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STRATEGY THE INDIRECT APPROACH B. H. LIDDELL HART EDITED BY MRS ANUPAMA SINGH

2 INDIRECT APPROACH 1. The Indirect approach was Liddell Hart's attempt to find a soln to the problem of high cas rates in conflict zones with high force to space ratios, such as the Western Front on which he served. 2. The strategy calls for armies to advance along the line of least resistance. It is best described in this quote from his papers referring to the theory. 3. In Strategy the longest way around is often the shortest way there.

4. A direct approach to the object exhausts the attacker and hardens the resistance by compression, where as an indirect approach loosens the defender's hold by upsetting his balance. 5. There were two fundamental principles which governed the "Indirect Approach". (a) Direct attacks on firm defensive positions almost never work, and should never be attempted. (b) To defeat the enemy, one must first disrupt his equilibrium. This cannot be an effect of the main attack; it must take place before the main attack is commenced. 6. While he originally developed the theory for infantry, contact with J. F. C. Fuller helped change his theory more towards tanks. 7. The indirect apch become a major factor in the development of blitzkrieg.

8. Often misunderstood, the indirect approach is not a treatise against fighting direct battles; it was still based on the Clausewitzian ideal of direct combat and the destruction of an enemy force by arms. 9. It was in reality an attempt to create a doctrine for the remobilisation of warfare after the costly attrition of the strategic stalemate of the First World War. Q. What are the views of Sun 7 ZU on the art of war 500 BC as high lightened in strat - indirect Approach? Ans. 1. All warfare based on deception. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) When able to attk, we must seem unable. When using our forces, we must seem inactive. When we are near, we must make en believe that we are away. When for away, we must make him believe we are near. Hold out baits to entice en. Feign disorder, and crush him.

3 2. 3. 4. No country have benefited from prolonged warfare Supreme excellence Break ens resistance without fighting. Highest form of Generalship (a) (b) (c) (d) To baulk ens plans. Prevent Junction of Ens forces. Over is to attk ens army in Fd. Worst policy of all is to besiege walked cities.

5. Indirect Apch. Direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect method will be needed in order to secure victory. 6. Appear at pts which en must hasten to defend. you are not expected. March swiftly to places where

7. Make for ens weak pts. You may adv & be absolutely irresistible, if you make for ens weak pts. Your may retire & be safe from pursuit. if your movements are more rapid that those of En. 8. All men can see tacs where by I conquer but what none can see is strategy out of which victory is evolved. 9. Avoid what is strong is to strike what is weak.

10. Art of studying circumstances. Refrain from intercepting en whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm & confident array. 11. When you surround en army leave an outlet free . Do not press desperate foe too hard. 12. Rapidity is essence of war . Take advantage of ens unreadiness, make way by an Expected routes & attk ungrounded spots. Q. What has been implication of Appearances of hydrogen Bomb on the world? Ans. 1. Gen. Increased sense of insecurity in those whom the wpn was designed to protect.

2. Pure Mil strat needs to be guided by longer & wider view from the higher plane of grand strat. (a) Tortured Anxiety of people is manestation that leaders failed to think through problems of attaining peace through use of H Bomb. (b) Did not look beyond imdt strat Aim of wining war & were content to assume Mil victory would assure peace.

4 3. H-Bomb would not be used against any menace less certainly & immediately fatal than itself by any resp govt. 4. H Bomb more handicap than help policy of containment. (a) Reduces likelihood of all out war, increases possibility of ltd war pushed by indirect & wide spread local aggression. (b) Aggressor can Exploit a choice of Techniques, differing in palter but all designed to make headway while causing hesitancy about employing counter action with H or A bombs. 5. No Total War as a method & victory as a war aim. Both terms and concepts are totally Absurd. 6. Aggression may count on his opponents natural reluctance to commit suicide as an immediate response to threat that is not clearly fatal. 7. 8. For containment Dependent on conventional wpns. Strat shift to Dual idea of Evading & ham stringing superior Air power.

9. Wiping out cities with H-Bombs would be to destroy out potential Fifth column Assets. 10. Atomic power is stimulating & accelerating reversion to indirect methods.

Q. Is there a practical way of combining prog toward attainment of truth with prog towards its acceptance? Ans. 1. Strat principles imp of maintaining an object consistently and also pursuing it in a way adapted to circumstances. 2. Avoid frontal attack on long established posn, instead seek to turn it by flank movement so that more penetrable side is exposed. Q. Give out rational justification for mil hist as basis of mil Edn? Ans. 1. Gen (a) Mil & Med profession has incessant prac.

(b) Advances in medicine & surgery have been due more to scientific thinker & research worker than to practitioner. 2. Direct Experience Ltd to form adequate foundation either for theory or for application. 3. Preponderant prac value of MH in trg & mental devp of soldier.

5 4. Selection of one or two campaigns & study then exhaustively as means of professional trg & mil theory with such a Ltd basis and continual changes in mil means from war to war carry danger that outlook will be narrow. Q. In most campaigns dislocation of ens psychological & physical bal has been vital prelude to successful attempt at his over throw comment? Ans. 1. Gen. (a) Eff results in war have rarely been attained unless appch had in directness as to ensure opponents un readiness to meet it. (b) Indirectness. Physical & psy.

2. Direct Appch to ones mental object or physical objective along line of natural Expectation for opponent tends to produce negative results. 3. Dislocation produced by strategic indirect Appch. May take varied forms ;(a) (b) (c) (d) Time. Space. Comn. Psy factor.

Q. Comment upon Battle of Marathon? Ans. 1. Gen. Persian invasion of 490 BC was a comparatively small expedition intended to teach Eretria and Athens to abstain from encouraging revolt among Persias Greek subjects in Asia minor. 2. 3. Eretria destroyed. Inhabitants deported for resettlement on Persian gulf. Athens. (a) Ultra- Democratic party waiting to aid Persian intervention against their own conservative party. (b) Landing of Persians at marathon (i) Persians, instead of making direct advance on Athens, Landed at Marathon, 24 miles NE of it. (ii) Could calculate on drawing Athenian army towards them, thus facilitating seizure of power in Athens by their Adherents. (iii) Direct attk on city would have hampered such rising, perhaps even have rallied its force against them. (c) Athenian Army matched out to marathon to meet them.

6 (d) Under prot of covering force, they re- embarked rest of army in order to move it round to phalerum Land there & make spring at unguarded Athens. (e) (f) Plan miscarried due to variety of factors. Victory for Greeks (i) (ii) Striking w/o Delay at covering force Superior Armour & Longer Spears Supreme assets against Persian.

(iii) Persian saw siege unavoidable as Athenian army back in Athens Merely punitive object did not seem worth wroth purchasing at heavy price. Q. Use of strat mobility for an Indirect Apch was realized and Exploited much earlier in sea than in land warfare. Ans. 1. Gen. (a) 487 B.C, Athens began expansion of her fleet Decisive factor in Countering Persians superiority in land forces. (b) 2. 3. 4. Persian Army under Xerxes Marched against Greece.

Army too Big to be tpt by sea and so was compelled to take an overland route. Supply to Army Fleet used for his purpose. Greek Sure about line along which to Expect ens Apch (a) Army tied to coast & Navy tied to Army. (b) Persian unable to depart from Expected line of Apch. (c) Trn afforded Greeks series of pts at which they could firmly block the line of Natural Expectation.

5.

Use of Indirect Apch (a) Ruse for opportunity for decisive Naval Battle. (i) Themistocles msg to Xerxes that Greek fleet ripe for treacherous surrender. (ii) Deception Drew Persian fleet into narrow straits where their superiority of numbers were discounted. (iii) Basis of Themistocles msg. Inspired by fear that allied Peloponnesian cdrs would withdraw from salamis leaving Athenian fleet to fight alone giving Persians a chance to use their superior numbers in open sea.

7 (b) Opposition by Sailor Queen Artemisia against Xerxes desire for Battle. (i) Urged not to carry out direct assault and instead cooperate Persian land force in move against Peloponnesus. with

(ii) Argued Peloponnesian naval contingents would react to such threat by Sailing for home and thereby cause disintegration of Greek fleet. (c) Attk turning fatally disadvantageous to attackers. (i) Withdrawl on part of defender acted like bait in drawing heavier side into unbal posn. (ii) Persian Galleys became congested mass exposed to counterstroke which Greek Galleys delivered from either flank. (iii) Persian withdraw.

Q. The sequel to Sulamis was rise of Athens to ascendency in Greek affairs. This Ascendency near ended by Peloponnesian war (431-404 B.C.) The extravagant duration of 27 yrs of warfare & terrible drain not only on chief adversaries but on luckless would be neutrals may be traced to fluctuating and often purposeless strategy into which both sides repeatedly drifted Comment. Ans. 1. (a) Gen Peloponnesian war (431 to 404 BC) was ancient Greek war fought by Athens & its empire against Peloponnesian league led by Sparta.

(b) Reshaped ancient Greek world. Athens strongest city state in Greek prior to was, near reduced to state of near completes subjection, while Sparta become established leading power of Greek. 2. Conduct. (a) Ph I. Sparta & her allies attempted direct invasion of Attica. (i) Foiled by Pericless war policy. (aa) Refusing Battle on land .

(ab) Using superior Anthenian Navy to wear down ens will by devastating raids. (ii) Periclean Strat. (aa) Strat . Is best confined to its literal meaning of general ships actual dirn of mil force. (ab) Grand strat . Employing and combining strat with other wpns economic, political psychological. Such policy is in application a higher level stat, for which them ground strat has been coined.

8 (ac) Aim of Periclean ground strat. To gradually drain ens endurance in order to convince him that he could not gain decision. In contrast strat of indirect appch which seeks to dislocate ens bal in order to produce decision. (iii) Epidemic of plague. (aa) Plague tipped scales against Athens in moral & economic attrition campaign. (ab) Due to above Periclean strat was made to give place to direct offn strat. (iv) Brasidas of Sparta wipes out all strat advantage of Athens. (aa) Strat mov directed against roots, instead of trunk of en power.

(ab) By passing Athens and striking at Chalcidice - Achilles heel of Athenian empire. (ac) Strat adopted. Combination of mil force with promise of freedom & prot to all cities which revolted against her. Drew her main forces _________. (b) PH-II. Pseudo peace and Scilian Expedition. (i) Repeated Athenian expeditions failed to regain Chalcidice.

(ii) Offn by Athens against Syracuse overseas food supply of Sparta & Peloponnese came from Syracuse. (iii) Grand strat of indirect Appch. Defect :(aa) Striking not at ens actual partners but business associates.

(ab) Instead of distracting ens forces , it drew fresh forces into opposition. (iv) Moral & Economic results might change bal of war but blunders in execution. (c) Ph-III. Lysander destr of Athenian ships at Dardanelles.

(i) Plan. To avoid fighting & reduce Athenians to extremities by attacking empire at its most vulnerable pts. (ii) Execution. (aa) Reached entrance of Dardanelles to lay in wait of grain ships on their way to Athens.

9 (ab) Grain supply essential to Athens. Therefore rushed entire fleet of 180 ships to safe guard it. (ac) Deception by Spartan Admiral Lysander. Four successive days tried to tempt Lysander to battle which he gave them every encouragement to think they had cornered him. Instead of retiring in safe harbor of Sestos, stayed in open strait opp Aegospotami. On fifth day, when most of crew gone ashore to collect food, attacked and captured entire fleet. 3. Lessons. (a) Failing of Direct Apch. In 27 yrs of struggle Scores of Direct Apchs failed, scales were turned against Athens by Brasidar move against Chalcidice root. (b) Use of Grand strat. To effect Achlibaos in direct appch on plane of grand strat to Spartas economic root in Sicily. (c) Attk at economic obj. By attacking Ships of grains Lysander drained ens str and was able to produce conditions favourable to surprise and obtain swift mil decision.

Spartan Campaign THREE COPONNESIAN WAR

10 Q. Describe the grand strat followed by Epaminondas in finding Spartas accendency and also how army & state succumbed quickest to paralysis of brain ? Ans. 1. Gen. In years imdt preceding rise of Epaminondas Thebes had release himself from Spartas dominion. 2. Grand Strat of Indirect Apch. (a) Refusing battle, strat merely of Evasion.

Gained Times to Devp professional force.

(b) Gained time and opportunity foa disaffection to spread, and for Athens, thereby relived of land pressure to, concentrate her Energy and manpower on revival of her fleet. 3. New tactical in methodology of Oblique order in Battle of Leuctra (371BC).

THEBAN CAMP

EPAMINONDAS

SPARTA N CAMP

(a) (b) (c) 4.

Epaminondas placed his str on his left wing. Held his weak centre & right. Crushing Superiority against one wing of En where their leader stood.

Epaminondas march to Sparta. (a) Use of 3 separated, but converging colns three distracting forces & dirn of opposition. (b) After meeting of converging colns at Caryal, 20 miles short of Sparta, slipped past capital and moved up from rear. Timely arrival of rfts from Peloponnesian allies and thwarting chance of city falling w/o siege.

11 5. Creation of new capital of Messenian state (a) Realization on part of Epaminondas that Spartans would not be lured into open. (b) (c) Prolonged Investment Dwindling of Heterogeneous force. Relinquished blunted strat wpn for more subtle wpn creation of new capital. (i) (ii) (d) 6. Est all insurgents elements that joined. Used booty gained during invasion as endowment for new state.

No victory in fd but dislocation of foundation of Spartan power.

Victory at Mantinea (a) Caused en to form up facing his line of Apch. towards en camp/line of natural Expectation. (b) Mvre to threaten ens rt wing. (i) (ii) Surprise/Deception. Dislocation of en Bal. Marching directly

Q. How policy and strategy can assist each other and also how strategy can turn topographical obstacles from disadvantage to advantage also how Macedon est supremacy of Greek? Ans. 1. Gen. (a) (b) 2. Thebes & Athens united against Macedon. Foreign backing Persian king.

Indirect Apch by Philip. (a) Prompting invitation for himself at Amphictyonic council for himself Amphissa in western Bocotia. Rallied Thebes & Athens against him, but Ensured benevolent neutrality of other state. (b) Occupation of Elates and distracting strat attention of En towards Eastern route. (i) After marching southwards, Philip suddenly diverged at cytinium from route to Amphissa Natural line of Expectation and instead occupied Elate. (ii) Foreshadowed wider political Aims. Restoration of phocian

(c) Steps to weaken opponents politically. committees Earlier dispersed by Thebans.

12 (d) Mvre from diverging from line of Expectation. (i) Moved swiftly from Cytinium, crossed pass by ni & debouched into western Bocotia at Amphissa. Pressing on to Naupaetus opened comns at sea. (ii) Forced defender to abandon pass.

(iii) Instead of pressing eastwards from Amphissa through hilly country which would aid resistance, switched army back through cytinium and Eiatea thread Southward through unguarded pass of paapotamil and descended upon ens army at Chaeronea. (e) Lured Athenians out of posns to lower grnd & than delivering counterstroke.

13 1. Gen (a) (b) Alexanders adv series of acute zigzags. Indirectness more political than strat, although political in grand strat sense.

(c) Earlier strat direct and devoid of subtlety confidence in own superiority & felt no need to dislocate adversaries strat bal. 2. Defeating of Persian covering force. (a) (b) (d) Defeated Persian covering force at Grancious. En overwhelmed by wt & impetus of spear Armd cav. Had Persians conc they would have paralyzed invasion at birth.

3. Restoring Democratic govt & rights in sardis therby securing own rear in most economical way. 4. Dislocation of Persian comd of sea. way to south and then east ward. (a) Returned to Aegean coast & pushed his

Deprived Persian fleet of freedom on move, through depriving of its bases.

(b) By freeing sea ports Deprived en fleet much of manpower which was recruited from them. 5. Sewing of rear in central Asia. Beyond panphylia, coastline of rest of Asia minor practically Barren of ports. Hence turned towards Ancyra. 6. Strat out mvre by Darius III enroute towards Syria (a) plains. (b) Indirect Apch by darius III Moving up higher reaches of Euphrates and coming to Alexanders rear. (c) 7. Extricated himself by superiority of tacs/tac instrument. Failure of int and own faulty Appreciation that Persians would wait for him in

Adopting indirect route to coast of Syria instead of pressing on to Babylon. Reasons:(a) Though Dislocated Persian comd of sea, it was yet to be destroyed. If it Exsisted threat of unsecure rear. (b) Addl precaution measures.

(c) Egypt immense economic asset for consolidation of his hold on Persian empire. 8. Battle of Gaugamela an occupation of Babylon.

14 9. Battle with poms on Hydaspes (a) (b) (c) Masterpieces of indirectness. Distributed army widely along Western bank. Deceived & opponent as to intentions.

(d) Repeated noisy marches & counter marches of Alexanders cavalary, dulled Poruss reaction. (e) (f) (g) (h) Fixed Porus to definite and static posn. Bulk Army opp Porus. With small force made a NI xg Eighteen miles upstream. Dislocated mental & moral equilibrium.

Q. What was Fabian strat? Ans. 1. 2. 3. Mil strat. Pitched Battles & frontal assaults are avoided.

Aim. To wear down an opponent through a war of attrition & indirection. Methodology (a) (b) (c) (d) Avoid decisive Battles. Harass en through skirmishes to cause attrition. Disrupt sups. Affect morale.

4. Emp of this strat implies that weaker side belives time is on its side, but it may also be adopted when no feasible alterative strat can be devised.

15 Roman Wars Punic Wars

Battle at Lake Trasimene 1. Backgrnd. (a) During the Punic Wars, in 217 BC Servilius and Flaminius took charge of the army. (b) 2. Four new legions were raised, and were divided between the two consuls.

Hannibals Indirect Apch. (a) Flaminius army moved south to prepare the defence of Rome.

(b) He expected Hannibal to attack the city, but he failed to intercept the Carthaginians because they marched much faster than he did and had overtaken him. (c) While all this was going on Servilius legion were on their way to join up with Flaminius near Rome. (d) Hannibal wanted to try to stop the two armies from joining together because a combined army would greatly outnumber his own. (e) Hannibal marched daringly around his opponents left side, which effectively cut Flamimius off from Rome. (f) Hannibal was an abnormal general and hence, like other great captains, chose to face the most hazardous conditions rather than the certainty of meeting his opponents in a position of their own choosing. (g) For four days and three nights Hannibals army marched through a route which was under water suffering terrible from fatigue and enforced want of sleep, while losing many men and more horses. (h) But on emerging he found the Roman army still passively encamped at Arretium. (i) 3. Hannibal attempted no direct attack.

Hannibals Disposns. (a) As Hannibal passed Lake Trasimene, he noticed a place that was suitable for an ambush. (b) Above his camp, he deployed his hy inf. From this position they would be able to charge down into the Romans left flk.

16 (c) He placed his cavalry and some light infantry in the forests near the Romans retreat. (d) Then he deployed more light infantry all along the hills overlooking the lake, with orders to stay hidden in the trees until they heard the signal to attack. (e) Finally, during night, he had some of his men light campfires on the hills in the distance. (f) This would trick the Romans into thinking that his army was further away than it actually was 4. Conduct of Battle. (a) In the Battle of lake Trasimene, (Refer Appx D) the Romans marched along the road by the northern side of the lake. (b) Flaminius had seen the campfires in the distances and thought that the Carthaginians were pulling away from him, so he quickened his march. (c) 5. Once all the Romans had passed into the valley, Hannibal sprung his trap.

Lessons Learnt. (a) This was a mental application of the mvre against the ens rear, based on searching inquiries about his opponents character and it was followed by physical execution. (b) Pressing along the road to Rome, Hannibal laid and achieved the greatest ambush in history. (c) The fwg morning, Roman army of Trasimene, was caught by surprise in a trap front and rear and annihilated.

17 Lake Trasimene

Battle of Cannae 1. Backgrnd. (a) The Battle of Cannae was major battle of the Second Punic War, which took place on 2 August 216 BC. (b) The army of Carthage under Hannibal decisively defeated a numerically superior army of the Roman Republic under command of consuls Paullus and Varro. (c) It is regarded as one of the greatest tactical feats in military history.

(d) The Roman massed their heavy infantry in deeper formation than usual while Hannibal utilized the double-envelopment tactic. (e) Varro moved the Roman army out of camp to provide the kind of battle which Hannibal desired. 2. Battle Disposns. (a) (b) The inf of both sides were posted in the centre and the cavalry on the flanks. But Hannibals detailed disposition was unconventional.

(c) He pushed fwd the Gauls and Spaniards, who formed the centre of the inf line, while holding back his African foot, posted at each end of the line. (d) 3. Thus the Gauls and Spaniards formed a natural magnet for the Roman inf.

Conduct. (a) The Gauls & Spaniards were as intended forced back so that what had been a line bulging onwards became a line sagging inward.

18 (b) The Roman legionaries, flushed with their apparent success, crowded into the opening where the press grew ever denser, until they could scarcely use their weapons. (c) While they imagined that they were breaking the Carthaginian front, they were actually pushing themselves into a Carthaginian sack. (d) For at this juncture Hannibals African veteran wheeled inwards from both sides and automatically enveloped the thickly packed Romans. (e) Meanwhile, Hannibals hy cavalry on the left wg had broken through the opposing cavalry on that flank. (f) And sweeping round the Romans rear, dispersed their cavalry on the other flank hitherto held in play by the elusive Numidian horses. (g) Leaving the pursuit to the Numidians the hy cavalry delivered the final stroke by bursting into the rear of the Roman infantry, already surrounded on three sides and too lightly jammed of offer effective resistance. (h) (i) Thence fwd the battle was merely a massacre. Out of the 76,000 men of the Roman army, 70,000 fell on the battle. Battle of Cannae

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Q. Hannibal stood at bay in the southern Italy fighting Rome while Scipio Jr in 210 B.C by swiftness of move, superior tac & skillful diplomacy was able to capture imp ports and cities of Carthage in Spain. This cut off vital source of recruitment, lgs & economic sp of Hannibal. Thereafter Scipio moved to Africa for his decisive indirect apch against Carthage in 204 B.C. (a) How did he apply indirectness as a strat to capture the Carthage camp on arrival? (b) Why did he not at once move for Carthage even when Hannibal had not arrived in Africa? (c) By what other indirect activities did he keep Carthage on tenterhooks before the final battle of Zama? Scipios Capture of Carthage Camp. 1. Backgrnd. (a) Scipio sailed in 204 BC and landed near Utica.

(b) His intention was to secure the port of Utica, to serve as his base in capture of Cartagena. (c) Carthage, meanwhile had secured the friendship of the Numidian Syphax.

(d) Syphax brought an army of 60,000 men to reinforce the new Carthaginian forces which Hasdrubal was raising against Scipio. (e) This adv compelled Scipio to abandon the siege of Utica and dig in on the shore between there and Carthage. 2. Scipio dulls En reaction. (a) On the apch of the combined armies much superior to his own, in numbers if not in quality, Scipio fell back to a small peninsula, where he fortified himself.

20 (b) Here, he first lulled the cdrs of the investing forces into a feeling of security, then distracted their attn by ostensible preparations for seaborne thrust against Utica. 3. Scipios Final Blow. (a) Finally, he made a ni move upon the ens two camps.

(b) The demoralizing and disorganizing effect of the surprise was intensified by Scipios subtle calculation in first launching an attack on Syphaxs less orderly camp. (c) In the camp swarms of huts overflowed the fortified bdys and were made of inflammable reeds and matting. (d) In the confusion caused by setting of fire to these huts the Hasdrubals Carthaginians opened their own gates to put out the fire & rescue. (e) Imagining that the fire was accidental for when darkness fell, all had been quite and normal in the Roman camp seven miles distant. (f) When the gates of the Carthaginian camp were opened, Scipio launched upon them the second stroke of his attack so gaining entry without the cost of making breach. (g) Both the hostile armies were dispersed, with the reputed loss of half their total strength. (h) In this example the strat not only paved way for a victory in the battle but also produced it.

Sciplo`s Capture of Carthage Camp

Reasons for Scipio not attacking Carthage. 1. Scipios move was a parallel to that of Hannibal, when the latter did not attack Rome after the battles of Lake Trasimene and Cannae. 2. Reasons by Liddell Hart. (a) Unless there is an opportunity and favourable prospect for a quick surprise aslt, a siege is the most uneconomic of all ops of war. (b) The en in both the cases had an army in fd capable of intervening a siege.

21 (c) Assailant would thus be progressively weakening himself against en.

