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PLATO
A N I)
THE OLDEB ACADEMY

TRANSLATED WITH THE AUTHOR S SANCTION
FROM THE GERMAN OF
DR.
EDUARD ZELLER
BY
SARAH FRANCES ALLEYNE

AXD
ALFRED GOODWIN,
M.A.
Oxford
Felloic and Lecturer of Balliol College,
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PEBPACE.
THIS TRANSLATION of Dr. ZELLEii
s
c
Plato imcl die
liltere
Akademie
Section
2,
Part
2,
Vol. II. of his
Pluloso-
pbie der Grieclien
lias
been made from the third and
earlier portion of enlarged edition of that work, an which ( Sokrates und die Sokratiker ) has already ap of Dr. REICHEL. peared in English in the translation
The
text lias been translated by Miss
ALLEYNE, who
desires to
express her grateful acknowledgments to Dr. HELLER for his courteous approval of the under
taking.
For the notes, and for the revision of the whole, Mr. GOODWIN is responsible.
The
tion:
references in the notes require
some explana
Simple
figures,
with or without supra or infra,
indicate the pages

Vol. I.
and notes of the English translation. means the first (German) volume of the PhiloI.
sophie der Grieclien, and Part of the second volume.
the Erste Abtheilimg
Of the value
of Dr.
HELLER S work
in the original,
it
vi
PREFACE.
is unnecessary to speak. Professor JOWETT Las recently borne ample and honourable testimony to it in the
preface to the second edition of his Plato.
It is
hoped
that the present translation
may
be of use to some
who German than Greek.

students of Plato
are perhaps less familiar with
CONTENTS.
CHAFTEB
PLATO
Childhood and Yonth
Relation to Socrates
I
I.
S LIFE.
........
"
PAGE
1
.
!
Teaching
Travels Sojourn at Megara. in the Academy .
.
u
14 95
~?
Attitude to Politics.
Second and third
Sicilian journeys *
"20
Death
Character
t>
CHAFTEB
PLATO
S
II.
WRITINGS.
;
Enquiry into the State of our Collection Genuineness
......
.
.
its
Completeness
45
4<
External Evidence
;
References of Aristotle
Review of these
[
......
.
59
54 ^4
Value of their Testimony
Criterion of Authenticity in Platonic Writings Particular Dialogues
...
"
y-j
77
^
87
Plato
Writings the Records of his Philosophy
CHAPTER
III.
THE ORDER OF THE PLATONIC WORKS.

Scope and Design of the Enquiry Early Attempts at an Arrangement of the Writings
viii
CONTEXTS.
Schleiermacher
Hermann
Their Followers
Standard of Criticism
Early Works
...... ..... ..... .....

. .
FAGS
^
1 () 4
99
109
.
Its application to our Collection
.117
n
Phaidru.s
. .
>
Gorgias, Mcno, Tkeeetutus, Euthydemus,

Sophist, Politicus,
125
Parraenides, Philcbus, Euthydemus, Cratylus,
Symposium, Phaedo Republic, Timams, Critias, Laws
...... ......
CHAPTER
IV.
I
136
131)
HAKACTEU, METHOD, AND DIVISION OF
Character in relation to Socrates
......
....
.
. .
LATO
PHILOSOPHY
144
144
147
To
the pre-Socraiics
.
Method ^.Dialectic
150
1>3
Form
Philosophic Dialogue Connection with the Personality of Socrates
of Plato s Writings.
159
100
Myths
Division of the System
........
CHAPTEll
V.
.
104
KOI .KDEUTIC
GKOUXDWOKK OF FLAWS DOCTK1XK

Its Theoretic Side
.
.
170
170
1.
I \jl. Sophistic Doctrine. Its Ethics

.
Ordinary CoiiKciousness. Its Practical Side
........
.
175 183
189
Its
.
Theory of Knowledge
"
.184
190
191
Sophistic us a
:
Whole
,.
Philosophy
Philosophic Impulse, Eros Philosophic Method. Dialectic ^/The / Its Elements; Formation of Concepts
i,
The
.....
....
. .
190
199
(Classification
Logical Determinations
/
.......
.
.
204 208
Language ment
.
.210
214
Philosophy as a AVhole
Stages of Philosophic Develop
cox M:\TS.
CHAPTER
DIALECTIC,
1.
VI.
22; )
Oil
THE DOCTRINE OF IDEAS

Knowledge
The Doctiine
of Ideas founded upon that of
225
And
of
Being
Proofs as given by Aristotle Historic Origin of the Doctrine

2.
Concept of Ideas
...... ..... ........

.
.
. .
228 232
233
237
Ideas as Universals or Genera
238
As Substances
. . .
.
.
*
.
.
. . .
As Concrete
Or Numbers
Unities
.
."
V
. .
.240 .248 .254

261
.
:{.
As Living Powers The World of Ideas

Extent
.
....
.
.
:
......
. .
.
:
271
271
Subdivisions
276
277
The most Universal Categories The Highest Idea, the Good, and
.
.
(fod
276
CHAPTER
PHYSICS.
<
VII.
Jeneral Causes of the

1.
World
of
Phenomena
293
293
Matter.
1
Its
Derivation
.
Ascription of Matter Not a Primeval, Corporeal Substance
.207
.
300 309
312
Not the Product Hut of Space

2.
of
Envisagemcnt or Opinion
. .
.
.
-.
.312
.
Difficulties of this
Theory
Relation of Sensible Objects to the Idea Immanence of Things in Ideas
No
derivation of the
World
of Sense
Reasons against the Identification of Matter with the

limited in the Ideas
Lacuna
in the
System
at this point
Participation of things in Ideas
.... ..... .... .... .....

.
315
317
319
320
332
Un
335
337
Reason and Necessity
Physical and Final Causes
CONTEXTS.
TAGE
3.
The World-Soul
Connection of this Doctrine with Plato
s
341
whole System
.
343
345-
Nature of the Soul
The Soul and the Mathematical Principle The Soul as the Cause of Motion
.....
.
351
356
356
And
of
Knowledge
CHAPTER
The World-System and
its
VIII.
PHYSICS (CONTINUED).
Parts
361
How
1.
far these Discussions arc valuable
and important
its
.361
363
The Origin Time
of the
World.
Question of
beginning in
368-
2.
Formation of the Elements.

Physical Derivation
Properties,
tion
.
Tclcological Derivation
.371
Decomposi
375
the Cos-
Distribution, Admixture, Motion,
3.
The World-System
mic.il
Year
.........
;
the Heavenly Bodies
Time
379
The World
as the
Become (Gewordene) God
386
CHAPTER
1
IX.
iivsics (CONTINUED).
Man
\lfs
Nature of the
Human
Soul
........
mode
of Representation
388
389
Mythical History
in this
Dogmatic Element
Immortality
Pre-existence
....
.
390
396
397 404
Recollection, Transmigration, and Future Retribution Parts of the Soul
406
417
Freewill
Relation of the Soul to the Body Physiological Theories
Plants and Animals

Difference of Sex
...... .......
.
.419
421
.423
432
433
433
Diseases
CONTENTS.
xi
CHAPTER
ETHICS
X.
PAGE 435
4. The Highest Good

.
Withdrawal from the World of Sense Relative Value ascribed to it

Virtue
Virtue and Happiness . . Socratic and Platonic Doctrine of Virtue
.
....
.
436
438 441
*5.
444
.
.
445 448 449
Natural Disposition
Customary and Philosophic Virtue

Plurality of Virtues
;
450
451
Primary Virtues
s
.
.
The
Distinctive Peculiarities of Plato
Ethics
454
CHAPTER
The
State
XI.
v ETHICS (CONTINUED).
401
of the State
End and Problem

The
Philosophy as the Condition of the true State

Constitution of the State
.
.... ....
.
.
. . .
461
466 468
Importance of Public Institutions;

Platonic Constitution
aristocratic character of the
469
Separation and Relation of Classes This Constitution based upon Plato

Social Regulations
;
.471
s
whole System
473
477
Parentage
Education
Citizens
478
of Life
;
Manner
Community of Goods, Wives, and Children

s
481
Significance of this Political Ideal from Plato
Point of View.
Influences that led

Its affinity
him
to it
.
482
.
with the Modern State
490
4<r2
Defective States
CHAPTER XI
.PLATO
1.
T.
VIEWS ON RELIGION AND ART
494
Religion.
The Religion
of the Philosopher; Purification of
the Popular Faith

Visible Clods
495
Popular Religion General Result
.........
.
499
SCO 503
COXTEXTtt
I
AGK
2.
Art
The
Beautiful
Artistic Inspiration
Imitation
Supervision of Art Particular Arts
Rhetoric
....-......... ....
CHAPTER
XIII.
... .....-
505
50f>
508 509 513
.511
514
THE LATER FOKM OF PLATONIC DOCTRINE.
THE LAWS
517 517
The Platonic Doctrine according The Laws. Point of View

Philosophy less prominent Religious Character
.... ....
to Aristotle
522
523
Importance of Mathematics Ethics

Particular Legislation
Politics
.............. ....-.-...
.
. .
.
525
527 529
531
533
.
Constitution
Social Regulations
;)
540
General Character of the

Point of
Laws
Divergences from Plato

.
.
original
.
View
the Evil World-Soul
543
548
Authenticity
CHAPTER
THE OLDER ACADEMY.
Platonic School.
XIV.
SPEUSIPPl
S
.
External History
Philosophy
.
553
Character of
its
565
500 5G8
572
Spcusippus Theory of Knowledge the Good and the Soul First Principles
;
Numbers
Magnitudes
Fragments
Ethics
.
of his Physics
......
,575
576
;">78
CHAPTER XV.
IMI,
I.
TMK OLIJKK ACADEMY (CONTINUE!)).

Divisions of rhilosopliy
First Principles
Kinds and Stages of Knowledge
........ ........
.
. . . .
.
XKXOCKATKS
581
58:2
583 584
580 587
Number and
Spatial
Ideas
"
Magnitudes
The Soul
. Cosmology Gods and Daemons
. . .
.
589
....
.
. .
5 .)1
(
593
Elements.
Formation of the World

. .
595
~
; "^
Psychology
Ethics
.
/
5<7
CHAPTER
XVI. ACADEMY
.
. (>04
Metaphysical Enquiries
Heraclides
Eudoxus
Polemo
........ ....... ....

. .
OTIIEU PHILOSOPHERS OP THE
C04
<OG
Oil
<>12
The Epinomis
.
(>17
Crater, Grantor
C>18
CHAPTER
PLATO
S
I.
LIFE.
THERE
whose
Plato
tain
1
is
life
;
hardly another philosopher of antiquity with we are so intimately acquainted as with
and
still
yet even in his case, tradition is often uncer more often incomplete. 1 Born some years
which gave information both life and his philosophy, and likewise of a work of Philippus of Opus TrepinXdrwj os (see Diog. ii.
dorus,
According to Simplicius, Phys. a. m. Schol. 427 a. 15. De Ccelo, 8 b. 16 sq. 41 b. 1 sq. Karst. (Schol. 470 a. 27, where, instead of Karsten s reading /Sty, should be read /3tou, 474 a. 12.) Xenocrates had already written
268
TOV HXctTwi os piov. Whether this means a special work or merely an incidental notice in connection with some other dis quisition must remain undecided. (Steinhart. Plato s Leben, 8. 260 sq. adopts the latter supposition on account of Diogenes silence as to
irepl
about his
Dercyllides ap. Simpl. 56 b. Vol. Hercul. 162 sqq. Col. 6 cf. my Diatribe de Hermodoro, Marb. 1859, p. 18 sq. and for the latter Suidas s. v. 4>tX6(ro0os). But from
106,
iii.
6.
Phys. 54
b.
Coll. Alt.
i.
any such work.)

Diogenem, iv. mate Platonis
IJ.IQV
i.
5.
tical
IlXdrwj os with the TrepiSeiirvov HXdrwj os

iii.
Speusippus apud Apuleius de Dogmentions an 67*16(which must be iden

unless
ap. Diog.
2,
we suppose
Steinhart, that the titles of the writings of Speusippus and Clearchus are confused see respectively Plat. 97, 45, loc. cit. 7, 260). Finally we know of a treatise of Plato s scholar Hcrmo:
with
Hermann and
part of whom are known to us only from Diogenes, are of very unequal value (a review of them is to be found in Steinhart, loc. cit. 13 sqq.) Diogenes himself is to be relied on only so far as he indicates his authorities and this is equally true of the Hpo\y6fj.va
;
these most ancient sources we have only a few notices preserved to us. Later writers, the greater
edition of Plato, vi. 196 sqq.) and of the short bio graphies of Olympiodorus and the
(in
s
Hermann
anonymous
writer
who
for
the
most part simply copies these.

the Platonic letters the 7th
is
Of
the

the
after
commencement
for the history of
it
still,
of the Peloponnesian war,

he went to Megara,
after Socrates
most important
Plato
>
cannot be accepted as genuine, nor does it merit the unlimited confidence placed in it by Grote (Plato, i. 113 not so much sqq.), who is actuated by the interest of a true historian
s life
;
by that of an advocate. The remaining Platonic letters are quite

as
i.e. directly death, vide p. 14, 26, On the other hand, Athen supra. ians, v. 217 a. says that he was born in the archonship of Apollodorus, 01. 87, 3 (B.C. 429), and with this we may connect Diogenes state ment, loc. cit., that the year of Plato s birth was that of Pericles
worthless as historical evidence. On the other hand, Plato s genuine writings give but very few points from which we can derive any
death,
if
(as
Hermann, History
and System of the Platonic Phi

losophy,
i.
knowledge of his
life.
The minor
accredited accounts are false and not seldom self-contradictory. The more recent literature bearing on Plato s life is given by Ueberweg, Hist, of Phil. i. 39. Steinhart,
loc. cit.
2
points out) we follows Eoman reckoning. Pericles died two and a half years after the
85,
9,
assume
that
Diogenes
28
sq,
tradition in Diogenes Laer-
tius,
iii. 3, says that he was born at JEgina, in which island his father had received an allotment
outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, in the autumn of B.C. 429 of (01. 87, 4), in the archonship The statement in Epameinon. the pseudo-Plutarch (Vita Isocratis 2, p. 836), that Isocrates was seven years older than Plato, Isocrates points to the same date. was born 01. 86, 1 (436 B.C.) vide
;
occupation by an Athenian This state colony, about 430 B.C. ment is doubtful in itself, and is rendered more so by the obvious falsity of the succeeding statement, that he only returned to Athens after the Spartan expulsion of the The date of colonists, B.C. 404. Plato s birth is uncertain. Apol-
on
its
loc. cit.
and Diog. iii. 2 ; Dionysius, Di Judicium de Isocrate, init.

ogenes himself, in assigning Plato s birth to the archonship of Epamei
non, and accordingly making him only six years younger than Iso crates, is going on a false reckon exclusive of the year of ing,
Pericles
It may be ob death. served that Diogenes, or our pre sent text of him, has eV Afj.eiviov instead of eV ETrafj-eivuvos ; and in connection with this is the assertion of the IIpo\ey6(j.va TTJS IlAaTWPCS
<i\oo-o0i ay,
lodorus, according to Diog.
iii.
2 sq.,
assigned
(i.e.
it
to the
Olympiad
88,
88th Olympiad i.), B.C. 427, on
the 7th of Thargelion (May. 21) (on the reduction to our months cf. Ueberwcg, Exam, of the Platonic
C. 2 (Plato, cd.
Herm.
Writings Steinhart, loc. cit, 284) nnd this, according to Plutarch,

Qufestiones Convivalcs
2,
1,
vi.
8,
1,
1,
1,
Plat.
and Apuleius, Do Dogm. his 1, was really kept as
Diog. Laert. ed. Cobet, appendix, p. 6), that Plato was born while Pericles was still alive, in the archonship of Ameinias,
197.
88.
m<ire
llermodorus (ap. Diog. C) agrees, when he says that Plato was 28 years old when
birthday.
this
With
confusion
This introduces and Eusebius, in his Chronicon, followed by the Paschal

01.
;
Chronicle, in dating his birth 01.
PLATO S LIFE.
the
89
i.,
3 son of an ancient aristocratic Jiouse,
favoured
has only given an instance
own carelessness. to the year of Plato s death, tradition is more consistent. Apol
of his
As
authority not only of the careful chronologist Apollodorus, but also that of as a Hermodorus,
who,
Seneca states even more definitely (epistle 58, 31), that he died on his 82nd birthday and it seems only an inexact expression
;
was
v. 217 b, agree in assigning it to the archonship of The ac Theophilus, ()1. 108, i. counts of his age, however, again Herpresent a great discrepancy. mippus apud Diog. iii. *2 (with whom are Lucian, Macrobii 20, Augustine, De Civitate Dei viii. 11, Censorious, De Die Natali, 15, 1, and the Prolegomena C. 6) says he
and Athenaeus
lodorus apud Diog. v. 9, Dionysius Halicaraassiensis Ad Ammaeum, 5,
personal pupil of Plato, more than all other witnesses has the pre sumption on his side of being well informed on this point.
(The
opinions against his trustworthi ness will be tested pp. 14, 26, note.) He may therefore be depended for the upon chronology of his times (I here retract the own^
opinion
earlier
formerly
writers),
and
shared the
with
most
81.
probable supposition is that Plato was born B.C. 427, and died 347
perhaps shortly middle of the year.

clusion
is
B.C.,
before
the
This con
favoured, amongst others

i.
of Cicero s
by Grote, Plato
(De Senectute,
5,
that he died
13)
writing in his 81st
year, with which we may compare what Dionysius says (De Compositione Verborum, p. 208), that he had been constantly polishing his works up to his 80th year.
Hist, of Phil. i. 39 ; Examina tion of Plato s writings, 113 and Steinhart loc. cit. 37, without ab
;
114; Ueberweg
solutely rejecting the date 428 B.C. for his birth. To the latter
On
the
^
other hand, Athenaeus

Nâlerius
;
Maxirnus viii. 7, o, make him 82 Neanthes apud Diog. loc. cit., 84. This
cit.,
loc.
and
statement
it
is
highly improbable, as
the philosopher
to
would compel us to put back

birth
the
of
431 or 432 B.C. However, the statement which allows him to attain 81 years would very well agree with the supposition that he was born B.C. 429, and died
348. But even if he was born B.C. 427 and died a short time after completing his 80th year, in one case his death falls under the archonship of Thcin the other case in ophilus,
B.C.
the mythic traits of his Apolline character (as 0. Miiller, The Dori
ans,
ap.
i.
by Hermodorus to have been only 28. That Plato s nominal birth day might very possiblv belong to
birthday actually fell on the 7th of Thargelion and consequently earlier than Socrates death, had already attained his 29th year at the time of the flight to 3Iegara, and could not rightly be said
position is of course opposed the fact that Plato, if his
sup
330, conjectures
loc.
cit.
cf.
Leutsch
;
Hermann, Plato 85 A.
sq.)
p.
Stein-
hart
39 already remarked whole question is
has
43.
been
The
,81st year. nation of the
For
date
by Corsini De die Natali Platonis (in Gorius Symbola Literaria vi.

97 sqq.)
;{
reae specially treated
this determi
Cf. Fasti Attici
iii.
we have
229
the
His father
sq.
Aristo,
according
B2

also
4 by wealth, no less than birth, he must have found in his education and surroundings abundant intellect-
to Plutarch,
p.
De Amore
Prolis 4,
496, died before Plato reached
manhood.
father,
nothing of him
Beyond this, we know and of the grand Aristoclcs, we only know

;
that Plato himself bore his name, until it was superseded by the nick name nXarwi given him by his gymnastic master on account of
his powerful build.
Cf. Alexander and Neanthes apud Diog. iii. 4 transcribed by Olympiodorus, Vita Platonis 2, and the Prolegomena, Sextus c. 1 Seneca, ep. 58, 30 Empiricus adversus Mathematicos 1,258; Apuleius, Dogm. Plat. 1, &c. Thrasylus, however, apud Diog. 1, and after him Apuleius,
;
Hermann, Plato 23 sq., 93, and Martin, Etudes sur le Timê, 1, On the further question as 246. to Plato s brothers, and their re lation to the Glaucon and Adeimantus of the Republic, and Parmenides, vide on one side Hermann,
Allgemeine Schulzeitung for 1831, and his p. 653 ; his Plato, 24, 94
;
Disputatio de Reipublicaj Platonis tempore (Marburg, 1839), forming part of the Vindicias Platonics
;
and SLeinhart, Works of Plato, 5, 48 sq. on the other, Buckh s Ber

:
lin
Lectures for the

;
1839
Munk, Die
summer of Natiirliche OrdSchriftcn,
nung der Platonischen
loc. cit., notice his father
as a de scendant of Codrns: Olympiodorus, but this is c. 1, says, of Solon

;
obviously an oversight. His mother, Perictione, as she is called by the great majority of the biographers while a few are said (Diog. 1) to have substituted Potone, the
page 63 seqq., 264 sq., (his argu ments and conjectures are of very Susemihl, Geneunequal merit). tische Entwicklung der Platonis chen Philosophic 2, 76 sqq. The
former authorities recognise, both in the Republic and the Parmenides, two older relations of Plato s, his mother s brothers, who are as
little
name
of his sister, Speusippus mother (vide Diog. iii. 4, iv. 1) was a sister of Charmides (vide supra, p. 10(3, 1), and cousin of Critias, deriving her descent from Dropides, a friend and kinsman of Solon s, and through him from
Aristo.
known to us as their father The latter, following Plu

see in
tarch and others, characters Plato s On the grounds
own
given
these brothers.
in
v.
the
Abhandl.
Neleus, the ancestor of the last kings of Attica, vide Diog. 1, who,
however, wrongly makes Dropides Solon s brother. (In this he is

followed by several writers, and partly misunderstood by Olym piodorus, c. 1, and the Prolego See also Apuleius, mena, c. 1.)
is
J. 1873, Hist, Phil. Kl. S. 86, the latter supposition alone seems to me to be tenable. Whether in Repub. II, 368, A. Plato s father is mentioned as still living at the supposed time of this dialogue
d.
Berl.
Akad.
mides, 155 A, 157 E Timanis 20 D, and Ast, Life and Writings of Plato, 16 sq., together with
;
Dogm.
Plat.,
init.
Plato,
Char
made out (40 B.C.) cannot be with certainty; according to Apol. 34 A, 38 B, we must suppose that he did not live to see the trial of Socrates. Cf. Plut. de Amore Prolis 4, S. 496. Antiphon, a halfbrother of Plato, and the son of
PLATO S LIFE.
9
ual food;
5
history,
we might conclude
and even without the express testimony of that he profited by these

only reduced to necessity by the
Pyrilampes, appears in the intro duction of the Parinenides, and (128 B) appears to be younger than the sons of Aristo (that this Antiphon was Plato s half-brother, and not an older relation, has been
shown by Bdckh
loc. cit.).
How
child
ever, the legends of Plato s Apolline descent cannot be appealed to as
evidence that he was the

of his
first
war (Xenophon, 29 sqq. ; Memora bilia iii. 6, 14), but that Plato s parents were not involved in this calamity, we may see from the Memorabilia, loc. cit., where So crates advises Glaucon, before he aims at the care of the whole state, to undertake that of an individual
Peloponnesian
Symposium
4,
mother (vide supra, pp. 44, 111): according to Plato s Apology 34 A. Adeimantua appears to be
older.
4
instance, of really needed it.
for
his
Had
uncle, who his father
The
later writers certainly re
present Plato as a comparatively poor man: e.g. Gellius, Noctes

Atticas iii. 17, 1 (according to tradition he was tenui admodum
Isidoii
example Apart from none but the son of a rich family could have entertained the
lay nearer to
and mother been
poor, the
hand.
this,
notion of pressing forward, before his twentieth year, to the leader

ship of public affairs. Again, Plato names himself (Apol. 38 B) as one of the four who offered to bail Socrates for 30 minse so that he must have been
;
pecunia familiari); Damascius,Vita 158 ; TT yap r\v 6 repeated by Suidas, voce

;
HXdruv,
Plat.
4.
and
Apuleius,
story in Plutarch, 2 fin., of his getting the means to travel by selling oil in the same way. -^gypt, points Vari?e Historic 3, 27, says -<Elian, that he had heard a tale (which he
The
Dogm.
Solon
c.
a solvent person, 6771/777-775 dtoHis journeys, too, are evi X/oews. dence of his being well oft for the tale about the oil-selling does not
;
look
much
like
the
;
who
it
philosopher
trua at
all,
despised trade
if
doubts,
r
>
in
this
place,
>.
he
s
repeats
the
like
though about
in
Aristotle
Plato
as
without hesitation) of having once been ready,
under pressure of poverty, to serve a mercenary soldier, when Socrates dissuaded him. f. Her mann, Plato 77 sq., 98, 122. All these accounts, however, were no doubt invented by ascetic admirers or opponents of the philosopher in later times. Plato s whole to the aristocratic family belongs party, who were generally the great land-holders; his uncle Charmidcs had been rich, and was
(
can only mean that he took some of his own produce with him to Egypt instead of ready money. Finally, even though his choregia
(Plutarch, Aristides 1, Dion 17 ; Diog. 3) as a freewill service, the cost of which was borne by Dion, be no proof of wealth, and the purchase of the writings of Philolaus (vide subter), involving great expense, be not quite well authen ticated, or may have been effected with other people s money, we still have sufficient evidence of his having been a man of some means, not only in his will, (in Diogenes
PLATO AND THE OLDEE ACADEMY.

advantages to the fullest expansion of his brilliant Among the few further particulars that have genius. 6 descended to us respecting his earlier years, our atten41
bis
sq.),
but also in what

life
;
is
told of
way of management
and
domestic
vide Diog. 6, 25 sq. Hieronyinus adversus Jovinianum certainly 2, 203, ed. Martianay, establishes nothing. 6 Apuleius, dogm. Plat. 2: nam Speusippus domesticis instructus documentis pueri ejus acre in per-
in public contests is cer whether he even tainly not true entered at the Isthmia may be
torious
cipiendo ingenium et admiranda^ laudat et verecundise indolem pubescentis primitias labore atque amore studendi imbutas refert et in viro harum incrementa virtutum
: :
doubted, for after his acquaintance with Socrates had begun he hardly cver took part in athletic struggles, and previous to that he was too (Hermann, p. 100, con young. jectures that the origin of the story may be traced in the Crito,
52 B.) master
et
6
ceterarum testatur.
97.
Cf.
Her
mann, Plato
these belong specially the tales about his early education and teachers, heading and writing he is said to have learnt from the
To
of his writing probably derived from the Anterastre and, similarly, the story in Diog. 5 (Apul. loc. cit. : Olymp. 2; Prolegg. 3), to the effect that he enjoyed instruction from artists, and thence acquired the knowledge of colour shown in the Timaeus, may be merely an ar bitrary assumption based on that
is
;
The name
Dionysius
who
is
immortalized in
the Anterasta?, gymnastic from Aristo of Argos, who brought him on so well that he entered the Isthmian games as a wrestler.
The strange assertion dialogue. of Aristoxenus apud Diog. 8 (cf.

TKlian Y. H.
to Corinth
7. 14), that he took part in three campaigns, not only
(For
his
gymnastic,
6,
cf.
;
after
Delium
the
(01. 89,
Dicaiarchus, Diogenes 4
Servius
(Ol. 88, 3),
(Olympiad 96), but to 1), and Tanagra and at Delium obtained

is
on
668; Apul. c. 2; Olympiod. c. 2 Prolegomena, c. 2. and Porphyry apud Apuleius Cyrillum contra Julianum, 208 D, make him enter at the Pythian
;
^neid
prize
for valour,
doubtless
modelled on the three campaigns of

Socrates (vide supra, p. 50), whose words with reference to them (Apol. 28, D.) are put into Plato s mouth
in
games
as well the Prolegomena remove the victory to the Isthmian and Olympic contests.) Music he
;
Diogenes 24.
What we know
of the state of
learned under Draco,
a pupil of
Damon, and Metellus of Agrigentum (Plutarch, De Musica^T, 1;

Olymp. and
Proleg., loc.
is
cit.
;
cf.
Athens towards the end of the Peloponnesian war would certainly lead us to conclude that he must have seen some military service, and perhaps he abo took part in
that
action at
xiii.
Hermann,
p. 99).
How much
of
Megara (409
65),
B.C.,
historical cannot be determined, and is a matter of comparative indifference. That he
these accounts
Diodorus Kep.
ii.
cording to his
own
in which, ac statement in
dis
368 A., his brother
repeatedly appeared and was vic
tinguished himself.
LATO 8 LIFE.
tion is principally drawn to three points, important in their influence on his mental development.
tion of his country,
Of these we may notice and the

s
first
the general condi
political position of his
family.
Plato
youth coincided with that unhappy period
succeeding the Sicilian defeat

the
when
all
the faults of
previous Athenian government were so terribly avenged, all the disadvantages of unlimited democracy so nakedly exposed, all the pernicious results of the self-seeking ethics and sophistical culture of the time
so unreservedly displayed.
social class
He
himself belonged to a
ing
to a family which regarded the exist constitution with undisguised, and not always
and
Several of his nearest relations groundless discontent. were among the spokesmen of the aristocratic party. 7
But when that party had itself been raised to power by the common enemy, on the ruins of Athenian great
ness, it so misused its strength that the eyes of its blindest adherents were inevitably opened. It is easy to see how a noble, high-minded youth, in the midst of
such experiences and influences, might be disgusted, not only with democracy, but with existing State sys
tems in general, and take refuge in political Utopias, which would further tend to draw off his mind from the actual towards the ideal.
Again, there
were
other
circumstances
simulta
know neously working in the same direction. that Plato in his youth occupied himself with poetical
7
We
Critias,
as
is
well
known;
Memorab. Ill,
ii.
7,
1,
3; Hellenica
Charmides, acording to Xcnophonc,
4,
11.).

8
attempts,
and the
artistic ability already

9
evinced by
some of his earliest writings, coupled with the poetical character of his whole system, would lead us to suppose
that these studies went far beyond the superficiality of 10 There is, therefore, little reason a fashionable
pursuit.
to doubt (however untrustworthy
cise information
may be our more pre on the subject 11 ) that he was intimate!
with the great poets of his country. with Lastly, he had, even before his acquaintance
8 Diog. 5. He is said to have at practised composition in verse,
fusion
first
dithyrambs, and then songs and tragedies; and even to have conceived the idea of becoming a
the rest are at least quite is the little epic fragment in the Anthologia Planudea, 210. Cf. Bergk, loc. cit.,
;
uncertain, and so
and Hermann, Plato, 101.

