Alternatives 32 (2007), 939

Culture and Cash: How Two New Mexico Pueblos Combined Culture and Development
Sandra Lee Pinel*

From 1980 to the present, most American Indian tribes exercising the Indian Self-Determination Act of 1975 have invested federal and other funds to develop their governing institutions and economies on the assumption that traditional systems of governance are obstacles to business investment and, therefore, to development. Contrary to this pattern, the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico retained theocratic and nonelected forms of governance recognized by Spanish rulers and remained in their ancestral domain. This article considers lessons learned by the Zia Pueblo and Pueblo de Cochiti from 1980 to 2005 in their efforts to make new development support, rather than compete with, customar y values and institutions. It argues that these Pueblo Indian tribes demonstrate the importance of traditional governance institutions and tribal members who can strategically engage both indigenous knowledge and outside expertise to plan development that supports cultural integrity. KEYWORDS: development, indigenous knowledge, Pueblo Indians, indigenous governance.

For indigenous peoples, development can be an uneasy marriage of capitalism and culture. American Indians are indigenous peoples of the mainland United States.1 During the past thirty years, the United States government reversed policies of extinction, termination, and assimilation to affirm the status of American Indian tribes as domestic dependent nations with internal authority to govern their people and manage their resources and land.2 A survey of tribal economic-development initiatives found that successful tribes

*Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of WisconsinMadison, Madison, WI 53706

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were those that used sovereignty to apply cultural standards to choose among development strategies, but there are few descriptions of how indigenous peoples use their political institutions to create and sustain culturally appropriate development strategies. 3 Based on participatory research, this article describes how two small Indian Pueblo tribes in New Mexico worked through traditional and modern institutions to make and sustain development decisions between 1980 and 2005. One Pueblo Indian tribe, Pueblo de Cochiti, overcame the impact of coerced development, while the other, Zia Pueblo, comprehensively planned development to forge development strategies that would protect cultural integrity. After describing the methodology and cases, the article concludes with implications for planning and development theory and its application by indigenous communities, challenging the persistent theoretical binaries between tradition and development and between comprehensive/rational and communicative or radical planning.

Indigenous Peoples and Development Planning Comprising approximately 4 percent of the worlds population, indigenous peoples are not only ethnic minorities and aboriginal descendents of the original inhabitants of a territory, they are selfdefined groups that want to maintain distinct political, economic, social, and legal systemsto maintain identities within the nationstate while also claiming rights as citizens within those states. 4 The first United Nations Decade of Indigenous Peoples (19952004) and the draft declaration of indigenous rights recognized that indigenous peoples are determined to continue their existence as groups, transmit and continue their cultures and political and legal institutions, and preserve their territory on which identity depends.5 In making international claims to sovereignty, indigenous people argue for collective rights and the possibility of ethnic federalism that would relate indigenous forms of government to the state.6 For some tribes and indigenous communities, a primary goal of indigenous development is self-determination and autonomy within the framework of a wider state.7 This goal of maintaining difference runs up against the state interest in uniformity and control of its subjects and its resources for the larger public good.8 The application of planning and development theory presents a special challenge for indigenous peoples. Former modernist development planning marginalized cultural groups, fostered the idea of underdevelopment in order to justify intervention, assumed

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that the rational application of economics and other social sciences served a unitary public interest, and overlooked the practical value of indigenous knowledge to sustained development.9 Scotts critique of high modernism showed how state-sponsored plans that applied uniform standards and ignored local and indigenous place-based knowledge destroyed the very institutions necessary to sustain local culture and development. 10 In response to critiques, planning theory has largely replaced rational, comprehensive, and state-run planning with a focus on communicative/collaborative planning and radical planning.11 Communicative/collaborative approaches seek local and culturally based knowledge and consensus through dialogue or social learning, while radical planning emphasizes social mobilization in opposition to state bureaucracies and modernist forms of knowledge.12 Inspired by Habermass focus on civic dialogue as the basis of knowledge for planning, communicative and collaborative planning theorists suggest that culturally based worldviews are best included in plans when the rational/comprehensive process is replaced with participatory planning that involves all stakeholders in developing a consensus.13 The planner can facilitate dialogue that includes stories, symbols, other ways of knowing. 14 Development theory and practice followed a similar trajectory from centrally planned development toward participatory development with proscriptions for decentralized and democratic governance involving civil society.15 Critics of participatory approaches argue that the focus on dialogue and process ignores power, institutions, and the limited ability of indigenous and minority peoples to stake a claim on their interests.16 Another unstated problem is that culture is framed only as epistemology and is therefore interpreted as a set of perspectives, stories, or values that can be shared in the planning process without attention to the role of social and cultural institutions in transmitting, retaining, and applying indigenous knowledge. Although social learning approaches to planning addressed some of the cultural hubris of 1960s modernization theory, which assumed traditional societies must follow a linear and linked psychological, social, and economic process of development, Friedmann claims that only radical planning can challenge the power structures and epistemologies of rational planning.17 Friedmanns radical planning and alternative development, however, assume a universal political solution to asserting minority knowledge and goalscivic society and democratic institutions that empower households.18 Lane and Hibbard recently applied the radical-planning lens to indigenous cases of

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Culture and Cash

negotiated natural-resource management because these communities identified and implemented strategies to confront institutionalized oppression.19 Rather than describing how these communities applied their political systems to planning, however, they assumed a participatory internal process while focusing on the importance of state-recognized rights to empowerment. Identifying this process as radical planning may obscure more than it reveals. Competing planning and development theories do not recognize the legitimacy, diversity, and potential of traditional indigenous political institutions to transform their political economies. The development stories of two New Mexico Indian pueblos demonstrate other possibilities. Marginalized and minority/indigenous populations also contribute methods of comprehensive planning combining modern and traditional institutions and forms of knowledge to rationally choose development strategies that support cultural goals. I follow Escobars recommendation for local ethnographies that document the mechanisms by which local cultural knowledge is appropriated by larger forces and the ways in which local innovations and gains can be preserved as part of local and cultural power.20 Although Escobar critiqued international development planning for prejudicing disciplinary and professional knowledge over cultural practices and social functions of traditional institutions, he recognized the creative ability of traditional communities to adopt innovation and apply cultural power within the global mechanisms of unequal exchange and resource extraction. He defined development as a whole life project . . . with space for broader individual and collective endeavors, culturally defined.21 This article narrates how Pueblo de Cochiti and Zia Pueblo, two small Pueblo Indian tribes of northern New Mexico, defined, planned, and directed development toward their goals of cultural survival.

Research During Development Participatory and Applied Research The following case studies of Zia Pueblo and Pueblo de Cochiti development are based on participatory research and observation from 1982 through 1988, while the author was employed as social and economic development strategies director by the Five Sandoval Indian Pueblos, Inc. (FSIP) and as a consultant to Pueblo de Cochiti. FSIP is a nongovernmental consortium governed by a tribally

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appointed board. Observation continued while the author was subsequently employed with the New Mexico Office of Indian Affairs under the direction of one of the key informants and with the Seventh Generation Funds economic development program. Case studies are the result of participant observation and participatory research with key informants, including Peter Pino, Richard Pecos, and Regis Pecos, who still continue to implement tribal plans in their capacities as tribal administrators and officials.22 The author conducted follow-up interviews with tribal staff, federal agency partners, and others through 2005. Context As two of the 562 federally recognized Indian tribes in the United States, Pueblo de Cochiti and Zia Pueblo tribal governments have self-governing authority to manage their own natural resources under the trust protection of the United States. Due to the federaltrust obligation, state and local governments cannot encumber or control American Indian land and water.23 As the only Native American and indigenous peoples on the continent to expel European colonizers successfully, in the 1680 Pueblo Revolt, the Pueblo Indian tribes of the Rio Grande, New Mexico, have long guarded their lifeways.24 In the 1980s, federal programs expressed Reagan administration policies (19811988) to decentralize governance and reduce local and Indian dependence on federal funds. The intent was for tribal governments to become economically self-sufficient by creating a more favorable environment for the development of healthy reservation economies by the private sector. 25 The 1984 Presidential Commission on Reservation Economies recommended that tribal and federal governments remove obstacles to private investment and entrepreneurship on Indian reservationsthe biggest obstacles being identified as antiquated tribal government structures.26 Federal programs supported the formation of community-development corporations (CDCs) and other strategies that would encourage and reduce the risk for entrepreneurship and private investment by separating business management from tribal-government politics.27 CDCs are legally incorporated institutions governed by a board that may collect resources from the private sector, foundations, government agencies, and institutions and support physical, social, and economic projects.28 They were originally supported by the Ford Foundation to generate community development and combat poverty. Through FSIP, Zia Pueblo participated in a national demonstration program to transfer CDCs to rural communities, while