3. It would have been a strat mistake had Hannibal landed on his rear while he was undertaking a siege at Carthage. Various Indirect Apchs adopted by Scipio instead. 1. Instead of moving on to Carthage, Scipio systematically lopped off her supplies and allies. 2. He restored Masinissa as the King of Numidia, thus assuring cav resources to counter Hannibals best wpn. 3. He struck Carthaginians with terror & dismay by advancing to Tunis just in sight of Carthage. Q. In 202 B.C as soon as Scipio concluded a peace with Carthage by his indirect strat and help of the Numidian allies, Hannibal landed at Leptis. Scipio instead of taking an offn to prevent Hannibal from reaching Carthage moved to the Carthages interior in an indirect manner and cut off the main source of supplies to it. He thus forced Hannibal to move into the battle of his own choosing. Elucidate the events leading to the decisive battle of Zama. Battle of Zama. 1. Backgrnd. (a) The Battle of Zama on 19 Oct 202 BC between Scipio and Hannibal, where drawn by the compulsion of condition created by Scipio. (b) Hannibal had to move west by forced marches to meet Scipio, instead of north to Carthage (inverted V). (c) 2. Thus Scipio had lured him to an area of his own choosing.

Scipios strat insight. (a) The move had also brought Scipio more closer to his Numidian ally, Masinissa, who was bringing in reinforcements. (b) Here Hannibal lacked the mtrl reinforcement, stable pivot and shelter in case of defeat which he would have enjoyed if the battle had taken place near Carthage. (c) Scipio had thrust on his en the need seeking battle and he now exploited this moral advantage to the full.

3.

Conduct & Progress for Battle. (a) Masinissa joined Scipio, almost coincidently with Hannibals arrival on the scene. (b) Scipio fell back instead of going fwd and thus drew Hannibal.

(c) Hannibal was drawn to a camping grnd where the Carthaginians suffered from lack of water and adequate battlegrnd.

22 (d) The battlegrnd was a plain area where Scipios newly acquired advantage in cavalry could have full play. (e) And when tactical defeat for the first time overtook Hannibal, the consequences of his preliminary strat defeat also overtook him. (f) For there was no sheltering fortress at hand where the defeated army could rally before the pursuit annihilated it. (g) The bloodless surrender of Carthage followed.

Battle of Zama

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Roman Civil Wars. Julius Caesar against Pompey. 1. The campaign where Julius Caesar fought Pompey, during the Civil War of 50 to 45 B.C. are also examples of the strategy of the indirect approach. 2. Caesar understood the mind of his adversary: Pompey very well, as he with his numerically inferior force marched towards Rome. 3. Time and surprise were the two most vital elements at that time.

4. As Caesar passed thru the populous areas of Italy many joined him instead of Pompey (Jan 49 B.C). 5. Morally shaken by the speed of Caesars adv Pompey shifted from Rome to Capua.

6. Caesar still moved ahead to Southern Italy forcing Pompey to move to Brindisi from where he subsequently fled to Greece. 7. Fleeing of Pompey was a strat failure. As directness in apch adopted by Caesar robbed him of chance of ending the war in one campaign. Second Campaign: Roman Civil War 1. Instead of fwg Pompey in Greece, Caesar turned to deal with the Pompeian front in Spain (Jun 49 B.C). 2. He advanced to ens main forces at Ilerda across the Pyrenees.

3. Instead of making any attempt to press the siege of Ilerda, Caesar devoted his energies to the creation of an artificial ford which enabled him to command both banks of the river Sicoris, on which Ilerda stood.

25 4. This tightening of his grip on their sources of supply induced Pompeys lieutenants to retire, while there was time. 5. Caesar allowed them to slip away un-pressed, but instead sent his Gallic cav to get on their rear and delay their march. 6. Then rather than assault the bridge held by the enemys rearguard, he took the risk of leading his legions through the deep ford, which was regarded as only traversable by cavalry and marching in a wide circuit during the night, placed himself across the enemys line to retreat. 7. Even then Caesar did not attempt battle, but was content to head off each attempt of the en to take a fresh line of retreat using his cav to harass and delay them while his legions marched wide. 8. Firmly holding in check the eagerness of his own men for battle, he at the same time encouraged fraternization with the men of the other side, who were growing weary, hungry, and depressed. 9. Finally, when he had shepherded them back in the dirn of Ilerda, & forced them to take up a posn devoid of water, they capitulated. 10. It was strategic victory as bloodless for the defeated as for the victor.

11. Despite the substitution of maneuver for direct assaults upon his en the campaign had cost him only six weeks of his time.

ILERDAX

26

Campaign in Greece (Jun-Aug 48 B.C) 1. Initial Direct Apch. (a) (b) (c) 2. In 48 B.C Caesar chose a direct sea route to Greece where Pompey had fled. He sailed from Brindisi and landed at Dyrrachium with almost half of his force. The sea borne landings resulted in a stalemate.

Battle at Pharsalus. (a) The deadlock was broken by an indirect apch adopted by Caesar.

(b) He marched on a difficult route to place himself between Pompey and Dyrrachium. (c) Next he constructed investment lines around Pompeys forces which were numerically superior to his and had an adequate opportunity to move away by the sea route (d) Caesar then drew out the Pompeys forces in a series of mvres into open by moving eastwards in Macedonia. (e) At Pharsalus he got the better of Pompeys forces and chased him across thru the Asia Minor to Mediterranean and then to Alexandria. (f) 3. Ptolemy assassinated Pompey at Alexandria subsequently in Oct 48 B.C.

Comments on Caesars Strat. (a) Caesars Fault. Caesars recurrent & deep rooted fault was his concentration in pursuing the obj imdt in front of his eyes to the neglect of his wider obj.

27 (b) (c) (d) Strat he was an alternating Jekyll & Hyde. Caesars indirectness of apch appears narrow & wanting in surprise. In each of his campaigns he strained the ens morale, but did not dislocate it.

(e) The reason would appear to be that he was more concerned to aim at the mind of the ens tps than at the mind of their comd. (f) His campaigns bring out the distinction between the two qualities of indirect apch: to the opposing forces and to the opposing comd. (g) They also bring out most forcibly the difference between a direct and an indirect apch. (h) For Caesar met failure each time he relied on the direct, & retrieved it each time he resorted to the indirect. Chronology Roman Civil War 1. 2. 3. Aug 47 B.C Jan 46 B.C Sep 45 B.C Campaign in Asia Minor. African Campaign by Caesar ended by Battle of Thaspus. Spanish Campaign ended by Battle of Munda. Byzantine Wars Q. What were the peculiarities of the various Campaigns of Belisarius? Ans. Campaigns of Belisarius: Pecularities. 1. The campaigns of Belisarius stand out for their use of the indirect apch.

2. Belisarius utilized the extraordinary slender resources to undertake some farreaching campaigns. 3. His consistent use of the tactical defensive was unique in itself.

4. Remarkable feature of his army was that it was based on the mobile arm and mainly composed of cav. 5. Belisarius was audacious and his tac were to allow or tempt the other side to do the attacking. 6. He did this as a matter of subtle calculation, both tactical and psychological.

Q. Write a short note on the Byzantine Cav and Inf. Ans. Byzantine Cavalry. 1. 2. The principal arm of Byzantine Army was formed by the hy cavalry. These were armed with bow as well as lance, and clad in armour.

28 3. The underlying idea was to combine the value of mobile fire-power and of mobile shock-power. 4. These hy cavalry were supplemented by lightly equipped horse-archers- a combination which, both in form and tactics, foreshadowed that of modern lt and hy (or med) tanks. Infantry. 1. The infantry likewise were of light and heavy types.

2. The latter, with their heavy spears and close-locked formation, merely served as a stable pivot round which the cavalry could mvre in battle. Battle of Daras Backgrnd. 1. In 530, a Persian army of some 40,000 men advanced upon the fortress of Daras.

2. To meet them Belisarius had a force of barely half their strength, mostly composed of raw recruits who had recently arrived. 3. Rather than stand a siege, he decided to risk a battle, though on a posn he had carefully prepared for defensive-offensive tactics. 4. He counted on the Persian contempt for the Byzantines, as well as their superiority in numbers, to make them take the lead in attack. Battle Disposns. 1. A wide and deep ditch was dug in front of Daras, but near enough to the walls to allow the defenders of the ditch to be supported by overhead fire from the battlements. 2. Here Belisarius placed his less reliable infantry.

3. A cross - trench ran forward at right angles from each end, and from the ends of these projecting trenches another straight one stretched outwards to the hills on either side of the valley. 4. Along these flanking extensions, which had wide passages at intervals, bodies of heavy cavalry were posted ready for counter attack. 5. The Hunnish light cavalry were posted at the two inner corners so that, if hy cavalry on the wings were driven back, they might relieve the pressure by making a harassing sally on to the attackers rear. Persian Actions. 1. The Persian, on arrival were baffled by these dispositions, and spent the first day in exploratory skirmishing. 2. Next morning Belisarius sent a letter to the Persian cdr suggesting that the points in dispute could be settled better by mutual discussion than by fighting.

29 3. But the Persian cdr replied that the promises of Romans could never be trusted.

4. In his mind, Belisarius message and his defensive attitude behind a trench were merely signs of fear. 5. The attack was launched.

Conduct. 1. Persians were careful not to push into the obvious trap in the centre but their care played into the hands of Belisarius. 2. For it meant not only that their efforts was split but that the fighting was confined to the cavalry on the wgs to the arm in which Belisarius was least outnumbered and on which he could best rely. 3. At the same time his inf were able to contribute by their archery fire.

4. The Byzantine bow outranged the Persian and the Persian armour was not proof against the Byzantine arrow as the Byzantine was against the Persian. 5. Against his left wg the Persian cav at first made progress but then a small cavalry det which had been hidden behind a hill on the flank suddenly charged them in rear. 6. This unexpected stroke, coupled with the appearance of the Hunnish light cavalry of their other flank, caused them to retreat. 7. On the other flank, the Persian cavalry pressed still deeper, up to the walls of city, only to produce a gap into which Belaisarius threw all his available cavalry. 8. This counterstroke at the weakened hinge of the Persian line first drove the Persian cavalry wing off the battlefield into a divergent line flight and then turned on the exposed flanks of the Persian infantry in the centre. 9. The battle ended in the decisive defeat of the Persian the first they had suffered at Byzantine hands for several generations. Comments on Belisarius strat. 1. Belisarius was master of the art of converting his weakness into strength and the opponents strength into a weakness. 2. His tactics, too, had the essential characteristic of the indirect apch - that of getting the opponent off-balance, thereby uncovering and dislocating a joint. (See presentation on Battle of Daras : Sketch Below)

30

FORT DARAS

Belisarius Vs Vandals 1. 2. 3. Justinian decided. in 533. to send an expeditionary force to Africa under Belisarius. Vandals had occupied Africa with Carthage as their capital. For it, however, he provided only5.000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry.

4. They were picked troops the odds seemed heavily against them, since the Vandals were reputed to have nearly 100,000 troops. 5. Belisarius was able to route the Vandals with meager resources.

Belisarius Vs Ostrogoths. 1. Backgrnd. (a) In, 535, Justinian attempted the re-conquest of Italy and Sicily from the Ostrogoths-and as cheaply if possible.

31 (b) He sent a small army under Belisarius to Sicily with an expeditionary force of 12,000 men, instructing him to give out on arrival there that the force was on its way to Carthage. (c) He was then to occupy the island if he found that it could be easily taken; if not, he was to re-embark without showing his hand. 2. Belisarius gains foothold. (a) Belisarius was able to occupy Rome effortlessly with the help of locals.

(b) Vitiges, a general in the Goth army, after buying off the Franks with gold and territory gathered an army of 150,000 men to recapture Rome. (c) 3. To defend it, Belisarius had a bare 10,000.

Belisarius Prepares Def of Rome. (a) But in the three months' grace, he had remodeled the city's defences and built up large stocks of food. (b) His method of defense was an active onewith frequent well-judged sorties.

(c) He exploited the advantage which his cavalry enjoyed through being armed with bows. (d) They could harass the ens Cavalry masses while themselves keeping out of reach, or tease the Gothic lancer into blind charges. (e) Though the strain on the scanty defenders was severe, the strength of the besieger was shrunk much faster, especially through sickness. (f) To accelerate the process Belisarius boldly took the risk of sending two dets from his slender force to seize by surprise the towns of Tivoli and Terracina, which dominated the roads by which the besiegers received their supplies. 4. Belisarius Receives Rfts. (a) Rfts reached him from home, he extended his mobile raids across to and up the Adriatic coast towards the Goths' main base at Ravenna. (b) Finally, after a year's siege, the Goths abandoned the attempt and withdrew northward-their departure being hastened by the news that a Byzantine raiding force had seized Rimini, a town on their comns disturbingly close to Ravenna. (c) As the rear half of the Gothic army was crowding over the Mulvian Bridge, it suffered heavily from a parting stroke which Belisarius launched against it. (d) While Vitiges retreated NE towards Ravenna, Belisarius dispatched part of his force, with the fleet, up the west coast to capture Pavia and Milan. (e) He himself, with a mere 3,000 men, rode across to the east coast, where he was joined by a newly landed reinforcement of 7,000, under Narses.

32 (f) Thence he hastened to the relief of his endangered det Rimini, which had allowed itself to be shut in by Vitiges. (g) Masking the fortress of Osimo, where the Goths had left a force of 25,000, Belisarius slipped past it and advanced on Rimini, in two colns, while another part of his force went by sea. (h) This adv from three directions was intended to give the Goths an exaggerated impression of his str. (i) To strengthen the impression, a far-stretched chain of camp-fires were lighted by ni. (j) The stratagem succeeded, helped by the fear which Belisarius's name now inspired, and the much larger Gothic army bolted in panic on his approach. (k) Belisarius now, while keeping watch over Vitiges in Ravenna, planned to clear his comns with Rome by reducing the various fortresses that he had slipped past in his rapid advance. (l) With such small number as he possessed this was not an easy problem, but his method was to isolate, and concentrate upon particular fortress while using a farflung curtain of mobile dets to keep any potential relieving forces occupied in their own area. (m) Meantime Vitiges send embassies to the Franks and the Persians to join in a concerted attack on the Empire from both sides while its forces were so widely stretched. (n) The King of the Franks responded by crossing the Alps with a large army. (o) But had to flee back home in face of a famine as they dared not push on in face of a mobile opponent, Belisarius. (p) Belisarius was then able to tighten his grip on Ravenna, and bring about the surrender of Vitiges.

33

RIVER PO

PAVIA & MILAN

RIMINI

RAVENNA ROME TAGINAE

Belisarius Vs Chosroes, The Persian King 1. Backgrnd. (a) In 540, he was recalled by Justinian to deal with the Persians' renewed threat.

(b) Chosroes, the new King of Persia had succeeded in capturing Antioch and other wealthy Syrian cities after a desert march. (c) A new peace treaty was made between Justinian and Chosroes.

(d) The treaty was violated as soon as Chosroes returned back & Belisarius reached Constantinople. 2. Chosroes Invades Again. (a) Chosroes soon invaded the area of Colchis along Black sea and captured the fortress of Petra. (b) To counter this Belisarius dispatched his Arab allies on a raid down the Tigris into Assyria. (c) This well timed thrust threatened the base of Persian Army in Colchis. (d) (e) (f) An apt example of indirect apch against a superior en. Chosroes then advanced to Jerusalem, the wealthiest city after Antioch. He moved with a large army of approx 200,000.

34 (g) With such a huge army he couldnt move across the desert route & had to march up to the Euphratus into Syria before he turned for Palestine. (h) Sure about the ens route Belisarius conc his avlb tps at Carshemish, on upper Euphrates in order to threaten the invaders flk while adv. 3. Chosroes sends an envoy. (a) Chosroes got to know about the presence of tps at Carshemish.

(b) He sent an envoy to work out a possible basis of peace but in reality check the str and disposns of Belisariuss force. (c) Guessing the intentions/ object of envoy Belisarius staged a Mil Play.

(d) Wherein he moved out some of his best tps on the route of Persian envoys apch. (e) Tps were asked to spread out and move constantly. This was to magnify their numbers. (f) 4. Belisariuss light heartedness and carefree attitude of tps added to the effect

Miraculous results of the deception. (a) The Persian envoy returned to report that a hazardously large force was onto the flks of the Persian army. (b) Further confusing mvres along the Euphrates by Belisariuss cav bluffed the Persians into a hurried retreat across the river and back home. (c) This miraculous result was achieved by an indirect apch purely psychological, profited by a flanking posn.

2nd Italian Campaign under Narses 1. Backgrnd. (a) Belisarius was tasked by Justinian again to deal with the Goths but gave him very less resources. (b) This was mainly due to various differences between both.

(c) In 548 Belisarius obtained permission to return as no help was forthcoming from the emperor. (d) Four yrs later Justinian repented his decision and sent a fresh expedition under Narses. 2. Narses Indirect Advance. (a) Narses made full use of the opportunity offered to him.

35 (b) him. (c) He firstly ensured that a really strong and well equipped force was provided to

He marched north round the Adriatic shore.

(d) On the other hand the Goths believed that an invasion would come across the sea and not along the rugged costal route which had numerous river mouths. (e) Narses made an unexpectedly rapid progress using river crossing expedients and reached Ravenna without any opposition. 3. Narses forces Totila to battle. (a) Losing no time Narses pressed southwards and bypassed various forts on way. (b) Slipping thru passes in Apennines he came upon Totila at Taginae, this ensured that gothic force could not assemble fully. (c) Here Narses had numerical superiority over Totila and planned on a tactical offn def relying on the instinctive offensiveness of Goths. 4. Battle at Taginae. (a) Narses design was based on an awareness of the Goth's justified contempt for the frailty of the byzantine inf in face of a cavalry charge. (b) In the centre of his line he placed a large body of dismounted cavalry, to use their lances on foot, so that they might appear to the en like a mass of inf spearmen. (c) On each flk of this central body he placed his foot-archers, pushed well fwd in a crescent from which they could enfilade any assault on the centre, with most of his mounted cavalry close in rear of them. (d) Well out to the left, under a hill, he posted a picked force of cavalry to deliver a surprise stroke upon the Goths' rear as soon as they became deeply engaged. (e) This cleverly baited trap fulfilled its purpose. Gothic cavalry were launched against the supposedly unreliable inf in the en's centre. (f) In their charge they suffered badly from the converging hail of arrows on their flks and were then checked in front by the firm stand of the dismounted lancers while increasingly galled by the archers who now closed in on their flks. (g) The Gothic inf hesitated to come up in sp for fear of being themselves attacked in rear by the horse archers whom Narses had posted near the flanking hill. (h) After continuing the vain effort for some time, the disheartened Gothic cavalry began to fall back, whereupon Narses delivered a decisive counterstroke with his own cavalry, hitherto held in res. (i) The defeat of the Goths was so complete that Narses met with little further serious resistance in carrying out the second re-conquest of Italy.

36 Medieval Wars

William of Normandy`s Invasion of England. 1. Landing on Sussex Coast. (a) William of Normandys invasion of England, in 1066, profited from a strategic distraction, and thereby gained at the outset the virtues of an indirect approach. (b) This distraction was the landing of King Harolds rebel brother, Tostig, and his ally, Harold Hardrada, King of Norway, on the Yorkshire coast. (c) This had seemed less immediate a danger than Williams invasion. But it matured earlier and thus gave added effectiveness to Williams plans even though it was promptly defeated. (d) Two days after the annihilation of the Norse invaders at Steamford Bridge, William landed on the Sussex coast. 2. Batlle of Hastings. (a) Instead of advancing northward, he lured Harolds into a precipitate dash southwards with only a fraction of his force by ravaging the lands of Kent and Sussex. (b) The further south Harolds came and the sooner he gave battle, the further both in distance and time, he was separated from his reinforcements. (c) He brought Harolds to battle within sight of the Channel coast and decided the issue by a tactical indirect apch ordering a feigned flight by part of his force which led his opponents to dislocate their own dispositions and in the final phase, the devise of high angle archery fire which caused Harolds death might be classified as an indirect fire apch. 3. Advance to London. (a) Williams strategy after this victory is equally significant.

(b) Instead of marching direct to London, he first secured Dover and his own sea communication. (c) On reaching the outskirts of London, he avoided any direct assault, but made a circle and a circular swathe of devastation, round London to the west and then to the north, (d) Threatened with starvation, the capital surrendered when William had reached Berkhamastead.

37

KENT SUSSEX

38 King John: Thirteen Century. 1. In 1216, when King John saved his kingdom, after almost losing it, by a campaign in which pure strategy was unmixed with battles. 2. His means were mobility, the strong resisting power then possessed by fortresses and the psychological power inherent in the dislike of the townsmen for the barons and their foreign ally, Louis of France. 3. When Louis after landing in east Kent, occupied London and Winchester, John was too weak to oppose him in battle and most of the country was dominated by the barons. But John still preserved the fortresses of Windsor, Reading, Wallingford, and Oxford-which commanded the line of the Thames and separated the baronial forces north and south of itwhile the key stronghold of Dover remained untaken in Louis's rear. 4. John had fallen back to Dorset, but when the situation became clearer he marched north, in July, to Worcester, securing the line of the Severn and thus establishing a barrage to prevent the tide of rebellion flowing further to the west and south-west. Thence he moved east along the already secured line of the Thames as if to relieve Windsor. 5. He deceived the besiegers by sending a detachment of Welsh archers to fire into their camp at night, while he himself swerved north-east and won the race to Cambridge. 6. He was now able to est a further barrage across the routes to the north, while the main French forces were tied to the siege of Dover. His success in circumscribing and contracting the area of opposition and disaffection spelt the failure of the rebels and their ally.

39

Welsh Wars.

(pg 78 Strategy)

1. King Edward I, in 1265 was to make an even greater contribution to military science in his Welsh wars, not only in developing the use of the bow and the combination of cavalry charges with archery fire, but, still more in his strategic method of conquest. 2. The problem was to subdue a hardy and a savage mountain race who could evade battle by retiring to the hills, and then re-occupy the valleys when the invader broke off operation for the winter. 3. If Edwards means were comparatively limited he had an advantage in the fact that the area of the country was also limited. 4. His solution was combination of mobility and strategic points.

5. By building castles at these points, by connecting them with roads, and by keeping his opponents constantly on the move so that they had no chance to recuperate physically and psychologically or recover geographically, during the winter he split up and wore down their power of resistance. Fabian Policy by Constable du Guesclin. (Pg 79 strat)

1. After severely getting defeated from English the French adhered steadfastly to the Fabian Policy of the Constable du Guesclin. 2. The policy was to avoid battle with the main English army, while constantly hampering the movement, and contracting the territory. 3. Far removed from a passive evasion of battle, his strategy exploited mobility and surprise to a degree that few generals have matched - cutting off convoys, cutting up detachments, and capturing isolated garrisons. 4. Always taking the line of least expectation, his surprise attacks on such garrisons, often by night, were helped both by his new and rapid storm methods and by his psychologically calculated choice of objectives where the garrisons were discontented or the population ripe for treachery. 5. Also he fanned every flame of local unrest-as an imdt distraction to the ens attn and an ultimate subtraction from their territory. 6. Within less than five years, du Guesclin had reduced the vast English possessions in France to a slender strip of territory between Bordeaux and Bayonne. 7. He had done it without fighting a battle. Indeed, he never pressed the attack on even small English force if it had gained time to take up defensive dispositions. 8. Other generals have maintained, in common with moneylenders, the principle 'no advance without security. du Guesclin's principle was: 'No attack without surprise.'