9 Specially in the Protagoras; but in some of the minor dialogues too, e,g. the Lysis, Charmides, and Laches, the dramatic element is greatly in excess of the dialectic.
competitor in the tragic contests, when he became acquainted with Socrates, and, following his ex So his burnt poems. ample,
Olyinp. 3, Prolog. 3. Julian, V. H. ii. 30, gives a somewhat different account. According to him, Plato s but seeing first essay was in epos how far short his productions came of their Homeric model, he de stroyed them (on this, however, cf. Hermann, Plato 100, 54), and next composed a tragic tetralogy, which was actually in the per formers hands, when his acquaint ance with Socrates decided him to abandon poetry for ever. Of the epigrams ascribed to Plato (some ascribed as early as Aristippus, irepi TraXcu as Tpu0?;s, apud l)iog. 29 who is followed by Diogenes him self, loc. cit., Apuleius de Magia Gellius xix. 11 ; Atlienaus c. 10 and others cf. Bcrgk, xiii. 589 C. Lyrici Gneci, 489 sq.), which are mostly amatory trifles, the great majority are evidently forgeries, or attributed to him by some con
;
10 That poetry in Athens at that time was largely of this character is shown, among other testimony, by the passages from Aristophanes quoted by Hermann on page 100 Frogs 88 sq. Birds 1444 sq. 11 Diog. iii. 8, says that he first
;
;
brought
mimes to Sophron s Athens (this, however, could only have been after his journey), and took such delight in them that he used to keep them under his
pillow.
The
;
latter statement also
occurs in Val. Max. 8, 7, sectn. 3 ; Olymp. 3 and Proleg. 3 (with re gard to Sophron and Aristophanes). Probably, however, these assertions only originate in the endeavour to
find
He for his dialogues. said to have taken Epicharmus as a pattern, but not much reliance can be placed on this.
models
is also
Vide Part
1, p.
428
sq.
PLATO S
Socrates,
L //
/;.
turned
his
attention
to
philosophy,
and
12 had become ac through Cratylus the Heraclitean quainted with a doctrine which, in combination with
other elements,
13
essentially
contributed to his later
system. All these
influences, however, appear as of little importance by the side of Plato s acquaintance with
AVe cannot, of course, say what direction his this teacher, but the well remain unanswered. We know question may enough to prove from all historical traces that the deepest, most lasting, most decisive impression was
Socrates.
mind might have taken without
produced by the philosophic reformer on his congenial Plato himself is said to have esteemed it as the highest of Fortune s favours, that he should have been born in the lifetime of Socrates, 14 and later tradi
disciple.
tion has adorned with a significant

1J
13
myth
15
the
first
Vide Part
1,
p.
001
sq.
Aristotle, Metaphysics 1, 6, init., e/c vecv re yap avv^Q^ ycvopevos irp&Tov KparvXy /ecu rats
/cXetreuns
56aty,
del
H paus cnravTuv rCov

,
pl
avrQv OVK
ova->js,
ravra plv
Hermogenes of which (vide Cratyl. 384 A, 391 C.) is certainly the well-known disciple of Socrates, (vide supra 1GG, note 1). Similarly from the Parmenides is derived the assertion (Anonymus apud Phothe
tium, Cod.
/cat
vffTepov ourws vTrtXafitv. Zuttpdrous d Trfpl jj.tv ret 7]6iKa

Trpay/j.a.Tevofji.<?-
Zeno
14
249, p. 439 a.), that and Parmenides instructed
Plato in logic.
vov,
(S:c.
eKeivov dirodf^d/jLEvos, &c.
Diog. (3, Olymp. 4, and Proleg. 4 date the acquaintance with ( ratylus after Socrates death ; but, in face of Aristotle s express testimony, wo can, of course, attach no weight to
this. Diogenes also mentions, in connection with Cratylus, the 1 armenidean Hermogenes(who appears
Compare the expression in Plutarch, Marius 4G Lactantius, Institutiones Divinse 3, 19 ; though its genuineness may be doubted, as we have the same put into the
;
mouth
15
ap. Diog.
of Socrates, or 1, 33.
1,
even Thales,
;
Pausanias,
1
;
30, 3
;
Diog. 5
Prolegomena as Hermippus); but this is merely an arbitrary in ference from the dialogue Cratylus
in the
Plat.
1 Apul. dogm. Socrates is said to have dreamt that a swan, the bird of Apollo, flew towards him with a
Olymp. 4; Proleg.
1(1
PLATO AND THE OLDEll ACADEMY.
meeting of the two men. But apart from this, the fact must always be regarded as one of those remark able contingencies which are too important in their bearing on the course of history to be severed from it 16 in our thought. During a long and confidential in
17
tercourse,
Plato penetrated so deeply into the spirit of
his distinguished friend that the portrait of that spirit which he was able to bequeath to us is at once the most
faithful
and the most

if
ideal that
we
possess.
Whether
at that time he directed his attention to other teachers
of philosophy, and
so,
to
what
extent,
we do
not
know;
18
but
it
is
scarcely credible .that a youth so

with the Pythagorean philosophy might be inferred from the Phrcdrus, if it were certain that this dialogue
melodious song. Plato presented

Socrates
tlie
1(i
Next morning and himself,
meaning
immediately recognised of the dream.
was
According to Hermodorus apud Diog. 6, he was twenty years old when he became acquainted with Socrates, and twenty-eight when he went to Euclid, after Socrates death. According to this, he would he born in 01. 88, 1 (vide supra,
280, 1).
ever,
composed before Socrates But the accounts which might warrant such a conclusion
death.
the statement that the Phsedrus his earliest work, and that the subsequent Lysis had been read and
(e.g.
was
disowned by
vide
Socrates,
for
which
Exact information, how
can hardly be got on this The absurd statements of point. Suidas, sub voce nXdrw^, and Eudoc a in Villoison s Anecdota 1, 362, about a twenty years with intercourse are Socrates,
.
obviously wrong.
17
How
Olymp. 3.. Diog. 38, 35. Prolegg. 3) are not trustworthy enough, and the supposition itself Still more is far too improbable. dubious is the conjecture (Snsemihl Entw. 1, 3, 444; Munk, Genet. Natiir. Ordn. 497 sqq.; and cf. Herm. Plat. 528), that, in the Phsedo, 95 E sqq., Plato puts the
history
of
his
clcse
is
the
two were to
own
the
philosophic
each other
shown by the whole
attitude of the Platonic writings, and by the portraiture of Socrates in them, more completely even
development in This Socrates.
mouth
of
has-
assumption
We than by some single passages. may, however, compare Xenophon,

3, G,
;
Mem.
1;
Plato,
Apology,
given rise to a string of others equally untenable. The influence on the earlier formation of Plato s, mind which can alone be certainly attested, that, namely, of the Heraclitean philosophy, is not touched upon here.
34 A, 38 13 Phredo, 51) B. 18 That he was already acquainted
obviously
Nor
does.
PLATO 8 LIFE.
9
11
highly educated, and so eager for knowledge

first
whose
impulse, moreover, towards philosophy had not come from Socrates should have made no attempt
until his thirtieth
year to inform himself as to the achievements of the earlier philosophers, should have
learned nothing from his friend Euclid about the Eleatics,
nor from Simmias and
Cebes about Philolaus
that he should have enquired no further respecting the doctrines continually brought to the surface the
by
public lectures and disputations of the Sophists, and left unread the writings of Anaxagoras. so easily to be obtained in Athens. 19 It is nevertheless probable that the overpowering influence of the Socratic
teaching temporarily weakened his interest in the earlier natural philosophies, and that close and repeated
may have
study
may
afterwards have given
into their doctrines.
Similarly, his
him a deeper insight own imaginative
nature, under the restraining influence of his master s
was probably habituated to severer thought and more cautious investigation perhaps, indeed, his idealistic tendencies received at first an absolute check;
dialectic,
;
the passage in the Phaedo, on the whole, convey the impression of a biographical account it is rather an exposition of the universal necessity of progress from the material to tinal and causes, thence to the Ideas. It takes the form of a personal confession ; but is not giving a historical Plato^ of narration the philosophical development either of himself or Socrates he is laying down in outline the principles Avhich lead from the philosopy of nature to con:
;
ceptuul philosophy. Brucke, Plat, Stud. iii. 427, with whom Steinhart in the main, in spite of the agrees admission that the development of Socrates is here described, liebenveg, Exam, of Plat. Writings, 92 sq." 19 Plato Apol., 20 D. Phieilo, 97 B. With regard, too, to the
writings of Parmenidea and Zeno, Schaarschmidt rightly observes that they were read quite as much in Athens as in Megara.
12

science, together with the art of form a to be attained by him
and conceptual
ing concepts, was only
to all such things stranger like his contemporaries the dry prosaic method of the Socratic en through 20 But Plato needed this schooling to give him quiry.
the repose and certainty of the scientific method to develope him from a poet into a philosopher nor did he. in the process permanently lose anything for which
;
temperament designed him. Socrates con him a glance into a new ceptual philosophy had given and he forthwith set out to explore it. world, The tragic end of his aged master, a consumma tion which he seems at the outset to have thought 21 wholly impossible, must have been a fearful blow to Plato and one consequence of this shock, which still
his natural
;
seems long years afterwards to vibrate so sensibly in the thrilling description of the Phsedo, may have been
perhaps the illness which prevented the faithful dis 22 We are, ciple from attending his master at the last.
-
As
I have
observed
in
the
Zeitschrift fur Alterthumswissensch aft for 1851, page 254, this is
early production like the Lysis the most obvious explanation seems
to lie in the influence of Socrates,
21 22
rendered
probable
stitution of those
by the conminor Platonic
Cf. p. 161, note 1.
Pheedo,
;
59
B.
Cf.
Herm.
dialogues which \vc are justified death of in dating before the If in these dialogues Socrates. the dry formality of the dialectic discussions is found to present a striking contrast to the completeness and vivacity of the dramatic if there is a remarkinvestiture able absence in them of youthful fire ; if, in later works, e.y. the
;
Plat. 34, 103 Plutarch, DeVirtute seem Morali 10, p. 449, does^not It is to warrant any conclusion.
not impossible
that
his
is
owing
fiction,
to
ill-health
absence a mere
%
by means of which he wished to secure greater freedom

himself in the narrating speeches which preceded the death of Socrates. His readiness to stand bail for Socrates has been
for
Phrcdrus and Symposium, similar subjects are treated wilh much greater vigour and elan than in an
already mentioned, p. 288 sq. The statement of Justus of Tiberias,
PZATO 3 LIFE.
as to the effect of the fate of Socrates
13
however, more immediately concerned with the enquiry on Plato s philo

;
this enquiry
sophic development and view of the world and if for we are thrown upon conjectures, these are not entirely devoid of On the one hand, probability.
for
example,
we
shall find
no
difficulty in
understand
reverence for his departed teacher was immeasurably increased by the destiny which overtook him, and the magnanimity with which he yielded to it how the martyr of philosophy, faithful unto
ing
how
his
death,
became idealized in his heart and memory as the very type of the true philosopher how principles tested by
;
this fiery ordeal received in his eyes the consecration of
efficiency 24 in those circumstances fainter; nay, how the general tendency was fostered in him to contemplate reality in a gloomy light, and to escape from the ills of the
a higher truth how at once his judgment on the men and circumstances concerned in the sacrifice of Socrates 23 grew harder, and his hope as to any political
;
sent
life
into a higher, supersensuous world.

it
On
pre the
other hand,
scientific
ap.
may
growth
that
perhaps have been better for his his connection with Socrates
later
Diog; 2, 41, Proleg. 3, that Plato wished to undertake Socrates defence himself, but was prevented by the clamour of the
Bocrates
p.
ie
298 497
-4
A
A
judgments,
sq.
;
e.g.
vi.
;
Politicus,
Republic,
488
viii.
557
P>
sq.
5(32
A A sq.
judges, like everything else 1

trial,
about
Of.
is
disputed.
loc. cit.
161 sq.;
andHerm.
specially the way in which speaks of the great Athenian
U.
statesmen in the (iorgias, 515 C sq., and 521 C sq. Thesetetus, 173 ; sq., on the condition of his city and the relation of the
;
According to the 7th Platonic letter, 324 sq., Plato had intended to take an active part in first under the Thirty politics, Tyrants, and, after their expulsion, under the democracy ; but was deterrcd both times by the state of affairs, and specially by the attack on Socrates. We cannot, of course,
give much weight to this debateable testimony.
Jtive
philosopher
to
politics
besides
lasted no longer than it did. During the years of their intercourse he had made his teacher s spirit his own, in fulness than was possible to any of his fellow
completer students
;
was now for him to perfect the Socratic the addition of new elements, and to fit by himself by the utmost expansion in many directions
it
science
for erecting it
on an independent basis his apprenticeship (Lehrjahre) was over, his travelling time (Wander25 iahre) was come. /
:
After the death of Socrates, Plato, with others of his pupils, first betook himself to Megara, where a
circle of congenial
minds had gathered round Euclid. 26

are mentioned, the expression Thirty Tyrants, or simply
I borrow this denomination from Schwegler, Hist, of Phil. 41. -6 Hermodor. ap. Diog. ii. 106,
iii.
the the
took place according to this authority when Plato was twenty-eight doubtless immediately after the execution of He indicates its motive Socrates. in the words deicravTas rr]v &fji.66.
;
The migration
Tyrants (without rpidKovra), is not used as the ordinary appellation for the Thirty in any writer
of that period, or, in fact, in any writer preserved to us before the
time of Cicero and Diodorus.

invariable title
is ol
The
r-qro. rdv rvpa-vvuv. Formerly by these rtpavvoi were understood the so-called Thirty Tyrants, and little
weight was
to
the
therefore attributed evidence of Hermodorus.
But this explanation can no longer be entertained, now that we know from Simplic. Phys. 54 b. 56 b.
(supra 1, 1), that the Hermodorus whose statement is preserved for us in Diogenes, is no other than the well-known Platonist. How can it be supposed that a
rpidKovra. Tvpavvos, according to the Greek is a single chief who rules view, without laws; a rule like that of the Thirty is not a tyranny, but, as it is often called, an oligarchy. The Thirty are only once called
rupcwot
tions, lihet.
e.rj.
in
oratorical
exaggerain Arist.
;
by Polycrates
ii. 24, 1401, a. 33 but we cannot conclude from this that it was the usual appellation for them, and that every one who spoke of the rvpavvoi must have
L
j
personal pupil of Plato, like Hermoderns, could have been so ignorant as to think that Socrates was executed under the tyranny of the Thirty? AVe need not understand the rvpavvoi in this sense. Indeed, often as the Thirty
Hermodorus the Thirty. expression must be understood in the rvpavvoi. are a different way the democrats who brought about the execution of Socrates, just as Xenophon, Hellen. iv. 4, (j, calls the democrats who held sway at
meant
PLATO S
He
afterwards undertook
27
LIFE.
L6
E ^ypt,
Similarly
journeys which led him to
Gyrene,
Magna
Graecia,
and
28
Sicily.
cited
Owing
p
1
to 1)
Corinth rovs TvpavvetovTas on account of their reign of terror.
witnesses
on
seventh Platonic etter, 325 13, calls the accusers of Socrates awurretovTC! rive*. The
distinction
fc.,
the
Equally unjustifiable is the assertion of Stein against Hermodorus, with regard to some of the well-
122
sq.,
and rvpavvcvovTfs is, I think, too fine, and I see no reason why an adversary might not have applied the term rvpaww. to violent democratsjust as much as to violent
T will nllcroivliB ^P I will nnf oligarchs. not, of course, dispute the possibility that this expression is not borrowed from HerraoUorus himself. Stein (Siebcn
,
which Steinhart, PI. draws between Tâww
known Socratics, such as Xenophon Antisthenes, JEschincs, that it is highly improbable, if not quite impossible, that they were with Plato at Megara. Hermodorus does not state that all the Socratic students had gone there
""
"
merely says, ....n ,-rt

>
iii.
(f>r)Gt.v
Ep/j.65wpos ets
rial
Ev K \ddr]v avv K ai &\\ois

and
if
we
"com
z. Gesch. d. Plat. ii. CO, Ppfaer 170 sq.), and after him Schaarschmidt (Sammlung d Schr. plat. 5 *(]. have been led into V1J.U1 ~ W error A through a false in
, / /
pare
-*
"ii
l 0(f-
TOVTOV (Euclid)
--
i^wAu HXcirwm rai

I
o*
roi>f
Xoor>j
^tXocroôyj, the meaning is obviously not (as Ol IlUt tiO Steinhart, PL L. 121, un-
pre-supposition,
s
rejecting
Hermodorus
date
and
who were
but the
derstands)
all
the
philosophers
his evidence for Plato s sojourn in
Megara, on the ground that rtpwcan only mean the rtpavvoi /car eo X those who have always been understood as the Tyrants at Athens, viz. the Thirty only. Schaarschnndt has so ,r misconstrued the Ttpav VQl of Hermodorus as to identify, in a ty reading of the seventh Plaso-called
at that time in Athens rest known to the reader
(i.e. the reader of Hermodorus, or of the writer whose statement is here made use of) who had left Athens with Plato AVe mHit
ready to doubt, with (PL L. 121) whether danger threatening one of their
!
be
more
teinhart
number
friends
sion.
afforded
is
1 lato
for
and
his
nc letter, the
5vv<i<rTcvot>Tcs
who
any ground
It
apprehenthat
thin H ^ eoiy Hermodorus could not of course have been the immediate pupil of Jlato, in of Der,
brought Socrates to trial with the rtpawoi mentioned earlier (the marks quotation are SchaarSchmidt s); but in the Platonic etter there is not a word about rvpawu, whereas the rptdKovra men 0n ( 4C 25 ?Acc n t Schaa r ? .^hmidt s
quite
possible
Hermodorus attributed this motive to them from his own conjecture in which he was really mistaken However, the state of âaft";
the
death of Socrates
that there
is
so little
^f
1
known to us dde Whether

27
we cannot de -as norsome

unwar]f
occasion, though perhaps ranted, for apprehension

()ll
wh
;
fbl ,
spite
ides,
who
Plat. 51 sq.
109
sti
sq.
work,
and
possessed his spite of the other
A11 testimony agrees that his travels extended at least thus far
I.I
the meagreness, and sometimes the contradictoriness y 29 of the traditions, it is impossible to ascertain with cerFor his travels in Egypt, we
quote his acquaintance with
tian
is
may Egyp
institutions
.
note 2 )
The
(vide page 358, order of the j ourney s
variously given. According to FiniCicero, Republic, i. 10; De bus, v. 29, 87 ; Valerius Maximus, ext. 3 ; Augustine, De viii. 7,
Civitate
first
Dei,
viii.
4,
he went
to Egypt, and then to Italy should be re It and- Sicily. marked, that Valerius, like the declamator he is, transfers the date of the travels to the period when Plato had become famous.
Accord is quite indemonstrable. ing to Diog. 7, he had intended to visit the Magi (and according to Apul. loc. cit., the Indians too), but was prevented by the wars in Asia. Lactantius, Institut. 4, 2, actually makes him travel to the Magi and Persians Clemens, Cohortationes 46, to the Babylonians, and ThraAssyrians, Hebrews,
;
On
the other hand, Diogenes
iii.
Cicero, Tusculans, 4, 19, 44. speaks of the ultimse terras which had explored ; according to lie Olymp. 4, Prolegg. 4, he had been initiated in the doctrines of Zoro aster by Persians in Phoenicia
cians.
;
(with
tutes,
whom
i.
is
Quintilian,
Insti
visit
12,
first,
15),
makes him
then the Pythagoreans in Italy, then Egypt (accompanied by Euripides, who had died some time before, however), and thence return to Athens. According to
Cyrene
and Apuleius, Dogin. Plat. i. 3 the Prolegomena, c. 4, he went first to Italy to visit the Pythagoreans,
;
then to Cyrene and Egypt, and thence -back again to Italy and The most credible of these Sicily. We can statements is the first.
scarcely suppose that Plato visited Italy twice running (the 7th Pla tonic letter, 326 B, only knows of
Pausanias, iv. 32, 4, repeats this, and says that he was also ac-. qnainted with Chaldean lore and according to Pliny, Natural History 30, 2, 9, he acquired the Persian magic while on his travels. These, however, are doubtless the inven tions of later times, analogous to the tales about Pythagoras, and perhaps to some extent modelled still more palpable on them. fiction is the alleged acquaintance
;
with Jews and Jewish Scriptures, on which cf. Brucker, i. 635 sq. Her mann, p. 114 A, 125; with the writers he quotes, and the 3rd part
;
of the present work, 221, 300,

edit.
2nd
one Italo-Sicilian journey), while everything is in favour of Sicily s having been the end of his travels
(vide
subter).
And
the
opposite
account gives us an unhistoric motive in the assertion of Apuleius and the Prolegomena, that he
visited
Cyrene and Egypt to inves
Lactantius, loc. cit. wonders that Plato and Pythagoras had not visited the Jews. 29 Diogenes 6 would lead us to suppose that he went from Megara straight to Cyrene, and from thence On the other hand, the to Sicily. 7th Platonic letter makes a long
interval of active teaching elapse before his coming to Megara. Vide next note.
tigate the sources of PythagoreanThe conjecture of Stallbaum, ism. Plat. Opp. i. xix., Plat. PoHt. 38
;
that Apul.
is
following Speusippus,
PLATO S
taiuty
LIFE.
17
continued in Megara, when he com whether they immediately succeeded the Megaric sojourn, or a return to Athens intervened ; whether his stay in Athens was or short; and long whether he had or had not become a teacher of
lie
how long
menced
his travels,
philo
sophy before his departure. But from Sicily only ten or twelve
30
Socrates,
:!0
there
is
he really returned years after the death of great probability, and even some
if
The only source for this is, of course, the 7th Platonic letter, 324
and that account becomes sus

is
picious, because it the assertion in
even had
connected with 325 C sq. that
before his journeys Plato âcquired and expressed the conviction, KaKuv ou Xêif ra dv6puTriva 76/77, irpiv CLV % r b rCov
6p#cDs ye /cat d\r)0u$ dpxds t\0ri rds TroXm/cas TO T&V i) vva.aTtv6vTuv ev rats %K TWOS /to/pas 0etas SVTUS If with this $tXocro0?70-77. we compare Kep. v. 473 C, we can hardly doubt that the above quoted words are to be referred to this place in the Republic. Conse quently, the composition of the must be dated before Republic
<f)i.\o<ro(t>ovvTuv
Êgina, and, according to an apparently accurate account in Diog. iii. 19, his execution was actually debated on, as a plebiscite punished all Athenians who entered the island with death. Êgina, therefore, must at this time have been at open war with Athens. Now, according to Xenophon, Hellenica, v. 1,
1, this state of things cannot be dated before the last of the Corinthian years war; up to that the intercourse time,
in
7&os
et j
Tr6\ecrii>
between Athens and JEgina had received no check. This would give us 389 or at most 390 B.C., and we may therefore accede to
the views of Hermann (p. 63) and almost all the later writers, that it was about this time that Plato returned to Athens. Grote, Hist, of Greece, xi. 52, would date his arri val at Syracuse not earlier than 387 on the ground that Dionysius would hardly have had leisure, before that time, during his war with Pihegium, to attend to tho We need not, how philosopher. ever, attach much importance to
;
Plato
s first Sicilian But journey. this (vide subter) is in the highest
degree improbable.
At
the same
time, the statement of the letter as to Plato s age at the time of his journey receives a confirmation
which has been noticed by Stallbaum, Plat. Polit. p. 44, in cor

recting his earlier theory
(De Ar13),
gumentoetArtificio Theseteti,
that Plato did not return till the The confirmation is year 386.
this.
Plato
his way back from Sicily, said to have been sold for slave at Dionysius instigation,
^
On
is
argument and, according to Diodorus, xiv. 110 sq., the con quest of Khegium dates later than of Antalcidas, after the_ peace which the treatment experienced by Plato in JEgina was
;
this
impossible.

external evidence, 31 that long before his journey he
Some
time, too,
had
between Plato
departure. Philosophic, i. 46, inclines to the belief that Plato s first appearance in the Academy was in 01. 99 an
:
must be allowed arrival and his Tennemann, Platon s

s
the dialogue must refer to the first The date of its comperiod, 39. position cannot be much later ; the
opinion
which
needs
no
special
remarks and the facts

sently adduced.
31
refutation, in face of the previous to be pre
not be inclined to to the expres 7th letter on this on pp. 15, 28; 17, 30), point (quoted or to Valerius Maximus, both being too little trustworthy. But the is undoubtedly favoured by theory the circumstance that we possess a series of important works of Plato s, composed in all probability before his return from Sicily, and
give
We may
of the
much weight
sions
almost a dedication Euclid points to a time at which Plato had not so decidedly broken with the Megara School as he has in the Sophist, and gives us the impression that it relates tomatters still fresh in the Greek reader s mind. (Ueberweg, p. 235, thinks such a dedication awkward I only say that the frame in which the dialogue is set amounts to a dedication. Cicero has dedicated
introduction
to
;
Posterior Academics to Varro the same way.) Munk and Ueberweg object" that if Plato wrote the Theastetus so early, he must have foreseen Theretetus
his
in
some of them after his sojourn at Megara. The first of

at
least
these is the Theaetetus. The oc casion of the dialogue is connected with with Theaetetus, â meeting who is returning sick to Athens from the army at Corinth. This can only refer to the Corinthian
achievements in mathematics, at tested by Proclus in Eucl. p. 19, 25. But Socrates does not say
D) that Theaetetus will be a distinguished mathe matician he only predicts that he

live
to
;
(Theaet. 142
become an e\\6yifjios a.vf)p and there was no reason why he should not have said this at the
will
;
War,
Munk (Nat. Schr. 391 sq.) and of Plat, writings, Ueberweg (Exam, 227 sq.) make the reference to B.C. 368 cf. Diodor. 15, 68. At that
B.C.
d.
394-387.
Ordn.
PI.
however, Thesetetus would have been no longer under any obligation to take part in a foreign campaign, and the dialogue would have to be dated later than various considerations, to be brought for
date,
If Thesetetus is 392-388. called (143 sq.) /meipaKiov in B.C. 399, it does not follow that he was no more than 16, as Munk thinks ; in the Symposium 223 A, Agathon, at the time of his first victory, is called fj.eLpa.KLov and in Plutarch, Pericl. 36, Pericles betrothed son
date
&
ward presently, will warrant. Be tween the two dates given there was no Athenian army at Corinth. In its later years the Corinthian war was carried on by Athens with
mercenaries only (Xen. Hell. 4, 4, 1 ; 14 Diodor. 14, 86, 91 sq.), so
:
denoted by the same title on the other hand, These tetus is called avT]p in page 144 D. Several other works (vide subter) seem to have preceded the Thecetetus, and probably most of them were com posed at Athens Plato could not have given the requisite pains and concentration while on his travels
is
: : ;
and
to
suppose them written at
PLATO S LIFE
settled in Athens, 32
19
and there worked as teacher and author; even granting that at this period his instruc tions were confined to a select few, and that the open ing of his school in the Academy took place later on. 3 * What, in this case, we are to think about the journey
to
"
Egypt and Gyrene
whether the
visit to Sicily
34
was
first
imediately connected with it, or whether sturned t3 Athens from Egypt, and
the Italian journey after an interval of
Plato
only undertook
some
years,
mnot be
certainly determined, but there favour of the latter alternative. 35

to
is
a good deal
-legara would be
assume
longer residence there than our evidence warrants. (See following

note.)
was ment
the
to
reason
of
his
retire
Megara, he must soon
Some
Irace of such a stay,
beyond the notice in Hermodorus, would naturally have been pre

served.
Thesetetus,
The sharp polemic of the (which Hermann, 499,

I
and Steinhart, Mat. Werk. iii. 81, 556, appear to be wrong in ignor and the probably contem ing),
poraneous Euthydemus against Antisthenes (vide supra, pp. 248, 1, 4 252, 3 254, 1 ; 255, 2
;
;
have been enabled to return home without danger; and again, as the philosophic intercourse with Euclid, supposing this to be Plato s as well be object, could just enjoyed from the neighbouring
Athens,
it is
a year at Megara. 33 Grote agrees with the above, Plato i. 121. He rightly considers
highly improbable that Plato should have spent the 13 (strictly speaking 10-12) years before his return from Sicily in voluntary banishment. ^ As Steinhart conjectures, P f.
iii.
what could detain the philosopher
impossible
to
see
it
25G, 1 ;) might indeed warrant the conjecture, that at the time when he wrote these dialogues, Plato had already had some per sonal encounters with Euclid, and
known him
Athens.
as his If at this
opponent
in
W.
period Plato
35
Most of our
who
bad already passed some years of literary activity at Athens, we can hardly imagine that the philosopher
will
100, 213, 316, 473. authorities take
it for granted that he came straight from Egypt to Italy. But the varying accounts of the order of
document as
delivery
only allow a written a reminder to oral
(IMiscdrus
276
sq.)
should have refrained from enun ciating his views in personal inter course with others.
32
travels, noticed above, show the utter want of exact informa tion on the point. The 7th letter is silent about the journey to Egypt if we are to follow it, we must conclude that he went
;
his
If fear for his personal safety
straight from
home
to Italy;
and
c2
20
PLATO AXD THE OLDER ACADEMY.

If,
when
indeed, Plato had already attained to manhood he visited the countries of the south and west ;
is,
had already, that
with the Italian Pythagoreans,
before his personal acquaintance found the scientific

36
bases of his system, and laid them down in writings, these journeys cannot have had the striking effect on
his philosophical development which is often ascribed Besides the to them in ancient and modern days.
general
human
enlargement of his views and knowledge of nature, his chief gain from them seems to have
37
consisted in a closer acquaintance with the Pythago
rean school
to
(whose principal written book he appears have purchased), 38 and in a deeper study of.mathes
Plutarch
statement (Plut. de Ge7, p.
nio Socratis
Plato visit
579), which makes Delos on his return
from Egypt, perhaps goes on the presupposition that he was not on a voyage to Italy, but to Athens.
have dropped out) Apuleius, loc. Dio cit., Eurytus and Archytas; genes, Eurytus and Philolaus (the latter can scarcely have been alive at the time). Cf. Bockh, Philol. and Pt. 1, p. 287, of the 5 sq.
; ;
The main
this
point, however, is that theory gives the easiest ar
present work.
i8
The
first
writer
known
to us
rangement
of his works with reference to his life. The Politicus shows traces of his acquaintance
who
mentions the purchase Philolaus works by Plato
of
is
Timon
Gellium,
the
iii.
Sillographer,
17.
with Egypt (vide subter, p. 22, 41). But on these points conjecture is
all
He
only
that
36
is
We
possible. shall see presently that
the Theoetetus and dialogues of the same date presuppose the doctrino of Ideas, and a certain acquaint ance with Pythagorean tenets. 37 The details on this point seem to rest on mere conjecture. Cicero,
loc.
cit
however, that Plato bought a small book for a large price, and with its help wrote his Timaeus. That the purchase was made on his travels, he does not say nor does the as given price of the book denarii = 100 Attic Gellius, 10,000 mime seem to come from him.
;
On
the
other hand,
Hermippus,
crates,
names Archytas, EcheTimseus, and Acrion, or

,
ap. Diog. viii. 85 (about B.C. 230), says, on the authority of a writer
Maximus adds (Valerius as Pythagoreans, whose acquaintance he had made at that time. Olympiodorus gives Archy tas, (the name of Timseus seems to
Arion
Ccetus),
not named, but doubtless an Alex andrian, that Plato, on his visit to Philolaus work Sicily, bought from his relations for 40 Alexan drine mince, and copied his Timseus
PLATO S
matics.
LIFE.
is
21
To
this study,
Theodorus
said to
have in
troduced him, 33 and we have at any rate no proof against the correctness of the statement. 40 He may have re
ceived further mathematical instruction from Archytas and other Pythagoreans, so that we can scarcely be
wrong
for the science,

from
it.
in connecting with this journey his predilection 41 and his remarkable knowledge of it 42
:
book was
Others (ibid.) say that the a present in acknow ledgment of Plato s having ob of one of tained the freedom Philolaus scholars from Dionysius. Cicero, Hep. i. 10, says less de Plato acquired it that finitely
during his stay in Sicily. Accord ing to Satyrus ap. Diog. iii. 9, viii. 15 (followed by lamblichus de vita Pythagorica, 199) it was not Plato himself, but Dion by his
have come down to us. A priori, it would be more likely that it came to him at Athens through the instrumentality of Simmias and Cebes. The Prolegomena, c.
5, transfer the myth of the world soul to the pseudp Timseus.
39
Diog.
iii.
Apul.
loc.
cit.
That Plato was acquainted with

Theodorus
seems probable from the Thesetetus, 143 sqq., and the opening of the Sophist and Poli-
commission, who bought it for 100 This sum, adds Diogenes, for he is he could easily afford
minse.
;
ticus.
The
doubtless
had acquaintance been made at Athens. Athens of So and cf.
said to have been well off, and, as Onetor tells, to have received from
had visited shortly before the death crates. (Plato, loc. cit. ;
Theodorus
Dionysius more than eighty talents. (The latter statement is not merely exaggerated, but plainly fictitious ; also Diog. ii. 81, and page cf.
312,
2.)
Xen. Memor.
40
iv. 2, .10.)
The
mains
possibility, of course, re that the journey to Gyrene
Tzetzes,
Chiliades
x.
790 sq., 999 sq., xi. 37, makes Dion buy it for him from Philolaus heirs for 100 minse. We may
probably agree with Bo ckb, Philologus 18 sq., Susemihl, Genet.
Entwickl.,
PI.
<
in order to assign to Plato the mathematical teacher on whom he bestows the acknowledgment of mention.
41 shall see later on what significance Plato attached to ma
was a mere invention,
We
1, 2, sq.,
.t,
and Steinhart,
saying
that
ll
sq.,
in
certainly was acquainted with the work of Philolaus, per but haps actually possessed it
Plato
beyond
when, where, and how he acquired it, cannot be deter mined, owing to the contradictory, ambiguous, and partially improb
this,
thematical relations, and how much he valued a scientific knowledge of them. They are to him the pecu liar connecting link between Idea and Phenomenon ; and thus the knowledge of them is the inter mediate step, leading from sensuous
envisagement
Conviy.
viii.
to rational contempla
tion of the idea.
Cf. Plut. Qusest.

init.
; Philop. de Schol. in Arist.
able nature
of the
accounts that
An. D,
0, o.
David
22
while, on the contrary, the stories about the mathema tical lore, priestly mysteries, and political ideas which
he
is
stated to have acquired in Egypt,

tical
43
are in the
viii. 972 sq. 26, a, 10 Tzetz. Chil., ascribe to him, without sufficient his authority, the inscription over lecture-room, ju^Seis cfyew/^r/oTjTOS dalrw, which is generally stated to
;
mouth,
in Thesetetus s dis doubtless his own coveries as the idea of stereometry, in Republic vii. 528 sq., is re
definitions
;
have been of Pythagorean origin. 42 Vide Ciceron. de Oratore, i. and Proclus in Euclidem, 50, 217
;
presented to be, with special refer ence to the a#?7 T&V Kvfiuv. For
mathematical passages in his writ

ings, the reader
ii.
as one of the most important contributors to the advance of mathematical science.

19,
who notices him
Meno
546
sqq.,
43
82
;
87 Timaeus, 35
sq.
may
be referred to
A;
Rep.
sqq.,
viii.
31
53
sqq.
Phavorinus apud Diog. iii. 24, and Proclus, loc. cit. and p. 58, attribute
the invention of analysis and the Both state conic section to him. however, are doubtful ; ments, Proclus 31, gives himself, p. Menjcchmus as discoverer of the conic section. See, however, Ideler
According to Cicero de Finibus, v. 29, 87, he learned from the Priests numeros et ccelestia (so
Yal.
on Eudemus, Abh.
d.
Berl.
Ak.
1828, Hist. Phil. Kl. S. 207, for Phavorinus statement. The tale of his solving the Delian problem (how to double a cube), while at the same time he found fault with the usual mathematical processes, is widely spread. Plut. de Ei. 6,
Max. viii. 7, 3) according to Clemens, Cohort. 46 (cf. Stromata, i. 303 C), he learned geo metry from the Egyptians, astro nomy from the Babylonians, magic from the Thracians (evidently reminiscence of Charmides, 156 D), and the rest from the Assyrians and Jews. Strabo (xvii. 1, 29, p. 806) wr as actually shown the house in
;
386
De Genio
c.
Socratis
viii. 2, 1,
7, p.
7>
Qusest. Conviv.
p.
519 718
Heliopolis where Plato had stayed with Eudoxus for thirteen years (For thirteen, some MSS. of tho Epitome read three, arbitrarily:
!
Marcellus,
:
14; Theo Sinyrn. c. 1. Still, the accounts are very mythical he reduced the problem to the finding two mean propor
tionals
vid. Strabo, ed. Kramer.) Against the whole statement, vid. Diog. viii. 86 sq. Ideler, loc. cit. 191 sq. Plato is said to have stayed at Heliopolis until he induced the
between two given

be correct.
Cf.
lines.
This
may
Euto-
priests to communicate some their astronomical lore to him.
of
At
cius in Archim. de
Sph. et Cyl.
Archim. ed. Torelli,p. 135. Philop. in An. Post. p. 24, 117. (Schol. in Ar. 209 a, 36 b, 21 sq.) Ideler, loc. cit. He is also said to have in vented a time-piece, Athen. iv. 174 c. In the Theeetetus, 147 D gqq., he puts several new arithme
all events, they kept the greater to themselves. Clemens part (Strom, loc. cit. cf. Diog. viii. 90) even knows the names of the priests who taught Plato and Eudoxus. He separates the two latter in
:
time.
Plut. Gen. Socr.
c. 7, p.
518,
gives
him
Simmias
for
a com-
PLATO S LIFE.
44
23
highest degree improbable.