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Culture and Cash

Pueblo de Cochiti was required to form a CDC as a condition for regaining control of a development lease on tribal lands. Other aspects of these cases have been initially discussed in two publications.29 This article considers the role of indigenous political institutions in planning and development theory and practice. Although this narrative emphasizes the role of nonelected tribal councils and appointed officials, they are not final authorities on matters of greatest import. The term elders is used to refer to unspecified higher authorities.30 Small Pueblos with Long Traditions According to both oral history and archaeological studies, the Pueblo of Zia has occupied the same site for more than one thousand years, since the Keresan-speaking Pueblo people migrated from Chaco Canyon, a world-renowned ancient city and abandoned center of Anasazi culture.31 Zia Pueblo is located approximately forty miles to the northwest of Albuquerque, via Bernalillo, one of the oldest Spanish/Mexican settlements in New Mexico. After leaving the highway development of Bernalillo and adjacent Santa Ana Pueblo, one arrives at the open mesas and Pajarito Plateau and passes a gypsum mine within tribal lands to arrive at the village of Zia, almost indistinguishable from its rocky perch surrounded by irrigated farm and grazing lands. Zia Pueblo supplied New Mexico with its very recognizable state flag emblem, the Zia Sun symbol. One of the largest of the eighteen Rio Grande pueblos when Coronado arrived in 1540, the pueblos population fell to its lowest, fewer than one hundred persons, during Spanish occupation. Since 1980, the population of approximately six hundred residents has steadily increased. Almost 100 percent of the population are tribal members, and for more than seven centuriessince 1250 their families have continued traditional ceremonies, dances, and Roman Catholic services in the same plaza as their ancestors. Keresan, spoken by the Pueblos of Zia and Cochiti, is one of four languages spoken by Rio Grande Indian pueblos (Pueblos), so named by the Spanish in the sixteenth century for their compact and sedentary village life.32 In addition to continuing irrigated agriculture and raising cattle on their ancestral lands, Zia residents depend on their well-known pottery and on urban jobs in nearby Rio Rancho and Albuquerque. Pueblo de Cochiti, a rather larger Keresan-speaking pueblo (a population of more than nine hundred in 1980) has more than fifteen hundred residents. This pueblo, too, is located less than one hour from Albuquerque, but it is also close to the state capital,

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Santa Fe, a growing city. To reach Pueblo de Cochiti one exits the interstate north of Bernalillo, traveling toward the Rio Grande and Jemez Mountains for twelve miles, crossing the lands of two other Indian pueblos and passing through several small Hispanic communities served by the same irrigation canals from the Rio Grande. Cochiti Dam suddenly looms as a gray wall across the river that blocks all view of the Frijoles Canyon homelands and flooded ancestral villagesstretching five miles across the Rio Grande Valley at the mouth of Frijoles Canyon and rising more than two hundred and sixty feet above the pueblos farmlands and residential village. Beyond the village one arrives at the Cochiti Lake residential and recreational development area, and the paved road ends at the Cochiti golf course. Famous for its drum makers and clay figurines of storytellers, Pueblo de Cochiti also has the largest percentage of college-educated members of all the pueblos (Table 1), exceeding the county average as a whole. A full 27 percent of the population in 2000 held at least a bachelors degree, compared with 8.9 percent at Zia Pueblo and 24 percent for Sandoval County as a whole. Household poverty levels of 13 and 15 percent are comparable between the two pueblos. Both have an average household income of approximately $35,000 below the county average. However, with more than four persons per household, the average per capita income at Zia Pueblo was $8,698 in 2000, compared with $15,363 at Pueblo de Cochiti, where the average household had fewer than three persons. Approximately 38 percent of the workforces in both pueblos are in the public sector, and many Pueblo de Cochiti members hold executive positions in the nearby state capital. Agriculture plays a stronger role in Zia Pueblos economy than it does for Pueblo de Cochiti, where agricultural activity further declined with the 1975 completion of Cochiti Dam. Given its high educational levels, proximity to the capital city, and tourist attractions, Pueblo de Cochiti might be expected to pursue business development more aggressively than the other pueblo, Zia Pueblo. As two of the eight Keresan-speaking pueblos in the Rio Grande, Pueblo de Cochiti and Zia Pueblos have many similar political institutions and cultural concepts, including a moietybased religious system that directs the annual appointment of civic leaders. Each winter, after stories of renewal, new political officials are appointed by the pueblos traditional religious leaders. They assume office by accepting canes that were given to the Pueblos first by the king of Spain and later by President Lincoln.33 Generally, there are six primary political officers in Keresan pueblos, including the annually appointed governor and lieutenant governors

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Table 1 Socioeconomic Status of Pueblos, 2000 Zia Pueblo Population Native American Average HH size Female headed HH HS degree or more Attained BA or advanced college degree In labor force Employed Of those, commute alone by car Median HH income Per capita income Families below poverty line 646 99.5% 4.17 37% 73.9% Cochiti Pueblo and Cochiti Lakea 1501 47.4% (27.4% described Latino) 2.79 14% 81.9% Sandoval County 89,908 16.3% (29.4% Hispanic) 2.84 12.2% 86%

8.9% 65% 59% (37.7% gov.) 65.3% $34,583 $15,363 15%

27% 51% 49% (38% gov.)

24% 63% 58%

71.3% $35,500 $8,689 13%

79.9% $45,000 $19,174 9%

Source: 2000 U.S. Census from State of New Mexico Department of Economic Development Note: a. Cochiti Pueblo data includes 400 residents from Cochiti Lake, primarily non-Indian; therefore, data is not entirely comparable to Zia for the Native American population.

responsible for secular affairs and relations.34 Only members and their families are permitted to live within these Pueblo communities. Although leadership may have been dispersed among clans and kinship groups in the past, final authority is now concentrated.35 Spanish and US governance augmented and affected traditional institutions, but did not replace them because the Pueblos hid them from view.36 Because the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ceded the Southwest to the United States, recognized the Spanish land grants and Mexican citizenship of the Pueblos, the Pueblos actually hold title to their lands. However, due to their preexisting citizenship, the federal government did not initially recognize their status as American Indians. Until the New Mexico Enabling Act of 1910 and the United States Pueblo Lands Act of 1920 defined Pueblo peoples as Indians and extended federal trust protection for their lands, the Pueblos lost land and resources to settlers and federal agencies such as the US Forest Service.37 However, the New Mexican tourist economy depends on their cultures and arts. Their location near art and tourist centers also increases the income potential for potters and other artists, while their legal status allows them to regulate and control access to their lands and ceremonies.

