Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Contents:
Foreword Executive Summary Overall Aim and Key Themes Approach and Methodology Contextual Information Overall Impressions Key Areas for Improvement ACPO/S and NPIA Guidance for Policing at Airports Crime Investigation Counter Terrorism Firearms Incident Management/Operational and Contingency Planning Support to Central Search Licensing Public Order Roads Policing Training and Development Performance Management Neighbourhood Policing Uniform Patrol Value for Money The Development, Agreement and Implementation of the Airport Security Plan and Police Services Agreement The Airport City Enterprise Zone Appendix Contributors to the Review 1 3 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 15 17 19 21 22 23 24 26 26 27 28 29 30 32
Foreword
We recognise that making sure all users of the airport are protected and secure has always been of paramount importance.
I have great pleasure in presenting this report which details the work of the Greater Manchester Police Authority examination of policing at Manchester Airport.
Ahead of the 2012 Olympic Games, my authority colleagues and I were keen to carry out a thorough review of this sphere of policing, appreciating its crucial role in ensuring the safety and security of the public. We recognise that making sure all users of the airport are protected and secure has always been of paramount importance. Our scrutiny work clearly shows there is a great deal of good work being undertaken by the Manchester Airport Section and we were very impressed with the knowledge, professionalism and pride exhibited by the officers and staff we spoke to. Notably, the many plans and procedures in place for dealing with the wide variety of incidents and situations that arise within the airport setting are well crafted, frequently tested and subsequently improved. Effective partnership working with Manchester Airport plc and the many other agencies which operate from the site is vital and staff acknowledged this throughout our study. Nevertheless, the review did identify a number of areas for improvement which, if addressed we anticipate will further enhance the work of the Manchester Airport Section. We will be monitoring the progress of the force in addressing these recommendations to ensure that Greater Manchester Police is continuing to provide a high quality service to all those working at and visiting Manchester Airport. This work will form a part of the positive legacy that Greater Manchester Police Authority will pass on to the incoming Police and Crime Commissioner. Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank all those who took part in the review whose input and involvement was of great value and essential to the success of our study.
Christine McGawley JP
Chair of the Commission Vice Chair of Greater Manchester Police Authority
Executive Summary
Policing at Manchester Airport
Greater Manchester Police Authoritys review of policing at Manchester Airport was conducted between September 2011 and April 2012. Commission members worked in teams to gather pertinent information to demonstrate the effectiveness of GMP in policing the airport and identify areas for improvement.
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Policing the border generally undertaken by Counter Terrorism Unit officers and UKBA. Protective security undertaken by uniformed police officers, detective officers and police staff, in partnership with the airport operators own staff and contractors. General policing usually delivered by uniformed officers, detective officers and police staff who are not attached to the Counter Terrorism Unit.
The Airport Security Planning Framework means that all UK airports should agree a local Airport Security Plan (ASP) with their key stakeholders and ensure that, where a need is identified, the airport operator meets the cost of dedicated policing services.
The extent to which the policing of Manchester Airport complies with the standards enshrined within the Guidance on Policing at Airports (Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS) and the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA), February 2011). The guidance sets a common standard for policing at airports across the UK. It specifies areas covering a number of key themes, namely:
crime investigation counter terrorism firearms incident management support to central search licensing operational and contingency planning
public order roads policing training and development performance management neighbourhood policing uniform patrol
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Where available information allowed, examine issues relevant to value for money in relation to the policing of airports. Progress in the development, agreement and implementation of the Airport Security Plan (ASP) and Police Services Agreement (PSA). The impact on policing of the planned Airport City Enterprise Zone.