40

Block-system Strategy by Henry V

(Pg 79 Strat)

After the battle of Agincourt on 25th Oct 1415 which French lost due to application of direct methods though being numerically superior by four-to-one, Henry V employed what may be called a 'block-system' strategy, seeking permanent conquest by methodical extensions of territory, in which the population was conciliated as a means to secure his tenure. The interest and value of Henry's later campaigns lie in their grand strategy rather than in their strategy. EDWARD-IV 1. First Campaign to Throne: 1461. (a) In 1461 Edward IV gained his throne and regained it in 1471, after being in exile, by his exceptional use of mobility. (b) First campaigns success was mainly due to swiftness of judgment and movement. (c) Edward was in Wales when he got a word that the main Lancastrian army was coming down from the north upon London. (d) Turning back, he reached Gloucester on the 20th Feb where he learnt of the Lancastrian victory at St. Albans on the 17th February over the Yorkist force under Warwick. (e) St. Albans to London was 20 miles, Gloucester to London more than 100 miles; the Lancastrians had three days in hand. (f) Edward, swiftly entered London on the 26th, and was there proclaimed king, while the Lancastrians retired to the north. (g) When he followed them up, he risked much by attacking an army of superior str in its chosen posn at Towton. (h) But a snowstorm and its exploitation by his subordinate, Fauconberg, who galled the blinded defenders with arrows . 2. Regaining Throne in 1471. (a) In 1471, he had lost his throne in the interval; but with 1,200 followers and some assistance from his former supporters in England, he attempted to retrieve his fortune. (b) When he set sail from Flushing, the coasts of England were guarded against him but, fwg the line of least expectation, he landed in the Humber on the shrewd calculation that as this district was Lancastrian in sympathy it would be unguarded. (c) Moving swiftly, before the news of his landing could spread and his foes could gather, he reached York. (d) Then he marched down the London road and neatly swerved past a force blocking the way at Tadcaster. (pg 80-81)

41 (e) Keeping the lead from this force, which now pursued him, his threat to the next opposing force, which awaited him at Newark, induced it to retire eastwards. (f) Thereupon Edward turned SW to Leicester, where he gathered in more adherents. (g) He then headed for Coventry, where Warwick, now his chief opponent, was assembling his forces. (h) He drew both his pursuers thither, as he turned SE and marched straight on London, which opened its gates to him. (i) Now feeling strong enough to accept battle, he marched out to meet his pursuers on their arrival at Barnet; and here a fog-confused battle ended in his favour. (j) That same day the Lancastrian Queen, Margaret of Anjou, landed at Weymouth with some French mercenaries. (k) She marched to unite with the army which the Earl of Pembroke had raised in Wales. (l) By swiftness again, Edward reached the edge of the Cotswolds while her army was marching north along the Bristol-Gloucester road in the valley below. (m) In a long day's race-one army in the valley, the other on the hts above, he caught hers in the evening at Tewkesbury, having prevented it crossing the Severn at Gloucester by sending orders ahead to the Constable to close the gates. (n) That night he camped too close to the Lancastrians for them to escape.

(o) Their posn was strong defensively, but Edward used his bombards as well as archers to gall them into a charge, and thus gained a decisive advantage. (p) Edward's strategy was exceptional in its mobility but typical of the age in its lack of subtlety. For medieval strategy had normally the simple and direct aim of seeking imdt battle. Jenghiz Khan`s Conquest of China. 1. (pg 81 strategy)

The best example of strategy in the Middle Ages comes from the East.

2. In scale and in a quality, in surprise and in mobility, in the strategic and in the tactical indirect apch, their campaigns surpass any in history. 3. In Jenghiz Khans conquest of China we can trace his use of Taitong-Fu to bait successive traps. 4. By far -flung movements with a combination of three armies he finally broke up the moral and mil cohesion of the Kin Empire. 5. When in 1220 he invaded the Karismian Empire, whose centre of power lay in modern Turkestan, one force distracted the ens attention to the apch from Kashgar in the south.

42 6. While the main mass appeared in the north and screened by its operations, he himself with his reserve army swung wider still. 7. After disappearing in the Kizyl-Kum desert, debouched by surprise at Bokhara in the rear of the ens defensive lines and armies. 8. Mongols in Europe. (a) In 1241 his generals, Subutai, set out to teach Europe.

(b) While one army as a strategic flank gd, marched through Galicia - engaging the attention of the Polish, German and Bohemian forces, besides inflicting successive defeats on them, the main army in three widely separated columns swept through Hungary to the Danube. (c) In this advance the two outer columns formed both a shield and a cloak to the later released move of the central column. (d) Then converging on the Danube near Gran, the Mongols were balked by the assembly of the Hungarian army on the far bank but, by a skillfully graduated retirement lured their opponents away from the shelter of the river and the reach of reinforcement. (e) Finally by a swift night mvre and surprise on the Sajo River, Sabutai dislocated and annihilated the Hungarian army and became master of the central plains of Europe.

43

DECISIVE BATTLE OF MOHI IN EUROPE

Seventeenth Century Thirty Years Wars. 1. Background. (a) The Thirty Years Wars reveals no campaign that can be called decisive.

(b) The nearest was the final duel between Gustavus and Wallenstein which, through the formers death in the culminating battle of Lutzen, was decisive. (c) Gustavus was the King of Sweden supported the protestant cause while Wallenstein was a German, serving for King Ferdinand II of the Holy Roman Empire (Catholics). (d) Gustavus died in the Battle of Lutzen while Wallenstein was murdered on the orders of King Ferdinand II later on. (e) This defeat was partly due to the inferiority of Wallensteins fighting machine and was also partly due to Wallensteins failure to profit tactically his strategical opportunity for he had obtained prior to the battle a very real advantage. (f) It is worthwhile to note that this opportunity had come through not one but three successive indirect apchs which indeed had changed the whole aspect of the war. 2. Indirect Apch by Wallenstein. (a) In 1632, called back to command non-existent armies, Wallenstein had gathered within three months some 40,000 soldiers of fortune, drawn by the glamour of his name.

44 (b) 3.Despite the urgent appeal for aid from Bavaria, then being overrun by Gustavus's all-conquering army, Wallenstein instead turned north against Gustavus's weaker ally, the Saxons, and after throwing them out of Bohemia, moved on towards Saxony itself. (c) He even compelled the reluctant Elector of Bavaria to bring his army to join him, thus apparently leaving Bavaria more defense less than ever. (d) But the reality was otherwise, and Wallenstein's calculation justified-for the threat of losing Saxony, his junior partner, compelled Gustavus to quit Bavaria and hurry to the rescue. (e) Before he could come up, Wallenstein and the Elector had united. Faced with their combined forces, Gustavus fell back on Nuremberg. (f) Wallenstein followed, but finding the Swedes strongly posted, he dug himself into a position from which-while his army rested securely, gaining confidence dailyhe could command Gustavus's lines of supply with his light horse. (g) He maintained this method and object unswervingly, deaf to all challenges to battle, until the Swedish King, attempted a vain assault on his posn. (h) The repulse did not dislocate but had disturbed the moral ascendancy which Gustavus's many victories had gained him, and thereby loosened his hold over the German states. (i) From Nuremberg, Gustavus marched south against Bavaria once more.

(j) Instead of fwg, Wallenstein turned north against Saxony-a master move. It brought Gustavus to heel as promptly as before. (k) By superb marching Gustavus came up before Wallenstein could intimidate the Saxons into a separate peace. (l) 14. In the battle of Lutzen which followed, the Swedish army redeemed its strategic setback by a tactical success; but at the price of its leader's death.

EUROPE IN 1648

45 Second Civil War in England. 1. In the Second Civil War in England, Cromwell was the ruling mind with John Lambert as his assistant. 2. When it became known, late in April 1648, that the Scots were raising an army to invade England in sp of the Royalists, Lambert was left with only a small force to delay the invaders which he did most effectively by the indirect course of constantly threatening their flank as they marched down the west coast route, while checking any attempt of theirs to cross the Pennines and rally their friends in Yorkshire. 3. After the fall of Pembroke (11 July 1648), Cromwell was able to move north. Instead of advancing direct to meet the Scots, he marched in a sweeping curve by Nottingham and Doncaster collecting supplies on the way then northwestward to join Lambert at Otley o. corps of 3,500 under Langdale covering the left flank. 4. en. Cromwell had only 8,600 men, incl the Yorkshire militia, against some 20,000 of the

5. But his decent on the tail of the Scottish column at Preston dislocated its balance and caused it to turn and meet him in successive fractions. 6. On Preston Moor, Langdals corps was overthrown. Then pressing pursuit fiercely, Cromwell rolled up the Scottish column driving it through Wigan to Uttoxeter and Ashbourne, where checked in front by the midland militia and pressed in rear by Cromwells cavalry it surrendered on 25 August. 7. This victory was decisive. Not only did it crush the foes of the Parliament, but it enabled the army to purge the Parliament, and to bring the king to trial and execution.

46

Battle of Dunbar. 1. When Cromwell found the Scottish army, under Leslie, in posn across his path to Edinburgh, a mere contact-making engagement satisfied him of the str of Leslie's sit. 2. Although within sight of his goal, and short of supplies, he had such self-restraint as to abstain from a frontal assault on disadvantageous ground. 3. Despite his eagerness for battle he would not venture it unless he could draw the en into the open and get a chance to strike at an exposed flank. 4. He fell back on Musselburgh, and then to Dunbar, to re-provision his forces.

5. Within a week he advanced afresh and at Musselburgh issued three days' rations as a preliminary to a wide mvre through the hills of Edinburgh and the enemy's rear. 6. And when Leslie succeeded in moving across to bar his path directly at Corstorphine Hill (2Ist Aug 1650), Cromwell-though now far from his base-sought yet another apch by a mvre to his left, only to be blocked afresh by Leslie at Cogar. 7. 8. Most men would have gambled on a direct battle. But not Cromwell. He fell back on Musselburgh and then to Dunbar, drawing Leslie after him.

9. He did not embark his army, but waited at Dunbar in the hope that the en would make a false move that might become his opportunity. 10. In the next move Leslies left the main rd, he made a circuit round Dunbar during the ni of the 1st Sep, and occupied Doon Hill, overlooking the rd to Berwick. 11. He also sent a det to seize the pass at Cockburnspath seven miles further south.

47 12. Next morning, Cromwell found himself cut off from England. His plight was all the worse because his supplies were already short and his sick-list lengthening. 13. It had been Leslie's plan to wait on the hts in anticipation that the English would try to force their way along the road to Berwick, and then to descend upon them. 14. The wx on the 2nd was so tempestuous as almost to drive the Scottish tps off the bare crest of Doon Hill. 15. About 4 p.m. they descended the slopes and taking up a posn on the lower grnd near the Berwick rd, where they had more shelter from the rain, while their front was covered by the Brock bum-which ran through a ravine until it neared the sea. 16. Cromwell and Lambert watching the movement saw it as an opportunity and advantage to attempt upon the en. 17. For the Scots' left wg was wedged between the hill and the steep-sided burn, and would have difficulty in helping the right wing if an attack was concentrated there. 18. Lambert was entrusted him with the conduct of the opening moves. During the ni, the tps were moved into posn along the north side of the burn. 19. After marshalling the guns opposite the Scots' left wing, Lambert rode back to the other flk at daybreak to lead the cavalry's attack near the sea. 20. Helped by surprise, both they and the inf in the centre were able to cross the burn without difficulty, although their further advance was temp checked. 21. The intervention of the English reserves turned the scales on the seaward flk, and enabled Cromwell to roll up the Scottish line from right to left-into a corner, between hill and burn, from which the Scottish tps could only extricate themselves by breaking into flight. 22. Thus by a tactical indirect apch, fwg instantly upon the overconfident ens slip, Cromwell shattered a force twice his own strength-sealing with triumph a campaign in which he had refused all temptation. 23. The victory of Dunbar gave Cromwell the control of southern Scotland. It wiped the army of the Kirk, and the Covenanters as a political factor, off the balance-sheet of the war.

48

Battle of Worcester. 1. When, late in June 1651, Cromwell was fit enough to resume ops, he was faced with a difficult problem. 2. Although now, for the first time, the superiority in numbers was on his side, he was faced by a canny adversary established in a region of marsh and moorland which afforded every natural advantage to the weaker side in barring the approach to Stirling. 3. Unless Cromwell could overthrow the resistance within a brief time he would be doomed to spend another trying winter in Scotland, with inevitable suffering to his tps and the likelihood of increasing difficulties at home. 4. To dislodge the enemy would not suffice, for a partial success would only disperse the enemy into the Highlands, where they would remain a thorn in his side.

49 5. Cromwell's solution of the problem was masterly. First he menaced Leslie in front, storming Callander House, near Falkirk. 6. Then he passed, in stages, his whole army across the Firth of Forth and marched on Perth-thereby not only turning Leslie's defensive barrier across the direct apch to Stirling but gaining possession of the key to Leslie's supply area. 7. By this mvre he had, uncovered the route to England. He was on the rear of an enemy now threatened with hunger and desertion-and he left a bolt-hole open. 8. They naturally at the end of July started on the march south into England. 9. Cromwell, foreseeing this, had prepared their reception-with the aid of the authorities at Westminster. 10. The militia was called out promptly, all suspected Royalists were kept under svl, and hidden stores of arms were seized. 11. Once more the Scots moved down the west coast route.

12. Cromwell dispatched Lambert's cavalry to follow them, while Harrison moved obliquely across from Newcastle to Warrington, and Fleetwood moved north with the Midland militia. Lambert slipped round the flk of the en, and joined Harrison on the 13th Aug. 13. The two then opposed an elastic delaying resistance to the oncoming invader.

14. Cromwell meantime was marching, twenty miles a day in Aug heat, down the east coast route and then south-westwards. 15. Thus four forces were converging on the trapped invader. Charles's turn away from the route for London towards the Severn valley only delayed for a few days, and failed to disturb, the closing of the jaws. 16. On the 3rd Sep, the battlefield of Worcester provided Cromwell with his 'crowning mercy'.

50

1.

Two deeper causes of this indecisiveness in the late 17th Century were:(a) First, the development of fortification had outpaced the improvement of wpns and given the defensive a preponderance such as was restored to it in the early twentieth century by the development of the machine gun.

(b) Second, that armies were not yet organized in permanently self contained fractions, but usually moved and fought as a single piece, a condition which limited their power of distraction-of deceiving the opponent and cramping his freedom of movement. Turennes Victory at Turkheim. 1. Background. (a) Only one campaign stands out as decisive, this is Turenne's winter campaign of 1674-5, crowned by the victory of Turkheim. (b) Turenne was one of the marshals of Louis XIV during Franco-Dutch wars.

(c) Louis XIV's allies had left him one by one, while the Spaniards, Dutch, Danes, Austrians, and most of the German princes had joined the hostile coalition. Turenne had been forced to retire over the Rhine, after laying waste the Palatinate.

51 2. Turennes pre winter moves. (a) The Elector of Brandenburg was converging to unite with the imperial army under Bourneville. Turenne imposed a check at Enzheim, in Oct 1674, on Bourneville-before the Elector came up. (b) But he was forced to withdraw to Dettweiler, while the Germans spread into Alsace and took up winter quarters in the towns between Strasbourg and Belfort. (c) The stage was set for Turenne's masterpiece. The initial surprise lay in his decision to undertake a midwinter campaign. 3. Turennes Winter plans. (a) To deceive the en, he placed the fortresses of middle Alsace in a state of defence. Then he withdrew the whole field army quietly into Lorraine. (b) Next he marched swiftly southward, behind the screening hts of the Vosges, gathering on his way rfts. (c) In the last stages of the move he even split his forces into numerous small bodies in order to mislead the enemy's spies. (d) After a severe march through hilly country and through snowstorms, he reunited his army near Belfort, and, without any pause, invaded Alsace from the south-having left it from the north. (e) Bourneville, tried to stop Turenne at Mulhausen (29th Dec), but was swept away. (f) Then the French torrent swept up the trough between the Vosges and the Rhine, driving the scattered Imperialists north towards Strasbourg. (g) At Colmar, half-way to Strasbourg, the Elector of Brandenburg, now in command of the Germans, had established a dam that was buttressed by a force equal to Turenne's. (h) But the momentum, both physical and moral, was with Turenne, and was skillfully maintained by a tactical indirect approach on the battlefield of Tilrkheim. (i) Here Turenne sought less to destroy the opposing army than to liquidate the hardening resistance, leaving natural consequences to complete the enemy's dissolution. (j) He succeeded so well that a few days later he was able to report that not a soldier of the enemy was left in Alsace. (k) The French then recuperated in winter quarters at Strasbourg, drawing supplies freely from the German bank of the Rhine, and even as far as the Neckar. (l) The Elector had retired, with what remained of his forces, to Brandenburg; and Turenne's old rival, Montecuculi, was called back in the spring to command the Imperial armies.

52 (m) He, too, was manoeuvred into a position where Turenne had him at a disadvantage, on the Sasbach; but at the outset of the action Turenne was killed by a cannon-shot-and with his fall the balance of the war changed again. Q. Why is the decisiveness of the winter campaign of Turenne's in such startling contrast with the rest of the campaigns of the seventeenth century in Europe? Ans. 1. It was an age when generals, however limited their horizon, were at least supremely skilful in mvre. 2. A real dislocation of the opponent's system was only this once achieved.

3. Turenne is famous as the one Great Captain, who reached in his last campaign a solution of the problem of achieving a decision in seventeenth-century warfare. 4. He did it without departing from the golden rule of those times-that highly trained soldiers were too costly to be squandered. 5. Experience had taught him that under such conditions a decisive result could only be gained by a strategic plan in which the approach was radically more indirect than any yet conceived. 6. At a time when all mvres were based on fortress pivots- which formed the protected supply depots for the maintenance of the field armies-he cut loose from such a base of operations, and sought in the combination of surprise and mobility not only a decision but his security. It was a just calculation, not a gamble. For the dislocation-mental, moral, and logistical created among the enemy afforded him throughout an ample margin of security.

53

54 Eighteenth Century (War of Spanish Succession 1701-1713) Marlborough. 1. In 1704, pressed by the French and Bavarian to the west and Hungarian rebels to the East, Austria faced the real possibility of being forced out of the war. 2. Concerns over Vienna and the sit in southern Germany convinced Marlborough of the necessity of sending aid, but the scheme of seizing the initiative form the en was extremely bold. 3. From the start Marlborough mislead the Dutch, who would never willingly permit any major weakening of Allied forces in the Spanish Netherlands. 4. To this end, Marlborough moved his English troops to the Moselle and then march south to link up with Austrian forces in southern Germany. 5. A combination of strategic deception and brilliant administration enabled Marlborough to achieve his purpose. After marching 400 km the Allies fought a series of engagement against the Franco-Bavarian forces ranged against them on the Danube. 6. The first major encounter occurred on 2nd July 1704 when Marlborough and Prince Louis of Baden stormed the Schellenberg heights at Donauworth. 7. However, the main event followed on 13 August when Marlborough - assisted by the Imperial commander, the able Prince Eugene of Savoy - delivered a crushing defeat on marshal Tallard`s and the Elector of Bavaria`s army at eh battle of Blenheim. 8. The whole campaign was one of the greatest examples of marching and fighting, and is a model of planning, logistics, tactical and operational skill, the successful outcome of which had altered the cause of the conflict Bavaria was knocked out of the war, and Louis XIV`s hopes of an early victory were destroyed.

55 Marlboroughs Campaign of 1705. 1. None of the Marlboroughs Campaigns of 1705 were decisive except a design which bore the evolution of his generalship. 2. His previous maneuvers in Flanders had been on pure deception and for success reqd speed of execution which was difficult to obtain with Dutch. 3. This time he tried an indirect apch by a route that offered alternative objectives, thus producing a wide distraction of the opposing forces which diminished the need for superior speed. 4. Swinging south of Villeroi's position near Louvan, he advanced on a line which kept the enemy in doubt as to his aim, since it threatened any of the fortresses in that area Namur, Charleroi, Mons, and Ath. 5. Then, on reaching Genappe, he wheeled north up the road through Waterloo towards Brussels. 6. Villeroi hurriedly decided to march back to the rescue of the city. But just as the French were about to move, Marlborough, who had made a fresh swerve back eastwards during the night, appeared on the new front they had taken up. 7. Owing to his distracting move it was an ill-knit front, if less vulnerable than their marching flank would have been. 8. He had arrived just too soon for his own advantage, and the wary Dutch generals thus found reason for resisting his desire to deliver an imdt attack arguing that, whatever the confusion on the other side, the enemy's actual position behind the Ysche was stronger than at Blenheim.

BRUSSELS WATERLOO ATH MONS

CHARLEROI

56 Marlboroughs Campaign of 1706. 1. In the 1706 campaign, Marlborough conceived the idea of carrying out an indirect approach of far wider scope. 2. He envisaged crossing the Alps to join Eugene, driving the French out of Italy and gaining a back entrance to France by combining a land apch with amphibious ops against Toulon and with Peterborough`s operations in Spain. 3. The project was forestalled by a French offn which was taken due to Louis XIVs belief that an offn everywhere would create an impression of strength and secure favorable terms of peace. 4. Marlborough lost no time in seizing this opportunity. It was, in his judgment, the second time that the French had redeemed his prospects by their reluctance to stay quietly within their lines when the game was in their hands. 5. He met them at Ramillies, where they had occupied a concave position.

6. He exploited his posn on the chord of the arc to execute a tactical form of indirect apch. 7. Fwg an attack on the French left, which drew their reserves thither, he skillfully disengaged his own troops on that wing, and switched them across to press home the advantage gained on his own left wing, where the Danish cavalry had penetrated a gap. 8. This menace in rear coupled with the pressure in front caused the collapse of the French. 9. Marlborough exploited the victory by a pursuit so effective that all Flanders and Brabant fell into his hands.

57

(War of Austrian Succession 1740-48)

58 Q.. Frederick the great is considered to be one of the greatest tactical genius of all times. Site examples of use of indirect apch by Frederick in various campaigns? Ans. Fredericks Wars. 1. 2. 3. 4. The war of the Austrian Succession was indecisive in its general results. Frederick the Great was the one ruler to profit, or profiteer. He gained Silesia early and then retired from the competition. The war established the prestige of Prussia as a great power.

Advance to Vienna. 5. The events which decided the cession of Silesia (an industrial area with Austria) to Prussia, by the early peace of Breslau in1742, deserve notice. 6. A combined advance by the French and Prussians upon the Austrian main army had been arranged. 7. Frederick, instead of continuing westwards to unite with his ally, suddenly turned southwards towards Vienna. 8. Although his advanced troops appeared before the enemy capital, he quickly fell back for the enemy army was him off from his base. 9. This advance of Frederick usually been denounced as a mere rash demonstration; yet in view of its sequel the charge may perhaps be harsh. 10. For his rapid retreat drew the Austrians in pursuit of him far into Silesia where, turning at bay, he inflicted a sharp reverse, exploiting it by a vigorous pursuit. 11. Only three weeks later, Austria had to make a separate peace with Frederick, by which Silesia was ceded. 12. Indirect apch of the war in this theatre even though it comprised but a mere appearance before Vienna and a small tactical victory, wrested apparently from the jaws of defeat. March on Prague. 1. In April 1757, he crossed the mountains into Bohemia and marched on Prague.

2. On arrival, he found the Austrian army posted in a strong position on the heights behind the river. 3. Thereupon, leaving a det to mask his movement and watch the fords, he marched upstream during the night, crossed the river, and advanced against the enemy's right. 4. Although his apch began in an indirect way, it became direct before the mvre was complete for the Austrian army had time to change front, so that the Prussian infantry found themselves attempting a frontal assault across a fire-swept glacis. They fell in thousands.

59 5. Only the unexpected arrival of Zeiten's cavalry, which had been sent on a wide detour, turned the scales of battle and produced the retreat of the Austrians. 6. The subsequent siege of Prague was interrupted by the advance, to the city's relief, of a fresh Austrian army under Daun. Battle of Rossbach. 1. In the battle of Rossbach (in Electorate of Saxony), on 5 November 1757, during the Seven Years War, Frederick the Great faced an Allied army twice his strength. 2. The Franco - Imperial allied army tried to copy Frederick`s characteristic mvre and turn it against him. 3. Not only did the narrowness of the mvre give him ample warning, but the allies`s hasty assumption that he was retreating led them to `distract their own forces in order to catch him up so that when he counter mvred, not to face them, but to fall on their far flank, they were almost instantaneously dislocated. 4. Thus here, through his opponents bungling, Frederick achieved a real indirect apch of surprise, not merely of mobility. 5. This was by far the most economical of all his victories, for at the price on only 500 casualties he inflicted 7,700 and dispersed an army of 64,000. 6. Frederick the Great had discovered operational mvres and with about 3,500 horsemen had defeated an entire Army of two combined European powers.

60

Indirect Apch into Austria. 1. In 1758, Frederick began by a real indirect approach against the Austrians, marching right across their front and past their flank to Olmtitz, twenty miles into enemy territory. 2. Even when he lost an important convoy of supplies, he did not fall back, but instead continued his march through Bohemia right round the Austrian rear and into their entrenched base at Koniggratz. 3. But he had now once more to pay forfeit for the opportunities lost at Prague and Kolin, for the Russian 'steam-roller' had at last got up steam and had rolled forward to Posen,on the road to Berlin. 4. Frederick decided that he must forgo the completion of his Bohemian campaign and march north to stop the Russians. Recoil to Eastern Front. 5. He succeeded, but the battle of Zorndorf (Prussian win against Russia) was another Prague. 6. Once again Frederick circumvented the obstacle offered by the Russians' strong position, marching right round their eastern flank in order to strike them from the rear. 7. But once again the defender was able to achieve a change of front, and convert Frederick's indirect approach into a frontal attack. 8. This had brought him into grave difficulties before his cavalry commander, Seydlitz, intervened by a circling stroke against the enemy's new flank across ground that had been deemed impassable thus giving his mvre an unexpectedness which made it, in effect, a truly indirect approach.

