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MMDA vs BAVA 328 SCRA 836 Facts: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agency

tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers. Held: The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police power is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police power. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.

HELD: NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and not to practice optometry (the latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry). The conditions attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be given any legal application therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid exercise of police power. Though the mayor can definitely impose conditions in the granting of permits, he must base such conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra vires. Lastly, the granting of the license is not a contract, it is a special privilege estoppels does not apply.

Binay vs Domingo Facts: On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 (A resolution to confirm and/or ratify the ongoing burial assistance program extending P500 to a bereaved family, funds to be taken out of unappropriated available funds existing in the municipal treasury.) Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement fired of P400,000 for the implementation of the program. However, COA disapproved Resolution 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds. COA denied the petitioners reconsideration as Resolution 60has no connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc of the inhabitant of Makati. Also, the Resolution will only benefit a few individuals. Public funds should only be used for public purposes. Issue: WON Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause

ACEBEDO OPTICAL CO. INC VS CA 329 SCRA 314 Facts: Acebedo Optical applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City. After hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but he attached various special conditions which basically made Acebedos dependent upon prescriptions to be issued by local optometrists. Acebedo is not allowed to practice optometry within the city. Acebedo however acquiesced to the said conditions and operated under the permit. Later, Acebedo was charged for violating the said conditions and was subsequently suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then assailed the validity of the attached conditions. The local optometrists argued that Acebedo is estopped in assailing the said conditions because it acquiesced to the same and that the imposition of the special conditions is a valid exercise of police power; that such conditions were entered upon by the city in its proprietary function hence the permit is actually a contract. ISSUE: Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise of police power.

Held: Yes, The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Itsfundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations).Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property

therein." And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied there from, as well ROXAS & co. vs CA 321 scra 106 FACTS: This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of the acquisition of these haciendas by the government under Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the President. T h i s C o n g r e s s p a s s e d R e p u b l i c A c t N o . 6 6 5 7 , t h e Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988.Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL., petitioner applied with the DAR for conversion of Haciendas Palico and Banilad from agricultural to non-agricultural lands under the provisions of the CARL. On July 14, 1993, petitioner sent a letter to the DAR Regional Director reiterating its request for conversion of the two haciendas. Despite petitioner's application for conversion, respondent DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the two Haciendas. The LBP trust accounts as compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced by respondent DAR with cash and LBP bonds. On October 22, 1993, from the mother title of TCT No. 985 of the Hacienda, respondent DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award(CLOA) No. 6654. On October 30, 1993, CLOA's were distributed to farmer beneficiaries. On August 6, 1992, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to the Secretary of respondent DAR withdrawing its VOS (voluntary offer to sell) of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. In a letter dated September 28, 1992, respondent DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a reclassification of the land would not exempt it from agrarian reform. Respondent Secretary also denied petitioner's withdrawal of the VOS on the ground that withdrawal could only be based on specific grounds such as unsuitability of the soil for agriculture, or if the slope of the land is over 18 degrees and that the land is undeveloped. Despite the denial of the Voluntary Offer to sell withdrawal of Hacienda Caylaway, on May 11, 1993, petitioner filed its application for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad. , through its President, Eduardo Roxas, reiterated its request to withdraw the VOS over Hacienda Caylaway in light of the following:1) Certification issued by Conrado I. Gonzales, Officer-in-Charge, Department of Agriculture, Region 4, 4th Floor, ATI (BA) Bldg., Diliman, Quezon City dated March 1, 1993 stating that the lands subject of referenced titles "are not feasible and economically sound for further agricultural development.2) Resolution No. 19 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas approving the Zoning Ordinance reclassifying areas covered by the referenced titles to non-agricultural which was enacted after extensive consultation with government agencies, including [the Department of Agrarian Reform],