Command
PSA Team
(MANPADS - ACPO TAM funded)
REDUCTION IN CRIME
Overall Impressions
The Police Authority was impressed with the level of professionalism and knowledge demonstrated by the officers we spoke to. Key policies, procedures and plans are regularly tested, reviewed and further developed when necessary. Although the emphasis on policing is focused on prevention, the Manchester Airport Section is clearly prepared to deal with incidents of a type already experienced or anticipated and is also geared up to tackle situations of a more spontaneous and unusual nature. Manchester Airport Section is well organised and the impression gained by the Police Authority was that of a well-oiled machine, with officers and staff having a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities. Airport officers were able to provide a good deal of evidence and reassurance that the Section is managed effectively and has a well defined set of priorities. The Police Authority was impressed with the degree of openness demonstrated by the officers and staff we spoke to. The unique nature of policing arrangements at the Airport means the Section has a good deal of autonomy and the Police Authority felt that, in many ways, the ethos within the Section epitomises GMP Force Commands vision of doing the right thing. Officers and staff take a huge amount of pride in their work, acknowledging that the way the Airport Section is run means they have the time to do a good job. Conversely, the distinctive and different characteristics of airport policing means that it could potentially be difficult for officers and staff to pick up normal basic command unit policing without receiving relevant refresher training. The importance of effective partnership working between Manchester Airport Section, the airport operator and other agencies was emphasised. As well as ensuring that the airport environment is safe and secure for all, good relationships with partners mean that key pieces of equipment can be borrowed and utilised (e.g. the car parks have a machine that can lift and move vehicles). Having agencies such as the fire and rescue service on site is essential when particular types of incidents take place.
Manchester Airport Section is well organised and the impression gained by the Police Authority was that of a well-oiled machine, with officers and staff having a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities.
The officers we spoke to expressed the view that Manchester Airport Section is not always seen as a basic command unit, despite the fact that it is essentially run as a mini basic command unit. This means the Airport is sometimes not the top priority in relation to force-wide training and other roll outs and this can be problematic (e.g. there is no access to the Police National Database at the Airport a situation which the Police Authority would maintain is addressed as a matter of urgency). The widely varied nature of the police work at the Airport can mean that the Section could be seen as a something of a jack of all trades. That being said, officers and staff do recognise that this is in many ways necessary due to Manchester Airport Sections unique set up and the commercial relationship with the airport operator. Some of the unique requirements of policing at the Airport can make fitting in with other GMP processes difficult. For example, Manchester Airport Section highlighted issues with estates and planning in relation to the bureaucracy and time involved. Each year, negotiations between the Section and the airport operator regarding the Police Services Agreement are sensitive and can be protracted, taking up a considerable amount of staff time. The review team would suggest that, where appropriate, additional support be sought from relevant headquarters branches (e.g. Specialist Operations Branch Finance Manager). Where possible, the budget for officer and staff training should be protected, particularly in order that essential, mandatory training can be delivered in a timely way. Although the Airport Section has a positive and mature two-way relationship with regard to the exchange of intelligence with the North West Counter Terrorism Unit, officers expressed the view that basic command units and branches within GMP do not always make best use of the Section in terms of the circulation of intelligence about wanted criminals and other matters, stating that this can sometimes be better from external police forces. Though the establishment of a Hotel Watch Scheme has assisted in this area, officers feel that the relationship they have with the airport hotels might be further enhanced in terms of the flow of relevant intelligence. Some individuals involved in serious and organised crime will travel abroad and likely use the airport for this purpose. Officers highlighted that the circulation of intelligence relating to organised crime groups and wanted criminals could be improved. Relationships locally with the UK Borders Agency are positive, however, officers believe that intelligence sharing from national UKBA sources could be improved.
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Areas covered:
Crime Investigation Counter Terrorism Firearms Incident Management / Operational and Contingency Planning Support to Central Search Licensing Public Order Roads Policing Training and Development Performance Management Neighbourhood Policing Uniform Patrol
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The force has defined the geographical area of policing that airport police units are responsible for.
understand the diverse resources and range of capabilities police officers can bring to policing an airport.
This section of the scrutiny report provides brief details of the focus of each theme covered within the guidance and an assessment of how well Manchester Airport Section is meeting the standards within each theme.
Evidence
Manchester Airport Section presented and discussed a plan of the geographical area that the Airport Police Unit is responsible for policing. The boundaries on the map are those included in the Airport Security Plan Terms of Reference. An explanation was provided in relation to the background, purpose and meaning of each boundary. The plan shows the following:
Crime Investigation
The ACPO/S and NPIA guidance highlights the importance of crime at airports being investigated to the same standards as crime occurring in any other setting. It also outlines a number of key issues that should be considered when crime investigation is being undertaken.
GMP Airport geographical basic command unit boundary (blue line); Area patrolled by GMP including parts of Cheshire, under agreement with Cheshire Constabulary (green line); and, Boundary of Manchester Airport defined by the Civil Aviation Authority (red line).