61 9. But Frederick's losses, if somewhat lighter than the Russians', were the heavier in comparison with his resources. 10. Lessons from Fredericks Campaigns. (a) If many lessons are to be culled from Frederick's campaigns, the main one would appear to be, in brief, that his indirectness was too direct. (b) He regarded the indirect approach as a matter of pure mobility, instead of a combination of mobility and surprise. (c) Thus, despite all his brilliance, his economy of force broke down.

Q. Frederick combined in his person the functions of strategy and grand strategy. Elucidate. Ans. Gen. 1. Frederick was free from the responsibility and limitations which are imposed on a strategist in the strict sense of the word unlike Marlborough. 2. The comparative scarcity of fortresses in his theatres of war was another advantage.

3. Although faced by the coalition of Austria, France, Russia, Sweden, and Saxony, with England as his only ally, Frederick had at the outset, and until mid- way through the second campaign, a superiority in the actual forces available. Strategy of Interior Lines. 4. He practiced the strategy of interior lines', which involved striking out-wards from a central pivot against one of the forces on the circumference, and utilizing the shorter distance he had thus to travel to concentrate against one of the en forces before it could be supported by the others. 5. Ostensibly, it would seem that the further apart these enemy forces, the easier it must be to achieve a decisive success. 6. 7. In terms of time, space, and number, this is undoubtedly true. Moral element in the strat of interior lines. (a) When the en forces are widely separated each is self-contained and tends to be consolidated by pressure. (b) When they are close together they tend to coalesce and become members one of another, mutually dependent in mind, morale, and matter. (c) The minds of the cdrs affect each other, moral impressions are quickly transfused, and even the movements of each force easily hinder or disorganize those of the others.

62 (d) Thus while the antagonist has less time and space for his action, the dislocating results of it take effect more quickly and easily. 8. Further, when forces are close together the enemy's mere divergence from his approach to one of them may become an unexpected and therefore truly in- direct apch to another. 9. In contrast, when forces are widely separated there is more time to prepare to meet, or avoid, the second blow of the army which is exploiting its central position. 10. The use of 'interior lines' as Marlborough used them in his march to the Danube is a form of the indirect apch. 11. Frederick consistently used his central position to concentrate against one fraction of the en, and he always employed tactics of indirect apch. 12. But his tactical indirect apch was geometrical rather than psychological.

13. Which was unprepared by the subtler forms of surprise favoured by Scipio and for all their executive skill, these mvres were narrow. 14. The opponent might be unable to meet the fwg blow, owing to the rigidity of his mind or his formations, but the blow itself did not fall unexpectedly. Oblique Advance. 1. Frederick called his technique the oblique order, and he explained it as follows: a commander should strengthen one wing of his army and employ it to attack the enemy flank, while holding back another, smaller wing to threaten the enemys main force and keep it from changing position. 2. Since the en army would already be deployed, it could not switch troops fast enough to the threatened flk before Fredericks columns struck. 3. Fredericks three improvements to his army led him to devise a new method of combat which he called the Oblique order of attack. These were as under. (a) He trained his soldiers to march faster and farther. (b) He also trained them to fire their muskets at a higher rate than soldiers in other armies. (c) And he emphasized mobile artillery drawn by horses at a time when other armies paid mobility little heed. 5. These improvements made Fredericks army the most superior in that period. Frederick said that an army of 30,000 could beat an army of 100,000 using this method. 6. The tactic was an adaptation of Epaminondass simple technique at Leuctra [in 371 B.C. in Greece], and this simple idea preserved Fredericks kingdom. Capture of Quebec. 1. The war of the Austrian Succession was indecisive in its general results.

63 2. Only one country that achieved results during this period was England an ally of Prussia. It was not only an indirect participant in the Seven Years* War (1756-63), but made her contribution and took her profits indirectly. 3. One campaign between European forces in this long series can truly be termed decisive either in its military or political results the campaign which ended in the English capture of Quebec. 4. Quebec was in Canada and its capture was not only the briefest, but waged in a secondary theatre. Quebec was a natural fortress, on the north bank of the St. Lawrence, and protected by cliffs and ravines. 5. During the capture, the British forces under James Wolfe took on the French under Montcalm at Quebec. 6. The result is the more suggestive because this apparently hazardous indirect apch was only undertaken after the direct approach on the line of the Montmorency had failed with serious loss of lives and, still more, of morale. 7. Wolfe resigned himself to a direct apch after various baits and the bombardment of Quebec, as well as the exposure of isolated detachments at Point Levis and near the Montmorency Falls had failed to lure the French from their strong position. 8. But in the failure of these, compared with the success of his final hazardous landing on the French rear above Quebec, there is a lesson. 9. Lessons from Capture of Quebec. (a) To entice the enemy out was not enough; it was necessary to draw him out.

(b) Also there is a lesson in the failure of the feints by which Wolfe tried to prepare his direct approach. To mystify the enemy was not enough; he must be distracted a term which implies combining deception of the enemy's mind with deprivation of his freedom to move for counter-action, and the distension of his forces. 10. In Wolfe's ultimate move, all these conditions were fulfilled and the result was victory.

11. During the night of the 12-13 Sep, Wolfe managed to get over 4,000 tps across the river to the west of the city, and up the Heights of Abraham, towering cliffs that lined the river, using a tiny trail from a cove that he had scouted from the far side of the river. 12. A combination of luck, and overconfidence amongst the French allowed Wolfe to get 4,828 and an increasing number of guns up the cliff and in a position to threaten the city. 13. Even then, he could still have lost. Montcalm had detached 3,000 of his best men further up-river, and could easily have waited for their arrival before launching his attack. 14. Instead, convinced that only a small force awaited him he led his garrison out onto the attack. The resulting Battle of the Heights of Abraham (13 Sep) was short and decisive.

64 15. But Quebec is an illuminating example of the truth that a decision is produced even more by the mental and moral dislocation of the command than by the physical dislocation of its forces.

French Revolution and Napoleons Campaigns

65 Q. How did the French army develop through the French revolution into a world class army? Ans. The reasons for achievement of France lied in a combination of favorable conditions and impelling factors. These factors helped the French marshals to use indirect apch at both strat and tac levels. These new tactics of fluidity were simple, yet vital pivot. Some of them have been listed below. 1. The French now marched and fought at a quick step of 120 paces to the minute, while their opponents adhered to the orthodox 70paces. 2. This endowed rapid transference and reshuffled concentrations of striking power where by the French could in Napoleon's phrase, multiply 'mass by velocity' both strategically and tactically. 3. A second natural condition was the organization of the army into permanent divisions - the fractioning of the army into self-contained and separately acting parts. 4. This helped divisions to operate separately and conc on to a common goal when reqd. 5. A third condition, linked with this, was that the chaotic supply system and the undisciplined nature of the Revolutionary armies compelled a reversion to 'living on the country'. 6. The distribution of the army in divs meant that this practice detracted less from the army's effectiveness than in old days. Where, formerly, the fractions had to be collected before they could carry out an operation, now they could be serving a military purpose while feeding themselves. 7. Moreover, the effect of moving light' was to accelerate their mobility, and enable them to move freely in mountainous or forest country without depending on magazines and supply-trains for food and equipment. 8. The personal conditions centered round the genius of a leader Napoleon Bonaparte whose military ability was stimulated by the theories Bourcet and Guibert. 9. From Bourcet he learnt the principle of calculated dispersion to induce the enemy to disperse their own concentration preparatory to the swift re-uniting of his own forces. 10. Also, the value of a 'plan with several branches', and of operating on a line which threatened alternative objectives. 11. From Guibert he acquired an idea of the supreme value of mobility and fluidity of force, and of the potentialities inherent in the new distribution of an army in self-contained divisions. 12. He also learnt the art is to extend forces without exposing them, to embrace the enemy without being disunited, to link up the moves or the attacks to take the enemy in flank without exposing one's own flank. 13. Guibert's prescription for the rear attack, as the means of upsetting the enemy's balance, became Napoleon's practice.

66 14. To the same source can be traced Napoleon's method of concentrating his mobile artillery to shatter, and make a breach at, a key point in the enemy's front. 15. In developing the wider range of strategic combinations thus possible, lay Napoleon's chief contribution to strategy. Q. Give a brief on the 1st coalition against the French?

Ans. French revolution ended with the trial and execution of Louis XVI. This was the reason to the 1st coalition between England, Holland, Austria, Prussia, Spain, and Sardinia. All these wanted monarchy back in France and therefore attacked France. Q. Jourdan was one of the ablest marshals of France since French revolution. (a) Elucidate his use of indirect apch in the siege of Namur and Battle Fleurus. (b) How did in Jul 1796, Archduke Charles of Austria use the same to bring the collapse of the French army during its campaign across the Rhine? Ans (a) 1. Background. (a) In May 1794, Jourdan lead the Army of the Moselle north. (b) This force was combined with the Army of the Ardennes and the right wing of the Army of the North to form an army which did not officially become the Army of Sambre-et-Meuse until 29th June 1794. 2. Progress of ops. (a) With 70,000 men of the new army, Jourdan laid siege to Charleroi on 12 th June. (b) While a 41,000 Austrian-Dutch army under William V Prince of Orange, defeated the French at Lambusart on 16th June and drove them south of the Sambre River. (c) Casualties numbered 3,000 for each army. Undeterred, Jourdan immediately marched on Namur to the east-northeast of Charleroi. (d) Instead of attacking Namur, he suddenly swung west and appeared to the north of Charleroi. (e) After a quick siege, the 3,000 Austrian garrison of Charleroi surrendered on 25th June. His arrival intimidated the fortress into surrender. (f) Coburg, the en commander-in-chief, hurried back eastwards, collecting such troops as he could on his way. Too late to save Charleroi, Coburgs 46,000 men attacked Jourdans 75,000 French the next day. (g) The Battle of Fleurus proved to be a decisive French victory when Coburg called off his attacks and retreated. The French had the inestimable advantage of

67 having strategically dislocated the enemy and having drawn him to attack with a fraction of his strength. (h) After Fleurus, the Allied position in the Austrian Netherlands collapsed.

3. Aftermath. Jourdan seems to have had no wider object in view, but the innate psychological 'pull' of such a move on to the enemy's rear gave him what Napoleon and other great captains sought as a calculated result.

R SOMBRE NAMUR FLEURUS

JOURDANS MOVE

CHARLEROI

Ans. 3(b) 1. Background. (a) When the French, in turn, assumed the role of invaders, they failed, despite their superior numbers, to achieve any decisive results in the main campaign across the Rhine. (b) 2. Indeed the campaign was in the end, was blasted by an indirect approach.

Progress of Ops. (a) In July 1796, the Arch duke Charles, faced by the renewed advance of the two superior armies of Jourdan and Moreau, decided, in his own words, 'to retire both armies (his own and Wartensleben's) step by step without committing himself to a battle, and to seize the first opportunity to unite them, so as to throw himself with superior, or at least equal, strength on one of the two hostile armies'. (b) But the enemy's pressure gave him no chance to practice this 'interior lines' strategy direct in aim, save for the idea of yielding ground to gain an opportunity until a French change of direction suggested a more audacious stroke.

68 (c) It was due to the initiative of a cavalry brigadier, Nauendorff, whose wide recce showed him that the French were diverging from the Archduke's front to converge on and destroy Wartensleben. (d) He sent the inspired message: If your Royal Highness will or can advance 12,000 men against Jourdan's rear, he is lost.' (e) If the Archduke's execution was not as bold as his subordinate's conception, it was sufficient to bring about the collapse of the French offensive. (f) The disorderly retreat of Jourdan's shattered army back to and over the Rhine, compelled Moreau to relinquish his successful progress in Bavaria and fall back similarly. Q. Fire must be conc on one point, and as soon as the breach is made, the equilibrium is broken and the rest is nothing. Elucidate Liddle Harts discussion on the above mentioned principle. Ans. 1. Liddle Hart discusses the words 'one point ' and the 'equilibrium'. He says that the former is a physical metaphor, whereas the latter expresses the actual psychological result. 2. He says that the word point is with the idea of economy of force, but only in the ltd sense of first costs, contends that the offn should be aimed at the ens weakest point. 3. But where a point is weak it is usually because it is remote from any vital artery or nerve centre, or because it is deliberately left weak to draw the assailant into a trap. 4. Liddle Harts explanation. Liddle Hart suggests that what Napoleon really meant was not 'point', but 'joint' and that he was too firmly imbued with the idea of economy of force to waste his limited str in battering at the enemy's strong point. 5. A joint, however, is both vital and vulnerable.

Q. We must not disperse our attacks but conc them. Bonaparte argued that indirect apch must be used against Austria, their most determined en. (a) How did Napoleon use the strat of indirect apch in the Campaign against Austria? (b) Explain as to how Napoleon shattered the Austrians taking refuge in Mantua and the reinforcements coming to their aid. What tac ruse, a rare device for Napoleon, did he use to beat the numerically superior Alvintzi? Ans(a). 1. Background. (a) To tackle their most determined en Napoleon argued for using the army on the frontier of Piedmont for an indirect approach to Austria. (b) In his conception, northern Italy was to be the corridor to Austria.

69 (c) And in this secondary theatre, his aim fwg Bourcet's guidance was to knock out the jr partner, Piedmont, before dealing with the Sr partner. (d) By drawing Austria's forces into offensives against him in Italy, and defeating them there, he gained, twelve months later, an open road into Austria. (e) During the course of campaign whenever Napoleon used a direct apch he failed while the indirect always paid him dividends. 2. Disposns. When Bonaparte assumed command of the 'Army of Italy', in March 1796, its troops were spread out along the Genoese Riviera, while the allied Austrian and Piedmont forces held the mountain passes into the plains beyond. 3. Bonapartes Plan. (a) Bonaparte's plan was to make two converging thrusts across the mountains at the fortress of Ceva, and having gained this gateway into Piedmont, to frighten her govt a separate peace by the threat of his advance on Turin. (b) He hoped that the Austrian forces would be still in their winter quarters.

(c) Although if they should move to join their allies he had in mind a feint towards Acqui to make them withdraw in a divergent, north-easterly dirn. 4. Course of events. (a) It was by fortune rather than design that Bonaparte gained the initial advantage of separating the two armies. (b) The opportunity was created by an offensive move on the part of the Austrians who made a bound forward to threaten Bonaparte's right flank and fore stall any French advance on Genoa. (c) Bonaparte countered this threat by a short-arm jab towards the joint of the Austrian advance- though two more jabs at a neighboring point were needed before the Austrians accepted the repulse and fell back on Acqui. (d) Meantime, the bulk of the French army was advancing on Ceva. Bonaparte's rash attempt, on the 16th of April, to take the position by direct assault was a failure. (e) He then planned an encircling mvre for the18th, and also changed his line of comns to a route further removed from possible Austrian interference. (f) The Piedmontese, however, withdrew from the fortress before the new attack developed. (g) In following them up, Bonaparte suffered another expensive repulse when he tried another direct assault, on a position where the Piedmontese had chosen to make a stand. (h) But in his next move both their flanks were turned, and they were hustled back into the plains.

70 (i) In the eyes of the Piedmontese govt, the threat to Turin from the oncoming French was now larger than the Austrians' belated promise to march to their aid. (j) The 'equilibrium was broken and its psychological effect dispensed with any need for physical defeat to make the Piedmontese appeal for an armistice which removed them from the scales of the war. (k) Napoleon had also understood the vital imp of time factor in this campaign because had the Piedmontese held out even a few days longer, he would have to retreat back to the Riviera. ('It may be that in future I may lose a battle, but I shall never lose a minute).
MILAN TURIN RIVER PO MANTUA

PIACENZA TORTONA

CEVA

GENOA

Forts of quadrilateral.

Ans(b). Advance upon Austrians. 1. After the armistice with Piedmont, Napoleon took Milan as his objective.

2. Deceiving the Austrians into a concentration at Valenza to oppose his expected north eastward advance, he marched east instead, along the south bank of the river Po. 3. And on reaching Piacenza, he had turned all the Austrians' possible lines of resistance. 4. Subsequently, the Austrians slipped out of his reach, to gain the shelter of Mantua and the famous Quadrilateral of fortresses. 5. From a mil point of view, however, this restriction of Bonaparte's freedom of action proved the proverbial 'blessing in disguise'.

71 6. More by force of circumstances than by Bonaparte's design Mantua became a bait to draw successive Austrian relieving forces far from their bases, and into his jaws. 7. It is significant that he did not entrench himself in a covering position, but kept his forces mobile, disposed in a loose and wide-flung grouping which could be concentrated in any dirn. Austrian attempts of relief of Mantua. 8. Austrians attempted to relieve the Mantua but were beaten back four times by Napoleon. 9. The locking up of so much of her military capital drove Austria to a fresh expenditure every time. 10. During the third attempt Bonaparte was faced with numerical superior Austrians.

11. When the converging armies of Alvintzi and Davidovich drew near to Verona, his pivot for the guarding of Mantua, Bonaparte hurled himself at the former, the stronger, and suffered a severe repulse at Caldiero. 12. But instead of retreating, he chose the daring course of a wide mvre round the southern flank of Alvintzi's army and on to its rear. 13. The delays caused by marshes and water-courses increased the hazard of his mvre, but it up set the enemy's plan of closing their jaws on his army, supposed to be at Verona. 14. 15. While Alvintzi wheeled to meet him, Davidovich remained inactive. Bonaparte found it hard to overcome Alvintzi's superior numbers.

16. But when the scales of battle were hanging in the balance at Arcola, Bonaparte resorted to a tactical ruse, a device rare for him sending a few trumpeters on to the Austrian rear to sound the charge. Within a few minutes the Austrian troops were streaming away inflight. 17. Fourth attempt. Two months later, in Jan 1797, the Austrians made a fourth and last attempt to save Mantua, but this was shattered at Rivoli where Bonaparte's loose group formation functioned almost perfectly. 18. Like a wide spread net whose corners are weighted with stones, when one of the enemy's columns impinged on it the net closed in round the point of pressure and the stones crashed together on the intruder. 19. This self-protective formation which thus, on impact, became a concentrated offn formation, was Bonaparte's development of the new divisional system by which an army was permanently sub-divided into independently moving fractions, instead of, as formerly, constituting a single body from which only temporary detachments were made. 20. Although at Rivoli this loaded net was the means of crushing the Austrians' manoeuvring wg, it is significant to note that the collapse of their main resistance came from Bonaparte's audacity in sending a single regiment of 2,000 men across Lake Garda, in boats, to place themselves on the line of retreat of a whole army.

72 21. Mantua then surrendered, and the Austrians who had lost their armies in the effort to save this outer gate to their country had now to watch, helplessly, Bonaparte's swift approach to the defence less inner gate. 22. This threat wrung peace from Austria while the main French armies were still but a few miles beyond the Rhine. Second Coalition battles. 1. In the autumn of 1798, the Second Coalition was formed by Russia, Austria, England, Turkey, Portugal, Naples, and the Papacy. 2. Here Napoleon did not use his Army res to reinforce the main army on the Rhine.

3. Instead, he planned a bold indirect apchs; a swoop along an immense arc on to the rear of the Austrian army in Italy. 4. Austrians had driven the small French 'Army of Italy' back almost to the French frontier and pinned it into the north-west corner of Italy. 5. Bonaparte intended to move through Switzerland, and then to descend into Italy as far east as the Saint Gothard pass, or even the Tyrol. 6. But the news that the Army of Italy was hard pressed led him to take the shorter route by the Saint Bernard pass. Thus, when he debouched from the Alps at Ivrea, in the last week of May 1800, he was still on the right front of the Austrian army. 7. Instead of pressing SE direct to the aid of Massena, who was shut up in Genoa, Bonaparte sent his advanced gd due south to Cherasco, while, under cover of this distraction, he slipped eastward to Milan with the main body. 8. Thus, instead of advancing to meet the en in their natural posn, facing west of Alessandria, he gained a natural posn across the Austrians' rear - forming a strat backstop, or barrage, which was the initial objective of his deadliest mvres against the en's rear. 9. Such a posn offered natural obstacles and provided him a secure pvt from which he prepared a strangle hold for the en, whose instinctive tendency, when cut off from their line of retreat and supply, was to turn & flow back. This conception of a strategic barrage was Bonaparte's chief contribution to the strat of indirect apch. Napoleonic Wars. Battle of Austerlitz. 1. Also known as the Battle of the Three Emperors was one of Napoleons greatest victories. 2. On 2 Dec 1805, Napoleon decisively defeated a Russso - Austerian army, commanded by Tsar Alexander I and Fransis II of Holy Roman Empire, after nearly 9 hrs of difficult fighting. 3. Often regarded a tactical masterpiece, Napolean used a subtle series of variations of the indirect apch.

73 4. His first aim was to push the Russians as far east as possible, so as to separate them from Austrian Armies now returning from Italy. 5. Napoleon resorted to the indirect apch of tempting the Russians into taking the offn by display of his own apparent weakness. 6. To face the 80,000 men of the en army, he concentrated only 50,000 at Brunn and then pushed out isolated detachments towards Olmutz. 7. This impression of weakness he supplemented by doves of peace to the Tsar and the Austrian emperor. 8. When the en swallowed the bait, Napoleon recoiled before them to a posn at Austerlitz, designed by nature to fit his trap. 9. In the battle which followed, he used one of his rare examples of the tactical indirect apch to offset his equally rare inferiority of numbers on the battlefield. 10. Luring the en to stretch their left in an attack on his line of retreat, he swung round his centre against the weakened joint and thereby obtained a victory so decisive that within 24 hrs the Emperor of Austria asked for peace. Battle of Austerlitz

74 Napoleon adventure in Prussia. (Refer Appx P) 1. A few months later, Napoleon turned to deal with Prussia.

2. He had a superiority of almost two to one with an army that was grand against one that was defective in trg and also obsolete in outlook. 3. In 1806, he still sought, and gained the advantage of initial surprise.

4. To this end he had cantoned his troops near the Danube and then swiftly concentrated to the north, behind the natural screen formed by the Thuringian forest. 5. Next, debouching suddenly form the wooded range into the open country beyond, his batailion carrre drove straight ahead towards the heart of the en country. 6. Thus Napoleon found himself, on the rear of the Prussian forces.

7. He swung round to crush them at Jena, he seems to have relied primarily on sheer weight: the moral effect of his posn being incidental, although imp.

75 Q. How did Britain apply indirectness in its Grand strat against French in the Peninsular War? The Peninsular War. Grand Strat of Indirect Apch by Britain(1807-14). 1. Britains brief thrust against the French forces in Spain dislocated Napoleon's plans in Spain, gave the national rising time and space to gather strength. 2. This ensured that the Iberian peninsula remained a sore in Napoleon's side.

3. In this curious warfare, England's most profound influence was in aggravating the trouble and encouraging the sources of it. 4. 5. French army was bogged down by the guerrilla warfare in Spain. It suffered overwhelming losses which drained the French strength and morale.

6. It is a clear deduction that the majority of the losses in French strength, and their morale, was due to the ops of the guerrillas, and subsequently of Wellington himself, in harrying the French. Q. What was Battalion Carre in Napoleons Army? Ans. 1. By 1804, the French had more than 350,000 soldiers, organised into corps that were independent armies of varying sizes. 2. Each contained inf, cav, arty and engrs and was capable of fighting at least a delaying action against most fmns until reinforcements came. 3. To this sys, Bonaparte added his own Battalion Carre, which meant indl corps would move towards a predetermined point separately, but within a day's march of each other. 4. This strat not only gave corps cdrs confidence that sp was not far away, but also lessened the strain a single army marching along a single route placed upon local food supplies. 5. This was particularly imp in nations like Spain and Russia where the land was poor and barely able to sustain the population let alone huge armies. 6. It also allowed for speed and flexibility of manouevre. Q. Elucidate the indirectness displayed by Wellington to harry and weaken the French Army in Spain? Ans. Wellingtons arr. 1. In Apr 1809, Wellington arrived at Lisbon with 26,000 men.

2. On arr he found himself in a central posn in respect to the French Marshals in the Iberia peninsula.

76 3. Profiting by it, his unexpected appearance, and the en's dispersion, Wellington moved north against Soult (French Marshal). 4. Although he failed to cut off Soult's most southerly dets as he had planned, he surprised Soult himself and developed an incipient dislocation by heading Soult off from his natural line of retreat. 5. Subsequently, Wellington mopped up the resistance without it ever having had the chance to coagulate. 6. And at the end of Soult's enforced retreat through the bleak mtns northward into Galicia, his army had suffered loss and exhaustion out of all proportion to the fighting. 7. British success lay in Wellington's shrewd calculation of the economic factor the limited French means of subsistence and his construction of the lines of Torres Vedras. 8. And also his strat of indirect apch to a mil-eco object and objective.