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Prior to 1975 and the establishment of tribal government administrative centers, both pueblos conducted business with the federal government out of a suitcase in the governors kitchen. After the Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 and Supreme Court decisions that reaffirmed a government-togovernment relationship between the United States and federally recognized American Indian tribes, Zia Pueblo and Pueblo de Cochiti created tribal offices and gradually added positions of tribal administrator and other program staff. Since 1982, both have used federal-government programs to reclaim ancestral lands and protect cultural lifewaysways tribal staff like to contrast with what they perceive as individualistic and profit-oriented business culture.38 Rather than suffering a brain drain of educated tribal members and professionals, many individuals wear two hats, as tribal officials/staff/citizens who proudly host visitors to pueblo feast days and other events. Zia Pueblo was able to plan and deliberate alternative types of development that would meet cultural goals and then form a corporation through which to manage future enterprise. In contrast, Pueblo de Cochiti first experienced development as an invasion of a dam and small city through which they lost land, cultural resources, and management control. They formed a community-development corporation as a required step in regaining control of their lands that were leased to a development corporation. They were then able to use the CDC to restrict, as well as manage, development.

Zia Pueblo: Gradual Planning and Development Tribal and rural communities will often copy the successful projects of others without evaluating the appropriateness and market feasibility of the project for their own setting. Instead, Zia Pueblo rejected the possibility of casinos, restaurants, hotels, and golf courses that were developed by neighboring Santa Ana Pueblo. Instead, Zia Pueblos landscape appears almost unchanged. Nevertheless, the pueblo used its own form of comprehensive and rational planning to create a unique development strategy. A Plan with Many Aspects A primary goal reflected in the pueblos first comprehensive plan of 1980 was land acquisition. Using income and negotiations, the pueblo has expanded its 1980 boundaries, comprising approximately

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190 square miles (117,000 acres), to include 150,000 acres in trust status, including most areas of historic use and occupation.39 Unlike some other tribes that used federal funds and consultants in this era to develop only planning data and written reports, Zia Pueblo appointed and retained a planning committee of tribal members and employees. The committee considered professional advice before presenting its own recommendations to the tribal council, which is comprised of all adult men in the pueblo and who serve for their lifetime within the broader authority of the pueblos cacique and other religious officials. Committee members participated in a 1988 session to update the plan, which was again updated a decade later. The plan includes all aspects of pueblo development from enhancing cultural pride through archaeological research of ancient village sites and establishing a tribal museum to securing water rights and buying more rangeland. A second village incorporates elements of historic design found in the excavated village below. The pueblo did not assume that development meant it would invite business onto its land. Because many tribal members can commute to jobs, tribal administration viewed economic development as a way to finance tribal government and thereby protect the land and water resources necessary to the future of the tribe as a whole. Development goals included: Earn income with minimal disturbance to renewable resources Learn business by investing off-reservation with equal partners Purchase and sustainably manage additional resources Build self-reliant and educated youth who can hunt, farm, work outside the community, and contribute to sustaining the way of life

Since urban jobs may not always be available, Zia Pueblo officials felt it was essential that youth learn Pueblo ways and that all families have access to a garden and to sufficient grazing land for one or two cattle, a long-term economic practice at Zia.40 The formal planning process augmented customary practice with outside expertise to consider how opportunities and proposals could best meet cultural as well as economic goals. Cash-and-Culture Decisionmaking Federal programs in the 1980s defined tribal economic development as creating a climate for businesses to grow or relocate to

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reservation lands that required separating tribal governance from business-management institutions. 41 Zia Pueblos tribal administrator, Peter Pino, holds an MBA. He understood the needs of the business community, but he also felt some business needs conflicted with Pueblo lifeways. Despite being the first in the FSIP consortium to establish a community-development corporation, Zia Pueblo did not invite businesses to locate within the pueblos trust lands or near the villagethe holy land. Why rush? Pino deliberated. Business is more responsibility than a marriage and not something everyone understands the way a person understands hunting.42 He felt that a decision to get into business should be made with the full understanding of all that is involved. Although some pueblos in the area established successful casinos, Zia Pueblo did not want to introduce gambling or other enterprises into the community that would require a work day that might directly compete with members commitment to the ritual calendar and their community obligations. The planning committee considered that when tribal members work in the city, rather than at full-time jobs within the pueblo, they adapt to these requirements while at work and shed those values for community life when at home.43 Between 1985 and 2000, the pueblo entered into short-term leases and contracts for tribal revenue. Pino, noticing that New Mexico was promoting its landscape to the film industr y for location filming, joined the New Mexico film commission. Within a few years, four films were partially shot at Zia, and several tribal members and youth had parts as extras. In contrast to the early Hollywood representation of Indian lifeways in film, the pueblo adopted rules to ensure that the historic village and sacred sites would not be filmed, thereby controlling the impact of these development choices.44 The growing city of Rio Rancho borders Zia Pueblo to the south, an area where a company requested a twenty-year lease to test explosives and construction materials. Although the project offered an important income stream, such land disturbance was contrary to Pueblo values toward the land. On the other hand, there was a potential benefit of discouraging housing adjacent to this land. Rather than accept or reject the project, Zia used the criteria in its plan and added technical research to propose a shorter lease with reclamation fees. On further consideration of the pueblos land appeals to nearby housing developers as an open-space amenity, Zia Pueblo subsequently permitted construction of a television transmittal tower on the mesa overlooking Rio Rancho homes in order to discourage home construction on the pueblos border.

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One of the national issues noted for business investment on tribal land is the federal-trust status of Indian land and the sovereign immunity of tribal governments from lawsuit. The pueblo initially established its community-development corporation as a management arm, while the tribal council retained control over development decisions. After planning, however, the pueblo redirected its efforts toward commercial real-estate investment outside of trust lands. When the city of Rio Rancho arranged to purchase water rights in nearby San Ysidro for its own growth, the pueblo purchased the 196 acres of land that accompanied those water rights, adding to the commercial frontage purchased previously. Through the Zia Realty Investment Enterprise, the pueblo also purchased almost 20 acres of downtown Bernalillo, a quiet and historic community with a large potential for growth. Through these acquisitions and a further one of 30,000 acres of mesa from a private owner, the pueblo added 200 acres of commercial land that will not be put into trust status, 12,000 acres of grazing land that is now in trust status, and a wilderness area that will be comanaged with the federal government.45 These purchases meet both cultural and economic development strategies in the revised comprehensive plan: New land is used for customary household cattle grazing. Cultural concepts are also reflected in the plans language. When last updating its plan, committee members formed a vision that gave cultural meaning to the subsections such as agricultural and natural-resource development. That vision included Conserve Wildlife for Future Generations and Continue Zia Life Waysterms with cultural, not just bureaucratic, significance. Pueblo Mediators Tribal members educated in both worlds are critical to the pueblos ability to choose and modify development strategies. Since 1978, Peter Pino has been tribal treasurer and administrator for Zia Pueblo. He has maintained that community-based comprehensive planning provides a way to walk in two worlds, stay in control and get everyones ownership so there is a long-term commitment by the tribal council to plan implementation. 46 He has tried to buffer the business and Pueblo worlds psychologicallya difference he described as looking out for number one and share and share alike. He has also tried to create a buffer zone for himself: One also needs time for what makes a person less of a square and more of a circle . . . like getting out there in my holey t-shirt and tennis shoes to clean the irrigation ditches each spring, he told me. It is