Apuleius, Dogm. Plat. pan ion. 3, and the Proleg. 4, make him learn sacred rites in Egypt, as well as geometry and astronomy. Vide Olyinp. 5 Luean, Pharsalia x. 181. Philostratus, Vila Apollonii 1, 4,
;
In
Sicily, Plato visited

vii.
799; the gravity character of the the re music, ibid. vii. 819 ; gard paid to arithmetic in the he while popular education) blames ethers (loc. cit. ii. 057 A,
ii.
65(31);
and
religious
only speaks of geometry and as tronomy, which Plutarch de I side, c. 10, p. 354, also mentions. Quintilian, 1, 12, 15, speaks indefinitely of the secrets of the priests Diodorus, 1, 98, mentions the laws which Plato, like Solon and had borrowed from Lycurgus, He is here following Egypt. Manetho or some other Egyptian
;
d\X
erepQ.
0<xf
SLV
evpois avr60i.
953 E, if the remarkable words, KaSaytp K.T.\. are really Plato p, he censures the Egyptian cruelty towards On the whole, he is strangers). inclined to disparage the moral condition and mental capacity of the Egyptians, and ascribes to
Specially,
in
xii.
them
authority.
44
not the scientific, but only the industrial character (Hep. iv.
The
external evidence has no
It se. authority per belongs altogether to a time far removed from Plato s, and abounding in arbitrary fictions which derived all Greek wisdom from the East. Some of the oldest legends, as in
435 E; Laws, v. 747 C). This if he were sensible of any great philosophic debt to Egypt and there is really nothing
does not look as
;
Strabo and Diodorus, sound so in

credible
dim
to
and point so plainly to Egyptian sources, that we

r
cannot attach the slightest w eight them. There is no historic probability that Plato borrowed anything of importance from the Egyptians (vide pt. 1, p. 31 sqq.). And if we seek traces of the alleged Egyptian influence in Plato s doc
system to point to Egyptian Throughout, his philo sophic attitude appears independent of any but Greek influences the mathematical element in him is most nearly connected with Pythaand Arist. goreism (cf. p. 301,
sources.
: ;
in his
Metaphysics,
1,
C,
init.);
his re
ligious references are confined to the Greek cultus ; his politics find their illustration only in Greek
and writings, we find pretty nearly the opposite of what, accord to those later traditions, we ing
trines
might expect. He certainly shows some knowledge of Egypt (Polit. -T.-J he makes C, Pbscdr. 274 C)
;
once of an Egyptian myth (Phaedr. loc. cit.) he derives another, really of his own inven tion, from Egypt, while he enlarges on the great antiquity of Egyptian
use, perhaps,
;
and Greek circumstances. the separation of classes in the Republic, as will be shown in its place, is not to be explained as an imitation of the Egyptian casteIndeed, the most marked system. feature in the Egyptian constitu the priestly rule, is altogether tion, absent in Plato and in the Politypes
Even
tictis, 290 sqq., with express re ference to Egypt, he very decidedly Cf. with the disapproves of it.
legends
sqq. ) ; he praises particular institutions (Laws
(Timie.
preceding Herm.
sqq.,
;
p.
54
p.
sqq.,
112
where there are and my Part i. tions
fuller
quota
sq.
25

the court of Dionysius the elder. 45 But in spite of his close intimacy with Dion, 46 he gave great offence there 47 by his plain speaking, and the tyrant in wrath deli
vered up the troublesome moraliser to the Spartan
ambassador
Pollis,
by
whom
he was exposed for
sale in
the slave-market of ./Egina. Eansomed by Anniceris, 48 a Cyreniaii, he thence returned to his native city.
45
Of
this there can really be
no
All our authorities are unanimous on the point, and Plato himself, in drawing the picture of the tyrant (Pep. viii. fin. ix.
init.),
doubt.
nelius Nepos, x. 2 (with whom, in the main, Diodor. xv. 7 agrees), says that Dionysius invited Plato
seems to be speaking from per sonal experience of what he de
from Tarentum at Dion s request. 46 Vide the places quoted specially the 7th Platonic letter.
This, of course, is as little trust worthy as any of the other letters but it shows that Dion was gene
rally assumed to have stood close relations with Plato. his alleged services to him,
IS
;
The circumstances of the are variously given. in quite ancient times, a find, calumnious story to the effect that
scribes.
visit
We
in
For
cf.
it
was the
Sicilian kitchen
which
326 B (Of. Ep. sq; Apul. Dogm. Plat. 4; Thec. mistius, Orationes, 23, 285 Aristides, Orationes 46 de quatuor viris, T. 301, Dind. Lucian, Parasite, 34; Olymp. 4; Diog. iii. 34 ; vi. 25, &c. We find a similar
cuse.
;
attracted the philosopher to Syra

Plat.
vii.
epos, Plutarch, Cic. de or.

sq.,
iii.
34,
139, and pp. 288

47
300, 3.
Thus much
more
is
The
detailed
probably correct. accounts in
account in Pbilostr.
v-n-ep
Plut., Diog., Olymp., loc. cit., appear to be mere arbitrary colour of the main fact. The anec ings dotes about Plato s meetings with
v.
Apoll.
)
1,
35,
TT\OVTOV 2i/ceXt/coO.
The usual
;
account is that he went to see the volcano (Diog. iii. 18 Apul. 4

;
Olymp. 4
Prolog. 4
Hegesander
the seventh
Aristippus (referred by many to this period) are equally uncertain. Vide supra, 291, 2, 312, 2. 48 Here too there is a great diver to sity in the accounts.
ap. Athen. xi. 507 b
According
Platonic letter
is less definite,
326
and Plut. Dion. 4, follows it, in saying that chance or some Divine guidance brought him to Sicily). According to Diog., Dionysius accord obliged Plato to visit him ing to Plutarch, it was Dion who introduced Plato to his brother-inlaw. Olymp. says that he sought out the tyrant uninvited, to induce
; ;
Diodorus xv. 7, Dionysius sold the philosopher in the Syracusan slave his friends market, for 20 minze freed him, and sent him to a friendly country. Diogenes, 19 sq.,
;
authority, says that Dionysius was at first disposed to put Plato to death, but was dis
on
Phavorinus
suaded by Dion and Aristomenes and only delivered him to Pollis to

Bell.
Pollis took
in
him
to
him
to lay
down
his power.
Cor
and there,
^gina
accordance with u
PLATO S
Plato seems
LI I
! :.
25
now
to
have made
his
first
formal
-appearance as a teacher.
Socrates,
Following the example of

intelligent youths in the
he, too, first chose
who had sought out
Gymnasia and other public

as the scene of his labours a
places,
gymnasium, the Academy, he subsequently withdrew into his whence, however, own garden, which was adjacent. 49 Concerning his
decree of the people, Plato would have been executed, as being an Athenian, but was allowed, as a favour, to be sold instead. Diogenes
adds, that
journey.
Dion or other
;
friends
wished
repay Anniceris his this he expenses, 20 or 30 minse refused to take, but bought with
to
for use, the garden in it, the Academy, the price of which is given in Plutarch (de exilio 10 S.
in the second Gottling, Geschichtlichen Abhandlungen 1, 369, endeavours to free Dionysius from the guilt of the sale but his arguments, doubtful in themselves, are hardly in accord with Plutarch s state
whole
occurrence
ment.
in
Plato
There is no real certainty any of the various versions of

;
the affair
(Plato
s
cf.
Steinhart
critique
603) as
3000 drachma? (30 mina;).
So Heraclitus, Alleg. Homer C. 74, Plutarch himself (Dion 5, S. 150. cf. de tranquillitate animi 12, 471), and an account in Olympiodorus
in
Leben, 151 sqq.). 49 cf. Herm. Diog. iii. 5, 7. 41 121 sq., who makes the necessary remarks on the statements of
;
say that when incurred Dionysius enmity his friends hurried him away on board the ship with which
Gorg.
164,
Plato
had
Olymp. c. 6, and the Prolog, c. 4. According to ^lian, iii. 19, it was after his third Sicilian journey that he withdrew for some months into
his garden, being dislodged
totle
;
by Aris
Pollis
sailed
to
Greece
if
(this
is
scarcely
credible,
Sparta
Athens were then at war). sius had given Pollis secret orders to kill Plato, or sell him and to
;
and Diony
effect
brought him to ^gina. Tzetzes, Chil. x. 995 sq., has a wonderful version Plato was bought by Archytas from Pollis, and then instructed in the Seneca Pythagorean philosophy.
this
Pollis
manifestly false. JElian again, ix. 10, and Porphyry, De Abstinentia 1, 36, tell us that the Academy was reputed to be unhealthy, but that Plato refused to move from it for the sake of longer It could net, however, have life.
which
is
been very bad for Plato, Xenocrates, and Polemo lived to a good Hieron. adv. Jovin. ii. in it. age
;
(ep. 47, 12, Inst. iii. 25,
and apud Lactant. 15 sq.) mentions the transaction, while he blames An niceris for only having paid 8000 sestertii 20 minse for a Plato. Olympiodorus, 4, actually puts the
Mart., actually thinks that Plato betook himself to the un healthy spot, nt cura et assiduitate
203,
morborum
;
libidinis
impetus fran-
geretur judging the philosopher rather too much by his own ex
So too Êneas of Gaza, Theophr. ed. ISarth, p. 25.

perience.
26

;
manner of instruction tradition tells us nothing 50 we consider how decidedly he expresses himsel against the rhetoricians who made long speeches, bu
if
knew
them
;
neither
51
how
to ask questions nor
how
to answei
and how low, on the same ground, was his esti mation of written exposition, open to every misunder in. standing and abuse, comparison with the living 52 if we mark the fact personal agency of conversation,
that in his
own works,
a
dialogue
is
the development of thought by from which in his long literar} law,
career he allowed himself not a single noteworthy de we can scarcely doubt that in his oral teach parture,
ing he remained true to these main principles. On the other hand, however, we hear of a discourse
on the Good, published by. Aristotle 53 and some of his fellow pupils, and belonging to Plato s later years. Aris
54 totle himself mentions discourses on Philosophy; and that these were not conversations, but in their general character at any rate continuous is witnessed
discourses,
partly by express testimony, partly by their inter nal evidence, which can be taken in no other way.
Olymp. 6 has not the value of a witness, and can lead us to no concltision of any moment. 51 Prot, 328 E sqq, 334 C sqq. ; Gorgias 449 B.
_
:
55
statement of Aristoxenus (on

totle s
An*
authority), Hannonirc Elementa, ii. p. 30, and this work Part ii. b. 48. 2, 771, d. 2.
1, (Schol. in Aristot. 551, 19); Ihiloponus Ue Anima C, are given by Brandis, ])e
(I
MCS
references on this point, from Simplicity, Physiea 32 b, 104, 117 Alexander on the Metaphy;
S?** ; Ihe
11
275
sq
27G
b. 2,
De Anima i. 2, 204 b. 18 ; on the Question whether the AristoteHan books (and consequently the Platonic discourses) on the Good were identical with those on philosophy, or not, vide Brandis loc. cit. 5 sq. Gr. E. Phil, ii b 1 84
;
54
perditis
sq.
A.istotelis
de ideis et de To the Bono, p. 3 sq., 23 sqq. tame treatise may be referred the
libris
Aristot.
loc.
cit.
calls
them
d Kp6a<ns,
ov<ria.
Simpl.
\6yoi
and
cw
PL A TO S LIFE.
there
27
are many portions of the Platonic Also, system which from their nature could not well be imparted conversationally, (it is most probable, therefore, that
made use of both while the supposition must be admitted that as in his writings, so in his verbal instruction, question
Plato, according to circumstances,
forms
.and answer gave place to unbroken exposition, in pro portion, partly to the diminished vivacity of increasing years, partly to the necessary advance in his teaching,
from preparatory enquiries to the dogmatic statement of his doctrine in detail) That, side by side with the communications intended
for the
narrower circle of his friends, he should have given other discourses designed for the general public, is not 56 It is more credible that he likely. may have brought
his writings into connection with his
spoken instruction,
and imparted them

to their memories. 57
>
to his scholars
by way of stimulus
On
;
this point, however,
we
are
Diog. iii. 37 (vide note 4) docs not warrant such a conclusion the reference there seems to be to a On the prelection in the school. other hand Themist., or. xxi. 295 I), tells us that Piato once delivered a discourse which a large audience ilocked to hear from Athens and the country. When,
however, he came to the doctrine ot the Good, the whole assembly, to Plato s usual hearers, disXo doubt this is only an persed.
matics, astronomy, and finally of the One Good. PJato certainly would not expound the most ideal part of his system to a miscellaneous concourse of hearers, as
Themistius imagines; and, apart from that, with his views as to the
conditions of any fruitful study of philosophy, and his low estimate of mere popular display speeches, he is hardly likely to have troubled himself with giving discourses to
down
arbitrary expansion of
tox.
Joe.
cit.
what Aris-
people who had not requirements.

57
fulfilled
his
on Aristotle s Authority, thr.t the majority of Plato s disciples were greatly astonished, in the discourse on the Good, to hear, not of things usually considered good, but of mathetells
Cf. Phsedr. 270 I). Instead of other amusement, a man might write books, cavr$ re uTrtynoâra ei s rb \ridrjs 6rj<Ta.vpi6/j.ti>os, ITOJTCU, Kal travrl rif ravrbv
7??/>as
tai>
s Atcrt6j/Tt.
28
PLAIO AND THE OLDER ACADEMY.

58
Plato doubtless combined entirely without information. with intellectual intercourse that friendly life-in-com
mon
to
Socratic circle
which he himself had been accustomed in the and the Pythagorean Society. With a
little
it
philosopher so
of
moral endeavour,
life.
able to separate philosophic from might be expected that community
knowledge would naturally grow into community of In this way he appears to have joined his scho lars at stated intervals in social repasts. 59 There can be no doubt, from what we know of his sentiments on the subject, 60 that his instructions were altogether gra tuitous and if, on certain occasions, he accepted pre sents from some of his rich friends, 61 there is no reason
;
The tale given by Diog. 37, from Phavorinus, that at the read ing of the Phsedo all present, ex
cept Aristotle, gradually withdrew, is highly improbable. Philosophic interest and respect for the master cannot have been so scanty, even in Plato s inferior scholars, as to allow of anything of the kind, least of all at the delivery of such a masterpiece. Besides, at the time when Aristotle was Plato s pupil, the Phsedo must have been long published.
547, d. sqq., quoting Antigonus Carystius, tells with some censure of the extrava gance introduced by Lycon the Peripatetic at certain meals held on the first day of each month, to which the scholars contributed.
xii.
69
58
irepl
nXdrawa
0f<rt/ccDs
/cat
ETrcvcrnnroi
dXX
IVa 0cuVwj rcu /cat TO

/cat
dXX^Xots
ir\ei<TTOv
fjLevoi
Kdi TO
evexev
0tXoXo7tas. It would appear from this that monthly banquets of the Muses were an institution of the
/cat
Academy, and with them we may connect the well-known tale about the general Timotheus, who, after a meal with Plato, said, With such company one need fear no headachesto-morrow. (Plat, de sanitate tuenda9, p. 127; Qurest.Conv.vi. proem.; Athen. x. 419 c.; JElian, V. H. ii. At all 18, from the same source.) events, Athen. loc. cit. says, as of
Athenseus
something well known, r6 v A/caand so again i. 4d-rj/uiig. (rv/JLTr6(noi>,

E, iv T( HXdrajj/os crucrcrtrta;. To what new Pythagorean, however,
They were connected with sacrifices

to the
he
Muses.
Athen. continues,
ou
rrjs
yap
iVa crvppvtvTes
rb avro
ws TOU dpdpiov
diro\a.ixrucrti>,
irefts
yevofj-tvys rpa% x&P<- v efrivias

ol
iroi-f]ffa.VTo
rd?
vvvbdovs rauras
indebted for the informationsecond passage that thenumber of the guests used to be 28 (4x7) he has not informed us. 60 On which compare Part 1. 888. 61 Anniceris is said to haveis
in the
PLAIO S LIFE.
29
:o conclude that such voluntary offerings were therefore customary among his disciples in the Academy. Plato s sphere of work seemed to him to be limited
"
to this intellectual
f
and educational
activity,
more and
more, as experience deepened his conviction that in the then state of Athens, no diplomatic career was compat
ible
with the principles he held. 62 The desire, however, that it might be otherwise was none the less strong in
;
him G3 and that he had not abandoned the hope of somehow and somewhere gratifying this desire is proved by his two great political works, which are designed
:
not merely to set forth theoretical ideals, but at the same time to exert a regulative influence on actual con ditions. Consequently though he, as little as his great
master, himself wished to be a statesman, both

.
may
bought
for him the garden in the Academy, Dion defrayed the ex-
(3or)deiai>
&v,
d\X
uff-rrep ets
|
,
the purchase of the penses for writings of Philolaus and equipping a chorus (supra 24, 48 - (i. ;;s; 4, Not one of these 5). accounts is sufficiently established, the two first only on feeble evidence. The statement of the 13th Plat, Let. 3G1 sq. is quite worthless. 62 Cf. p. 13. Of the illustra tions given there, only the most apposite, Uep. vi. 49G C, need be here. In the present conSuoted of society, says Plato, few ition ever succeed in devoting themselves
for
;
WV, OVT iKavos &v eis Traviv dypiois avrtt^,
irpiv
re.
TI
TTJV
Tr6\
Trpoa.7ro\6/J.vos /cat TO?S fiXXots
&v yfroiro,
TO.VTO. TTOLVTO.
\oyi<rfj.(^ \&{i<!bv 4)OVXJUa> t
Zx^v Kal
Xti.lJ.CovL
TO, O.VTOV
irpaTTUV, olov tv
/cat
Kovioprov
01X775
vn6
TTvev/j.a.TOs
(pepo/Jifrov
VTT&
Tfiîov
et
/cat
aTrocrrcij,
bpuv TOVS &\\ov$ /caradvo/JLias,
Trifj.TT\a/JL^vovs
dyairq.^
Try
63
ai)ros
/caâpis
rot,
is
ddiKlas
re
/c.r.X.
dvofflwv
tpyuv
/Stwa-crai.
AXXa
the
:
rejoinder,
to
to Philosophy and remaining true to her. Kat TOVTUV drj T^V oXiyuv oi
yev6fj.evoi nai yevcrd/j-fvoi
loc. cit., ou
izdfjLevos
rd eXa^tora af dtairpa-
aTraXXdrrotro
which
fjLaKdpiov TO KTTJfj.a, /cat a.Z t/ca^ws iSovres TTJV p,avLav, /cai6rt

oi)oets
wy ijdu /cat r&v TroXXuu

eitreiv
(Socrates replies, ovdeye rd neyio-ra, ev fir] rv)(_<j0v iro\iTeias Trpoo"t]KOV(n>]S
ydp
Trpoo"r)KOv<7r)
avrds re
TUIV
[taXXov
idl&v
oi Stv
vyits
us
^?roy
/cat
fj-erd
rd
sq.
vepl Td
TUV iroXeuv Trpdrrct

fj.ed
o5
iiri
ovcrei.
Cf. ibid. v.
473
i>IJ.fj,axos
OTOV rts luv
30

64
;
certainly be credited with the
men
aim of forming
states
cir-
and
if
he repudiated
said of a
political activity in
G It has truly been ^ series of men who
Parrhon
and
distinguished
themselves by their political ac tivity that they came out of the

Platonic
in
school.
appears to have con nected himself), the first of whorr

is
whom Pytho
Heraclides,
with
However, even
antiquity, the opinions as re gards the political character of this school were very divided; and if the admirers of Plato like Plutarch adv. Col. 32, 6, sqq. p. 1126, bring into connection with him as pupils as many as possible of the greatest statesmen of his time, not seldom exceeding the bounds of historical fact, it cannot be expected that adversaries like Athenasus xi. 508,
d. sqq.,
known as the speaker and agent of King Philip ( c f. Steinhart, Life of Plato 195, 322, 16); both are cited as Platonists by Diogenes iii. 46. It must be from a confusion with the above-mentioned Heraelides, that
Demetrius of Magnesia according Diogenes v. 89 assigned ^the murder of a tyrant to

to
same
have
Heraclides Ponticus, who bore the name. Besides these we
and his predecessors,
will
be precise about their evidence for the statement that the majority of the Platonic pupils were Tvpa.vvt.Koi
rives
Chip (the supposed writer of a letter in the Epist. Socrat.) and Leonides, who perished in the murder of the tyrant Clearchus of Heraclea (Justin xvi.
5,
Kal
didfioXoi.
loc, cit.
Plutarch
whom
According to Dion (concerning

24,
third
a.
Memnon
KXtapxos, who adds to them as a Antitheus; opposed to this
Suidas,
vide
to
pp.
46,
32
sq.)
belonged together with Aristonymus, Phormio (Plu tarch Prrecepta. Keip. 10,
s pupils,
Plato
ger.
and Menedomus, who respectively gave laws to the Arcadians, Eleans, and Pyrrhgeans (Menedemus is mentioned by the contemporary comedian Epicrates in Athenseus,
connection with Plato and Speusippus, in Plutarch Sto. Rep. 20, 6, p. 1043 in connection with Xenocrates) ; further Delius of Ephesus (called in Phi ostratus.
59,
d.
15)
ap. Phot. Cod. 224, p. 225, 10 sqq., says that Lysimaclms killed him and his brother, because they had murdered their mother) ; Euphraens of Oreos (Suid. about whose influence at the court
Ei)0/>.)
of^Perdiccas
epist. v.
(to
whom
the Plat,
506, E),
recommends him). Athen(loc. cit. cf.
oeus
it
js true
in
Vit. Soph.
3, p. 485 through a pen At as), who under Alexander was the Philip active promoter of the expedition against Persia, together with Pytho and Heraclides of îios, the murderers of the Thracian king Cotys (Arist. Polit. v. 10, 1311 b. 20, mentions as such the brothers
1,
slip ôf the
and
according to Antigonus of Karystus, expresses himself very unfavour ably, but who we learn from Demosth. Philipp. iii. p 126 sqq. (by which Athenians account of his death is set right) was a martyr to Grecian liberty; Leo, who as statesman and commander defended
.
his
mother-city Byzantium against
Philip. (Plut. Phoc. 14, Philostr. Vit. Soph. 1, 2. Suidas
AeW)
Hermias, prince of Atarneus, the well-known friend of Aristotle

(Diog.
59,
p.
v. 3,
610.
5 sqq. Strabo xiii. 1, Diodor. xvi. 52,
PLATO* 8 LIFE.
umgfcances
r
31
lie
which he considered hopeless, 65 there was, at same time, nothing in his principles to keep him
Arum. 1, 5. Suidas Part ii. b. 1(5 sqq. 2nd Besides these Diog. iii. 46,
and later on Xeno crates (Plut. Phocion, 4, adv. Col. 32, 6) ; with regard to the latter,
heard Plato,
however, he must have confined himself to being present at isolated
discourses.
)ionys. ep. ad.
Zpfdas.
Jit.).
:
1:
of Lampsacus and imolaus of Cyzicus, both of whom ccording to Athenae. 508 sqq. (who alls the one Euagon and the other imams) made unsuccessful atientions"Eu?eon
.
Though Chameleon
in Diog.
iii.
and Polemo
sent
46 repre
11
empts to usurp tyrannical power Athenaeus their respective cities

;
dds to them Charon of Pellene as no of the profligate tyrants who ame out of the school of Plato
rid
i-e
t-
Hyperides and Lycurgus (of whom also the PseudoPlutarch vitze decem. Orat. vii. p. 841 makes the same assertion) as
the
orators
Xenocrates, with what justice do not know. According to

loc.
cit.
pupils of Plato, their speeches (as Steinhart remarks, Plato s Life, 174 sqq.) show no proofs of the
influence of Platonic thought
and
Uhenreus
allippus,
)ion,
Diog.
also,
the
46, murderer of
iii.
expression.
Still less
can we claim
of
Êschines
(with the
falsa
was a scholar of
;
Plato,
which
for a pupil scholiast on
Pinto
^sch. de
is opposed by the Plat. 333 C Plut. Dion, 34. The Clearchus mentioned above,
tatemeut
pist. vii.
.ccording to
KXtapx-, atended the Academy only a short irae. It is very improbable that habrias was a student of the
Suidas
...
Academy (Plut. adv. Col. 32, 6, cf. seudo-Ammon, vita Arist. p. 10, Vest., who makes him out a relaion
of
Plato
in
s).
The
iii.
\6-yos ^lato
rial is
Diog.
stood
account 23 sq.)that
at his
alone
by him
worth
little
historically, as
(
who appeals to i., Phalereus, compare and Apollon. Vit. JHsch. p. 14) though Demosthenes, his great is stated, variously adversary, sometimes with greater and some times with less precision, to have been a pupil of Plato, still, how ever, in his orations no influence of Platonic philosophy appears, as may have been significant Plato s influence on him as a accord stylist. (Plut. Demosth. 5, ing to an anonymous writer in
legat.
Demetrius
Vrist. Rhetor, iii. 10, 1411, p. 6, nentions another defender of haand the defence which in Diog. is put in the mouth of Plato from the )bviously originated Apology, 28 K. Timotheus (Êlian, ^ria Hist. ii. 10, supra 28, 59) it s true was proved to be a friend but his jy no means a pupil of Plato elation to him cannot at all have jeen so intimate as Ps.-Ammon
>rias;
Hermippus,
844.
vita)
orat. viii. 3, p.
Mnesistratus in Diog. iii. 47. Brut. 31, Cic. de Orat. i. 20, 80. 121; Orat. iv. 15; Off. i. 4; Lucian, Quintil. xii. 2, 22, 10, 24 Encomium Demosthenis, 12, 47 Schol. in Demosth. contra Androt.
; ;
40;
does
Olympiod.
not
in
Gorg.
to
!<;
>.)
The 5th
letter attributed
him
to
make Demosthenes
oc.
in
cit.
would have
it.
Phocion
his
younger
days
may have
to speak as a Platonist. but only of the express his good opinion Platonic school, under which ho
PLATO AND THE OLD Ell ACADEMY.

back from
it,
should there arise a favourable opportu
66 Such an oppor nity for the realization of his ideas. tunity seemed to offer after the death of the elder Dio67
nysius,
when Dion,
the younger,
and, at his instigation, Dionysiu; invited him pressingly to Syracuse. 6

Athenian, and particularly so spoken a friend of Sparta as Plate undoubtedly was, to lay down new constitution. The absurd lltl Platonic letter cannot come unde
th<
obviously does not include himself. 175 sqq. Cf. Steinhart loc. cit.
,
1
280 sqq. and Schiifer, besides the authorities mentioned
Demosth.
1,
above, particularly
Hermann,
Plat.
74
sq.,
119
With 189. of Isocrates
Steinhart, 171regard to the relations

sq.
with Plato we shall speak later on (p. 345, 2, 2nd edit.). No one represents him as his pupil, as he was eight or nine years older than Plato, and their friendship
asserted in Diog. iii. 8, is estab lished only for the earlier years of their lives by the writings of both.
consideration as historical evi dence. Plato himself lays it down a: a necessary condition, that phi should not withdraw losophers
(i(i
from
duty
politics.
is
The
corresponding
an immediate consequence And that this duty should onlj be binding with regard to one own state, would hardly be {
maxim with one
Âccording
to
Plutarch,
i.
principem ineruditum,
p.
Lucullus, Êlian, V. H. xii. 30, the people of Gyrene (beside whom Diog. iii. 23 and M\. V. H. ii. 42, give the Arcadians and Thebans at the founding of Mega lopolis) asked him for a scheme of laws but he refused both, in the former case because Gyrene was too luxurious for him, in the latter
2
;
;
Ad by his political ideal as Plato. ^ This happened 01. 103, 1, 779

;
so fully possessec
ai
the beginning of the winter, am therefore 368 B.C. Diodor. xv 73 sq. Plato s journey must assigned to the following year Cic. de Sen. 12, 41 (with which cf
b<
i. p. 244, 3) dates it, or at al. j events, according to Fin. v. 29 87, the first journey. 405 A.U.C.,
1
Part
because he perceived taov

OdXovTas, ov
TT]V iaovoîav.
Trelffeiv
êw
ov
auroi)s
last
Ti/j,dv
which needs no refutation, 8 Ep. Plat. vii. 327 B ii. 311 E; iii. 316 G sq.
"
sqq.:
;
Plut.
4,
The
for is^vcry improbable,
statement Plato would
Dion, 10
6, p.
sq. (cf. c. princ.
Phil.
779),
who adds
in
without doubt have

cratic as they
given
them
thagoreans
entreaties
that the PyItaly joined their

s.
a constitution just as little demo gave themselves; and moreover it is incredible that
the vic tory of Leuctra promoted the founding of Megalopolis for the of Arcadia protection against Sparta, should have invited an
after
to
Dion
3, is all
Gf.
Gorn.
7th not
Nep., Dion, C Platonic letter
&c.
The
certainly
Epaminondas, who
the following trustworthy, and ones depend on it. What other sources of information Plutarch may have had we do not know. That Plato, however, did make a
PLATO S LIFE.
Could this potentate indeed be won over to Philosophy and to Plato s political beliefs (and of this Plato, or at any rate Dion, appears certainly to have indulged a 69 hope), the most important results might be expected to follow, not only in his own kingdom, but in all Sicily and Magna Gratia, indeed throughout the Hel lenic states. Meanwhile the event too
insufficiently this hope was founded. Plato arrived in Syracuse, the young Prince received
soon,
how
proved, only
When
him most
shortly
politely,
in the philosopher
and and
at first
showed
lively interest
70
his
endeavours;
became weary of these serious conversations, and when his jealousy of Dion, which was not entirely groundless, had led to an open rupture with that states man, and at length to the banishment of the latter, Plato must have been from the glad to
escape
painful
position in
but he very
home. 71
second
bicily
which he found himself, by a second return Nevertheless, after some years, at the renewed
a
third
and
cannot
journey
to
be
doubted.
The
accomplished
occasion
on
that
particular
estimony is unanimous; and if he Diogenes counter-statement had not taken the journey, the iii. 21, that he asked Dionysiiw composer of the letter would have for land and people towards the had no reason for defending him realisation of \l state, ? certlinly on that score. That his motives false. Apul. dogm PI 4 is a were Actually those ascribed to misunderstanding. him is probable in * More detailed and itself, information made more so by the whole but of doubtful worth politimay be ca situation; and this is borne found in Pint. Dion 13 Do Aduput by the passage in the Laws, latione 7, p. 52, 20, p. 67- Pliny iv. :09Lsqq, in which Hermann, Natural History vii.30 vEl p. 09, rightly recognises an H. iv. 18 New* loc cit expresTl,, the hopes which led fiato alleged meeting jumot Iheae hopes, he Syracuse Aristippus at thS Syracusan Court 8 ha ve not f lcd h;ls been already discussad, Part i in ro^ IT" their , n regard to f universal foun312 3 pp. 291 2 ;ion, even though they were not Plat. iii. 229 B Ep.
,
ofPll ^d
"
"
sqq.,
iii.
I)
34

and entreaties of
his friends,
solicitations of the tyrant
he resolved upon yet another voyage to Sicily. His immediate aim was doubtless to attempt a reconciliation between Dion and Dionysius 72 to this may have linked
;
new political hopes the turned out so unfortunately that undertaking, however, Plato was even in considerable danger from the mis
themselves more
distantly,
:
trust of the passionate prince, and only evaded it by the intervention of the Pythagoreans, who were then at the head of the Tarentine state. Whether, after his
71
73
return,
Dionysius,
318
iii.
he approved of Dion s hostile aggression on we do not know ; 75 but for his own part, from
Dion
C
21
Plut.
sq.
The
14, 16 Diog. latter assigns to

;
this
journey what,
according
to
better authorities, happened in the third ; and he therefore puts an incident in the first, which Plu tarch relates of the second. Cf.
also
Syracuse according to Diog., Xenocrates. He is said to have left the conduct of his school at Athens during his absence to Heraclides. (Suidas, voc. Hpa;
/cAe/Sijs.)
The
Epistolse
Hera-
clidis,
Stobseus, Florilegium, 13, 36,
quoted there by Ast, and even by Brandis the former in

PI.
who, however, connects with it a circumstance generally told of Dionysius and Aristippus. 72 Dion, who appears in the two previous journeys as Plato s enthu
siastic admirer, had, according to Plutarch, Dion 17, become still more intimate with him during a long stay at Athens, in the course of which he also became a close
Leben
u. Schr. p. 30, the latter

ii.
Gh.-Ptom. Phil.
exist.
a.
145
do not
quotation is due to a misunderstanding of Tennemann s Suidas words, Plat, Phil. i. 54 ; in Heraclides Epistol. (Platonicse
p. 73 (Bipont.). According to Ep. vii. 350 B 345 D) this must be dated (cf. p, in the spring of 360 K.C., for he is said to have met Dion at the Olympic games (which can only be those of the year named) and in formed him of events in Syracuse. His hither journey would then be
ii.
The
sc.} 74
friend of Speusippus. 73 Ep. Plat. iii.

vii.
;
316 D sqq. ; 330 B 33 D 337 E sqq. and from these sources Plutarch, Dion 18-20 Maximus Tyrius, Dis; ; ; ;
;
Kertationes xxi. 9 Diog. 23. The are uncertain the particulars letter of Archytas ap. Diog. 22 is
361.
75
Cf.
Herm.
p. 66.
certainly spurious. According to Plut. c. 22 (cf. Ep. Plat. ii. 314 D)
Speusippus
accompanied
him
Plutarch, adv. Col. 32, 6, p 1126. Cic. de Orat. iii. 34, 139, and JEIian, V. H. iii. 17, represent the impulse as coming from Plato.
to
But
this is
an exaggerated
infer-
PLATO^ LIFE.
35
this time, having now attained his seventieth year, he seems to have renounced all active interference with
70
politics.
The
77
activity of his intellect, however, con
tinued
amidst
the
reverence
till
of
countrymen
and
his death, 78 which, after a foreigners, and peaceful old age, 79 is said to have overtaken happy him at a wedding feast. 8u
unabated
from Ep. Plat. vii. 326 E. Ep. iv. Dion found warm sup port from .Speusippus and other
ence
Cf.
Diogenes, 25,
and what
will
be
presently remarked on the exten sion of the Platonic school.

78
His Platonists, Plut, Dio. 22, 17. companion and subsequent enemy, Callippus, is noticed as a scholar
of Plato s (vide p. 31).
"
Of
his literary
works
this is
expressly witnessed (vid. supr. p. 3, and Diog. 37; Dionys. comp. verb. p. 208 Quint, viii. 6, 64 on
;
xi. Athenseus, 506, indeed says that he was intimate with
on,
As
Archelaus of Macedonia, and later paved the way for Philip s supremacy so that we might infer his sympathies to have been in general with the Macedonian party.
:
which however cf. Susemihl, Gen. Ent. 11, 90 sq.). And we may safely conclude that it was the same with his activity as teacher.
The
alleged
work
cussed
by
interruption of his Aristotle will be dis later in the life of that
regards Archelaus, however, the statement is refuted by chrono logy, and by the Gorgias, 470 and the alleged support of sq.
Philip narrows itself down, even on Athenzens s own quotations, to the circumstance that Plato s scholar Eophrseus had obtained for Philip a certain territory from Perdiccas, and this Philip used for the fur therance of greater designs. Any personal intercourse between Plato and Philip there does not seem to have been. M\. V. H. iv. 19, cer tainly says that Philip paid honour
to Plato, as to other learned men ; but, according to Speusippus ap.
philosopher. 79 Cicero, de Senect. 5, 13. Hermippus ap. Diog. iii. 2. Augustine, C. D. viii. 2. Suid. voc. n\dr. Cicero s scribens est mortuus, loc. cit., is not at variance
*
with this latter, if we remember that it need not be taken literally. According to Diog. 40, a certain Philo had used the proverbia
expression ITXarui/os
that Plato died of
<f>9etpla<ns,
00e~/>es;
and
this
Myronianus concluded from

is
as
it
Athen.
loc. cit.,
and Diog. 40, he

unfavourably
expressed about him.

77
himself
said Pherecydes and others did. this is false. Perhaps the expression comes originally from the place in the Sophist, 227 B ; or the passage may at least have given a handle to the
Of course
story.
As
(besides what has been quoted, p. 32, 65, and about his relation, to Dion and
Cf.
to Plato s burial,
monu
.
ment, and will, vide Diog. iii. 25, 41 sqq. Olymp. 6; Pausan. 1, 50, ::
llerm. p. 125,
1
(
Dionysius)
J7.
D2
3i5

Even
in antiquity, the character of Plato
was the
subject of
less
many
calumnies.
81
poets which have
come down and concern the philosoper more than enough,

;
jests of the comic 82 are indeed harm to us
The
the
other reproaches, for the 83 that the life silencing of which Seneca s apology
man
but there
are
of a philosopher can never entirely correspond with
his doctrine,
is
scarcely sufficient.
On
the one hand,
he
accused of connections, which, if proved, would 84 on the for ever throw a shadow on his memory; other of unfriendly, and even of hostile behaviour
is
towards
several
of
his
fellow
85
disciples.
He
has
81 One of these critics of Plato wasTimeeus the Locrian, Plut. Nic. 1 two others we shall meet with in Aristoxenus and Theopompus,
;
the
this
pupils
of
way, retaliated
of Plato Isocrates
and and Rhetoric of. Dion. De prsec. Hal. ep. ad Pomp. p. 757 Hist. 782; Athen. xi. 508 c. Eplct.
: ;
Isocrates, who, iu for the attacks the Platonists on
hand, Suidas, p. 3000, ed. Gaisforci, affirms that he never entered into But this, any sexual relations. again, can only be a dogmatic invention, originating with the asceticism of later schools. 85 The only hostility that can be
Diss. 11, 17, 5.

