson implicating Jinggoy Estrada in the commission of the predicate act mentioned in sub-paragraph (b), the Honorable Supreme Court early enough had clarified the import of the charge against accused Jinggoy Estrada under the Amended Information in this manner: Xxx xxx xxx Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur, which Act is the offense described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner (Jinggoy Estrada) but instead names other conspirators of the Former President. [Jose Jinggoy Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, supra, p. 553] The recent decision in People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan (Special Division) and Jose Jinggoy Estrada (G.R. No. 158754, promulgated August 10, 2007) which upheld this Courts Resolution granting bail to Jinggoy Estrada, has explained the essence and import of the above-quoted ruling: Obviously hoping to maneuver around the above ruling so as to implicate individual respondent for predicate acts described in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of the Amended Information, petitioner now argues:

It should be emphasized that in the course of the proceedings in the instant case, respondent Jinggoy Estrada waived the benefit of the said ruling and opted, instead, to participate, as he did participate and later proceeded to cross examine witnesses whose testimonies were clearly offered to prove the other constitutive acts of Plunder alleged in the Amended Information under sub-paragraphs b, c, and d. We disagree. At bottom, the petitioner assumes that the ruling accorded benefits to respondent Jinggoy that were inexistent at the start of that case. But no such benefits were extended, as the Court did not read into the Amended Information, as couched, something not there in the first place. Respondent Jinggoys participation, if that be the case, in the proceedings involving subparagraphs b, c, and d, did not change the legal situation set forth in the aforequoted portion of the Courts ruling in G.R. No. 148965. For when it passed, in G.R. NO. 148965, upon the inculpatory acts envisaged and ascribed in the Amended Information against Jinggoy, the Court merely defined what he was indicted and can be penalized for. In legal jargon, the Court informed him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, right guaranteed an accused under the Constitution. In fine, all that the Court contextually did in G.R. No. 148965 was no more than to implement his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation in the light of the filing of the Amended Information as worded. If at all, the Courts holding in G.R. No. 148965 freed individual respondent from the ill effects of a wrong interpretation that might be given to the Amended Information. The mere fact that FPres. Estrada endorsed Gov. Singsons request for release of funds to the then DBM Secretary for review does not indicate any undue interest on the part of FPres. Estrada in the grant of Gov. Singsons request. The tenor of the marginal note itself was simply for the DBM Secretary to see if [he] can accommodate the request of Governor Singson. Finally, not a scintilla of evidence links FPres. Estrada to any of the obscure personalities who withdrew the P130,000,000.00, namely, Delia Rajas, Alma Alfaro, and Eleuterio Tan and to any of the official bank documents that made possible the diversion and misappropriation of the aforesaid public funds. In sum, the paper trail in relation to the P130,000,000.00 diverted tobacco excise taxes began with Gov. Singson and ended with Atong Ang. This Court does not find the evidence sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that FPres. Estrada or any member of his family had instigated and/or benefited from the diversion of said funds. RE: SUB-PARAGRAPH C OF THE AMENDED INFORMATION _____________________________ (c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)TO PURCHASE, 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE

Under paragraph (c) of the Amended Information, accused FPres. Estrada was charged with the crime of plunder, for having willfully, unlawfully and criminally acquired, amassed or accumulated and acquired ill-gotten wealth in the amount of P189,700,000.00 representing commissions or percentages by reason of the purchase of shares of stock of Belle Corporation by SSS and GSIS. The gravamen of this specific charge is whether FPres. Estrada, unjustly enriched himself at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic by receiving a commission of P187 Million as consideration for the purchase by SSS and GSIS of Belle Shares. Even if the Prosecution is able to establish that FPres. Estrada used his official position, authority, relationship and influence and directed, ordered and compelled Carlos A. Arellano (then President of the SSS) and Federico C. Pascual (then President of GSIS) for SSS and GSIS to buy Belle shares with money of the GSIS and SSS which are held in trust by the said institutions for the millions of employees of the government and the private sector, such fact alone does not constitute an overt or criminal act, the commission of which would warrant a conviction for plunder. Prosecution must establish that, in consideration of the purchase by GSIS and SSS of the Belle Shares, FPres. Estrada received the amount of P189,700,000.00 as commission. In discharging its burden of proof that FPres. Estrada directed, ordered and compelled, for his personal gain and benefit, the GSIS to purchase 351,878,000 shares of stock more or less, and the SSS to purchase 329,855,000 shares of stock more or less, of the Belle Corporation in the amount of more or less One Billion One Hundred Two Million Nine Hundred Sixty Five Thousand Six Hundred Seven Pesos And Fifty Centavos (P1,102,965,607.50) and more or less Seven Hundred Forty Four Million Six Hundred Twelve Thousand And Four Hundred Fifty Pesos (P744,612,450.00), respectively, or a total of more or less One Billion Eight Hundred Forty Seven Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Fifty Seven Pesos And Fifty Centavos (P1,847,578,057.50), the prosecution presented its principal witnesses in the persons of Arellano, Pascual, Ocier and Capulong. EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION WILLY NG OCIER (Ocier) was the Vice Chairman and Director of Belle Corporation on June 24, 1999. He testified that SSI Management, a company created by Roberto Ongpin was the Selling stockholder of Belle shares totaling 650,000,000. [TSN January 9, 2002, p.94] Roberto Ongpin, in his personal capacity, originally gave an option to Mark Jimenez to purchase these 650,000,000 shares of Belle [Ibid., pp. 67- 68] because Roberto Ongpin at that time granted (sic) to transform Belle Corporation into the foremost gaming company in the Philippines, and he wanted somebody to help him acquiring (sic) licenses to do Jai-Alai and to do Super Sabong, Bingo, Casino, etc., etc. [Ibid. pp. 71 and 72] and Mr. Roberto Ongpin whom he held in high regard, told him that Mark Jimenez was a very close friend of FPres. Estrada. [Ibid. p. 84] The option was given as an incentive for Mark Jimenez as a favor to Roberto Ongpin. [Ibid. p. 88] Mark Jimenez was not able to exercise the option because Ongpin was ousted from the Board of Belle on June 15, 1999. [Ibid. p. 90] After a meeting of the Board of Directors of Belle Corporation on July 20, 1999 (Exh. P), when Dichaves asked Ocier about the option given by Ongpin to Mark Jimenez and if the option can be given to him, Ocier told Dichaves that the option cannot be given anymore because of the fact that the shares are intended to be sold in light of a recent call for unpaid subscription. [TSN, January 7, 2002, p. 17] The Board of Director of Belle Corporation decided to make a call for payment of unpaid subscriptions to raise money to address the debt problem of the Corporation. [TSN, October 1, 2001, p. 79] When asked what can be done in relation to the Belle shares, Ocier explained to Dichaves that he needs the latters help in selling the Belle shares to cover for the 75 per cent unpaid subscription and the two of them basically agreed to divide the work wherein Ocier would contact his foreign brokers to sell the shares and Dichaves will contact his local counterparts or contacts if he can sell the shares locally. [TSN, January 7, 2002, p.18] Ocier further testified that overtime (sic) the market was not very strong, so the foreign brokers took quite a while to make decisions about their action of buying Belle shares. [Id.] In a subsequent meeting with Dichaves, Ocier testified that Dichaves confirmed to him that there was a good chance that GSIS and SSS may be willing to buy the Belle shares and when he asked when the shares can be transacted he was assured by Dichaves that the latter had taken up the matter already with FPres. Estrada and that Dichaves told him that the Former President had already spoken to Carlos Arellano of SSS and Ding Pascual of GSIS about the said matter. [Ibid. p. 19] After a few weeks, Dichaves called Ocier and told the latter that the transaction may be pushing through but that Dichaves wanted to take up a matter of condition that was proposed for the transaction to push through which was to the effect that Ocier will have to give a commission for the transaction to push through. [Ibid .pp.

20-21] Ocier testified that since the shares involved was approximately 600,000,000 to 650,000,000 and the price of Belle at that time at about P3.00 per share, the total expected proceeds of the sale was almost Two Billion Pesos (P2,000,000,000.00) and the commission that Jaime was asking for amounted to Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00). [Ibid. p. 23] When asked to whom the commission should be given, Ocier answered that according to Dichaves, the condition was being imposed by FPres. Estrada. [Ibid. p. 26] When asked for his reaction to the information conveyed by Dichaves that it was FPres. Estrada that imposed the condition, Ocier testified that his reaction was that he felt that it was quite a big amount of commission to be paid and that normally, in real estate and stock transactions, commissions range between three (3) to five (5) percent only and he told Dichaves that he finds that quite high [Ibid. p. 34], to which Dichaves answered that that was the condition. [Ibid. p. 36] When asked what his answer was to the answer of Dichaves that that was the condition, Ocier answered that he was constrained to agree because Dichaves told him that that was the only way for the transaction to push through. [Id.] Ocier further testified that on October 21, 1999, Belle shares totaling 447,650,000 were sold by SSI Management to GSIS and SSS through Eastern Securities Development Corporation [Ibid. p. 39; Exh. Q; Q-1; Exh. T] while other Belle Shares were sold through other brokers. [TSN dated January 14, 2002, p. 20] CARLOS ALMARIO ARELLANO (Arellano) was appointed Chairman and President of SSS on July 1, 1998 by FPres. Estrada. [TSN, November 7, 2001, p. 49] The transaction with Belle was initiated on October 6, 1999. He got a call from FPres. Estrada and was told: Gusto ko kayo ni Ding Pascual ay tignan ninyo ang pagbili ng Belle Corporation sa stock market. [Ibid. pp. 75- 77] He thought that the words tignan ninyo was an instruction for him. [Ibid. p. 80] After the instruction, he asked the people in the Investment Department of SSS to take a look and review the shares of Belle as an investment item in the portfolio of SSS and also to find out to what extent the SSS can further increase the SSS position in the said stock. [Ibid. p. 82] As far as the Investment Committee was concerned, they agreed that Belle is still possible investment for the SSS. [Ibid. p. 94] In answer to the instruction of the President he said Opo, opo. [Id.] He got a call from FPres. Estrada the week after and he was asked to see the President at Malacanang. [Ibid. p. 95] At Malacaang, he saw FPres. Estrada with Jaime Dichaves. While he was there he approached the FPres. who stood up and took him aside and asked whether this time, he had followed FPres. instructions to buy Belle shares. He replied: Tinitignan pa po ng Investment committee namin. [Ibid. pp. 97, 104] He did not immediately buy the Belle shares because he felt that it was not the proper timing and the volume that was being considered was too much and not yet the proper time. [Ibid. p. 102] When he answered this to the Former President, he recalled that the reaction of the Former President was to tell him Bilisan ninyo na, bilisan. [Ibid. p. 107] Upon receiving these instructions, he still did not do anything for a few days after. [Ibid. p. 115] After several days, he received another call from FPres. Estrada and he repeated Bilisan mo, bilisan ninyo na. [Ibid. p. 124] As far as he was concerned, it was more serious than previous orders given to him. [Id.] On October 21, the SSS implemented the transaction. [TSN dated November 7, 2001, p. 110] FEDERICO CALIMBAS PASCUAL (Pascual) was the President of GSIS in 1999, testified that he had a meeting with FPres. Estrada on September 6, 1999 and in that meeting, he was instructed by the FPres. Estrada to buy Belle Shares. It was only in October 9, 1999 when he ordered his people to buy Belle Shares because First: he was hoping that the President was not serious in his September 6, 1999 instruction and he was hoping the President would forget his instruction. [TSN, November 22, 2001, p. 20] Second, because he was not very comfortable with Belle because some people are of the opinion that Belle Shares, because the corporation is involved in jai-alai and gambling, is speculative flavor. [Id.] In another telephone conversation with FPres. Estrada on October 9, 1999, he felt that the President was more serious in his instructions in the sense that, he was away and there was this telephone call and he felt that FPres. Estrada was already agitated. [Ibid. p. 24] In the telephone call, he was asked by FPres. Estrada bakit hindi ka pa bumibili ng Belle to which he replied tatawag ho ako sa head office at papa-aralan ko. [Ibid. pp. 56-57] When he returned to the Philippines on October 21, 1999, he learned that GSIS had purchased 351,000,000 Belle Share worth P1,100,000,000.00 as shown by the investment committee confirmation report. On cross-examination, he testified that his purpose in executing his affidavit was to remove from the minds of the doubting public that he benefited from the Belle Shares. [Ibid. p. 48; Exh. O to O-4] The alleged money making that intervened or supervened in the purchase of Belle Shares was not included in his affidavit because the purpose was to show how GSIS purchased shares of Belle on the instruction of the Former President. [Ibid. p. 54] The purchases of Belle Shares were made when he was abroad. FPres. Estrada gave him the

instructions to buy and he also made instructions to his people to buy, that was the chain of events. [Ibid. pp. 68; 74] He authorized the purchase of Belle Shares only if Belle was a qualified share. [Ibid. p. 69] If he did not make that call to the people in GSIS about the Former Presidents instruction, there was probably no possibility of GSIS acquiring Belle Shares during that period of time beginning October 13 to October 21. [Ibid. p. 77] Except for the instruction, there was nothing irregular, illegal or anomalous about the transaction and he does not know whether somebody benefited from the purchase of Belle Shares that took place between October 13 to 21. [Ibid, p. 83] RIZALDY TADEO CAPULONG (Capulong) was the Deputy Chief Actuary and Assistant Vice-President of the Securities Trading and Management Department of the Social Security System (SSS). He headed the Actuary Department which was responsible in making long term and short term projections of the revenues and expenditures of SSS. As AVP of the Securities Trading and Management Department, Capulong was in charge of providing research and operational support to top SSS offices with regard to equities and investment. Capulong testified that he made the recommendation which cost the SSS P1,300,000,000.00 because per his research, evaluation and verification, it was a profitable transaction. He had gone into the validity and legality of the acquisition of the Belle Shares and he was convinced that they were all proper, legal and beyond reproach. He signed the recommendation and submitted it for approval of the Executive Management Committee and then for the approval of the Social Security Commission. Capulong clarified that it was an approval for allocation not for funding. For SSS to be able to acquire shares of their corporation, it was necessary that there was an approval for an allocation. SSS had the amount of money but it was not reserved for Belle transactions even with the approval of the recommendation. The money will only be identified and allocated at the time of transaction. [TSN dated February 6, 11, 13, and 18, 2002] EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE REYNALDO PASTORFIDE PALMIERY (Palmiery) was the Senior Executive Vice-President and the Chief Operating Officer and Member of the Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Palmiery was the Chairman of the Investment Committee of the GSIS in 1998 to 2000. The Investment Committee discusses the new proposals for investment which were elevated by the Corporate Finance Group of the GSIS. The process is that the Finance Corporate Group first studies and evaluates stocks which are not yet qualified and accredited to be purchased and elevates this to the Investment Committee for discussion, and if it is approved by the Investment Committee then it is elevated to the board for approval. Palmiery testified that the GSIS had been trading all Belle Shares in 1993. The first acquisition of GSIS then was about 18 million shares, or 5% of the outstanding stocks of Belle Corporation, and that the GSIS booked an aggregate trading gain of P145,859,195.95 on the purchase of Belle Shares alone (Exh. 236 and submarkings). Palmiery then presented and identified a Joint Counter-Affidavit which the members of the Investment Committee filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. He confirmed the statement contained in the last paragraph of the joint affidavit that the Investment in Belle Shares was made solely on the basis of the compliance with the law and GSIS internal guidelines. Palmiery was not aware of any phone call made by FPres. Estrada to Pascual. He further explained that the acquisition of the Belles Shares was pursuant to the directive of General Manager Pascual. Palmiery related that he received a call from Pascual and instructed him to review and study the prospects of Belle Corporation with the end objective to purchase shares of stock of the said corporation up to the limit allowed under the existing guidelines of GSIS. The evaluation was pursued and approved. On cross-examination, Palmiery admitted that under GSIS Resolution No. 284 series of 1992, General Manager Pascual was given the sole authority to trade in stocks listed or traded in the two (2) major stocks exchange, and under GSIS Resolution No. 273, he was granted the continuing authority to buy Belle Shares. Resolution No. 273 was then amended in 1998 by the GSIS providing for the continuing authority for the President and General Manager as well as the Executive Vice President and the Senior Vice President for Corporate Finance to purchase and sell stocks traded in the Stocks Exchange at prevailing prices. On re-direct examination, Palmiery testified that when General Manager Pascual called and instructed him to purchase Belle Shares the number of shares to be purchased was specified to be within the limits of the GSIS Guidelines which was the number of shares equivalent to one board seat or 10% of the outstanding shares whichever is higher. [TSN dated December 13, 2004 and TSN dated January 24, 2005] HON. HERMOGENES DIAZ CONCEPCION (Conception) was a Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Concepcion testified that he was familiar with the Belle Resources and Shares of Stocks, and confirmed the veracity and accuracy of the statement in paragraph 10 of his Affidavit. With respect to the acquisition that

took place on October 13 to 21, 1999, witness Concepcion explained that the President/General Manager of the GSIS has full authority to buy and sell shares listed in the stock exchange of the amounts within the boundary set forth by the Board of Trustees. So, the President buys and sells these securities without the Board knowing what he did because decisions have to be made sometimes on the spot in order to get a better margin. Paragraph 16 (2) of the Counter-Affidavit was checked with the records of the GSIS, the Committee in charge of the investment, and the amounts made by the GSIS on these shares, P145,859,195.94, was furnished to them. Witness Concepcion explained that during the period from 1993 to 2000, the GSIS would buy shares then sell them, buy shares then sell them, and by that process, the GSIS made P145 Million as profit or actual gain. Witness also stated that paragraph 16 (9) which refers to the purchase of 351,878,000 shares was based on the records of the GSIS. Concepcion also testified that then President and General Manager Federico Pascual never told them that FPres. talked to him nor discussed to the witness the alleged directive or pressure brought upon him by FPres. Estrada. There was no need to ask Federico Pascual why he bought shares because there is the presumption that our functions are regularly performed. [TSN dated December 8, 2004] MERCEDITAS GARCIA GACULITAN (Gaculitan) was the Corporate Secretary of the Social Security Commission (SSS). Gaculitan testified that before these investments in Belle Resources Corporation were made prior approval of the investment by the Commission en banc were obtained since all purchases and all investments are required to be approved or passed upon by the Social Security Commission. [TSN dated December 13, 2004] Accused FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA testified on his own defense. The relevant portions of his testimony are set forth below. The purchase of Belle Shares according to accused FPres. Estrada In the Memorandum for FPres. Estrada, the defense stated that under this indictment, the Prosecution incur the bounden duty to prove: 1. accused Estradas acts constitutive of directing, ordering and compelling the GSIS and SSS to buy Belle Shares; 2. the purchase were made solely due to the said acts of compulsion by accused Estrada; 3. the extent and parameter of Estradas acts relative to the questioned purchases; 4. the alleged profit commission is government fund or money; and 5. damages to the government or People of the Philippines. The Defense claims that the prosecutions evidence itself shows that (1) the transaction complained of was perfectly valid, since accused FPres. Estrada did not direct, order or compel SSS and GSIS to buy Belle Shares and (2) there is no proof that any commission was paid to the accused. [Defense Memorandum, p. 192] To bolster its claim that the purchase of Belle Shares was a perfectly valid transaction, the Defense pointed to the following portions of Arellanos testimony: 1. That the purchase of Belle Shares was a routine transaction in the regular course of business, for SSS had previously purchased Belle Shares at profit; 2. What was told by FPres. Estrada to Arellano was simply to initiate the acquisition of Belle Shares. How many shares he was ordered to buy and at how much price per share, was never dealt with in the phone conversation; 3. The above notwithstanding, Arellano proceeded on his own volition with the acquisition of the 249 Million Belle Shares. 4. The Decision to purchase was exclusively his and the policy making body of SSS. [Ibid. pp. 193-194, citing TSN, November 8, 2001, pp. 63, 73-74, 75-76] The Defense argues that the reason why Arellano testified in the manner he did and executed an affidavit implicating FPres. Estrada in the instant plunder case notwithstanding that there was nothing irregular, illegal or anomalous in the October 21, 1999 acquisition of Belle Shares was because his testimonies and affidavit are his last ditch effort to exculpate himself from possible plunder charges where he may be detained without bail considering that plunder is a capital offense. [Ibid. p. 197] Likewise, the Defense cited the testimony of Capulong who testified that he examined and audited all the acquisition papers and the various confirmation slips and official receipts covering the acquisition and found them to be in order. Hence he had no objection to, but on the contrary, approved the payment of the said acquisition. Said witness also testified that as far as he was concerned, there was nothing illegal or irregular or