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important after long days behind a desk to know one can still carry a harvested deer on ones back.47 In his position, he has constantly translated between two worldviews and thus can act as knowledge and cultural mediator with business executives. Pino has been hesitant to bring into the community businesses in which the mentality and full-time devotion to profit required for success would compete with Pueblo epistemology. However, he also earned the respect of the business community by using his education to understand the needs of business. Pino has represented the pueblo in the Rio Rancho Chamber of Commerce and monitored regional highway plans so that the tribal council could anticipate impacts and opportunities from the growth of Rio Rancho and metropolitan Albuquerque. While tribal governors change annually, the position of tribal administrator continues to provide continuity in management and information, thus increasing the business communitys confidence in tribal leadership without changing the customary political forms of authority. The tribal administrator also brokers indigenous and technical knowledge throughout the rational planning process. He convinced professional range managers to consider the rational basis of customary range-management practices during a tribal council meeting called to decide whether or not to adopt a rangeland management ordinance proposed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to prevent overgrazing.48 The rangeland-management experts proposed an ordinance that would limit the total number of cattle by charging a fee. The tribal council determined that each family should have access to land on which to graze a few cattle and teach husbandry to young people. US Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) staff expressed doubt that the pueblo would ever adopt an ordinance to limit access because the decision makers, the tribal council members, are also cattle owners whose self-interest might affect their willingness to reduce grazing. The BIA proposed an ordinance to charge for permits that was based on the economic theory that raising prices will reduce resource use. Some council members objected to a fee-based permit because it would create inequalities and favor wealthier tribal members. Pino introduced the discussion by reminding the council of its obligation to preserve the land for future generations, thus focusing the decision on long-standing community values, rather than personal interests. One tribal councilman proposed that the ordinance limit the total number of cattle grazed by each tribal member.49 Subsequently, the pueblo has invested revenue from other projects to buy more grazing land and to improve the quality of the range so that all families would continue to have access to grazing

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land. The final adopted ordinance combined quotas and fees and was implemented over a three-year period so that people would become accustomed to paying for these and other resources. The BIA specialists had proposed a solution based on economic theory. Zia Pueblo, on the other hand, used its plan and the knowledge of its council members to propose an alternative to reach the same goal, while retaining equal resource access and customs. In summary, Zia Pueblo has defined development as security, control, and education of youth into Pueblo lifeways. Zia Pueblo used comprehensive planning to combine indigenous knowledge of the elders with the analysis of technical experts. The pueblo has gradually assumed control of BIA programs and increased its revenue while minimizing changes to life within the community. Recently, the tribal council was poised to invest in commercial development near urban centers while it considered difficult questions of sustainabilityquestions such as who will fill Pinos role with cultural integrity, understanding of business, time to run the investment corporation, and willingness to forgo employment benefits offered by outside employers. Pino himself yearns for more time planting his fields and teaching his six grandchildren the Pueblos lifeways.50 There are hard choices ahead, but Zia, one of the smallest of the Rio Grande pueblos, has stayed in slow and steady control of its own development in contrast to the internal conflict caused by a development plan that was imposed on Pueblo de Cochiti in 1968.

Pueblo de Cochito: Outside Plans, Conflict, and Control Pueblo de Cochiti lost control of 50 percent of its acreage, including half of its traditional farmland and sacred areas, to the 1975 completion of Cochiti Dam and Lake. According to a 1968 BIA plan, the pueblo was to gain jobs, income, and business opportunities. Because major development impacts were not anticipated, understood, or controlled by the tribal council and traditional leaders, this highly educated tribe turned inward, rejecting all enterprise opportunities in the 1980s. The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development later lauded Cochiti as an example of successful tribal economic development under the control of customary political institutions, but it did not narrate how rapid imposition of development can tear apart a communityor how in the span of a generation, a tribal community can reclaim its confidence and

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control through cultural resilience, strategic use of knowledge, and institution-building.51 Imposed Development The 1968 BIA plan accompanied the US Army Corps of Engineers proposed construction of the Cochiti Dam and Lake, a national flood-control project long advocated by state and urban politicians downstream to be constructed across tribal lands. The pueblo has occupied the same site for more than seven hundred years, and remains of their ancestral village stretch up and beyond the flooded canyon. Records show that the pueblo was coerced to sign an easement for the flooding of more than 4,000 acres or lose title to those lands. Under pressure, tribal governors and some officials signed the easement and the accompanying ninety-nine-year development lease suggested in the BIA plan. Some 6,500 acres of tribal land were leased to a private development corporation to construct a retirement city of forty thousand or more persons. Adjacent ancestral lands were already under the control of Bandelier National Monument, the Los Alamos National Laboratories, US Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management. and the University of New Mexico. According to this plan, the pueblo was to receive a share of residential lot subleases and profits from the commercial area, golf course, and marina, and manage its own camping area by the lake. Rather than embracing these planned benefits, the tribal council resisted further developments and despaired over impacts. 52 An elder who served as a tribal officer when the pueblo signed the easement explained to Congress in the mid-1980s, We didnt have no choice; we never wanted to give up our rights. . . . After 40 years, our lifeline has been broken.53 Unlike Zia Pueblo, where all male tribal members are members of the tribal council, the tribal council at Pueblo de Cochiti is comprised of all the former appointed governors. Unfortunately, only some of the Cochiti tribal officials signed the easement and therefore the approvals bypassed customary political procedure. As a result, the tribal council debated who was to blame for the impacts, including destruction of a sacred rock outcropping spliced by the dam spillway, a place sacred not only to Pueblo de Cochiti but to other Pueblo peoples as geographically distant as the Hopi in Arizona.54 Lack of consensus on development, the destruction of sacred sites, and difficulty dealing with non-Indian members of the town assembly hardened a long-existing division between progressive and conservative elements within the pueblo, resulting in a generation

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of internal self-blame and stalemate.55 When subsequent development opportunities were presented, the tribal council discussions often plunged into deep sadness and internal blame.56 By 1984, residential construction at Cochiti Lake stagnated within a changing economy and conflicts increased between the Californiabased development corporation, the pueblo, and the non-Indian town of Cochiti Lake, which had fewer than 150 households. NonIndian residents demanded more growth, infrastructure, and management control. Both residents and the pueblo sued the increasingly absent development corporation, which in turn blamed Pueblo resistance for the slow pace of development. That same year, the lake almost reached its maximum level, accompanied by a rising water table, flooding, and increased salinity in the pueblos farmlands below the dam. The cultural loss caused by the dam was crystallized by Regis Pecos: The holy place and agriculture were taken away, and it was that which engaged and sustained the native religion; they are inseparable and interdependent.57 The youth were no longer taught how to tend the caciques field for blue corn used in ceremonies. The tribal councils demands were nonnegotiable: The Corps of Engineers (COE) should restore farmland before the council considered any development proposals or federal-agency agreements. It also objected to increasing non-Indian presence that Cochiti Lake introduced into tribal lands and affairs. Pueblo Mediators In the 1980s, Regis Pecos was one of several young, well educated tribal members raised by a family that taught commitment to traditional values and respect for elders. His elder brother, Richard Pecos, served as tribal planner with FSIP and another served as tribal financial officer. After graduating from Princeton University in political science, Regis Pecos was asked to join a tribal committee to work with legal counsel and planners who would document the history of events related to Cochiti Dam and Lake.58 Richard Pecos became assistant tribal administrator, and the new tribal governor, who had previously held executive office in state government, decided to establish a congressional record on the failed federal-trust responsibility. Regis Pecos again acted as an intermediary between staff, Congress, and tribal council demands that the COE fix all damages. After several years of sustained effort, including bringing elders to congressional hearings and discussing compromises with the

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tribal council, Congress appropriated funds to reclaim farmlands. The pueblo and the COE cooperatively installed a drainage system below the dam in the 1990s. With this success, the tribal council gained some confidence.59 The pueblo also intervened in the 1984 bankruptcy of the Cochiti Lake developer. Pecos helped the governors and tribal council seize this opportunity and understand its strategic options. By acting as a knowledge and cultural intermediary between the tribal officials and lawyers, Pecos and other committee members structured and gained tribal-counsel confidence to accept a compromise offered by the bankruptcy court.60 Although the lease and non-Indian housing development will continue to 2067, the pueblo purchased all development for $1 million. The transfer was conditional on the establishment of the Cochiti Community Development Corporation (CCDC) and honoring of the lease provisions. Increasingly educated by experience, the members appointed to the CCDC board kept only a small staff and shrank the size of the developable area, as directed by the tribal council, from 6,500 to under 1,000 acres. The CCDC then completed construction of a sewage-treatment plant, maintained the recreation center and marina, and upgraded the nationally recognized golf course. By 2000, the CCDC owned a convenience store, a laundromat, and a rentable meeting space. Within the governors office, the pueblo obtained funding to establish a department of environment and natural resources. It fenced off undeveloped land and recruited as director a younger, academically trained wildlife biologist who actively works with federal agencies. Pecos and other members with professional skills and traditional values negotiated more control for the pueblo, thus helping the council to overcome internal conflict and blame. Collegeeducated youth must also earn the confidence of elders, and as they mature they assume more responsibility as governors and other officials. Tribal members who are professionals also participate in ceremonies, growing from dancers to elder singers. After ser ving as director at the state Office of Indian Affairs, Regis Pecos ser ved as governor and is now a lifetime member of the tribal council. Richard Pecos ser ves as tribal administrator. The CCDC members hold many responsibilities and defer to the tribal council and elders. Change comes through patience and timing. As in the case of Zia Pueblo, the same tribal members who strategize later mature into trusted positions where they can implement those ideas through agreements with agencies and the business community.