Wellington Vs Massena. 1. In Spain, Massena's invasion came by the north in 1810, past Ciudad Rodrigo, and thus gave Wellington the longest time and space for his strategy to take effect. 2. His precautions in stripping the country of provisions helped slow down Massena's adv, also it was strengthened by Massena's folly in committing his tps to a needless direct assault. 3. Wellington then fell back to the lines of Torres Vedras which he had constructed, across the mountainous peninsula formed by the Tagusand the sea, to cover Lisbon. 4. On 14th of Oct, four months and barely two hundred miles from his start, Massena came within sight of the lines a sight which struck him with shock & surprise. 5. Unable to force them, he hung on for a month until compelled by starvation to retreat to Santarem, thirty miles back, on the Tagus. 6. Wellington, shrewdly, made no attempt to press his retreat or bring on a battle, but set himself to confine Massena within the smallest possible area so that he might have the greatest possible difficulty in feeding his men. 7. Massena lost 25, 000 men out of which only 2, 000 died in action.

8. Another distracting factor these yrs was the constant threat of British landings on an immense coastline. Q. Liddell Hart explains that captains who have used directness in their apchs have seldom won a decisive victory. Napoleon towards 1812-15 started to use directness more often in his Campaigns too. Bring out the reasons of Failure of Bonaparte Strategies which led to his end? Ans.

77 1. Towards 1812-15 the tendencies already seen to be growing in Napoleon's strategy that of relying more on mass than on mobility, and on strategic fmn rather than on surprise. 2. As Napoleon pressed into Russia, after his first blows 'in the air' he contracted his line into his customary bataillon carre, and tried to swing it tactically on to the enemy's rear. 3. But Napoleon's open jaws closed so obviously, at Smolensk and Borodino that the Russians slipped out. 4. No example could have better demonstrated the drawbacks of a convergent as compared with a true indirect approach. 5. Later on in 1813 Napoleon moved into Prussia adv against Berlin.

6. While tackling an indirect apch by Schwarzenberg with his more deadly indirect apch, towards the last moment, he lost his nerve and decided upon a direct apch where he achieved a tac victory but Schwarzenberg retreated t safety. Battle of Leipzig. 1. (Refer Appx Q) The Battle of Leipzig was fought from 16-19 October 1813, by the coalition armies of Russia, Prussia, Austria and Sweden against the French army of Napoleon. 2. The battle involved of 600,000 soldiers, making it the largest battle in Europe prior to World War - I. 3. The three allied armies began to close in upon Napoleon who, weakened by his battles, had fallen back from Dresden to Duben, near Leipzig. 4. Schwarzenberg lay to the south, Blucher to the North and, unknown to Napolean, Bernadotte was almost round and behind his northern flank. 5. Napoleon decided on a direct, followed by an indirect, approach first, to crush Blucher and then to cut Schwarzenbergs comn with Bohemia. 6. It would seem that the sequence was at fault. Napoleons direct move on Blucher did not bring the latter to battle. 7. Yet it had one curious result, all the more significant because it was unpremeditated.

8. The direct move upon Blucher was, quite unrealized, an indirect move upon Bernadottes rear. 9. By unnerving Bernadotte, it led him to fall back hurriedly northward and so removed him from Napoleons line of retreat. 10. Thereby this blow in the air at Blucher saved Napoleon form utter disaster a few days later.

78 11. For when Blucher and Schewarzenberg closed in upon him at Leipzig, Napoleon accepted the gage of battle and suffered defeat but, in his extremity, still had a path by which he could extricate himself, and withdraw safely to France. Read pre-staff prcis. The American Civil War(1861-65) Q. With the devp of railways the armies were fixed and exhibited directness in their apch. How did the Railway cause a paralysis to armies during American Civil War and what were the corrective measures taken by the Union Army against it? Ans. Problems of a Rail-fed Army. 1. 2. 3. The railway fostered the expansion of armies. It could fwd more men and feed them also. Soon armies became tied to the railheads.

4. The Union armies being accustomed to it were more susceptible to paralysis than their opponents. 5. In the Western theatre, the dangers of a rail fed mass were exposed by the mobile raids of Confederate cavalry by leaders as Forrest and Morgan. Solutions by Sherman. 1. 2. Sherman of the Union Army was a strategist who diagnosed the problems. He saw that he must free himself from a fixed line of supply and move self contained.

3. Thus, he marched through the back door of confederacy to cut the lines that its main army and wrecked its supply sys at the source. Q (a). How was indirectness used for repulsing Lees invasion of North by Grant in the Western theatre of the American civil war? Q (b). How did Grant use indirect apch to capture Vicksburg and Jackson? Ans. Background. 1. 2. Lee fought for the Confederates in the American civil War. He realized early the value of protecting vital lgs lines.

3. Under Lee, the strat was that the armies of the West must hold while he fought a defensive offn campaign in east. 4. Lee conc his forces to repel a Union counter offn and had to withdraw to Virginia.

5. As he withdrew, he won a decisive victory at Chancellorsville but couldnt get a decision at Gettysburg where he lost half of his str.

79 6. The repulse of Lee's invasion at Gettysburg has commonly been acclaimed the turning-point of the war. Indirectness in Unions Apch. 7. The first repulse of Lees invasion by Union came in Apr 1862, when Farragut's sqn ran past the forts guarding the mouth of the Mississippi, and there by gained the bloodless surrender of New Orleans. 8. After four unsuccessful attempts in Feb/Mar, Grant resorted to a truly indirect apch in Apr 1863.The second decisive effect was achieved by the capture of Vicksburg by Grant, which gave the Union a complete control of this vital artery. 9. This ensured that Confederacy was deprived permanently of reinforcements and supplies from the Trans-Mississippi states. Capture of Vicksburg and Jackson. 1. Part of the Union fleet and tpt ran southward past the Vicksburg batteries, by night, to a point thirty miles below the fortress. 2. The bulk of the army moved thither overland, by the west bank of the Mississippi; and, under cover of Sherman's distracting movements towards the NE of Vicksburg, it was transported to the east bank in face of weak opposn. 3. Then, when Sherman rejoined him, Grant took the calculated risk of cutting himself loose from his new temp base and moving NE into the ens territory to place himself on the rear of Vicksburg, and astride its comns with the main Eastern states of the Confederacy. 4. In this mvre he made almost a complete circuit from his starting-point.

5. He thus appeared to put himself midway between the en's two forces which were concentrating, respectively, at Vicksburg and at Jackson, forty miles to the east. 6. Jackson was the jn of a lateral north and south rly with the main east and west line.

7. On arriving at this rly, he found it advisable first to move his whole army eastward to compel the en to evacuate Jackson. 8. This illustrated the change in strat conditions brought about by the devp of railways.

9. Napoleon had used the line of a river or range of hills as his strategic barrage, while Grant's strategic barrage was constituted by the possession of a single point, a rly jn. 10. Once this was secured, he turned about and moved on Vicksburg, which was now isolated, and remained isolated long enough to ensure its capitulation weeks later. Q. Sherman exhibited economy of force by mvre and devp a new strat practice of by keeping his enemies on the horns of dilemma, this he used to take on alternate objs. Describe the indirectness exhibited and the op methods adopted by Sherman in moving across the Confederacy at Lee`s rear in his famous march to the sea.

80 Ans. Background. 1. After gaining Atlanta Sherman planned to march through Georgia-CarolinasRichmond. 2. By this he wanted to stop the supplies to Richmond and Lees army in north, gain moral ascendancy and bring the collapse of the Confederate resistance. 3. On 15 Nov 1864 he left Atlanta, living on the country and destroying the railways. He reached outskirts of Savanah on 10 Dec thereby reopening his comns by sea. 4. Sherman then moved northwards through the Carolinas towards Lee's rear, depriving the South of its chief remaining ports. Shermans Operational Methods. 5. During Shermans march through Georgia he had not only cut loose from his comns but had cut down on lot of extra baggage drastically. 6. His army became a huge flying coln of 60, 000 lightly equipped tps. 7. Each of his four corps was self contained.

8. A number of foraging parties acted as a wide flung screen across the front and flanks of the marching colns. 9. New Strat Practice by Sherman. (a) He realized that during the campaign of Atlanta he had a single geographical obj which simplified the tasks of his opponents. (b) To overcome this limitation Sherman now planned a number of objectives during his march thus keeping his opponents in dilemma. (c) (d) This way he always had an alternative obj too. The deceptive dirn had had a profound physical and moral effect on en.

10. His armys move on a wide and irregular front with five to six colns each covered by foragers helped pushing on incase one was blocked. 11. Opposing tps repeatedly gave away to this moral pressure as their minds were so saturated with Shermans maneuvering. 12. It was the deadliness of Shermans rear attack- against the rear of people and not only an army, which broke the will of en soldiers. 13. 14. 40% of Lees army deserted to save their family and homes. Both Grant and Shermans aggressiveness was consistent with the aim of their Govt.

(Refer Appx R)

81 Q. Explain the Strat of Interior lines?

1. Interior lines is a strat of warfare that is based on the concept that lines of movement, comn, and supply within an area are shorter than those on the outside. 2. As the area held by a defensive force shrinks, these advantages increase.

3. Using the strat of interior lines, a surrounded force can more easily supply, communicate, and move its forces around, and can mount a series of surprise attacks on the forces encircling it. 4. This allows a strategy of moving quickly enough and so unpredictably that the surrounding forces would be forced to retreat. 5. Frederick the Great's op strat in his prosecution of the Seven Years' War against the French, Russian, and Austrian Empire's separate armies can be considered an example of the advantage of interior lines in warfare. 6. General Robert E. Lee used this technique during the Battle of Antietam during the American Civil War in 1862. Q. Moltkes Campaigns in the the Central Europe were examples of indirect apch though unintentional in plan. Briefly bring out the indirectness achieved by Moltkes army against the Austrians and French. Ans. Moltkes Campaigns. 1. Moltke or Moltke elder was a Fd Marshal and subsequently chief of staff in the Prussian Army. 2. In the wars with Austria and French during 1866-70, Moltke's strat was that of a direct apch with little trace of guile, relying on the power of a superior conc of force. 3. In 1866, Prussians' breech-loading rifle gave them an advantage over the Austrians' muzzle-loader. 4. While in 1870, the French inferiority of force lay partly in their inferior numbers and partly in their inferior training. 5. War against the Austrians(1866). (see map on pg 156-157)

(a) In 1866, the need to save time by using all avlb railway led Moltke to detrain the Prussian forces on a widely extended front of over 250miles. (b) His intention was to rapidly advance and converge inward through the frontier mountain belt, to unite his armies in northern Bohemia. (c) But the loss of time due-to the King of Prussia's reluctance endowed his strategy with an indirectness of apch that he had not intended. (d) Prussian Crown Prince gave Moltke a reluctant sanction to move his army SE to safeguard Silesia.

82 (e) Thereby he separated himself further from the other armies; and also put himself in a posn to menace the flank and rear of the Austrian mass. (f) These dispositions disturbed the mental equilibrium of the Austrian command.

(g) It is worth note that Moltke's far-stretched assy of his forces proved to have more flexibility than the Austrians' conc on a front of forty miles which gave them the apparent advantage of being able to op on 'interior lines'. (h) His original plan had two branches.

(i) If exploration were to show that the Austrians supposed posn behind the Elbe at Josefstadt was insecure, the Crown Prince's army was to side-step eastwards and take it in flank, while the other two armies pined it in front. (j) If an attack seemed impracticable, all three armies, were to circle westward, cross the Elbe at Pardubitz, and then, swinging east, menace the enemy's comns with the south. (k) 6. However, the Austrians were found to be on the near side of the Elbe.

War against the French (1870). (a) In1870, Moltke had intended to bring about a decisive battle on the River Saar, in which all his three armies would concentrate on and pulverize the French. (b) This plan was upset not by the enemy's action, but by their paralysis.

(c) This paralysis was caused by the mere news that the German Third Army, on the extreme left, had crossed the frontier far to the east and won a minor tac success over a French det at Weissenburg. (d) Thus, unintended and unforeseen, was created the opportunity for the German Third Army, still marching free towards Paris, to make an indirect apch to Mac Mahon's army. (e) Making a complete change of dirn from westward to northward, it moved round on the flk and rear of MacMahon. The result was Sedan. The Russo Japanese War(1904-05) 1. The Japanese strategy, was essentially that of a direct apch.

2. There was no real attempt to take advantage of the unusually advantageous condition that the Russians were entirely dependent on a single line of rail way the Trans Siberian. 3. But all that Japan`s strategists contemplated a direct blow at, and into, the teeth of the Russian army. 4. 5. And they held their own forces more closely grouped than those of Moltke in 1870. There was an abundance of indecisive bloodshed.

83 6. As a result, Japanese were so exhausted after the final indecisive battle of Mukden that they were glad, to make peace with a foe who had no heart in the struggle, and had not yet put one tenth of his available forces into it. Conclusions from 25 Centuries. Value of Indirect Apch. 1. Out of 280 campaigns covered in the 25 centuries only six followed a direct strat apch. 2. Out of these two(by Alexander), were prepared by Grand Strategy of indirect apch. The rest of the four campaigns were a success after a lot cas on both sides. Superiority in tac Instruments. 3. Alexanders two wins in these six were direct apchs and were won because of his superior tactical instrument: his army. Similarly Napoleons wins were due to his confidence in the superiority of his use of massed artillery against a key point. 4. As for 1866 and1870, at Sadowa and Sedan the Germans' tactical superiority in each case; a superiority was assured by the breech-loader in 1866, and by superior artillery in 1870. 5. Liddell Hart also concludes with examples that the indirect apch is by far the most hopeful and economic form of strategy. 6. Deductions. The most successful cdrs when faced by an en in a posn that was strong naturally or materially, have hardly ever tackled it in a direct way. 7. Further, he demonstrates that rather than resign himself to a direct approach, a Great Captain will take even the most hazardous indirect approach if necessary over mtns, deserts or swamps, with only a fraction of force, even cutting himself loose from his comns. 8. All conditions are more calculable, all obstacles more surmountable, than those of human resistance. 9. While Napoleon was able to cross the Alps in 1800 'according to plan ', the little fort of Bard could interfere so seriously with the move of his army as to endanger his whole plan. Categories of Battles. 10. Combining the strategical and the tactical examination, Liddell Hart classifies that most of the examples fall into one of two categories. 11. Cat -1. They were produced either by a strat of elastic def - calculated wdlthat was capped by a tactical offn, 12. Cat- 2. Or produced by a strat of offn, aimed to place oneself in a position 'up setting' to the opponent, and capped by a tactical defensive : with a sting in the tail.

84 13. Both can be expressed in the word 'lure' or 'trap'.

14. The most effective indirect approach is one that lures or startles the opponent in to a false move so that, as in ju-jitsu, his own effort is turned into the lever of his overthrow. 15. A further deduction, perhaps not positive, from svy, is that in a campaign against more than one state or army it is more fruitful to conc first against the weaker partner, than to attempt the overthrow of the stronger in the belief that the latter's defeat will automatically involve the collapse of the others. Two Maxims. 16. We can also crystallize the lessons into two simple maxims, one negative, and the other positive. 17. The first is that, in face of the overwhelming evidence of history, no general is justified in launching his troops to a direct attack upon an en firmly in position. 18. The second, that instead of seeking to upset the enemy's equilibrium by one's attack, it must be upset before a real attack is, or can be successfully, launched. Soundest Strat. 19. The soundest strategy in any campaign is to postpone battle, and the soundest tactics to postpone attack, until the moral dislocation of the enemy renders the delivery of a decisive blow practicable. Q. Comment upon German and French plan in western theatre in WWI. How did German action in Lorraine undermined Sclieffens plan.

85 THE WESTERN FRONT 1. Gen (a) (b) (c) 2. Franco German frontier narrow 150 miles long. Little room for mvre. Fortress chain Epinal, Toul, Verdun

Initial French Plan (a) Initial defensive, leased on frontier fortresses, to be followed by decisives Counterstroke. (b) Fortress system Along Alsace - Lorraine frontier.

(c) Gaps betn Epinal & Toul to chanalize expected German invasion so that counter delivered with assurance & effectives. (d) 3. Restricted frontier - Non violation of neutral territory.

Plan XVII . (a) Result of denouncing of initial French plan.

(b) Direct appch in form of leading offn against German Centre with all forces united. (c) Short coming ;(i) Counted upon having bare equality of str against en who would have sp of his own fortified frontier zone. (ii) Surrendering advantage of own fortified posn. 4. Role of British Expeditionary force (a) (b) Role of an appendix to French left wing. Departure from policy of Exploitation of mobility given by sea power.

(c) Suggestion of cdr BEF to send force to Antwerp where it would have stiffened Belgiums resistance & threaten rear flk of German armies as they advanced through Belgium into France turned down by DMO. 5. Schlieffens Plan (a) (b) (c) Framed in 1905 Avoid French fortified posn and mov as widely as possible through Belgium. Concentrated bulk of German forces on right wg.

(d) Rt wg to sweep through Belgium & Northern France & then, continuing to traverse vast arc to left or East.

86 (e) With Extreme right passing south of Paris, cross seine near Rouen, press French back towards Moselle, where they would be hammered in rear on anvil formed by Lorraine fortresses & Swiss frontier. (f). Indirectness of plan (i) Not in Geog detour but in Distr of force.

(ii) Initial surprise sought by incorporating reserve corps with active corps at outset in offn mass. (iii) Distr of force (aa) (ab) (ac) (ad) Total Div available Swinging mass Forming pivot falling Verdun Left wg - 72 - 53 - 10 -9

(iv) Reduction of left wing to incr effect of swinging mass if French attacked in Lorraine& press left wing back towards Rhine, It would be difficult to counter, German attk through Belgium. Further French went more difficult it will become. (v) 6. Ltd indirectness of Plan. Density of force inrelation to space.

Modification of Schlieffens plan by Moltke (a) More tps available betn 1905 & 1914.

(b) Increased str of left wing disproportionately to right. (c) By making left wing safer, he made plan unsafe, and began a continuous sapping of its foundation which ended in its collapse. (d) Brief lapse by Moltke to Seek decision in Lorraine. (i) Tempted to accept challenge indirect manner.

(ii) Postponing Rt wings sweep temporarily in order to Seek decision in Lorraine. (iii) In brief lapse diverted to Lorraine six newly formed Erasats divs which should have had gone to increase str of its rt wg. (e) Incr in str led to German Cdrs in lorrraine loath to fulfill their self suppressing role. (i) Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria instead of continuing to fallback & lure French, halted his army for battle. (ii) Arranged with neighbor forestalling of German attk as French attk slow to devp.

87 (iii) Force ration 25 Divs : 19 Divs, lack superiority and strat posn to make counterstroke decisive. (iv) Result :(aa) (ab) (f) (g) Mere throwing of French on to their fortified barrier. Enable dispatch of tps Westwards for battle of Marae.

Led to progressive reduction of wt and role of rt wg. Dissipation of Force. (i) Six reinforcing Divs to lorraine.

(ii) Seven Divs of Rt wing detached to invest / stand gd over Antwerp, Givet, Maubauge. (iii) 7. Four Divs with drawn to reinforce Eastern front.

Effect of Modification. (a) Weakening of decisive rt wing directly/ indirectly. (i) Klucks army on extreme right wheeled in prematurely thereby presenting a chance for Paris Garrison to catch him in flank. (ii) Only 13 German Divs available against 27 Franco British Divs on this decisive Flank. (b) German inferiority due to subtraction of force from rt wing, French Superiority due to misguide action of German left wing. (c) Switching of French Divs from left to right would not have been possible if French left wing had been allowed to push on deeper into Lorraine.

Q. Comment wether the str of German rt wing could have been maintained even apart from Diversions and subtractions. Ans. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Doubtful. Belgians destr of Brs over meuse. Germans could run no trains past liege. Block made impossible for them to reinforce rt wg as originally planned. Sups of all three rt wing armies had to pass through one half strangled Artery.

6. Overlooking lesson of American civ war Devp of rlys & armies dependence on such comns forced dply of large number than could be maintained in log range ops without risk of breakdown.

88 Q. What were the causes of German retreat in WW-I after partial success of Schlieffans plan. Ans. 1. Gen. According to Schlieffans plan Armies 1-5 were to wheel through Belgium, Armies 6-7 to attack the French border, aiming for a brief decisive Swing to south to capture Paris (1st Army under von Kluck) and to pin French Army against Swiss border. 2. Opening German Campaign failed due to :(a) Delays caused by :(i) German adv through Belgium Slowed up by destr of rlys by retreating Belgium and 12 day delay at rail link city of liege. (ii) Delaying of Von Klucks Army at battle of mors by BEF, then retreating intact. (b) :In decisiveness caused by this Initial delay to timelines of German adv led to

(i)

French armies under Gen Joffre had time to rush North, using rlys.

(ii) Moltke withdrawing some res from Western front to reinforce his East Prussian armies after Initial Russian advance on Eastern front. (iii) Von Kluck on German rt flk fearing he was losing contract with 2 nd German army on his left, swing South earlier than planned, bringing him east of Paris, exposing his flank to regrouped French forces around Paris. (iv) By contraction of his Frontage & greater directness of Apch, for sake of security, Moltke sacrificed prospects inherent in wide sweep of Schlieffan plan. As it proved instead of contracting risk he invited fatal counterstroke. (v) Narrower envelopment of French Centre & right.

(vi) Initial rapid adv of Germans outstripped the capacity of sup colns to resupply. (vii) Creation of 30 mile gap between 1st and 2nd German Armies. (aa) Owing to pressure on Germans sensitive flank, Kluck was constrained to draw off first one part and then remaining part of his army to sp his threatened flk gd. There by leading to creation of gap. (ab) Kluck took rapid advance because of British retreat opp gaping sect. Bullow ordered retreat of 2nd Army when he realised that Britishers unintentional Exploiting of gap by retracing of steps has caused advancing into gap. 1st Army gain was thus nullified. (viii) Failure of 6th & 7th Army on Defs of French eastern frontier.

89 (ix) Battle of Marne was decided by jar & a crack. Jar administered marenourys attk on German rt flank caused a crack in weak Jt of German line, & this physical crack in turn produced moral crack in German Comd. (x) Moral Effect of phantom forces like tpts of British disembarking fresh tps and Russian Expeditionary force on Belgium coast caused material detention of German forces in Belgium. (xi) Failure to Exploit Flanks by German Army in race to sea Falkenhayn planned strat trap by his latest formed flank army, while another composed of forces released by fall of Antwerp & 4, newly raised Corp to sweep Belgian coast. But king Arbers cautious Apch led to Belgian Army in posn to withstand German sweep. Q. What were the salient feature of plans of campaign on Eastern front. How was comn an imp fact contributing to over all design of battle. Ans. 1. Gen (a) (b) 2. Plans more fluid less elaborately worked out. Kaleidoscopic in changes of fortune as in western theatre.

Eff of Sys of comn (a) Germans (i) (ii) (b) (c) Borders provinces provided with netwk of strat rlys. Vital advantage in conc for countering Russian adv. Sparse Sys of comn.

Poland & Russians

Over all effect in Plg & strat (i) Further German Armies progressed into Poland and Russia more advantage they will loose. (ii) Most profitable strat was to lure Russians fwd into posn for counterstroke rather than to launch offn themselves. (iii) Drawback Such Punic strat gave Russians time to concentrate & to set in motion cumbrous & rusty machine.

3. 8.

Diff of opinion betn Austria & Germans Problem to hold Russians for six weeks (a) Both Agreed that problem was to hold Russians in check during six weeks before Germans would have crushed France & could Switch their forces East wards to join Austrians indecisive below against Russians.

90 (b) German opinion (i) To leave min force in East to seek decision against France.

(ii) Only Political dislike of Exposing National territory to Invasion prevented them to Evacuation East Prussia. (c) 4. Austrian stand Imdt offn to throw Russian machine out of gear.

Moltke Fell in for Austrian strat (a) Promised to keep Russians fully occupied while campaign in France was being decided. (b) Plan Offn North-eastwards into Poland by two armies, protected by two more on their right, further East.

5.

Desire of one ally affected strat of other. (a) Russian comd, both for mil & for racial motives, wished to concentrate against Austria, while she was unsupported & leave Germany alone until later, when full str Russian Army would be mobilized. (b) French, anxious to relieve German pressure against themselves, urged Russians to delivers simultaneous attk against Germany. (c) Russians consented for an offn for which they were neither ready nor organized.