and the requisite public hearings.3) Resolution No. 106 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas dated March 8, 1993 approving the Zoning Ordinance enacted by the Municipality of Nasugbu.4) Letter dated December 15, 1992 issued by Reynaldo U. Garcia of the Municipal Planning & Development, Coordinator and Deputized Zoning Administrator addressed to Mrs. Alicia P. Logarta advising that the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas has no objection to the conversion of the lands subject of referenced titles to non-agricultural. Petitioner alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas are located, had been declared a tourist zone, that the land is not suitable for agricultural production, and that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the land to non-agricultural..Petitioner urges the Court to take cognizance of the conversion proceedings and rule accordingly ISSUE: WON the courts are in a better position to resolve petitioner's application for conversion of land. HELD : NO. Respondent DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioner's application for conversion, being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter The DAR's mandate over applications for conversion was first laid down in Section 4 (j) and Section 5 (l) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987 and reiterated in the CARL and Memorandum Circular No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office of the President. The DAR's jurisdiction over applications for conversion is provided as follows: A. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to "approve or disapprove applications for conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses," pursuant to Section 4 (j) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987. B. Sec. 5 (l) of E.O. 129-A, Series of 1987, vests in the DAR, exclusive authority to approve or disapprove applications for conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial and other land uses. C. Sec. 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, likewise empowers the DAR to authorize under certain conditions, the conversion of agricultural lands. D. Sec. 4 of Memorandum Circular No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office of the President, provides that "action on applications for land use conversion on individual landholdings shall remain as the responsibility of the DAR, which shall utilize as its primary reference ,documents on the comprehensive land use plans and accompanying ordinances passed upon and approved by the local government units concerned, together with the National Land Use Policy, pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 and E.O. No. 129-A. Applications for conversion were initially go verned by DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1990 entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands and Non-Agricultural Uses," and DAR A.O. No. 2, Series of 1990 entitled "Rules o f P r o c e d u r e Governing the Processing and App roval of Applications for Land Use Conversion." These A.O.'s and other implementing guidelines, including Presidential issuances and national policies related to land use conversion h a v e b e e n consolidated in DAR A.O. No. 07, Series of 1997. Under this recent issuance, the guiding principle in land use conversion is:

to preserve prime agricultural lands for food production while, at the same time, recognizing the need of the other sectors of society(housing, industry and commerce) for land, when coinciding with the objectives of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law to promote social justice, industrialization and the optimum use of land as a national resource for public welfare. "Land Use" refers to the manner of utilization of land, including its allocation, development and management. "Land Use Conversion" refers to the act or process of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the DAR. The conversion of agricultural land to uses other than agricultural requires field investigation and conferences with the occupants of the land. They involve factual findings and highly technical matters within the special training and expertise of the DAR. DAR A.O. No. 7, Series of 1997 lays down with specificity how the DAR must go about its task. This time, the field investigation is not conducted by the MARO but by a special task force, known as the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI-DAR Central Office). The procedure is that once an application for conversion is filed, the CLUPPI prepares the Notice of Posting. The MARO only posts the notice and thereafter issues a certificate to the fact of posting. The CLUPPI conducts the field investigation and dialogues with the applicants and the farmer beneficiaries to ascertain the information necessary for the processing of the application. The Chairman of the CLUPPI deliberates on the merits of the investigation report and recommends the appropriate action. This recommendation is transmitted to the Regi onal Director, thru the Undersecretary, or Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Applications involving more than fifty hectares are approved or disapproved by the Secretary. The procedure does not end with the Secretary, however. The Order provides that the decision of the Secretary may be appealed to the Office of the President or the Court of Appeals, as the case may be, viz :Appeal from the decision of the Undersecretary shall be made to the Secretary, and from the Secretary to the Office of the President o r t h e C o u r t o f Appeals as the case may be. The mode of appeal/motion for r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , a n d t h e a p p e a l f e e , f r o m Undersecretary to the Office of the Secretary shall be the same as that of the Regional Director to the Office of the Secretary. Indeed, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Respondent DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioner's application for conversion, being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. The power to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are nonagricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not with this Court. MARTIN CENTENO, vs. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS 236 SCRA 197 Facts: The officers of a group of elderly men of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development. As a consequence, an information was filed against Centeno, for violation of PD No. 1564 or the Solicitation Permit Law. Centeno filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that PD No. 1564 only covers

solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel. Issue: Should the phrase "charitable purposes" be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose? Ruling: No and that legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly. Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor and therefore acquitted. Del Mar v. PAGCOR G. R. 138298 (August 24, 2001) FACTS: Respondents sought a clarification of the issues raised in their motion for reconsideration, namely: a. whether PAGCOR itself has a valid franchise to conduct jai-alai games, b. whether PAGCOR can operate, maintain or manage jai-alai games in association with BELLE and FILGAME HELD: The court ruled that only PAGCOR alone possesses a valid franchise to operate, maintain and/or manage jai-alai games. PAGCOR may not operate jai-alai games in association with BELLE and FILGAME.