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Decisionmaking and Risk Taking The CCDC pursues projects that are consistent with cultural values by honoring the decisions of tribal elders who are responsible for guarding those values. As stated on the pueblos website, land, air, and water on and adjacent to the reservation are the lifeline of the Pueblo traditions and culture that will be lost if those resources are severely impacted by development and cannot be used for farming, fishing, hunting, and maintaining cultural traditions.61 Although the damages from Cochiti Dam can never be erased, the pueblo gained confidence in its ability to control future land-use impacts by owning and reducing the size of the Cochiti Lake development and by gaining concessions from the COE and other federal agencies. In 2001, the COE formally apologized to the Pueblo de Cochiti for the damage it had caused, and the new COE district chief and his staff began meeting monthly with the governors office to discuss any water- or recreational-management issues. The Los Alamos National Laboratories provided a grant to the Pueblos Environment Department for joint ecological monitoring studies and certification of the CCDC as a qualified, minority-owned business by the US Small Business Administration. 62 The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) asked the tribal council for help in managing the 2001-designated Kasha Katuwe Tent Rocks National Monument, which is adjacent to Pueblo sacred and historic village sites that have been under mixed private and federal ownership. Collaboration with the BLM to protect the monument also helps the pueblo to protect sacred sites just outside the monument. It hopes to regain title for the sites from private and federal-agency owners. The tribal council member who serves as liaison to the monument explained to me that the tribal council, which had remained opposed to federal initiatives since the dam, reversed its position because the BLM had respectfully approached the entire tribal council and requested assistanc The BLM continues to work with a tribal council member liaison, but it also returns to consult the entire tribal council on management plans.63 The tribal council began supporting development because it controlled that development and because the young tribal members who had done the research and planning, having become older, had graduated into being mature staff and members of the tribal council. In summary, thirty years ago the federal government instituted economic development plans for Pueblo de Cochiti and asserted that the Cochiti Lake development would provide jobs, income, and economic opportunities for small business development as

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tribal members learned business-management skills from the private-sector developers. Despite this major investment, a strategic location near Santa Fe and Albuquerque, and a high level of college education among tribal members, the pueblo rejected a subsequent hydroelectric plant and other income and business opportunities when powerless to address the cultural impacts of Cochiti Dam and Lake. The tribal council, comprised of former governors, began to consider development opportunities only after the tribal council regained control of land-use and development through two major events: (1) convincing the bankruptcy court to transfer Cochiti Lake to the management of the pueblo through the CCDC; and (2) convincing Congress and the COE to mitigate damages to farmland from Cochiti Dam. Despite these gains, difficulties remain with some elected leaders and residents within the primarily nonIndian town of Cochiti Lake. Negotiations were facilitated by a generation of tribal members, including the Pecos family and others raised by those who valued both tradition and a college education. They persisted over the course of twenty-five years to leverage allies, collect evidence, and earn the confidence of elders through traditional social and political institutions. In short, they practiced their pueblos way of long-term and comprehensive planning through reflection, deliberation, patience, and respect. Important decisions are made with care and long discussions that can take years. Equally, when the tribal council and elders make a decision, that decision is sustained for generations. Customary Governance for Development Development for Cultural Integrity Native American organizations have criticized federal economicdevelopment programs such as the construction of the Cochiti Lake development area for expecting quick results and defining economic development in terms of business investment, rather than as sustainable, culturally revitalizing, and comprehensive strategies that ensure the continued and unique existence of the people involved.64 At the Pueblo de Cochiti, an imposed development plan was intended to extend some tribal benefits to a water project constructed at the bequest of urban and state politicians. However, the tribal council resisted benefits from a development that had damaged their land and their spirits. Damages cannot be reversed, but after gaining control of the Cochiti Lake development and obtaining

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cooperation from the US Army Corps of Engineers to mitigate damages, the tribal council began to manage development on their own. The CCDC was featured as a success in case studies of tribally controlled economic development.65 The Pueblo de Conchiti case shows that success was founded not on the separation of business management from tribal politics, as originally intended by the Reagan Commission in 1983, but on reconnecting development to indigenous political institutions. Cochiti Lake continues to generate important revenue for tribal governance, but the CCDC only selectively pursues opportunities with the consensus of the tribal council. Zia Pueblo, where there was little initial development before the tribe had management capacity, was able slowly and systematically to consider the feasibility, social, and cultural impacts of business-development alternatives and learn from the experience of other pueblos. Zia Pueblo began with fewer educational and financial assets and opportunities than did Pueblo de Cochiti, but it was spared the social impact of an imposed development project. Ultimately, Zia was able to choose its own development strategy. Using a comprehensive planning process with a committee and the tribal council, the tribal administrator built a consensus on development criteria before pursuing particular projects. Whereas, Pueblo de Cochiti created a community-development corporation in order to assert management control, Zia Pueblo initially negotiated revenue without assuming total management responsibility, and because it did not want to turn development decisions over to a CDC it found little initial use for the structure. Despite their contrasting experiences of imposed and gradual development, both applied cultural standards regarding land, social equity, ceremonial practice, and respect to redefine development. The initial push for economic development came from the federal government in order to reduce federal-funding responsibility to the tribal administrations and people. 66 The need for tribal government income overshadowed any employment goals. Through their close urban proximity, both pueblos have access to the business and political leadership of the state and higher education. Tribal members do not have to choose between urban employment and community obligations. Though difficult, it remains possible to live and participate in the ceremonial and agricultural life of the tribe, while also pursuing a higher education or job in the Santa Fe or Albuquerque areas. In turn, non-Indian government and business leaders are invited to learn about customs through annual pueblo feast days.

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Pueblo Mediators Pueblo de Cochiti and Zia Pueblo also assert cultural autonomy within the state through mediators who can translate epistemologies and address the needs and expectations of outside players without divulging cultural knowledge that is protected by elders responsible for cultural integrity. The Zia Pueblo tribal administrator describes his role as a translator who speaks the language of the business community, explains business to tribal council members, and makes outside agencies and the film industry respect tribal cultural values. He hopes to pass on this role to others when he retires.67 The Pecos family credits their grandparents for encouraging them to obtain a college education and then return home to help their people, despite more lucrative opportunities away from the Pueblo.68 Regis Pecos, for example, knew how to reframe tribal council despair over Cochiti Dam into legislative proposals that could obtain congressional support. They take their turn serving without pay as tribal officers, such as assistant war captain, or they work for the state and volunteer their time to tribal committees. Pino and the planning committee at Zia applied the classic steps of strategic planningcommunity assessment, visioning and goal setting, assessment of strengths and weaknesses, choice among alternatives.69 In choosing to court the film industry, the pueblo applied its values and its sovereign powers to prevent filming within the traditional village area. Both pueblos engaged in a form of transactive planning through social learning that was facilitated by Pino, Pecos, and other tribal members and planners to draw into relationship the expertise of elders, economists, and engineers.70 Planning Both Pueblos also continue to practice forms of comprehensive and rational planning that are inherent to traditional decisionmaking institutions while also borrowing new planning methods. All innovations are considered for their place within a long lifeline of stories connecting the people, time, place, and a changing world.71 Although an economist might question the rational nature of Pueblo de Cochitis decision to restrict the size the development potential of Cochiti Lake severely, the decision was entirely rational within a values context in which rational means are not equated with a positivist epistemology.72 Although tribal councils make decisions by consensus, this is with deference to elders and is not described by current collaborative planning models. After the tribal