anomalous in the SSS purchase of Belle Shares in October 21, 1999 and that it was a legal investment and a valid investment that is in the list of investment of SSS. That it is not an irregular investment and it is said that it might be somewhat not ordinary in the sense that in this case there was a call. [Ibid. p. 198, citing TSN, November 14, 2001, p. 53] Insofar as the acquisition by GSIS of Belle Shares, the Defense argued that the purchase by GSIS was in accordance with investment policy and rules. The Defense sought to establish that the Belle Shares were qualified under GSIS policy and charter and GSIS may by itself and in accordance with its rules, purchase Belle Shares without the need of any order or compulsion from anybody as shown by the testimony of Pascual, the President of GSIS when he admitted that even way back in 1993, GSIS had been purchasing or dealing with Belle Shares and had already made profits at the extent of around P145,000,000.00 since 1993 up to the present prior to his coming in as the new General Manager of GSIS. [TSN, November 22, 2001, pp. 61 to 62] That the purchase was in accordance with the GSIS policy was established by Pascuals testimony that the trading department under the Corporate Finance Group investigated and made further inquiries in connection with the shares and concluded that there would be no violation that could have been committed by GSIS in the purchase of the shares. [TSN, December 3, 2001, pp. 14 and 15] Pascual further testified that the price of P3.13 per share was the worth of the shares around the time it was purchased and it was reported to him by his people that the reason why they bought so much was because there was a history of profitability and that they already had a P1,000,000,000.00 turnover plus and he felt that it was a good buying afterwards. (sic) [Defense Memorandum, p. 204] Pascual also testified that he had no information if anybody benefited from the purchase of Belle Shares that took place on October 13 to 21 and admitted that GSIS was suffering a paper loss because of the purchase. [Ibid. p. 204-205, citing TSN, November 22, 2001, pp. 83-84] Defense argued that assuming arguendo that there was an instruction from FPres. Estrada for such purchase, such instruction was not too compelling or irresistible to directly cause the execution of the purchase suggestion and that such instruction was immaterial because the GSIS Board which approved the transaction did not receive the alleged instruction of the Former President and that in the same vein, the GSIS decided on the purchase independently, free from any compulsion by an outsider as the instruction given by Pascual was to the effect that a study be conducted and if the Belle Shares are qualified, to buy within the range of their authority. [Defense Memorandum, pp. 205-206, citing TSN, December 3, 2001, p. 93] As to Pascuals testimony that it was unusual for FPres. Estrada to call him for the purchase of a (sic) particular shares, the Defense pointed out that as per admission of Pascual, what he meant by unusual was that FPres. Estrada called him when he was out of the country. Defense pointed out however, that as testified by FPres. Estrada, the latter did not know that Pascual was out of the country when he called. [Ibid. p. 209] Defense pointed out that, by Pascuals admission, the GSIS Board was not pressured into finding that the Belle Shares were okay, above board, and that they were not pressured by anybody into concluding the purchase. [Ibid. p. 214, citing TSN, December 3, 2001, p. 93] FPres. Estrada testified that he appointed Arellano and Pascual and he knows that Belle Resources is the developer of Tagaytay Highlands because sometimes, he spends his weekend in Tagaytay Highlands. [TSN, April 26, 2006 (pm), p. 10-11] He denied that he instructed or ordered Pascual to buy Belle Shares on September 6, 1999 during a meeting with him. What he told Pascual was to study and make due diligence if Belle Shares will be beneficial to the GSIS. To which Pascual answered Yes and that he has this Corporate Finance Group to make the study. As to the testimony of Pascual regarding his telephone conversation with FPres. Estrada, the latter testified that he did not know that Pacual was abroad and he talked to him not about Belle Shares but about delayed benefits of GSIS members. [Ibid. pp. 17, 24] He denied ordering Pascual to buy Belle Shares. [Ibid. pp. 1517] He claimed there was nothing irregular about his instruction to Pascual when he only told him to make a serious study and due diligence. [Ibid. p. 22] As regards Arellanos testimony, FPres. Estrada denied that he ever called Arellano nor did he order him to buy Belle Shares. He remembers that Mr. Jaime Dichaves told him, that being one of the members of the Board of Directors, the latter informed him that Belle Resources are offering their stocks to GSIS and SSS and that Dichaves was looking for investors, local and foreign and he told Dichaves that it will be upon the study of SSS and GSIS who will decide whether they are buying or not. [Ibid. p. 25] As regards the telephone conversation with Arellano, FPres. Estrada testified that they talked in Tagalog and he said to Arellano to study the offer of Belle Resources and if it will be beneficial to the government then why not. To which Arellano answered Yes, sir, that he would refer the matter to the Investment Committeee to give due diligence. [Ibid. pp. 26-27] FPres. Estrada

denied that he pressured Arellano and said that he noticed that the testimony of Pascual and Arellano are the same as if they are of the same script. [Ibid. p. 29] FPres. Estrada stated that Pascual or Arellano, admitted buying Belle Shares and they were the ones who decided the amount and how much to buy and they did not inform him anymore. [Ibid. p. 32] As regards the testimonies of Pascual and Arellano, FPres. Estrada testified that it seems they have only one lawyer. He learned that Pascual and Arellano were called by then DOJ Secretary Perez and it was the latter who pressured them to testify against him and they were threatened to be charged with plunder. He also learned that Secretary Perez gave them a lady lawyer but he does not know the relation of Perez to that lady lawyer. [Ibid. p. 37] FPres. Estrada testified that after Arellano testified in Court, the latter called him and apologized because according to him, he could not do anything since he was threatened by Secretary Perez with the words that if they can send the President to jail, what more of him? [Ibid. p. 41] FPres. Estrada also denied knowledge of the alleged conversation and transaction between Ocier and Dichaves. He testified that Mr. Dichaves was, at that time, one of the members of the Board of Directors of Belle Resources and a business man. [Ibid. p. 42] FPres. Estrada cited instances when he was offered commissions but he rejected them such as the IMPSA and SGS deals. [Ibid. pp. 45-48] His reaction to Arellanos statement to him that the latter was threatened was to say that he understood because the same thing happened to him when he was offered by Secretary Nani Perez that he could go to any country of his choice but he refused. [Ibid. pp. 49-50] FINDINGS OF FACT Re: Sub-paragraph (c) of the Amended Information We find that the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that FPres. Estrada directed and instructed Arellano and Pascual for SSS and GSIS respectively to buy Belle Shares. As can be culled from the testimonial and documentary evidence of the Prosecution, the following circumstances surround the purchase of the Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS. On July 20, 1999, Ocier and Dichaves discussed the matter of the sale of the 650,000,000 shares of Belle, in the light of a recent call for payment of unpaid subscription which the Board of Directors of Belle Corporation decided to address its debt problems. Ocier explained to Dichaves that he needs the latters help in selling the Belle Shares to cover for the 75 per cent unpaid subscription. They agreed to divide the task of looking for buyers of these Belle Shares with Ocier looking for foreign buyers and Dichaves to look for local buyers. [ TSN, January 7, 2002, p.18] In a subsequent meeting with Dichaves, the latter confirmed to Ocier that there was a good chance that GSIS and SSS may be willing to buy the Belle shares as Dichaves had taken up the matter already with FPres. Estrada and that Dichaves told him that the Former President had already spoken to Carlos Arellano of SSS and Ding Pascual of GSIS about the said matter. [Ibid, p. 19] After a few weeks, Dichaves called Ocier and told the latter that the transaction may be pushing through but that a commission will have to be paid as a condition for the purchase to push through. [Ibid. p. 21] As per Ociers testimony, Dichaves told him that it was FPres. Estrada who imposed the condition. [Ibid. p. 26] Since the shares involved was approximately 600,000,000 to 650,000,000 and the price of Belle at that time was about P3.00 per share, the total expected proceeds of the sale was almost Two Billion Pesos and the commission involved would amount to Two Hundred Million Pesos. [Ibid. p. 23] Since the payment of the commission was the only way for the transaction to push through, he was constrained to agree to the payment of the commission. [Ibid. p. 36] On September 6, 1999, at a meeting with FPres. Estrada, Federico Pascual, President of GSIS was instructed by the President to buy Belle Shares. [TSN, November 22, 2001, p. 20] On October 6 1999, Carlos Arellano got a call from FPres. Estrada and was told: Gusto ko kayo ni Ding Pascual ay tignan ninyo ang pagbili ng Belle Corporation sa stock market. [TSN, November 7, 2001, p. 77] He thought that the words tignan ninyo was an instruction for him. [Ibid. p. 80] After the instruction he asked the people in the Investment Department of SSS to take a look and review the shares of Belle as an investment item in the portfolio of SSS and also to find out to what extent the SSS can further increase the SSS position in the said stock. [Ibid. p. 82] He got a call from FPres. Estrada the week after and he was asked to see the President at Malacanang. [Ibid. p. 95] At Malacaang he saw FPres. Estrada with Jaime Dichaves. While he was there he approached the President who stood up and took him aside and asked whether this time, he had followed FPres. Estradas instructions to buy Belle shares. He replied: Tinitignan pa po ng Investment committee namin; [Ibid. p. 97-104] When he answered this to the President, he recalled that the reaction of the President was to tell him Bilisan

ninyo na, bilisan. [Ibid. p. 107] Upon receiving these instructions, he still did not do anything for a few days after. [Ibid. p. 115] After several days, he received another call from FPres. Estrada and the latter repeated Bilisan mo, bilisan ninyo na. As far as he was concerned, it was more serious than previous orders given to him. [Ibid. p. 124] October 9, 1999 while Pascual was abroad, he talked by phone to FPres. Estrada who asked him bakit hindi ka pa bumibili ng Belle to which he replied tatawag ho ako sa head office at papa-aralan ko. [TSN, November 22, 2001, pp. 56-57] He felt that the President was more serious in his instructions in the sense that, he was away and there was this telephone call and he felt that FPres. Estrada was already agitated. [Ibid. p. 24] He ordered the purchase of the Belle Shares on the same day. The President gave him the instructions to buy and he also made instructions to his people to buy, that was the chain of events. [Ibid. pp. 68; 74] For the period October 13-21, 1999, GSIS bought 351,878,000 Belle Shares and paid P1,102,965,607.50 (Exh. N), and the Social Security System (SSS) bought 329,855,000 Belle Shares for P744,612,450.00 on October 21, 1999. [TSN, February 14, 2005, p.78] That the purchase of Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS was the result of the instructions of the FPres. Estrada is borne out by the following circumstances: 1. The sequence of events beginning from the time Ocier agreed to the payment of commission, to the instructions transmitted personally and by telephone calls from FPres. Estrada to Pascual and Arellano, to the actual purchase of Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS. 2. The haste with which GSIS and SSS bought Belle Shares. In the case of GSIS, from October 9, 1999 (when the agitated instructions were given) to October 13, 1999 (the date when the first purchases were made) or a period of 4 days. In the case of SSS, a few days after October 13, 1999, ( the date when the more serious order was given by FPres. Estrada to Arellano) to October 21, 1999 (the date when the purchases were made) or a period of no more than 8 days. The instructions to buy originated from FPres. Estrada and cascaded to Pascual and Arellano then to GSIS and SSS respectively. 3. The obedience to FPres. Estradas instructions despite Arellanos reluctance to do so because he believed that it was not the proper timing and the volume that was being considered was too much and not yet the proper time. [TSN, November 7, 2001, p. 102] And in the case of Pascual, his reluctance to buy because he was not very comfortable with Belle because some people are of the opinion that Belle Shares, because the corporation is involved in jai-alai and gambling, has speculative flavor. [TSN, November 22, 2001, Ibid. p. 20] 4. The relationship of Pascual and Arellano to FPres. Estrada, who, being the appointees and subordinates of FPres. Estrada, cannot refuse the instruction of their superior. 5. The manner in which the instructions were given. In the case of Arellano, he felt that the third order was more serious than previous orders given to him. [TSN, November 7, 2001, p. 124] And, in the case of Pascual, because he felt that FPres. Estrada was already agitated. [TSN, November 22, 2001, p. 24]

We find no merit to the claim of the Defense that the prosecutions evidence itself shows that: (1) The transaction complained of was perfectly valid, since accused FPres. Estrada did not direct, order or compel SSS and GSIS to buy Belle Shares and (2) There is no proof that any commission was paid to the accused. [Defense Memorandum, p. 192] The denial of FPres. Estrada that he instructed Pascual and Arellano to buy Belle Shares cannot overcome the straightforward and direct testimony of Pascual and Arellano attesting to the persistent instructions given by FPres. Estrada which is replete with details. Mere denial by an accused, particularly when not properly corroborated or substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Denial, being in the nature of negative and self-serving

evidence, is seldom given weight in law. Positive and forthright declarations of witnesses are often held to be worthier of credence than the self-serving denial of the accused. [People v. Quilang, 312 SCRA, 328, 329] Neither can We give more weight to the claim of the Defense that the purchase of Belle Shares was a perfectly valid transaction even as it pointed to the following portions of Arellanos testimony: 1. That the purchase of Belle Shares was a routine transaction in the regular course of business, for SSS had previously purchased Belle Shares at profit; 2. What was told by FPres. Estrada to Arellano was simply to initiate the acquisition of Belle Shares. How many shares he was ordered to buy and at how much price per share, was never dealt with in the phone conversation; 3. The above notwithstanding, Arellano proceeded on his own volition with the acquisition of the 249 Million Belle Shares. 4. The Decision to purchase was exclusively his and the policy making body of SSS. [Ibid. 193-194, citing TSN, November 8, 2001, pp. 63, 73-74, 75-76] for prefatory to these actions of the SSS were the instructions given by FPres. Estrada to Arellano and the compliance with said instructions by Arellano. While it is true that the SSS had previously granted authority for additional investment by SSS in Belle Shares prior to and up to 1999, it was only in the 1999 purchases that there was an instruction coming from FPres. Estrada through Arellano to purchase Belle Shares. st The evidence of the Defense show that the 1 Indorsement dated September 29, 1999 re: proposal to increase by P450,000,000.00 the investment allocation for Belle to total P1,300,000,000.00 was not signed by Arellano (Exh. 242), contrary to the assertion of the Defense. [In its formal offer of Evidence on p. 45, Defense claimed that Exh. 247 was executed by Arellano. Exh. 247 is the same as Exh. 242] Neither was there any documentary evidence submitted showing the approval by the Commission of the proposal increasing by 450,000,000 the investment allocation for Belle to total P1,300,000,000.00. Likewise, the testimony of Capulong - that he examined and audited all the acquisition papers and the various confirmation slips and official receipts covering the acquisition and found them to be in order and hence, he had no objection to, but on the contrary approved the payment of the said acquisition; that as far as he was concerned, there was nothing illegal or irregular or anomalous in the SSS purchase of Belle Shares in October 21, 1999 and that it was a legal investment and a valid investment that is in the list of investment of SSS; that it is not an irregular investment and it is said that it might be somewhat not ordinary in the sense that in this case there was a call [Defense Memorandum, p.198, citing TSN, November 14, 2001, p. 53], in fact corroborates Arellanos statement that indeed there was a call from FPres. Estrada instructing the purchase of Belle Shares. Moreover, Capulong, in his testimony, stated that Belle Corporation Shares were no longer qualified stocks since Belle had not declared dividends whether in cash or stock in 1997, 1998 and 1999. [TSN, February 14, 2005, p. 75] He likewise testified that it was former President and Chairman Carlos A. Arellano who directly gave the orders to the brokers to purchase Belle Shares in behalf of the SSS and he (Capulong) had nothing to do directly insofar as the acquisition was concerned since his participation is merely limited to recommend the increase of the funding for the acquisition of the shares. [TSN, February 11, 2002, p. 11] Capulong further testified that for the month of October, 1999, the SSS bought 389,855,000 shares with a value of P1,031,126,400.00. [Ibid. p. 38] In his subsequent testimony, Capulong testified that on October 21, 1999, the SSS bought 249,679,000 shares at the value of P784,551,150.00 at an average price of P3.14/share. [TSN, February 14, 2005, p. 78] After October 21, 1999, Belle Shares was on a downward trend going down to the P1.00 level by the year 2000. By October 23, 2001, it went below P1.00, then it went down to 70 centavos by February 15, 2001. As of February 11, 2002, it was being traded at 40 to 50 cents. [Ibid. pp. 92-93] Capulong further testified that out of the 249,679,000 shares which SSS bought on October 21, 1999 for P784,551,150.00, a total of 96,366,000 shares were sold at an average selling price of P1.7736/share resulting in a loss amounting to P127,464,710.00. [TSN, February 18, 2002, pp. 94-95] The Defense argues that the reason why Arellano testified in the manner he did and executed an affidavit implicating FPres. Estrada in the instant plunder case notwithstanding that there was nothing irregular, illegal or anomalous in the October 21, 1999 acquisition of Belle Shares was because his testimonies and affidavit are his last ditch effort to exculpate himself from possible plunder charges where he may be detained without bail considering that plunder is a capital offense. [Defense Memorandum, p. 197]