Clearly defining geographical boundaries to delineate areas of policing responsibility allocated to the airport policing unit and the neighbouring basic command units. Liaising with the airports Risk Advisory Group (RAG) regarding any security vulnerabilities. Working closely with commercial organisations and the airport operator to deal with theft effectively. Making efforts to carry out investigations quickly, taking into consideration the commercial impact of delaying flights and contact with witnesses. Developing protocols with airlines and the airport operator regarding the employment of covert policing techniques. Sharing crime data with airport security personnel.
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Evidence
The force has clear procedures in place that govern the investigation of key crime types, including crimes committed in flight and the theft of cargo and freight. At the time of the scrutiny review, the recently appointed Manchester Airport Section Commander was looking to increase the Sections focus on organised crime groups including those involved with drugs, sexual exploitation and human trafficking. An area for improvement identified was the circulation of intelligence relating to organised crime groups and wanted criminals. Manchester Airport Section officers made the point that some individuals involved in serious and organised crime will travel abroad and likely use the airport for this purpose. They felt that opportunities to apprehend these individuals could be enhanced if the flow of intelligence was improved.
Counter Terrorism
Counter terrorism policing at airports encompasses two linked but distinct areas firstly, protecting the UK as a whole by identifying people involved in terrorism entering the UK and secondly, protecting people who use the airport from terrorist acts, in line with the governments CONTEST strategy. Although Special Branch officers have primary responsibility for the first aspect, airport police units perform a crucial role in relation to the second.
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The force can evidence that airport officers contribute to wider counter-terrorism policing activity through the tasking and coordination process The force supports and contributes towards the Airport Security Plan by active participation in the Risk Advisory Group (RAG) and the Security Executive Group (SEG) Airport police forces share intelligence as far as possible with security cleared members of the Risk Advisory Group (RAG) and the Security Executive Group (SEG) The force considers putting in place an intelligence sharing protocol with other agencies to facilitate flows of information at airports The force can evidence support for and alignment to ports specific National ACPO (Terrorism and Allied Matters) Strategies, e.g. the Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) Strategy Airport officers feel that although relationships locally with the UK Borders Agency are positive, intelligence sharing from national UKBA sources might be improved. Officers also believe that the relationship they have with the airport hotels could be better in terms of the flow of relevant intelligence. A Hotel Watch scheme is in place and steps are being taken to improve attendance by hotel representatives. It is anticipated that this should help to enhance the gathering and flow of intelligence. Manchester Airport Section was omitted when the Police National Database was rolled out around the force. This system is vital in terms of officers being able to access and contribute intelligence of local, regional and/or national relevance. The Police Authority believes this situation should be addressed as a matter of urgency. The force has a strategy relating to counter terrorism which supports and is aligned to relevant ports specific ACPO (Terrorism and Allied Matters) strategies. The strategy is informed by the outcomes from local engagement and consultation and includes plans to divert flights if required. Officers at the Airport reported that the Section is regularly reviewed by ACPO (Terrorism and Allied Matters) and feedback would indicate that the force is performing well in this regard.
Evidence It is clear from discussions with Manchester Airport Section officers that counter terrorism is a priority for the Section. The Airport is an iconic site and therefore a potential target for terrorists. Officers are provided with training around how to identify suspicious situations. This encompasses the things to look for and what action to take. Tasking and coordination meetings take place regularly and there is a good two way flow of intelligence between Manchester Airport Section and the North West Counter Terrorist Unit.
The Executive Director of the Police Authority is an active member of the Security Executive Group (SEG) and has found ample evidence of GMPs influence and contribution with regard to the Airport Security Plan.
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Firearms
The role of the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment (STRA) and having a transparent audit trail in relation to the need for firearms officers at an airport is accentuated within the guidance document. The need should be identified by the Risk Advisory Group, included in the Airport Security Plan, and the actual deployment of armed officers should be based on clear evidence. In addition, the guidance highlights the importance of police forces having appropriate protocols in place with UKBA, airport operators and airlines with regard to securing firearms entering the UK. It also points out that firearms tactics may need to be adjusted and practiced to ensure they are appropriate for use in an airport setting.