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council agreed to purchase the Cochiti Lake sublease, it told the CCDC its limitations. Traditional political institutions choose among development alternatives; staff or community-development corporations (CDCs) manage implementation. Although planning was transformative, it was not radical by inviting broad citizen participation. CDCs were not vehicles for social mobilization as they may be in urban contexts. The pueblos were adaptive and have used a strategy of slow accommodation since the sixteenth-century Spanish conquest, adding those institutions that were required by colonizers, such as the positions of governor, but placing them under the invisible authority of the cacique and other customary spiritual leaders.73 These two pueblos declined the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act provisions for constitutional governance, opting instead to retain systems by which political officials are appointed by religious leaders and societies for both sacred and secular functions. 74 Traditional knowledge is tied to responsibility and not shared with all tribal members or with outsiders. Federal, state, and private personnel sometimes question the annual change in pueblo governors as inconsistent and inherently unstable for business agreements. Although this system slows down decisions and could discourage youth, as may have occurred at Pueblo de Cochiti, it also ensures more consistent commitment to a chosen path once theyoung participants mature. Zia Pueblo will continue to pursue offreservation land investment and business partnerships despite a change in governor, and Cochiti has the institutional memory to continue working with Cochiti Lake residents. Agencies and business representatives often miss the underlying stability of their political systems. Decisionmaking and Legitimacy Development is essentially a problem of collective and sustained decision making. While new and formally established institutions may be critical intermediaries for development, political institutions must primarily mobilize and sustain community collective action for successful development to occur.75 Some American Indian officials or tribal councils that lack legitimacy face internal conflicts that interrupt development projects. Former Pine Ridge, White Earth, and Navajo tribal chairmen were accused, rightly or wrongly, of personally benefiting from development projects. Tribal councils elected according to constitutions are not always recognized by the customary kin-based leadership.76 The Pueblo administrators support Cornell and Kalt, who state that the most important factor in successful

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tribal resource development is local decision making and control.77 Local is not descriptive of indigenous political economies. Decisions by these Pueblo tribal councils and officials are embedded in indigenous social, religious, and political institutionsones that matter to development that supports identity. * * * In the early 1980s, when the pueblos initiated their economicdevelopment programs, the Presidential Commission on Indian Reservation Economics identified traditional government as the biggest institutional barrier to tribal business development and entrepreneurship.78 The commission prescribed that tribal governments become predictable to private investors through legal and managerial reform and the creation of community-development corporations that would separate business management from politics. One would expect, therefore, that successful tribes would be those that transferred development decisions from customary political institutions to new community-development corporations and other predictable and codified institutions. The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, on the other hand, found that sovereignty and the ability of tribal governments to apply and create their own institutions and develop their own strategies was critical to success.79 The Pueblo de Cochiti and Zia Pueblo responded to federal policy of the 1980s within the context of land ownership and selfdetermination; thereby using federal programs to create the intermediate position of tribal administrator, community-development corporations, and natural-resource management plans while retaining and strengthening the authority of traditional political institutions over development decisions. Pueblo plans defined successful development as strengthening cultural values and having the land, water, and financial resources necessary for future generations. Although both pueblos generated income and strengthened cultural identity, there are important lessons in their contrasting stories. Despite higher levels of education and major initial investment, Pueblo de Cochiti had to overcome pain and political divisions that resulted from development that bypassed traditional decision-making institutions. In contrast, the smaller and more insular Zia Pueblo created unique and sustained development opportunities through its customary political institutions. In both cases, culturally grounded and college-educated tribal members were intermediaries. They used planning to combine outside expertise with the traditional knowledge of tribal elders and

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council members who made rational and comprehensive plans that applied cultural standards. In this way, youth were taught agriculture and respect for elders, protection of homelands, and prevention of obvious economic inequalities, and tribal members were provided with the opportunity to continue their participation in ritual and community life. Pueblo intermediaries served as planners who augmented the traditional practice of long-range and comprehensive thinking. By facilitating social learning between experts and tribal officials, they helped decision makers to more fully consider, design, and control development options and negotiate more beneficial agreements. Although ideals and profits may be compromised, these compromises were deliberate, controlled, and inclusive of Pueblo epistemologies and goals. Lessons for Indigenous Political Economies Indigenous communities have different cultural and social institutions, resources, and histories of displacement, loss of land, and emergent sovereignties within the state and dominant political economy.80 Despite major losses and changes, the Rio Grande pueblos can narrate an unbroken connection to places and systems of selfgovernance, and they have the advantage of proximity to urban area markets, universities, and state government. Indigenous communities face the future with other painful histories and emerging rights and cannot duplicate their choices. This is precisely the broader lesson of their stories. Like all rural communities that lack experience or opportunity, indigenous communities may try to borrow or import a development idea such as a casino without a systematic evaluation of values, context, market, or desired outcomes. Some, without sufficient rights, may experience their choice as to accept or reject a major mine or water-resource project without modification. Pueblo de Cochiti and Zia Pueblo demonstrate agency. They strategically engage professional knowledge and political institutions to create and modify developments. Indigenous planning may deploy both other ways of knowing and rational planning to redefine development.81

Planning Theory and Indigenous Peoples John Friedmann defined planning as the application of knowledge to action in the public domain.82 Escobar and others critiqued professional planning for embracing the scientific knowledge of development economics and other professions and the needs of

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the global economy over cultural practices and social functions of traditional institutions.83 Rather than expand the concept of rational and comprehensive planning to include tribal public domains and public interests, planning theorists proposed participation in which indigenous peoples could share their stories and perspectives with other interests.84 As critics pointed out, rights are fundamental to questions of who owns development plans. However, sovereignty is always partial and negotiated. 85 Marginalized populations may need to co-opt and distort communication in order to achieve social justice.86 They may adopt the language of rational planning to achieve political and cultural power. 87 Although other indigenous communities will not share Pueblo circumstances, there is a lesson in how Zia Pueblo and Pueblo de Cochiti used planning within their own political institutions and rights in order to redefine and pursue development strategies. In these pueblos, transformative planning was not always radical, as Lane and Hibbard suggest. It was also adaptive, central, comprehensive, rational, and creative. Rational and comprehensive planning should not be confused with reliance on positivist forms of knowledge.88 Faludi, who first advocated the rational planning process, argues that rational choice is based on valued ends and not on predetermined ends or economic criteria. Rational planning decisions and institutions rest on underlying belief systems, cultural values, and social structures.89 By bringing indigenous knowledge and indigenous political institutions into each phase from visioning to evaluation of alternatives, plans can support indigenous community identity. The pueblos defined development choices in terms of cultural values. Both relied on local knowledge and the knowledge of economists, planners, and environmental scientists to strengthen their economic options and power to protect cultural integrity.90 Both tribal governments also used professional discourse to translate and justify their development goals and regulations. Indigenous planning is rooted in customary forms of valuing, deliberating, deciding, and evaluating. However, when dealing with the wider political economy or imposed development projects, it can be useful to include scientific knowledge more formally and to communicate the rationality of ones decisions to power. Development Theory and Indigenous Peoples Development theory fostered the idea of underdevelopment. When that idea is internalized, indigenous communities may undervalue their own forms of governance. Although participatory