Q. How does Tennenberg campaign from Example of Interior lines form of Indirect Appch. Ans. 1. Gen (a) Russia accelerated Invasion of East Prussia in order to ease pressure on French allies. (b) Crossed East Frontier of East Prussia and threw back Prittwitz 8th Army on th 20 Aug 1914. 2. Panic by Prittwitz (a) Prittwitz heard Samsonovs Army crossing southern frontier of East Prussia in his rear, which was guarded by only three Divs while Ten faced them. (b) 3. Prittwitz removed from comd. Ludendorff took over as COS.

Conc of six Divs by Ludendorff against Samsonovs Left wing. (a) (b) Force, inferior in str to Russians. Could not have been Decisive.

91 (c) Cal risk of withdrawing rest of German tps, Except cavalry screen from front & rushing them back Samsonovs right wing. 4. Daring move aided by absence of comn betn two Russian cdrs & ease with which Germans deciphered Russian wireless orders. 5. Samsonovs flanks were crushed, centre surrounded and Army Destroyed. practically

Q. German mvre at Silesian frontier has been classic example of how relatively Small force, by using its mobility for indirect Appch to a vital pt, could paralyse the adv of En several times its str. Comment. Ans. 1. Gen (a) Effect of Tanmenberg diminished. Offn of Austrian 1st and 4th Armies into Poland nullified by Russian 3rd & 8th Army upon weaker 2nd & 3rd Army guarding Austrian rt flank. (b) (c) 2. General retreat ordered by Austrian Army . Austrias plight compelled Germans to send aid.

Initial Measures undertaken by Germans (a) German force in East Prussia formed into 9th Army.

(b) 9th Army switched & south to SW corner of poland to adv on Warsaw in combination with Austrian offn. 3. Riposte by Russians (a) Russians fully mobilized . Regp of forces & CA and drove back the adv and followed it up by powerful effort to invade Silesin. (b) Formed Phalanx of seven Armies Three in van & two protecting either flank. 10th had invaded Eastern corner of East Prussia. 4. Master stroke by Germans (a) Based on Sys of lateral rlys inside German frontier.

(b) 9th Army, falling back before Russian adv, slowed it down by systematic destr of scanty comns in Poland. (c) Switching of force against Jt betn the two Armies Guarding Russian right flank. The wedge split two armies, forced 1st back on Warsaw and almost achieved another Tanmenberg against 2nd. 5. soil. Russian stream Roller was thrown out of gear, & news again did it threaten German

92 Q. The Real story of 1915 on Eastern front is that of tussle of wills betn Ludendorff, who desired to reach decision by strat of indirect Appch,and Flankenhayn, who considered that he could both limit his Expenditure of force & cripple Russias offn powers by strat of direct appch. Ans.

1.

Gen (a) Ludendorff wished to seize opportunity for wide indirect Appch round Northern flank near Baltic, through Vilna towards Russian rear & astride their sparse rail comn with polish salient. (b) Flankenhayn circumspect from boldness and its drns and upon his res.

2. Breakthrough in Russian centre in Dunajec sect betn Carpathians &Vistula by Flankenhayn (a) Surprise complete & Exploitation rapid.

(b) Illuminating Example of diff betn indirect Appch & surprise. Surprise of time, place, force achieved.

93 (c) Russian rolled back towards their res, sups & rlys.

(d) Pressure of Direct Appch though dangerous strain on Russian comd was not dislocating shock. 3. Reliasation by Flankenhayn that he had committed too far in Galicia to drawback. (a) Partial offn gained no secure place.

(b) Only Bringing more Tps from France could he hope to fulfill his aim of transferring tps back there. 4. Ordering of Ludendorff by Flankenhayn to strike south Eastward from East Prussia and changing dirn of offn from East to NE (a) (b) (c) Plan though convergent, was too much of frontal attk. Two wings might Squeeze Russians and they would do no more. Merely pushed Russians back. Russians were back on Rumanian frontier.

(d) Imposed strain by Detaining large German forces and keeping Austria morally & physically on rack. 5. Sanction of Vilna mvre (a) Launched by Ludendorff with his own meager resources.

(b) Light & Isolated thrust cut Vilna Dvinsk Rly & almost reached Minsk rly, central line of Russian comns, Despite Russian being free to concentrate all res to resist it. 6. Resects suggestive testimony to its potentialities if attempted Earlier, and in strong force, When Russian body was firmly Entangled in Polish net. Q. How was Serbian campaign in WW-I was indirect Appch with Ltd aim but in its own sphere was decisive aim? Ans. 1. Gen. Offn in East terminated & def in West being unshaken, central powers Launched & campaign against Serbia. 2. Plan Based on Bulgarias Intervention in war on side of central power. (a) Austro German invasion held in check.

(b) Mountainous country Serbian resistance firms until left wing of Bulgaria worked round southern Serbia across rear. (c) Serbia cut from Franco British rfts from Salonika.

94 (d) 3. Serbian collapse.

Result (a) (b) Relieved Austria from danger on this side Gave Germany free comn and cont of central Europe.

Q. What was Brusilovs offn ? Ans. 1. Main Aim. To relieve pressure on French & British Army in France & Italian Army and if possible Knock Austria Hungary out of war. 2. 3. 4. 5. Conceived as diversion. No prep, No conc of Tps Unexpected casual adv. Surprise & shock with strat results :(a) Stopped Austrian attack on Itlay.

(b) Compelled Fallenhayn to withdraw tps from western front and so abandon campaign round Verdun. (c) Caused down fall of Fallenhayn & replacement by Hindenburg & Ludendorff.

95 (d) 6. Early Successes convinced Romania to Enter war.

Effect of offn Short-lived. (a) Russian comd late too throw wt of offn in this dirn.

(b) Prolong effort along line of hardening resistance used up Russian Res W/O Compensating effect. (c) Caused moral bankruptcy of Russia mil power.

Q. Comment wether Mackensen switching of force and xg Danube for convergent advance on Danube a profitable strat. Ans.

96 1. Gen (a) Romania hoped that pressure of Brusilov, of British in Somme & Allied force now at Salonika would present central power being reinforced. (b) Had strong natural ramparts on either side of Carpathians and Danube.

(c) Dorbuja - Back yard strip near Black sea formed bait which skilful opponent could attach to his hook. 2. Rumanian offn (a) (b) (c) (d) 3. 4 Divs move & NW though Carpathian pass towards Hungarian plain. 3 Divs To GD Danube. 3 Divs Dorbuja. Slow & cautious adv

Macksens CA (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Stormed Turtucaia Br H. Destroyed 3 Rumanian Divs on Danube front. Danube flank secured moved Deeper in to Dobruja. Moved away from natural line or Expectation Bucharest. Drew Rumanian Res intended to sp Transylvania offn.

4.

Falkenhayns offn to the west. (a) (b) Crossed series of river lines. Checked at Alt, macksen intervened.

5.

Abandonment of potential posn on Rumanian rear. (a) (b) Mackensen crossed Danube for convergent Adv towards Bucharest Enabled Flankehayn to cross alt.

(c) But it Enabled Rumanian to use their close central posn for counter stroke at Mackensens flk. (d) line. Combined pressure pressed Rumanian army to withdraw to seretn blank sea

97

98 Q. What were mistakes committed by both Italian and Austro- Hungary/German forces in Italian theatre. Ans. 1. Gen :(a) Configuration of frontier gave Germans scope for geographical or physical indirect appch. (b) 2. Trn . (a) (b) (c) Italian province of Venezia formed salient pointing to Austria . Flanked on north by Austrian Tyrol and Trentino on south by Adriatic. Isonzo front Bordering Adriatic stretch of relatively low grnd on Isonzo front. Germans showed no inclination to try Psy indirect appch.

(d) Frontier after Isonzo front followed Julian and Carnic Alps in wide sweep to NW, arc continuing SW to lake Garda. 3. Restricted option for Italy for offn (a) Great Breadth of Alpine mass on North & absence of any vital obi, did not encourage an offn. (b) Only option available - Direct adv to Eastwards towards Austria.

(c) Draw back of the option. Suffered from threat of Austrian descent from Trentino on its rear. (d) 4. Restricted choice Course adopted.

Italy adopted direct appch and could not adv beyond SP in 2 yrs.

5. Refusal of Falkenhayn to lend 9 German Divs to Conrad, reqd to relive Austrian Divs on Eastern front. 6. Conard exposed Eastern front to Brusilovs adv by taking out divs from East for Italy Force Inadequate. 7. Attk by Conard came to success. Italian comd did not believe conard had force/facilities for large scale attk. 8. Attk lost momentum for want of Res (a) (b) (c) Withdrew res from Isonso sect. Evac of stores & Hvy Arty. Brusilovs adv caused suspension.

99 9. Ludendorff plan for combined below after 17 months (a) (b) Could only spare res of 6 Divs Austria suffering morally and materially from exhaustion.

(c) Due to lack of means, plan ltd to narrower & more direct Appch Thrust at NE Corner of Isonzo Sect where it bent round towards Alpine mass. (d) 10. Scope of plan expended without incl in means.

Offer by Austria (a) (b) Drove Italians to Piare river stout barricade. In adequacy of rail comns. (i) Switching of res to Trentino foiled by inadequacy of rail comns.

(ii) Ineff attempt by Trention Army Belated stroke lost effect of rear thrust for whole Italian front and res had been pushed back. (c) Austro German attk purely direct convergence after initial surprise having passed- It pressed Italians back towards res, sups, homeland, allied rfts. Q. What were the options available to British & French in Balkan Theatre. Dardanelles appch through a direct appch to Turkey was an Indirect appch to central powers. What were reasons of failure? Ans :1. Choice of Balkan Theatre (a) Strong doubts about breakthrough of trench barrier.

(b) German lines in France could be looked upon as fortress that could not be reduced and cannot be completely invested. Lines may be held by investing force while ops proceed elsewhere. (c) Blow in some other theatre would correspond to classic attk on ens strat flank. (i) (ii) 2. Options (a) Kitcheners plan for securing Turkeys mainline of Eastward comn by landing in Gulf of Alexandretta. (b) Transfer of bulk of British forces to Balkans as a way of Ens Back-dooropposed. (i) French & British comd confident of early decision in France Modern devps changed conceptions of dist & power of mobility. Exploitation of tradition Amph strat and sea power of Britain.

100 (ii) Stressed on difficulties of Tpt & Sup & ease with which Germany could switch tps. (c) Proposed landing at Salonila as starting pt for march on Constantinople with an Army to encourage Greece & Bulgaria to join forces & then adv up the Daunbe into Austria Hungary in conjn with Romania. 3. Gallipoli/Dardanelles landings (a) (b) (c) (d) Aim. To relieve Turkish pressure on Russians forces in Causcavs. Paucity of tps Hence naval demonstration in Itlay. Churchills plan to convert demonstration into passage. Fumbling policy thrown away chance of surprise.

(e) Weakness in members, restd msn of aiding passage of fleet compelled to choose landing on Gallipoli peninsula in preference to mainland/Asiatic Shore. (f) Time & opportunity forfeited by inexperience of landing tps & Inertia of Cdrs on spot.

101 4. Fault not in conception but in Execution. (a) Force expended by British in Driblets should have on outset used fail proportion of forces. (b) Direct appch to Turkey but indirect appch to main Turkish army in Causcavs / centre power. (c) Fulfilled Principle of adjusting end to means.

Palestine and Mesopotamia Theatres Q. It is said that Palestine and Mesopotamian Theatre during WW -I was considered as means of Strat distraction, which absorbed far greater forces of British than diverted by En Comment. Ans :- Imp of overseas assets 1 In past British redeemed forfeits of her Allies on continent by seizing overseas possession of En 2 Such counter gains are assets in negotiating favorable peace settlement in an event of unfavorable/ indecisive issue. 3 4 Offseted effect of En successes in European theatre & bal loss of prestige. Psy imp of such counterpoises should never be over looked, specially by sea power.

5 Continental powers possession of oversea territories liable to be cut off tends to curb her aggressive inclinations. (a) Italys prolonged hesitation to enter war that that started in 1939 until her allys victory seemed certain. (b) Entanglement of bases is a restraint even though it may not be preventive.

102

Q.

Analyses the reason of decisive victory of British in Palestine

Scarily& Ruses

Asymmetric warfare / Arab Revolt TE Lawrence Strat Barrage

Mobility

British Decisive Victory

Disruption of L of C

Air Superiority

Ans :1. Ingredients of Assy metric warfare by TE Lawrence (a) (b) Guerrilla warfare Economically within limits of Instrument. Weakened fighting str of Turkey

(c) Turks in susceptible to loss of men but not to loss of material of which they suffered scarcity. (d) Turks not able to endure strain of fluid ops. Tried to hold vast area with qty of men which were not large enough to spread itself in netwk of posts over the area. (e) (f) Valuable line of cmns. Strat Adopted (i) Instead of trying to drive en away by cutting off sups, aimed to keep them there, by allowing short ration to reach them, so that longer they stayed weaker and more depressed they become. (ii) Blows might induce them to concentrate & simplify both sup & security problems. (iii) (iv) (v) Pin pricks to keep en speared out Arabs exploited mobility. Sought to destroy material - Seek it at pts where there was no force.

103 (vi) Never tried to maintain/improve advantage, but to move off & strike again somewhere else. (vii) Smallest force in quickest time at farthest place.

(viii) Denial of Tgts Continue action till en had changed his dispositions to resist it. (g) Assy Metric Warfare vs Normal Warfare. Assymetric warfare (i) If normal warfare fails choice (i) conditioned by factors of time, should fall on indirect appch which spared force aims at eventual decision by sapping (ii) Quickened & active form of opponents str & will. blockade, inherently slower to take eff than Strat of dislocation. (iii) National conditions make quick issue imperative latter appears preferable. (iv) Unless end is sought by indirect appch more costly than Assy metric Strat. (v) Lack of room & density of force also handicaps. (vi) In normal warfare choice should fall on form of indirect appch which aims at quick decision by trapping opponent. Normal warfare

2. Survey & Ruses Drew attention of En towards Gaza while Beer Sheeba with its water supply was seized by wide & swift swoop on its unprotected side. 3. Disruption of L of Cs (a) British mastered all forms of Turkish comns and relied on Napoleons maxim that whole secret of art of war lies in making oneself master of comns. British aim at fwg :(i) (ii) Paralysis of Physical org By cutting armys lines of comns. Paralysis of moral org - By closing its line of retreat.

(iii) Paralysis of sensors org - Destr of lines of inter comn by which orders & rpts pass. (b) Methodology adopted (i) (ii) Drove en ac out of air making ens comd blind. Bombing main Telegraph & tele Exch.

104 (iii) Cutting off main rly line at Derna by Arabs which had physical effects of shutting off flow of Turkish sups temporarily. 4. Strat Barrage. Turks were still capable of holding British Inf until Strat barrage across rear become known & produced invariable moral effect. 5. Use of mobile elements (a) Inf used to break preliminary condition of trench warfare but once condition of warfare was restored victory was achieved by mobile elements. (b) Dislocating & demoralizing degree, sustained surprise. normal

application of mobility which by its extreme

Q. How was Navy effectively used in WW - 1 as an instrument of grand Strat of indirect appch? Ans :- Blockade 1. Navy was instrument of brocade decisive agency in struggle.

2. Tighter the blockade became it lessened the power of resistance & more demoralizing the sense of constriction. 3. 4. Caused Semi starvation of German people & caused final collapse of home front. Submarine campaign of Germany :(a) Consequence:(i) Gave Britain leverr to loosen declaration of London & tighten blockade by claiming rt to intercept & search all ships suspected of carrying goods to Germany. (ii) German action in torpedoing Lusitania gave US propulsion towards entering war. (b) Effect on Britain Depended on Sea borne sups for sustenance. By the time counter measures combined with Germanys in sufficient submarines resources caused a progressive decline Britain had only food for six weeks. 5. Naval Blockade classified as grand strat of indirect Appch to which no eff resistance was possible and type which incurred no risk except slowness of effect. 6. Economic pressure not only lured but constrained Germany into mil offn of 1918.

105 Q. Germany did not forgo aims which were not worth the candle and is difference betn grand Strat & Grandiose stupidity. What should Germany should have done to win the war. Ans 1. War policy of Def in west, offence in East.

2. US should have been made to be out of conflict only blockade could not have been tightened. 3. With whole belt of Central Europe under cont, Russia out of war Allies could not have done more than inducing Germany to relinquish bargaining counters of Belgium & Northern France in return of undisputed retention of her gains inEast. 4. Could have forgone the desire of mil victory over Allies.

Q. What were the new innovative Tacs devised by the Germans/ Ludendorff to break stalemate of trench warfare. Ans

1. Gen. German comd & staff realized how rarely possession of superior force offsets disadvantage of attacking in obvious way. 2. Fwg new Innovative tacs was devised :(a) Inf trained in Infilt tac.

(b) Innovative use of Arty fire. Brief but intense Arty bombardment incl gas & smoke shells, to disrupt/suppress defs & obscure the aslt.

106 (c) Eff tac surprise & deception. (i) Eff Surprise attained by subtle compound of many deceptive elements.

(ii) Aslt Divs brought by ni marches; masses of arty brought close to front line in concealment & opened fire w/o preliminary registration. (iii) (d) Preps for successive attks at other pts.

Penetration of weak pt of defs.

(e) Application/Emp of Res. Res were directed to back up success, not redeem failures. (f) Tacs considered before purely strat objs. unless tactical success is possible. (g) (h) Which it is futile to pursue

Quick breakthrough followed by Rapid Exploitation. Draw back. Ludendorff failed to grasp significance of tk & devp it in time.

Q. In 1918 German break through proved quick, exploitation rapid. Yet the plan failed where did fault lie. Ans :- Reasons.

107 1. Fwg was gen criticism subsequent to event & to war :(a) (b) 2. 3. 4. Tac bias had led Ludendorff to change dirn & dissipate str. Conc Str at tac success at expense of strat goal.

Dissipated large part of Res in trying to redeem tac failure. Hesitated too long over decisions to exploit tactical successes. Choice of pt of attk. (a) Arrg & Lafere (i) (ii) (iii) Choice fell on mil Sect.

Grand favorable Sect weak in defs, res. Close to jt betn French & British Army.

(iv) Bad judgment, sect strongly held by British 3rd Army - Bulk of British res in flk to give sp (v) Hoped to separate British & French Army their pulverize British Army. & break

(b) Verdun Sailor. Rejected on score that grnd was unfavorable through could hardly lead to decisive result.

(c) Ypres & Lens. Rejected on score that it would meet main mass of British Army & that low lying grnd would be late in drying. 5. Distr of str according to ens str & not concentrating against weakest resistance. 6. Ludendorff was bent on breaking British Army by breaking down its strongest sect of resistance indirect assault Failed to throw cut of res along line of least resistance south of Somme. 7. 8. Break on Move & sups. At no time he threw cut a long line of fracture betn British and France Army. (a) Jt is most sensitive to and profitable pt of attk.

(b) Penetration betn two forces on units is more dangerous if they are assembled Shoulder to Shoulder than if they are widely Separate & organically separate. 9. Drifted into an attrition campaign.

10. Stopped Exploitation for fear of counterstroke. Throughout Ludendorff loud out res sparingly too late & too fur for real success. 11. Yielding to Influence of Tac Success, Ludendorff pressed each too fan & too Long, thus using up his own res & causing under Interval betn Each blow.

108 12. Ludendorff had Driven in three great wedges, but none had penetrated far enough to sever a vital artery; & this strat failure left Germans with an indented front which invited flanking counter strokes. Elastic def and use of masses of Lt tks by Allies. Q. Ans 1. 2. 3. What were Reason of final defeat of Germany? Naval Blockade Grip of Sea power starved Germany. Entry of US Provision of men & materials. Crumbling of home front. HITLERS STRATEGY AND HITLERS RUN FOR VICTORY

Q. The peaceful Powers have suffered a lot from 'missing the bus' through their slowness to gauge what hitler would next attempt. Comment. Ans 1. Contribution of Hitler to Strat Hitler gave the strategy of indirect approach a new extension, logistically and psychologically, both in the field and in the forum. 2. Necessity to understand opponent (a) Wise in war not to underrate your opponent.

(b) Imp to understand his methods, and how his mind works. Such understanding is the necessary foundation of a successful effort to foresee and forestall his moves. 3. Advisory Organ of Govt to Incl En Department A nation might profit a lot if the advisory organs of govt incl an 'enemy department', covering all spheres of war and studying the problems of the war from the Ens point of view so that, in this state of detachment, it might succeed in predicting what he was likely to do next. 4. Democracies failed to Anticipate Hitlers Course of action Mein Kampf, together With his speeches and other utterances, provide abundant clues to his dirn and sequence of action. Q. How did Hitler gave a new dirn and wider meaning to the German Doctrine of war? Ans 1. Analyzed 'How to achieve the moral breakdown of the en before the war has started.

2. Diverged from the orthodox trend of German mil thought of Clausewitz who rejected the idea that there is a skilful method of disarming and overcoming an en without great bloodshed. 3. Emphasis on demoralization of en other than by mil means if things can be done in a better and cheaper way. 4. Strategy to destroy the en from within, to conquer him through himself.

109 6. Recognized that mil wpn is one of the means that serve the purpose of war/ one out of the assortment which grand strat can employ. 7. In Hitler's view the true aim of the war-leader should be to produce the capitulation of the hostile armies without a battle. 8. Applied psy strat in political campaign.

9. Devp and coord all forms of war like activity and all possible instruments which may be used to operate against ens will. Q. Ans. 1. What is Totalitarian War as described by Lundendorff ?

Attk on theories of Clausewitz (a) Attk on theories of Clausewitz which had been the foundation of the German doctrine in 1914. (b) To Ludendorff, their fault was not that they went too far in the way of unlimited violence, regardless of cost, but that they did not go far enough. (c) Criticized Clausewitz for allowing policy too much imp, not too little. According to Clausewitz, "The political goal is the end, and warfare is a means leading to it, and a means can never be thought of without a certain end. ' In Ludendorff 's view, this was out of date. The totalitarian principle demanded that in war a nation should place everything at its service ; and, in peace, at the service of the next war. (d) War was the highest expression of the national 'will to live', and politics must therefore be subservient to the conduct of war.

2.

Primary concern was to ensure 'the psychical unity of the people (a) Ludendorffs primary concern - To ensure 'the psychical unity of the people. `

(b) Towards this, he sought to cultivate a religion of nationalism through which all Women would accept that their noblest role was to bear sons to 'bear the burden of the totalitarian war, and all men would devp their powers for that purpose in short, to breed, and be bred, for slaughter. 3. Suppress everyone who might express, or even entertain, views contrary to those of High Comd. 4. Need for a Self-Sufficient National Economic System

5. Mil C-in-C must Lay Down his Instrs for the Pol leaders Latter must follow and fulfil them in the service of war. 6. Ludendorff Demanded the Absurdity that Strat should Cont Policy which is like saying the tool should decide its own task.

110 Q. The True Purpose of Strat is to diminish the possibility of resistance. Comment. Ans. 1. Mil wpn only one of the tool of Grand Strat Mil wpn is one of the means that serve the purpose of war/ one out of the assortment which grand strat can employ. 2. Other instruments of Grand Strat Pressure, Propaganda, and Diplomacy. More oblique kinds of Mil action, Economic

3. Subdue opposing will at the lowest war cost Subdue opposing will at the lowest war cost and min injury to the post-war prospect. For the most decisive victory is of no value if a nation be bled white in gaining it. 4. Aim of Grand Strat and Strat It should be the aim of grand strat to discover and pierce the Achilles' heel of the opposing govt's power to make war. And strategy, in turn, should seek to penetrate a jt in the harness of the opposing forces. 5. Strike at weakness To apply one's str where the opponent is strong weakens oneself disproportionately to the effect attained. To strike with strong effect, one must strike at weakness. 6. Higher plane of warfare On a higher plane of warfare, impression made on the mind of the opposing cdr can nullify the whole fighting power that his tps possess. And on a still higher plane, psychological pressure on the govt of a country may suffice to cancel all the resources at its command so that the sword drops from a paralysed hand. 7. Str of a country Nominal str of a country is represented by its numbers and resources and they are dependent upon its stability of cont, morale, and sup. Direct pressure always tends to harden and consolidate the resistance of an opponent. 8. True purpose of strat To diminish the possibility of resistance.

Q. How did Hitler applied Psy Strat in the political campaign by which he gained cont over Germany ? Ans. 1. Playing off capitalist and socialist interests against each other.

2. Negotiated, a ten-year peace-pact with Poland to cover his eastern flank, in 1935 he threw off the armament limitations imposed by the Versailles Treaty, and in 1936 ventured the mil reoccupation of the, Rhineland. 3. Began camouflaged war by supporting General Franco's bid to overthrow the Spanish Republican Govt as an indirect approach, in conjn with Italy, against the strategic rear of France and Britain. 4. Covered himself in the west by refortifying the Rhineland, he was able to turn eastwards to make moves that were further indirect strokes at the strat foundations of the Western Powers. 5. Marched into Austria, and thus laid bare the flank of Czechoslovakia. In Sept 1938 he secured, by Munich agreement, not merely the return of the Sudetenland but the strat paralysis of Czechoslovakia.