8ii.
demonstrated, however, is between Antisthenes and Plato; vide Part i. Antisthe 255, and supra, p. 18, 31 nes is allowed on all hands to have
.
Ap. Diog.
c. sq.
;
iii.
59
83
81
xi.
20 509 c.
;
sq.
Athen.
iv.
Vitabeata, 18, 1. Vide Diog. 29 ^lian, V. H. 21; Athen. xiii. 589 c., and
;
Even supra, p. 8, 8. here called his favourite
Dion is and an
been the aggressor, and always to have displayed the greater vehe mence and passion. The assertion that Plato behaved ill to Êschincs has been discussed, Part i. p. 107, 6 204, 3; and his alleged neglect of
;
him
p.
epitaph is quoted, which Plato (at the ago of seventy-three) is said to
in Sicily (Diog. ii. 61) tradicted by Plut. de Adul.
is
c.
con
26,
67
He certainly passed censure

;
have composed on his friend, who must have been sixty at least. That Antisthenes alluded to some
amours of Plato s by the title of his Sdtfwi is a mere arbitrary con
The censure of Dicrearjecture. chus ap. Cic. Tusc. iv. 34, 71, is levelled not at his character, but On the other his philosophy.
on Aristippus, vide Part i. p. 242 but it was well merited, and we may well believe there was no love lost between them, even though the anecdotes of their meeting in Syracuse (vide Part i. p. 291, 2) do not tell us much, and the accounts of a certain Hegesander ap. Athen. At all events, xi. 507 b. still less.
PLATO W
also been charged with censoriousness and self-love S(i not to mention the seditions behaviour after the death of Socrates which scandal has laid to his account. 87 His relation with the Syracusau court was early 88 made the handle for divers 80 accusations, such as love of pleasure,
;
90
avarice,
flattery of tyrants
to
yl
;
and
>iog.
his political character
what we do know cannot turn

Plato
s
disadvantage.
assertions
We
get re
cum Xenophonte intercepisse fertur, Berlin, 1811) how little ground there is for such a belief in the writings of either; and the writings are the only real
Platoni
an enmity existing between Plato and Xenophon (Diog. iii. 34; GoJl. N. A. Athen. xi. 504 e.). But any, 5; Bockh has shown (de simultate qua)
peated
of
.
1 ix. 40, taxes Plato with the childish design of buying up and destroying the writings of Democritus. But of this we may un
hesitatingly
acquit
too
him.
may at least credit Plato with the sense to see

;
toxenus witness
is
untrustworthy
Aris a
and we
Most likely the whole authority. story is an invention. Cf. Steinhart, PI. L. 93 sq.
Dionysius ad Pompeium, p. 775^.; Athen. xi. 500 a. sqq.; Antisthenes and Diogenes ap. vi. Diog. 7, 20; Aristides de
quatuorviris.
that a widely spread mode of thought could not be abolished by the burning of a few books. His own distaste for merely material
The accusation
is
may perhaps account for his never mentioning the physicist of Abdera. 87 Hegesander ap. Athen. xi. 507 a. sq. the falsehood of the statements need not be pointed out to any reader of the Phaedo or the
;
ment
science and his general disparage of such studies
on Plato s grounded which cannot be said to justify it, however one-sided many of his judgments may be. The conscious superiority, to which he had a real right, may have been too prominent in particular cases; even disadvantageoiisly so, some
mainly
writings,
Symposium. The dream of Socrates related ibid, is a malicious parody of that mentioned above,
p. 9, 15.
18
The seventh Platonic
letter is
refutation of such charges. According to Diog. iii. 34 ; vi. 25,
Hut this can hardly bear out such accusations as the above. Of the anecdotes given in Plutarch de
adul. c. 32, p.
xiv.
Cf. the quotatimes, for others. lion from Aristotle, Part i. p. 289, 2.
the charges were openly in Plato s lifetime.

19
made even
Vide
iii.
)0
Philpstr.
p. 23, 45. v. Apoll.

9.
1,
35;
Diog.
The
anonymous
70
vi.
33 (Diog.
the
Êlian, V.
;
H.
irrelevant,
untrue; and what Hermippus ap. Athen. xi. 505 d., gives, looks unhistorical too. Aristoxenus apud
40) the first is second certainly
508, and the Florilegium Monacense (Stob. Flor. cd. Meineke,
assertion in Arson. Violet, ed. Katz,
T.
iv. 285), No. 227, that in old age he became avaricious, is of the
same kind.
Seneca, v.
0,
27, 5,
remarks that he was reproached
88
has especially suffered at the hands of those who were 92 Lastly, if we themselves unable to grasp his ideas. he not only, as an author, are to believe his accusers,
respecting allowed himself numerous false assertions but also such indiscriminate quotation his
predecessors,
93
from their works, that a considerable portion of his own more than a robbery from writings can be nothing them. 94 All these complaints, however, so far as we are
for
taking money. Others say (v. supr. Part i. p. 312, 3; and Diog. so even at ii. 81) that he did not do re Syracuse. The seventh letter cognises no reason for defending
mouth xi. 505

91
of
e.
Socrates
;
and
other
507 c. Diog. 35. So he is said to have borrowe d

writings
for
from Philolaus
his
Timams
a work
public
him against the charge.

Diog. vi. 58. Against which it is unnecessary to refer to Plut. Dion 13, 19, and the quotations on
91
and from (v. supr. 20, 38), of Protagoras tor the Re

(Aristox.
37, 57).
Diog.
iii.
and Phav. ap. According to

Praeparatio
Porphyry
ap.
Euseb.
p. 24, 47.
92
The
quotations
xi.
given
sqq.,
by
d.
Athenaeus,
sqq.,
500
e.
508
have but
little
Some are plainly supra, p. 34, 76), or misrepresenta tions ; and the rest, even if true, would not have much reference to
Plato himself.
importance. untrue (vide
Evangelica, x. 3, 24, he is indebted to the same source for his objec Alcimus ap. tions to the Eleatics. Diog. iii. 9 sq., reproached him with having taken the foundations of his system from Epicharmus
:
Theopompus,
On
the other hand,
we may
see from the places quoted, had pp. 29, 62 ; 32, 68, that Plato occasion to explain his political
inactivity
and his relation
to the
With regard thenes, and P>ryso. to Epicharmus, the assertion is shown in groundless, as has been Vol. i. 428 sq. To the statements
of Aristoxenus
Athen. xi. 508 c., said that he borrowed most of his dialogues from Aristippus, Antisap.
younger Dionysius.
And we may
and Theopompus
untrust-
expect to find that both were cast

in his teeth, just as his political idealism and his preference for aristocratic government must neces Of. also sarily have given offence.
no one who knows the
wortbiness of the writers will be inclined to give much weight. The statement of the former (whom his assertions about Socrates already
sufficiently
Hep.
93
v.
472 A, 473 C, E.
the
v. c.
list
characterise,
54,
6,
supra,
is
Cf.
of
;
offences
in
51
sq., 48,
59,
5}
im
the correc Athen. 55, 57-61 tion of which we may spare our selves, together with the absurd about the fictitious complaints speeches which he puts in the
of it ; if true probable on the face at all, it can only have reference

to
the
some unimportant points. And same applies to Theopompus s

(cf.
story
supra, 36, 81), apart from
.PL A
TO X L
?<
/<:.
;;;,
in a position to test
>
them, appear so unfounded that
scarcely a fraction of
95
them
will stand the process of
investigation;
and the
rest are
supported by such
to
affect
weak evidence, that they ought not
that
11
reverence for the character of the philosopher which is certain to ensue from the So perusal of his works.
11
may judged by what he has written, only the very highest opinion can be formed of the To appreciate him correctly, personality of Plato. however, he must be measured by a standard that takes account of his natural disposition and historical
place.
far as a
man
be
Plato was a ((reek, and he was proud of being one. He to a rank and to a the prejudices as belonged family, well as the advantages of which he was content to share. He lived at a time when Greece had touched
life, and was steadily His nature was declining from political greatness. ideal, adapted rather to artistic creation and scientific
.
the highest point of her national
research than to practical action which tendency, nourished and confirmed by the whole course of his life, and the strong influence of the Socratic School, could not fail to be still further his strengthened
;
by
a temperament and such influences might be evolved all the virtues of

political experiences.
the
own
From such
common Socratic element, which

did
to borrow of assertion may _ Porphyry possibly have some basis of truth but it can hardly redound to Plato s discredit. Finally, if Plato vvns indebted to Philolaus for the construction of the elements and other details of physical science in the Timaeus, and for the deductions
Plato
not
need
s
anyone.
as to the limit and the illimitable in the Philebus, we can find no fault with him for this in itself; and in both cases he has sufficiently pointed out his sources in making
a general reference to the Pythagoreany, even if he has not named

Philolaus.
9r>
Vide preceding note,
40
man and a philosopher, but nought of the grandeur of a politician. Plato might desire the very best for his country, and be ready to sacrifice for her sake
a
everything except his convictions but that he should have thrown himself into the turmoil of political life,
:
which he was quite unfitted, that he should have lavished his soul s strength in propping up a constitu 96 tion, the foundations of which he thought rotten,
for
means that he felt to be use stem the torrent of opposing fate, that he, like Demosthenes, should have led the forlorn hope among the ruins of Grecian freedom, would be too much to His province was to examine into State prob-l expect. lems and the conditions of their solution their prac-1
less to
;
that he should have used
he abandoned to others. Thus inner disposition and outward circumstances alike designed him for philosophy rather than statecraft. But even his philosophy had to be pursued differently from that of Socrates, nor could his habits of life exactly resemble his master s. He desired to be true in the main to
tical realization
the Socratic pattern, and by no means to return to the mode of teaching adopted by the Sophists. 97 But aim-
ing as he did at the formation and propagation of a comprehensive system, aphoristic conversation, condi
tioned by a hundred accidental circumstances, was not enough for him he wanted more extensive machinery,
;
cf. ; p. 20, 02 171 sqq. 97 He not took no fees for only his teaching (Diog. iv. 2, and
;
96
Vide supra
11.
latter
p. 888 sq.), but he also censured the form in which the Sophistic doctiine was enunciated (Protaff
828
sqq.
;
Proleg.
314, 4), strongly disapproving of the Sophists conduct in this respect (vide Vol. i.
c. 5, cf. p.
B. sq.
334 C sq. ; Gorg. 449 Cf. Hipp. Min. 373 A.

;
supra, p. 26, 51).
PLATO S
at
LIFE.
41
fo:
ifc
i!c
quiet ; lie wanted hearers follow his enquiries in their entire connection, and devote to them their whole time his ; philosophy was forced to withdraw itself from street and
skilled
labour, intellectual
who would
ket, within the precincts of a school. 98
mar-/
Here
^
ii.
already
were
life
;
Socratic
way
it.
of
many deviations from the many more sprang from Plato s
inclinations, which were generally Simplicity and temperance were indeed t, required by his principles," and are expressly ascribed 100 iffltohmi ; but the entire freedom from wants and
B.
-;own habits
opposed to
and
posses-
tfsions to
which Socrates attained, would not have suited Ja man of his education and circumstances. Himself
he could not deny
lul
;
,:full of artistic taste,
all
worth to
life s
Jexternal adornments
Junreservedly to all life, be so indifferent to the outward, as they who, jnary Ilike Socrates, were satisfied with moral introspection.
I
extending his scientific research reality, he could hardly, in ordi-
by nature, a thorough
Socrates, in spite of his anti-democratic politics, was,/ man of the people: Plato s
per-}
sonality, like his philosophy, bears a
more
j
aristocratic)
Cf Diog. 40
ra
irX<rTa,
tf er6fe 5^
"i
*<u
Plato
indect| saij nofc
K adb nvts 0acrt.

i>
lu 4 3 6 41 )l i Voo v-f fi \ ule the places quoted p. 28, and Diog. 3!. in the game ;
ep<
have disdained a certain amount of luxury in domestic management vi 26 ) some of his (Di were di culed by contemporary comic writers on account of their
"
s>
fine clothes
and
their
36 (attributed to Pythagoras by Hot. Monac. 231), of his pouring the water with which he away meant to quench his thirst, as an
exercise of self-denial.
connection we may notice the doubtfultale in Stoba3us, Flor. 17,
haughty be
xi.
haviour.
544 Bq .) other hand, Seneca ad Helv. 12, 4, says that Plato only had three slaves- his Will in Diog. iii. 42 mentions
five.
(Athena), () n the
5()9-
xii
42
stamp.
to
He loves to shut himself up in his own circle, ward off what is vulgar and disturbing; his interest and solicitude are not for all without distinction, bul
only or chiefly for the elect who are capable of sharing his culture, his knowledge, his view of life. The aris
tocracy of intelligence on which his State rests has dee]: roots in the character of Plato. But precisely to this
circumstance are owing the grandeur and completeness

that
make
As
Plato in his
his character in its particular sphere unique, capacity of philosopher unites the
boldest idealism with rare acuteness of thought, a disposition for abstract critical enquiry with the freshness
of artistic creativeness
;
so does he, as a
man, combine
102 with lively susceptibility severity of moral principles for beauty, nobility and loftiness of mind with tender
ness of feeling, passion with self-control, 103 enthusiasm

for his purpose with philosophic
104
calm, gravity with

105
mildness,
106
dignity
magnanimity with with gentleness. He
human
is
kindliness,
great because he
knew how
-
to blend these apparently conflicting traits

QVTJT&V
An
epitaph in Piog. 43 calls

irpotptpuv
him
fjdei
10;J
<ru(}>poavvri
up as a model of gentleness, IM Cf. the in Part

quotations
286, 9.
105
i.
p.
re diKaiy.
To this belongs the wellknown tale, that Plato asked a

friend to chastise his slave because
by
us,
beautiful instance is giv JElian, V. H. iv. 0.
,,
I
he himself was angry. Another version is, that he said to the slave
hirasclf,
Luckily
or you
for
you, I
am
Heraclides ap. Diog. 2G tellsillsthat in his youth he never allowed himself to laugh immoder-
10(i
would get stripes. Plut. de educatione puerorum, 14, de sera numinis vindicta, 5, p. 10 Sen. de Ira iii. 12, 5; 51. B^log. 38 sq. Stob. Flor. 20, 43,
angry
; ;
57; Flor. Mon. 234. Perhaps it is with reference to this story that Or. 2, 30 d., holds him Themistius,
and Julian, Y. H. iii. 35, says laughter was forbidden in the Old Academy. need not take either of these statements literally, but they show that Plato was regarded as a very serious character. Another instance is given by Seneca,, de Ira ii. 21, 10.
ately
;
We
ito
fic-Ii
unity, to
complement
on
all
other, to develope
opposites by means of sides the exuberance of
is
])owers and capabilities into a perfect harmony, 107 iihout losing himself in their That multiplicity.
iri
loral
beauty and soundness of the whole
life,
which
t:
108 Mato, as a true Greek, requires before all he things, as, if his nature be truly represented in his works.
<or
rought to typical perfection in his own personality. 109 is the picture marred by incongruity of outward
emblance with in ward reality, for his bodily strength and 110 But through-eauty have been especially recorded. ut, the most is striking peculiarity of the
philosopher
hat close connection of his character with his scientific
ims,
which he owes to the Socratic school.
The
aoral perfection of his life is rooted in the clearness of

it is the light of science which dis the mists in his soul, and causes that Olympian perses civility which breathes so refreshingly from his works,
is
understanding
n a word, Plato
fitting
107
is
an Apollo-like nature, and

to
it is
testimony
the impression produced by

Jahn
the statuette, a drawing of which after Braun, Mon. Ined. d.
iii.
Jato
Olympiodorus says (C 6) of and Homer, dvo yap cuVcu

X<?7<H>rou
vxal
(tvi01 -
yeve<r6ai
rravap-
Instit.
7,
had prefixed
to his
edition
of
the
E.g. Kep. iii. 401 sq. ; C. Phileb. 64 A. C_sq.; 60 Cf. also Panretius ap. Cic. use. i. 32, 79, and the verses of
i
Symposium
(the
original has vanished), is the only one which bears his name and displays any likeness. Other supposed
vristotle
1
quoted, ii. 9, 2, 2nd edit. Epict. Diss. i. 8, 13, *oX6s

KCLI
Further iaxvpfcApul. dogm. Plat, 1, arid the notations supra 339, 1, 242, 2, on lato s build and gymnastic dex2nty. Among the portraits of lato (on which see Visconti, IconoU\dTui>
Pionysos. vorinus in Diog. iii. 25 mentions a statue on his tomb by Silanion.
busts of Plato represent Asclepios or the bearded Pha-
f.
According
c. 9, p.
which
5,
to Pint. adul. et amor 53, Plato had high shoulders his affected admirers tried
to imitate, and according to Uiog. a thin clear voice.
raphie grecqne,
i.
169 [228]
sq.),
44
PLATO AND THE OLDER
ACA]>EMY.
himself on his contemporaries, and by his writings o after generations, that many myths should have place
closest union with the him, Pythagoras, go who, in the bright clearness of his spirit, was to th Greeks the very type of moral beauty, proportion, an
like
in the
harmony.
111
111
This view had influence in

celebration
the
birthday feast, and perhaps even in the par ticular date assigned for it vide We find from Diog. supr. 338, 1.
:
of
his
touch his wife before the birth her first child. At the most in
.
(Olymp. Conv. viii.
i.
Prol. 1),
2,
Plut,
Qu.
1,
4: Apul. dogm.
PI. 1,
M\. V. H. x. 21, that even in Speusippus time the tale went that Plato was a son of Apollo. As throwing light on the origin of these stories, Stcinhart (PI. L.
Greek 36, 282) refers to the eultus of heroes, and particularly to the similar stories about Alex
ander; he indeed conjectures that
portant crisis of his life he is sai to have been introduced to Socrato by a significant dream as the swa of Apollo, supra, p. 0, 15. B himself dreamed, just before h death (according to Olymp. Proleg. 2), that he had become swan. may recognise tt theme of all these myths in tl
;
We
8,
was owing to these same stories that people wished to place Plato as a spirit-hero beside the deified
it
for we cannot world-conqueror believe that this legend belongs to the time of Speusippus. I think we are not entitled to deny the
;
Later writers con Phaedo, 85 B. pare him, as Physician of Soul with Apollo s other son, Asclepiu the Physician of the Body. (C Diog. 45 ; the idea can hardly I his own out of his epigram (3 makes an epitaph and the Pro with some additions, an oracle. (),
; (
>lymj
possibility of this especially as the stories about Pythagoras ofler

;
still
closer
parallel
than
(cf.
stories
about Alexander
the Vol. i.
265 sq.). However, it cannot be proved that the further amplifica
was already known according to which a vision had forbidden Aristo to

tion of the myth to Speusippus,
Apolh Probably, however, it had an in dependent origin in the Apollin myth, as a natural symbol for on from whose lips, as from Nestor s flowed forth speech, sweeter thai
honey.
The pleasing story (given in Div. i. 36, 78, Yal. Max. i. 6, ex 3 Olymp. 1), of the bees on Hj mettus feeding the child Plato wit their honey, is brought the Pro by C 2, into connection with a sacr fice to the shepherd god
Ci<
4.",
CHAPTER
.LATO S WHITINGS.
II.
ENQUIRY AS TO THE COMPLETENESS AND GENUINENESS OF OUR COLLECTION.

spirit,
HE most eloquent monument of the Platonic
the most important source for our knowledge of Platonic doctrine, are in the writings of the plilohimself. 1
His literary activity extends over the of his life, a Jreater part period of more than fifty and by a special favour of ears,it has so
>pher
Fortune,
is
"ppened
that not one of the works which he intended

lost.
publicity has been

1
?
This
at
H.
any
v.
rate a
Stein,
Schleiermacher,Platon sWerke, Bde. 1804 (2nd edition 181G). t, Platon s Leben u. Schriften, 16. 1 eber Platon s Socher, briften, 1820. Hermann, Ges:chte und System des Platonis1830, p. ;J43 sqq. Hitter, schichte der Philosophic, vol. ii. 1-211. Brandis, Griech.-Kom.
is,
Genet. Entw. Part ii.
7 2 die Summlung d. plat. Schrift. 1800. Bonitz, Plat. Studien, 1858. Grote Plato, 3 vols., 1805. Kibbing,
Schrift.,
1801.
Gesch. d. Plat. vol. 1802-1864. Schaarschmidt,

z.
Bucher
1,
d.
plat.
Idecnlehre
-We
bability
il.
ii.
a.
151-182.
Stallbaum,
Steinhart, in 3 Introductions to Plato s Works, nslatedby Miiller, 1850. Suckow,
his Introductions.
Wissenschaftliche und Kiinstsche Form der Platonischen hriften, 1855. Munk, Die Natiirie Ordnung der Plat. Schriften,
7. Susemihl, Die Genctische twickelungder Plat, Phil., 1855.
testimony abundantly proves his having con

tinued his literary labours to the last (vide The pp. 3; 35, 78). Laws are said to have been found unfinished after his death (Diog. and there is also internal iii._ 37), evidence that this work was his
latest
were composed, partly after the death of Socrates, partly perhaps even before; ancient
shall find that in all pro several of his dialogues
berweg, Untersuchungen iiberd. itheit und Zeitfolge der Plat.
(vide subter).
46

tract
reasonable inference from the fact that no reliable
of the existence of any Platonic writing no longer in ou: possession has come down to us ; for the spuriousnes:
3 of the lost dialogues of which we do hear is beyon( 4 be sup question, and some other writings which might Divisions the to be Platonic, posed
Ap. Diog. iii. 62 MiSou/, $cu aXeXiSuw, E/356/-t?7, E7rtjuei i5?js, ap. Athen. xi. 506, d., Ki ûwi ap. Doxopat. in Aphthon., Ixhet. Grsec. ed. Walz. II. 130, cf. Simpl. in Categ. 4 f, /3ctj. Ge/uoTo/cXT/s (un
:!
/ces,
KaOdirep HXdruv iv TCU TO yap p.ffov (sc. Part. Anim Xeiop) /juyâ. iroiel. 1,2, 642, b. 10 we must not fora
yovres,
<TT
diaipe<re<rii>
a classification of animals on
dii
less this is after all

title
for the
merely another Cimon, in which, ac

;
ferent arrangements of the limbj olov robs 8pvi6as robs IJL& eV rfj8
roi)s 5e
cording to Athenseus, Themistocles was strongly criticised we have no right with Hermann to conjec ture Theretetus in stead of Themis tocles, or to assume in the Cimon of Athenaeus a confusion with the Gorgias).
fêra rCov evuBpu Oai ro))s 5 eV a\X( The first of these passage yevei. can refer neither to Philebus, 16 E
e/ceZ
yap TOVS
fj.tv
ffVfJ.($(ilvt dirjpfjo
Other apocryphal writings are given by the Arabian in Casiri s Biblioth. Arab. i. 302, who pro fesses to quote Theo.
4
nor to Timams, 27 D, 48 E sq., q for neithe 31 B sq. 53 sq. is the denotation Sicup&rets ap
Diog. loc. cit. introduces the of the above mentioned and other dialogues with the words vo6evovTa.L bôXoyov^vw^.
list
some
If we consider how7 ready the scholars of the Alexandrine period were to accept as Platonic a series of writings, the spnriousness of
propriate to any of these pas sages, nor does any one of then contain the quotation here fron the Stcupe cms. The first four an not concerned with the corporea elements, the air\a crci/xara, t which the remark of Aristotl applies (though Ueberwcg, Unters
Plat,
Schrift.
disputes this)
sq.
tb
Timseus 31
which we can scarcely doubt, we

cannot avoid concluding that those writings which they unanimously rejected must have had very dis
tinct
sq.^cer tainly treats of these, but neithe of the passages could well be de noted by Sicupe cms, and both havi four elements instead of the threi
53
signs
of
must have appeared
spuriousness, and at a compara
which
tively late period. 5 Aristotle mentions
repeatedly
ii.
th found in Aristotle 5tcpe(ms, and the two middli elements, so far from exhibiting a mixture of the two exterior, a
Platonic
3,
Statpecreis,
;
Gen. et Corr.
330, b. 15
those
who presup
pose only two original elements, represent the rest as a mixture of these u crai rws 5e /cat oi rpia Xc;
rather (p. 53 B), according to theii stereometric combination, relatec to only one of them, and with ii stand in contrast to the other. We cannot, however, think of a refer-
LATO
ti
WltlTL\(.lX.
17
)isconrses about Philosophy,

^ oce to a merely orally delivered Iterance of Plato s (Ueberweg,
.
>c.
and about the Good, the

;
cit.
Susemihl.Genet.Entw.il,
is not here named as we shall find, Aristotle very often refers to Plato without
because Plato
48), because in this case, according Aristotle s invariable custom,

t>
naming him.)
are
quite
if
)nse
istead of the present Trote? a past must stand, and an oral ex-
passage
Do
If, however, we convinced from the Gen. et Con-, that
sceived
r
;
would without doubt have some further notice. The mentioned must .aipeaeis here
osition
Aristotle actually had in his hands an exposition of Platonic Classi

fications, it is
most natural
is
to
con
clude that he
aerefore be a composition not inkUded in our collection of Plato s
,orks, either written by Plato himBJlf, or else an exposition of Planic doctrines. .In the second
..
was at least given out as his work, because in that case Aristotle
or
same book in De cannot however be supposed that this proceeded from Plato himself,
referring to the Part. Anim. It
issage (Part. An.), Aristotle can

ily
...
mean
would have (Part. Anim.
1,
a written
8tat/>e
<rets
2)
ex
treatise
;
by
:.
j
,.
and for fypafj.fj.evai ftis we must not think of any of pe Platonic writings which have
torvived to us, because that denofor any one of them cr for jition ity paragraph out of one of them .iould be very strange and the
; ;
pressed himself differently, and doubtless either this treatise itself or some more authentic trace of its existence would have been pre served than is found in its alleged transmission to Dionysius, Ep. Plat, xiii. 360 B. The latter passage seems rather to refer to the
diaipeaeis which Alexander apud Philoponum in Arist. De Gen. et Corr. 50 b., med. mentions among
at his
of Aristotle, about the flrds being placed partly in the Kme class with the aquatic animals,
^flotation
in another class, is not to be j.irtly ^lund in the passages to which one Iould most readily turn in this 220 A sq. Polit. 264 ,|8e, Soph. I; (the former passage is referred to Susemihl, |f Hermann, Plat. 594 c. cit. Pilgcr liber die Athetese d. lat. Soph. 0, the latter by UeberOn the eg, loc. cit. 153 sq.). ntrary, the 5icu/^<ms here are not ferred to Plato, and so far the
;
;
the spurious writings in circulation time under Plato s name, of
which
self
however
The dtaiptveis nothing. referred to by Aristotle were a, collection of classifications of mun

dane existences, used in the Acad emic school and based on Platonic
enunciations.
knew
Philoponus
him
The
is
existence
of
such a writing
fact
shown by the
iv. 5),
that diaipfoeis are attributed
issage in Part. Anim. taken by self, would not contradict the snpsition of Suckow (Form cl. .at. Schr. 97 sq.) that the yeypafj.va.(. were neither diaipecrfis ritten treatise of Plato s, nor
to
Speusippus (Diog.
(Ib.
Xeno-
an
Aristotle (Diog. v. 23. Simpl. Categ. Schol. in Arist. 47 b. 40 the Arabian ap. Eose, Arist. Fragm. in 5th vol. Berl. Acad. Arist. 1471, 52) Her13),
:
;
crates
and
position
of
is
Platonic
doctrines.
modorus
ockow
ap.
p.
Simpl.
in
entirely
mistaken in
(transcribed
ying that they could not be so
Hermodoro,
Phys. 54 b. my Diatribe do 20, and Susemihl s
48
i

7
unwritten doctrines
originally never claimed to b(

8
the works of Plato at

Genet.
refer
all.
There
48, 2,
7
is
no ground evenfoi
edit.
522), seems to discourses in which such classifications occurred. The assumption (Alherti Gcist. und Ordn. d. Plat. Schrf. 37, 64), that Aristotle was himself the composer of the Stcupecms which he refers to,
ii.
Entw.
2nd
to
Platonic
Phys.
iv. 2,
209
b. 13.
Aristotle
th<
has mentioned determinations of the Tiaueu; about space, &\\ov Se Tpbirov e/ce
re
says, after he
\eyuv TO
/AeraA^Trri/cov
dypd(f>oLS
/ecu
&
TOIS
OJU.WS
\eyofJi^voL j
Soy/JiQ.o iv
is rendered highly improbable by the way in which they are cited if the and criticised Stcup&rei? attributed to Aristotle by the later writers were the same as those from
;
TOV TOTTOV
aTre(f)-f)va.To.
KO.I
TT]V ^(jjpav Tl
,
which Diog. what he tells
iii.
80-109 borrowed
with repeated re
ns,
ference to Aristotle, about the Pla tonic Classifications, they cannot be either (as Suckow thinks loc. of Aristotle, or cit. 96) a work
one used by him, but
merely a work of the later schools. Just as little can we look for the Amipfoeis
referred to in Aristotle s exposition of the Platonic discourses on the
is manifes that no Platonic written treatise can be intended by these tiypafa 567/xara; yet on the other hanc this name is not suited for a refer ence to an oral discourse as such: we can therefore only understand by it a collection of notes of sucb Platonic views as were still up tc that time dypcufra, embodying the contents of Platonic discourses.
O.VTO
It
The way, however, in which allusion is made precludes
thei
the
Good
Arist.
(with
libris
cf.
Brandis,
12).
De
perd.
dis
(On these
supposition that Aristotle himself! was the author of this collection! (as Philop. ib., Schol. in Ar. 371 b; 25, and Gen. etCorr. 50 b. thinks)
courses
edit.)
We
Part ii. b. 48, 2, 2nd should sooner look for
the reference in the dypafia doy/tara (vide p. 382, 2), Phi lop. loc. cit. Karsten de Plat, cpist. 218 ;
;
and though Simplicius (Phys. 12flj a. m. 127 a. o. Schol. in Ar. 37| b. 3, 372 a. 21) is right in referring
;|
dai
the &ypa.(j)a doy/A. to &ypa<f)ot, aw of Plato, still he is har

specially
Schaarschmidt, Samml. d. PJat. Schr. 104; still the different de notation makes us suppose different
writings.
be, in
justified in
o-vvovcrieu
But however that may any case we cannot consider
understanding by thei on the Gooc Themis t. on the passage (p. 21 Speng.), states on mere conjectur (his own or some one s else) thf
the Atcup^(reij referred to by Aris totle to be either a Platonic or an

Aristotelian writing.
ireis
The
Aiaipe-
which were subsequently cur
rent under the name of one or the other of these two philosophers can only be considered as a post-Aristo telian interpolation or perhaps u recasting of the older work.
6
Cf. p. 26, 53, 54,
and Part
ii.
b.
in the Hyp. 86yp. Plato represenl matter as participating in the ide not Kara /j.fdeiv, as in the Timast but Ko.0 Aristotle 6/j.oiuaiv speaking merely of a variation the denotation of the participate matter itself. 8 The expressions which Ai Top. vi. 2, 140 a. 3, cites Platonic occurred not in k
:
LATO S WRITINGS.
49
thinking that any Platonic writing was ever more comu
iplete
tli
an
it is
now. 9
less care
Fortune has indeed bestowed

rt
i
on the purity
the Platonic collection.

jpf
the Greeks regarded as spurious several of the writings lu the critics of our own Jthat bore Plato s name century,
;
Even the learned among
Imt in oral discourses in Timaeus Platonic ^Lexicon is alien to Plato s works .as we have them, comes generally from Plato, but from another [not [writer vide Hermann, Plato, 556. As regards the remarkable state ment of an obscure myth-writer of the middle ages (in A "Mai s Auct. Class. 183) who appeals to an alleged Philosophus of Plato in support of a very un-Platonic view
writings.
;
10
All the
lost
dialogues
(vide
(whatever
p. 46, 3)
and those of the exist
ing number marked
in the editions as Dialogi nothi, except the Clitophoii (vide Hermann, pp. 424, 594, Even in ancient 225, et cet.). times the Epinomis (Diog. iii. 37, Suid. 0tXc<ro0os. Prolegg. in Plat,
following Proclus) was by ascribed to Philippus of Opus, the second Alcibiades (Athen. xi.
c.
25,
many
506
c.), to
cf.
of the origin of the belief in Gods, Schaarschmidt, Samml. d. plat Schr. 89.
Xenophon
(this
cannot
possibly be right),
rastaa
and the Anteand Hipparchus were con

doubtful
For, inoeiKT. p. nXctTWJ 1 fj.vov TOV iravTos rbv TifUUtf ca\fi T(2 KPITIQ) we cannot con clude that this rhetorician had the
fi>
from TT. Menander, 143 W. 337 Sp. (6 yovv
ap. viii. 2 On the contrary, it respectively). is scarcely credible that Panaetius
sidered
(Thrasylus,
Diog.
ix. 37,
and Êl. V. H.
a more complete form than we have. Had this been so, Jtill further traces of it would have jeen preserved whereas we see
ritias
in
from Pint. Solon, 32, that in Pluarch s time only the introduction ind the beginning of the narra"
ive
remained
his
words
seem
ather to be merely an inexact ex>ression, meaning that the subcct of the Timaeus was treated in he beginning of the Critias as a hymn of praise to the Cosmos, oecause Timaeus here prays to the
jfod, whose origin he has described, hat, in case he has uttered anyhing irapa /xAos, God would TOV
Totc?j/.
actually condemned the Pha?do as spurious, in order to deprive thebelief in immortality of the autho rity of Plato Âsclepius, Schol. in Ar. 576 a. 39. Anthol. Graac. ix. 358 according to David, Schol. in Ar. 30 b. 8 Syrian, as our text stands, the latter Epigram was written on the Phaedrus, for which, however, the Phaedo is obviously to be read); this statement seems
;
to
have originated
in
a misunder
standing of the tradition of Pa naetius doubts as to the genuineness

of the Phredo, and of his opposition to the Platonic doctrine of immor Had tality (Cic. Tusc. i. 32, 79). he declared the Phaedo spurious on the grounds stated, he would have spared himself this opposition.
50
sometimes unanimously, sometimes by an overwhelming majority, have rejected a still greater number; others
upon their trial, and among these, as formerly 11 1 happened on the first appearance of Ast and Socher, is to be found more than one work the repudiation o which would considerably affect our apprehension o:
are yet
the Platonic philosophy.
Though an exhaustive inves
tigation of this subject would exceed the limits of the present treatise, we must to a certain extent examine
it,
and notice the points of view on which our judg

of
it
ment
depends.
With regard then
first
to the!:
external evidence, from the consideration of which every such enquiry must start, by far the most important is:;
that of Aristotle.
For setting this
aside, very
few re
marks of ancient authors concerning the works of Plato have been handed down to us, 13 either from his own 01
11 Platou 1810.
Leben und
Schriften,
Ueber Platen
13
s Schriften, 1820.
Isocratcs
certainly
seems
regards the v6pot), and Polit. 1, 6 1255 a. 7, Arist. speaks of TroXXol T&V tv rols vo/mois, who dispute the
right of enslaving captives in war. Still less can we,
to
mean
made
with!
writings by bis mention (Philippic 13, written 340 B.C.) of v6fj.ois Kdl TroAtra cus
Plato
s political
Suckow (Form.
sq.) infer
d. plat. Schr.
from the plural
lol]
|i
0-o0tcrrwi/,
TwtrbTWffwpurTwpyc ypawdvait.
Still this reference, if
the passage
be taken by itself, cannot prove that Plato was the only one or the first who had written on the formation of the state and on
know of several similar works, besides those of Plato, in the period before Isocrates the lIoXiTeia of Protagoras, the work of
laws; we
;
we cannot gather what
that Isocrates attributed the Rej public and the Laws to different!! authors; cf. Uebenvcg, Plat. SchrJj: 184 sq. From the statement oil Tbeopompus, quoted p. 38, 941 j
Platonic*
i
Odl writings he had before him. the contrary, it appears from Plutj An. Procr. 3, 1 Alex, on Metaph
:
1091
10,
a.
27
b.
cf.
Arist.
De
Antisthenes
(Diog.
Coelo,
IT.
vi. 16),
TroXtrems those of Phaleas and