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development replaced modernization theories,91 the international focus on participatory democracy involving civil society retains the modernist assumption that development is conditional on replacing traditional institutions with prescribed forms for managing a common public good. Governance is presented as an apolitical, technically sound, and universally valid endeavor, and democracy can be delinked from the political debate and associated with good management practices.92 Emphasis on good governance as a condition for development, therefore, extends what Scott describes as the state-making criteria of transparency, uniformity, and predictability. The development choices of Zia Pueblo and Pueblo de Cochiti challenge the long-standing artificial divide assumed between traditional governance and development to show that tradition and development can coexist. Development may be sustained, not when indigenous peoples abandon traditional political institutions but, rather, when traditional leaders, elders, and tribal councils are responsible for considering alternatives and make informed decisions that are then implemented through new institutions that are sanctioned by traditional political forms. Because development efforts must be sustained for many years and cannot succeed when leadership is factionalized, indigenous political institutions with deep cultural legitimacy may be important assets for development. Rather than assume that culture and community are antithetical to formal development institutions, I argue that community can complement formal rules in development because a cohesive community may increase interpersonal confidence and reduce freerider and rent-seeking behavior that undermines development benefits while sustaining collective action.93 There may be certain risks to indigenous communities that automatically embrace traditional institutions without regard to changing perceptions of gender rights and democratic governance. Traditional social and political institutions may help overcome cultural dissonance and, therefore, help sustain long-term development initiatives. Consequently, indigenous people should not feel they must choose between tradition and development. Social and political systems and knowledge are assets with which to craft development that supports identity. rather than compete with it.

Notes
The author thanks Peter Pino, Zia Pueblo, and Richard and Regis Pecos, Pueblo de Cochiti, for sharing their knowledge, vision, and insights for more than 20 years and thus, helping me create this article. Too

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numerous to name are the current and former tribal officials and men and women of Cochiti, Zia, Santa Ana, Jemez, and Sandia Pueblos who informed the ideas presented here. This article is offered in respect for their stories of inspiration to other communities. 1. Alvin Josephy, Jr., Joane Nagel, and Troy Johnson, eds., Red Power: The American Indians Fight for Freedom (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999); Joane Nagel, American Indian Ethnic Renewal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 2. William Canby, American Indian Law (St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 1998); Vine Deloria, Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An Indian Declaration of Independence (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985); Josephy, Nagel, and Johnson, note 1; Stephen Pevar, The Rights of Indians and Tribes (Washington, D.C.: American Civil Liberties Union, New Leaf Studio, 1992). 3. Stephen Cornell and Joseph Kalt, Assessing the Causes and Consequences of Economic Development on American Indian Reservations: An Introduction to the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, in The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, ed. John. F. Kennedy School of Government (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1988); Cornell and Kalt, Pathways from Poverty: Economic Development and Institution-building on American Indian Reservations, in Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, Project Report Series (Cambridge: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1989); Cornell and Kalt, American Indian Economic Development as a Problem of Collective Action, in Property Rights and Indian Economies, ed. Terry L. Anderson (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992). 4. David Maybury-Lewis, Indigenous Peoples, Ethnic Groups, and the State (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1997). 5. The draft UN declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples includes the preservation and development of ethnic and cultural characteristics and distinct identities; protection against genocide and ethnocide; rights related to religions, languages, and educational institutions; ownership, possession or use of indigenous lands and natural resources; protection of cultural and intellectual property; maintenance of traditional economic structures and ways of life, including hunting, fishing, herding, gathering, timber-sawing and cultivation; environmental protection; selfdetermination, self-government, and participation in the political, economic, and social life of the states concerned: Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Resolution, 1994/ 45 of August 26, 1994. See also Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Indigenous Peoples: Emerging International Actors Crawford Young, ed., Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy: A Comparative Inquiry (UNRISD, 1998): 134149. 6. Maybury-Lewis, note 4. 7. Richard Howitt, John Connell, and Philip Hirsch, Resources, Nations, and Indigenous Peoples, in idem, eds., Resources, Nations, and Indigenous Peoples: Case Studies from Australia, Melanesia, and Southeast Asia (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1996); Maybury-Lewis note 4. 8. James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Howitt, Connell, and Hirsch, note 7. 9. Arturo Escobar, Planning, in W. Sachs, ed., The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power (London: Zed Books, 1992), pp. 132 145; Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of

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the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); John Friedmann, Planning in the Public Domain: From Knowledge to Action (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 13; Scott, note 8. 10. Scott, note 8, pp. 223261. 11. Friedmann, note 9; Judith Innes, Planning Theorys Emerging Paradigm: Communicative Action and Interactive Practice, Journal of Planning Education and Research 14 (1995):183189. 12. Micheal M. Cernea, ed., Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, Oxford University Press, 1985); John Friedmann, Empowerment: The Politics of Alternative Development (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992); Friedmann, note 9. 13. John Forester, The Deliberative Practitioner: Encouraging Participatory Planning Processes (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999); Jurgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979); Patsy Healey, Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997); Innes, note 11; Judith Innes and David Booher, Consensus Building as Role Playing and Bricolage: Toward a Theory of Collaborative Planning, Journal of the American Planning Association 65 (1999): 926. 14. Leonie Sandercock, ed., Making the Invisible Visible: Multi-cultural Cities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Leonie Sandercock, Toward Cosmopolis: Planning for Multi-cultural Cities (Chichester: John Wiley, 1998); Leonie Sandercock and Peter Lyssiotis, Cosmopolis II: Mongrel Cities in the Twenty-first Centur y (New York and London: Continuum International, 2003); Karen Umemoto, Walking in Anothers Shoes: Epistemological Challenges in Participatory Planning, Journal of Planning Education and Research 21 (2000): 1731. 15. Patrick Bond, Global Governance Campaigning and MDGs: From Top-down to Bottom-up Anti-poverty Work, Third World Quarterly 27 (2006): 339354; Cernea, note 12. 16. Margo Huxley, The Limits to Communicative Planning, Journal of Planning Education and Research 19 (2000): 369377; Oren Yiftachel, The Dark Side of Modernism: Planning as Control of an Ethnic Minority, in Sophia Waton and Katherine Gibson, eds., Postmodern Cities and Spaces (Oxford, Eng.: Blackwell, 1995). 17. Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); Tacott Parsons, Evolutionary Universals in Society, in Timmons Robert and Amy Hite, eds., From Modernization to Globalization: Perspectives on Development and Social Change (Malden: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 3399; W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). 18. Friedmann, note 9; idem, note 12. 19. Marcus Lane and Michael Hibbard, Doing It for Themselves: Transformative Planning by Indigenous Peoples, Journal of Planning Education and Research 25 (2005): 174. 20. Escobar, Encountering, note 9, p. 49. 21. Ibid., p. 50. 22. I managed the FSIP program for social and economic development strategies from 1982 to 1986 and supervised five tribal planning technicians under the direction of a planning committee that included Peter Pino and appointees from the four other Pueblo tribes. Some staff, including Richard Pecos, later became tribal administrators. Pinel also