111 6. By this series of practically bloodless mvres, carried, he had not only destroyed the former French domination of central Europe and strat encirclement of Germany, but reversed it in his own favour. This process was the modern equivalent on a wider scale and higher plane, of the classical art of manoeuvring for posn before offering battle. 7. Throughout its course Germany's str had been growing, both directly by the vast devp of her armaments, and indirectly by subtraction from the str of her potential main opponents through lopping off their allies and loosening their str roots. 8. Made a pact with Russia and ensured her detachment.

9. If the Allies declared war in fulfilment of their obligations they would automatically forfeit the advantages of def and be committed to an inherently offn strat without the necessary resources and under the most unfavourable conditions. 10. Only way in which they might have extricated themselves from this awkward posn, without allowing Hitler to have his way entirely, was by adopting the 'sanctions, policy of economic and diplomatic boycott, coupled with the supply of arms to the victim of aggression. Q. What were the reasons of initial mil success of Germany? Ans. 1. Intro (a) Most significant feature of the Western campaign was Hitler's care to avoid any direct assault. (b) Continued use of the indirect appch despite his immense superiority in modern means of attk. (c) Devp and coord all forms of war like activity and all possible instruments which may be used to operate against ens will. 2. Avoiding Head on asslts Tactics of the German forces corresponding their strat avoiding head on asslts, seeking to find 'soft spots' through which infilt along the line of least resistance. 3. ' Baited offensive' (a) Although he had twice as many divs as French and British combined, and an advantage of four to one in ac and tks odds which would have justified him in attacking the strongest posn he did not attempt to penetrate the Maginot Line. (b) Lured the Allies out of their defs on the Belgian frontier by his ' baited offensive' against the two small neutrals, Holland and Belgium. Struck in behind them with a thrust at the uncovered hinge of the French advance when they had advanced deep into Belgium. (c) Baited French Command in concentrating almost the whole of their left wing for a massive advance to offer battle in Belgium, while leaving a few second-rate divs to gd pivotal sect facing the Ardennes a wooded and hilly area which they

112 assumed to be too difficult as a line of approach for mech divs. Germans exploited this sect. 4. Deep Strat Penetration Along line of least expectation and least resistance .By passing and incr tempo of ops.

5. Threatened alt objs Rapid prog of the German penetration beyond Sedan benefited much from the fact that it successively threatened alt objs, and kept the French in doubt as to its real dirn first, whether it was towards Paris or the rear of the forces in Belgium. 6. Emp of Concept of Blitzkrieg Meaning "lightning war", in its strat means is associated with a series of quick and decisive short battles to deliver a knockout blow to an enemy state before it could fully mobilize. The tactical meaning of blitzkrieg involved a coordinated mil effort by tks, mobilized inf, arty and aircraft, to create an overwhelming local superiority in combat power, to overwhelm an enemy and break through its lines. 7. Strat Paralysis (a) High speed mech warfare. (b) Combine use of tks, dive-bombers, and parachutists to spread confusion and dislocate comns. (c) Use storm-troopers for infilt who would cross frontier while peace still prevailed role was to sabotage comns, spread false reports, and, if possible, kidnap other country's leading men. This disguised vangd would in turn be backed up by air-borne tps. 8. Victory in WW I had made French Complacent Mil ideas advanced less than that of opponent beyond the methods of WW I. Victory had bred complacency and fostered an orthodoxy. Q After gaining great opening successes in Russia. The Germans lost in Russia and which was one of the reason of their defeat in WW2. Comment. Ans 1. Gen (a) Scarcity of natural obsts in Russia offered immense scope of mvre and infilt to attacker. (b) Despite great size of Red army, the ratio of force to space was so low that German mech forces could easily find openings for indirect adv onto th opponents rear. (c) Widely spaced cities, where rd and rlys converged, provided attacker with alternative obj that it could exploit to keep Russians on Horns of deliemma. (d) Forfeited the advantage through failure to decide in which dirn the advantage should be pursued.

113

2.

Difference between Hitler and Army Comd on Selection of Objs (a) (b) Different ideas from the start of the plg, and never properly reconciled them. Hitlers wish to secure Leningrad and Ukraine (i) Hitler wished to secure Leningrad as primary obj thus clearing his Baltic flank and linking up with the Finns, and tended to disparage the imp of Moscow. (ii) For economic factors wanted to secure the agricultural wealth of the Ukraine and the industrial area on the Lower Dnieper. (iii) The two objs were extremely wide apart, and thus entailed entirely separate lines of ops. That was essentially different from the flexibility inherent in operating on a single and central line of op that threatens alt obj. (c) Brauchitsch and Halder wanted to concentrate on Moscow line (i) Brauchitsch and Halder wanted to concentrate on the Moscow line of advance-not for the sake of capturing the capital but because they felt that this line offered the best chance of destroying the mass of Russias forces which they expected to find on the way to Moscow. (ii) In Hitlers view that course carried the risk of driving the Russians into a general retreat eastward, out of reach.

3.

Divergence of effort and loss of concentration (a) Dissipation of Str in Leningrad Decision to concentrate on gaining victory in the Ukraine had resulted in Hitlers primary obj Leningrad, becoming a secondary one. Sufficient str and effort were used in this divergent dir to bring about the envp of Leningrad, but not sufficient to produce a decisive defeat.

114 (b) Bid to Capture Moscow and Reaching Caucasus Hitler could not resist the temptation to exploit the victory in the south and at the same time pursued the aim of capturing Moscow. He assigned Rundstedt the extremely ambitious fresh task of clearing the Black Sea coast, capturing the Donetz industrial area, and reaching the Caucasus. (c) Reasons for Str Becoming Split in Diverging Dirs (a) Partly due to division of minds at the top

(b) Ironically, due to dazzling initial success in all dirs. Instead of keeping a single line of op that threatened alt objs, they were led to pursue several lines of op each too obviously aiming at a single obj, which thus became easier for the defender to cover. (c) Moreover, in each case the attackers dirn became obvious at the same time that his drive was becoming a precarious stretch of his own sup line. 4. Wx (a) Brauchitsch limited German ops for a month to bring up new sups, overhaul machines. This delay left only six weeks to complete the battle before the start of the winter season. (b) Hitler's plans miscarried before the onset of severe winter wx. He was so confident of quick victory that he did not prepare for even the chance of winter warfare in the Soviet Union. 5. 1942 German Offn (a) Lack of resources In 1942, Germans no longer had the resources for an offn on the previous yrs scale. (b) Hitler Unwilling to Stay on Def Hitler unwilling to stay on def and consolidate gains as number of his Gens advised, or withdrawn to Poland as Rundstedt and Leeb had advocated. (c) Failure in Battle of Stalingrad (a) Halder planned the op with the aim of a hold on the Volga round Stalingrad, and there establishing a strat barrage between the main Russia armies and their oil supplies. (b) Hitler, without revealing his mind to Halder, was primarily intent on driving direct into the Caucasus as quickly as possible and encouraged the cdrs of that drive to regard it as the main aim. The effort to gain the Stalingrad strat posn suffered in consequence. (c) Then, at a later stage the aggravation of being frustrated at Stalins name place altered the bent of Hitler mind, and everything else was sacrificed for a too direct concentration, too directly aimed, against that untaken city.

115 (d) Narrowing of the frontage made it easier for the defender to switch his local resvs to any threatened point on the def arc in Stalingrad. Several times the Germans succeeded in piercing the defs round Stalingrad, but each time the gap was closed. The sum of experience suggests the axiom that a narrowing of the front always favours the defence. Q Ans 1. What were causes of Hitlers defeat despite initial successes ?

Decline of Hitler in plane of Grand Strat (a) Failed to allay fears that his prog created.

(b) Did not reassure people that his New Order was beneficent. He might have achieved the Union of Europe under German leadership. (c) Political appch was too direct. Gospel of National Socialism marred effect of socialistic appeal. 2. Failure to subdue or make peace with Britain after collapse of other countries in West 3. Failure to finish off Britain at Dunkirk Germans halted their adv on Dunkirk. The army was to halt for three days, giving Allies time to organise an evac and build a def line. Over 330,000 Allied troops were rescued. 4. Two front war Failure to have any real plan to invade Britain and clean up the west before attacking Russia thus ensuring a two front war. 5. Under Estimating the Russians Simply under-estimating the Russians at Stalingrad and Kursk. whole 1942 offensive was misguided and they should have gone straight to Moscow. 6. Poor choice of allies Alliance with Italy proved to be disastrous. Japan would only have made sense as an ally if it had attacked the Soviet Union in the Far East. Hitler's main alliance was based on ideology, not on shared interests. The other less powerful Axis states like Hungary and Romania tended to follow in step with Germany in an effort to gain territory. 7. Declaring war on Russia and US Deciding to attack Russia was a bad idea, as well as declaring war on the US. Both of these countries could substantially out produce Germany. 6. Leadership Adolf Hitler assumed personal operational comd of the German armed forces and did not know how to develop effective tactics and strat. Examples :(a) (b) (c) (d) Attacking Stalingrad instead of Moscow. Failing to follow through with the invasion of Britain. Failing to divert sufficient troops to Rommel in North Africa. Failing to mop up the BEF at Dunkirk.

116 Theory of strategy

Q. Ans. 1. 2

How does lidell Hart differ from clauses Clausewitz on strategy?

Clausewitz defi of strategy. Scope of definition. (a) (b) (c) Forms plan of war.

Art of emp of battle as means to gain obj of war.

Maps out proposed course of different campaigns which compose war. Regulates battles to be fought in each.

3.

Defect in definition as per Lidell hart. (a) Intrudes on sphere of policy/higher conduct of war.

(b) Higher conduct of war should necessarily be resp of govt & not mil leaders which the govt employs as agents in executive cont of ops. (c) Narrows meaning of strat to pure utilization of battle, thus convening the idea that battle is only means to strat end. 4. Confuse the means with the ends. To reach the conclusion that in war every other considerations should be subordinated to the aim of fighting a decisive battle is confusing the means with the end. Q. What is Distinction betn strat and policy. Why govt would enjoin strat of Ltd aim. Ans. 1. Gen. (a) Autocratic Soldier Ruler Distinction betn strat and policy would not matter, both combined. (b) Democratic Countries (i) Encouraged soldiers to claim policy subsequent to their conduct of ops.

(ii) Drew states man to overstep and interfere with mil, its mil employees in use of their tools. 2. Distinction betn strat & policy. (a) Moltkes definition of strat. Practical adaptation of means placed at Gens disposal to attainment of object in view.

117 (b) Resp Of Mil Cdr (i) Resp to Govt.

(ii) Apply most profitably to interest of higher war policy, the force allotted to him within theatre of ops assigned to him. (iii) If he considers force allotted to him is inadequate for task justify in pointing this out & if his opinion is overruled he can refuse / resign. (iv) Exceeds his rightful sphere, if he attempts to dictate govt what measure of force should be placed at his disposal. (b) Role of Govt. (i) Adapt to conditions, as war progress.

(ii) Can intervene in strat of campaign - Replace Cdr / modify obj according to need of war policy. (iii) Indicate clearly the nature of task, should not interfere with mil cdr in handling his tools. 3. 4. Strat has not simple object of seeking to overthrow Ens Mil power. Enjoining strat of Ltd aim. (a) When govt appreciates that en has mil superiority, either in gen or in particular theatre. (b) Desire to wait until bal of force can be changed by fwg :-. (i) (ii) Intervention of. Transfer of force from another theatre.

(iii) Wait / limit Mil effort permanently, while economic and Naval action decides issue. (iv) (v) Achieved by draining of ens force. Weakening en by pricks instead of risking blows.

(vi) Object of war policy can be assured by seizing territory which can either retained used as bargain to negotiate peace. (vii) (viii) Drain on en should be disproportionately grater them on self. Object sought by:(aa) Raiding ens sups. (ab) Local attacks to annihilate / inflict disproportionate loss on parts of ens force.

118 (ac) (ad) (ae) Lure him into unprofitable attks. Cause excessively wide distr of his force. Exhaust his moral & physical energy.

(c) Seize of territory for retention / use of barganing counter when peace negotiated. (i) Got may call overthrow of ens mil power beyond capacity / not worth effort. (ii) 5. More sp for such policy from history than mil opinion.

Usually War Policy of Ltd Aim Imposes a Strat of Ltd aim. (a) Decisive aim should only be adopted with approval of govt which alone can decide whether it is worth. (b) If govt has decided upon ltd aim / Fabian grand strat, the Gen even within his strat sphere, who seeks to over throw the ens mil power may do more harm than good to the Govts war policy.

6. Strat as per lidell Hart. The art of distributing and applying mil means to fulfill the ends of policy. 7. Strat &Tactics (a) Strat is not merely concerned with movement of forces but with effect.

(b) TACs Tactics. When application of mil instrument merges into Actual fighting, the dispositions for & cont of such direct action termed tactics (c) Q Ans 1. Each not only influences but merge into other.

What is higher / grand strategy and what are its components.

Gen (a) (b) (c) Tac Application of strat on lower plane. Strat Application of lower plane of grand strat. Policy. (i) (ii) Guides conduct of war. Bring the sense of policy in execution.

2. Role To coordinate & direct all resources of nation / band of nation towards attainment of political object of war.

119 3. Components/ Instruments

Fighting Pressure

Financial Pressure

Diplomatic Pressure

Commercial Pressure

Ethical Pressure

To Weakens Opponents will 4. Aspects of grand strat. (a) Calculate and Devp economic resources & man power of nations to sustain fighting services. (b) Moral resources. To faster peoples willing sprit is often as imp to possess more concrete forms of power. (c) Regulate and Distr of power. (i) (ii) (d) Betn several services. Betn the services & industry.

Keeps peace as end state in view. (i) (ii) Horizon of strat bounded by war. Looks beyond war to subsequent peace.

(ii) Avoid damage to future state of peace for its security and prosperity by combining & regulating various instruments. (iii) Sorry state of peace betn sides Unlike strat, grnd strat awaited Exploration & understanding.

Q. Ans 1. 2.

What does strat depends upon?

Gen.

Conception of strat on its proper plane & original basis - Art of Gen.

Strat depends on fwg:(a) Sound Calculation & Coord of End & means. (i) End must be propositioned to total means.

(ii) Means used in gaining each intermediate end, which contributes to ultimate, must be proportioned to value & needs of that intermediate end. (iii) Excess may be harmful as a defi.

120 (b) Economy of force. Success lies in closest proximity. Because of uncertainty of war & Lack of scientific study, difficult to achieve the adjustment. (c) Science of War will Depend on Art for Application. Art cannot only bring end nearer to means, but by giving higher value to means, enable end to be extended. Q. What are elements & conditions of strat and what is relation betn movement and speed and relation betn strat & Tac. Ans. 1. Gen. (a) (b) Strat, cal is simpler & closer approximation to truth than Tac. Human will. (i) (ii) (iv) 2. Chief incalculable. Manifests in resistance. Lies in domain of tactics.

Purpose of strat. (a) (b) Not to overcome resistance, Except from nature. To diminish possibility of resistance.

(c) Diminish possibility of resistance by exploiting elements of movement and surprise. 3. Movement (a) (b) Lies in physical sphere. Depends upon fwg calculable conditions:(i) (ii) Time. Topography.

(iii) Tpt capacity means by which & measure in which force can be moved & maintained. 4. Surprise (a) (b) (c) 5. Lies in Psy sphere. Cal more difficult than physical sphere of manifold conditions. Manifold conditions very in each case & are likely to affect will of opponent.

Relation betn mov & surprise. (a) Strat may aim to exploit movement than at exploiting surprise, or conversely two elements react on each other.

121 (b) Movement generates surprise and surprise gives impetus to movement.

(c) Movement which is accelerated changes its dirn inevitably carries with it degree of surprise, even though be unconcealed. (d) Surprise smoothes path of movement by hindering ens counter measures & counter movements. 6. Relation of strat to tactics. (a) Difficult to decide where strategically movement ends & tactical movement begins. (b) Tacs Lies in domain of fighting.

(c) Strat - Not only stops on frontier but has for its purpose the reduction of fighting to slenderest possible proportions. Q. What is aim & action of strat? Ans. 1. 2. Aim. To bring about battle under most advantageous circumstances. Obj. (a) (b) (c) To produce decision w/o any serious fighting. More advantageous the circumstances, less proportionately will be fighting. Achieve destr of ens forces economically.

(d) If state is not seeking conquest but maint of its security The aim is fulfilled if the threat is removed, en is led to abandon his purpose. (e) (f) Seek mil decision under most advantageous circumstances. Dislocation of en.

(g) True aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strat sit so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by battle is sure to achieves this. 3. 4. Action of strat- Strategic Dislocation. Strat dislocation. Produced in physical/logistical sphere. It is result of move which :(a) Upset ens deposition by compelling a sudden change of front dislocates the distr & org of his forces.. (b) (c) Separates his forces. En dangers his sups.

122 (d) Menaces the route/routes by which he could retreat in case of need and re-establish himself in his base/homeland. 5 Dislocation may be produced by one of a/m effects- more often consequence of several. (a) Difficulty in differentiation - Mov directed towards ens rear tend to combine these effects. (b) Respective Influence varies according to size of Army & complexity of org large army with complex org, more serious effect on its L of Cs. (c) Decisive advantage can be gained by menancing ens line of retreat, equilibrium of his dispositions or his local sups. (d) To be eff, dislocation most usually be applied at a pt closer in time and space, to ens Army than a menace to his comns. 6. Psy dislocation. (a) Result of impression on Cdrs mind of physical effects as listed in para 4.

(b) Impression strongly accentuated, If his realization of being at disadvantage is sudden/feels unable to counter ens move. (c) 7. Fundamentally springs from sense of being trapped.

Reason for physical move to ens rear. (a) (b) Turning temporarily unbalances an Army. Consequences of direct move:(i) Consolidates opponents bal, physical and psychological - incr in resisting power. (ii) (c) (d) (e) (f) Rolls en back towards its res, sups & rfts.

Aim not only to avoid resistance on its way but in its issue. Line of least resistance & line of least Expectation. Combination of physical and psy aspects dislocates the opponents bal. Dislocation to be preceded by move / means distract en. (i) (ii) Purpose of Distraction deprive en of his freedom of action. Should operate in both physical & Psy spheres.

(iii) Physical Sphere. Distension of ens forces / Diversion to unprofitable ends, So as to achieve fwg:-

123 (aa) Too wide distr & committal of en force else where.

(ab) Thereby, not having power of interference with own decisively intended move. (iv) Psy sphere Play upon fears of and by deceiving, the opposing comd. Mystify, mislead, surprise. (aa) (ab) (ac) Mystify & mislead distraction. Surprise cause of dislocation. Distraction of en Cdrs mind will lead to distraction of his force.

Q. The force that is effectively used for distraction of en, grater is the chance of counteraction succeeding in its Aim. Comment Ans. 1. Distr of Army / force. (a) (b) (c) 2. 3. Parts of Army can aid each other. Combine to produce max possible conc of force at one place. Min force necessary is used else where to prepare success of conc.

In prac min necessary may form far larger proportion of total than max possible. Need for distraction has grown with delaying power of wpns.

4. Superior wt at intended decisive pt does not suffice unless that pt cannot be reinforced in time by opponent. Q What is the basis of strat? Or In war every problem, & every principle, is a duality. Like in coin, it has two faces. Hence need for as well calculated compromise as means to reconciliation comment. Or According to Boureet every plan of campaign ought to have several brs & to have been so well thought out that one or other of the said brs cannot fail of success. Napoleon Bonaparte followed in seeking always, as he said, to Faire son thume en dux facons comment.

124 Ans. Gen. 1. 2. 3. Need in war that while hitting one must GD. Corollary - In order to hit with effect, en must be taken off his Gd. Fwg are examples of quality:(a) True conc is product of dispersion. (i) (ii) (b) Eff conc obtained when opposing forces dispersed. In order to ensure that own forces must be widely distr.

For reaching an obj one should have alternative objs. (i) If en is certain as to pt of our aim, he has best possible chance of guarding him self & blunting our wpns. (ii) Taking line that threaten alt objs. (aa) Distract ens mind & forces.

(ab) Most economic method of distraction - Allows us to keep larger proportion of force on real line of ops thus reconciling greatest possible conc with necessity of dispersion. (ac) Puts en on horns of dilemma.

(ad) When opposing forces cannot be regulated one must provide for alternative courses. (ae) Plan must have Adaptability & flexibility.

(af) Alt objs assure gaining of at least one obj whichever is least guarded - & may enable us to gain one after the other. (iii) Creation of Dilemma in tactical Fd. (aa) Ens disposition based on nature of grnd Difficult to find choice of Dilemma producing obj. (ab) (ac) (ad) Adapt line of effort to degree of resistance that is met. Exploit weakness that is found. Plan with singular aim apt to prove as failure.

125 Q. While plg of any stroke at ens comns, either by mvre round his flk or by rapid penetration of a breach in his front, the question will arise as to most eff pt of aimweather it should be directed against imdt rear of opposing force, or further back comment. Ans. 1. Nearer to force cut is made, more imdt will be the effect.

2. Effect becomes more greater & felt if made against force in motion than on a stationary force. 3. Stroke close in rear of en force may have more effect on mind of en tps, stroke far back tends to have more effect on mind of en Cdr. 4. Dirn of mobile stroke depends upon:(a) (b) Strat posn. Sup conditions of en force (i) (ii) (iii) (c) No of lines of sups. Possibility of adoption of Alt sup lines. Amount of sups in Adv depots.

Accessibility to objs. (i) (ii) (iii) Dist. Natural obst. Opposition likely to be met.

5. Unless natural obsts are very secure, or en has unusual independents of sups from base, more success and more effect is to be expected from cutting his comns as far back as possible. 6. Methodology (a) (b) Demolition of route. Actual on threatened interception of trains and lorry convoys.

Q. What is theory of distr strat adv. Ans. 1. Gen. (a) (b) 18th century physical conc adv-strat & tac. Napoleon Distr strat adv- Army moving in indp fractions but conc tac adv.

(c) Devp of fire power Tac adv dispersed to dimnish effect of fire. But strat adv conc due to influence of Rlys & growth of masses. (d) New conditions of Air & motor power further dev in to dispersed strat adv.

126 (i) (ii) (iii) Danger of air attack. Aim of mystification. Need of drawing full value from mech mobility.

(iv) Advancing forces should not only be distr as widely as is compatible with combined action but be dispersed as much as is compatible with cohesion. (e) Devp of radio aided towards reconciling dispersion with cont.

2. Instead of simple idea of concentrated stroke by concentrated force, we should choose according to circumstance betn those variants:(a) (b) Dispersed adv with concentrated single aim, i.e. against one obj. Dispersed adv with concentrated serial aim, i.e. against successive obj.

(These will each demand prelim moves to distract ens attn & forces, unless possibility of taking alt objs enables us to rely on such distracting effect being produced already by ens perplexity.) (c) Dispersed adv with distributed aim i.e. against a number of objs simultaneously.(cumulative eff of partial success, on even mere threat, at no of pts may be greater than the effect of complete success at one point). 3. Aim To permeate & dominate Areas rather than capturing line (i) Paralyse ens action rather than theoretical obj of crushing his force.

(ii) Fluidity of force may succeed where concentration of force merely entails rigidity.

THE CONCENTRATED ESSENCE OF STRAT AND TACS Q. What are 8 principles Axioms of war given by lidell Halt. Ans. 1. Gen (a) (b) (c) 2. Modern tendency Principles Expressed in single word. Difficult to condense into single word. Apply to tac as well strat unless indicated.

Fwg are the axioms:Positive (a) Adjust your end to your means (i) Determining obj clear sight & cool cal.

127 (ii) (iii) Folly to bite off more than you can chew. Mil wisdom sense of what is possible.

(iv) Face Facts still preserve faith. Faith can achieve impossible when action begins. (v) (b) Confidence Avoid exhausting it in vain effort.

Keep your object always in mind (i) (ii) (iii) Adapt plan to circumstances. More ways to gaining an object - realization. Every objective should bear an object - pay attn.

(c) (d)

Choose the line (or course) of least expectation. Try to put yourself in ens shoes & think what course it is least probable he will foresee / forestall. Exploit the line of least resistance. (i) So long as it can lead you to any objective which would contribute to your underlying objects. (ii) Application of maxims:(aa) (ab) Tacs- use of res. Strat- exploitation of any tactical success.