Evidence
Each year a comprehensive training needs analysis is conducted and, as a part of this process, the training that is essential for airport policing is identified and prioritised. At the top of this priority list is training in relation to counter terrorism. The officers we spoke to emphasised that counter terrorism is probably the key focus of the policing at the Airport. At the time the review took place, the most recent training on counter terrorism issues had taken place in December 2010 and January 2011. In addition to this, all officers and staff receive regular inputs from GMP Counter Terrorism Branch staff who are based at the Airport. There is a dedicated member of staff responsible for developing a menu of tactical options to use to deal with terrorism. Officers emphasised that the Airport Section does not wait for an incident to happen in order to bring relevant tactical options into play, rather that different tactics are tested and practiced during the year. Operation Cyclamen is Manchester Airport Sections plan to deal with detections of radiation. Staff are trained in the specifics of Cyclamen in order that they are fully versed in the action to take if radiation is discovered. In the unlikely event that radiation escapes from the Airport, neighbouring basic command units would be informed as a matter of urgency and would activate their own plans. The officers we spoke to stressed the advantages of having other emergency services such as fire and rescue on site and highlighted that partnership working is key to dealing with the many different types of incidents that occur at the Airport.
Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment (STRA) reflects the reasons for deploying armed officers at the airport In conjunction with the UK Borders Agency, the force has a procedure in place for managing firearms entering the UK The force has an evidence-based procedure in place for the deployment of routinely armed officers
Evidence
The Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment (STRA) is carried out annually and is reviewed at each Risk Advisory Group meeting. The Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment links mitigating action to risk, specifying how many armed officers should be deployed for each consideration. Armed officers are deployed under a standing firearms authority which provides authorisation for officers to routinely carry firearms at Manchester Airport. The Section has a comprehensive standard operating procedures manual for authorised firearms officers working at the Airport. This details a wide range of relevant topics such as working with other operational teams, training, the standing authority, tasking and dealing with prisoners. It was confirmed that through running their own accredited training at the Airport on behalf of GMP, the Sections firearms capability was now at full strength including senior officers.
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In common with the rest of the force, Manchester Airport Section has standard operating procedures which govern the issue of CS Spray, Tasers and baton guns. During the review, the officers we spoke to could not recall a recent incident where any of the less lethal options had been deployed, save one instance where a Taser had been drawn but not fired (n.b. unholstering a Taser is classed as a deployment). Since that time, however, there was a successful actual Taser deployment in June 2012.
Evidence The officer in charge of firearms policing explained that, materially, there are no specific differences in tactics with regard to firearms policing at the Airport. The role profile for authorised firearms officers (AFOs) is the same at the Airport as it is for authorised firearms officers working elsewhere in the force and, for the most part, officers receive the same training (n.b. authorised firearms officers at the Airport receive specific training in Operation Release, the Airports hijack plan). The key difference relates to the environment in which firearms policing takes place.
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Evidence
All of the relevant plans and policies are kept in a secure cabinet within the silver control room at the Manchester Airport Section. This is so that they are at the fingertips of any silver commander directing the operational elements of a response to a critical incident or full emergency. Electronic copies are stored on a shared drive. These plans cover all manner of critical incidents and emergencies including hijack, aircraft incidents (e.g. if an aircraft is experiencing problems in landing, fuel spillage), large scale flight disruption (e.g. due to poor weather) plus evacuation of terminals and other parts of the airport complex (e.g. the cargo centre, the police station). These plans are informed by the Airport Emergency Orders and are reviewed annually as well as after each occasion they are used. Each plan has a control sheet attached to it which is used to record relevant information about how the plan has worked and/or might be amended to improve it. Much of the training provided to officers and staff working at the Airport is linked to dealing with critical incidents and emergencies. A general awareness is provided along with detailed information about the criteria to apply when providing an appropriate
A key issue highlighted to the Police Authority is that each incident can be very different so it is important to stay ahead of the game.
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A positive outcome from effective joint working has been the modification of plans to take account of commercial issues. For example, re-entry to buildings and areas after an incident now requires a police and airport representative to jointly manage a controlled return, ensuring security and taking appropriate measures such making sure shop staff are in place before the public are allowed through the cordon. Manchester Airport Section comprehends fully that the airport is a time critical environment where any unnecessary delay costs money. This is recognised by all officers who provide a level of service rarely found in everyday policing. Where incidents occur in flight, procedures have been developed with the airlines to ensure that witness information can be obtained swiftly from crew members without causing the aircraft to be delayed. A good example of the level of service is an incident which occurred in May 2010 when protestors breached the airport perimeter and locked themselves onto an aircraft. They subsequently blocked access to the World Freight Centre. Although it took almost two hours to release the protestors from the aircraft and arrest them, airfield operations were suspended for just 44 minutes. During this time, mindful of media coverage and commercial interest, strategically placed vehicles prevented the protestors from being filmed and photographed. The Manchester Airport Sections Planning and Policy Manager, together with Forward Planning officers, works very closely with the Airport Emergency Planning Manager and provides valuable practical assistance in the preparation of airport emergency plans. Such plans always give prominent consideration to the airports commercial priorities.