Eminent Domain Heirs of Suguitan v City of Mandaluyong FACTS: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City issued a resolution authorizing Mayor Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the property of Suguitan. The city filed a complaint for expropriation when Suguitan refused to sell the property. The city later assumed possession of the property by virtue of a writ of possession issued by the trial court. The court later issued an order of expropriation. Petitioners argue that the local government units delegated power of eminent domain must be exercised through the issuance of an ordinance, not by mere resolution. HELD: The law may delegate the power of eminent domain to local government units that shall exercise the same through an ordinance. The local government unit failed to comply with this requirement when they exercised their power of eminent domain through a resolution. The Local Government Codes requirement of an ordinance prevails over the Implementing Rules and Regulations requiring the issuance of a resolution.

Paranaque vs VM Reality Facts: Petitioner sought to exercise its power of eminent domain based on a resolution by the municipal council. Petitioner cites a previous case wherein a resolution gave authority to exercise eminent domain. Petitioner also relies on the Implementing Rules, which provides that a resolution authorizes a Local Government Unit to exercise eminent domain. Issue: Whether or Not an LGU can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body. Held: Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former. Telebap vs Comelec Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881. Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides: Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign. Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property.

According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such. Issues: (1) Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws. (2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just compensation. Held: Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them. The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets. As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC. Taxation Philex Mining vs CIR Facts: From July 1, 1980 to December 31, 1981, Philex Mining Corp. purchased from several oil companies, refined and manufactured minerals, motor fuels, and diesel fuel oils. Specific taxes of P2,492,677.22 were paid. On October 22, 1982, the company availed of the provisions of RA 1435 granting refund of 25% of the tax paid and provided proof of the use of the oils, as required. Pending such claim for refund (P623,169.30 representing the 25%) with the CIR, the company filed another claim for refund with the same amount plus 20% interest thereon with the CTA on November 16, 1982. The CTA granted the refund but only P16,747.36 which was based on the amount deemed paid under Sections 1 & 2 of RA 1435. Philex contends the refund should be based on the actual specific taxes paid as per the increased rates provided in Sections 142 and 145 (which became Sections 153 and 156) of the NIRC. Held: CTA is incorrect. In 1977, PD 1158 codified all existing laws. Sections 142 and 145 of the Tax Code, as amended by Sections 1 and 2 of RA 1435 were re-numbered to Sections 153 and 156. Later, these sections were amended by PD 1672 and subsequently by EO 672 increasing the tax rates for

certain oil and fuel products. In effect, the reason for the refund ceased to exist. (The purpose of the tax was for Highway Special Fund which was abolished in 1985). SC affirmed therefore the decision of the CA & CTA that the basis of tax refund under RA 1435 is computed on the basis of the specific tax deemed paid under Sections 1 & 2 and not the increased rates actually paid under the 1977 NIRC, citing several cases in support thereof. Further, although Philex paid the taxes on their oil and fuel purchases based on the increased rates, the latter law did not specifically provide for a refund based on the increased rates. Since the grant of refund privileges must be strictly construed against the taxpayer, the basis for the refund remains to be the amounts deemed paid under Sections 1 and 2 of RA 1435. Also, there is no merit to petitioners assertion that equity and justice demands that the computation for tax refunds be based on actual amounts paid under Sections 153 and 156 of the NIRC, there being no tax exemption solely on the ground of equity. SC finally held: The rule is that no interest on refund of tax can be awarded unless authorized by law of the collection of the tax was attended by arbitrariness. An action is not arbitrary when exercised honestly and upon due consideration where there is room for two opinions, however much of it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion was reached. Arbitrariness presupposes inexcusable or obstinate disregard of legal provisions. None of the exceptions are presents in this case. Respondents decision was based on an honest interpretation of the law. We see no reason why there should be payment of interest. CIR vs CA 1998 Facts: Private respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts various programs and activities that are beneficial to the public, especially the young people, pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable objectives. YMCA earned an income from leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop owners and from parking fees collected from non-members. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment for deficiency income tax, deficiency expanded withholding taxes on rentals and professional fees and deficiency withholding tax on wages. YMCA protested the assessment. Issue: Whether or not the income of private respondent YMCA from rentals of small shops and parking fees is exempt from taxation Held: YMCA argues that Art. VI, Sec. 28(3) of the Constitution exempts charitable institutions from the payment not only of property taxes but also of income tax from any source. The Court is not persuaded. The debates, interpellations and expressions of opinion of the framers of the Constitution reveal their intent. Justice Hilario Davide Jr., a former constitutional commissioner, stressed during the Concom debate that what is exempted is not the institution itself; those exempted from real estate taxes are lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, an eminent authority on the Constitution and also a member of the Concom, adhered to the same view that the exemption created by said provision pertained only to property taxes. In his treatise on taxation, Justice Jose Vitug concurs, stating that the tax exemption covers property taxes only. Indeed, the income tax