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worked on contract with Pueblo de Cochiti in 1986 and 1987 and for the New Mexico Office of Indian Affairs from 1991 to 1992, directed by Regis Pecos. I have added comparative and theoretical insights from work with the Seventh Generation Fund, the National Rural Development Council, and doctoral studies in planning and development. 23. Canby, note 2; OMB, Indian Entities Eligible to Receive Services from the U.S. Government, U.S. Federal Register, July 12, 2002; Pevar, note 2. 24. Alfonso Ortiz, The Pueblos (New York: Chelsea House, 1994); Joe S. Sando, Pueblo Nations: Eight Centuries of Pueblo Indian Histor y (Santa Fe, N.M.: Clear Light, 1992). 25. Josephy, Nagel, and Johnson, note 1, p. 129. 26. Presidential Commission on Indian Reservation Economies, Report and Recommendations to the President of the United States (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1984), p. 101. 27. Frank P. Stafford, The Development of Poverty: A Perspective on Community Development, Economic Development Law Center Report No. 21 (Berkeley: NEDLC, 1990), pp. 1, 2. 28. Ford Foundation. Seizing Opportunities: The Role of CDCs in Urban Development, Report No. 556 (New York: Ford Foundation, 2006), p. 149. 29. Sandra Lee Pinel, Stopping the Flood of Damages from Cochiti Dam, Cultural Survival Quarterly 12 (1988): 2528; Sandra Lee Pinel, Social Impact Assessment Sensitizes Planning, American Planning Associeation, ed., Planning and Community Equity (Chicago: Planners Press, American Planning Association, 1994), pp. 77104. 30. One is not permitted to enquire about or disclose Pueblo religious practices that underlie governance; therefore this article relies on Pueblo authors Sando and Ortiz to summarize the political system briefly. Women do not hold political positions, though they have their own medicine societies and affect decisions through the men. It is outside the scope of this article to address gender issues within the pueblos; however, there is ample evidence that womens roles and customary rights and inheritance were affected by the Spanish prior to US control, and changes of that time are now incorporated into what is considered traditional. 31. Eward P. Dozier, The Pueblo Indians of North America (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1983). 32. Ibid.; Alfonso Ortiz, New Perspectives in the Pueblos (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1972); Sando, note 24. 33. Ortiz, note 32; Sando, note 24. 34. Pueblo de Cochiti, Pueblo de Cochiti Home Page, describes tribal government, history, culture, arts, offices, and developments, including the CCDC: Pueblo de Cochiti, www.pueblodecochiti.org/ 35. Dozier, note 31. 36. Ortiz, note 24. 37. Pueblos were spared the allotment act privatization of landholdings and so do not have non-Indian and private holdings within their jurisdiction: ibid. 38. Sandra Lee Pinel, Peter Pino, Zia Pueblos Man of Many Hats, New Mexico 68 (1990): 5665. 39. Peter Pino, written communication with author, Zia Pueblo, 2006. 40. Leslie White, The Pueblo of Sia, New Mexico (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962).

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41. Presidential Commission, note 26. 42. Pinel, note 38, p. 56. 43. Ibid. 44. Peter Pino, interviewed by Sandra Pinel, Madison, Wisconsin, 2001. See also Teodoro Jojola, On Revisions and Revisionism, American Indian Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1996): 4147. 45. Pino, note 44; Pino, note 39. 46. Peter Pino and Regis Pecos were later interviewed for Sandos volume of selected pueblo biographies (Joe S. Sando, Pueblo Profiles: Cultural Identity Through Centuries of Change [Santa Fe, N.M.: Clear Light, 1998]). In Sandos work they reiterate many points that were documented in earlier descriptions of these cases by Pinel; see Pinel, note 38; Sandra Lee Pinel, Appropriate Development Planning: Lessons Learned with Two Pueblos, in Land Tenure Center, ed., Who Owns America?-III (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001). 47. Pinel, note 38, p. 63. 48. There is a growing international literature on traditional and indigenous knowledge in resource management and several critiques that are outside the scope of this article. For a Canadian native peoples perspective, see Paul Nadasdy, The Politics of TEK: Power and the Integration of Knowledge, Arctic Anthropology 36 (1999): 118. 49. Sandra Lee Pinel, A Community Planning Approach to Resource Protection and Development, in Committee on Native American Natural Resource Law, ed., Natural Resources Development on Indian Lands, Planning for Success (Albuquerque, N.M.: American Bar Association, 1991). 50. Pino, note 44; Pino, note 39. 51. Cornell and Kalt, Assessing, note 3; idem, Pathways, note 3. 52. Pinel, Stopping the Flood, note 29. 53. Sando, note 46, pp. 293303. 54. Regis Pecos, discussions at work with Sandra Pinel, Santa Fe, New Mexico Office of Indian Affairs, 1991. 55. Charles Lange, Cochiti: A New Mexico Pueblo, Past and Present (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1990). 56. Pinel, Stopping the Flood, note 29; Sando, note 46. 57. Sando, note 46, p. 297. 58. Ibid. 59. H 6683Settlement Implementing Between the Pueblo de Cochiti and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (House of Representatives, July 27, 1992) authorized funds for the implementation of the agreement reached between the two parties under Public Law 100-202. 60. Sando, note 46. 61. Pueblo de Cochiti, note 34. 62. Los Alamos National Laboratory press release, Los Alamos National Laboratory Assists Cochiti Pueblo, ed. Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2006; Jacob Pecos and Donald Suina, interview by Sandra Pinel at Pueblo de Cochiti, Environment Department, April 8, 2005. 63. Sacred Lands Coalition, Summit on Federal Sacred Lands Consultation, Santa Fe, N.M., National Congress of American Indians, Native American Rights Fund, Association of American Indian Affairs, November 1416, 2003; Pecos and Suina, note 62. 64. Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, presentation by Coalition on Indian Development, US Senate, October 25, 1989. 65. Cornell and Kalt, Pathways, note 3.

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66. Presidential Commission, note 26. 67. Pinel, note 38; Sando, note 46. 68. Pecos and Suina, note 62; Sando, note 46, p. 293. 69. See Pinel, Social Impact, note 29. 70. Friedmann, note 9. 71. Teodoro Jojola, Indigenous Planning, Clans, Intertribal Confederations, and the History of the All Indian Pueblo Council, in Sandercock, ed., note 14. 72. Andreas Faludi, Rationality, Critical Rationalism, and Planning Doctrine, in Critical Rationalism and Planning Methodology: Research in Planning and Design, vol. 14, ed. Andreas Faludi (New York: Routledge, 1986). 73. Sando, note 24; Ortiz, note 24. 74. Dozier, note 31; Sando, note 24. 75. Cornell and Kalt, 1990. 76. Fergus Bordewich, Killing the White Mans Indian: Reinventing Native Americans at the End of the Twentieth Century (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1996): 202233, 302333. 77. Cornell and Kalt, Pathways, note 3; idem, American Indian Economic Development as a Problem, note 3. 78. Presidential Commission, note 26. 79. Cornell and Kalt, Assessing, note 3; idem, Pathways, note 3; idem, note 75. 80. Lane and Hibbard, note 19. 81. Sandercock, ed., note 14. 82. Friedmann, note 9. 83. Escobar, Planning, note 9; idem, Encountering, note 9. 84. Friedmann, note 12; Innes, note 11; Sandercock, ed., note 14, and idem, note 14. 85. Lane and Hibbard, note 19. 86. Jerry Kaufman, Forester in the Face of Planners: Will They Listen to Him? Planning Theory Newsletter (1990): 2733. 87. Marcus Lane, Indigenous Land and Community Security: A (Radical) Planning Agenda (Madison: Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, 2001): 118. 88. Alexander Faludi and Ernest Alexander, Rationality Revisited: Planning Paradigms in a Post-postmodernist Perspective, Journal of Planning Education and Research 19 (2000): 242256; M. J. Breheny and A. Hooper, The Role of Rationality in Urban and Regional Planning, introduction to Rationality in Planning: Critical Essays on the Role of Rationality in Urban and Regional Planning, ed. M. J. Breheny and A. Hooper (London: Pion Press, 1985). 89. Faludi and Alexander, note 88, pp. 242330. 90. Pinel, note 49; idem, Social Impact, note 29; idem, note 46. 91. Cernea, note 12; Inkeles and Smith, note 17; Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, in Timothy Roberts and Amy Hite, eds., From Modernization to Globalization: Perspectives on Development and Social Change (Malden, UK: Blackwell, 2000): 119133. 92. Laura Zanotti, Governmentalizing the PostCold War International Regime: The UN Debate on Democratization and Good Governance, Alternatives 30 (2005): 461487. 93. Michael Storper, Society, Community, and Economic Development, Studies in Comparative International Development, 39, no. 4 (2005): 3057.