The force takes account of commercial issues in delivering effective incident management with partners
Evidence
The Airport follows the Forces Gold, Silver and Bronze Command and Control model and has its own Communications and Major Incident Control room. Partner organisations are familiar with the Major Incident Control room and some store their own dedicated equipment within the room. Manchester Airports Crisis Management Centre is adjacent to the Major Incident Control room and during any ongoing incident, the Silver Commander and senior Airport representative liaise closely and have joint debriefs after the incident has concluded.
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Evidence
The force has a strategy relating to incident management which supports and is aligned to relevant ports specific ACPO (Terrorism and Allied Matters) strategies. This includes such issues as how to deal with suspicious packages and the circumstances that would necessitate the closure of one or more of the airport terminals. Again, the strategy is informed by the outcomes from local engagement and consultation.
The force liaises with the e-Borders programme and has processes in place for dealing with alerts issued by the National Borders Targeting Centre
Evidence
The e-Borders Inspectors Guidance document details the procedures to be followed when an alert is issued by the National Borders Targeting Centre. An additional guidance document for Communications Officers provides a summary of actions to be taken by these staff in order to comply with the Inspectors Guidance Document. The Communications Manager maintains records of all e-Borders alerts, providing monthly reports to Command. It should be noted that e-Borders work is specifically excluded, by legislation, in determining cost recovery for policing services from Manchester Airport. The National Borders Targeting Centre issues alerts on a daily basis. Officers expressed the view that the volume of alerts received is difficult to manage and explained that the Airport Section is starting to use a risk-based approach to filter and prioritise the alerts they action. The priority alerts for action are those with a clear link to protecting the public. The officers we spoke to felt that although the e-Borders programme is working, it could easily become overloaded. Compliance with the requirements of the National Borders Targeting Centre by airlines is voluntary. The officers we spoke to indicated that although some airlines are very good, there are others that only
Does the force have procedures in place to manage the following contingencies in central search?
Terrorist weapons found Material suggesting a person is involved in terrorism found Firearms found Offensive weapons found Prohibited articles found Stolen goods found Drugs found Large amounts of currency found Disruptive passenger in central search Assault on members of central search Public order offences in central search
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Disruptive passenger in central search Assault on members of central search Public order offences in central search
Depending on the nature of an individuals behaviour, a disruptive passenger may be advised by officers to prevent escalation of the incident. If police were called to deal with a disruptive passenger about to board an aircraft, or having done so, it would be the airline staff who would determine under the conditions of carriage if the passenger would be permitted to fly. Police would only be present to prevent a breach of the peace from occurring. Assaults and public order offences would be dealt with in the same way in central search as they would in any other location.
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Licensing
The checklist outlined within the guidance under this heading links to the role of alcohol in incidents with disruptive travellers. It highlights that police forces should give thought to working closely with airport concessions supplying alcohol and the airport operator to inform passengers of the physical and other consequences of drinking too much and then travelling by plane. The force has agreed a multi-agency procedure to identify and deal with people who are drunk before they board an aircraft Premises which consistently supply alcohol to people who go on to be disruptive passengers are identified and appropriate action taken The force should consider having an alcohol and flying awareness strategy in place There are a number of effective mechanisms in place to deal with the supply of alcohol at the airport. These include:
Bar Watch
The Bar Watch scheme has been established to ensure that premises selling alcohol to persons who go on to be disruptive passengers are identified and appropriate action taken. The scheme runs alongside the Problem Flight Initiative during the summer months to provide a visible presence and support bar staff in identifying persons who are drunk and causing anti-social behaviour, and to warn individuals about the offences relating to boarding an aircraft whilst drunk. An electronic briefing site is in place which tasks officers to visit relevant airside bars and update the records with their findings. When carrying out patrols at recognised vulnerable points, all officers include the outlets that sell and/or serve alcohol, ensuring they provide a highly visible presence to deter any anti-social behaviour and give reassurance to employees and others using the facilities. Officers are asked to make themselves aware of the yellow card scheme and put it to use appropriately.