This argument of the Defense are mere allegations and extracted from FPres. Estradas testimony that Arellano called him up and explained the circumstances behind Arellanos execution of his Affidavit which are however, uncorroborated. Neither do we find that the presence of the instruction from FPres. Estrada is negated by the argument of the Defense that the acquisition by GSIS of Belle Shares, was in accordance with investment policy and rules. The Defense sought to establish that the Belle Shares were qualified under GSIS policy and charter and GSIS may by itself and in accordance with its rules, purchase Belle Shares without the need of any order or compulsion from anybody as shown by the testimony of Pascual, the President of GSIS when he admitted that even way back in 1993, GSIS had been purchasing or dealing with Belle Shares and had already made profits at the extent of around P145,000,000.00 since 1993 up to the present prior to his coming in as the new General Manager of GSIS. [TSN, November 22, 2001, pp. 61 to 62] That the purchase was in accordance with the GSIS policy was established by Pascuals testimony that the trading department under the Corporate Finance Group investigated and made further inquiries in connection with the shares and concluded that there would be no violation that could have been committed by GSIS in the purchase of the shares. [TSN, December 3, 2001, pp. 14 and 15] Pascual further testified that the average price of P3.14 per share was the worth of the shares around the time it was purchased [TSN, November 22, 2001, pp. 89-90] and it was reported to him by his people that the reason why they bought so much was because there was a history of profitability and that they already had a P1,000,000,000.00 turnover plus and he felt that it was a good buying afterwards. (sic) [TSN, November 28, 2001, p. 55] Nowhere in the argument of the Defense does it establish the absence of the instruction of FPres. Estrada to Pascual, other than the self-serving denial of FPres. Estrada. Moreover, as Pascual testified, the GSIS profits in 1999 did not come from Belle Shares. Furthermore, the fact that GSIS made profits to the extent of around P145,000,000.00 since 1993 did not mean that it made profits from the Belle Shares purchased in 1999. As testified by Pascual, the actual profit of the GSIS in 1999 did not come from Belle Shares but from other stocks and there was no contribution to the profit of GSIS from the Belle Shares acquisition because up to the present they are still holding on to the Belle Shares. [TSN, November 22, 2001, p. 81] Even the evidence of the Defense shows that as of December 29, 2000, the value of Belle Shares had gone down to P0.69/share from the average purchase price of P3.14/share and an allowance for probable loss of P374,052,750.00 had been set up (Exh. 250, J-12). FPres. Estradas testimony that he called Pascual to inquire about delayed GSIS benefits is negated by the fact that after the call to Pascual, the latter gave instructions to buy Belle Shares. If benefits were being delayed, why would GSIS spend billions of pesos to buy Belle Shares instead of setting aside these monies to avoid delay in GSIS benefits? Defense argued that assuming arguendo that there was an instruction from FPres. Estrada for such purchase, such instruction was not too compelling or irresistible to directly cause the execution of the purchase suggestion and that such instruction was immaterial because the GSIS Board which approved the transaction did not receive the alleged instruction of the President and that in the same vein, the GSIS decided on the purchase independently, free from any compulsion by an outsider as the instruction given by Pascual was to the effect that a study be conducted and if the Belle Shares are qualified, to buy within the range of their authority. [Defense Memorandum, pp. 205-206] Pascuals testimony that when he talked to FPres. Estrada and the latter asked him why he had not bought Belle Shares in an agitated tone; that he did not mention the instruction of FPres. Estrada to others because the instruction was specific to him; that on October 9, 1999 after his telephone conversation with FPres. Estrada, he gave the instruction to GSIS to buy Belle Shares should be afforded stronger weight and more probative value than the arguments of the Defense. As stated earlier, the Prosecution has established that it was the instructions of FPres. Estrada that triggered the instructions of Pascual and Arellano to GSIS and SSS respectively which caused these agencies, in turn to follow the usual procedures established for the purchase of the shares which finally culminated in the purchase of the Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS. As to Pascuals testimony that it was unusual for FPres. Estrada to call him for the purchase of a (sic) particular shares, the Defense pointed out that as per admission of Pascual, what he meant by unusual was that FPres. Estrada called him when he was out of the country. Defense pointed out however, that as testified by FPres. Estrada, the latter did not know that Pascual was out of the country when he called. [Ibid. p. 209] Defense pointed out that, by Pascuals admission, the GSIS Board was not pressured into finding that the Belle Shares

were okay, above board, and that they were not pressured by anybody into concluding the purchase. [Ibid. p. 214, citing TSN, December 3, 2001, p. 93] We fail to see how the admission of Pascual that it was unusual for FPres. Estrada to call him to inquire about why GSIS had not purchased Belle Shares in an agitated tone and the statement of FPres. Estrada that he did not know that Pascual was out of the country at the time he called Pascual could lead to the conclusion that the GSIS Board was not pressured into finding that the Belle Shares were okay, above board and that they were not pressured by anybody into concluding the purchase. The issue was not whether the GSIS Board was pressured into finding that the Belle Shares purchase was okay or above board, but whether FPres. Estrada pressured Pascual into ordering GSIS to buy Belle Shares. The testimonies of defense witnesses, Justice Hermogenes D. Concepcion, Jr., the former Chairman of GSIS, and Reynaldo Palmiery, Executive Vice-President of GSIS, did not disprove that FPres. Estrada gave instructions to Pascual for GSIS to buy Belle Shares since, as admitted by them, they were not aware of such instructions. Nowhere in the testimony of Pascual did he state that he informed these people of the instructions of FPres. Estrada because, as stated by Pascual, the instructions were specific to him so he didnt want to involve his management anymore. [TSN, November 28, 2001, pp. 9- 10] The P189,700,000.00 Check No. 6000159271 payable to cash, drawn on International Exchange Bank with Eastern Securities Corporation as drawer [Exh. R-R-4] After the purchase by GSIS and SSS of the Belle Shares, Ocier caused the preparation of a check by Eastern Securities Development Corporation in the amount of P189,700,000.00 representing the profit commission to be paid from the sale. [TSN, January 14, 2002, p. 33-36] Ocier identified International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 dated November 5, 1999, payable to cash in the amount of P189,700,000.00 with Eastern Securities Corporation as Drawer. Ocier testified that the check was prepared so that he can hand carry and deliver it to Dichaves as per their agreement when he agreed to pay P 200,000,000.00 commission. [TSN, January 7, 2002, p. 49] When asked who was supposed to get the commission, Ocier answered that according to Jaime Dichaves, President Estrada was supposed to get the commission. [Ibid. p. 55] Ocier testified that he delivered the check to the residence of Dichaves in No. 19 Corinthian Gardens, Quezon City [TSN, January 9, 2002, p. 13] and he delivered the check because he had a pre-arranged appointment with Dichaves wherein he was supposed to hand the check to Dichaves. [Ibid. p. 15] Mr. Dichaves arranged the appointment because he wanted Ocier to explain in person why the check amount is P189,700,000.00 when the pre-agreed amount was P200,000,000.00. [Ibid. p. 18] Ocier explained that he deducted transaction taxes and brokers commissions from the amount of P200,000,000.00 and rounded the figure to P189,700,000 of (sic) which Dichaves agreed. Ocier learned later on that the check he delivered to Dichaves was deposited at Far East Bank to the account which he believes belonged to Dichaves. [Ibid. p. 60] On cross-examination, Ocier admitted that FPres. Estrada was not present when he had his conversation with Dichaves on the Belle shares on July 20, 1999. [TSN, January 14, 2002, pp. 20-29] Neither did he talk to FPres. Estrada after the check for P189,700,000.00 (Exh. R) was issued and cleared nor did he inquire from FPres. Estrada whether he received or was credited in any of his account with the amount stated in the check. [Ibid. pp. 39-40] Ocier likewise testified that he did not have the opportunity to discuss the profit commission, nor the receipt of the profit commission nor the Velarde account with FPres. Estrada despite the fact that he had constant meetings with FPres. Estrada. [Ibid. p. 60-61] When Ocier was asked if he could say that Dichaves was instructed by FPres. Estrada regarding the profit commission, Ocier answered that he trusts his cousin Dichaves and whatever the latter tells him he would normally believe. Ocier also testified that the totality of what he stated in his affidavit about the instruction, or the representation made by Dichaves was not corroborated or confirmed by FPres. Estrada or anybody else representing him because it was just between him and Dichaves. [Ibid. pp. 39-45] Citing Ociers testimony, Defense argues that such testimony on the subject sales and commission are purely hearsay and does not bind FPres. Estrada. What is clear on the record is that the commission went to Dichaves as gleaned from Ociers testimony. [Defense Memorandum, p. 221-222] In an attempt to establish that there was no evidence that FPres. Estrada received any percentage or commission from the sale of Belle Shares, the Defense pointed out that Capulongs testimony indicated that while there was a brokers commission, which was paid to brokers like Abacus Securities Corporation. [Defense Memorandum, pp. 215-216, citing TSN, February 11, 2002, pp. 13-16] In the case of the 389,855,000 Belle Shares

bought by SSS for P1,031,126,400.00, the payments went from SSS to the brokers, the buying brokers. [TSN, February 11, 2002, p. 38[ The Court finds that International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 dated November 5, 1999, payable to cash in the amount of P189,700,000.00 with Eastern Securities Corporation as Drawer (Exh. R), was paid as commission in consideration of the purchase of Belle Shares by SSS and GSIS. While the testimony of Ocier to the effect that Dichaves told him that it was FPres. Estrada who imposed the condition for the payment of commission is hearsay insofar as FPres. Estrada is concerned, the said testimony is admissible as proof that such statement was made by Dichaves to Ocier. Testimony of what one heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay. It is admissible in evidence, not to show that the statement was true, but that it was in fact made. If credible, it may form part of the circumstantial evidence necessary to convict the accused. [Bon vs. People, 419 SCRA 103] As regards the argument that Capulongs testimony indicated that while there was a brokers commission, this was paid to brokers such as Abacus Securities Corporation and that the purchase price of P 1,031,126,400.00 for 389,855,000 Belle Shares went from SSS to the buying brokers, again, we find this argument of the Defense to be unavailing. The issue is not whether FPres. Estrada received Brokers commission or received the payment from SSS, but whether he received the commission mentioned by Dichaves to Ocier as consideration for the purchase of Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS. Having found that a commission was paid in consideration of the purchase of Belle Shares by SSS and GSIS, the next issue that this Court must determine is whether the commission went to FPres. Estrada or Dichaves. The paper trail for International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 First: Far East Bank and Trust Co. (Cubao-Araneta Branch) In tracking the check (Exh. R), Prosecution presented Ms. Yolanda de Leon, (De Leon), Senior Manager of BPI (Cubao-Araneta Branch) formerly Far East Bank and Trust Co. [BPI merged with Far East Bank sometime in 2000] De Leon testified that Dichaves was one of the valued clients of the Bank and that Jaime Dichaves and Abby Dichavez had joint current and savings accounts with then Far East Bank and Trust Company in 1999. The Current Account had the No. 0007-05558-7 and the Savings Account had the No. 0107-38639-9 (C/A No. 0007-05558-7 and S/A No. 0107-38639-9). [TSN, February 4, 2002, pp. 23-24; (Exhs. BB and Z)] She identified the microfilm copy of International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 [Ibid. p. 39-41; Exh. DD] dated November 5, 1999 in the amount of P189,700,000.00 as the check that was deposited to the savings account of Dichaves on November 5, 1999 as evidenced by the microfilm of the deposit slip [Ibid. pp. 42-44; Exh. EE] and the bank statement of account for S/A No. 0107-38639-9 dated November 30, 1999. [Ibid. pp. 48-49; Exh. FF, FF-1] She testified that on November 9, 1999, the amount of P189,700,000.00 was auto- transferred from S/A No.0107-38639-9 to C/A No.0007-05558-7 as appearing in the Statement of Accounts for S/A No. 0107-38639-9 and C/A No. 0007-05558-7. [Id.; Exh. FF-2; Exh. GG, GG-1] She also testified that Jaime Dichaves drew a check against C/A No. 0007-05558-7 in the amount of P189,700,000.00 as evidenced by Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 3165579, a microfilm copy of which she identified. [Ibid. p. 52-53; Exh. HH] She testified that at the dorsal portion of the microfilm copy of Check No. 3165579, there appears an account number 160-625015 [Ibid. p. 56; Exh. HH-4] but she could not identify the bank that the account belongs because the bank indorsement of the other bank was not clearly visible. She further testified that both C/A No. 0007-05558-7 and S/A No. 0107-38639-9 were closed as of February 29, 2000 and March 31, 2000 respectively. [Ibid. p. 57; Exhs. II and JJ] On cross-examination, De Leon testified that she had no hand in the preparation of the Statement of Accounts marked as Exhs. FF, ZZ, II and JJ. [Ibid. p. 84] The Court finds that International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 dated November 5, 1999 was deposited to Far East Bank and Trust Co. S/A No. 0107-38639-9 of Jaime Dichaves and auto-transferred to C/A No.0007-05558-7 of Jaime Dichaves who drew from the latter account, Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 3165579 for P189,700,000.00. Second: EPCIB Greenhills-Ortigas Branch to EPCIB Binondo Branch S/A 0160-62501-5 with the Account Name Jose Velarde The prosecutions evidence on the deposit of Far East Bank Araneta Check No. 3165579 which was the subject of an inter-bank deposit from EPCIB Greenhills Ortigas Branch to EPCIB Binondo Branch Account No. 0160-62501-5 in the name of Jose Velarde consisted in the testimony of Ms. Glyzelyn Bejec, the Teller who 5 processed the Deposit Receipt marked as Exhibit I . She testified that as of November 8, 1999, she was assigned

to the EPCI Bank Greenhills Ortigas Branch as Customer Service Assistant Teller with Teller Identification No. 8. Her basis for indicating the number 0160-62501-5 in the Deposit Receipt was the Account Information Slip which is filled in by the depositor or the representative of the depositor. [TSN, May 6, 2002, pp. 46-47; 61] After she was given the Account Information Slip together with the four checks, she first verified the face of the check as to the date, the amount in words and figures, after which she stamped the non-negotiable endorsement at the back of each check, and also, she wrote down the account number indicated on the Account Information Slip given to her. She wrote down the account no. 0160-62501-5 at the dorsal portion of the check after which she deposited the checks to the Account No. indicated in the Account Information Slip. [Ibid. p. 65; 68] She explained that the deposit process involved first, encoding the account number given in the Account Information Slip, after which she swiped each check on the check reader and encoded the amount on each check and after that a deposit receipt was generated. After she had encoded the account number and the amounts of the four (4) checks that she processed for deposit the account name that reflected in the computer was Jose Velarde. [Ibid. p. 69-70] The checks that she processed for deposit were forwarded to their distributing for safekeeping and microfilming the next day. When she was shown the certified copy of Far East Bank Check No. 3165579 in the amount of P189,700,000.00 from the Philippine Clearing House Corporation, she testified that this was the same check she processed and she identified the dorsal portion where she wrote Account No. 160-625-015 (sic). Her 4 other means of identifying the check was her Teller ID no.8 which appears at the check (Exh U -1) and she identified the account holder of the check as Jaime C. Dichaves or Abe (sic) C. Dichaves and she attested that the check is payable to cash. She testified that the Bank accepts checks even if not endorsed by the depositor she accepted the check even without endorsement because it was given to her by the Branch Manger for deposit. [Ibid. p. 72-84] On cross-examination she testified that she threw away the Account Information Slip because the deposit receipt had been generated or the transaction has been validated in the deposit receipt. [Ibid, p. 89] To corroborate the testimony of Ms. Bejec, the prosecution presented Ms. Teresa Barcelona, the Branch Manager of the EPCIB Greenhills-Ortigas Branch during the period November, 1999. She identified inter-bank 5 deposit receipt dated 8 November 1999 which was previously marked as Exh. I issued by the EPCIB GreenhillsOrtigas Branch for deposit to account number 0160-62501-5 with the account name Jose Velarde. The transaction is an inter-bank deposit of four (4) checks to the account of Jose Velarde maintained at the Binondo Branch. [TSN, May 15, 2002, p. 80] The total amount of the four (4) checks is P263,292,303.65 of which one check is issued by Far East Bank and Trust Co. Araneta Branch with Check No. 3165579 amounting to P189,700,000.00. [Ibid. p. 81; 4 Exh. U -1] The person who transacted the inter-bank deposit with the EPCIB Greenhills Ortigas Branch was Ms. Baby Ortaliza who transacted personally with the witness and it was Ms. Baby Ortaliza who received the third copy of the deposit receipt for the account holder. [Ibid. p. 82] This transaction was processed by Teller Glezelyn Bejec as her Teller ID appears in the deposit receipt. [Id.] The Defense argued that Bejec stated that the checks were handed to her by the Branch Manager, Teresa Barcelona and not by the person who made the deposit, and that the depositor did not appear before her. Not one of the bank personnel or any other witness presented by the prosecution testified that FPres. Estrada had any participation in the opening of Current Account No.000110-525495-4 (sic) and Savings Account No. 016062501-5 in the name of Jose Velarde, nor its closing. Not one of the prosecution witnesses testified as to the source of the funds deposited in the said accounts. Nor was there any witness who could identify any of the persons who issued the checks deposited under the said account and under what circumstances the same were issued. In short, there is no proof that FPres. Estrada willfully, unlawfully and criminally amassed, accumulated and acquired ill-gotten wealth in the amount of P 3.2 Million (sic). Neither is there proof that this money came from commissions, gifts, percentages, kickbacks or any form of pecuniary benefits given to him as the source of said money have not been identified or traced. There is no evidence to show that he had enriched himself at the expense of the Filipino people. [Defense Memorandum, pp. 242-243] At any rate, Defense argues that the documents submitted as exhibits by the prosecution only tend to prove what checks were deposited to the said Account No.0160-62501-5 of Equitable PCI Bank in the name of Jose Velarde. [Ibid. p. 242]

The Court finds that the Far East Bank and Trust Co. Araneta Branch Check No. 3165579 amounting to P189,700,000.00 drawn by Dichaves was deposited to EPCIB S/A No. 0160-62501-5 account of Jose Velarde as 5 4 part of the deposit to said account totaling P263,292,303.65 (Exh. I ; U -1; 127-L). The link between FPres. Estrada and the Jose Velarde Account In discharging its burden of proof to establish that the Jose Velarde Account belong to FPres. Estrada, the prosecution relied on the following: 1. The testimony of Clarissa Ocampo that she saw Fpres. Estrada signed Jose Velarde 5 on the Debit-Credit instruction for S/A 0160-62501-5 (Exh. E ); 2. The admission of FPres. Estrada [TSN, May 24, 2006, p. 23] that he signed Jose 5; Velarde on Exh. E 3. The many bank transactions of Baby Ortaliza involving the personal accounts of FPres. Estrada and his family, the personal account of Loi Estrada and the Jose Velarde Account; 4. The use of the Jose Velarde Current Account for the purchase of the Boracay Mansion; 5. The funding that the Jose Velarde Account received from the Urban Bank Special Trust Account of FPres. Estradas son, Jose Victor Ejercito; and 6. The customary signing of FPres. Estrada as Jose. The signatures of FPres. Estrada as Jose Velarde in the Investment Management Agreement (IMA), Signature Cards, Investment Guidelines, Directional Letters, and DebitCredit Authority for EPCIB CA/SA 0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde Clarissa Ocampo testified that after explaining the documents being presented for his signature, she and Atty. Curato saw FPres. Estrada signed as Jose Velarde on the three (3) copies of the Investment Management 4 4 4 5 Agreement (IMA) [Exh. W to Y ; TSN November 13, 2002, pp. 70 -73], two (2) signature cards (Exh. Z ; A ) which 5 he signed three (3) times [TSN, November 13, 2002, pp. 78-80], one (1) copy of the Investment Guidelines (Exh. B ; 5 5 Ibid. pp. 82-84), two (2) copies of the Directional Letters (Exh. C to D ; Ibid. pp. 87-89), and one (1) copy of the 5 Debit-Credit Authority (Exh. E ). [Ibid. pp. 92-93] Her testimony regarding the Debit-Credit Authority in particular was as follows: OMB. MARCELO th th Q After these two exhibits marked as Exhibit C to the 5 power and D to the 5 power were signed by the former President and handed by you to Atty. Curato what happened next? A I was preparing to go and then I recalled that there was an envelope that was given to me by the banking side which contained the funding medium and so I looked at it, I pulled out the document inside the envelope, I read it and then I gave it to the President for signing. Q After giving it to the President what happened next? A Actually, I explained to him that the letter of instruction which is a debit/credit authority, I told him that the banking side gave it to me which authorizes the bank to actually debit or draw 500 Million from his account so I was pointing at the account number in the debit/credit authority so debit his account draw 500 Million and credit the same amount to trust for funding of his loan to Wellex sir. Q What was his reaction to your explanation? A He was nodding his head sir. Q After he nodded his head what happened? A He signed the document and I saw him signed. OMB. MARCELO Q What was the signature affixed by the former President? A He signed as Jose Velarde. Q After the former President signed this document as Jose Velarde what happened, if any? A I got the document and then I looked at it and I passed it on to Atty. Curato. [TSN, November 13, 2002, pp. 92-93] On May 24, 2006, FPres. Estrada testified as follows:

Q Ms. Ocampo and Atty. Curato testified before this court that you signed as Jose Velarde in the documents that you have just identified awhile ago and you signed as Jose Velarde, what can you say as to that testimony? A THAT IS TRUE. PINIRMAHAN KO PO IYAN DAHIL PO SA PAKIUSAP NI MR. JAIME DE CHAVES (SIC) NA OKAY NA RAW PO YONG INTERNAL ARRANGEMENT SA BANGKO AT PARA PALABASIN NA AKO ANG MAY ARI NG JOSE VELARDE ACCOUNT PARA MASIGURO PO NA YONG KANILANG PINAUTANG, IPAUUTANG SA WELLEX GROUP OF COMPANIES NI MR. WILLIAM GATCHALIAN AY SIGURADONG BABAYARAN. AYAW PO NILA SANANG PAUTANGIN SI MR.GATCHALIAN BAKA HINDI DAW PO MAKABAYAD SA TAKDANG PANAHON. [TSN, May 24, 2006, p. 23; Emphasis Supplied] William Gatchalian is a big businessman. isang malaking negosyante at siya po ay may ari ng Wellex group of companies at siya rin po ay isa sa tumulong sa aming partido noong nakaraang 1998 presidential election. [Ibid, p. 25] Q Now, you were requested by Mr. Jaime de Chaves (sic) to make it appear that you own the Jose Velarde account and that there was an internal arrangement between you and Mr. de Chaves (sic) I ask you now Mr. President, when did you agree to such request and arrangement? A Hindi lang po dahil doon sa internal arrangement. Hindi lang po dahil gusto kong tulungan si Mr. William Gatchalian kundi higit po sa lahat ay nakita ko ang kapakanan noong mahigit na tatlong libong (3000) empleyado na kung sakaling hindi mapapautang si Mr. William Gatchalian, maaring magsara ang kanyang mga kumpanya at yong mga taong, mahigit tatlong libong (3,000) empleyado kasama na yong kanilang mga pamilya ay mawawalan ng trabaho. AT INISIP KO RING NA WALA NAMING (SIC) GOVERNMENT FUNDS NA INVOLVE KAYA HINDI NA PO AKO NAGDALAWANG ISIP NA PIRMAHAN KO. [Ibid. p. 26-27; Emphasis Supplied] In the Debit-Credit Authority signed by FPres. Estrada as Jose Velarde for EPCIB S/A No. 0160-62501-5, the following words expressly appear: . . . my SA/CA No.0160-62501-5 maintained with your branch in the amount of P500,000,000.00 5and credit my Trust Account No. 101-78056-1 representing my initial contribution (Exh. E 3). [Emphasis Supplied] Lucena Baby Ortaliza and the bank accounts of FPres. Estrada and the Jose Velarde Account To establish the close relationship and trust of FPres. Estrada and his family on Lucena Baby Ortaliza, the prosecution presented REMEDIOS AXALAN AGUILA, Personnel officer of the Office of the Vice- President (OVP). She testified that Ortaliza was appointed VP Staff Officer II from January 2, 1996 to June 30, 1998 by FPres. Estrada. Being in the immediate staff of the Vice-President, she has the trust and confidence of the VicePresident and she can report anywhere, anytime as may be directed by the Vice-President. [TSN, May 22, 2002, pp. 21-24] Likewise, the Prosecution presented Linda P. Sison, Presidential Officer VI, Chief Personnel Data Bank, Office of the President. She testified that Ortaliza was employed in the office of the President on July 1, 1998 and appointed Presidential Staff Officer VI by FPres. Estrada. She was assigned to the internal house affairs office which normally attends to the needs of the President and members of the family. She resigned effective September 30, 2000 as Private Secretary VI in a letter of resignation dated October 4, 2000. [Ibid. pp. 47-48] To establish that Baby Ortaliza transacted for the bank accounts of FPres. Estrada and his family the Prosecution presented Salvador Serrano, Vice-President, Centralized Operations and Control Division of Security 14 14 Banking Corporation. He identified the Investment Savings Account Agreement of FPres. Estrada [Exh. C -C -8] in the amount of P10,000,000.00 with Security Bank San Juan Branch where, above the typewritten name Joseph E. Estrada under the word Conforme appears the signature of Baby Ortaliza and he was told by the New Accounts Clerk of the San Juan Branch that Baby Ortaliza is the representative of FPres. Estrada. [TSN, May 8, 2002, pp. 79-81; 87-90; 128-129]

The witness also identified the purchase of T-Bills by FPres. Estrada evidenced by Confirmation Sale No. 14 14 81046 (Exh. C -9 to C -16) value date April 10, 1997 where there appears the signature of Baby Ortaliza above TS No. 96848. [TSN, May 8, 2002, p. 114] The Prosecution also presented Ms. Pamela Moran who testified that Ms. Ortaliza was the only one person transacting the accounts of FPres. Estrada when she was in charge of the New Accounts Section of the Security Bank San Juan Branch. [TSN, May 15, 2002, p. 146; pp.149-152] The Prosecution further presented Patrick Dee Cheng of Citibank who testified that in the Hold-All-Mail Agreement signed by Ms. Luisa P. Ejercito, her designated representative was Ms. Lucena Baby Ortaliza. [TSN, 11 11 October 7, 2002; pp. 80-83; Exhs. B ; C and sub-markings] The Prosecution presented Ms. Marie Rose Ancheta Claudio who was Branch Manager of Urban Bank Greenhills Branch from 1998. [TSN, March 26, 2003, p. 92] She identified the Letter of Authority dated November 19 23, 1999 addressed to Urban Bank Greenhills Branch (Exh. I ) for issuance of three (3) Managers Checks in the amounts of P42,716,554.22, P10,875,749.43 and P 54,161,496.52, where the words Received By: Baby Ortaliza appeared. As per the witness, however, it was not Baby Ortaliza who received the check as she herself gave the Managers Checks directly to the client, Joseph Victor G. Ejercito. [TSN, March 26, 2003, p. 168] Having presented evidence that Baby Ortaliza transacted for FPres. Estrada and family with the Banks where FPres. Estrada and Family had accounts, the prosecution then presented evidence of the transactions by Ortaliza in relation to the Jose Velarde Account to establish that FPres. Estrada owns the Jose Velarde accounts. Thus, the prosecution presented Teresa A. Barcelona who testified that Baby Ortaliza transacted with 5 her personally for the deposit of P 143,000,000.00 (Exh. M and submarkings) into the Jose Velarde S/A No. 016062501-5 account and it was Baby Ortaliza who received the copy of the deposit receipt for the account holder. [TSN, May 15, 2002, pp. 76-80] Likewise, Baby Ortaliza transacted with her personally for the deposit of the amount of P263,292,303.65 5 [Exh. I and submarkings] to the Jose Velarde S/A 0160-62501-5 account and it was Baby Ortaliza who received the copy of the deposit receipt for the account holder. [TSN, May 15, 2002, pp. 80-82] Baby Ortaliza also 5 transacted with her for the deposit of the amount of P40,000,000.00 (Exh. N and submarkings) to the Jose Velarde S/A 0160-62501-5 account and it was Baby Ortaliza who received the copy of the deposit receipt for the account holder. [TSN, May 15, 2002, pp. 83-85] Baby Ortaliza transacted with her for the deposit of 5 P163,500,000.00 (Exh.Q and submarkings) to the Jose Velarde S/A 0160-62501-5 account and it was Baby Ortaliza who received the copy intended for the account holder. [TSN, May 15, 2002, pp. 89-92] The prosecution further presented Melissa P. Pascual former bank Teller of EPCIB Virra Mall Branch who 15 15 15 15 16 testified that she personally processed various checks (Exhs. V ; W ; X ; Y ; A , inclusive of submarkings) deposited by Ms. Ortaliza to the Jose Velarde S/A 0160-62501-5. She was sure it was Baby Ortaliza who deposited these checks because their branch is so small that everytime she comes to their branch, her voice is too loud so she would catch her attention. She would see Ortaliza give the checks to her officer which the officer would give to her for validation, for processing. [TSN, December 9, 2002, pp. 21-23; 35; 37-39] The purchase of the Boracay Mansion for P142 Million from money which came from the EPCIB C/A-0110- 25495-4 of Jose Velarde The prosecution presented evidence to show that the purchase of the Boracay Mansion was initiated by a check No. 0110-714951 dated October 5, 1999 issued by Jose Velarde from his EPCIB C/A No. 0110-25495-4 in the 16 amount of P 142,000,000.00 payable to Jose Luis J. Yulo (hereafter Yulo) (Exh. G ) who deposited the same to his BPI C/A No. 0383-0748-27 which was a joint account with Ma. Carmen L. Yulo. [TSN, December 9, 2002, p. 11416 16; 16 125; Exh. F ] Subsequently, on October 8, 1999, Yulo issued BPI Check No. 0002129 (Exh. U T ) from his BPI Current Account which was deposited to the account of St. Peter Holdings Corporation which, in turn, the latter used to buy three Managers Checks, one for P86,766,960.00 payable to Vicente AS Madrigal and/or Gerardo 16 16 Madrigal as sellers of the Boracay Property (Exh. V ; W ); another for P53,931,535.60 payable to Mercedes A. 16 Reyes (broker) (Exh. X ) and the third for P1,301,504.40 payable to Vicente AS Madrigal and/or Gerardo AS 16 Madrigal for payment of documentary stamps (Exh. Y ). [TSN December 16, 2002, pp. 29-51] To establish that the Boracay Property was, in reality, owned by FPres. Estrada, Prosecution presented a tag in the carpet 19-H-2 indicating the name: Pres. J. Estrada (Exh. H ) [TSN, March 19, 2003]; a Locator Slip which bears the words 19 Approved By; MS.LAARNI N. ENRIQUEZ, (Exh. H ) a school correspondence for FPres. Estradas child with 19-a Laarni Enriquez, namely: Ejercito, Ma. Jerika Larize (Exh. H ), and portion of the testimony of Chavit Singson

where he mentioned that FPres. Estradas new house in New Manila was called Boracay. [TSN, July 24, 2002, pp. 129-134] However, Jose Luis Yulo, whom the prosecution portrayed as the dummy of FPres. Estrada in the purchase of the Boracay Mansion was not charged as an accused in this case which presented a legal issue as to the propriety of attachment covering the said property during the pendency of this criminal case. The funding of the Jose Velarde Account from the Urban Bank Account of Jose Victor Ejercito The prosecution presented Marie Rose Ancheta Claudio who testified that JV Ejercito was the owner of Special Account No. (SPAN) 858 with Urban Bank pursuant to a Trust Agreement executed between JV Ejercito and Urban Bank Trust Dept. [TSN, March 26, 2003, pp. 98-99] Ma. Aileen C. Tiongson testified that Urban Bank 19 Managers Check No. 43222 (Exh. W ) for P75, 000,000.00 came from a pre-terminated placement of SPAN 858. [TSN, April 2, 2003, pp. 20-21] This Urban Bank Managers Check No. 43222 was subsequently replaced by four (4) 15 15 15 15 Managers Checks Nos. 39975, 39976, 39977 and 39978 (Exhs. B -2, B -4, B -6 and B -8) in the respective 15 amounts of P70,000,000, P2,000,000.00, P2,000,000.00 and P1,000,000.00 (Exhs. B -2-9). Subsequently, on January 24, 2000, these four (4) checks were deposited to EPCIB S/A No. 0160-62501-5 15 of Jose Velarde (Exh. B ; Exh. 127-N). Likewise, as mentioned earlier, three (3) Urban Bank Managers Checks for the amounts of 5 5 5 P10,875,749.43, P42,716,554.22 and P54,161,496.52 (Exh. I -17, I -18 and O -2), received by JV Ejercito were 5 deposited to EPCIB S/A No. 0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde (Exh. I ). Prosecutions Evidence to show that it was customary for FPres. Estrada to sign as Jose Prosecution presented Marianito M. Dimaandal who identified various official documents which showed 19 20 the signature of FPres. Estrada as reading Jose instead of Joseph (Exhs. X to R ). [TSN March 31, 2003, pp.40-47] Based on the forgoing testimonial and documentary evidence, it is the contention of the Prosecution that it has established that FPres. Estrada is the real and beneficial owner of EPCIB Savings Account No. 016062501-5 and Current Account No. 0110-25495-4 in the name of Jose Velarde. The theory of the defense on the Jose Velarde Account In attempting to prove that the Jose Velarde account was owned by Jaime Dichaves and not by FPres. Estrada, the defense presented Romuald Dy Tang and Beatriz Bagsit as their witnesses in addition to FPres. Estrada. Romuald Dy Tang testified that in 1999, he was connected with EPCI Bank as its SVP and Treasurer. The Chairman, Mr. George L. Go referred Mr. Dichaves to him because Go told him that Dichaves wanted to open a current account under an alias instead of his name. Mr. Dichaves also called him up and told him the same. He knows Mr. Dichaves because the wife of Jaime Dichaves is the sister of his sister-in-law. In effect, the wife of his brother and Jaimes wife are sisters. What he knows is Dichaves has a lot of business, substantial business and one of his major businesses is plaster glass. [TSN, May 4, 2005, pp.11,15, 17, 18] When he was called by Dichaves over the phone, the latter told him that Mr. Go referred him to Dy Tang to open an alias account for him. Based on that, Dy Tang told Dichaves to prepare a letter for records indicating his intention and Dichaves sent him a letter saying that he is opening an account under the name Jose Velarde and everything should be sofor safekeeping. [Ibid. p. 20] Dy Tang identified the letter dated August 25, 1999(Exh. 127 to 127 B-1). [Ibid. pp. 20-21] The letter was given to him on the day Dichaves went to his office to get the signature cards. [Id.] He gave the signature card personally to Dichaves and he did not see Dichaves sign the signature card because he was late for an appointment and both of them had prepared for such appointment and so Dy Tang gave the signature card to Dichaves and told him to return the same. [Ibid, p.22] He opened two accounts one savings and one current. It was a combo account. The signature card was returned after about a month or so, after a follow up with him and after he followed several procedures. [Id.] Both he and Betty Bagsit were jointly assisting Mr. Dichaves. Ms. Bagsit had to assist because if he will be the only one and he travels quite often, Mr. Dichaves will not have anybody to attend to his account. At that time Betty Bagsit was based in the Pacific Star branch in Makati and the Jose Velarde Account was a Binondo Account where the ledgers of the Velarde Account were kept. [Ibid., pp. 26-28] He testified that all the fixed (time) deposits of Dichaves were moved in the branch of Bagsit in Pacific Star. [Id.] In his sworn statement with the Ombudsman on March 23, 2001 (Exh. 327-327-C), Dy Tang stated that he received a letter from Dichaves advising them that all transaction for the Jose Velarde account should be coursed through him. He instructed Mr. Ceferino Ang, Vice President and Manager of Binondo Branch to cause the

opening of the account. He knows Mr. Dichaves personally because he was referred by Mr. George Go to him and because he is the brother-in-law of Dy Tangs brother. He went to the office to pick up the forms for the opening of the account sometime in late August 1999. Mr. Jaime Dichaves opened the account but Dy Tang does not know if he opened it for himself or another person. He gave the signature cards for Dichaves to fill up. The accomplished signature cards were given to him by Mr. Go. He was not present when the depositor affixed his specimen signature in the said signature card as it was given to him accomplished by Mr. Go. Beatriz L. Bagsit came into Equitable Bank as head of Pacific Star branch with rank of AVP and when st they acquired PCI Bank in 1999, she was promoted to 1 VP and the division head who handled the Makati area. [TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 63] She retired from the bank because of politics in the bank and the Jose Velarde case was coming up. She was the one handling the Jose Velarde account which was being handled also by Mr. Jaime Dichaves. [Ibid. p. 65] The Jose Velarde account started at Binondo Branch. It was opened there and when her superiors transferred to Makati, they called her to handle the account of Jose Velarde and she was introduced to Mr. Dichaves by their Executive Vice-President, Romy Dy Tang for her to handle the account personally. [Ibid. p. 66] There is no Jose Velarde who owns an account with their bank. Her basis for saying that Jose Velarde account belongs to Mr. Jaime Dichaves is that there was a letter that was given to her that came from Mr. Dichaves when the account was opened in Binondo. When the account was opened in Binondo, she was not handling the management of the same. The Jose Velarde account was never transferred to Makati. It was just the handling that was transferred sometime in November, 1999. [Ibid, pp. 68-70] Based on the letter (Exh. 127) it would appear that the Jose Velarde account belonged to Jaime Dichaves because it was Mr. Jaime Dichaves who issued the letter stating that all banking transaction of Jose Velarde should be coursed to him. The letter was shown to her by Mr. Dy Tang in November, 1999. She does not remember the exact date when she was told by Dy Tang to handle the account of Mr. Dichaves in the name Jose Velarde. She was first informed about it in Dy Tangs office and after that there was a time when Dichaves went to Dy Tangs office and that was the time she was introduced to Dichaves. She first met Mr. Dichaves in January, 2000. After she was introduced to Dichaves, there were times when he would call her for a transaction and there were times he went to her office. Sometimes Dichaves will tell her that he will be sending somebody to get the MC which he wants her to prepare and sometimes he would ask for the balance. [Ibid, pp. 72-96] Mr. Dichaves came to her office twice or thrice only. One is when he visited Mr. Dy Tang, the other one is when he just passed by, just to check the account of Jose Velarde and he gave her instruction that he will be sending representative to prepare an MC for him that was after the February 4, 2000 transaction. [TSN, April 18, 2005, p. 59] She does not know if Dichaves has an account in her area, she thinks there is none but she does not know with other branches. The records she had access to regarding the Jose Velarde Account were the signature card and the copy of the letter. The name Dichaves does not appear in the signature card. [TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 7684] She saw the debit-credit authorization on her table and she kept it and did not give it to anybody. [Ibid. p. 116] After Clarissa Ocampo was presented at the impeachment proceedings, Clarissa called her and she told Clarissa Kissa, hindi sa akin galing yong debit/credit because Clarissa was asking her if she was at the bank working and she told Clarissa that the bank was really bleeding and she took the opportunity to tell her Kissa, hindi sa akin galing yon. Saan ba galing yon?. [Ibid. p. 118] She testified that Clarissa was just surprised and asked her saan ba galing yon?. Where did it come from? She answered she didnt know but it didnt come from her. Thats all she told Clarissa. After that there was a follow-up from Atty. Curato asking her if she did not really issue the authorization and she told him No talaga eh. Sabi ko, hanapin natin kung saan talaga galing. She testified that later on, it was confirmed that it came from the Trust Department. [Ibid. p. 118-119] She testified that the Prefix Number for a Binondo Account was 0110 but she could not remember the Prefix Number for the Pacific Star Branch. [Ibid. p. 93] In her computation, the credits to the EPCIB Jose Velarde S/A No.0160-62501-5 totaled P2,168,523,085.00 excluding centavos and credit memos. [TSN, April 18, 2005, p. 98] The Court finds that the FPres. Estrada is the real and beneficial owner of EPCIB combo account C/A No. 0110-25495-4 and S/A No. 0160-62501-5 in the name of Jose Velarde. The eyewitness account of Prosecution witness Clarissa Ocampo that she saw FPres. Estrada signed the name Jose Velarde in the various documents presented to him and explained to him was undisputed by FPres. Estrada and constitutes direct evidence that FPres. Estrada signed as Jose Velarde.