VQIJ.OV ?} TT.
ii.
Hippodamus (Arist. Polit, who also 1267 b. 37, 1268
7, 8,
and other author! ties to be mentioned later on, thai Xenocrates noticed the Timseus
32
;
279
a. 6,
in
reference to the latter of the two, expressiy mentions his proposals as
according to Suid. Ecvoicp. also wrote TlXdruvoi rrjs irepl TroXtrems iv. howDiog. 82,
;
h<
PLATO S WRITINGS.
111
51
and these relate almost entirely which Aristotle, too, distinctly ascribes to writings lato. Towards the end of the third Aristo
succeeding century
;
century,
hanes of Byzantium
rorks
)iog.
in
iii.
those five
arranged a portion of the Trilogies which we know from

first
and fully two centuries later, Thrasylus 15 lade a catalogue of them in nine which Tetralogies, italogue, with a few very unimportant exceptions, 16 jntains all the writings transmitted *to us as Platonic.
61
:
14
thinks we may place entire confidence, not only the statements of but even in the cata Aristophanes, logue of Thrasylus. It cannot be supposed, he argues, bhat the school of Athens, which was continued in an
rrote
mentions only a treatise IT. Theophrastus refers to Timteus (Fragm. 28, 34-49 fimm ;) to the Laws (xi. 915 D). ee Fr. 97, 5 (Stobseus, Florilegium t, 2-2, end). Kuderaus, Eth. Eud.
er,
17
retes.
latter dialogue was Grantor (supra, p. 696
written
d.
by
;
2nd
edit.)
the Stoic Persaeus wrote against Plato s Laws, 200-250 B.C. (Diog.
n\. 14,
;thc
),
1247,
b.
Euthydemus (279 D inasmuch as what

;
15,
must
refer to
sq.,
is
281
here
quoted as Socratic is to be found there and there only Eth. Eud. vii. 124G, b. 34, seems to 1;}, refer to the Protagoras, 352, B, C; and Eth. Eud. iii. 1, 1229, a.
15, to
rii.
included the Repub the second the Sophist, Politicus, Cratylus the third the Laws, Minos, Epinomis the fourth the Thesetetus, Euthythe fifth the Crito, phro, Apology ra 5 d\\a Phffido, the Letters
first
lic,
vii. 36). 14
The
Timaetis, Critias
KO.Q
v
d.
KO.I
drd/crwy.
Suckow
Form.
into
Protas:.
360
Eth. Eud.
I think wrongly, denies that this division
plat. Schr. 163,
5, 6, 1239, b. 13, 1240, b. 17, teems to be connected with the for here the Jysis, 214 C sq., Sudemian text comes nearer the ?latouic dialogue than the par-llel passage of the Nicomachean
Cthics,
le
i
ix.
10, 1159, b.
7.
Aris-
38, 94) speaks of Platonic Ilepublic Dicwarchns e Plioedrus iii. (ap.
(vide sup.
to trilogies really belongs Aristophanes. * Ap. Diog. iii. 56 sq. 1(5 Besides the dialogues men tioned p. 46, 5, there are wanting in it only the two small dialogues TT. SiKaiov and TT. dper^y, the Defini tions, and the Letters nos. 14-19, admitted by Hermann in his first_
edition.
17 Plato and the other Com panions of Socrates, 1, 132 sq.
Diog.
n of the Timseus (vide

J38); the
first
38)
p. 20,
commentary on the
E2
52

line
unbroken
from
its
commencement, should
not
have been, completely and accurately informed of all that its founder had written. On the contrary, there can be no doubt that his very handwriting was care
and the members of the Academy were thus in a position to furnish the most trustworthy
fully preserved there
;
information to anyone who sought it, concerning the Such an. authenticity or the text of a Platonic work.
opportunity would- surely not have been neglected by Demetrius Phalereus and his successors at the founding of the Alexandrian Library. They would either have
procured copies of the original manuscripts of Plato, or have instituted enquiries in Athens as to the authenti
city of the
tion,
works which they received into their collec* causing a catalogue to be made of all the un
;
doubted writings
and since Aristophanes certainly and Thrasylus probably, followed in their catalogues
the Alexandrian tradition, the statements of these writers may be fairly supposed entitled to a high degree of
credit.
This theory, however, rests wholly upon a series of uncertain presuppositions. It may be that the ori of Plato, or copies of his works used ginal manuscripts
by himself, were preserved in the Academy, though not a particle of historical evidence on the subject exists ; but even supposing such to have been the case, who can guarantee that not only Plato s personal dis
ciples,
but their successors, were so convinced of the
completeness of their collection, and so jealously watch ful over its purity, as to deny admittance to every
book not included in

Platonic
?
it,
and represented
to
them
as
Not
to
mention that there are many con-
PLATO*8 \VIUTIXGS.
eivable cases
in
53
Dossession of the school

jy
which the manuscript collection in might have to be completed
lr
LV
18 And granted that the genuine Platonic works. had indeed never admitted Icademy any spurious writug into their library, how can we be sure that the Alexandrian librarians were ?
equally scrupulous
They
ti
prtainly might, on the above presupposition, have in.formed themselves in Athens as to the works which fcrere there acknowledged to be authentic, but how can
jj.
fore know that they actually did this ? There is not the Slightest warrant for the assertion; but on the other band we are told that the high prices paid for writings lin Alexandria and Pergamus gave great encouragement 19 and that in particular forgery, works were
*>
many
If we suppose that letters of flato really existed, there is no of them aecessity that copies should be found in his
literary
18
ytypcnrro ffvyypaâ, XapBdvetv

aatau.tvMv
avTols
i,,at>,,
,.,?. rCov
_Z..*t QVTWV
a-vyypa/nfjLO.
TraXcuou
TWOS
remains
supposing that the libra ries of Speusippus and Xenocrates met with any accident, as might easily have happened during the truggles of the Diadochi for the
;
/jLifrv.
SimpL
28,
a.
in Categ. 2
infra.)
e.
(Similarly Schol. in Ar.
Galen
obviously
possession of Athens, or that

af their
goes too far here in supposing that before the establishment of these
some
parts were lost, nothing would have remained but to supply hem from without. However, tve cannot take into account these jossibilities, as has been said: it
sufficient that
s writings were preserved in his school, or what precautions were taken to mainain the collection in its
19
to
how Plato
we know nothing
two great libraries there had been no forging of books and still less can we agree with the conclusion of Grote (loc. cit. 155), that as the rivalry of these two libraries first gave occasion for such forgeries, and the library of 1 ergamus was not founded till 230 B.C., we are not to suppose any forgeries before
;
this time.
Galen
in
integrity. Hippocr. de nat.
Galen says nothing
Of this supposed
;
rivalry
<pi\oTi/j.ei<rdai
lorn. 1, 42,
roi/s en
vtvirrfin,
xv. 105, K: irplv yap A\%av5peia re Kal Uepydfji.^ ^ ^ a(j \^ ^J oi SeVw

-
"
to seek after reputa tion or glory in anything, to dis play zeal uses the Simplicius
;
means simply
KT"
word VTrovdafctv
for
it.
54

they might
fur
falsely attributed to Aristotle, in order that
be bought by Ptolemy Philadelphia. 20
When we
ther consider] the state of literary criticism in the post Aristotelian period, it seems unreasonable to credit the
Alexandrians
with having tested the authenticity of works bearing illustrious names, so carefully and The catalogues of accurately as Grote presupposes.
Aristophanes and Thrasylus therefore merely prove that the writings they include were held to be Platonic
whether they really at the time of these grammarians were so or not, can only be determined by a particular enquiry into each work, according to the general rules
;
of criticism.
The statements
criterion
21
;
of Aristotle
afford
much
safer
but even with regard to these, the case is no means so simple as might be supposed. In the by first place, it is sometimes doubtful whether the writing
truth
or the passage which refers to a saying of Plato s in emanates from Aristotle ; and this doubt has
already destroyed or weakened the argumentative force 22 But even though the Aristotelian of some quotations.
-
Cf.
Tart
ii.
b.
87,
all
G,
2nd
edit.
collection of ferences in Aristotle
~l
to
the rePlato s
writings was attempted by Trendlenburg, Plat, de id. et num. doctr.
logue of them. To this reference is to be made in case of dialogues, the citations from which in what follows are not discussed in detail, -2 As the citation of the Laws (iv. 715, E sq.) at the end of the
spurious work TT. Ac6<r/uou, p. 401 ;j of the Timaeus (77 B), IT. of the Kuthydemus 1, 815 a. 21 the Eudemian (279 sq.}, in
<pvru>v,
then in my Platon. Stud, 13 sq. 201 sq. Next Suckow (Form. d. Schr. 40 sq.), Ueberweg plat.
;
(Unters. plat. Schr. 131 sq.), and
Schaarschmidt (Samml. d. plat. Schr. 90 sq.) thoroughly examined

these evidences.
his
Still,
Bonitz, in
Ethics (vide p. 50. 13). The citation of the Sophist also (254 A) in the xi. Bk. of the Metaphysics
c. 8, 1004, b. 29, might also be claimed, because not merely is the
Index Aristotelicus, 598 sq., gives the most exhaustive cata-
PLATO 8
is
Will 77 A7/-S
55
ii>
authorship of a passage apparently relating to Platonic is not writings be fully established, the reference
second part of this book decidedly of spurious, but the genuineness the first is anything but firmly established (c. 1-8, 1065, a. 26).
books
Ihird
repeatedly appear in the book in a more complete In i. 9, 1367, b. 8, a saying form.
repeated examination, I think it is more probably aa earlier abstract, perhaps a rough sketch noted down by Aristotle for the purposes of his lectures, rather than a later epitome of Bks. iii. The quotation of the vi. iv. Apology and of the Menexenus, in the 3rd Bk. of the Rhetoric, gives almost more ground for doubt. For though the contents of this book, as a whole, seem sufficiently Aristotelian in character, still the question arises whether, in the form in which we have it, it con stituted an original part of Aris
Still,
after
mentioned
of the historical Socrates is briefly 6 Zwicp. (ticrirep yap AftywoJowi tv ZXeycv, ou x a ^- ir 1
1415,
A0Tjvaioi3 eiraive ij ;) in Bk. iii. 14, b. 30, this is more fully

:
quoted from the Menexenus (235 6 yap \tyei SWK/>. iv T$ 1), 236 A) eiuTatpiq) aXydts, tin ov xa ^ eirov
AOrjvaiovs
&
AdyvaLois
eiraiveiv,
dXX
i>
Aatfedaifjioviois.
Whereas,
ii. 23, 1398, a. 15, as an example of a proof, e optoyxoO, the following olov on. TO oa^bviov is quoted: oiiotv effTiv a\\ T) 6ebs rj Geov tpyov,
in
iii. 18, 1419, a. 8, we find a quotation of four lines from the The Platonic Apology, 27 B-D.
totle s Rhetoric, or
whether
it
was
not added by a later writer to the first books, perhaps based on notes In or a lecture of Aristotle s. support of the latter supposition, other points, might be besides quoted the fact, that, according to Rhetor. 1, 1, especially p. 1054, b. 16 sq it seems doubtful whether Aristotle would, on the whole, have treated in his Rhetoric the sub jects discussed in the 3rd Bk. and again, the 3rd Bk. c. 17, re turns to the question of the trlareis, which the first two books had already thoroughly entered into. Especially might we be inclined
,
quotation from Theodectes, ii. 23, 1399, b. 28, occurs again, III. 15, and is treated of at greater length ; from 1416, b. 1-3, we learn the about a passage of particulars
the
in
Teucer
1398,
to.
iii.
of
4,
Sophocles,
which
al
a.
was
it
briefly
luded
that,
Again,
14,
6
is
remarkable
is
the
Menexenus
denoted by
cTrrrciîos
any
like
a. is
specification),
(without while by the

10,
expression,
1,
111,
14,
11,
the Epitaphios of Lysias These circumstances meant.

give
certainly
for
doubting
quotations
some grounds whether the fuller of the Apology and
suspect a different hand in many of the examples which are accumulated in the 3rd Book and worked out with propor tionate detail and in reference to this, it is worth noticing that
to
;
in the 3rd Bk. of the proceed from Aristotle On the other hand, I himself. cannot agree with Schaarschmidt
Menexenus
Rhetoric
^Saninil.
"d.
plat. Schrf. 383),
who
in
remarks
from
v. 29,
the
passages
which have already quotations, occurred in the first and second
1025, a. 6, relative to the Lesser Hippias, that it is
Metaph.
56
always of a kind that implies an unequivocal recogni If not merely the name of the) writing is given, but also that of the author if Aristotle Plato remarks in the Timeeus, Republic, 23 &c., says,
tion of the writings.
;
there can of course be no hesitation as to his meaning. But not unfrequently the writing in which some passage
is
to be found
is
named without mention
of its author
or conversely, utterances and opinions are ascribed to and nothing is stated concerning the writings in Plato, which they occur ; or lastly, reference is made to theo
and expressions contained in our Platonic collec tion, and yet there is no allusion either to Plato as their
ries
24 It author, or to a particular writing as their source. also happens sometimes that a from some dia passage
logue
is quoted with an express mention of the dialogue, and yet is attributed to Socrates, and not to Plato. 25 In all these cases, the question arises whether or not
we can claim
Aristotelian evidence for the Platonic
origin of the writings concerned; but a them only need occasion us any serious
Aristotle,
portion of If doubt.
Socrates
in
naming
dialogue, remarks.
more than improbable that Aristotle himself published the book

_
recasting.
-a
The
quoted, especially in the form we have it. Undoubtedly the (5th Bk. of the Metaphysics is proved to bo
in his
-4
quotations to which Bonitz Index has prefixed a. The three cases denoted by
b. c. d.
Bonitz
-5
:
genuine by Aristotle himself (cf. Part ii. b. 58, 2nd edit., and Arist. Gen. et Corr. 11, 10, 336, b. 29, cf. Metaph. y. 7) possibly not as a part of this work, but at any rate
as
E.g. (len. etCorr. 11,9,335, b. 9 ol fj.ev LKavrjv alriav dvai wpbs TO r^v r&v duv
iri0r)<ra.i>
yej>e<rdai
</>iW,
ticnrep
6ef<ai5wnSw/c/>aT?7s.
an
independent
Aristotelian
treatise
and there is no reason at all to suppose that we have it merely in the form of a later
Bonitz ranges these cases in the distinguished, however, from those in which Plato is mentioned by the addition of a
first class,
:>?
IK
maintains this or that, he always means by it that this dialogue has put the remark into the nouth of Socrates. For not only does he employ the
icre
^lato in
;ame mode of expression as to writings which he elsevhere most emphatically attributes to Plato, 26 but he lever quotes an opinion or a saying of Socrates from
f;
my
writing that
is
not in our Platonic collection
t(
ii
though he must certainly have been acquainted with :he Socratic dialogues of Xenophon, Êschines, and
Antisthenes. 27
Indeed the Socratic utterances are re-
yarded by him as so completely identical with Plato s 28 works, that he even designates the Laws as Socratic,
although Socrates never appears in them, and is probably not intended by the Athenian stranger and he quotes views which were entirely originated by Plato
;
and put in the mouth of his master, simply as the views of Socrates, 29 without any discrimination of the
26 As in the criticism of the Platonic Republic, Polit. ii. 1, c. 0, Ibid. iv. 4, 1291, a. 1065, b. 1 11 yap 6 ûKpdrrjs). viii.
;
(<f>T](rl
may have borrowed from Xenophon or some other source of tradition but he never quotes in
he
;
7,
1342,
a.
a.
33,
b.
23,
v.
12,
lolt i,
1 sqq.
(ei>
Se rf/ TroXire/^
virb
:
A^-yercu p.tv
TOVS,
11,
....
like)
rov 2w/cpdet
(,
and the
9,
Gen.
orr.
vide previous note. Sinrilarly Polit. 11, 4, 1262, b. 11, after it has been mentioned that Socrates (i.e. the Platonic Socrates in the Republic) wished the State to have the greatest possible unity, come the words, Kadairep ev rots eptoTiKOis fa fj.ev \tyovr a TOV Apiarowhere Plato s Symposium is
<j>dvt]i>,
the present tense (2w*p. 0^0-2, &c.) and from a writing mentioned by name, anything Socratic which is not to be found in our Platonic In the historic tense dialogues. there is only one undoubted reference to the Memorabilia of Xe-
nophon, (Mem. i. demus (Kth. Eud.

37).
-8
2,
vii.
54) in Ku1. 1235, a.
Polit.
ii.
0,
1265, a.
10 fwith
TO
y.lv 01
reference to the
TrepiTT&v
Laws)
Trcti
%x oV(rL
res
meant.
27
Arist. relates in
(2wKy>.
the historic
ef^rci,
In \6yoi K.T.\. preceding passage, too, the grammatical subject to ctp-rjKev &c. is
SuKparovs
ovv rov the
tense
many
&c.) things about Socrates which
yero,
^WK/JCITT;?. 19 ( f. Polit.
1
ii.
3,
1261, b.
19,
58
PLATO ANJ) THE OLDER ACADEMY.

If,
Platonic from the historic Socrates.
therefore,
dialogue in our collection is thus treated by Aristotle we may be certain that he considers it a work of Plato. 3
The same holds good

without the
name
as to dialogues which are cited either of Socrates or Plato. 31 This
kind of quotation only presupposes that the writing in question is known to the reader, and will not be mis taken for anything else we therefore find it employed
;
21
b.
TOVTO yap oiercu 6 2uKp.

iroielv 6
Si
j3ov\Tat
6:
otercu
c. 4. 1262, 2toKy>. OUTWS TJV alriaf 6 Zco/cy). 6eiv rdrretj , c. 5. 1263 b.
Platen. Stud. 207, as regards the the authenticity of this passage) Phsedrus, Hhet. iii. 7, 1408, b. 20:
;
OTrep Topyias eVot ei

<J>aiS/)<jj
KO.I
rd
T<
iv
T<
29
O.ILTLOV
T$ HuKparei T^S
7rapa.Kpov(reu$ xprj vopifriv TTJS VTTO6effiv OVK ovaav 6p6rji>. Polit. viii.
a.
29
ci
the Meno, Anal. post. 71, 5 MeVo?i/t MTJ, TO eV
d-jropTj/ma
ii.
cri>yu./3?7creTcu.
Anal,
1342, b. 23: Sto /caXtDs fTTLTi/muai /cat TOVTO 2wfcpaTei (i.e., the Socr. of tlie Republic) r&v irepi ryv p\ov7.
ffLKTiV
21, 67, a.
21
6/iot ws
prior, de Kal 6
TlVfS Af.T.X.
IJebcrweg in contending that
in Pihet. iii. 14. JO is not quoted as Pla tonic, has paid too little attention to the true state of the case. If
the
Menexenus
b.
,
the dvd/j.vrjais Gorgias, Soph. Elench. 12, 173, a. 7: wajrep Kal o fv T( Vopyia yeypa-jrTai KaXXi/fX^s \eyuv: the Lesser Ilippias, Mctaph.
;
1415,
v.
29,
1025,
a.
Sto
ei>
r<p
really Aristotle s 54, 22), we can only conclude that in conformity with his invariable custom he wished here to denote the Men exenus as Platonic, just as much as in the cases of the Republic,
is
this
citation
cf.
Xo7os TrapaKpoverai, &c. Schaarschmidt (Samml. d. plat. Schr. 383) says indeed of the latter
ITTTT^
notation
:
(on
this
p.
The
writer
of
the
3 ialogue is here spoken of in a tone of depreciation which we can
hardly imagine Aristotle employing with regard to Plato. However, for the estimation of this assertion
to refer to the pas sages quoted in note 29 from Polit. 5 ; viii. 7. In addition to this, Schaarschmidt himself remarks on the same page, the condemnatory judgment of Aristotle on the dia logue before us, taken by itself, does not prove that he considered Plato to be the author. For a
it is sufficient
ii.
the Phaedo, and the quoted at page 57, 2(3. :!1 As the Timaeus,
:
Symposium
Do
coclo
iii.
2. 300, b. 17 KaOcnrfp iv Ttûcuy Do Anima i. 3, 40(5, b. ytypairTai. 20: rbv avrbv 5 Tpbirov (as Democritus) KOI 6 TifiaLos QvaioXo-yti,
r<p
and frequently
dex)
355,
;
(see lk>nitz s In the Phaedo, Met enrol, ii. 2, b. 32: rb 5 ev T$ $a.i8wi>i

.
.
.
yeypa/Afjifroi
a.\jva.Tov
e crrt
(I
further objection to this assertion, vide p. 54, 22.
must
retract
the
donbts
of
my
PLATO K
II7///7AV/X.
;V.i
oil-
2 about other works that are universally famous f but among the philosophic writings which Aristotle men-
t;
lions in this
way, there
is
none which does not belong

:
;:-
to our Platonic collection
ft
?!
the Platonic writings, as before remarked, are the only writings of the Socratic school to which he ever refers. This circumstance
IK
makes
it
rr
tends to ascribe
extremely probable that Aristotle really inall the writings quoted by him in this
form to Plato, otherwise we should certainly have had a right to expect that those which he considered spu
and treatment they claim to be Platonic, would not have been intro might duced without some hint as to the true state of the
rious, especially if in their style
case.
For he could not presuppose this to be neces
sarily
known
33 to his readers.
As
.
to those passages
which attribute
to Plato or
Socrates theories and sayings to be met with in the Platonic writings, but which do not mention the writ
ings,
Aristotle himself very often furnishes us with a proof that he is really referring to these by his use
:
the present tense and the like. 34 .says,

of
:i
Plato
maintains,
Socrates
When
:i:!
.
he employs this form

s name. Schaarschmidt (plat.
many passages
under IXids,
Ei)pi7rt 577?.
E.g. the Iliad and Odyssee, and of Sophocles and Euripides; cf. Index Aristotelians
O8v<rafia,
out the author

342,
Schr.
Even the
2oô/cX^s, funeral ova-
my
:<4
therefore wrong, in opinion, in denying that the
383)
is
of Lysias ( GO) is qr.oted BheUii. 10, 1411, a. 31 (on which, however, cf. p. 54, 22) merely with the words: olov tv r$ eViraî ^,
tion
jVIeno and the Lesser Hippias were attributed to Plato by Aristotle.
As Metaph.
/ecu
xii.
</>a<n
and the Meo-o-^taK^s of Alcidamas, which had been already cited,

Bhot.
i.
to, II. 23,
13, 1373, b. 18, is referred 1397, a. 11 equally wiUi-,
Klvyaiv (which ace. to DC Ccelo iii. 2, 300, b. 1G, comes from Ibid. the Timiens, 30, A.). d\Xd fj.rjv ov5t UXdrwn 76 olbv re oferat ore (Phadr. 245, Ayeu
.">?,
32 (Aevxiinros
G; 1071, b. IIXdroH ) delelvai
60
liis
of expression, it is a sure indication that lie lias in mind those Socratic or Platonic discourses which 35 are laid down in and when we find these writings
;
utterances, therefore, if these conditions fully obtain, has no less force than the literal mention of the particular writing, and the express acknowledgment of its Platonic
very discourses in a work that tradition assures us to be Platonic, it is hardly possible to doubt that this is the work to which the quotation relates. An appeal of this kind to Socratic or Platonic
On
origin..
the other hand, however,
we must
not conclude that
Aristotle, whenever he makes use of the preterite in mentioning a doctrine of Socrates or Plato, refers only
to the writings that contain it. Several cases are here to be In the first distinguished. place, the perfect tense may properly be employed, and is very commonly employed by Aristotle, in quot ing the sayings of Plato, or of the Platonic
all,
indirectly or not at
36
Socrates,
from a writing. 37
(
It
sq.)
is
somewhat
M
different with
the
A TO a^ro eavrb KLVOVV. e^cu, yap Kai a/*a ry
"I-
s
,
x
;
89 5
>
E
8
d/>xV
otpavy
:
ij
l viii. 1,
251,
b.
17
nXdrwi/ 8 avrbv
rfros.I V
[rto
xtfwyav
*&a
^^
varepov fa
As a rule, whore the writings are named, the reference is made j n the cf. the quopresent tense tatlons intho Indcx Ari t. denoted
:
.
by
a.
3As
Ueberweg
sq.
Schr.
140
Cf.
believes on the
Plat other
r^ OVKiV
138,
:
r^v /card (TheaBt.181, C; the same statement occurs also Farm.
n\arw
fi
. :f
opifrrai
LV
0opAv
oW
>
E.g. Polit,
ef
ii.
pw v
>
sq.).
Eth
60,
x.
2,
"
1172, b.
l hileb
roo A 22,
f ar lV
l! C
nxdTUV
\
dvatpel
Platonic Republic). i, TO Xirefc vepl & c G 1264 b 28, 36

-
Sw^s Ibid
:
5,
1264
a.
12
(in
the 24
sq.)
tori
OVK
r)8o^
r^Qbv.
repldXIyw^d^S^puuKp.
.
.
repl Totfrw
^/
5tt6
]\ 1UT1X<}
tu
the im perfect and aorist. These are used in respect to Socrates when some only theory is to be ascribed to the historic Socrates, supposing it to have become known to Aristotle through certain writ 38 For it might very well be said of the Platonic ings. Socrates that he maintains something (in the
present),
(in the
narrative forms
something, because as this ideal person he exists for the reader of the Platonic writings, and for him only, in the present ; he has no existence independently of the reader and belonging to the past. If, however, Plato himself is
or that something is in question as said by perfect), but not that he formerly has said
him
mentioned as having said or thought something, this consideration has no longer any force. His utterances
l-i
it i,
a. 1
robots,
virodeffei
c.
9.
v 8e TO?S vo/iots eipTiTcu 1271, a. 41 TT?

:
Eud.
TOV vop.o6Tov iriTi[j,r]<Tiev &v -m, 6-rrep Kal nXdrwc ev rots

TTTTl[jl.r)Kei>.
V6[J.OLS
Top.
:
\\.
3,
Kddairep HXcirw^ uyno-rcu. Elench. 12, 173, a. 8 6 KaXSopji. x iv TI Yopyia ylypaiTTat. v. IMiys. iv. 2, 210, a. 1 p iv rep Ti/Aaly yeypafav. Likewise (ên. et ( orr. 1, 8, 325, b. 2 wcrTre/) iv TOJ TifAaiyyeypafpe and frequently. nXdrwi/, 58 E.g. Eth. N. vii. 3, 1145, b. 23
140,
b.
:
")s
iii. 1, 1229, a. 15 by Bhet. iii. 18, 1419, a. 8 sq. the conversation between Socrates and Plato Meletus, which narrates Appl. 27, B sq., is denoted as his
torical
fjpero,
by the past tenses f iprjKev, 0?7, &e., and llhet. ii. 9,

to panegyrize
,
13(57, b.
enough
8 the saying that it is easy the Athen
ians in Athens is attributed to the historical Socrates the in
by
troductory formula ticrirfp yap 6 ZwKpdr-rjs ZXeyev ; Rhet. iii. 14, 1415, b. 30, where the same ex
pression is quoted from the Menexenus, the words are quite in
jJ-tv
yap
6 Xws
(
^/xdêro
I . :
Trpds
TOV
<
from
Protag. 352, B sq. i. 13, 12;o, a. 21 the virtue of the man and of the woman is not the same, Kadairep y ero 2wKp. T. Mono 73, sq. So, too, Eth. N. iii. 11, 1116, b. 3 the quotation
\byov
K.T.\.
conformity with Aristotle

6
custom
(.-Jen.
Polit.
On
<
yap \tyei Sw/cp.

the
ii.
tv
T<
eVira^t w.
et
other
9,
hand,
in
OIT.
Socrates, which occurs in ftotag. 349 E sq. 3GO, C sq. is denoted by the past tense ^ 77^77 in Eth. (in the parallel
335, b. 9 (oi p.tv IKO.V^V alrLav dvai Trpos TO 76^ T&V eidwv (fiuaiv, wcrirep ev rrjv
/c-pciTT/s)
the present
to
w<rirep }
we must supply
oi ercu
as the finite verb
K.T.\.
passage
62
are not merely sayings which are present to us in his works, but also acts which he completed in the com* in that case, therefore, a his pilation of those works
;
toric tense, as well
as
present, might be used in
quoting them. Though this does not occur very fre 39 quently, it is sometimes to be met with, and we have consequently no right to conclude from the use of the
preterite in the quotation of a Platonic saying, that
is
il
not derived from any written work. 40 But there are also many passages in Aristotle where neither Plato nor any one of his dialogues is mentioned, but which have internal evidence to shov
that Aristotle in writing them had definitely in vie particular works of Plato, and which very often allud
to these
!9
41
unmistakably, though indirectly.
The argu
Etli. a. 32 (cC X.J. 2, 1095, yap Kal Tl\druv -rj-jropft TOVTO Kal not be brought in tfijret) need
^
Srâj/MirWifF wtfiTrrwj elre Sr/sarTIS.

40
As Ueberweg,
b.
Plat. Sclir.
b.
;">.">
here, because in (his case (besides Kepublic vi. 511, B) the reference seems rather to oral utterances. But the use of the past tense above remarked occurs decidedly Gen. et Corr. ii. 5, 332, a. 29 utrirep Iv Ti^cu y HXdruv Phys. iv. 2, 209, b. 15 typafev. (Plato, in Timaeus 52, A sq.) rbv
:
r<$
sq. in
remarking on Metapli. 14 and xi. 8, 1064, 1026,
vi. 2,
29
(vide p. 399, 2) the past tenses here used, Zra&v and ctpyKc 07?<ray, (which latter, except as a perfect, cannot be brought under consideration here, in accordance with the
above remarks) refer to oral

ances.
41
utter-
roirov Kal TTJV xupavT6avTbdTT<priVOLTO. Polit. ii. 7, 12(56, b. 5

:
IlXdruv
TOVS
vb/jiovs
ypd<pui>
Also Gen. et Corr. i. 2, IlXdrwv fj.tv 315, a. 29, the words oftv Trepi yevfocws ecr/câro K.T.A. refer to the Timrcus, as we see from what follows (315, b. 30 ;
The for mulre which Aristotle makes use of here are all pretty much to the same effect, Phys. iv.
ru/es etrat rb 214, a. 13: Kevbv rrjv TOU o-c6/iaroj vXyv (Tim. De An. ii. 2, 413, b. 52, sq.) 27 TO. 5e AotTrd ^6/ata TT)S Î X^J . owe ^wptord, Kadairep TLV&
7,
0a<ri
V ero.
/j.6t>}i>
<TTL
316,
a. 2
sq.).
sion is used
DC
similar expres-
0aoWTim.
^8
30, in^ referring to
scnsu c. 5, 443, b. a verse from the

d\-rjOes
69 c. though here the reference to a definite passage is questionable) ; Pol. vii. 7, 1327, b.
:
Phccnissre of Strattis,
ydp
Sirep
yap
<pa<ri
rives deiv virap-
PLATO S WHITINGS.
r,;;
mentative value of these passages can only be deter mined in each case by an appeal to the ordinary rules of criticism. The more perfect is the coincidence
Xetv rois
(pv\aî K.T.\. (Rep. ii. Pol. vii. 10, 1329 b.
;
<j>a[jiev
375
41
:
sq.)
ofre
iii.
Kolvrjv
elvai
Seiv
TT}v
KTT)<riv,
&(nrep rives eiprjKaviv

;
(Rep.
b.
;>:
410 D)
De An.
rives
1, 5,
\eyovffi
drj
411, /aepiar^v
iv.
avTT)v (rrjv
^vxri"),
&c. (Rep.
.
430
Tart. Aniiu. 11, G begin, sq.) 8e 6 fj-veXos . OVK &<nrep otovrai rives rrjs yovrjs o-irepfjLariKrj
;
(pavXuv 5 dpivrrjv. Schaarschmidt (Sind. Soph. u. Polit Rhein. Mus. N. F. xix. echt., &c. p. 2)^ thinks that he perhaps wishes to give us to understand that he did not know the author of the Politicus, or else that he did not
riav,
fffri
Mva.fj.is
iii.
1,
(Tim. 86 C?); De Coelo, 298 b. 33 8e rives, ol

;
d<rl
consider it to be Plato s. As far as I know, Plato is never cited by
him
in this
way
or in
any way
at all
Kal
TTO.V
0-w/tci
yevijToit
TTOIOVCTI,
ffvvndevres Kal dia\vovres e Kal els eTriweda (Tim. 53

8ui>
eTmre-
C
:
De
sq
.
Coelo,
ol
ii.
3,
280
b.
27
en
Kal
HeftaprvprjKevai
. . Siaipovvres eis eiriTreSa rovrois (paivovrai
Similarly Uebcrweg (Zeitschr. f. Philos. N. F. Ivii. ^.^says that the Sophist and Politicus are not attested by Aris totle as writings of Plato, but only of rls r&v and Suckow
Trp6repov,
approaching this.
&c. (Tim.
13,
10,
loc.
293
b.
30
cit.) frioi
De celo, 5^ ...
(
(Form.
d. plat. Schr.
87
sq.)
ii.
<pa.(rlv
iXXeadai similarly Ibid. 1, a, 28 ... uvirep ev r$ Tt/xatV (40 B) yeypcnrrai ; part. Anim. iv. 2, 076 b. 22: dioirep ol \eyovres TTJV rrjs x^y*
O.VTTJV
in detail that Aristotle, if he knew and accepted the Politicus as Pla
argues
280
could not possibly have tonic, failed to mention Plato s name in
<f>uffiv
a.icrdr)(re&s
rivos
elvai
xdpiv,
ov
\eyovviv. yap, &c. (Tim. 71 A-D) Pol. vii. 17, 1336 a. 34: ras 5e Siardffeis ruv iralowv Kal K\avdfAovs OVK opO&s dirayopevovo iv ol Kw\vovres ev rots v6,aois (Laws, vii. 791 E sq.) By these ex the scruples raised .is to amples
<f>a.(ri
KO.\WS
Even Steinhart passages. (Ztschr. f. Philos. Iviii. 47) finds the anonymous mention of Plato in the Politics so inexplicable that
he prefers to attribute the reference in the passage before us to an un
our
known
writer whose views Plato had appropriated. In reality, how ever, the way in which the passage
differs
of the Politicus is here referred to from the references to the
Polit.
iv.
2,
1289
b.
5,
being a
reference
of
Republic, Tirnaeus, and
Laws
before
to
aiv, so far as
Plato (Polit. 303 A), concerns the manner
the reference, now settled. Aristotle says there: i}8ij fj.ev oZv TIS dire<t>r]vaTo Kal rtcv Trp6repov ov /LLTJV els ravro
ovrwj,^ ur. eKelvos
[sc.
quoted only in this respect, that the author of this dialogue is denoted not by rives or ^vioi, but by ris in
the singular number, that is to say, the definite person, whom Aristotle is thinking about, is more distinctly and clearly referred to than in the other places.
/SXe âs
fj.ev
yap
H*v
T&V
tKpive, iraff&v TToXtretwi ] ovff&v
04
between the passage in Aristotle and the corresponding passage of a Platonic dialogue, and the less reason we have for supposing that the author of the dialogue
made use
of the Aristotelian writing, the clearer
it
becomes that the dialogue in question was known to Aristotle, and the greater the probability that this,
other portions of our Platonic collection, simi larly quoted and employed, was recognised by him as
like
genuine.
Among the writings that have been transmitted to us as Platonic, those which are most frequently criti cised by Aristotle, with continual mention both of the
author and the dialogue, are th^r three great expository the Republic, and the Laws. the^fcna3iis, Besides these, the Phaodo omy is expressly designated 42 The Phaedrus is once by him as a work of Plato.
works
named,
43
and
its definition
of the soul
is
twice quoted
as Platonic. 44
Symposium
is
of Aristophanes from the treated in a manner that presupposes