Evidence
Our scrutiny work determined that there are no specific licensed premises that have been identified as being consistently linked to alcohol sales and disruptive passengers. In the main, drunkenness problems appear to arise from individuals who consume their own duty free alcohol in the bar areas. People found consuming their own alcohol are reminded of the fact that they will not be permitted to board an aircraft if drunk.
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IT IS AN OFFENCE TO ENTER AN AIRCRAFT WHILST UNFIT THROUGH DRINK OR DRUGS OR TO BE DRUNK WHILST ON AN AIRCRAFT
YOU MAY BE DENIED ACCESS TO THE AIRCRAFT BY POLICE CREW OR SECURITY YOU MAY BE REMOVED FROM THE AIRPORT YOUR FLIGHT TICKETS CAN BE CANCELLED WITHOUT COMPENSATION
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Incident Record XXXX refers to a drunken male issued with a yellow card who was being loud at Terminal 1 Check In. The flight was delayed but the male had sobered up after his warning and was allowed to travel. Incident Record XXXX refers to a group of 20 males in Terminal 1 Check In area, one of whom was being generally disruptive. The male was immediately pulled from the queue and spoken to by officers. The individual was identified and checked on the Police National Computer using his passport as identification verification. Crew were advised to ensure that the party was split up to reduce the likelihood of any further incident. Bars airside in Terminal 1 were visited, advised about the group and agreed to limit the sale of alcohol. The male in question was issued with a yellow card and intelligence submitted.
Public Order
Public order incidents affecting airports can be varied in nature, develop rapidly and may elicit more attention from the media and the public than incidents in other locations. Incidents can range from groups of angry passengers in overcrowded terminals, planned protests where negotiation has taken place between the police and the protestors, to spontaneous incursions onto the airfield.
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Evidence
Operation Elba is Manchester Airport Sections response to pre-planned, notified public order events (e.g. planned protests) and has been used quite extensively. Recent protest activity has focused around the planned expansion of the airport and there has also been a climate camp. The operation has involved positive and successful negotiations with representatives from protest groups about suitable areas in which to stage their protest. In terms of the response to spontaneous events (e.g. incursions onto the airfield; protestors chaining themselves to the wheels of aircraft), officers have access to a menu of tactical options via the shared drive and can also call upon specialist advice from tactical (TAC) advisors. A number of officers at the Airport are trained in bronze and silver command roles and the silver control room is set up ready for use at any time.
Roads Policing
The guidance outlines two key differences with regard to roads policing at airports. Firstly, driving within an airside environment requires specialist instruction. Although most airside collisions will likely be investigated by the airport operators airfield operations unit, the requirements of both road traffic law and relevant airport bylaws may necessitate investigation by the police.
The force has sufficient police officers and staff trained in airside driving
Evidence
Manchester Airport are keen to limit the issue of Airside Driving Permits to those police officers who actually drive on the critical part on a regular basis. (n.b. The critical part is the part of an airport, other than the manoeuvring area (as defined by the International Civil Aviation Organisation) intended to accommodate the loading and unloading of passengers and cargo, the refueling, servicing, maintenance and parking of aircraft, and any movement of aircraft, vehicles and pedestrians necessary for such purposes). To acquire a permit there is a requirement to spend a month in company with an experienced driver after first passing a specific airside driving test. The critical part is constantly changing and Airside Directives and Airfield Safety Bulletins inform users of such changes. In the rare event that there are insufficient qualified airside drivers available from the force, airfield operations can provide escorts.
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The force has procedures in place to investigate airside collisions or to support partner agencies in doing so
Evidence
Manchester Airport Section submitted the Aerodrome Manual 2011 as evidence of the procedures in place for dealing with airside collisions. Manchester Airport Airfield Operations investigate airside collisions in the main. GMP provides assistance as and when the incident constitutes an offence under criminal law and is not being investigated by Airfield Operations or the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Such incidents could include crashed aircraft with loss of life or serious injury. Minor or routine occurrences are not dealt with by GMP as there is no police jurisdiction to deal with matters that are the responsibility of the airport operator under health and safety at work regulations. Airports are excluded from decriminalised parking enforcement and any change to this would need a change in legislation as well as the Chief Constables consent.