Another direct evidence that FPres. Estrada is Jose Velarde is the admission of FPres. Estrada that he signed as Jose Velarde in the documents presented to him by Clarissa Ocampo. One of such documents was the 5 Debit-Credit Authority (Exh. E ) which read: ...my SA/CA No.0160-62501-5 maintained with your branch in the amount of P500,000,000.00 and credit my Trust Account No. 101-78056-1 representing my initial contribution. Such admission constitutes an admission that he and Jose Velarde are one and the same person. Being a judicial admission, no proof is required and may be given in evidence against him (Rule 129, SEC.4; Rule 130, SEC. 26). Being an admission against interest, it is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not. [Rufina Patis Factory vs Alusitain, 434 SCRA 429] The evidence of the Prosecution which showed that Baby Ortaliza - a trusted person of FPres. Estrada and who enjoyed the confidence of FPres. Estrada and Loi Ejercito - transacted the various personal bank accounts of FPres. Estrada and Loi Ejercito as well as the Jose Velarde accounts, also constitutes corroborative evidence that the Jose Velarde Accounts are owned by FPres. Estrada and not by Dichaves, since Baby Ortaliza has been entrusted by FPres. Estrada to handle his own personal bank accounts and there is no evidence that Dichaves and Baby Ortaliza are related in any way to each other. The evidence of the Prosecution that the Boracay Mansion was purchased from funds coming from the Jose Velarde accounts is yet another corroborative evidence that proved that the Jose Velarde accounts are owned by FPres. Estrada. The documents found in the Boracay Mansion show that the beneficial owner of the Boracay Mansion is FPres. Estrada and is used by Laarni Enriquez whose relation to FPres. Estrada was never denied. Likewise, the evidence of the Prosecution which showed that three (3) Urban Bank Managers Checks for 5 5 5 the amounts of P10,875,749.43, P42,716,554.22 and P54,161,496.52 (Exh. I -17, I -18 and O -2), received by JV 15 15 15 Ejercito as well as the four (4) Urban Bank Managers Checks totaling P75,000,000.00 (Exhs. B -2, B -4, B -6 and 15 B- -8) were deposited to EPCIB S/A No. 0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde constitutes corroborative evidence that, as between FPres. Estrada and Dichaves, it can be inferred that JV Ejercito, being the son of FPres. Estrada, would contribute to the account of his father but not if the account were owned by Dichaves in the absence of proof that JV Ejercito was under obligation to deposit to the said account if the same was owned by Dichaves. The evidence of the Prosecution that it was customary for FPres. Estrada to sign as Jose shows that FPres. Estrada would sign as Jose and further shows that, to the naked eye, the signature of FPres. Estrada as Jose appearing in the various official documents signed by FPres. Estrada is similar to the signature of Jose appearing in Jose Velarde. As to the reliance of the Defense on the testimonies of Dy Tang and Bagsit to prove that the Jose Velarde accounts belong to Jaime Dichaves, We find that such reliance is misplaced. Dy Tang testified that after Mr. George Go referred Dichaves to him, he told Dichaves to prepare a letter for records indicating his intention and Dichaves sent him a letter saying that he is opening an account under the name Jose Velarde and everything should be sofor safekeeping. [TSN, May 4, 2005, p. 20] Dy Tang identified the letter dated August 25, 1999. [Ibid. pp. 20-21; Exh. 127 to 127 B-1] The Letter of Dichaves dated August 25, 1999 reads as follows: Dear Romy, May I request that a savings account and a current account be opened with your Juan Luna branch for Jose Velarde c/o the undersigned. All other banking transactions of Jose Velarde shall be coursed through the undersigned. Very truly yours, (sgd) Jaime Dichaves The Letter of Dichaves does not prove that he is the owner of the Jose Velarde Account. Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the Jose Velarde Account is owned by Dichaves, why did he not deposit the International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 dated November 5, 1999, payable to cash in the amount of P189,700,000.00 drawn by Eastern Securities Corporation directly to the Jose Velarde Account? If Dichaves owned the Jose Velarde Account, why did he take the circuitous route of depositing the International Exchange Bank into his Far East Bank Savings Account, then auto transfer the amount to his Current Account, then issue his personal check payable to cash for P189,700,000.00 which was ultimately deposited to the Jose Velarde Account?

It could not be because he did not want evidence to prove that the International Exchange Bank check was deposited to his account because he, in fact, deposited that check to his personal account. The only logical conclusion is that Dichaves did not want evidence to show that the International Exchange Bank check of Eastern Securities Corporation was deposited to the Jose Velarde Account because such deposit would confirm that FPres. Estrada, once proven to own the Jose Velarde Account, received the P189,700,000.00 commission arising from the purchase by SSS and GSIS of Belle Shares. Dichaves act of covering the paper trail of the International Exchange Bank check of Eastern Securities Corporation, albeit unsuccessfully, militates against the claim of the Defense that Dichaves owns the Jose Velarde Account. In his Sworn Statement dated March 23, 2001 (Exh. 327), Dy Tang stated that Jaime Dichaves opened the account but Dy Tang does not know if he opened it for himself or another person. He gave the signature card for Dichaves to fill up. The signature card was returned after about a month or so, after a follow up with him and after he followed several procedures. [TSN dated May 4, 2005, p. 22] The signature card was given to him by George L. Go already accomplished. He was not present when the depositor affixed his specimen signature in the said signature card as it was given to him accomplished by George L. Go. In the signature card, it appears that it was opened on August 26, 1999 but it was received only on 19 19 October 7, 1999. Likewise, the signature card bore the signature Jose Velarde three times (Exh. G , G -6). In his testimony, Dy Tang testified that he doesnt think that it would be Dichaves signing as Jose Velarde because when Mr. Dichaves called him about his discussion with Mr. Go to open an account, Dichaves told him that he was going to open an account under an alias account. [TSN, May 4, 2005, p. 44] Nowhere did Dy Tang testify that Dichaves is the owner of the Jose Velarde account. As appears in the signature card, the signature of Jose Velarde is almost identical to the signature of Jose 4 4 Velarde appearing on the three (3) copies of the Investment Management Agreement [Exh. W to Y ; TSN 4 5 November 13, 2002, pp. 70-73], two (2) signature cards (Exh. Z to A ) which he signed three (3) times [TSN, 5 November 13, 2002, pp. 78-80] one (1) copy of the Investment Guidelines [Exh. B ; Ibid. pp. 82-84]; two (2) copies 5 5 5 of the Directional Letters [Exh. C to D ; Ibid. pp. 87-89], and one (1) copy of the debit-credit authority [Exh. E ; Ibid. pp. 92-93], which FPres. Estrada signed as Jose Velarde as testified by Clarissa Ocampo and as admitted by him. Under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court is authorized, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. [Cogtong vs. Kyoritsu International Et. Al., GR No. 160729, July 27, 2007] As regards the testimony of Beatriz Bagsit, her basis for saying that Jose Velarde accounts belongs to Mr. Jaime Dichaves is that there was a letter that was given to her that came from Mr. Dichaves when the accounts were opened in Binondo. When the accounts were opened in Binondo, she was not handling the management of the same. Based on the letter, she testified that it would appear that the Jose Velarde accounts belonged to Jaime Dichaves because it was Mr. Jaime Dichaves who issued the letter stating that all banking transaction of Jose Velarde should be coursed to him. [TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 68-72] The testimony of Bagsit does not establish that it is Dichaves who owns the Jose Velarde accounts as her opinion was based simply on the letter issued by Dichaves. As against the inference that Dichaves owned the Jose Velarde accounts based on the letter of Dichaves, the Prosecutions evidence showing that FPres. Estrada signed as Jose Velarde in the various documents given to him for signature must be given more weight to establish the fact that the Jose Velarde accounts belong to FPres. Estrada. Moreover, there was a glaring inconsistency in the testimonies of Defense witness Dy Tang and Bagsit when Dy Tang testified that all the fixed (time) deposits of Dichaves were moved in the branch of Bagsit in Pacific Star, while Bagsit testified that she does not know if Dichaves has an account in her area, she thinks there is none but she does not know with other branches. [TSN, May 4, 2005. pp. 26-28; TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 76] As regards the statement of Bagsit that the Debit-Credit authority did not come form her and that later, it was found to have come from the Trust Department, We find the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo that the DebitCredit Authority came from Bagsit as being more credible. First, because the debit-credit authority deals with S/A 0160-62501-5 which is under the Banking Department and not the Trust Department; and Second, because as testified by Bagsit, she found the Debit- Credit Authority on her table after it was signed but she kept it and did not give it to anybody. The Court likewise notes that Bagsit was not involved with the EPCIB Binondo Branch but

she remembers the prefix for Binondo accounts as No. 0110, yet, she could not remember the prefix for accounts with the Pacific Star Branch of EPCIB which she headed since 1999. In the attempt to downplay the effect of FPres. Estrada signing as Jose Velarde in the Debit-Credit Authority, the defense argued that the said debit-credit authority was not implemented precisely because the signature of accused Estrada did not match with that of the real Jose Velarde (who turned out to be Jaime Dichaves) [Defense Memorandum, p. 251] and probably because the bank officers got to realize that accused President Estrada was not really the owner of the account. [Ibid., p. 263] Besides being speculative, the arguments of the Defense are mere allegations which are not supported by its own evidence. The evidence of the Defense shows that prior to February 4, 2000, the account balance of S/A 016062501-5 of Jose Velarde was P142,763,773.67. (Exh. 127-O) There was therefore not enough funds in the account to transfer to the Trust Account. Thus, the Debit-Credit Authority could not be implemented. Subsequently, a credit memo for P506,416,666.66 was issued in favor of the said Jose Velarde S/A 016062501-5 account. As per the testimony of defense witness, Beatriz Bagsit, the amount of P 506,416,666.66 represented the principal and interest of a preterminated placement of S/A 0160-62501-5. The placement was not in the name of Dichaves but in the name of an account number, i.e. Account No. 0160-62501-5 and behind that account is Jose Velarde. [TSN, April 18, 2005, p. 37] Eventually the P500,000,000.00 was withdrawn from the savings account in exchange for an MC payable to trust. [Ibid. pp. 30, 31] Consequently, while the funding for the P500,000,000.00 did not come via the debit-credit authority, nonetheless, the funding of the P500,000,000.00 came from S/A 0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde. Moreover, the debit-credit authority was not implemented because Bagsit kept the debit-credit authority and did not give it to anybody. [TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 116] Neither does the non-implementation of the Debit-Credit Authority which FPres. Estrada signed as Jose Velarde disprove the fact that FPres. Estrada admitted that S/A 0160-62501-5 in the name of Jose Velarde is his account when he admitted affixing his signature on the Debit-Credit Authority as Jose Velarde. The so-called internal arrangements with the bank, involved the use of S/A 0160-62501-5 which had been in existence since August 26, 1999 as the funding source of the P500,000,000.00 to be placed in the Trust account for lending to Gatchalian. The fact that the P500,000,000.00 funding was not effected by a debit-credit transaction but by a withdrawal of P500,000,000.00 from the said S/A 0160-62501-5 proves that the money lent to Gatchalian was the personal money of FPres. Estrada through the Jose Velarde account of which he is the owner. As explained by FPres. Estrada, William Gatchalian is a big businessman. Isang malaking negosyante at siya po ay may ari ng Wellex group of companies at siya rin po ay isa sa tumulong sa aming partido noong nakaraang 1998 presidential election. [TSN, May 24, 2006, p. 23] FPres. Estrada further testified: Hindi lang po dahil doon sa internal arrangement. Hindi lang po dahil gusto kong tulungan si Mr. William Gatchalian kundi higit po sa lahat ay nakita ko ang kapakanan noong mahigit na tatlong libong (3000) empleyado na kung sakaling hindi mapapautang si Mr. William Gatchalian, maaring magsara ang kanyang mga kumpanya at yong mga taong, mahigit tatlong libong (3,000) empleyado kasama na yong kanilang mga pamilya ay mawawalan ng trabaho. AT INISIP KO RING NA WALA NAMING (SIC) GOVERNMENT FUNDS NA INVOLVE KAYA HINDI NA PO AKO NAGDALAWANG ISIP NA PIRMAHAN KO. [Ibid. p. 26-27; Emphasis Supplied] Moreover, as pointed out by the Prosecution, there was no need for the internal arrangement since the loan to Gatchalian could have been extended by EPCIB directly considering that Gatchalian had put up sufficient collateral for the loan. From the foregoing, the ineluctable conclusion is that the so-called internal arrangement which allegedly prompted FPres. Estrada to sign the various documents presented to him by Clarissa Ocampo is a futile attempt to escape the consequence of his admission that he signed as Jose Velarde which leads to the legal and indisputable conclusion that FPres. Estrada is the owner of the Jose Velarde Accounts. THE DAMAGE AND PREJUDICE TO THE FILIPINO PEOPLE As stated earlier, SSS and GSIS used the funds belonging to its millions of members to buy Belle Shares upon instruction of FPres. Estrada who benefited for his personal gain from the P189,700,000.00 commission paid in consideration of the purchase of the Belle shares by SSS and GSIS . The money paid by GSIS and SSS for the Belle Shares are public funds which belong to the millions of GSIS and SSS members. The amount of P189,700,000.00 deposited to the Jose Velarde account of FPres. Estrada are public funds which came from the

proceeds of the sale received by SSI Management through Eastern Securities from GSIS and SSS. The Billions of Pesos that could have otherwise been used to pay benefits to SSS and GSIS members were diverted to buying Belle Shares to comply with FPres. Estradas instructions in order that FPres. Estrada could receive his P187,900,000.00 commission to the damage and prejudice of the millions of GSIS and SSS members who were deprived of the use of such funds and worse, who now stand to suffer the loss amounting to millions of pesos since the Belle shares are presently priced less than their acquisition cost. [From an average price of P3.14 per share to P0.69 per share as of December 29, 2000 (Exh. 250-J-2) and between P0.40 to P 0.50 per share as of February 11, 2002] The Court finds that FPres. Estrada took advantage of his official position, authority, relationship, connection and influence to unjustly enrich himself at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines: a) by instructing, directing and ordering, for his personal gain and benefit, by way of receiving commission, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) through its President Mr. Federico Pascual and the Social Security System (SSS) through its President, Mr. Carlos Arellano, to purchase shares of stock Belle Corporation, as a consequence of which, during the period October 13 to 21, 1999 GSIS bought 351,878,000 shares of Belle Corporation and paid One Billion One Hundred Two Million Nine Hundred Sixty Five Thousand Six Hundred Seven Pesos And Fifty Centavos (P1,102,965,607.50) while SSS, on October 21, 1999, bought 249,679,000 shares at the value of P784,551,150.00 at an average price of P3.14/share [TSN, February 14, 2005, p.78] or a combined total of at least One Billion Eight Hundred Eight Seven Million Five Hundred Sixteen Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Seven Pesos And Fifty Centavos (P1,887,516,757.50); b) by accepting and receiving, a commission in the amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos [P189,700,000.00] as consideration for the purchase by GSIS and SSS of the shares of stock of Belle Corporation pursuant to his instructions which amount was deposited in the Equitable-PCI Bank S/A 016062501-5 under the account name Jose Velarde of which FPres. Estrada is the real and beneficial owner; c) by depriving the millions of members of GSIS and SSS of the use of public funds in the amount of at least One Billion Eight Hundred Eight Seven Million Five Hundred Sixteen Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Seven Pesos And Fifty Centavos (P1,887,516,757.50) for payment of their benefits in order that he can receive his commission of One Hundred Eighty Nine Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P189,700,000.00) which likewise constitute public funds for his personal benefit and enrichment thus causing damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Government. RE: SUB-PARAGRAPH D OF THE AMENDED INFORMATION _____________________________ (d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND AND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE AT THE EQUITABLEPCI BANK. The prosecution presented the following witnesses to prove the enormous amounts of deposits to the Jose Velarde Account and the person who transacted with the bank in relation thereto. TERESA ARRASTIA BARCELONA was the Manager of Equitable PCI Bank in Greenhills-Ortigas Branch specifically located at the Ground Floor of the Equitable Building along Ortigas Avenue corner Roosevelt, San Juan, Metro Manila, which was within the vicinity of the business and commercial areas of Greenhills. 5 5 Witness Barcelona then related and identified twelve (12) Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipts (Exhs. I and M to 5 W ) dated as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. October 20, 1999; November 8, 1999; November 22, 1999; November 24, 1999;

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

November 25, 1999; December 20, 1999; December 21, 1999; December 29, 1999; January 4, 2000; May 10, 2000; June 6, 2000; and July 25, 2000.

These deposit receipts allegedly show various deposits made to Account No. 0160-62501-5 under the Account Name Jose Velarde maintained at the Equitable PCI Bank Binondo Branch. The transactions to the said account were allegedly inter-branch deposits or deposits made from one branch of Equitable PCI Bank for an account maintained at another branch of the said bank. The aforementioned deposit receipts show that the deposits to the adverted account were transacted at the Equitable PCI Bank Greenhills-Ortigas Branch. In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated October 20, 1999, there were allegedly nine (9) checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. The total amount of the checks deposited was P143,000,000.00. The teller who processed the checks was Glyzelyn Bejec. In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated November 8, 1999, four (4) checks were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account in the total amount of P263,292,303.65. The checks deposited were as follows: a Far East Bank and Trust Co. Araneta Branch Check with Check No. 3165579 amounting to P189,700,000.00; an HSBC Head Office Check with Check No. 0022012 amounting to P20,000,000.00; a Union Bank Head Office Check with Check No. 034181 amounting to P10,875,749.43; and another Union Bank Head Office Check with Check No. 034182 amounting to P42,716,554.22. These checks were likewise processed by Glyzelyn Bejec on November 8, 1999 at 4:01 p.m. In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated November 22, 1999, three (3) checks for the total amount of P40 Million were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were processed by the banks teller Joan Mok. In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated November 24, 1999, a check of P54,161,496.52 was deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. The check was processed by the banks teller Leonora Royo on November 24, 1999 at 9:26 a.m. In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated November 25, 1999, three (3) checks for the total amount of P20,000,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were processed by the banks teller Glyzelyn Bejec. In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated December 20, 1999, three (3) checks for the total amount of P163,500,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were processed by the banks teller Lagrimas Claveria on December 20, 1999 at 4:12 p.m. In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated December 21, 1999, a check of P5,000,000.00 was deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. The check was processed by the banks teller Glyzelyn Bejec. In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated December 29, 1999, two (2) checks for the total amount of P2,500,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were processed by the banks teller Glyzelyn Bejec. In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated January 4, 2000, seven (7) checks for the total amount of P70,500,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were processed by the banks teller Joan Mok on January 4, 2000 at 2:31 p.m. In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated May 10, 2000, four (4) checks for the total amount of P23,000,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were processed by the banks teller Joan Mok on May 10, 2000 at 4:30 p.m. In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated June 6, 2000, two (2) checks for the total amount of P42,945,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were processed by the banks teller Joan Mok on June 6, 2000 at 3:39 p.m. Lastly, in the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated July 25, 2000, a check of P40,000,000.00 was deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. This check was processed by the banks teller Glyzelyn Bejec on July 25, 2000 at 11:43 a.m.