;
The speech
the authenticity of that dialogue 45 and the same may be said of the allusions to the Gorgias, Meno, and
4a
Metaph.
i.
9,
991
b. 3, xiii.
1U80, 2 a. Gen. et Corr. ii. 9, 335 b. 9 (these three quotations refer to 100 B sq.). Phsedo, further references are given in
5,
896 A; that they have borrowed from one and the same writing is shown by the passage in the Metaphysics in
oi ercu.
its
use"
of the present
b.
Index Arist. * Ehet. iii. 7 (vide p. 58, 31), a passage which gives no occasion
for the ccruples
Of. p. 59 sq. ii. Polit. 12G2 4,
11
entertained on p.
epom/cotj \6yois êyovra rbv ApL<jTO(pa.vrjv. Previously a tenet of the Platonic

fofj.ei>
Kdeairep
ev
rots
55.
Top. vii. 3, 140 b. 3; Metaph. 1071 b. 37. Both places in xii.^G, their statement of this definition coincide more closely with the Phaedrus, 245 C, than with the Laws, x.
llepublic was mentioned ; still it would not follow as a matter of course that the Symposium was also attributed to Plato ; it is clear, however, from the remarks on p. 58 sq. that this was the case.
PLATO S W2UTIXG&
;r ,
Lesser Hippias. 46 The Thea3tetus is not actually men tioned, but passages are adduced as from Platonic writings, which are only there to be found. 47 Similarly the Philebus is not named but in by
Aristotle;
certain
4* passages of his Ethics he evidently has it in mind, and in one of these he cites expressly from a passages Platonic exposition, propositions which the Philebus alone contains. 49 therefore cannot doubt that he
We
in Bonitz, Ind. Arist. 598 b. 32 so..
naHnV1-j-
.. 3!l
an to the Gorgias because here it is not asserted that no pleasure is a good, but it is merely denied that every pleasure is a good.
rpu
4Jy
sq.,
Ihe supposition (Samml. d. plat.

entirely
J-ÛJ. AJ. of Schaarschmidt Schr. 278 sq.) is
inadmissible (as Georgii Philol. 18G8, vol. 97, 300 sq. clearly shows). He refers the quotation of Aristotle to Protag.
Jahrb.
f.
the remarkable expression ahrfafr)) yfrcffts emphasised there is wanting here. On the other hand, in what precedes, Z. 8 (trep6v /3e\Ttov
bus, and would account for the great conformity of it with the Philebus by supposing the writer of the Philebus to have made use
dva.L T?}? i]5ovf)s, uaircp rtj/e s rb reXos r??s he
0a<rt,
Phil.
54
is
yevfoews ),
sq.
refers to
Possibly
of
(cf.
the
Aristotelian
origin
this
para
Part ii. b. 72, 1, 2nd edit.); should it, howover, only proceed from Eudemus its evidence is none the less worthy of consideration. Further cf. my Platon. Stud. 281 sq il XT 49 Eth. N. 1172 b. 28: TOIOVTU di) Xo7^ Kal U\a.Twv dvcupei
-I
graph
uncertain
of the passage of Aristotle. Not merely are the expressions different in the Protagoras there is no mention of of alperbv, of the mixed life and of the separation
<t>p6vr)<Tis,
l.
fowpts) of pleasure and knowledge, as in the but there is Philebus, simply nothing at all that Aristotle quotes from Plato. The Prota goras does not refute the identifi cation of the good with pleasure, by showing that pleasure joined with
better than pleasure knowledge alone but from the presupposition that the good consists in pleasure (a presupposition, thc problematical
is
;
STI OVK tariv
rfiovriTa.ya.66v ai
"
xupa
66
its was acquainted with this dialogue and recognised are also in the writings of Aris There authenticity. sometimes taken inde totle many indications, which
in their coincidence, pendently, sometimes

correctness
of
50
unmistak-
which
is
indeed
hinted at, p. 358 B, which, how himself makes and ever, Socrates never attacks) it is demonstrated that every man does that from for himself which he
anticipates
between (two cases, the difference which Schaarschmidt loc. cit. 98 does not clearly dis sq., 237 sq.
tinguish).
positions
most enjoyment and

it
least
pain.
therefore impossible to sin better his knowledge, against

is
through being overcome by plea

sure
cit. does not 50 Indeed
a tenet which. Aristotle loc. mention. the value of Aristotle s evidence is in a high degree In an en strengthened thereby. tire series of passages from differ
ent works, widely distant in point of time, Aristotle shows an agree ment with two writings in our
collection of Plato s works (which, owing to their reciprocal references
The first of these sup disproved by the definite and repeated allusion of Aristotle to his predecessors whose views for it is quite are here noticed beyond the bounds of probability to suppose either that Aristotle picked up and retailed out of oral tradition or lost writings all that in our dialogues, (the is found
is
;
mention of which is most simply explained by his having made use

of these dialogues), or that the writer of those dialogues only collected these scattered notices by way of a supplement, either from the same sources as Aristotle, If on or from his own works. the other hand we suppose that the Sophist and Politicus were indeed used by Aristotle, but not acknow
(Soph.
217
Polit.
fall
ad
init.),
must stand
or
together),
so
in thought but striking, not only in expression, that it cannot pos to acci sibly be attributed merely He alludes in one (perh. dent. of these passages expressly to Plato, in a second (Metaph. see previous note) clearly xiv. 2 enough to a Platonic written trea iv. 2, see p. tise, in a third (Polit. to a rts TUV irpbrepov, in
ledged as Platonic, we shall seek in vain for any explanation of the

fact that, Metaph. vi. 2 (xi. 8),_he quotes as Platonic a passage which is found in a dialogue recognised
two)
by himself to be spurious or that, Metaph. xiv. 2, in his statement of the grounds which gave rise to a
;
62, 41) the rest indefinitely to
views and which assertions, the author of indeed he does not name, but which he had already before him How are from various sources. these facts to be explained, if
Aristotle either did not
far-reaching determination of Pla tonic doctrines, he follows the thoughts and expressions of a supposititious writing of Plato s in reference to the same subjects and again that he repeatedly favours a
;
the or did not Sophist and Politicus, acknowledge them as Platonic?
know
second pseudo-Platonic dialogue with a notice, of which, one would have imagined, he would scarcely have thought such an apocryphal
PLATO S WRITINGS
ably prove that both the Sophist
considering worthy, generally (cf. 57) he refers to no Socratic dialogues, except those Which are contained in our collec tion of Plato s works, and conse quently, as \ve must conclude, to such as he recognised to be Platonic. only 11 The following passages seem to refer to the Sophist (1) Metaph
that
:
G7
8-
51
and the Politicus
production
only, should be quoted by Aristotle as indeed Platonic, but not out of this treatise. (On the tense fraê cf. past Still
p. 02, 39.)
and here
passage stood alone, we might have some doubt. But we find in Aristotle still further ex
_
this
press
(3)
references
to
the
VI i.
J.U-O, Tpbirov Tiva. ov

,
-,
10-Vl
1>
u.
1J. Jl-i
:
XA TTV did TlXdTCjv
KaK&s
ov tTa&v. If Aristotle here alludes to a Platonic

irepl
fj.r]
TO
rr\v (rofaa-TiKTjv
In Metaph. xiv. 2, 1088, b. 35, Aristotle remarks, in connec tion with the question, whether the Ideas and Numbers are com
of
Sophist.
this can only be the Sophist in which 254, A stands the following
:
dialogue
ptv
posed^
ovatas
ofiv TO.
TroXXa ^certain (TToixeta aiTia 7775 e?rt ra^ras rds

:
the Sophist, aTrodiopdvKWv

Trpoaa7TT6,uevoy avTijs
ficulty
e/CT0o7rr?j,
fidXyio-Ta
.
8t
TO
ov,
els
TTJV
7rai>T
tffe<T0JU
can with dif be caught sight of; and
T a ovra, avrb TO
6/j.6(re
"
djLiri
TIS \vcrei Kal
/3a5te?rat
Schaarschmidt is entirely mistaken (Samml. d. plat. Schr. 190) in re ferring instead of this to the Kepnblic vi. 492 A-494 B, where there is nothing about the relation
of Sophistic to the
T^llaoêvipov Xoyy ov yap ^-fjiroTe TOVTO darjs elvat /JLTJ d\V

tovra,"
dvdyKTj
offru
rivbs
eli>ai
TO
/ur)
dv8eicu8Tt HVTIV.
yap e/c TOV ZVTOS Kal &\\ov Ta ovTa d 7ro\\c

2<recr0ai,
same passage
^ comes
ov
&v.
From the
Metaph.
is only 1004, b.
(2)
2,
xi. 8, a paragraph which another recension of vi.

:
Cf. 1089, a. 19: irolov ovv flrrof Kal ZVTOS TroXXa TO, OVTO. /Soi/Xerat drj TO êv8o<: Kal
four.
<fr
^v
ravT-rjv
TTJV
Qvaw \tyew
6v. /c.r.X.
Tbv (rocpKrTTjv irepl TO /mi) ov 8iaTP [(3fiv. Here the quotation of the Sophist is so perfectly obvious, that even Schaarschmidt allows it (Samml. d. plat. Schr. 101) ; and even if this part of the Metaphysics does not come from Aristotle (on which vide p. 54, 22), still the passage has its importance ag evi dence for the reference, which the words in Metaph. vi. 2 had given before. However, there is no need
0?7<ras
Sto^nXdrwi/
KaK&s dprjKe
Xêt) TO OVK
this
Now that
(Alex.
in
Mus.
did not passage merely (as Schaarschmidt, Rhein.
Aristotle
xviii. 7; Samml. d. Plat. Schr. 105 wishes to make out) in tend us to understand Platonic
scholars, himself, the

is
but,
is
at
once
Plato primarily clear from
to display
beginning, in which his object the grounds which

;
gave rise originally to the suppo sition of elements of the Ideas for this supposition was
undoubted ly propounded by Plato, and Schaarschmidt loc. cit. is in
first
of this evidence
is
even of
itself it
highly improbable that a judg ment which occurs in a written treatise handed down as Platonic
wrong
believing that the reference here be to Plato, inasmuch as the doctrine of Ideas in Aristotle s
cannot
F 2
08

;
and as the Politico were regarded by him as Platonic 53 in the Laws, it has the further is plainly referred to latter. the evidence on the side of the support of all OVK d\T]Vs eiireu/ ov n\ and Soph. Metaph. xiii. 4. 1078, b. 12, 1, 6, El. ov d rb 5, 167, a. 1 (olov from Socratic
987,
a. 29, is
derived
and Heraclitean
the view
doctrines, whereas of the tvioi in our passage
<TTL
5oa<rrbv,
Sri rb
ov
it
t<rriv\
is
it runs: [together with another, TroXXa \v odv ra atria] is derived from a reference to the Parmenides. There the question is concerned with the Ideas, here with the ele and ments, iinity, and the great of small. Further, the reference before us to Plato the
probable, though not strictly proved, that there is 241, an allusion to Soph. 240
exceedingly
B;
with the point which is in this pasexpressly emphasised that we cannot use expres gage,
for
sions like ^CVOT)
passage follows from the singular jSotfXcreu to Alexander s read and

,
asserting \pev8T) ws tanv re Ko.1 Kara \6yovs, and conscthe ov to tho quently attributing
oo&fav, ^without 86cus
&
(according these same expressions, ing) \tyfi 59 sq.), show that however
(cf.
^ _ Theaetet.
Sj/>
parallel
189, A. Eep.
p.
478,
vi.
B.
do
(5)
a.
not
passages E. v., 476, correspond so

to Soph.
:
like
Arist.
referring to a definite written treatise of Plato s,^ which can be no other than the Sophist,
is
closely.
7, is
The
22
reference of Top.
sq.
146,
247
for in the Sophist only does what we have here occur. Again, though
more certain in the latter D, of a dispassage as an example which is there iunctive definition,
fore
not quote Aristotle, as usual, does word for word, only formulating
quoted,
more precisely what Plato

in
says,
conformity with his supposed

(jSoyXercu),
meaning
and further on
a
remini
(1089, a. 21) adding scence from lectures or oral disqui sitions (See on this point Bonitz ad loc. Ueberweg, Plat, Schr.
;
ovvarbv TO in the former iradtiv T) iroirj<rai Xe ^w 5rj rb /ecu also we read oTTOiavovv KeKT-^fji-evov 8ui>aui.v. eiV eis era TO frepov bnovv TrefivKos 6VTWS ei s rb Tradelv. . . . irav rovro
6Vt
open to certain objections,

TO
:
di>
is
7roieu>
elvat;
c.
the allusion to pas Soph. 237 A, 241 D, 242 A, 258 D, E, cannot be mis taken (as Pilger, in his Programm d. Athetese des plat. Soph. iib. Berl. 1869, p. 7, sq., thoroughly
157
f)
still
this is again repeated 248, it is shown that this de to termination is also
and
applicable
sages like
Itisincresupersensuous existence. dible that so characteristic a defini

tion
was propounded
;
earlier
by any
proves).
(4) It
must remain un
decided whether Metaph. vii. 4, a. 4 ; 1030, a. 25 Rhet. 24, 1402, are to be Soph. El. 25, 180, a. 32, referred specially to the remarks
;
in
the Sophist (258 E, 260 C) about the M&V; in Do Interpr. 11, * o ov, 6Yi 21, a. 32 (rb
other philosopher it seems rather as if it was first put forward by its author in connection with the in in the Sophist, quiry introduced for the purpose of solving the and it if questions there raised, moreover actually brought in as something new and hitherto un known to the opponents at p. 247
_
D.
PLATO S
it
is
69
Rhetoric that the Apology was acknowledged by Aristotle; but some doubt exists with
The passage of the Politics where Arist. mentions the judg ment of one of his predecessors on democracy has been already
quoted, p. 62, 41.
If
-
clear from the
with
we compare
ytyove
/j.ev
it
Polit.
303 A:
i]
to the rules of their that art itself shows
B, and previously 293 A) the comparison with the physicians, who do not bind themselves strictly
art, when them that
did
[77
iraauiv
vou,l-
overly TOUTUV vetTrapa.v6fj.uv d ovo-uv v/u.Tra.<ruv
from memory ; makes it almost unimaginable that Aristotle had any other passage in his mind. Not less decided are the two passages
7, 1287, proposes the ques irdrepov ffvpfopei ftaXXov virb TOV dpivTov dvdpos &p X ecT0ai $ two a. 33.
;
the complete harmony in thought and in words too, as far as can be expected in a quotation
ftf\rl<rni,
;
under given circumstances a de parture therefrom is advisable. We must conclude that this was actually the comparison to which
Aristotle loc.
cit.
that the Politicus possession: for there can be no question as to an ac cidental coincidence in such a cha
we do
alludes,
not
know
although
was
in
his
Polit.
iii.
15, 16, 1286, a.

first
The
tion
dpt<TTii)v
v6fj.<i)v,
and remarks
TO?S
TO
\tyetv,
irpoffiriwrovTO.
nplfrwrt Ka66Xov
dXX
O fi
CTriTaTTeiv,
war
Iv
to
presup with such consummate accuracy and justness, merely on the passages in Aristotle, and still more incredible that he should have done this without attempting
positions
thought ; and it is just as incredible that the author of the Politicus based his own theory, self-consistent as it is, and deduced i Socratico- Platonic rom^
racteristic
Tex^y TO /card ypa/j-jnaT the second in criti &PXii> TjXiBiov cising this view mentions particu larly the latter point: TO 6 T&V dvai doKel rexvuv Trapd8eiyfj.a
fevdos,
ore
OTToiaovv
remove the objections of Aristotlo

all
;
at
Now
else
Aristotle
met with the views which he com

bats
fore
:
actually
where
can he have found

the
them except
us?
in
TO
For otherwise we must
dialogue be
/card
ypdâra
assertions
ia.Tptve<r0at
<f>av\oi>.
The
:
here combated are developed at length in the Politicus p. 294 A. it is shown: TO sq., tfp&io-Tov ov TOI -S
suppos3 before our Politicus an other treatise forming its counter

part, belonging likewise to the Platonic school, and corresponding with it, even in the particulars of the thoughts and the
d\\ AvSpa TOV K bv, and this the argument that supported by the law lays down the same or
v6fj.ovs
M.CTO.
(f)povr}<Tfws
pacr<.\L
eaTlv iaxoetv,
Moreover the
Arist.
Polit.
:
is
exposition. assertion which

1,
1,
1252,
a.
7,
combats
7ro\trt/c>
dinance for all persons and cases without regard to particular cir that it is a &A Trai/T-d? cumstances, ytyvojj.hov dir\ovv, 717369 Ta woewoTe aTrXa and in the further working out of this position occurs (295
;
Kal patrtXiKo v
Kai OIKOVO/J.IKOV Kal deo-rroriKoit elvai

ovdev Siafiepovvav ftfydXrjv oiidav r) jmtKpav ir6Xiv, al most word for word in the Poli ticus 259 B, C; the same asser
;
TOV ai Tov, the reason
is
found together with

cos
70
84 He nowhere mentions the regard to the Menexenus. which Parmenides there is only one minor particular, 55 But if the Philebus from it. may possibly be quoted 56 for the alludes to the Parmenides, the evidence
;
The one dialogue would indirectly apply to the other. but it was ap never specified; is Protagoras, too, 57 a known to Aristotle, and used by him as
parently
tion is
c.
really
repeatedly
i.
.
spoken
5,
of by
p.
Aristotle, Pol.
7,
beg.
vii.,
3.
Further parallel evidence of which

rior
1253, b. 18, 1325, a. 27. passages, the
60 sq. have come to Aristotle from other quarters, as for instance from the Menexenus. Even if he
knew
this dialogue,
we must
still
is
however
infe
to those hitherto quoted, are Arist. given in the Index 53 This follows from a compari
of tradition suppose other sources for Socratic sayings, for he could it to the scarcely have attributed historic Socrates merely on the
son of the Laws, iv. 713 C sq. with Polit. (on the golden age), 271 Dsq." Schaarschmidt, however thinks the plat. Schr.),_ (Samml. imitated in passage of the Laws the Politicus. In my opinion, the freshness and originality of the
<1.
authority of the Menexenus.

55
In
"the
como 59, 34, which certainly may from the Parmenides as well as from the Theretetus.
in
passage mentioned p.
before exposition in the passage us is so decided, that the grounds

for its spuriousness
must be very
_
be justi strong, before we should fied in looking for the origin of the Politicus in the wider amplifi cations of the Laws, which _even
here (713 E) obviously contain an allusion to the Republic (v. 473,
c. sq.). 54
have already supported this Platon. Stud. 194, by the of argument that the first part the Parmenides (129 B sq., 130 E sq.) is as good as directly cited in the Philebus (14 C, 15 B), and
0(J
my
this reason
valid.
plat.
still
think
is
quite
Schaarschmidt (Samml. A. Schr. 277) also agrees with
me
this
The passages with which we
are here concerned were quoted on and the grounds on which p. 54, the citations of the 3rd Bk. of the Rhetoric were called in question were there indicated. Apart from these, however, the use of the Apo
use of he, however, makes different di supposition in a rection from that above, and con cludes from the spuriousness of the Parmenides, which he believes to be incontestable, that the Philebus likewise cannot be genuine. 57 The proof is furnished by the s passage quoted in Uonitz Index, Part, Anim. iv. 10, 087, a. 24:
;
logy
is proved by Kliet. 11, 23; al though the saying of Socrates, which is quoted 1, 9, with the words ûKpdrrjs ZXeyev nia y, ac cording to what we have said at
people complain ws GvvtaTi}K.tv

/caXws
6
off
T&V tyuv
civdpuTTOs dXXd xei/oujra dvvTr68r]T6v re yap avTov
dval 0ao-i KO.I ra OTT\OV irpbs
OVK ifx yv/JLvbv Kal

TVJV d\K-fjv.
"-
Cf. Prot.
I>L.
\VltlTIXG8.
71
historical
58
authority.
He
seems also to have been ac
Lysis, Charmides, and Laches; though this is not so certain as in the case of the Pro
quainted
with
the
It is still more doubtful whether or not two G0 and the Greater Hippassages relate to the Cratylus 61 The Euthydemus is indeed referred to pias. by Eu-
59
tagoras.
but the fallacies which Aristotle quotes from ihe sophist of that name 65 are not to be found in the Platonic dialogue ; and though certainly on the suppo;
demus
G~
21
TO.
(Protagoras
Myth.):
f/x./i6\ws
/cat 6/39
definition
is
also
vi. 7,
mentioned
TrdvTUv XovTa, TOV 5e avdpuwov yvfj.v6v TC Kal dvvTrodrjTov Kal affTpWTOv Kal
fj,v
i"(pa
&\\a
by
Aristotle,
Top.
146, a. 21 as
an example of a faulty disjunctive definition (ofo? TO Ka\6v TO 5t

6êo)s
T)
TO
Si
YOT instance Trot. 352 B sq. the source of the account about >Socrates Eth. N. vii. 3 ad init., and the notice of Protag. Ethic. N. x. 1, 1164, a. 24 refers to Trot. 328 B sq. Also Eth. N. iii. 9, 1115, a. 9 approaches nearer Prot. 358 than Lacli. 198 B. 59 Cf. the references in Bonitz s Index Arist. 599 a. and the proceding note. ] )c An. 1 2. 405, b. 27: 5to Kal rots dvofj-affiv a.Ko\ovdovcriv, ol fj.lv TO
is
58
d/coT/s i]8v).
lie does
not, however, say
whence he got
and there is nothing to pre it, vent our supposing that, like the definition quoted in Top. v. 5, 135,
was originally propounded by some writer of the Sophistic period (some Prodicus or (Jorgias), or else by some one unknown to us, and was met with by Aristotle in
a. 12, it
0p/j,bv \tyot>Tes (sc. TTJV ^vx^v), OTL Sta TOUTO Kal TO rjv wfd/xaoTaf, ol -5e rb tyvxpbv Sia TTJV ava-jrvo^v /cat
Crat. 399 in the name the consideration seems to

:
have
lêcn,
ws TOVTO dpa,
airibv
tcrri
OTO.V iraprj
dependently of the Hippias ; or that it was current in the Academic school (based on Phileb. 51 B sq., or a corresponding oral discussion) and was therefore known to Aris totle just as much as to the author of the Hippias, supposing him to have been other than Plato. The statement of it in Aristotle also varies considerably from that in the Hippias, and according to
(Tw/xart,
TOV
fj
TTJV
/cat
(il
TOV avairveiv
8uvafj.iv
Metaph. v. 29 (vide p. 392, 3) Aristotle seems to have been ac

vi/. the Ilippias
62
ava^vxov. JLipp. Mnj. 20 A, Socrates puts forth the definition tentatively, and immediately shows it to be useless, OTL TO Ka\6v COTI TO dC
d/co7}s
quainted with only one Ilippias, Minor.
Cf. p. 50, 13. Soph. El. 20, 177, b. 12 sq.; Rhet. 11, 24, 1401, a. 2(5: cf. vol.
i.
re Kal ^^cws
tfdv.
The same
914, 4, 3rd edit.
72

to
sition of its genuineness, we should expect Aristotle have used it in his examination of fallacies which
w often brought him in contact with it, this relation of the two expositions is not sufficiently established to serve as proof for the authenticity of the Euthydemus. in our collection is mentioned If, then, any dialogue
him in a manner by Aristotle as Platonic, or used by
that
this circumstance is presupposes it to be so, For twenty years of its authenticity. greatly in favour
before the death of Plato, Aristotle was a member of the Platonic School at Athens; after that event In-
returned twelve or thirteen years quitted the city, but That during the lifetime later for the rest of his life.
of
the master any writing should have been falsely who were already well regarded as his work, by scholars or had the opportunity at instructed on the subject,
any moment of becoming
Even quite impossible. while Speusipin the generation succeeding his death, and Xenocrates were at the head of the Academy,
so, is
pus and Aristotle and other personal disciples of Plato lived in Athens, this could only have occurred under
and to a very limited extent. quite peculiar conditions, It is indeed conceivable that some one of the less the death of Plato important dialogues might after admitted even by his immediate disciples have been
without previous acquaintance with
it,
as
an
earlier
work that had escaped their attention, or under certain Cases of this circumstances as a posthumous bequest. kind have occurred in our own times, though we are so
much
richer than the ancients in resources,

Cf.
and more
Part
I.
010
sq.
practised in literary criticism. It might still easily liappeu that an imperfect sketch of Plato s,
more ^
com
importance have been owned during his lifetime by the School, should afterwards have emerged, and have been univer
If the sally recognised. testimony of Aristotle to Platonic writings, so far as it is clear and undoubted, does not absolutely guarantee their authenticity, it is at all events so strong an argument in their favour, that the weightiest internal evidence should only be suffered to countervail it and if any criticism of the Platonic
;
things frequently have repeated themselves in the first generation after the master s death or that reputed works of his, which, had they existed, must on account of their
;
after his death pleted by an unfinished writing, worked up by one of his disciples might be received as wholly genuine, without accurate discrimi nation of the original from the later But ingredients. it is incredible that such should
another
collection
starts
from presuppositions requiring
the
rejection of
prove these presuppositions incorrect. But if the evidence of Aristotle has this importance on the side of the writings from which he quotes, can we with certainty conclude that those about which he is silent are spurious ? No one would
there
is
numerous works recognised by enough in this one circumstance to
Aristotle,
maintain this with
some qualification. Aristotle is not passing judg ment on Plato s works as a literary historian who Is
out
.
wund
to furnish a complete catalogue of them,
and to
as a
bell all
that he knows.
Nor does he
deal with
them
modern writer of the history of philosophy, whose object
74
it is
PLATO AND THE OLDEB ACADEMY.

to
representation or them when occasion offers, in stating his own views, Plato and Socrates. those of criticising or opposing that must not expect him, therefore, to name everything as it such writings is known to him as Platonic, but only or desirable to mention for the purposes was necessary to be purscientific discussion he might happen of
into a combine their whole philosophic content he only mentions of the Platonic theory
;
We
any
suing.
Even
this canon, however,

s
applied.
Plato
works are
for
must be cautiously us the sole, or at any rate

j
the principal, source of our

:
knowledge concerning his

,
we cannot speak of the Platonic philosophy system case of without continually recurring to them. In the his knowledge of He owes Aristotle it was otherwise. com the Platonic doctrines in the first place to verbal
second munication and personal intercourse; in the him to the writings of Plato. They were to place only, sources in the exposition of the doc but subsidiary for the confirmation of trines, he uses them sometimes
;
dis that which he already knows from Plato s oral enter more deeply courses but he has no occasion to not into their contents except on subjects which were Of such subjects, the in those discourses.
;
examined most important seem to be the application of philoso to the explanation of nature and tc
phical principles institutions: political
hence the numerous quotations The the Republic, the Timaeus, and the Laws. from basos of the system, on the other hand metaphysical are indeed frequently and searchingly criticised by Aris far the greater number of cases on totle, but in by
th<
ground of Plato
discourses- the propaedeutic enqui
conception of knowledge, true virtue, governing, love, the right scientific method, and its opposition to the Sophistic teaching, are seldom touched 5 upon. Only one of the many pas sages from which we derive our knowledge of the theory of ideas is quoted by hiin; he makes no allusion
ries
into
the
and the
art
of
to
what
is
said on this subject in the Republic,

;
Timams,
Symposium, Pha-drus, and Therotetus

j
nor to the ex-
planations of the Sophist, Parmenides, and Philebus, though there was abundant for it. Even
been aptly introduced.

tli.>
opportunity the well-known discussions of the Republic upon the Good are merely glanced at with an uncertain hint, 60 despite the frequent occasions when have they
might
If
we turn
to those dialogues
we find the Protagoras, made use of in some

and nothing
is is
authenticity of which has never been questioned, 67 as before

passages, but
remarked, apparently it is never named,
quoted from it as Platonic. The Thea?twice mentioned, the Gorgias and the Sympo sium once and none of these quotations relate to the main content of the dialogues they are only incidental
tetus
;
recollections of certain particulars in them, the notice of which seems fortuitous. All this entirely con
sidered,
we may
being
well hesitate to conclude from Aris
with regard to any Platonic writing, that 68 was unacquainted with and this so much the it; more, as we do not even possess the whole of Aristotle s
e
"
totle s silence
The Fhaedo 100

;
-
sq.,
a.
quoted
EVti! -tin.
m
iv. 1
JV 109o,
2
,-
p * A
(;r
70
"
the case with the
ar-
26
;>07
is
cnnmscence
nit
17
of
Kep.
vi.
A;
menides Uebenveg. plat. Hclir 176 sq.; Schaarschmidt? Samrol. d.

;
pi.
Schr. 104.

works, and some lost writing or fragment might very from dialogues for which wepossibly contain citations
have now no Aristotelian evidence.
certainly that Aristotle should assert that Plato never surprising of things in ideas enquired wherein the participation G9 while in the Parmeiiides (130 E sqq.) the consists
;
It
is
difficulties
clearly
with which this theory has to contend are more surprising pointed out. But it is not
assail the doctrine of ideas
than that he should

*
:
with
Who formed the things of sense after the question 70 the pattern of the ideas ? though it is distinctly stated in the Timseus (28 C sq.) that the Creator of
the world did this in looking on the eternal archetypes. Nor, again, that he should maintain, notwithstanding 72 often the well-known explanation in the Phsedo,
alluded to by himself notwithstanding the doctrine in the Republic, of the Good being the absolute end of the W0 rld that the final cause is not touched by the
ideas.
9
71
73
We
/J.e0e%ii>
should have
:
expected that in attacking

71
fj.ti>TOi
Metapli. 1, 987, b. 13 $ TT}V fj.i/ ye TJTLS av eirj TWV etSwv, dêlaav i^P nnd the Pythagoreans) ev
70
Or
if it
should be maintained
in the latter case, that the Pemiur-
Metapli.
i8tj~\
. .
.
1,
9,
991,
a.
20
TO
S
TO,
"\fyeiv
irapafielyiJiaTa aura [sc. flvai KcvoKoyelv
....
t
;
eari
Ibid.
TI
yap eVri TO fpyafSâs dTrof3\^Trov

,
gus is not a scientific explanation and might therefore have been left out of account by Aristotle, he might just as well waive the diffi culties of the Parmenides because no positive determination is there given as to how we are to under
stand the participation of things in the Ideas.
72
6/Afvov
?rpos ras
xii. 10, 1075, b. 992, a. 24 In my Platon. Stud. 215, I 19. have mentioned a similar instance,
On which
b
73
or)
where
denies
Arist.
to
(only incidentally) Plato researches which
Metapli. 1, 6 Trepi ras

;
sec p. 64, 42. 9, 992, a. 29

e7rt<rr>7jU,as
ovSi
(so Alex..
and Cod.
7roi?7<reis
he had actually made (Gen. ct cf. Tim. Corr. 1, 2, 315 a., 29 sq. 68Dsq., 70 B sq., 73-81).
;
A perhaps, however,. should be read instead o

ftv
^Tricrr.)
opwuev
O.LTIOV, dib
(puffis
Kal
Trfis
vovs
Kal
Tra<ra
TTOIC?,
I*LA
7v>,y
wjtiTrxGS.
74
77
avOpwiro?, Aristotle, had he been acquainted with the Parmenides, would have re ferred to the fact that in that dialogue (132 A ) the same
objection
to
is raised.
Plato about the T T p[ og
But might we not

<
also
have ex
pected after the further stricture
assume ideas of art productions, mere relations, &c., which he does not/ 75 some such remark as this: In his writings he certainly does speak of such ideas ? And
concerning the Platonic theory of the 70 world-soul, should we not have anticipated some men tion of the passage in the Laws about the evil soul, 77 which has given so many handles to criticism ?
)ther
Plato ought then
in the discussions
things besides these might reasonably have been >oked for on the supposition that the writings of Plato the same significance, as sources of his
doctrines,
Many
for Aristotle as for us, and similar manner. But this we
and therefore his not alluding to a writing is by no means sufficient to prove that it was unknown to
pose
;
were used by him in a have no right to

presup.
him, or that he did not
acknowledge
it
to
be Platonic.
testimony, supplemented 8 sometimes from other quarters/ we are thus enabled to ascribe a number of writings to Plato with all the cer 79 tainty that can be attained in this These works way. acquaint us with the scientific and character of
literary
By means
of Aristotle s
their
author,
and
so furnish us
with a criterion for the

edit.
:r:2:
i. an
b
mv
*-
p-
1*?^., 2nd
p.
De An.
113sq. of
1,
this vol.
cf.
3,
40G, b. 25;
1$
works or portions of works which are either insufficiently supported by external evidence, or in their form or contents are open to suspicion. Great care, however, is necessary in fixing and applying
criticism of other
this standard
;
and
in
some cases even the most cautious
weighing of favourable and adverse considerations can not insure absolute certainty. 80 In the first place we
must
decide,
on which of the dialogues noticed by Aris

be based.
If
totle our Platonic criterion is to

fine ourselves to those
we con
which he expressly attributes to
Plato,
we
shall
have only the Republic, the TimaBus,
the Pht^do, and the Laws;
and important as these

whether they represent the
works
are, it is questionable
scientific
and
literary individuality of the
many-sided
Plato exhaustively enough to make everything appear un-Platonic that at all departs from their type. If, on the other hand, we also take into account those writings of which Aristotle makes use without mentioning their
author, or from which he quotes something that Plato has said, without naming the dialogue, we find that the Philebus is as well attested as the Theastetus the
;
Sophist, Politicus, Meno, and the Lesser Hippias, as the Gorgias and Symposium and all of them better than the Protagoras, the authenticity of which no one Our Platonic criterion must, in this case, doubts.
;
therefore be considerably wider than that of
and Schaarschmidt.
Moreover
that each divergence in a considered normal is necessarily a proof of its spurious80
Ueberweg must not be imagined dialogue from those works

it
On what
Iviii.
follows
cf.
the valuable paper of Steinhart, Ztsclir.
f.
Phil.
55
sq.
PLATO S
id
;
\VIIIT1NOS.
79
Hi
ness these normal works themselves present deviations one from the other, equal in importance to many that have formed the basis of adverse judgments. If it be objected against the Philebus that it wants dramatic
liveliness,
>u>
m-
the Protagoras
and the flow of conversational development, may be charged with meagreness of
K scientific content, with the entire failure of the theory of ideas, with the apparent barrenness of result in the whole enquiry, and the of the disfatiguing
isi
prolixity cussion about the verse of Simonides. If the antinomic development of conceptions is peculiar to the Parmenides,
!i
?Q
classifications to the Sophist and the Timasus stands alone not only in its .theories of the Creator and antemundane matter, the
and elaborate
Politicus,
mathematical construction of the elements, the arithmetical division, and distribution of the soul in space, but in its minute treatment of the whole $ subject of Physics, to which 110 other dialogue makes an approach. The Laws are separated by a far greater interval from the Republic and from the other normal works
a
11
>ir
rt
than
from the Politicus, and in an

H
r
artistic point of
view are
much graver criticism than the dialectical diaogues; the later form of the Platonic philosophy, (known to us through Aristotle, has a much more
open to
j
and formal character than the logical and metaphysical statements of the Laws. We cannot, indeed,
abstruse
81 ?o quite so far as Grote, Plato in none of his works
who sometimes speaks

had the
as if
least regard to those
ilready written, and thought nothing of contradicting limself in the most glaring manner, even in one and
81
Plato,
i.
349, 360, 439, 559;
ii.
89,
125 j
iii.
165, 463, 521, 1.
,SO
the same dialogue. But we ought not, on the otln as Plato s wi hand, to forget that so exuberant a spirit
form expression to one particular make it necessary that the purpose of a dialogue might to emphasize some points in it, and to pass slightly over others that the nature of a subject or the readers for
not limited for
its
:
whom
it
work be more
to be
was intended might require the style of a more or less ornate, and the treatment
t<
or less
popular
that
much
;
that
now seems
us incomprehensible might be explained by special casions and personal references that we are not in expecting, even from a Plato, nothing but produc
o<
justifie<
tions of equal finish
and importance
that as
we migl
establisl
have anticipated, even without the evidence

during the sixty years of Plato
ing it, both his philosophy and his artistic method uiiderwei a considerable change, and that 011 this account, if c no other, a standard derived from a portion of hi works cannot be applicable to them all without condi
tioii
s literary activity
or modification.
These considerations
the
certain!]
render a decision
concerning
Platonic writings, so far
genuineness as this depends on inte]

It is
IK
complicated. arguments, very difficult to compare one dialogue with others, enough simply must enquire whether Plato, as we know him from .undoubted works, might be supposed to have produc
and
the writing in question at a certain date and under cei This of course cannot always tain circumstances.
answered with equal assurance, either affirmatively It is sometimes hard to distinguish wii negatively.
perfect accuracy the
work
of a tolerably expert imitator
PLATO S WHITINGS.
from a
J
!
81
less
important work of the master

is
what
is
un-
Platonic from what
advanced age
that
and
unfinished, or the result of Plato s therefore it is almost unavoidable
the dialogues which can be vouched for as Platonic, or the reverse, others should creep in, with respect to which a certain degree of probability is all
among
we can
Those writings, however, on which our and estimate of the Platonic knowledge philosophy chiefly depend, can well maintain their ground in any
attain.
impartial investigation ; while, on the other hand, our general view of Platonism would be little affected
very
by the genuineness or spuriousness of several of the

pursue this subject or to discuss the reasons which particularly, may be urged for or against the Platonic origin of each work. But it seems necessary to point out those writ ings on which, as original sources of the Platonic philo sophy, our exposition of that philosophy will be founded,
even the
critical
lesser dialogues. It is impossible in this place to
more
grounds which determine the posi tion of these writings should not at once be explained, and receive only partial notice hereafter.
if
Our collection of Platonic works contains, besides those dialogues which even in ancient times were ac
knowledged
teen letters,
to be spurious, 82 thirty-five dialogues, thir
83
and a number of
definitions,
ing to ethics.
Among these there
are a few
mostly relat the Prota-
goâs, Phaedrus,
Republic
83
Symposium, Gorgias, Theeetetus, and the authenticity of which has never been
manu
has admitted
cf.
Cf. p. 49, 10.
On
the six others which Her-
57, 1C.
82
Phsedo also has been as little affected questioned: the 84 as Panaetius (if it really existed) by the suspicion of 85 The s temporary doubt. the Timasus Schelling
by
genuineness
portant
of
all
these works
may be
considered as
fully established.
There are, besides, several other

the Philebus,
Sophist,
im
dialogues
Politicus,
in spite of the re Parmenides, and Cratylus, which, 86 them in modern days, are certainly peated assaults upon not only on the strength as Platonic to be
regarded
be cited for of the Aristotelian testimony which can

Of. on this p. 49, 10. fact re Schelling himself in tracted his decision against this
ss 84
extended
it
from the Parmenides
to the Sophist, Politicus, Cratylus, and Ueberweg and Philebus,
u. Kel. WAV. 1, dialogue (Philos. Abth. vi. 36) subsequently (AVW.
p.
Abth.
ever,
vii. it
5574)
previously,
how
had been answered by Bockh (Stud. v. Daub. u. Creuzcr Its repetition by certain iii. 28).
AVeisse (z. writers, as for instance Arist. Physik 274, 350, 471 ; Idee lead d. Gotth. 97) will nowadays
1867, {Gesch. d. Phil. i. 3, 116; Philos. Monatschr. 1869, with him with p. 473 sq.) agreed more regard to all these dialogues afterwards, how or less decidedly ever (4th edit, of Gesch. d. Phil,
:
edit.
p.
124 Zeitschr. f. Philos. Ivii. 84), he retracted his opinion so far as the Cratylus and to recognise
;
Among the no one into error. of this view are express opponents
Hermann,
vi.
Plat. 699,
(PI.
and Steinhart,
68 sq. 8 Socher
first
and Pbilebus, while the Sophist Politicus he regarded as composed from notes of Plato s oral doctrines. The treatises in which Hayduck,
Deussen, Pcipers, Pilger defend as Platonic the Sophist and (Hayduck also the Politicus the Philebus, Cratylus), Georgii
Alberti, Alberti,
Schr.
258-294)
was the
the
menides, Suckow (Form. support: afterwards d. plat. Schr. 1855, p. 78 sq., 86 sq.) tried to establish the same charge as \vit\\ regard to the Politicus, did Ueberweg with regard to the
to reject as spurious and PnrSophist, Politicus, but he met with Httle
Dreykorn
Druschle,
Benfey, the
Lehrs,
Suckow,
Cratylus,
and
Schramm
tively, are
Susemihl, the Parmenides respec
Neumann,
mentioned by Ueberweg,
for
Parmenides (Unters. plat. Jahrb. f. 1861, p. 176 sq.