Evidence
An annual training needs analysis is undertaken in January to inform the training programme for the coming financial year. Some elements of the analysis are givens (e.g. counter terrorism, firearms, training linked to different types of incidents and emergencies, search techniques) whereas others are more specific to particular staff needs and linked to individual achievement records. The outcomes from the training needs analysis are examined, mandatory elements prioritised, and an annual plan put together. This is then translated into a series of five week plans. The annual plan is necessarily flexible in order to accommodate force level training requirements and unplanned events. Staff attendance at training is closely monitored and a comprehensive record is maintained for each staff member. This helps to inform the Airport Section when refresher training is required and fill any gaps in terms of training that officers need to undergo. The plan for 2012-13 features aspects of policing the Olympic Games that will impact on the Airport. It is clear that the resources available for training will be limited and prioritisation of essential training will be even more important than before. The Police Authority was
The force works closely with the operator to ensure effective traffic management at the airport
Evidence
The main car parks on the airport site are covered by Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) technology and the Section employs a number of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) with a specific traffic remit. Officers from the Manchester Airport Section attend daily car park meetings at which issues relating to traffic flow, congestion and security are discussed, actual and potential risks identified and mitigating actions planned. Amongst the issues recently identified were problems with poor signage around the Airport complex and a key issue concerning double yellow lines. Manchester Airport Section staff are working with the airport operator to address these issues.
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Supervisors and key post holders new to airport policing attend the UK Airport Commanders Group (UKACG) training workshop Senior officers and staff attend the UK Airport Commanders Group (UKACG) conference
Evidence
At the time of the scrutiny review, the most recent UK Airport Commanders Group training workshop had taken place between 5th and 7th April 2011. Attendees from GMP Manchester Airport Section were the Airport Commander, Deputy Airport Commander, the Police Services Agreement Team Manager and Police Services Agreement Coordinator.
The UK Airport Commanders Group conference took place on 28th September 2011. Attendees from GMP Manchester Airport Section were the Airport Commander, Deputy Airport Commander, the Police Services Agreement Team Manager and Police Services Agreement Coordinator. The conference covered a variety of pertinent topics including attack methodologies, an update on the aviation security review, threat assessment and response plus a guide to relevant content within the Police OnLine Knowledge Area (POLKA). It is clear from the information provided about the specific individuals who attended the above events that there have been significant changes in leadership at the Airport. A new Section Commander took up post recently and in addition, a new head of Specialist Operations, the Branch to which the Manchester Airport Section belongs, started on 1st March 2012.
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Neighbourhood Policing
Evidence
Manchester Airport Section generates a monthly pack which covers key areas of performance including recorded crime, detections, attendance at grade 1 and grade 2 incidents, sickness and other human resources indicators. The pack has been further developed in recent months to ensure that the information meets the needs of both the airport operator and the Section. The chief inspector meets with each inspector every five weeks to discuss performance. The Airport Commander meets with the airport operator once a month to review performance. Our review indicated that to help improve performance a cultural change had been needed in terms of the way that performance was monitored by the Manchester Airport Section. There has been a move towards an honest conversation with staff, building in action planning to improve performance and develop staff capability. The efforts of officers and staff who consistently do the job well are recognised by allowing them to represent GMP, for example, on visits to benchmark Manchester Airport Section against other airport sections such as Gatwick. Good-performing officers also get the opportunity to act up to the next rank on a rotational basis. Sickness action plans have also been introduced. These changes have resulted in a number of officers being set action plans to improve their performance. The outcomes from the most recent Airport Section priority setting process identified that work was There is a clear emphasis within the guidance on the fact that the principles of neighbourhood policing are just as pertinent and applicable in an airport setting as they are elsewhere. That being said, however, there is a recognition that airport operators will need to be convinced of the value added by neighbourhood policing and that the model adopted will link to the size of the airport. Forces should ensure that neighbourhood policing staff are conversant with the Airport Security Plan and the Police Services Agreement and can deliver protective security while engaged in neighbourhood duties.