It was Baby Ortaliza who personally transacted the above-mentioned checks with Barcelona whom she identified 5 in a photograph (Exh. X ). Barcelona related that Baby Ortaliza would hand over the checks to be deposited together with the account information slip or passbook of Jose Velarde to her and that, after the validation, Barcelona would hand over a copy of the deposit receipt to Baby Ortaliza. [TSN dated May 13, 2002 and TSN dated May 15, 2002] JOANNE GENEVIE RANIAGA MOK was a Customer Service Assistant Teller of Equitable PCI Bank Greenhills-Ortigas Branch since July 1997. She received deposits and processed withdrawals made with the bank. Mok related and identified four (4) Equitable PCI Bank deposit receipts which pertained to various checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account with Account No. 0160-62501-5: Deposit Receipt dated November 22, 5 5 5 1999 (Exh. N ); Deposit Receipt dated January 4, 2000 (Exh. T ); Deposit Receipt (Exhibit U ) dated May 10, 2000; 5 and Deposit Receipt (Exhibit V ) dated June 6, 2000. Mok testified that she personally processed the checks deposited to the said account. In the Deposit Receipt dated November 22, 1999, there were three (3) checks deposited with the total amount of P40 Million. In the Deposit Receipt dated January 4, 2000, there were seven (7) checks deposited with the total amount of P70,500,000.00. In the Deposit Receipt dated May 10, 2000, there were four (4) checks deposited with the total amount of P23,000,000.00. Lastly, in the Deposit Receipt dated June 6, 2000, there were two (2) checks deposited with the total amount of P44,945,000.00 Mok further related that she prepared 3 copies of the deposit receipts and that after processing the deposit receipts she threw away the Account Information slip. [TSN dated May 20, 2002 and TSN dated October 28, 2002] GLYZELYN HERMOZURA BEJEC was a Customer Service Assistant Teller of Equitable PCI Bank Greenhills-Ortigas Branch. She processed deposit and withdrawal transactions of the bank. 5 5 5 5 5 5 Bejec related and identified the deposit receipts of Equitable PCI Bank (Exhs. I , M , P , R , S and W ) which pertained to various checks she personally processed and credited to the Jose Velarde Account with Account No. 0160-62501-5. In the Deposit Receipt dated November 8, 1999, the total amount of deposit was P263,292,303.65. In the Deposit Receipt dated October 20, 1999, there were nine (9) checks deposited in the total amount of P163,000,000.00. In the Deposit Receipt dated November 25, 1999, there were three (3) checks deposited in the total amount of P20,000,000.00. In the Deposit Receipt dated December 21, 1999, the total amount of deposit was P5,000,000.00. In the Deposit Receipt dated December 29, 1999, there were two (2) checks deposited in the total amount of P2,500,000.00. Lastly, in the Deposit Receipt dated July 25, 2000, a check was deposited in the amount of P40,000,000.00. On cross examination, Bejec testified that there were Account Information Slips when the checks were presented but she already threw away the said slips. It was the policy of the bank to throw away the Account Information Slips when the deposit receipt had been generated. [TSN dated May 6, 13, and 20, 2002] LEONORA BACSAFRA ROYO was the Customer Service Assistant for new accounts of Equitable PCI Bank Greenhills-Ortigas Branch since March of 1993. She testified that she was the teller who processed the 5 Deposit Receipt (Exh. O ) dated November 24, 1999 and that she prepared three (3) copies of the same since it was an inter-branch check deposit transaction. The deposit receipt shows that an Urban Bank Head Office Branch Managers Check No. 0000037661 dated November 23, 1999 amounting to P54,161,496.52 was deposited to the Jose Velarde Account No. 0160-62501-5 maintained at the Equitable PCI Bank Binondo Branch. Teresa Barcelona, the branch manager, handed to Royo for processing the Urban Bank Managers Check as well as the accomplished account information slip. [TSN dated October 30, 2002] ANTONIO MARTIN SAGRITALO FORTUNO was the Bank Operations Officer of Equitable PCI Bank, Pacific Star Branch since January 28, 2002. The witness averred that he handled the opening of accounts; supervised the investment section; the foreign telegraphic transfer as well as the domestic telegraphic transfer and the safekeeping of the records of deposits; and the transactions which transpired in their branch. Witness Fortuno brought with him to Court the documents contained in the subpoena which he requested from the PCHC. These documents were the seventeen (17) microfilm copies of the checks that were deposited to the Jose Velarde account from the PCHC; the nine (9) deposit slips or deposit receipts that were deposited to the account of Jose Velarde together with the five (5) cash deposits; and the detailed report of transfers and debit, credit memos or the DRTM from October 19, 1999 to January 24, 2000. Fortuno related and identified the seventeen (17) microfilm copies of checks that were deposited to the Jose Velarde account from various banks as well as the deposit receipts and the DRTMs.

The original of the checks were allegedly returned to the issuing bank after having been negotiated. The first check deposited to the Jose Velarde account was a cashiers check from PS Bank Head Office with Check No. 14 14 14 000031436 amounting to P20,000,000.00 and dated October 18, 1999 (Exhs. R ; R -1; and R -2). Fortuno narrated that this check was presented to the teller of the bank and then the teller validated the deposit slip which was attached to the check. The amount of the check was consequently credited to the Jose Velarde account with an Account No. 0160-62501-5. The witness, however, cannot tell who purchased this cashiers check. The second check deposited to the Jose Velarde account was also a cashiers check from PS Bank Head Office with Check No. 14 14 14 14 14 000031437 amounting to P20 Million and dated October 18, 1999 (Exhs. S ; S -1; S -2; S -3; and S -4). This check allegedly passed the same procedure as the first check before the amount of the check was credited to the Jose Velarde account. The witness further related that the Jose Velarde account was maintained at the Binondo Juan Luna branch and that the deposits were made in the Pacific Star. 14 14 14 14 14 The first deposit receipt (Exhs. T ; T -1; T -2; T -3; and T -4) was dated October 19, 1999. This deposit receipt allegedly shows that there were two (2) checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account for the total amount of P30,000,000.00, one for P20 Million and the other for P10 Million. The witness specified that this deposit receipt indicated the account name Jose Velarde; the branch name as Pacific Star branch; the account number 0160-62501-5; the date and time of deposit which was on October 19, 1999 at 12:55 in the afternoon; and the checks deposited which were from the Security Bank Corporation Main Office with Check No. 000363859 for P20,000,000.00 and Check No. 000363858 for P10,000,000.00. He added that the checks were dated October 18, 1999. 14 14 14 14 14 The second deposit receipt (Exhs. U ; U -1; U -2; U -3; and U -4) was also dated October 19, 1999. This deposit receipt allegedly shows that there were two (2) checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account for the total amount of P30,000,000.00, one for P20,000,000.00 and the other for P10,000,000.00. The witness specified that this deposit receipt contained the account name Jose Velarde; the branch name as Pacific Star branch; the account number 0160-62501-5; the date and time of deposit which was on October 19, 1999 at 12:53 in the afternoon; and the checks deposited, the first check was from the Security Bank Corporation Main Office with Check No. 000363857 for P20,000,000.00, and the other check was from PSB Head Office with Check No. 0000031438 for P10,000,000.00. These checks were dated October 18, 1999. 14 14 14 14 14 The third deposit receipt (Exhibits V ; V -1; V -2; V -3; and V -4) was likewise dated October 19, 1999. This deposit receipt allegedly shows that there were two (2) checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account for the total amount of P50,000,000.00, one for P20,000,000.00 and the other for P30,000,000.00. Witness Fortuno identified the account name as Jose Velarde; the branch name as Pacific Star branch; the account number 016062501-5; the date and time of deposit which was on October 19, 1999 at 12:49 in the afternoon; and the checks deposited, the first check was from the Global Bank Head Office with Check No. 0000107383 for P30,000,000.00, and the other check was also from the Global Bank Head Office with Check No. 00017385 for P20,000,000.00. These checks were both dated October 18, 1999. 14 14 14 The fourth deposit receipt (Exhibits W ; W -1; and W -2) was dated November 3, 1999. This deposit receipt allegedly shows that a check deposit was made to the Jose Velarde Account for P5,000,000.00. Witness Fortuno identified the account name as Jose Velarde; the branch name as Pacific Star branch; the account number 0160-62501-5; the date and time of deposit which was on November 3, 1999 at 11:03 in the morning; and the check deposited which was from Westmont Bank in Ayala Avenue with Check No. 000187472 for P5,000,000.00. The said check was dated October 26, 1999. 14 14 14 The fifth deposit receipt (Exhibits X ; X -1; and X -2) was also dated November 3, 1999. This deposit receipt allegedly shows that a check deposit was made to the Jose Velarde Account for P5,000,000.00. The particulars of this deposit receipt were the same as the fourth deposit receipt except for the time of deposit, which was at 11:04 in the morning, and the check deposited which was from Westmont Bank in Ayala Avenue with Check No. 000187471 for P5,000,000.00. The said check was likewise dated October 26, 1999. 14 14 14 The sixth deposit receipt (Exhs. Y ; Y -1; and Y -2) was dated December 17, 1999. This deposit receipt allegedly shows that a check deposit was made to the Jose Velarde Account for P50,000,000.00. The check deposited was allegedly from Equitable PCI Bank in Divisoria - M. De Santos branch with Check No. 0783236 for P50,000,000.00. 14 14 14 14 14 The seventh deposit receipt (Exhs. Z ; Z -1; Z -2; Z -3; and Z -4) was dated January 11, 2000. This deposit receipt allegedly shows that there were two (2) checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account for the total amount of P26,325,055.65, one for P20,000,000.00 and the other for P6,325,055.65. Witness Fortuno identified

the account name as Jose Velarde; the branch name as Pacific Star branch; the account number 0160-62501-5; the date and time of deposit which was on January 11, 2000 at 12:39 in the afternoon; and the checks deposited, the first check was from Equitable PCI Bank in Divisoria M. De Santos branch with Check No. 0111-795-117 for P20 Million, and the other check was from Bank of Commerce in Port Area with Check No. 0030474 for P6,325,055.65. The Equitable PCI Bank check was dated January 6, 2000 while the Bank of Commerce check was dated January 11, 2000. 15 The eight deposit receipt (Exh. A ) was dated January 19, 2000. This deposit receipt with an account 15 information slip (Exh. A -1) allegedly shows that a cash deposit of P25,000,000.00 was made to the Jose Velarde Account. Witness Fortuno testified that the account name Jose Velarde as well as the account number were specified in the account information slip. 15 Last for the deposit receipt (Exh. B ) was dated January 24, 2000. This deposit receipt allegedly shows that there were four (4) checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account for the total amount of P75,000,000.00. The account name Jose Velarde as well as the account number were specified in an account information slip (Exh. 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 B -1) for this deposit receipt. The four (4) checks deposited (Exhs. B -2; B -3; B -4; B -5; B -6; B -7; B -8; and 15 B -9) were allegedly managers checks from the head office of Urban Bank and all dated January 18, 2000. Witness Fortuno testified that the first check with Check No. 00039976 was for P2,000,000.00; the second check with Check No. 00039975 was for P70,000,000.00; the third check with Check No. 00039978 was for P1,000,000.00; and the fourth check with Check No. 00039977 was for P2,000,000.00. Fortuno continued on his direct-examination and testified as to the Detailed Report of Transfers and Credit Memorandums (DRTM) dated October 19, 1999; DRTM dated November 3, 1999; DRTM dated December 15, 1999; DRTM dated December 17, 1999; DRTM dated January 11, 2000; DRTM dated January 19, 2000; and DRTM dated January 24, 2000. The witness explained that these DRTM reflects the inter-branch transactions which were done at the Equitable PCI Bank Pacific Star branch. These DRTM allegedly show the summary of the transactions made particularly to the Jose Velarde Account with Account No. 0160-62501-5. 15 15 The witness testified that the DRTM dated December 15, 1999 (Exhs. C and C -1) reflects the summary of four (4) cash deposits to the Jose Velarde Account. The first cash deposit was for P25,900,000.00; the second cash deposit was for P37,126,467.83; the third cash deposit was for P38,325,629.67; and the fourth cash deposit 15 15 was for P43,647,902.50. The DRTM dated October 19, 1999 (Exhs. D and D -1) reflects the summary of four (4) deposits to the Jose Velarde Account. The first deposit was for P30,000,000.00; the second deposit was for P30,000,000.00; the third deposit was for P40,000,000.00; and the fourth deposit was for P50,000,000.00. The total amount of deposits for October 19, 1999 was P150,000,000.00. The DRTM dated November 3, 1999 (Exhs. 15 15 E and E -1) reflects the summary of two (2) check deposits to the Jose Velarde Account. Each of these check deposits was for P5,000,000.00 for the total amount of P10,000,000.00. The DRTM dated December 17, 1999 15 15 (Exhs. F and F -1) reflects a deposit to the Jose Verlarde Account for P50,000,000.00. The DRTM dated January 15 15 11, 2000 (Exhs. G and G -1) reflects the summary of two (2) deposits to the Jose Velarde account for the total amount of P26,325,055.65. The first deposit was for P20,000,000.00 and the second deposit was for 15 15 P6,325,055.65. The DRTM dated January 19, 2000 (Exhs. H and H -1) shows a cash deposit to the Jose Velarde 15 15 Account for P25,000,000.00. Lastly, the DRTM dated January 24, 2000 (Exhs. I and I -1) reflects a check deposit to the Jose Velarde Account for P75,000,000.00. Fortuno claimed that the head of the branch of the bank at the time the foregoing deposits were made was Beatriz Bagsit. He added that the total amount of cash and check deposits for the period of October 19, 1999 to January 24, 2000 aggregated to P481,325,055.65. On cross examination, Fortuno clarified that the Equitable PCI Bank Pacific Star branch had no specimen signatures of Jose Velarde. He also admitted that he had no personal knowledge on any matter relating to the Jose Verlade Account nor does he know the persons who made the cash and check deposits. He testified that none of the names of FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada appear in the deposit slips or checks he exhibited and identified. [TSN dated November 25, 2002 and TSN dated November 27, 2002] MICHELLETTE SOLIDUM LEGASPI was the Branch Head of Equitable PCI Bank Greenhills-Virra Mall Branch on December 19, 1997 until July 26, 2002. The branch was near North Greenhills Subdivision, San Juan. It was less than 100 meters away from the Buchanan gate or perpendicular to Eisenhower Street of the subdivision. Polk Street was one of the streets of North Greenhills where the residence of former President Estrada was located. [TSN dated December 2, 2002, pp. 39-48]

The Virra Mall Branch was merged with the Greenhills Shopping Center Branch on July 26, 2002. All the bank records and documents of the branch were forwarded to the warehouse of the head office. 15 Legaspi brought a Certification (Exhibit T ) dated November 27, 2002, accomplished and executed by Judy L. Go, Vice-President and Branch Head, Juan Luna Binondo Center, Equitable PCI Bank which certified that Savings Account No. 016062501-5 and Current Account No. 011025495-4 were both under the name of Jose Velarde. [Ibid, pp. 49-56] Legaspi then identified seven (7) Electronic Clearing Systems Reports with attached documents which were microfilm copies of certain checks. She explained that the Electronic Clearing systems Report was the summary of all checks received and processed at Greenhills-Virra Mall Branch and then sent to PCHC for clearing. The microfilm copies of the checks supported the summary of the Electronic Clearing systems Report. The documents were handed over to Legaspi by their Legal Department. The Electronic Clearing Systems Report showed the batch sent by the branch to PCHC for clearing. The report bore the routing number of the branch and the identification of the checks that were sent to the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC). 15 For the September 10, 1999 Report (Exhibit U , with sub markings), ten (10) checks were processed by the branch. The microfilm copies of the checks bore the Account No. 016062501-5 which meant that the checks were deposited to the said account. Legaspi explained that the account number was found at the back of the checks. The back of the microfilm checks also bore a certification from the PCHC that the item was a photocopy of the original clearing document processed by PCHC. The following microfilm copies were presented: Allied Bank Check No. 00080546 for P10,000,000.00; Check No. 0080566 for P10,000,000.00; Check No. 0080548 for P10,000,000.00; Check No. 0080542 for P10,000,000.00; Check No. 0080543 for P10,000,000.00; Check No 0084547 for P5,000,000.00; Check No. 0080544 for P5,000,000.00; Westmont bank Ayala Branch Check No. 000181135 for P5,000,000.00; Metrobank Check No. 0091780568 for P5,000,000.00; Far East Bank Check No. 3165562 for P20,000,000.00 with Jaime Dichavez or Abbie Dichavez as account holder. Attached to the report was a document entitled Detailed Report of Transfer and/or Credit and Debit 15 memo (U -12) of Greenhills, Virra Mall Branch as of September 10, 1999. On the report, an inter-branch transaction on September 10, 1999 was made for Account No 016062501-5 for P90,000,000.00. The report was secured by the banks Legal Department pursuant to the subpoena. 15 For the September 30, 1999 Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit V , with submarkings), two checks were deposited to Account No 016062501-1. These were Equitable Bank Binondo Branch Check No. 0811277 for P8,300,000.00 and Allied Bank Check No. 0080550 for P20,000,000.00. The dorsal side of the Equitable check bore the account name Jose Velarde and Account No. 016062501-1. 15 Another attached document was the transaction journal log report (Exhibit V -4) which showed the two deposits. Reflected on the journal log was the amount P995,371.66 indicating the last balance of the Account as of September 29, 1999. A late Deposit Transactions Report of the Branch as of September 30, 1999 reflected that the two checks deposited were late deposit transactions so that they were considered the following day transactions. A Detailed Report of Transfer and/or Memo of Greenhills, Virra Mall dated September 30, 1999 also reflected the two checks. 15 The third Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit W , with sub markings) presented was dated October 6, 1999. The details contained the following: Equitable Bank Managers check in the amount of P300,000,000.00 deposited to Account No. 016062501-5. The journal log reported the P300,000,000.00 deposit on October 5, 1999. A detailed report of Transfer Memo (Exhibit W15-4) of the branch dated October 6, 1999 showed that a P300,000,000.00 check deposit to Account No. 016062501-5. 15 The next Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit X , with sub markings) was dated November 26, 1999 and showed that three checks were processed by the branch. These checks were: Equitable Bank Check No. 0811579 for P20,000,000.00, Check No. 0811580 for P20,000,000.00 and Check No. 0811582 for P60,000,000.00. The dorsal portions of the checks bore the account number 01602501-5 where the checks were deposited. The 15 Detailed Report of Transaction Memo (Exhibit X -5) dated November 26, 1999 also showed these three transactions. Since the checks were deposited beyond the clearing cut-off time, the late deposit transactions 15 report ( Exhibit X -6) was also presented. 15 The Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit Y , with sub markings) dated November 29, 1999 showed a Westmont Bank check No. 0000187474 deposit for P25 Million which against bore the account No.