;
Schr.
Pliilol.
Ixxxv.
1863, p. 97 sq.)
Schaar-
Grundriss, i. 117, 4th edit.: further details cf. Steinhart, Philos. Iviii. St. Ztschr. f.
sq.,
;
PI.
32
(Samml. d. plat. Schr. in 1866, p. 160 sq., and previously the Khein. Mus. f. Philol. vol. xx. 321 sq.) xviii. 1 ; xix. 63 sq.
Kchmidt
;
K. Planck on the 193 sq. Parmenides, Jahrb. f. Philol. cv. 433 sq., 529 sq.
PL A TO 8
of them, 81 but also
nal evidenced
011
Vlil TIXG8.
account of conclusive inter
The
position of the
Laws
its
will
be the
the less
subject of a future discussion.
There
is all
reason to mistrust the Critias, 89 since

as they go, are entirely in
contents, so far
harmony with the opening
is protected by a clear reference in the Phaodo, 91 as well as by Aristotle s quo1 at ions; and though not one of Plato s most per
of the Timaeus.
The Meno 90
fect dialogues, there is
no good reason
to suspect its
The Euthydemus is at any rate made use of by Eudemus, 92 and, though often attacked, 93 may be
authenticity.
87
See p. 64
have an opportunity later on, in speaking of the doctrines contained in these works, to ex amine with more detail one or two of the points which are declared to be not Platonic to notice all the particular objections of this kind
shall
:
88
We
sq.
his Grundriss
}1
i.
is impossible in the limits of the present treatise. I will here merely point out how improbable it is, that works so valuable and written with so much dialectic skill, in spite of all the objections that we can make against them, could ever have been composed by any one in the Old Academy, which, as we know from Aristotle and other accounts, ac
Cebes here says that pro-existence and immortality follow also KO.T CKCLVOV rbv \6yov, 8v . (Socr.) e?w#as da/ma \eyeiv, that /m-dOycns is nothing but and he proves this not only in reference to former dis courses ^v \6yy AcaXXtVry 6Vt, &c.), but by the fact worked out at length in the Meno, viz. that by means of properly arranged ques
P. 72
sq.
.
.
123, 4th edit,
(Ti>
dvd/j.j>r)<Ti$
(ci>l
tions,
we can elicit everything from a man, as is shown, for instance, in

case
of
the
geometrical
figures.
there is a reference here to an earlier written treatise, which can only be the Meno, will be more
That
quitted
itself but poorly in ab struse speculation. The points of view which are to be adopted in the more intimate criticism of the
writings have been cussed, p. 77 sq.

89
:
already dis
As Socher 369 sq. ; Suckow 158 sq. against him Susemihl, Jahrb. f. Philol. Ixxi. 703 Ueberweg, Plat. Schr. 186 sq. )0 Rejected by Ast, PI. L. und Schr. 394 sq., and Schaarsehmidt 342 sq., doubted by Ueberweg in
;
p. 73 B sq., which is un doubtedly treated with such detail only because it has not occurred in
obvious from a comparison of this brief allusion to something already known to the reader, with the prolix development of a further
reason on
any dialogue
92
hitherto.
Cf.
p.
50, 13.
Schaarschmidt,
p.
341, has asserted that on the contrary the author of the Euthy demus made use of Aristotle s So But he has not phistical Fallacies.
G2
84

we bear
and
95
:
if easily defended,
in
mind the proper design
of this dialogue,
94
what
is
seriously
between sufficiently discriminate intended and what is satirical exag

it
geration or irony
proved
this, for
would be hard
to
deny to Plato
the coincidence of
_
ed to him in true Sophistic fashion

to destroy all possibility of cogni with Sophis tion, to confuse Socratic
tic
many
quotes
of the
is
he Sophisms which
by no means conclusive.
It would rather, on this supposition, he very extraordinary that the very attributes fallacy which Aristotle does not occur in to
Euthydemus
Platonic
71,
views, and thereby spoil them, and with those refiners of language of the stamp of Isocrates (for that he is intended p. 305 B sq. is put
the
p.
Euthydemus
(vide
Should we, however, 63). and at the adopt this supposition, same time assert that the Euthy demus was used in the Politicus
(Schaarschmidt, 326), leave the question undecided as^to whether Aristotle had the Politi of the Politicus cus, or the author
beyond doubt Spengel, Abh.

of the
Kl. Acad. of Baireuth, vii. 764 did not know .how to dis sq.), who and So tinguish between Socratic
d. philos. philol.
after the proofs ôf
we cannot
and hoped to get lid phistic views, of the rivalry of the true philoso
phers
if
into discredit.
they brought the Sophists In conformity with
had the Aristotelian

fore him.
93
treatise,
be
(This, however, schmidt does, p. 237 f.)
Schaar
this object, the scientific refutation views is not of the Sophistic
Ast, 414
sq.
Schaarschmidt,
touched upon beyond a few allu Socratic philosophy sions, while the
is
326
object of the Euthyde mus (on which Bonitz, Plat. Stud. to be 11, 28 sq., ought especially consulted) is to represent the^ op and Sophistic position of Socratic views with regard to their^ value in the training and education of and this opposition is youth; not _by brought before us here, means of a scientific and detailed but by the actual expo statement,
sition of the two parties themselves, in the form of a (narrated) drama, In or rather of a satyric comedy. the exposition of this subject Plato had to do, not merely with the
w sq. The
form nothing new _is propounded nor any speculative views enunciated, which might weaken the impression intended to be conveyed here, and in the eyes of an nnphilosophical reader might
practical
expounded only in
its
simplest
wear the appearance of Sophistry. If Plato voluntarily exercised this self-restraint at a time when he
was already
firmly in possession of his doctrine of Ideas (Euthyd. 300
eq.),
some
special
present plain the fact,
he must certainly have had inducement and the theory will sufficiently ex
;
views of the elder Sophists and their later developments, but also Part i. p. (as was found probable,
cf. 248, 4 253, 1 ; 256, 1 255, 2 seem 254, 1) with Antisthenes,who
; ;
95 Supporters as well as oppo nents of the Euthydemus have not seldom failed to make this distinc tion. E.g., Schaarschmidt, p. 339, amongst many other censures of
the
artificiality
of
this
dialogue
1>LATO
K WRITINGS.
1
85
on trivial grounds so charming a sketch, abounding in comic power and humour. The Apology, which was
to Aristotle, is as little as the really doubtful Orito :/both are perfectly comprehensible if we regard the one as in the main a true statement of facts, 98 and
known
96
97
the other as apparently a freer representation of the motives which deterred Socrates from flight. may
We
consider the Lysis, Charmides, and Laches, with all of which Aristotle seems to have been acquainted, to be youthful productions, written when Plato had not as
yet essentially advanced beyond the Socratic stand point the Lesser Hippias, which is supported by very
;
(which are not clear to me), takes offence because Ctesippus, 303 A., when the buffoonery of Pionysoclorus lias
tific
character, in which the reader
was to recognise Isocrates. This was just as possible and just as

an anachronism as Schaarschmidt s supposed reference to Antisthenes in the Theaetetus. (Irote (Plato, vol. i. 559), without
little
reached
its
height, gives
TU>
up further opposition, with the words d0tVra,ucu d^d^w &v5pe,

is pal Still more pable. unintelligible, at least in my opinion, is the assertion on p. 334 that the men tion of Isocrates as the head of a school (Euthyd. 305 is such a
P>)
where, however, the irony
doubting the genuineness of the
demm
Euthydemus, remarks that Euthyis
treated as the represen
tative of true philosophy and dia lectic, though this is in glaring
flagrant
violation
that
I lato.
we cannot
Jf this
is
of chronology attribute it to an un-Platonic
contradiction with all that pre cedes. But Plato states nothing of the kind: he merely says certain
anachronism, what must Schaarschmidt think of the anachronisms
people regard
dyU0t
Ev6vdT)[j.oi>]
the Sophists (TOI)S as their rivals, and
Symposium, the Gorgias, and the Laws (cf. my treatise on the Anachron isms of the Plat. Dial., Abh. d. Berl. Akad. 1873. Hist.-Phil.
the
in
the
Protagoras,
seek therefore (because they con found the Sophists with the true
philosophers) to disparage the phi
losophers.
9(i
which, however, he rightly accepts without scruple ? But the Euthydemus not only docs not mention Isocrates as the head of a school, but does not men
7<J
Kl.
Cf. p. 70, 54.
sq.),
all; it simply repre sents Socrates as drawing a scien
tion
him at
Ast, 474 sq. 402 sq. de cides with his usual confidence : on the other hand Schaarschmidt dose not give any decided opinion. 93 Vide Part i. p. 103, 1 and Ueberweg, Plat. Schr. 237 sq.
97
As
<j
as a first attempt^; and decisive Aristotelian evidence, of a slight and the Entity phro as an occasional writing," On the other hand, there are so hasty character.
many weighty
nus, that notwithstanding 100 work Platonic r it is difficult to believe this Rhetoric, we might suppose if Aristotle really meant to attest it, instance he was deceived by a forgery that in this one 1 The Ion soon after Plato s death. ventured
internal arguments against the Menexethe passages in Aristotle s
upon
is
First the Greater Hippias probably, and and^ Alcibiades are still more probably, spurious/ the remainder of the dialogues in our collection,
-
Second Alcibiades, the Theages, the Anterasti, Hippar99
Following
from
tho
precedent
of
Hermann, Brandis and Steinhart

(differing
tho Euthyphro, Part i. p. 100 On which cf. 54.

101
1>1,
1.
my
Plat. Stud.
150
With
the
in reference to the Hippias Minor), I have endeavoured to prove this
in the Ztschr.f. Alterthumsw., 1851,

p.
250 sq. The same view is em braced by Susemihl and Munkin the works I have so frequently quoted, also by Stein, Gesch. d. Plat. i. 80 sq., 135 sq., and Ueberweg edit. i. 121 (Gesch. d. Phil. 4th sq.) : on the contrary, Ribbing, Genet. Darst. d. plat. Ideeul. ii. 129 sq., 103 sq., decides that the Enthjphro, Laches, Charmides, and Lysis, are genuine, while the Hippias Minor he considers Schaarschmidt to be spurious. Schr. 382 sq.) (Saraml. d. plat.
rejects the whole five The latter is opposed
have already put forward in my Platonic Stud. 144 sq., following who have Ast, most of those treated the question, besides Grote r
gards
judgment as Menexenus, which

this
re
have since declared themselves

;
in
the question is dis agreement cussed with particular thorough

ness by Steinhart (Plat.
W.W.
vi.
372
sq.).
tering upon the Menexenus is in no way an Platonic independent source for to Plato s relation philosophy; Rhetoric can in no instance be
I will refrain from en it here, especially as
determined
from
this
dialogue,
its
dialogues.
by Bonitz
in an exhaustive disquisition Zur Erkl. plat. Dialoge (Hermes v.), 429 sq., specially with regard to On the evidence of the Laches.
and, in fact, even if genuine, can only be conceived scope according to the explanations we give of other dialogues. 102 Cf. Ztschr. f. Alterthumsw..
Aristotle vide
p.
58,
31,
70; on
do I find any 1851, p. 256 sq. Nor this, thing in Munk to contradict view.
PLATO
elms,
WIUTIXG&
87
Minos,
rightly
critics
Clitophon, and Epinomis, have been abandoned almost unanimously by all modern
with the exception of Grote. It is impossible for a moment to allow any genuineness to the Defini 103 and Steinhart, 104 following the tions; and Karsten
example of Meiners, Hermann, and others, have con
shown that the Letters, as has so often hap were foisted upon their reputed author at various pened,
clusively
dates.
It has indeed been questioned whether even the un doubted works of Plato present a true picture of his
system. According to some, partly to increase his own importance, partly as a precautionary measure, Plato designedly concealed in his writings the real sense and
connection of his doctrines, and only disclosed this in 105 secret to his more confidential This notion pupils. has been, however, since Schleiermacher 10G and
justly
almost universally abandoned. 107

(C
It
can be supported
s
"Werke,
Commentatio. Critica de Plaqure feruntur epistolis.

PI.
10tJ
Plato
1,
1,
11 sq.
lonis
1<%4.
Utr.
cf.
Ritter,
ii.
178
sq.
sq.,
and Socher
PI. Schr.
392
Werke,
viii.
L., 9 sq.
review
PI. sq. of the earlier
279
literature
is given by the first of these passages, and by Karsten in tin- Introduction. This is the general opinion
O nts j ast supporters is Weisse, in the notes to his translation of Aristotle s Physics (pp. 271 sq. ; 313, 329 sq. ; 403 sqq. ;
wr
o ne
437
sq.
445
pp.
of earlier
ier
f
scholars.
all
We may
Anima,
Ges.
471 123-143.
sq.
;
sq.),
and do
Hermann
Motive,
re-
once for
to Brucker, 1,
sq. gives sensible of the investigation reasons fur this concealment and the artifices employed and Tenne;
who
659 thorough and
(Ueber Plato s Abh. 281

to
it
Schrifstell
sq.)
comes rather
asserts that
close
when he
we must
mann, System
2i ,4,
d.
Plat,
1,
128
sq.
Leb.
111, 126, 129. Ast, Plat, n. Schr. 511, gives further
not look for the nucleus of Plato s doctrine in his writings, and that his literary activity never aimed at establishing and developing an organic system of philosophy.
8 ay
Hermann would
hardly
.details.
that Plato ignored or gave up
88

108
neither on Platonic nor Aristotelian evidence:

assertions of later writers
all
the
who
transferred their concep-
philosophic scope in his writings. brings forward in support of Her mann the fact that the Timoeus But, according to his view, the writings only contain incidental and other writings give merely hints of the real principles of brief references to many points of But he adds Plato s system, the supra-sensuous essential importance. The application that it is the doctrine of the doctrine of ideas. of the principles to questions and elements of the ideal world and circumstances of the phenomenal of the soul that is dismissed with world is given in the writings ; the these passing notices, rather than And how do enunciation of the principles them the doctrine of ideas. selves was reserved for oral dis we know that at the time these treatises were written (there can be course. If, however, the inquiries of the Theastetus on the conception no question here, it must be remem of knowledge, the discussions of bered, of the Laws), the former the Sophist. Parmenides, Philebus, doctrine had received its full de
Symposium, Phsedo, Republic, and

Timaeus on the nature of concep
tions,
velopment?
finds
the intended exposition in the Philosopher, and, in fact, all the passages from which we are now able to foim BO complete a representation of the doctrine of Ideas if these were not meant to expound and establish the prin ciples of the system, it becomes difficult to account for them. They may sometimes exhibit a connection with alien questions; but it would
Hermann eventually himself obliged to qualify considerably and, in fact, his for mer assertions almost disappear. He allows, p. 298, that the Sophist
;
and Parmenides, for instance, are concerned with philosophic prin but he would account for ciples this by referring them to an earlier
;
period than the Phsedrus. This may be disputed and, at any rate, is
;
argue
little acquaintance with Plato s artistic method to con clude from this that they were introduced only incidentally. And Plato v. Phrcdrus, 274 B sqq. makes no division between the
in itself no justification for saying that philosophic principles are only incidentally referred to in Plato s
On page 300 he makes writings. a further concession the writings of the Middle Period the Sophist, are directly motived by &c. scientific instruction, and seek to
:
principles
and
their
application.
expound systematically the philo

sopher
s fundamental opinions. Finally, he contents himself with saying of the later writings, cannot expect to find his highest
Indeed, it would have been rather preposterous to communicate the application of philosophic prin
ciples,
We
to all
by means of his writings, the world, even beyond the
limits of his school, while he with
principles enunciated here in broad unmistakable terms (no intelli
held the principles themselves, without which the application could not fail to be misunderstood.
T
l
eber\veg (Unters. plat. Schr.
G5)
gent student would have any such such enunciations expectations) were reserved for his oral dis courses (which seems highly im;
I LATO tions of the
ti
WHITINGS.
HI)
Pythagorean mystical doctrine to Plato, 109

^
It is besides utterly incredible in itself that a like Plato should philosopher have spent a long life in literary labours, designed not
consequently prove nothing.
probable). But, continues Herthese principles arc so maim,
Herm.
as
loc. cit.) is
just as authentic
stamped upon the dialogues, that none with eyes to sec can miss any and the point of real importance dialogues may be used as trust
;
anything that Plato tells us about Socrates. As to Aristotle s frequent quotations from Plato s
discourses (vide subter, and 5), several questions pre sent themselves. First: How far do his accounts vary from the
p.
oral
46,
worthy authorities
sophic
for
for
his
philo
system.
In these
words
we have everything we could wish

granted.
>
The
PL-edrus,
274
sqrj.,
cannot be quoted in support. Plato

only showing there that the thing written is of no worth in but only in so far as it helps recollection of the thing spoken. He does not say that the content of what is delivered should orally not be written down, but con versely, that that only should be written which has passed in per sonal intercourse. The Timseus, 2H is not more relevant for, granted the impossibility of dis
itself,
(
,
is
contents of the Platonic writings? Secondly Are these variations to be ascribed to Plato himself, or to our informant? And, thirdly: May they not be explained by sup posing a real change in Plato s way of thought or teaching? AVe shall discuss these points further
:
on.
109 E.g., tlio Platonic letters just quoted, which betray themselves at once by their clumsy exaggerations. The second letter, by the way, says that the Platonic writings were the work of Socrates in his youth. Another instance is Xumenius apud Kuscbium, Pre-
cussing anything except with persons of special knowledge, it does not follow that such discussion
may
for
not
be
in
Written works
specialists,
may
written works. be designed
and composed so
;
paratio Kvangelica, xiv. 5, 7 (cf. xiii. 5), who says that Plato wrote in a purposely obscure style, as a measure of precaution Siinpl. De
;
Anim.
pupils)
allots
f I
alleged assertion secretiveness, that no true entrusts philosopher his real J5ut thoughts to writing. this is only one more proof of the spuriousness of the letters, and there is a great deal required to prove that the seventh letter (with
in
only they can understand them. J n ftp. J lat. vii. 341 15 sq. 11, :H2 D sq., we iind for the first time something of the
the
that
7, loc. cit. (of

;
Plato and his
iv a.iroppr)Tois
TT]V
^vots
rots
7rapa5i66>Tes
<f>i\offO(pia.v
avTrjv
Trpds TOVS tiXXovs dia TUV fj.adT)/j.a.TiKiitn> tiredeiKvvi TO dfo/xdrwi cf.

j
Cicero De Universo, 2, who sup poses Plato to say (in the Timseus, 28 c.), that it is not safe to speak openly of the Deity and .losephus contra Apionem, 11, 31, cf. Krischc
;
Forschungen, 183
sq.
!o

:
a purpose far to impart his views, but to hide them more effectually and simply carried oat by silence.
Further he himself assigns the same content to tha written as to the spoken word, when he makes the aim 110 And of the one to be the reminding us of the other.
Aristotle could not have been aware of
difference between Plato
s oral
any essential and written teaching,
otherwise he would not have based his
own
exposition-
and criticism equally on both, without ever drawing

attention to the fact that the true sense of the writings
could only be determined by the spoken comments Still less would he have taken the of their author.
mythical or half mythical portions in a literal manner, the idea only possible to one who had never conceived
Nor can this of a secret doctrine pervading them. with Plato s habit theory be brought into connection
of indirectly hinting at his opinion and gradually it when arriving at it, instead of distinctly stating
as
111
formed; with his occasional pursuit, in pure caprice with the it might seem, of accidental digressions
;
confessions of ignorance or the doubting questions that, instead of a fixed unequivocal decision, conclude maiir
or with the method that in particular of the dialogues invests philosophic thoughts with the manycases
;
All this, it is true, is coloured veil of the mythus. found in Plato and the reasons for such a method wil
;
hereafter disclose themselves.
Meanwhile the form
of
the dialogues will offer no insuperable hindrance tc their comprehension by anyone who has penetrated)
110
Pluedrus, 276
D;
cf.
preceding
ni Cf. on this
my
IMat.
Stud p
note.
201 sq.
LATO H WHITINGS.
01
tlieir
light of the whole,
aim and plan, and learned to consider each in the and as explicable only in its relation
;
to others
nor again
belief
112
is
there anything in this form to
that in the writings of Plato we have trustworthy records of his philosophy. If, lastly, we find in these writings, side by side with philosophic
i
weaken the
enquiry, a considerable space allotted to historical de

scription and dramatic imagery, it is yet easy in some cases to separate these elements, in others to recognise
the philosophic kernel which they themselves contain.

112
Cf. also Hegel,
Gesch.
d. Phil. II.
157
sq.,
161
sq.
PLAIO AND THE OLDER ACADEMY.
CHAPTER
III.
THE ORDER OF THE PLATONIC WRITINGS.

comprehension of the Platonic philoso did we possess more phy would be greatly facilitated of the several works, accurate knowledge of the dates and the circumstances which influenced or gave rise to them. We should not only then understand much
OUR
historical
that
in particular dialogues either escapes our notice or remains a mystery, and be better informed
now
as to their design and treatment, but we should also be in a position to judge with greater certainty of the
mutual relations of the several works, and to
follow
of Plato s system, so far step by step the development Unfortunately, how-! as it is reflected in his writings.
ever,
we have
The scanty
not the means of accomplishing all this/ notices of ancient authors as to the
datej
and purpose of certain works are sometimes so imtrust-1 1 worthy that we cannot at all depend upon them, and]
This holds good of the assertion (Diog. iii. 35, brought in by fad), that Socrates bad heard the Lysis to read, and Aristotle (ib. 37, ace. Phavorinus) had heard the Phaedo
(presumably at its first publicalion); of the supposition in Diog.
iii.
Plat.
that the Phsedrus was written treatise (Cicero, it however, Orat. 13, 42 places of the statement oi Athelater) naeus (xi. 505 K), that Gorgitt outlived the appearance of the;
3,
Plato
s first
38
(cf. ibid.
62),
Olympiod.
v.
del-; dialogue named alter him lius (N. A. xiv. 3, 3) that Xeno-i
of
THR ORDER OF THE PLATONIC WRITINGS.

ometimes
fives
03
tell us nothing more than we might ourhave derived from the works. 2 The information
o be obtained
lesign,
from these as to their interconnection, and time of composition is of a

necessarily
character.
-cry
limited
For as they profess to be
ecords of Socratic dialogues, we find indeed in many f them the date and occasion of the alleged conversa-
,,
but as to the imo when they themselves were composed they are ilent, and we can only in a few cases discover from
;
ion either directly or indirectly given
he setting of a dialogue or from one of those anaihronisms which Plato allowed himself with so much
noetic
license, the
3
issigned,
earliest date to which and with some probability that
it
can be
of their
also of its
fiomposition.
It
is
likewise a consequence
before
tively
B.C.
lion composed his Cyropredia in pposition to the first two books of he Republic, and of Plutarch (Sol.
2), that Plato s death prevented he completion of the Critias. Cf. IJebcrweg, Plat, Schr. 210 sq. K.g. Arist. Polit. ii. 6, beginn. ;.nd 1265, a. b. remarks that the were composed later than the lepublic, and that Plato wished to lescribe in them a state approachng nearer to actually existing I tates but little by little it was trough t round again to the ideal tatc of the Republic. s It appears from the beginning f the Thesetetus that this dialogue Is not earlier than the campaign gainst Corinth, in which Theaeteus took part but what campaign I his was we do not learn (vide p.
:
395 and 385 respec is very improbable that the passage of the Mono can refer, as Susemihl believes, Jahrb.
(for
it
f.
Philol.
Ixxvii. 854,
not to the
>aws
well-known event mentioned in Xen. Hell. iii. 5, but to some inci dent which has remained unknown to us we cannot suppose that this incident, which clearly excited so much attention, could have been twice repeated in the course of a few years ; and, moreover, before
;
the successful attack of Agesilaus, Persian politics had no occasion to
make such sacrifices
<
in order to gain the goodwill of a Thcban partyboth dialogues, leader; however, seem to be not far distant from these dates. As to the date of the
it
8, 31).
V)
The Mono (ace. and the Symposium

T>)
to p. 90,
(ace.
to
93,
cannot have been composed
any means be placed
Mcnexenus, if it is really Platonic, must have been written after the Peace of Antalcidas, and cannot by
before that
iU
PLATO AND THE OLDKll ACADEMY.

should
often
dramatic form, that the conversation
from apparently accidental circum develope itself definite theme being proposed; stances, without any and even where there is such a theme, we still cannot end of be sure that it is the sole, or even the ultimate, estimate its the dialogue the end by which we are to
relations to other
works
for the reply to this
main
interwoven with further enquiries of question is often to such importance and scope that it is impossible to the solution of regard them as merely subsidiary 4 The final the more limited problem at first proposed. to be purely nega result also seems not unfrequently
in tive, consisting
5
the failure of
all
some query; and though conclude from this that Plato
we
s
attempts to answer cannot with Grote*
design never extended
and beyond the refutation of every dogmatic assertion, of that elenclitic method by which the exposition
time
the Parmenides, 126,
s
sq.,
dialogue
is
earlier
than
It no
Plato
pre-supposes that Plato conscbrother Pyrilampeg, and no Ionquently Plato himself, were -er very young when this dialogue
half-
first Sicilian visit.
more
fol-
was written. ^The Apology, Crito, and Phsedo, from what is implied in their contents, cannot come before the death of Socrates, nor the Euthyphro, Thesetetus, Meno (accordand ing to 94 E), Gorgias (521 C), Politicus (299 B) before the accusation of Socrates how much later the they are (except in the case of Meno) cannot be determined by historical data contained in the
;
that the lows Irom Bk. i. 330 first hook at least was written before the execution of Ismemas. B.C. 382 (Ueberweg, plat. Schr. 2211 than that it was written before the death of Perdiccas and Xerxes, Cf. on the foregoing points I eberweg, loc. cit. 217-265.
E.g. (besides the Sophist, Polland Philebus), in the llepubout of which goes lie, the working far beyond the problem propounded Bk. ii. 367 E.
ticus,
4
any
As regards dialogues themselves. the Eepublic, even if there were no other grounds for the supposition,
Bk. ix
577
sq.
makes
it to
certain degree probable that this
361 A; Charm. 175 Lach. 199 E; Lys. 223 B; Hipp. Min. 376 C Meno, 100 B; Farm. 166 C. Theaet. 210 A sqq. G Plato i. 292,515; 246, 269 sq. ii. 278, 387 sq. ; 500, 550 sq.
5
Cf. Prot.
;
sq.
THK OHDKli OF
fe
Till-:
I>LA
TONIC WBITIXOfS.
!r,
Socrates confounded the fancied knowledge of his inU-rlocutors; and that his criticism and dialectics
neither rest
directly lead to
which
it:
is
on any positive conviction, nor even in 7 any; yet the positive element, that wanted to complete the critical is
discussions,
a:
not always so evident as to be unmistakable. Again, if a dialogue relates to phenomena of the post-Socratic period, and perhaps is partly occasioned by them, Plato can only in the rarest instance 8 allow his Socrates
plainly to speak of these
restricted
to
hints,
phenomena; he is therefore which were probably sufficiently

<J
may
7
by The same holds good with regard to the mutual intera philosopher who has created such a perfect system as Halo should have composed a whole series of writings, criticising ijien views, without at the same time wishing to do anything towards the establishment of his own;
260, 292, ii. (i. 3 sq.) that the affirmative and currents of his speculation negative ire throughout independent of one mother, each of them having its
irote s assertion
comprehensible to the majority of his first readers, but easily be overlooked or misinterpreted us.
5 s that
I
of
its
1
.
elf
âvcely
credi-
many
objections which Plato main-
might also be maintained against himself, this is simply a phenomenon which occurs
in the case of Aristotle and many others as well, because it is -enc rally easier to criticise than to im-
tains against others
prove
to
to
expose
;
solve
them
follow ever, dialectical discussions

positive result
than does not, howthat Plato in his

difficulties
it
aimed
at
no
Plmlr. 278
)wn channel, and that in ive theories he pays as

.jard
E, about Isocrates
his posilittle
re-
as Socrates to difficulties
Contradictions,
the details of polemical jeloped iMCUsaions, is the natural conseluence ot his presuppositions, but s contradiction to all psycho-
and which he had de-
in the beginning of the Theretetni about Theaetetus. 9 Part i. 214 sq We found it probable that in the Sophist he rcferred to the Megarians, Part i in the ThesetctuV 248, 4, 252 sqq.
;
Jical
how.s
it
Consideration probability. that many scruples thrown
dialogue receive in other the solution which Plato s

of
in
one
to Sophist, Euthydemus Vnti sin the Phi thenes, Part i. 303, 1 lebus to Aristippus, 84 in p. the Euthydemus to Isocrates.
<)4-
such
Many
allusions
may
Platonic
>omt
view
not
his
does
admits; and always happen,
writings
occur in the without beino-
if if
remarked,
96
There cannot be a direct dependence of the dialogues. to another, unless the same allusion in one dialogue lu where this is not the case, in both; persons appear in which the later dialogue can point to
the only way the earlier is by shortly
summing up
the results of the
that the matter former discussions, with the remark 11 here again it is But has been already considered. make mistakes to overlook the relation be to
does not tween two dialogues, or to imagine one that and even when there is no doubt of such inter exist still sometimes arise dependence, the question may is the earlier and which th which of the writings iu There are thus many difficulties, not only later.
;
easy
the
a: of a decision respecting the motive, aim, 12 an enqui but even of plan of the several dialogues, Are th their order, date, and interdependence. into or perha so related to each other as to form one, connected series, or ought we to rega more than one, them merely as isolated productions, in which Pla
way
or inclination prompted hi according as occasion of disclosed now one and now another fragment
his theories of life and of the system, and brought even oi| world to bear on various subjects, sometimes
those which had no direct reference to his philosophy?*

10 E K in the Theretetus, Sophist and Politico, the .Republic, Timams and Critias.
Timseus (51
sq.),
and
also in th
Symposium (202 A)
to the
Men
200
13
1
(^
sq.),
so,)
and the
Theartjtos Laws (v. 730
in all probability he refers in the Phrcdo to the Meno to (vide p. 83, 91), in the Philebus the Parmenides 70, 56), in the
"
In this
way
in the
sq.
also iv.
713
cf.
C), to the Republic

l
Repub. v 47, and (iv. 713 1|
(cf.
sq.) to the Ppliticus (vide 70, 53),
505 B, to the Philelm* x. 611 A sq., to the Phsedo (vide p 532, 2nd edit.), vi. 50, 6 C,
Republic,
vi.
which 1 canno question on enter here. 13 The latter is the view I
to the
Meno
(97
A,
sq.), in the
essenti Sochcr, p. 43 sq., and
THE ORDER OF THE PLATONIC W1UT1XGS.