exemption claimed by YMCA finds no basis in Art. VI, Sec. 28(3) of the Constitution. YMCA also invokes Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3) of the Constitution claiming that YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution whose revenues and assets are used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes on its properties and income. The Court reiterates that YMCA is exempt from the payment of property tax, but not income tax on the rentals from its property. The bare allegation alone that it is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution is insufficient to justify its exemption from the payment of income tax. Laws allowing tax exemption are construed strictissimi juris. Hence, for the YMCA to be granted the exemption it claims under the aforecited provision, it must prove with substantial evidence that: 1. it falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and 2. the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes. However, the Court notes that not a scintilla of evidence was submitted by YMCA to prove that it met the said requisites. YMCA is not an educational institution within the purview of Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3) of the Constitution. The term educational institution, when used in laws granting tax exemptions, refers to a school, seminary, college or educational establishment. Therefore, YMCA cannot be deemed one of the educational institutions covered by the said constitutional provision. Moreover, the Court notes that YMCA did not submit proof of the proportionate amount of the subject income that was actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.

CHAVEZ vs PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT Facts:-Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a former government official) initiated this original action seeking(1) to prohibit and enjoin respondents *PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad including the so-called Marcos gold hoard"; and(2) to compel respondent*s+ to make public all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."-Chavez is the same person initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's economy; he says that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.-PETITIONER DEMANDS that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that they do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim,

though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.-PETITIONER INVOKES Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest -RESPONDENT ANSWERS that the above constitutional provisions refer to completed and operative official acts, not to those still being considered. Issue: Whether or not the Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses. Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and all government functionaries and officials who are or may be directly ot indirectly involved in the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlement, as well as the final agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions embodied in this Decision. No pronouncement as to cost. RD:The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject provisions of the Constitution have as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged. However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions:(1) national security matters and intelligence information- there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters. 24 But where there is no need to protect such state secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to with hold documents and other information, 25 provided that they are examined "in strict confidence" and given "scrupulous protection."(2) trade secrets and banking transactions-trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code 27 and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 28)are also exempted from compulsory disclosure(3) criminal matters- Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals, which courts neither may nor inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law enforcement would be seriously jeopardized by free public access to, for example, police information regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on covert criminal activities.(4) other confidential information. The Ethical Standards Act 31 further prohibits public officials and employees from using or divulging "confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made

available to the public." Other acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court. -In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., the Court emphasized that the information sought must be" matters of public concern," access to which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy of full public disclosure extends only to "transactions involving public interest" and may also be" subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."- As to the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern," the Court, in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, elucidated: In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.-As to whether or not the above cited constitutional provisions guarantee access to information regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the final agreement, this same clarification was sought and clearly addressed by the constitutional commissioners during their deliberations, MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself? MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here, I suppose, is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction? MR. OPLE. Yes, subject to reasonable safeguards on the national interest. - Considering the intent of the Constitution, the Court believes that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed above such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.

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