016062501-5. A detailed Report Transfer Memo (Exhibit Y -3) was presented to show this interbranch transaction. The late transaction report dated November 29 for the P25,000,000.00 check deposit was also presented. [Ibid, pp. 51-137] 15 Electronic Clearing System Report (Exhibit Z , with sub markings) dated December 1, 1999 showed a 15 Metrobank Magdalena Center Check No. 035400 for P53,000,000.00. The detailed report transfer (Exhibit Z -3) reflected that the P53,000,000.00 check was deposited to Account No. 016062501-5. 16 The last Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit A , with sub markings) dated December 2, 1999 showed that Equitable PCI Binondo Branch Check No. 0811596 for P50,000,000.00, Check No. 0811597 for P50,000,000.00 and Allied bank Check No. 0176625 for P20,000,000.00 were processed. Attached were two 16 transaction journals (Exhibit A -5) dated December 1, 1999 showing these inter-branch transactions. Legaspi explained that they were unable to produce the deposit slips representing the inter-branch deposits made to the account of Jose Velarde because all the documents pertaining to the Virra Mall branch were forwarded to the warehouse. They were still in the process of retrieving the other documents pertaining to the deposit slips. [TSN dated December 4, 2000, pp. 11-23] Legaspi testified that the transactions were made by Baby Ortaliza whom she identified in a photograph 5 (Exht X ). [Ibid, pp. 24-30] On cross examination, Legaspi testified that she was certain that the deposit receipts were actually accomplished and saw Baby Ortaliza several times transacting at the branch. [Ibid, pp. 31-34] MELISSA PORTO PASCUAL was a bank teller of Equitable PCI Bank Greenhills Virra Mall Branch from April 1, 1999 to January of 2002. She processed cash deposits, check deposit deposits, withdrawals and encashment during that time. The witness then related and identified microfilm copies of checks which she claimed that she personally 15 processed for inter-branch deposits. These checks were: Equitable PCI Bank Check (Exh. V -2 and submarkings) 15 No. 0811277 dated September 26, 1999 with the amount of P80,300,000.00; Allied Bank Check (Exh. V -3 and submarkings) No. 0080550 dated September 15, 1999 with the amount of P20,000,000.00; Equitable PCI Bank 15 Check (Exh. W -2 and submarkings) No. 0241001331 dated September 13, 1999 with the amount of 15 P300,000,000.00; Equitable PCI Bank Check (Exh. X -2 and submarkings) No. 0811579 dated November 23, 1999 15 with the amount of P20,000,000.00; Equitable PCI Bank Check (Exh. X -3 and submarkings) No. 0811580 dated 15 November 23, 1999 with the amount of P20,000,000.00; Equitable PCI Bank Check (Exh. X -4 and submarkings) 15 No. 0811582 dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of P60,000,000.00; Westmont Bank Check (Exh. Y -2 and submarkings) No. 0000187474 dated November 27, 1999 with the amount of P25,000,000.00; and Allied Bank 16 Check (Exh. A -4 and submarkings) No. 0176625 dated December 1, 1999 with the amount of P20,000,000.00. The foregoing checks were deposited by Baby Ortaliza to the Jose Velarde Account with Account No. 0160-62501-5 which was maintained at Equitable PCI Bank Binondo Branch. Pascual described the physical 5 appearance of Baby Ortaliza and identified her in a photograph (Exh. X ). To corroborate her claim that she personally processed the aforementioned checks, witness Pascual 15 15 further related and identified the Electronic Clearing System Report (Exhs. U to Z -3) dated November 26, 1999; the Electronic Clearing System Report dated October 6, 1999; the Journal Report dated October 5, 1999; the Electronic Clearing System Report dated September 30, 1999; the Electronic Clearing System Report dated November 29, 1999; the Electronic Clearing System Report dated December 2, 1999; and the Journal Report dated December 1, 1999. [TSN dated December 9, 2002] LAMBERTO BAJACAN DEL FONSO (Del Fonso) was the Assistant Vice President and Department Head of the Branch Monitoring and Administration Department of Equitable PCI Bank since 1997. Del Fonso identified the bank statements relative to the Jose Velarde Savings Account No. 0160-62501-5 for the 19 19 period beginning August 1, 1999 to November 30, 2000 (Exhs. D to D -13, inclusive of submarkings) and to 19 19 Current Account No. 0110-25495-4 for the period beginning August 1, 1999 to October 31, 2000 (Exhs. E to E 14). As to Savings Account No. 0160-62501-5, he testified that the account was closed on November 13, 2000 19 (Exh. D -13). As to Current Account No. 0110-25495-4, witness Del Fonso identified a transaction for October 6, 1999 (Exh. E19-2) for an automatic transfer of the amount of P29,304,219.69 from the savings account. On the same day, there was an Inward Check deposit amounting to P142 million. For the other months, there were either minimal transactions or none at all. With respect to the account holder Jose Velarde, Del Fonso testified that he had no address indicated in the accounts as the same were simply c/o EBC or care of Equitable Banking Corporation through its Head Office in

15

Binondo, Manila. He clarified that this was allowed as a special arrangement, although he did not know and neither had he met Jose Velarde. [TSN dated January 22, 2003] RENE COLIN DACIO GRAY was head of the Cash Department of Urban Bank sometime on January 19 2000. He presented and identified a Managers Check No. 43222 dated January 17, 2000 (Exh. W ) issued by Urban Bank Greenhills Branch which totalled Seventy Five Million Pesos (P75,000,000.00). Gray related that the Chairman of Urban Bank, Arsenio Bartolome, asked him to divide this check into four (4) checks - Urban Bank 15 15 15 15 Check Nos. 39975, 39976, 39977 and 39978 (Exhs. B -2, B -4 B -6 B -8) all dated January 18, 2000. [TSN, March 31, 2003, pp. 8-31] AURORA CHUMACERA BALDOZ (Baldoz) was the Vice-President of the Receivership and Liquidation Group 2 of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) since March 24, 1994. As such, she actually administered the receivership, take-over and liquidation of banks that the Monetary Board orders for closure. She testified that she became familiar with Urban Bank because it was her group that implemented the take-over of the said bank on April 26, 2000. 19 Baldoz presented and identified documents relative to Account No. 858 (Exh. M ) of the Urban Bank, particularly, 19 19 the Letter of Authority dated November 23, 1999 (Exh. I ); Letter of Authority dated January 29, 2000 (Exh. J ); 19 Letter of Authority dated April 24, 2000 (Exh. K ); as well as Urban Bank Check No. 052093 dated April 24, 2000 19 in the amount of P107,191,780.85, and a Signature Card of Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 (Exh. L ). Baldoz 19 further identified a Certification (Exh. N ) that she issued to the fact that as receiver of Urban Bank, PDIC found no bank records showing any account under the name of Jose Velarde, Joseph E. Estrada, Laarni Enriquez, Guia Gomez, Rowena Lopez, Peachy Osorio, Joy Melendrez, Kevin or Kelvin Garcia, 727, 737, 747, 757, and 777. She 19 further certified (Exh. N 2) that Accounts A/C 858 and T/A 858 did not appear in the Registry of Deposits of Urban Bank and were not part of the deposit liabilities of the said bank. [TSN dated March 24, 2003] MARIE ROSE ANCHETA CLAUDIO (Claudio) was the Vice-President of Urban Bank and the Manager of Urban Bank San Juan Branch. She was part of the senior management of Urban Bank, particularly its business development committee which handled the business aspect of the bank. As area manager, she was in-charge of supervising four (4) branches of Urban Bank. On the other hand, as branch manager, she handled the accounts of the Greenhills branch clients in terms of deposits, loans and other products and it was in the course of her duties as such that she became familiar with Trust Account No. 858 or Special Private Account No. (SPAN) 858. Claudio testified that it was Arsenio Bartolome, then the Chairman of Urban Bank, who asked her to open Trust Account No. 858 and to accept a deposit of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). The deposit was accordingly 19 processed based on Trading Order No. 776313 (Exh. Q ) dated January 6, 1999. She came to know that the owner 19 of the account was Joseph Victor Ejercito when she was asked to take hold of a Trust Agreement (Exh. R ) from the Head Office about two (2) to three (3) weeks after she accepted the cash. Claudio further testified that the Head Office gave it to her to be given in turn to the client for signature. She added that she personally delivered the document along with a signature card to the office of Joseph Victor Ejercito. A few weeks after she left the documents it in his office, she came back and picked them up and gave them back tot her Head Office. She also testified that she was familiar with the signature of Joseph Victor Ejercito because he was a client of the bank. Also in connection with Trust Account No. 858, Claudio handled the acceptance of all deposits to the said account 19 through Trading Orders. Thus, she became familiar with Trading Order No. 035006-A (Exh. S ) dated January 27, 1999 in the amount of Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). For effecting withdrawals from the said account, Claudio explained that trading orders, managers checks and letters of authorities were required. She added that 19 she was familiar with some withdrawals, particularly those covered by Trading Order No. 060851 (Exh. T ) dated September 30, 1999 in the amount of Forty Two Million Pesos Three Hundred Sixty Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety Nine Pesos and Seventeen Centavos (P42,360,899.17) and with maturity value of Forty Million Seven 19-2 Hundred Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Four Pesos and Twenty Two Centavos (P42,716,554.22) (Exh. T ), which she approved and which was covered by Managers Check No. 0000034182 dated November 8, 1999 (Exh. 5 I -18). 19 Claudio also identified a withdrawal from the account through Trading Order No. 804490 (Exh. U ) with deal date November 5, 1999 with a maturity value of Ten Million Eight Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Nine Pesos and Forty Three Centavos (P10,875,749.43) covered by Urban Bank Managers Check No. 34181 5 (Exh. I -17) that was processed by branch accountant Aileen Tiongson and which she approved. Lastly, Claudio 19 identified Trading Order No. 808554 (Exh. V ) with a net maturity value of Fifty Four Million One Hundred Sixty One Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Six Pesos and Fifty Two Centavos covered by Urban Bank Managers Check

No. 0000037661 (Exh. O with submarkings). Witness Claudio verified that she gave the three (3) managers checks for withdrawals to Joseph Victor Ejercito. [TSN dated March 26, 2003] MA. AILEEN CANDELARIA TIONGSON (Tiongson) was the Branch Accountant of Urban Bank San Juan Branch from December 18, 1999 to March, 2000. Among her duties was to ensure that all transactions of the bank and all policies in the branch were properly implemented. Her duties also included checking trading orders prepared by the account officer for traditional and non-traditional products, facilitating the issuance of certificates of deposits, and processing the issuance of managers checks for withdrawal transactions. Tiongson clarified that non-traditional products included trust products or investment placements under trust agreements. Tiongson testified that she was familiar with Account No. 858 because she processed some of the transactions of the client like the issuance of managers check. She added that she was familiar with Managers Check Bearing 19) No. 43222 (Exh. W dated January 17, 2000 in the amount of P75 Million payable to cash. She added that the source of the managers check was the pre-terminated placement of Account No. 858. With respect to the said check, Tiongson testified that the placing of payable to cash in a managers check is not a regular procedure in the bank because a managers check should be payable to a specified person. [TSN dated April 2, 2003] GUILLERMO ARAZA BRIONES (Briones) was the Deputy Receiver / Liquidator of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) assigned to Urban Bank at the time it was under receivership. Briones testified that as Deputy Receiver, he took charge of all the assets and affairs of the bank and also acted as custodian of the said records. In such capacity, he came across Account No. 858 as he was instructed by PDIC Vice President Aurora Baldoz to look for documents pertaining thereto. He collated the documents and 20 20 consequently prepared an inventory list (Exh. V V -4). Briones identified and verified the following entries 19 therein: (1) entry A-2 as referring to Trading Order No. 020385 (Exh. T ) dated January 29, 1999; (2) entry A-21 referring to Managers Check No. 43222 dated January 17, 2000 in the amount of seventy-five million pesos 19 19 (P75,000,000.00) (Exh. W ); (3) entry B-3 referring to Trading Order No. 035006 dated January 27, 1999 (Exh. S ); 19 (4) entry B-25 referring to Trading Order No. 808554 dated November 22, 1999 (Exh. V ); (5) entry C-22 and C-23 19 referring to Trading Order No. 060851 dated September 30, 1991 (Exh. P ); (6) entry D-34 referring to Trading 20 Order No. 804490 dated November 5, 1999 (Exh. B -3); and entries E-3, E-4, and E-5 referring to letters of 19 19 19 authority dated November 23, 1999 (Exh. I ), January 17, 2000 (Exh. J ), and April 24, 2000 (Exh. K ). After collating the documents, he submitted them to Aurora Baldoz. [TSN dated April 9, 2003] EMMANUEL ENRIQUEZ BARCENA was the Assistant Vice President for Operations of the PCHC during the time material in these cases. He assisted the Vice President for Operations, Arturo M. De Castro, in supervising the check processing operations of the corporation; he made sure that the checks delivered by the banks were credited to the clearing account with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and correspondingly debited to the accounts of the drawee banks; and he was also responsible for the accuracy of the reports generated and furnished to the clearing participants and BSP to the delivery of checks by the banks. The witness related that the clearing participants are the commercial and thrift bank members of the corporation with authority from the BSP to accept demand deposits and participate in the clearing operations. These banks send local checks to the clearing house by batches and the clearing house receive these checks and feed the same in a reader sorter which capture the drawee banks information. Thereafter, the checks are sprayed with a tracer bond and microfilmed to identify the source of the check. The checks are then tallied against the batch control ticket and the net results, known as the clearing summary report, are reported to the BSP to serve as basis for debiting or crediting the clearing account of the bank concerned. The witness then related and identified several checks which were sent to PCHC and undergone the clearing process. He was particular with the signatures of Arturo De Castro, the Vice President of PCHC, Francisco Gementiza, the Microfilm Custodian of PCHC, and Edgar Gamboa, the Assistant of the Microfilm Custodian of PCHC. These checks were Allied Bank Check No. 0176610 with the amount of P5 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176611 with the amount of P10 Million; Westmont Bank Check No. 0187473 with the amount of P25 Million; Urban Bank Check No. 037661 dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of P54,161,496.52; Far East Bank Gift Check with the amount of P500,000.00; Allied Bank Check No. 0176621 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176620 dated December 20, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176622 dated December 20, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176619 dated December 20, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; UCPB Check No. 018706 dated December 28, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; UCPB Check No. 018707 dated December 28, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; FEBTC Check No. 0580312 dated May 8, 2000 with the amount of P3 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0209702 dated May

2, 2000 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0209706 dated May 2, 2000 with the amount of P5 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0209703 dated May 2, 2000 with the amount of P5 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0830000304 dated June 3, 2000 with the amount of P22,945,000.00; Metrobank Check No. 3010003358 dated June 6, 2000 with the amount of P20 Million; Asian Bank Check No. 0022012 dated November 5, 1999 with the amount of 20 Million; Urban Bank Check No. 034181 dated November 8, 1999 with the amount of P10,875,749.43; Urban Bank Check No. 034182 dated November 8, 1999 with the amount of P42,716,554.22; Allied Bank Check No. 0176604 dated September 30, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176601 dated September 30, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176602 dated September 30, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176605 dated September 30, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0660139670 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P30 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0660139681 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P13 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0732114979 dated October 15, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Global Bank Check No. 0107387 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P25 Million; Global Bank Check No. 0107388 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P25 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0385384 dated November 24, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0385385 dated November 24, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176615 dated November 24, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0783278 dated December 17, 1999 with the amount of P160 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0783284 dated December 20, 1999 with the amount of P2 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0783282 dated December 20, 1999 with the amount of P1.5 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 080519 dated December 20, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 006975 dated December 24, 1999 with the amount of P1.5 Million; Westmont Bank Check No. 0189619 dated December 23, 1999; PS Bank Check No. 031436 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; PS Bank Check No. 031437 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Security Bank Check No. 0363859 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Security Bank Check No. 0363858 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Security Bank Check No. 0363857 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; PS Bank Check No. 031438 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Global Bank Check No. 0107385 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Global Bank Check No. 0107383 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P30 Million; Westmont Bank Check No. 0187472 dated October 26, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Westmont Bank Check No. 0187471 dated October 26, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million. Witness Barcena then related and identified in the foregoing manner Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0783236 dated December 17, 1999 with the amount of P50 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0111-795117 dated January 6, 2000 with the amount of P20 Million; Bank of Commerce Check No. 0030474 dated January 10, 2000 with the amount of P6,925,055.65; Urban Bank Check No. 039975 dated January 18, 2000 with the amount of P70 Million; Urban Bank Check No. 039976 dated January 18, 2000 with the amount of P2 Million; Urban Bank Check No. 039977 dated January 18, 2000 with the amount of P2 Million; Urban Bank Check No. 039978 dated January 18, 2000 with the amount of P1 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080566 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080454 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080548 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080542 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080543 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080547 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080544 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Westmont Bank Check No. 00181135 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0091780568 dated September 1, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; and FBTC Check No. 3165582 dated September 8, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million. In another set of documentary evidence for the prosecution, the witness similarly related and identified Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0811277 dated September 26, 1999 with the amount of P8,300,000.00; Allied Bank Check No. 0080550 dated September 15, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 001331 dated September 30, 1999 with the amount of P300 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0811579 dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Equitable Bank Check No. 0811580 dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0811582 dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of P60 Million; Westmont Bank Check No. 0187474 dated November 27, 1999 with the amount of P25 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0385400 dated November 29, 1999 with the amount of P53 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0811596 dated December 15, 1999 with the amount of P50 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No.