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Evidence Evidence
Neighbourhood policing is very much seen as business as usual at the Airport. Key individual networks (KINs) have been developed and the information and views they provide are used to inform priorities. The airport operator is a key influence with regard to the neighbourhood policing effort and a driver behind the need for the Airport Section to provide services of the highest quality to its customers. Officers reported that, although the Section aims to have unarmed officers available, as there are only a certain number on each team at the Airport, it is unavoidable that authorised firearms officers attend regular incidents. If time permits officers should disarm or store their weapons so as to attend the incident unarmed. In some instances, however, this is not possible and officers follow a standard operating procedure which governs how they should carry their weapon. In some airports, all officers are armed and this lack of unarmed capacity has been criticised. There are risk-based and locally appropriate integrated patrol regimes for: Landside roads Airport rail and bus stations Airport car parks Terminal landside areas Cargo areas Fuel farms Security restricted area and critical part Airport perimeter fence
Evidence
The officers and staff we spoke to emphasised that patrol regimes are very much risk-based, focusing on the locations and times that are assessed to be the most vulnerable (e.g. car parks, cargo areas).
Uniform Patrol
A unique feature of airport policing is the predominance of armed officers. The guidance stresses the importance of establishing appropriate procedures and policy with regard to the attendance of such officers at incidents which do not require an armed presence. Also highlighted is the need for patrol regimes and the workforce mix to consider the outcomes of risk assessments carried out by the Risk Advisory Group and Security Executive Group to support the Airport Security Plan plus the roles performed by the airport operators own security personnel.
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Evidence
Manchester Airport Section submitted copies of financial information included the 2011-12 Police Services Agreement budget forecast and year to date spend, answering questions in relation to the individual budget heads. It was explained that information regarding costs under Police Services Agreements at other airports is not freely available and is subject to commercial confidentiality clauses within the Police Services Agreement contracts between the relative airport operators and the respective police authorities. Queries were raised in relation to Airwave, Automatic Number Plate Recognition maintenance and the Corporate Department recharge. The Corporate Department Recharge amount is based on a percentage of the total workforce costs.
Purchase of a minibus (annual hire charges were higher than the purchase price)
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The Development, Agreement and Implementation of the Airport Security Plan and Police Services Agreement
As mentioned earlier, all UK airports should agree a local Airport Security Plan (ASP) with their key stakeholders and make sure that, where a need for dedicated policing services is identified, the airport operator meets the cost of those services.
Our review examined progress in the development, agreement and implementation of the Airport Security Plan (ASP) and Police Services Agreement (PSA) in relation to Manchester Airport.
The Police Services Agreement is the last element of the security planning process for airports where it has been agreed that some security measures in the Airport Security Plan should be carried out by a dedicated police presence. The Police Services Agreement should: Identify the level of policing required; Define the amount of any payments to be made by the airport operator for that policing, or the manner in which the amount is to be assessed; Identify the accommodation and facilities that are to be provided by the airport operator to allow the policing service to be delivered.
Evidence
The Airport Section gave an update on the Airport Security Plan (ASP) and Police Services Agreement (PSA). Following some considerable negotiation, the Police Services Agreement for 2011-12 had been signed by the airport operator. Following a substantial review, the proposals for the Agreement for the year commencing 1st April 2012 had been submitted to Manchester Airport plc and a comprehensive presentation explaining the rationale for resourcing and funding different policing functions provided. The response received from the airport operator would indicate they believe there is still scope for negotiation in relation to the 2012-13 proposals. The scrutiny review team established that GMP has worked hard to ensure that the process adheres closely to that outlined within the Airport Security Planning Guidance (i.e. develop a risk register; determine mitigating measures; pull together the Airport Security Plan and police services required to meet that plan; negotiate the Police Services Agreement based on the service requirements).
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Evidence
This development is a private sector led project, jointly owned by Manchester Airport Group, Manchester City Council and the developers, Goodman. The development of Airport City within 12 months has been announced. As an Enterprise Zone, much of the site will be subject to simplified planning applications using Local Development Order Powers, resulting in quicker planning to building development and completion.
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Appendix
Contributors to Review
Greater Manchester Police
Superintendent Phil Davies Superintendent Robert Lomas Chief Inspector Mike Miskell Detective Chief Inspector Gill Mellor Inspector Jon Percival Inspector Paul Nield Inspector Angela Bradley Sergeant Janet Metcalfe Sergeant Debra Rasmussen Sergeant Dave Pawsey Acting Sergeant Peter Naden Detective Sergeant Ian Greenhalgh Constable Phil Gleave Constable John Harte Detective Constable Andy McNab
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