(e)

Take a line of op which offrs alternative objs. (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) Puts opponent in dilemma. Assurance- gaining atleast one objectives, which ever least guarded. May enable gaining one after other. Alternative objs - allow opportunity of gaining an objectives. Single obj. (aa) (ab) (vi) Unless en helplessly inferior, certainty that will not be gained. En no longer uncertain as to your aim.

Basic of infilt tac.

(f) Ensure that both plan & dispositions are flexible adaptable to circumstances. (i) Plan should foresee & provide for next step in case of success / failure / partial success (most common in war).

128 (ii) Exploitation / Adaptation By dispositions / fmn in shortest possible time. Negative (g) Do not through your Wt into a stroke whilst your opponent is on guard (i) (ii) (iii) Power of resistance and evasion. Has to be paralyzed for eff strokes. Attack launched only once Cdr satisfied that paralyzed has devp. Disorg & demoralization of en produces paralysis.

(h) Do not renew an attk along the same line (or in the same form) after it has once failed. (i) Mere rft of wt Not sufficient change, probable that en also have strength ended & himself in interval. (ii) (iii) En strengthened morally Due to success in repulsing. Dislocation and Exploitation necessary for success. (aa) (ab) One precedes & one follow actual blow. Cannot hit en with effect unless first created opportunity.

(ac) Cannot make effect decisive unless exploit second opportunity that comes before en can recover. (ad) Trg in Army focus on detailed Execution of attk. Psy element is obscured. NATIONAL OBJECT AND MIL AIM Q. In discussing about subject of objective in war it is essential to be clear about , and to keep in our minds the distinction between the political and mil objective . comment. Ans. 1. Gen (a) (b) (c) Two are different but not separate War pursuance of a policy. Mil obj means to political end . (i) Mil obj governed by Pol obj.

(ii) Basic condition policy should not demand what is militarily impossible.

129 (iii) 2. Any study of problem ought to begin & end with question of policy.

Obj & mil Policy. (a) Objective. (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) Has physical & geog sense thus tends to confuse thought. Better to speak about Object when dealing with purpose of policy. Object in war is a better state of peace. Essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.

(v) Applies both to aggressor nations who seek expansion & to peace ful Nations who only fight for self preservation. (b) 3. Mil Aim. Deals with the way forces are directed in service of policy.

Tendency to loose sight of basic National Obj. (a) Gaining mil victory is not in itself equivalent to gaining object of policy.

(b) Thinking of war done by men of mil profession Tendency to lose sight of basic National object and Indentify it with mil Aim. (c) Policy governed by mil Aim this has been regarded as an end in itself on merely means to the end. 4. Mil Aim becoming distorted & over Simplified. Losing relationship between object and mil aim between policy and strat. 5. Adapting Aims to limitations of str & policy. sight of proper

Q. What was Clausewitzs influence on theory of war and theory of mil aim & obj. Ans. 1. Gen. (a) Mis interpretation of Clausewitzs theory.

(b) Influenced Prussians, particularly Moltke Armies of world copied features of Prussian system. 2. Clousewitzs greatest contribution. (a) (b) (c) Emphasis on psy factors. Human spirit infinitely more imp than op lines & angles. Discussed fwg:-

130 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 3. Eff of danger. Fatigue. Value of boldness. Determination.

Codifying thinker rather than creative or dynamic one. (a) Too continental in outlook to understand the meaning of sea power.

(b) Short vision. Declared his conviction that superiority in number becomes more decisive on threshold of mechanical era. (c) No revolutionary effect on warfare - revolution warfare. 4. Clausewitzs theory of Mil Aim (a) (b) Dualism of thought. Aim of all action in war is to disarm the en. (i) If opponent made to comply with our will, we must place him in sit which is more oppressive to him than sacrifice we demand but disadv of posn must not be transitory nature, atleast in appearance, otherwise en, instead of yielding, will hold out in hope of a change for better. (ii) Clausewitzs said the object of combat is not always destr of ens forces. Its object can often be attained as well w/o combat taking place at all. (iii) The waste of our own mil forces must always be greater the more our aim is directed upon destr of ens power. (iv) Blurring of Philosophy. By fwg :(aa) We have only one means in war- The battle. in reverse towards tribal

(ab) Bloody Soln of crisis, effort for distr of ens forces, is the first born son of war. (ac) (ad) (ae) Only great & Gen Battles can produce great results. Let us not near of gens who conquer w/o bloodshed. Became doctrine fit for corporals not Gens.

(af) Incited Gens to seek battle at first opportunity, instead of creating an advantageous opportunity. (v) Contributed to decay of Generalship (aa) Constantly dwelt on decisive imp of numerical superiority.

131 (ab) Clausewitzs said surprise lies at foundation of all undertakings for without its preponderance decisive pt is not conceivable. (ac) (ad) (ae) 5. Disciples struck to his emphasis on numbers. Making battle appear the only real war like activity. Reduced the art of war to the mech of mass slaughter.

Clausewitzs Theory of Object. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Idea of absolute warfare- Rd to success through unltd application of force. Made policy slave of strat. Principle of force w/o limit & w/o calculation. Negation of statesmanship & of Intelligent strat. Contradiction to own theories. (i) Principle of utmost force. Pol object, as original motive of war, should be std for determining both aim of mil force & also amount of effort to me made. (ii) Pursuance of logical Extreme. The means would lose all relation to the end & in most cases the aim at an extreme effort would be wrecked by opposing wt of forces within itself.

6. Teachings taken w/o understanding and largely influenced WW-I thereby leading on to WW-II . Q. Course and effects off first WW provided ample cause to doubt validity of Clausewitzs theory. Comment. Ans. 1. Leaders slow to adapt aim to circumstances / devp new means to make aim more possible. 2. Battles fought w/o decisive results.

3. Theory of suicidal extreme- drained their own str beyond safety limit in pursuit of ideal of complete victory by battle which was never fulfilled. 4. Collapse due to emptiness of stomach due to economic pressure of sea power than loss of blood- Germans lost due to loss of spirit inconsequence of failure of gain victory. 5. Moral & Physical Exhaustion of victor Nation. Left in capable of consolidating their posn.

132 Q. What were the positive reasons / factors emerge from WWI ? Ans. 1. Decisive part played by sea power. Ens economic collapse w/o any decisive battle at sea. 2, Devp of AF. (a) Possibility of striking at ens economic & moral centres w/o having to achieve first destr of ens main force in Battle Fd. (b) Influence on mil aim & choice of objs :(i) (ii) Increased capacity of applying mil action- civil obj, economic & moral. Increased rg of mil action.

(iii) Paralysing effect Nullifying effect by paralyzing power to oppose is far better economy of force than actual destr of opposition. (c) AF concerned to assert independence. exploiting objs w/o regard limitations. 3. Mechanized land forces. (a) Enlarged possibility of producing collapse of ens main force w/o any serious battle by ;(i) Cutting Sup lines. (ii) Dislocating cont sys. (iii) Producing paralysis by nerve shock struck of deep penetration into their rear. Q. What were causes of German early success in France / Europe & failure later in Russia ? Ans. Cause of Succes. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Mvre - Strat more than tactical. Cutting opposing armies comns. Dislocating cont sys deep penetration drive. Eff on civ objs shaking peoples morale & disrupting civic org. Blitzluirg (i) Series of swift German conquests. (ii) Combined AF & mech elements producing paralysis & moral disintegration of opposing forces. Concentrated to narrowly

133 2. Causes of Failure in Russia. (a) Hitler confirmed to the General Staffs preference for Fighting Battles. Pursuit of this aim did not prove decisive, although it produced several great victory. (b) (c) had Conc on economic objs would have been decisive open question. Drive to moral-cum - economic objs offered by Moscow & offered dividends. Leningrad have

(d) Best chance of defeating Russia lost by aiming to win to wing battles in classical way. Q. What was drawback of strat bombing undertaken by allies ? Ans. 1. Gen (a) Contribution of British & US AF (i) Allied invasion of continent possible.

(ii) Crippling effect on ability of German armies by action against mil obj particularly comns. 2. Drawbacks (a) Pursuance of independent ops against civ objs. Attk on industrial centres was to combine direct economic and moral effect on opposing nation in belief that it would prove more decisive than cooperative action against ens armed forces. (b) Strat Bombing a misnomer. . (i) Such aim & action lies in sphere of Grand strat.

(ii) More correctly defined as Grand Strat combing / Industrial combing which causes moral & economic effect. (iii) (iv) Effects less decisive than air action against strat objs in mil sphere. Air Action on plane of Grand strat on civ object. (aa) Strat only concerned with problem of winning mil victory, Grand strat with that of winning peace. (ab) Air Action against an civil object is action on plane of Grand Strat. Seems to be an unsound objective. (c) Air attk on Ems Industrial centres (i) (ii) Unlikely to have an imdt decisive effect. More likely to produce prolonged war of attrition.

134 Q. How the force can be used on moral objective ? Ans. 1. Armoured forces to deliver decisive below against en Army- comns & comd centres which froms its nerne sys. 2. AF besides cooperating in Strat action might also strikes with decisive effect at Nations nerne Sys-static civ centres of industry. Q. WW-II demonstrated adv & new potentialities of indirect / Strat action against mil obj. Ans. 1. New mobility produced flexibility, in varying dirn of thrust & threat, which dis armed resistance. 2. Revision of doctrine & mil aim undertaken on a combined service baiss.

3. True aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strat sit so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce decision, its continuation by battle is sure to achieve this. GRAND STRAT Q. Object of war is to attain better peace even if only from your own point of view? Ans. 1. 2. Essential to conduct war with constant regard to peace. Clausewitzs definition of war (i) Continuation of policy by other means prolongation of policy through war into subsequent peace must always be borne in mind. (ii) State which expends its str to pt of exhaustion compromise its own policy and feature. 3. Concentrating exclusively on victory (a) No thought for after effect, may lead to be too exhausted to profit by peacecontain germs of another war. 4. Risk greater if war waged by coalition. (a) No longer counter bal of opposing force to cont- the victors.

(b) Divergence is apt to become so acute as to turn comradeship of common danger into hostility of mut dissatisfaction leading to ally of one war becoming en in next. 5. Unification merely brings artificial/ imposed unity. Unification has been able to est unity of ideas usually ended in uniformity paralysing the growth of new ideas.

135 6. Peace makess prog by mut checks created by bal of force Vitality spring from diversity which makes for real prog so long ther is mut toleration leased on recognition that worse may come from attempt to suppress differences than from acceptance of them. 7. Bal of Power (a) Unbal precipitating war.

(b) Federation Most desirable but also should have mut checks & balancing factors. 8. Satisfactory peace settlements made by negotiation rather than by decisive mil issue. 9. Avoidance of excesses otherwise might damage after the- war prospects.

Q. What policy should be adopted by a conservative native state. Ans. 1. Gen (a) (b) 2. Adapt gen theory of strat to nature of Nations fundamental policy. Essential difference of aim betn Acquisitive and conservative state.

Acquisitive state (a) (b) Primarily concerned with conquest. Inherently unsatisfied need to gains victory in order to gains its object.

3.

Conservative state. (a) Achieve its object by inducing aggressor to drop this attempt at conquest by convincing him that game is not worth the candle. (b) Victory is real sense attained by foiling other side bid for victory.

(c) In attempting more it may defeat its own purpose by self exhaustion internal effects of overstrain. 4. Policy to be Adopted by conservative state. (a) Strat to fulfill its inherently more ltd object in most str conserving way so as to ensure its future as well as its present. (b) Economy of force and deterrent effect (i) (ii) Best combined in the def offn method. Based on high mobility that carry power of quick riposte.

136 (iiI) Static def most brittle - might seem that pure def would be most economical method but static def most brittle. 5. Example (a) (b) Roman empire conservative strat as basis of war policy. England strat based on sea power. (i) Str kept pace with her growth.

(ii) Rivals broke down in self exhaustion immoderate desire for imdt satisfaction of out right victory. Q. Although war is contrary to reason, since it is a means of deciding issues by force when dscn fails to produce an agreed soln, the conduct of war must be cont by reason if its object is to be fulfilled. Comment. Ans. 1. While fighting is a physical act, its dirn is a mental process. The better your strat, the easier you will grain the upper hand, and less it will cost you. 2. Conversely, the more str you waste the more you incr risk of scales of war turning against you and even if you succeed in winning the victory, the less str you will have to profit by the peace. 3. The more brutal your methods the more bitter you will make your opponents, with natural result of hardening the resistance you are trying to overcome ; thus the more evenly the two sides are matched the wiser it will be to avoid extremes of violence which tend to consolidate the ens troops & people behind the leader. 4. Peace entirely of own choosing - The more intent you appear to impose a peace entirely of your own choosing by conquest, the stiffer the obstacle you will raise in your path. 5. Asking Defeated Side after War. If and when you reach mil goal, more you ask of defeated side more trouble you will have, and more cause you will provide for an ultimate attempt to reverse the settlement achieved by war. Q. Victory in true sense implies state of peace. Comment. Ans. 1. 2. Victory in sense is only possible if quick result can be gained. Long effort can be economically proportional to the national resources.

3. Peace through stalemate preferable. Based on coincident recognition by each side of opponents str preferable to peace through common exhaustion. 4. Resp of States manship. Never to lose sight of post war prospect enchasing mirage of victory.

137 5. Psy of Strat. If you find your opponent in strong posn costly to force, you should leake him a line of retreat as the quickest way of loosening his resistance.

Q. The less that a nation has regard for moral delegations the more it tends to respect physical str. It is folly to imagine that aggressive types whether indls or nations, can be bought off. Comment. Ans. 1. Deterrent power of force should be strong so that cannot challenged with impunity.

2. Very belief in force make aggressive nation susceptible to deterrent effect of a formidable opposable force. 3. Adequate check except against pure fanaticism.

4. Hard to make peace with predatory types- easier to induce than to accept a state of truce and farless exhausting than an attempt to crush them. 5. Peaceful Nations once aroused are more inclined to proceed to extremes.

STRATEGY OF INDIRECT APPROACH IN NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN Q. Describe as to how indirect appch was applied by OConnor for offn stroke despite Grazianis superiority. Ans. 1. Choice of objs available to British Sollum & Halfaya or Sidi Barrani. (a) Grazianis disposition & possibilities of wide apch mvre south of escarpment aimed at Sollum & Halfaya created an opportunity of strat barrage behind ens front. (b) (c) 2. Stroke near Sidi Barrani alternative. Stringency of tpt dictated second course.

Initial Plan. (a) (b) Method conformed to official pamphlet and not to the tac sit. Attk frontal along line of most expectation.

(c) Attk to be delivered over mine fd and its was so timed that arty could have 4 hrs after day light for registration. (d) Asslt tps could have laid under ens superior AF during pause for registration.

138 3. Modification of plan- Applied - Principle of indirect appch in fwg :(a) (b) (c) (d) 4. In Dirn. In Method. In timing. Psychologically. - indirect appch.

Conduct (a) (b) (c)

Capturing camps from rear. Long pause of registration eliminated - Arty sp entirely unregistered. Upsetting ens bal By compounding tac move.

Q. The greatest problem of desert warfare is ration of frontage to depth and fwd tps to res. Comment. Ans. 1. 2. Mech mob in desert easy Adm factors reduce size of FD armies. Outflanking of side that stays put in def.

3. Tendency to over extend front-in detriment to depth & res never a right decision. Reasons for adopting this policy :(a) (b) (c) Army short of Mob Tps. Weak in offn Armr. Comd ignorant of fundamental nature of this type of warfare.

Q. How to avoid psy dislocation which results from en making a sudden move against ones rear or conversely, how to dispose an army so that it can use its arms in new dirn w/o becoming unbal. Ans. 1. Gen. Soln lies in so disposing ons own forces that mere fact of ones dispositions does not constitute a strat indirect apch. 2. 3. 4. Devp powerful to flk & rear same as part originally nearest to En. Check to ens adv & Gen CA-eff def action. Possible Disposition of a Defending Army. (a) (b) (c) Linear with mob res. Circular i.e. linear but with closed rear (The hedge hog). Open chequered Square (i) (ii) Centres of resistance Chequre square. Mutual arty fire sp.

139 (iii) Capacity of reinforcing movement with in its area.

(iv) Whole disposition must admit atleast 75% of mobile element of the whole being able to concentrate at pt of attk before en can break resistance of threatened chequer localities. 5. Abandonment of rigid divisional area & divisional front idea (a) (b) (c) (d) Tendency of cdrs to think that if on any given frontage we dply X divs inline.. Each should conc solely on def of its own frontage. only Assists nearest neighbors in its own particular interest. Task of res fmns to sp any fw Div which is heavily attacked/prot from rear attk.

6. Adjustment of rations of numbers, frontage and mobility reqd. Difficulty of def action by small forces in open country arises from fact that defender invariably over extends his front & so has little or no depth or res. 7. Recommended Disposition. (a) Stable def element holding locs some 10,000 yards apart laterally & in depth, each containing quota of Arty & Inf. (b) Remainder of Arty, Inf and armr free to move within this frame work either to conc at any threatened pt / to strike at flank and rear of an en attempting to by pass the array. (c) (d) (e) Locs mutually Sp with Armd element operating in this disposition as pivot. Air fds covered by grnd layout and in rear of it. Use of Lt Mob Elements. (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) Outside / on either flk of rectangle of chequer. With indp main & As. Within Gen Sp dist. Opencountry Pivot occupy area of obsn. Close / Roaded country Placed at rd centres.

Q. How in Battle of Cauldron Did British got defecated? Ans. Gen Masterly exposition of principle of indirect apch. Small German force of approx 2 bdes of Armr & 4 mech Inf defeated 8th Army. Rommel immobilized 8th Army by means of frontal threat from numerous but other wise quite uselss Italian elements.

140 1. Def layout (a) (b) 2. Linear. lay wide open to attk in classical oblique order.

Paralysis of Ritchie by Rommel. (a) Containing of Ritchies front by bulk of Italian Elements.

(b) By passing Free French post at Bir Hacheim & striking at Ritchies Sesitive area betn El Adem and knights br by small Afrika Korps and better Italians elements. (c) Clearance of rear by destr of isolated Bde of 50th Div & Capturing of more isolated free French posn at Biz Hacheirm. 3. Placing Ritchie on horns of Dilemma. (a) Defeated CAs with Hvy loss.

(b) Adv against El Adem equally threatened rear of British for us holding the Gazala Sect / grnd imdt east of Tobruk where lay their rail head and dumps. Q. How did Auchinleck apply indirect appch in battle of Egypt against Rommel? Ans. 1. Gen. (a) (b) 2. Auchinleck disposed what remained of mil forces betn Matruh & Persia. Made wider strat decisions necessary to produce max conc of effort in crisis.

Decision Dilemma to hold Mersa Matruhs. (a) (b) (c) (d) Hold Mersa Matruh Mythical prestige. En could by pass defs of Matruh via desert. Defending army reqd large armd force to prevent en from by passing. Bulk of armr lost during earlier fighting.

3. Course of action Adopted Delay en in mob battle south of Matruh and to make his main stand near El Aklamein for battle of Egypt. 4. Imp Decisions giving Indirectness (a) Centralization higher cont of Arty of Army-Earlier un soundly fractioned by permt dispersal of Fd regts into inf Bde gps. (b) Ignore widely dispersed previously prepared def betn El Almein and Q attara Depression. No longer suited to type of battle intended to fight. (c) Thinned out fmns carrying vulnerable unmechanised inf.

141 5. Nature of Def. (a) (b) Strat necessarily def, every tactical action was offn. Elastic & Evasive front stretching from El Alamein to R Weisat ridge.

(c) Inf & Arty lay side by Side. Flexible front of 25 pounders protected by closely disposed inf & sp by tks. 6. Immobilizing offn Element of Panzer Army. (a) (b) (c) Attks of Afrika korps wilted against def. Exploited fleeting opportunity by taking offn action against left wing by Govt. Attk seriously damaged Italian Ariete Div.

(d) Rommel dispersed Afrika Korps along forty miles betn sea and Qattara depression to sp Italians. Q. Wavell when visited the 8th Army, he said we are advantageously posted indeed. This is a form of def which would justify a withdrawl of your front so as to lure the en into our network. Hence can be considered doing so ? what was the def layout of El Alamein. Ans. 1. Gen. (a) Failure of Rommels offn,

(b) It yet remained to destroy him & so strengthen gen defs of Egypt & pos of 78th army the if he attacked he would be decisively defeated. 2. Securing of Flk of 8th Army. (a) Constr of Chequer locs to rear each 10,000 yards apart laterally & in depth & each garrisoned by 2 Inf Bns & one 25 ponders Battery. (b) 3. Div with 3 Bdes had 3 such locs in their area.

Def Locs merely skeleton framework for def plan of whole armys area. Army not reqd to hold def framwk was free to operate in interval betn localities to eithers flk or to front & rear. Presented no prot to en & facilitated own counter

4. Mine fd Belts in chequer BD. mvre.

5. Dispositions were so disposed that it could form front in any dirn w/o loss of equilibrium. (a) (b) No danger of any part of army fighting in isolation. Neither the higher command experiencing distraction from rearward attk.

142 6. Application of Indirect Apch. (a) Should en operate against one or other flk of the defended area he would be attacked from outside as well as inside. (b) Counterstroke by armd and motor elements from SE against out flanking movement. (c) Three way application (i) Chequer Resigned to meet ens adv in Indirect way.

(ii) Hvy armd gp & Lt mobile gp also place to be capb of exacting and indirect apch to ens flk & rear. 7. Preps fro see defn Battle farther East, if first failed. (a) (b) (c) Defs of Alexandria extended into desert beyond Amriya & East of Nile. Obst of Wadi Natrun also made basis of def A. Cairo defs extended towards Fayum.

(d) Prep made to Br Nile near Maadi & farther South. - 8th Army If had to withdraw from Alamein, its withdrawal would be in good order & intact, so conducted as always to threaten flk of ens adv from two dirns. FOR BY WISE COUNSEL THOU SHALT MAKE THY WAR - ARAB ISRAELI WAR 1948 Q. The problem that face strat and tac plg is two fold. We must, on one hand, strive by all means to prevent the en from acting on sound principles. On the other hand, a supreme plg effort must be made to enable our forces to exploit those principles in order to facilitate achievement of our aims and objs. For this purpose every principle which the en is likely to apply must serve as a tgt for the ingenuity of those who plan the ops of our forces. Examine principle of war in the light of aforesaid. Ans. 1. Gen. (a) Mil - pol aim determined by the Govt at each stage must be coordinated with secondary and diversionary ops. (b) Main object is to exploit the principle of war so fully, and in such manner, that the fate of the battle will be strategically determined even before the fighting beginsor, at least, ensure that the fighting will proceed with max advantage to us. (c) Days of frontal tactical attacks are fast disappearing and the art of tactics aims at achieving the main task by flank and rear attacks. 2. Examination of Principles (a) Principle of surprise - Continuous activity by various int agencies.

143 (b) Principle of maintenance of aim (i) (ii) Tactical diversionary attacks. Strat, Psy and Pol offn.

(c) Principle of economy of force - Attks against L of Cs and stores in the rear, thereby pinning down the ens forces and dispersing them. (d) Principle of coordination - Strike against the channels of administration.

(e) Principle of concentration - Diversionary attacks and air activity to split up the ens forces. (f) (g) (h) 3. Principle of security -Sum total of the above activities and those that follow. Principle of offn spirit - Offn spirit. Principle of mobility - Destr of L of Cs.

Plg our Activity (a) Design to achieve mil pol aim determined by govt at each stage must be coord with sec & diversionary ops. (b) Aim of Object. To exploit principle of war so fully & in such manner, that fate of battle will strategically determined even before fighting begins will proceed with max advantage to over selves. (c) To exploit principles of war and to determine issue of fighting even before fighting has begun, it is necessary to achieve fwg three aims:(i) To cut the ens lines of comns, thus paralyzing his physical build up.

(ii) To seal him off from his lines of retreat, thus undermining the ens will and destroying his morale. (iii) To hit centres of administration and disrupt his comns, thus severing the link betn his brain and his limbs. 4. True aim True aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce a decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this. 5. Achieving determinat strat sit Dislocating ens org and _______causing ens dissolution / his discruption in battle. 6. Plans to be framed in accordance with time factor. (a) Time factor may be determined by aritfical causes Intermention by UN. (b) It is necessiatated sometime that plans are chosen that would achieve more imdt effect & not necessarily greatest effect.

144 7. Maint of Aim. (a) Aim ______be single. (b) Method of achieveing it must comprise alternatives for outherwise failure of one method will imdt bring about failure in achieving aim.