0811597 dated December 1, 1999 with the amount of P50 Million; and Allied Bank Check No. 0176625 dated December 1, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million. Witness Barcena continued on his direct examination and related and identified FEBTC Check No. 3165579 dated November 8, 1999 with the amount of P189,700,000.00; BPI Family Bank Check No. 0006623 dated July 25, 2000 with the amount of P40 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0742099 dated August 15, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0091780523 dated August 15, 1999 with the amount of P31 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0385379 dated August 19, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0830416015 dated July 29, 2000 with the amount of P22 Million; and Allied Bank Check No. 0080549 dated August 25, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million. Lastly, the witness then presented and identified a Detail List dated November 9, 1999 of PCHC which contained a listing of incoming checks of the participating bank in Greater Manila Area. On cross examination, witness Barcena clarified that the checks forwarded to PCHC pertained to checks that were not yet acted by the drawee bank as to whether the same were honored or dishonored. [TSN dated January 13, 2003; TSN dated January 15, 2003; and TSN dated January 20, 2003] EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE The defense presented BEATRIZ LEGASPI BAGSIT, the Vice President and Division Head in the Makati Area of Equitable PCI Bank, andROMUALD DY TANG, Treasurer and Executive Vice President of Equitable PCI Bank. The gists of their testimonies were already discussed in relation to sub-paragraph (c) above. FPres. Estrada also denied on the witness stand that he owned the Jose Velarde account. FINDINGS OF FACT Re: Sub-paragraph (d) of the Amended Information To reiterate, the crime of plunder is committed through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts [or predicate acts] described in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080 as amended. The prosecution presented overwhelming evidence that there were numerous deposits of astoundingly large sums of money into the Jose Velarde account. However, the prosecution failed to prove the predicate act/s as defined under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080 through which the said deposits could have been acquired or amassed, except for the amount of P189,700,000.00, representing illegal commissions from the sales of Belle shares and the money collected from illegal gambling. It is not per se the accumulation of wealth which is proscribed by the Anti-Plunder Law. The acquisition of wealth of not less than P50,000,000.00 must be linked to the commission of overt or criminal acts falling within the ambit of the said law. All that the prosecution has succeeded in showing is that the Jose Velarde account is the repository or receptacle of vast wealth belonging to FPres. Estrada. RULING OF THE COURT ON THE CHARGE OF PLUNDER Elements of the Offense of Plunder Having reached the foregoing Findings of Fact after a meticulous and laborious study of the voluminous testimonial and documentary evidence of both the prosecution and the defense on the four (4) sub-paragraphs of the Amended Information, the Court is now called upon to apply the Anti-Plunder Law to the facts of this case. The accused are charged with plunder as defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended, entitled An Act Defining And Penalizing The Crime Of Plunder, As Amended (July 12, 1991). Particularly, Section 2 of the said law provides as follows: Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties.- Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill gottenwealth through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The Court shall declare any and ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and share of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in the favor of the State. (As to the penalty, this section is amended by Republic Act No. 9346

prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines. RA 9346 was signed into law on June 24, 2006. In view of its provisions, the penalty for the crime of plunder is now reclusion perpetua pursuant to Section 2 (a) of RA 9346. In addition, the convicted person shall be eligible for parole under Act. No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.) Section 1 (d) of the same statute cited in Section 2 above reads: d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or in directly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes: 1) Through misappropriation, conversation, mis-use, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; 2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/ or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned; 3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of asset belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivision, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; 4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including promises of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; 5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or 6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. RA No. 7080, as amended, enunciates a rule of evidence in Section 4 thereof which is quoted hereunder: Section 4. Rule of Evidence. For purpose of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The case of Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560, promulgated November 19, 2001), which upheld this Courts Resolution dated July 9, 2001 denying accused Former President Estradas Motion to Quash the information in this case, enumerates the elements of the crime of plunder, as follows: (1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons; (2) That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts described in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080 as amended; and (3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00. The terms Combination and Series were likewise defined in the above-cited case as follows: Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of combination, it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec.1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belongings to the National Government under Sec.1, par. (d), subpar. (3). On the other hand, to constitute a series, there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1,

par. (d), say, misappropriation , malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for combination and series, it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. (emphasis supplied) The Charges in the Amended Information in Relation to Accused The import of the charges in the Amended Information was carefully discussed by the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Jose Jinggoy Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2003, 377 SCRA 538, 553-556], as penned by now the Honorable Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in this wise: For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended Information vis--vis the provisions of R.A. No. 7080. The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other co-accused with the crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while the second paragraph describes in general how plunder was committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts that constitute the crime and name in particular the co-conspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead names other conspirators of the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts - that of ordering the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions from such purchase from the Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the Jose Velarde account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the former President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act that the former President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his account name Jose Velarde at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as related in the second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion. We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including the predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in one, and not in four, separate Informations. A study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple informations. The Anti-

Plunder Law wasenacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regimewhere charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with he multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the former President to acquire illegal wealth.They also found out that under the then existing laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved different transactions, different time and different personalities.Every transaction constituted a separate crime and required a separate case and the over-all conspiracyhad to be broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation of multiple Informations was a legl nightmarebut eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent cases were filed against practically the same accused before the Sandiganbayan. R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti Plunder Law was enacted precisely to address this procedural problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 733 xxx xxx xxx . . . In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonalityto help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada. In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves two structures: (1) the so-called wheel or circle conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes); and (2) the chain conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a wheel conspiracy. The hub is former President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the spokes is the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. Throughout the trial before this Court, the prosecutions task was to establish, with the required burden of proof, the commission of the crime of plunder by the principal accused former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada in conspiracy with his co-accused during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001 by willfully, unlawfully and criminally amassing, accumulating and acquiring by himself directly or indirectly ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of Four Billion Ninety Seven Million Eight Hundred Four Thousand One Hundred SeventyThree Pesos and Seventeen Centavos ( P4,097,804,173.17), more or less and thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines, through ANY OR A COMBINATION OR A SERIES OF OVERT CRIMINAL ACTS, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS described in paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information. After a thorough evaluation of the established facts, we hold that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the elements of plunder as follows: (a) The principal accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, at the time of the commission of the acts charged in the Amended Information was the President of the Republic of the Philippines; (b) He acted in connivance with then Governor Luis Chavit Singson, who was granted immunity from suit by the Office of the Ombudsman, and with the participation of other persons named by prosecution witnesses in the course of the trial of this case, in amassing, accumulating and acquiring ill-gotten wealth as follows: (i) by a series of acts of receiving bi-monthly collections from jueteng, a form of illegal gambling, during the period beginning November 1998 to August

2000 in the aggregate amount of Five Hundred Forty Five Millionh Two Hundred Ninety One Thousand Pesos (P545,291,000.00), Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) of which was deposited in the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation; and (ii) by a series consisting of two (2) acts of ordering the GSIS and the SSS to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation and collecting or receiving commission from the sales of Belle Shares in the amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P189,700,000.00) which was deposited in the Jose Velarde account. In Jose Jinggoy E. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538, 549) the Supreme Court ruled as follows: Contrary to petitioners posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal gambling "on several instances. The phrase on several instances means the petitioner committed the predicate act in series. To insist that the Amended Information charged the petitioner with the commission of only one act or offense despite the phrase several instances is to indulge in a twisted, nay, pretzel interpretation. In the same case (Jose Jinggoy E. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra.), it was held: Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate actsthat of ordering the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions from such purchase from Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the Jose Velarde account at the Equitable PCI Bank. These two predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the former President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does. (emphasis supplied) This Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, who among the accused benefited from the misappropriation of the excise tax share of Ilocos Sur and in what amounts, as charged subparagraph b. The prosecution likewise failed to offer evidence on the alleged illegal sources of the numerous deposits in the Jose Velarde account which belongs to FPres. Estrada, except for the commission received from the sale of Belle shares to GSIS and SSS and the money collected from illegal gambling. The Anti-Plunder Law requires the prosecution to prove the series or combination of overt or criminal acts through which ill-gotten wealth deposited in the Jose Velarde account was amassed, accumulated or acquired. The prosecution failed to discharge this burden of proof. However, the two different series of predicate acts outlined above (particularly, first, the regular and methodical acquisition of ill-gotten wealth through collections from illegal gambling and second, the receipt of unlawful commissions from the sales of Belle shares twice), whether taken separately or independently of the other or in combination with each other, unquestionably constitute the crime of plunder as defined by Section 2, in relation to Section 1(d) of RA 7080 as amended. The case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001) ruled: xxx As Senate President Salonga explained, of there are 150 constitutive crimes charged, it is not necessary to prove beyond reasonable doubt all of them. If a pattern can be shown by proving for example, 10 criminal acts, then that would be sufficient to secure conviction. The State is thereby enabled by this device to deal with several acts constituting separate crimes as just one crime of plunder by allowing their prosecution by means of a single information because there is a common purpose for committing them, namely, that of amassing, accumulating or acquiring wealth through such overt or criminal acts. The pattern is the organizing principle that defines what otherwise would be discreet criminal acts into the single crime of plunder. (369 SCRA 394, 475-476) A pattern was established by the carefully planned system of jueteng money collection on a regular bi-monthly basis from the dfferent provinces nationwide to enrich FPres. Estrada with the connivance and/or participation of Gov. Singson, Yolanda Ricaforte, Emma Lim, Carmencita Itchon, SPO2 Artates, Jamis Singson and other jueteng collectors referred to in the Amended Information as John Does and Jane Does. The Court notes that Gov. Singson in the course of his testimony mentioned certain persons who collected jueteng money aside from himself and his employees; namely, Anton Prieto, Bonito Singson, Bong Pineda, Charing Magbuhos, Celso de los

Angeles, Jesse Viceo, Romy Pamatmat and a certain Sanchez of Batangas. As proven, the collections in several instances from illegal gambling money went way beyond the minimum of P50,000,000.00 set by the AntiPlunder Law. These repeated collections of jueteng money from November 1998 to August 2000 would fall within the purview of a series of illegal acts constituting plunder. The said series of acts, on its own, would have been sufficient to convict the principal accused, FPres. Estrada. However, this Court also finds that FPres. Estrada is criminally liable for plunder for receiving commissions from the purchase of Belle Shares by the GSIS and by the SSS in grave abuse of his power on two (2) separate occasions as charged in sub-paragraph (b) of the Amended Information. Clearly, the receipt of these commissions on two (2) occasions likewise meets the definition of a series of two (2) similar unlawful acts employing the same scheme to accumulate ill-gotten wealth. It is unnecessary to indulge in an exposition of whether the two series of acts falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of the Amended Information, proven in the course of the trial could have amounted to two (2) counts of plunder. It would be a purely academic exercise, as the accused cannot be convicted of two offenses or two counts of plunder on the basis of a single Information, clearly charging him of only one count of plunder, because that would violate his constitutional rights to due process, given the severity of the crime charged in this case. The predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of the Amended Information, which formed two (2) separate series of acts of a different nature, were linked by the fact that they were plainly geared towards a common goal which was the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth for FPres. Estrada and that they shared a pattern or a common method of commission which was the abuse or misuse of the high authority or power of the Presidency. (U.S. v. Hiverly, 437 F3d 752) In sum, the Court finds that prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the commission by the principal accused former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada of the crime of plunder but not so in the case of former Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estrada and Atty. Edward Serapio. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding the accused, Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of PLUNDER defined in and penalized by Republic Act No. 7080, as amended. On the other hand, for failure of the prosecution to prove and establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds the accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio NOT GUILTY of the crime of plunder, and accordingly, the Court hereby orders their ACQUITTAL. The penalty imposable for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is Reclusion Perpetua to Death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, however, the lesser penalty shall be applied in accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. The period within which accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention shall be credited to him in full as long as he agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners. Moreover, in accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the Court hereby declares the forfeiture in favor of the government of the following: (1) The total amount of Five Hundred Forty Two Million Seven Hundred Ninety One Thousand Pesos (P545,291,000.00), with interest and income earned, inclusive of the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00), deposited in the name and account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. (2) The amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Million Pesos (P189,000,000.00), inclusive of interests and income earned, deposited in the Jose Velarde account. (3) The real property consisting of a house and lot dubbed as Boracay Mansion th located at #100 11 Street, New Manila, Quezon City. The cash bonds posted by accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio are hereby ordered cancelled and released to the said accused or their duly authorized representatives upon presentation of the original receipt evidencing payment thereof and subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures. Likewise, the hold-departure orders issued against the said accused are hereby recalled and declared functus oficio. SO ORDERED.

VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. CONSUELO TAN, respondent. [G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000] PANGANIBAN, J.: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void.

The Case Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals [1] (CA) in CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999 Resolution denying reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 13848, which convicted herein petitioner of bigamy as follows: WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, [the court hereby renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison term of three (3) years, four (4) months and fifteen (15) days of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law. Costs against accused.
[2]

The Facts The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial courts judgment, as follows: From the evidence adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibaez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused was single. There is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Caares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith, which matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil marriage between accused and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan. On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993. On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutors Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City,

and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void. Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for having contracted a second marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage having been legally dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential elements of the crime are present, namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites for validity. x x x While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited the defense that his previous marriage ha[d] been judicially declared null and void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of accused. It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991, accuseds prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it is clear that accused was a married man when he contracted such second marriage with complainant on June 27, [3] 1991. He was still at the time validly married to his first wife.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated: Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. But here, the final judgment declaring null and void accuseds previous marriage came not before the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a second subsequent marriage before the former [4] marriage has been legally dissolved. Hence, this Petition.
[5]

The Issues In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues: A Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict petitioner. B

Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner. C Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable doubt.
[6]

The Courts Ruling The Petition is not meritorious.

Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. The elements of this crime are as follows: 1. That the offender has been legally married;

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
[7]

When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed that petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy. Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are considered valid until set aside by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at [8] [9] all. Thus, he concludes that there is no first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries of former Justice Luis Reyes that it is now settled that if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first marriage is voidable, it is not a defense. Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, but she points out that that declaration came only after the Information had been filed. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. She argues that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time. We agree with the respondent.

To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage has [10] [11] been characterized as conflicting. In People v. Mendoza, a bigamy case involving an accused who married three times, the Court ruled that there was no need for such declaration. In that case, the accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of the first. When the first wife died, he married for the third time. The second wife then charged him with bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held that the second marriage was void ab initio because it had been contracted while the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was obviously void and illegal, the Court ruled that there was no need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence, the accused did not commit bigamy when he married for the third time. This ruling was affirmed by the Court [12] in People v. Aragon, which involved substantially the same facts. But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of nullity. In Vda de [13] Consuegra v. GSIS, Jose Consuegra married for the second time while the first marriage was still subsisting. Upon his death, the Court awarded one half of the proceeds of his retirement benefits to the first wife and the other half to the second wife and her children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second marriage. It held: And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observes that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. In Tolentino v. Paras, however, the Court again held that judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage was not necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his Death Certificate, his second wife was named as his surviving spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said entry in the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of the first wife, holding that the second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of the first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a prior existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present evidence to prove, among others, that her first husband had previously been married to another woman. In holding that there was no need for such evidence, the Court ruled: x x x There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs, according to this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x. Subsequently, in Yap v. CA, the Court reverted to the ruling in People v. Mendoza, holding that there was no need for such declaration of nullity. In Domingo v. CA, the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still necessary for the recovery and the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared: The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity [18] of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was not a criminal prosecution for bigamy. Nonetheless,Domingo underscored the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new provision of the Family Code, which came into effect several years after the promulgation of Mendoza and Aragon. In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which provided: Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
[17] [16] [15] [14]

(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; (b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court." The Court held in those two cases that the said provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is [19] necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages. The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code and Article 41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as follows: ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void. In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such marriage void was necessary. Verily, the Family Code andDomingo affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of the Civil Code Revision Commitee has observed: [Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the marriage of a person may be null and void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such fact before that person can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This provision changes the old rule that where a marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. [20] Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033). In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon that there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is now necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy. The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre, which involved an administrative Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyers argument that he was free to enter into a second marriage because the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. The Court further noted that the said rule was cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code. Significantly, it observed that the second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that the first marriage was void, was bigamous and criminal in character. Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited by petitioner, changed his view on the subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote in 1993 that a person must first obtain a [22] judicial declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before contracting a subsequent marriage: It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be allowed to marry again. x x x.
[21]

In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that. Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.

Damages In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals insofar as [23] it denied her claim of damages and attorneys fees. Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her; hence, she cannot obtain [24] affirmative relief from this Court. In any event, we find no reason to reverse or set aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on this point, which we quote hereunder: We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case that Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim that she claims to be; she was well aware of the existence of the previous marriage when she contracted matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove this, and we find no reason to doubt said testimonies. xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous marriage does not inspire belief, especially as she had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with him. We are convinced that she took the plunge anyway, relying on the fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr. Mercado, she being by then already living with another man. Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was fully conscious of the consequences of her act. She should have known that she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth [would] come out, as it did in this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If there are indeed damages caused to her [25] reputation, they are of her own willful making. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent. G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individuals criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit 1 with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before 2 Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten 3 letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. The Information, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads: That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage. CONTRARY TO LAW. When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".
6 4 5

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage 7 ceremony took place to solemnize their union. He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable 8 her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman. He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between 9 him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage. On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and 10 one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A

QUO CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD 11 BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT. After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
12

Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites 13 for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated. Hence, petitioner argues that all 14 four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal. Petitioners defense must fail on both counts. First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the 15 Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, 16 informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married. To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the National 17 Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995; and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated 18 February 3, 1997. Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows: Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).

This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, 19 provided all requisites for its validity are present. There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the selfserving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioners own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for validity. Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accuseds marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case. As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy. The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the 21 crime of bigamy was not committed. This argument is not impressed with merit. Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners 22 psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
20

liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The States penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done. Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and 23 their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry 24 before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses). Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 25 26 27 37 and 38 may contract marriage. In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses. Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived 28 or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment. As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the accuseds guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the States basic social institution, the States criminal laws on bigamy step in. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence

Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED. Summary of Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Statement of the case: This was an appeal from a conviction for kidnapping and rape. Statement of the facts: Miranda (D) was arrested and taken to the police station where officers questioned him for two hours. D signed a confession. The confession stated that it was made voluntarily and that D had full knowledge of his legal rights. Ds confession was used against him at trial and over Ds objection. D was convicted of rape and kidnapping. The state supreme court affirmed the conviction. D appealed. Legal issue: Must law enforcement officials inform an accused of his constitutional rights? Are statements obtained from an individual subjected to custodial police interrogation admissible if he has not been notified of his privilege under the 5th Amendment not to be compelled to incriminate himself? Holding: Incriminating statements made by an individual are only admissible if the following safeguards have been taken; and/or, when a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom, the following warnings must be given: he has the right to remain silent; that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law; that he has the right to have an attorney present; and if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him. Reasoning: (Warren, C.J.) Yes. When a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom, the following warnings must be given: he has the right to remain silent; that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law; that he has the right to have an attorney present; and if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him. The fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination is jeopardized when a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom. Once these warnings have been given, a person may knowingly and intelligently waive his rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. No evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against a person unless the prosecution has shown that the person had been informed of his rights. If a person indicates a desire to remain silent or have an attorney present at any time during questioning, the interrogation must cease or cease until an attorney is p! resent. The admissibility of volunteered confessions or statements is not affected by this decision. If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney, the state has a heavy burden to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege. A valid waiver is not presumed simply from silence. Warnings are a judicial prophylactic to protect the fundamental right against compelled self-incrimination because of the oppressive nature of station house questioning. This case does not hamper police officers in investigating crime because general on-the-scene questioning is not affected. Conviction reversed. Dissent: (Harlan, Justice) The new rules are not designed to guard against police brutality or other unmistakably banned forms of coercion. The thrust of the new rules is to negate all pressures, to reinforce the nervous or ignorant suspect, and ultimately to discourage any confession at all. Dissent: (White, Justice) The Fifth Amendment forbids only self-incrimination only if it is compelled. The core of the majoritys opinion is that there is compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings and that no statement made while in custody can be the product of free choice unless the protective devices as described by the court are used. Critical summary: This is probably the most cited case in legal history.