Supposing the former alternative to be the
tlif
i>7
case,
is
connection of the writings the result of calculation and design ? Or did it evolve itself naturally in tho
course of the author s
life
and mental development?
these causes simultaneously at work, so that the origin and sequence of the Platonic writings
all
Or were
should be ascribed partly to the philosopher
mental
growth, partly to literary and artistic design, and partly also to accidental occasions? What influence
again
had each of these moments generally and particularly ? And how, lastly, on either of the above presuppositions,
arc
we
to decide
on the date and succession of tho

all
sc\ oral
works
On
opinions
rians
differ widely.
these points, as is well known, Many of the ancient gramma
certain groups
and commentators divided the works of Plato into and classes, 34 according to the affinity of
and peirastic ; under that of agonistic the endeictic and anatreptic
writings. Diogenes makes the same primary division into didactic and zetetic dialogues, but pro-
of Ast, p. 38 sqq., not to mention the older scholars, such as Tenne-
mann,
14
Plat. Phil.
i.
to form
get a division according in Diog. iii. 49 sq., and Prolog. 17 ; the divisions are into
We
137, 264.
ceeds to a triple subdivision, of tho

zetetic
dramatic, narrative, and mixed dialogues. Diog. himself, loc. cit., approves of a division according to matter we have one like this given by Albinus, Isagoge in Plat. dial, c. 3, G. Albinus divides thedidactic from the zetetic dialogues (vfi-rjyrjTLKol from ^tjT-rjTiKoV), and subdivides the didactic into theoretic and practical the zetetic into
; ;
into
physical, ethical (in-
eluding political), and logical (according to the scheme of StSacr/coXta,

irpais, dirdSeiîs), and of the didactic into gymnastic (peirastic and
These gymnastic and agonistic. again have further subdivisions
the theoretic dialogues into physical and logical, the practical ilia-
logues into ethical and political, Under the head of gymnastic dialogues
maieutic), elenchtic, and agonistic (anatreptic). Aristophanes too in his determination of the trilogies, into which he divided a part of the Platonic dialogues (vide p. 51, 14), in correspondence with the connection which Plato himself has made between certain of them (Aristophanes first trilogy is that of the Kepublic, and this seems to
come the
so-called maieutic
have been the standard which occasioned his whole arrangement),
08
and by this they apparently meant that they were following, at any rate partially, 15 Their assump the order observed by Plato himself.
their form or contents;
tions
Platonic doctrines however, so arbitrary from such un-Platoiiic points of view are grouped
are,
;
the spirit and deeper reference of individual works the spurious is so greatly in are so little understood first attempt to termingled with the genuine, that this
determine the order of the writings was rather deterCritias phon, Republic, Timaeus, Let (9) Minos, Laws, Epinomis, The standard in this com ters. bination is unmistakably the con tents of the writings only in the first tetralogy the philosophical aims are not so much considered as the reference to the fate of Socrates personally. The existence
; ;
seems
to
have been directed partly

of the contents of
by the relation
the dialogues, partly by referring to the supposed time of publication. The former, on the other hand, is the only starting point for Thrasyllus
arrangement.
marian (particulars
This gram about whom
are given Part iii. a. 542, 3, 2nd edit., and in the authorities quoted to there) divides the dialogues (ace. Diog. iii. 56 sqq., Albin. Isag. 4) in one respect just as Diogenes,
into physical, logical, ethical, poli tical, maieutic, peirastic, endeictic, anatreptic. This division, and also
of a series of different arrangements of the Platonic writings is proved Beitr. z. (as Nietzsche remarks, d. Laert., Quellenkunde Diog. Basel, 1870, 13 sq.) by the fact
the double titles of certain dialogues, taken from their contents

J)
(<baiwi>
^vxys and so forth), he either borrowed from some one else or was the first to introduce but he further divides the whole of the
TTfpl
;
that Diog. iii. 62 mentions no less than nine dialogues, which were the placed by different writers at beginning of their catalogues, among them the Republic and Euthyphro, with which Aristo
phanes and Thrasyllus had com
menced
15
their lists respectively.
Platonic writings into the nine
fol
lowing
tetralogies
(1)
Euthy-
According to Diogenes, Thra Plato him syllus maintained that

self
phro, Apology, Crito, Phtedo ; (2) Cratylus, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus (3) Parmenides, Philebus, Symposium, Phrcdrus ; (4) the two
;
published
the
dialogues
in
tetralogies.
much-debated question as to the order in which
The
Alcibiades, Hipparchus, Anterastrc,

(5) Theages, Charmides, Laches, Lysis (6) Euthydemus, Protagoras, (7) the two HipGorgias, Meno
;
;
they should be read is of itself, strictly speaking, a presumption that they were arranged on a defi
nite plan.
Cf. Diog. 62, Albin.
4 sqq.
pise,
Ion,
Menexenus
(8)
Clito-
Tllfi
ORDER OF THE PLATONIC WRITINGS

1G
;
99
rent than encouraging and the same judgment must be passed on those modern attempts which followed in the track of Thrasyllus and Albinus. 17 Even Temiernamrs enquiries into the chronological order of the
Platonic works, 18 useful as they were in their time, are generally superficial in their neglect of any fixed and decisive point of view. The notion of an
arrangement
based upon the internal connection of the dialogues was first fully and satisfactorily carried out in Schleier-
macher s
Plato,
brilliant work.
as
inferior to
According to this author, he certainly considered written instruction 20 spoken, and yet continued writing to such
19
to
an extent even in old age, must have manifestly sought make his writings resemble conversation as much as
possible.
Now
the
weak point
:
of written teaching, as
he himself intimates, is this that it must always re main uncertain whether the reader has really appre hended the thought of the writer; and that there.is no
opportunity for defence against objections, or for the removal of misunderstandings. In order, as far as
plan every enquiry that the reader should be driven either to the origination of the required thought, or to the distinct
consciousness of having missed
Against
recent
it
;
might be, to remedy these defects, Plato in his writings must have made it a rule so to conduct and
and as the plan of

;
defenders of
24
sq.
18
the Ihrasyllic tetralogies, cf. de Ihrasyllo, Ind. lect.
Ast, 49 sq.
Herm.
Gott.
Hermann, 562.
185. 13 FE.g.
sq.
Syst. d. plat. Phil. 1, 115 sqq He and his followers up to Herniann are mentione.l by Ueberwef
Serranus,
Petit,
Syden-
ham, Eberhard, and Geddes.
With
Unters. d. plat, Schr. 7-111 19 Loc. cit. p. 17 sqq

2
regard to these, it will suffice to referto Schleiennacher, PI. W. 1, 1,
Phajtlr.
274
sqq.
Cf. Pro-
tagoras, 329 A.
H2
100
this design, there each separate dialogue clearly shows and a necessary mutual refe arises a natural sequence could make rence in the dialogues collectively. Plato cer no advance in any dialogue unless he presumed a
tain effect to have been produced
by its predecessor that which formed the conclusion of one consequently as the basis and commencement must be
;
presupposed
of another.
And
phical sciences,
as he regarded the various philoso and separate, but as es not as
many
and indivisible, there would result sentially united from this not many parallel independent orders of Pla but one all-embracing order. In this
tonic dialogues,
21
to distinguish three divi order, Schleiermacher proceeds
sions:
the elementary, the indirectly enquiring, and He does not the expository or constructive dialogues. succession of the works; maintain that the chronological
must necessarily and minutely correspond with from some internal relation, nor that occasionally
dental reason that which
this
acci
of
came
earlier
in
order
thought
may
He
claims only 22 main with the chronological order.
not have appeared later in order of timejJ that his order should coincide in tli
He
allows thai
arc
secondary works of comparatively

intermingled with the principal
less
importance
dialogues, and
ht
would also which do not lie at all within the sphere of philo 23 These concessions, however, do not affect hit sophy.
general canon.
21
make room
for those occasional writing!
24
22 23
2*
Loc. cit. p. 44 sqq. Loc. cit. p. 27 sq. 38 S q. Scbleiermacher reckons, in the
first
class of Plato s writings, tfo
Phcedrus, Protagoras, nides as chief works
and Parme
;
the Ljsil
Laches, Charmides, and Euthyphr
THE ORDER OF THE PL A TONIC WRITINGS.

Ast agrees with
Schleiermaclier
25
;
101
in
distinguishing
three classes of dialogues
but
differs
from him con
siderably in his principle of classification, in his dis tribution of particular dialogues the three
among
classes,
and in his judgment of their authenticity. Schleiermacher is still more decidedly opposed by Socher 26 and Stallbaum 27 in their attempt at a chroorder,
23
nological
but neither of these writers fully

developed, and in some points modified, in the Introductions to
i.)
as secondary works; the Apology and Crito as occasional pieces of

historical import, and other minor dialogues as probably In the second class he spurious. puts the Gorgias and Theaetetus, with the Mono as an appanage, and at a further interval the Euthydemus and Cratylus then come the
essentially
single dialogues, and in numerous Dissertations. 28 Socher assumes four periods in his writings. 1. Up to Socrates accusation and death comprising the Theages, Laches, Hippias Mi
:
nor,
1st
Alcibiades,
De
Virtute,
Sophist, Phaedo,
Politicus,
and Philebns.
Symposium, Some faw

.
Mono, Cratylus, Euthyphro, Apo

logia, Crito, Phsedo.
2. Up to the establishment of the school in the
dialogues are passed over as spu His rious, or at least doubtful. third class contains the Republic, and the Timacus, and Critias Laws, again as an appanage. S icr.itic, in which the poetic
;
Academy
comprising
the
Ion,
Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Pro

tagoras, Theaetetus, Gorgias, Philebus. 3. From that time to about the 55th or 00th }"car of Plato s life, to which belong the
dramatic clement predomi e.g. the Protagoras, Pluedialec drus, Gorgias, and Phaxlo tic or Megarian, in which the poetic element is in the background (Theaetetus, .Sophist, Politicly, Parmenides, Cratylus) purely scien
nates
; ; ;
and
or Socratic-Platonic, in which the poetic and dialectic elements interpenetrate reciprocally (Philetific,
Phaodrns, Menexenus, Symposium, 4. The Republic, and Timacus. period of old age, comprising the Stallbaum makes three LAW*. one, up to the time just periods after Socrates death, including the Lysis, two Hippia?, Charmides, Laches. Euthydemus, Cratylus,
:
1st Alcibiades,
Mcno, Protagoras,
Apology,
Crito,
bus, Symposium, Republic, Timajus, Critias\ All the rest he regards as spurious. Cf. the criticisms of Bramlis, 1, a. 163. Loc. cit. p. 41 sqq., c. 27 De Platonis vita, ingenio et
|
Euthyphro,
Gorgias.
Ion,
Of these he dates the Charmides about B.C. 405, and

the Laches soon after (Plat. Opp. v. i. 1834, p. 86, vi. 2, 1836, p. the Euthydemus 403 (loc. 142)
;
scriptis
Tom.
i.
(Dialogi selecti, 1827, A; Opera, 1833, Tom.
cit.
vi.
1,
63
sqq.)
01. 94,
94,
?,
1;
Cratylus,
Olympiad
(loc.
102

reduced
first to
established this order, or

ciple.
Hermann
was the
sions of Schleiermacher
definite
for
by
view of the origin to prove the his predecessor Herbart, while seeking
it to a fixed prin controvert the conclu a new theory, founded on a 29 of the Platonic writings;
of the doctrine of ideas by the gradual transformation had not applied this point of help of the dialogues, view to our collection as a whole. Like Schleierma
cher,
Hermann
is
convinced that the Platonic writings,

;
collectively, represent
a living, organic development not in but he seeks the cause of this phenomenon, the part of their author, on any design or calculation of his mind. They are not, in his but in the
opinion, a
of philosophic development but a direct consequence of Plato s indi Plato, he thinks, ripened only vidual development,
for others,
v
2
growth mere exposition
cit
26);
Alcibiades,
at
his
Therct.
sq.,
the lime
when An.ytus began
12 sqq., ami Parm. 290 Stallbaum bad dated them two

;
Socrates (loc. proceedings against cit. vi. if 187); Mono, Olympiad 04 3 (loc. cit vi. 2, 20); Protagoras,
soon after tbesetbe years later) the Syrf Pbsedrus, followed by later than B.C. posium, a little
,
Olympiad 94,3
16; Opp.
or
vi.
Sel. 11, 2,
4 (Dial. 2, 142);
385 (Dial.
then
the
Sel.
iv
<
Pluedo,
in.
1,
sqq.); 1, Philebus, and

.
Euthvphro, Olympiad 95, l u.c. 399, at the beginning of the proseIon same period cution (loc. cit )
;
Republic,
Olympiads
(Dial. Sel. third period is
Ixn. sq.).
99-100. Ihe
(loc
cit
iv
2,
remaining three,
soon
after
Sel. 11, 1, 24).
and the Olympiad 95, 1,

289),
Socrates
death (Dial,
His second period rantres between the fir.st and second Sicilian journey, and comprises the Theietetos, Sophist, Politic,
written four all Parmenides, letwcen B.C. 399 and 388, and published immediately afterwards 28-45 previously, (cf. Kep. pp. in his treatise De Arg. ct Art.
;
between the second and Plato s death, and the I including the Laws the latter begun before the tias Laws, but finished alter, Opp. vii. 377.) 9 Loc. cit.: cf. especially o4b]., 384 sq., 489 sqq. !0 In the treatise DC \ lat Svstematis fundamento, 1808 (WJcj
Sicilian journey
;
<
xii.
appendix weg, loc.
61 sqq.), but especially in the cf. Leber(ibid. 88 sq.

:
cit.
38
sq.)
/ //
ORDER OF THE PL ATOXIC WRITINGS.
103
gradually, and under the influences of his time ; the stadia along his course are marked the different
by
classes of his
The two events of greatest writings. consequence in his mental history are, according to Hermann, the death of Socrates, with its immediate
withdrawal to Megara and his own first which acquainted him with the journey, Pythagorean 31 doctrine. While these indicate the chief periods of
;
result, Plato s
his intellectual life
and
literary activity, they also fur
nish us with three classes of dialogues the Socratic or elementary; the dialectic or mediatising; the ex The dialogues of the first pository or constructive. class, written in part before the death of Socrates, in
part immediately after, have a fragmentary, more ex clusively elenchtic and protreptic character, confine themselves almost entirely to the Socratic manner, and as yet go no deeper into the fundamental
ques
tions of philosophy.
The second
class is distinguished
by greater dryness, less liveliness, less carefulness of and by that searching criticism (sometimes ap proving, sometimes polemical) of the Megaro-Eleatic
form,
which occupied the time of Plato s sojourn In the third period, there is on the one hand, as to style, a return to the freshness and fulness of the first; 32 while on the other, Plato s horizon has
philosophy, in Megara.
himself says, p. the return to his native city and the beginning of his career teacher in the But Academy. i what follows he really assigns ato s acquaintance with
;
31
Hermann
philosophic development.
3-
1S4,
Hermann accounts
for
thi,
as follows: It was not till his return to his native city that the reminiscences of his youth
p.
397,
Pytha-
conkl once
soul.
more
rise
before
his
.joreanism, acquired on his travels, is the deciding motive in his
This would certainly be u remarkable effect of external cir-
sopliy
and from the fusion of
all
these
of his get the most perfect expositions which the Socratic form receives the dee
and thus attains modern writers on
its
33 highest ideal.
this question fluctuate
and Herma: part between Schleiermacher 35 34 and Brandis, and more i ample, Bitter
cnmstances on a character like Plato s but scarcely more remark able, perhaps, than the influence
;
of the
pleted
same perio by the Pi(
and
Critias.
The
which Hermann
ibid,
suspects, of
the separation a separation of a few miles from the metropolis of Greek classicality, in producing the crudities of the Megarian
dialogues.
sion of the
gives a full discus Lysis, as the type of the first class, which includes the Lesser Hippias, Ion, 1st Alcibiades, Charmidcs, Laches,
33
Hermann
suggested by the the latter Sicilian 34 Bitter, Gescl attaches only a tance to the enqui of the Platonic impugns the exist port ant difference them, and does no
s
Socratic period
ir
completion
the
and in Protagoras and
activity to the exl
Euthydcmus. The Apology, Crito, and Gorgias are a transition to the second class, and the Euthyphro, Meno, and Hippias Major but its comes still nearer to it
;
recognition is jusl up all certainty
the representatives are Theactetus, Sophist, Politictis, and The third class is Parmenides. headed by the Phsedrus, as an inaugural lecture at the opening
proper
hand, but is incnm Schleiermacher s agreeing with that the three literary periods Pluedrus was written before the Protagoras (an inference from p. 275 sqq., compared with Prot. 329, A., which does not seem decisive
to me),
of the
Academy. Socher, o07 sq., and Stallbaum, Jntrod. Phavl. iv. 1, xx. sq., had already conceived this
to be the position of the Phsedrus. The Menexcnus is an appendage to
this,
and before and after these the Lesser Hippias, Lysis, Laches, then the Apology, rharmides Crito, Euthyphro next the Gorgias,
; ;
Parmenidcs, Thecetetus, Sophist, Politicus perhaps about the same time the Euthydemus, Meno, and
;
and the Symposium, Phaedo, and Philcbus are riper productions
Cratylus
Philebus,
later
on,
the Phsedo,
;
and
Symposium
and

36
105
bing,
ler
3r
follow Schleiermacher in the

ally themselves
logy, Crito,
main
Schweg38
;
and Steinhart
with
Hermann
last
the Republic, Timaeus (Grit.)

L:i\vs.
ii.
,
and as a
transition to
and
J5
152 sqq defends Brandis, Schleiermacher s view with much force and acuteness against the attacks of Hermann, without main taining the formers arrangement
in all its details.
the second class, Gorgias. (2} Dialectico-thcoretic dialogues Thesetetus, Meno, Euthydcmus, Cratylus,
:
He
would assign
the Parmenides to the second lite

period, and not place the Meno, Kuthydemus, and Cratylus between the Theaetetus and Sophist.
rary
Sophist, Politicus, Parmenides. (3) Synthetic and progressive dialogues Symposium, Phzedo, Philebus, Re public, with which (p. 117 sq.) the Timseus, together with the Critias and the doubtful Hermocrates, must
:
.be
He
in
eets
the
connected, though not inti mately, on account of their expo
Phrcdrus,
it
however,
the Lysis,
sition of peculiar views.
The
re
the
front rank, with Schleier
macher, and next to

Protagoras,
and amongst these the Laws, Ribbing considers

maining
writings,
Charmides,
;
Laches,
Euthyphro
to
and assents generally
leading ideas of Schleier arrangement. Ribbing, in his Genet. DarBtellungderplat. Ideenlehre (Leipz. 1863), the second part of which is devoted to an examination into the
the
macher
56
spurious. 37 Hist, of Phil., 3rd edit. p. 43 sq. 38 Steinhart arranges the dia logues as follows 1st, Purely So
:
cratic
nor,
Ion, Hippias 1st Alcibiades

:
Major and Mi
(before
Alci-
genuinemss and arrangement

the
of
biades second banishment, B.C. 406), Lysis, Charmides (at the beginning of the rule of the Thirty, B.C.
404), Laches, Protagoras. Socratic, transitional to the doctrine of Idens
:
writings, puts forward the hypothesis that the scientific con tents and the scientific form of the Platonic writings must be the
Euthydemus,
Meno, 309 Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, same

B.C.
; ; ;
402
standard
for
their
arrangement,
and that the order arrived at from this point of view must coincide
with
order.
their
supposition
proper chronological In accordance with this he marks out, in
year; Gorgias, soon after the be ginning of the sojourn at Megara Cratylus, somewhat later. 2nd, Dia lectical Theoetetus, n c. 393, com posed perhaps at Gyrene Parmen ides, probably between the Egyptian
:
;
agreement
with
Schleiermacher,
and
Sicilian
journey
Sophist and
three classes, among which he divides the particular dialogues in the following way: Socratic
(1)
Dialogues,
i.e.
such as particularly
method of phi losophizing, and are connected with the Platonic system propredeutically Phsedrus, Protagoras, Char mides (ace. to p. 131 sq. also
kiM-p to the Socratic
:
perhaps during the Italian journey. 3rd, Works belonging to Plato s matu rity, after his travels in Italy and more exact acquaintance with Py
thagorean philosophy the Phaedrus, B.C. 388 Symposium, 385 Plisedo, Philebus, Republic, about 367 Timreus, Laws. In his Life of Plato, however (301, 2, 232 sq.), the Meno
:
;
Politicus,
same time or
Lysis),
Laches,
Euthyphro, Apo
100

tries to reconcile both,
39 40
and similarly Ueber-l that the view of Plato s works, as evin weg, holding his philosophy, has no cing a gradual development of than the other view of a less historical
Susemihl
justification
methodical design determining the order of the works, demands that the two principles should be to some extent the limit, and to some extent the complement,
one of the other.
He
ultimately inclines very
much
to the side of Schleiermacher, placing, however, the commencement of Plato s literary career much later
than Schleiermacher does, and differing considerably from all his predecessors with regard to the order of 41 The theories of Munk and the several
writings.
of indirect teaching Euthydemus, placed in the lime after So and the Philelms, Cratylus (both perhaps written at death with Ueberwcg in Plato s last Megara), Thesetetus (after 394 and Timseus and the visit to Gyrene), Phaedrus period, between the Parthe La\vs. (389-8), Sophist, Politicus, 29 He agrees with Hermann in menides, Symposium (383-4), Third scries, constructive Phsedo. saying that at the beginning of Philebus, Eepublic his literary career Plato had not dialogues his whole system already mapped (between 380 and 370), Tiuiasus, Laws. But he does not agree with Ctitias, out.
is
:
crates
Hermann
further
theory,
viz.,
that Plalo was unacquainted with Socrates earlier philosophies in and that therefore the lifetime, shown with Elcatic acquaintance and Pythagorean doctrines is a decisive criterion of the date of any work. His arrangement, ac cordingly, is slightly ditferent from the first scries his predecessor s
:
40 Enquiry into the PlaUnic writings, 89-111, 74 sq., 81.

41
(p.
ICO
In the above-mentioned work to the sq. 293) with regard
Protagoras, Lesser Hippias, Lysis, Charmides, and Laches, Ueberweg considers it probable that they were composed in Socrates life time, while the Apology and Crito imme (p. 246 sq.) were composed
comprises Socratic or propaedeutic ethical dialogues, Hippias Minor, Prota Lysis, Charmides, Laches,
(399 B.C.), Apology, Urito, Gorgias (soon after Socrates
goras,
To the diately after his death. same period he thinks the Gorgias must belong (p. 249) the Phaedrus
;
Mono
death),
Euthyphro
The 2nd
(rather later). series, dialectic dialogues
on the contrary (252 sq., 101) to the years 377-5 u.c. ; that the Sym posium must have been written 385-4 (219 sq.), not long after the

A\ oisse
107
ii
While most commentators have based their enquiry into the order of the Platonic books chiefly on the contents, these two writers pay much more attention to the form
since Sclileiermacher
;
stand almost alone.
taking his criterion of earlier or later author from the date to which each dialogue is ship internally 42 and Weisse from the distinction of direct assigned,
Munk
and narrated dialogues. 43

Phoedrus;
2;;>
,
few other authors, who

(cf.
the
Euthydemus
(258,
Writings
between the Phaedrus and the Phaedo, the Republic and the Kmseus, and still earlier before the
Munk
especially p. 25 sq.)
Phaô the Mcno (281 sq.). The Theaetetus Ueberweg (227 sq.) places in the year 368, or there abouts the (Sophist, Politicus, and Philebus (p. 204 sq., 275, 171, 290 sq.), as also the Laws, in Plato s
;
goes on the supposition that Plato wished to give in the main in the body of his writings Socratic cycle not so much an
exposition of his own system, as a complete, detailed, and idealised picture of the life of the true philosopher, Socrates; and as that presupposes a plan in accordance with which he determined the ex
ternal investiture of the dialogues, so the times of publication show the order in which Plato intended
last
years
(p.
221,
171).
The
Pannenides he considers spurious (supra 82, 86). These views are modified in the treatise Ueber don Gegensatz zwischen Methodikern and Genetikern, Ztschr. f. Philop. N. F. cvii. 1870, p. 55 sq. cf.
:
them
to be read, and on the whole also that in which they were com
Grundr. i. 121, 4th edit, (besides the statements about the Sophist,
Politicus,
86
it
83, 90).
likely
and Meno, quoted pp. 82, Uebenveg. r.ow thinks that Plato s writings as a
In particular Munk makes posed. the dialogues of the Socratic cycle follow one another thus, in three divisions (1) Pannenides, Prota
:
whole belong to the period after the founding of the school in the Academy and further, as a neces sary consequence of this supposi tion, he deduces the sequence of all
;
goras, Charmides, Laches, Gorgias, Ion, Hippias Major, Cratylus, Euthydemus, Symposium ; ( 2 )
Phoedrus, Philebus, Eepublic, Tinueus, Critias (3) Meno, The

;
aetetus,
Sophist,
Politicus,
Euthy-
writings without exception Tom a deliberate and systematic in harmony plan and, finally, with this, he places the Protagoras :vnd the kindred dialogues between
.he
;
:he
42
Symposium and
In his treatise
of
:
the Republic.
( Phaedo. rito, Apology, Outside the cycle come the dia logues which were composed be fore Socrates death, or on special occasions, such as on the one hand Alcibiades I., Lysis, and Hippias II., on the other the Laws and the
phro,
The Natural
Platonic
Arrangement
the
MenexemiH. 43 Schu ne
(on Plato s Protagoras,
108

44
have never sought definitely to establish their theories, can only be shortly mentioned in this place.
1862, p. 8 sq.) wishes to
make
this
and
also
for
many
details in his
distinction the ground of an en order quiry into the chronological He appeals to of Plato s writings. in the Republic, iii. the
treatise.
44 Suckow, Form. d. Plat. Schrift. 508 sq., supposes with Schleieran macher arrangement and
C sq., where Plato banishes the drama from his state, and to allows gether with lyric poetry that too only narrative poetry, and
392
passage
under fixed and limited conditions. With him he comhines as standards for judgment, the esthetic and
of view, stylistic points
sequence of the Platonic dialogues according to deliberate and special His arrangement, however, aims. Schleierwidely deviating from macheris as follows: (l)Parmenides,
Protagoras,
(2)
Symposium, Phaedrns,
because the
is style of the particular writings
a more universal and trustworthy criterion of their genuineness and date than their subject matter, and the affinity of style will be very the time of closely connected with
to this point production. According of view, as be remarks, the Pla
Republic and Timaeus; (3)Philebus, Therctetus, Sophist, Apology, the Phzedo. (The Politicus and Laws he considers spurious as re he gards the remaining dialogues
:
Stein (Sieb. expresses no opinion.) Biicher z. Gesch. d. Plat. i. 80 sq.) separates the Platonic dialogues into three groups: (1) introductory
tonic works will arrange them selves somewhat as follows : (1)
Laws,
Cratylus,
Theaetetus,
So
such as work out the system in its Ethics (Meno, particular elements, Laches, Charmides, Protagoras,
Science Euthyphro, Euthydemus),
(Lysis, Phsedrus,
Symposium);
(2)
phist, Politicus, Philebus, Timseus, Critias, Meno, Phredrus: (2) Men-
(Theretetus\
the
theory
excnus, Apology, Crito, Gorgias, Protagoras, La:hes, Charrnides, Symposium, Parmenides, Republic, the direct dialogues are Phrcdo Gorgias, Cratylus, Critias, Crito, Meno, Laws, Phoedrus, Laches, Philcbus, Politicus, Sophist, TheTimseus the indirect arc retetus,
:
;
Good (Gorgias and
of tho Philebus), the
So theory of Ideas (Parmenides, phist, and Politicus), Psychology whicl: (3) the dialogues (Phaedo) construct the State and the sys
;
tern of
Critias,
Charmides,
Parmenides,
Phaedo,
Nature (Republic, Timaeus He regards Laws). Crito supplementary the Apology, Menexenus, the two Hippire, Ion
Alcibiades
I.,
J
The
tl*
the
Protagoras, Republic, Symposium. The Âpology is related to the in direct, the Menexenus to the direct dialogues. The writings not
and Cratylus.
to
relation of this division time of the composition
of
mentioned here Schone apparently

does
not
allow
to
be
Plato
s.
He
says, however, in his preface that he is indebted to a lecture of
dialogues he has not yet explained. Rose, De Arist. libr. ord. 25 proposes the following arrange merit: Apology, Crito, Alcibiadet
I
Weisse
for his
fundamental concep
Platonic question,
Lysis Euthyphro, Laches, Ion two Hippise, Charmides*
tions as to the
Menexenus, Protagoras, Euthyde
THE ORDER OF THE PLATONIC WRITINGS,
luy
If we would gain a sure standard for this enquiry, the ostensible date of the dialogues and the historical position which Socrates occupies in them must not be
taken into account; for we have no proof at all that the order which would thus result is the order in
which they were composed, or that Plato ever in tended to portray his master in a continuous, biographical manner. Indeed, this assumption is refuted,
not only by the indications given in several of the works as to the time when they were written, 45 but also by the circumstance that the Socrates of Plato
of philosophy 46 in exactly the same manner, ^discourses Jin age and in youth and during the last years of his
;
:
pursues enquiries which formed the elementary j groundwork of dialogues purporting to be earlier. 47 The fact that Plato in the Theaetetus explicitly makes
life
choice of the direct dramatic form of conversation to 48 avoid the inconveniences of second-hand repetition,
imis,
_
Sophist,
Gorgias, Meno, Thesetetus, Cratylus, Parmenides,
where he
resembles that in the Protagoras, is a young man and in

;
letters,
written Olymp. 107,

II.
1.
Alcibiades
and Theages, if they are genuine, precede the Protagoras. 40 According to this the Meno, and probably also the Thesetetus, must be earlier than the Symposium and the Timseus: vide supra 93, 3;
90,11. According to were later.
46
47 Cf. e.g. the relation of the Theaetetiw to the Parmenides, of the Kepublic to the Timoms, of the
Munk
Gorgias, Meno, and to the Kepublic, of the Fhaedrus to the Symposium. Munk perverts these relations in a very Cf. also Suseunsatisfactory way.
Politicus,
Euthyphro
they
mihl s thorough criticism of Hunk s work. Jahrb. fur Philol. Ixxvii.
For instance in the Euthydemus, where ho is fjSrj irpecpvTcpos

(272
B), his
829
sq.
Page 143 B.
sq.,
a passage
philosophic
method
which can only be explained on
110
and that he elsewhere more than once connects, either unmistakable reference, a direct expressly or by an 49 an indirect one preceding it, would ol dialogue with
itself suffice to
rebut the theory of Weisse

is
for the
this
to suppositions that are necessary 50 much farther than evidence go
countervail
that
pure conjecture. Plato gave
permissible tc right to suppose; unconditional preference to the re
Nor have we any
peated dialogue, except in cases where for the attainment of the required end
it
was important
to describe with
some minuteness the persons, motives, and accompany

51 he doubtless, ing circumstances of the conversation forms during his whole literary career, employed both
;
indifferently, as occasion offered.
There are other and

to
more important clues by which we can

the supposition that the Thesetetus was preceded by other narrated dialogues (as the Lysis, Charm ides,
didactic.
some extent
determine the chronological order of the writings, and

Here the question
is
not
and Protagoras). 49 The Timseus and the Laws
to
the Kepublic, the Philebus (supra, 70, 56) to the Parmenides. 50 That the introduction of the Thoretetus is not genuine, that the in an earlier recension "Republic hnd the form of a direct dialogue, that the Laws (in spite of the
imitation of different! characters, but about the exposition of philosophic views. Should, however, that inference be drawn, we fail to see what advantage the
about
the
evidences
supra,
and
pp. 93, 2; written before the
proofs mentioned 90, 11) were

lie-public,
but
dialogues had in this respect over the direct, inasmuch as the expressions of the Sophists and like persons, at the representation of whom offence might have been taken, in the one just as much as in the other were related in Sid, direct speech, consequently and not aTrXrj dirjyriaei /u/u-/7<rews
narrated
after acknowledged Plato s death; Schb ne, p. 6 sq. 51 For the passage in the Eeto dramatic, public which refers only allows no epic, and lyric poetry,
were
only
traits
reasoning from analogy as to Plato s procedure in writings which serve the philosophicquite another aim,
(Hep. 392 D). The most unworthy which Plato represents, such as the obstinacy and buffoonery of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, are described by Socrates, just as much as the bluntness of Thrasymachus in Hep. i. 336 B.
THE
ti.
01iJ>KJi
OF
Till : ri. ATONIC
WHITINGS.
Ill
:1
also the question whether or not that order arises from conscious design. Such are the references in various dialogues to events in Plato s lifetime they are, how:
t]
but few in number, and point only to the date before, and not after, which a dialogue could not have been written. 52 While, therefore, much valuable infornation of a particular kind is to be gained from them, hey do not nearly suffice for the arrangement of the vorks as a whole. further criterion be found
ever,
n the development of Plato s literary irst attempts, as a rule, are wont to

a certain
>y
art.
might But though
betray themselves
of awkwardness, it does not follow hat the artistic excellence of an author s works
amount
j,|xact pace
keeps with his years. For liveliness of mimetic and dramatic movement, even of
delicacy
and sensitiveness to form, are with most persons, fter a certain and even before age, on the decline inscription hat period, artistic form may be kept in the backTound by the exigences of scientific
aste
;
strictly
enquiry
be
of an author, the circumstances in which he the purpose for which rites, particular works were
mood
omposed, may determine the amount of care bestowed nd of finish attained, without affording us a clue as to
leir relative
;
dates and again, that which Plato inaimded for the narrow circle of his personal disciples Jould probably be less ornate as to style than writings signed to awaken scientific interest in a large and
>
$ixed number of readers, and to give them their

itroduction
"
first
to
53
philosophy.
On
similar
grounds,
Cf. supra, 93, 3. Ihe remark in
reference
to
this on p. 80 (as to the genuineness of the writings), finds an analogous
112
method in each later work is noi however, the scientific more perfect than in the earlier, though, 01
necessarily
the whole, the fluctuations

progress
may
be slighter and
th<
more
steady and
continuous.
Although
tw<
the mutual relation of therefore, in considering of view ought not to be disre dialogues, this point in many cases the question cannot be decide*
garded, by reference to
The philosophic content o the various writings affords a safer test. But here we must begin by enquiring to what extent and uncle
it
alone.
als<
relative dates of the dialogues ma; wha inferred from differences in their contents and be
what conditions the
an exposi are the characteristics which show whether to an earlier stage of its author tion really belongs
Plato carried less far. development or was purposely information on this poim own statements give us no
In a
passage of the Pha3clrus (274 to written expositions on the groun sqq.) he objects that they are not restricted to persons who are capabl the hands of understanding them, but come into and are therefore liable to all kinds every one alike,
much
criticised
<
of compoapplication to the order Even in the case of poets sition. and artists, the supposition that are their more complete works their latest would lead to
works,
we had preserved
always mistakes without end

in
as in the case of Plat to us only I works themselves, and not ani trustworthy accounts about ^ tl time of their origin as well. Th
if,
and though
many
epochs
ities,
of them of course the of their development are

stylistic peculiar"de-
with a writer to whom the mei, artistic form of his works is not a
in dc-alm] difficulty is still greater
shown by marked
still
it
would be exceedingly difficult for us in most cases to termine these epochs precisely, and
to
independent and separate objecj but only the means to other ami, which themselves limit ^the coiditions
and direction
of
its
appl;
assign
to
them
their
proper
cation.
ORDER OF THE PL A TOXIC WJHTIXG&

;
113
pastime, indeed for reminding those already instructed of what in after years they may have forgotten, but far less
-
them regarded
misconception and unfounded abuse he would have in the light of a mere useful
valuable than personal influence, by which others are scientifically educated and led to right moral con
However important this passage may be another connection, it affords us no help in de termining the order, date, and interdependence of the Platonic writings. cannot conclude from it, as Schleieruiacher does, that Plato in each of the dialogues must have assumed the result of an earlier one unless it be previously shown that there existed the
victions.
in
We
among
dialogues a single inter-connected order; for particular dialogues could serve very well for a reminder of oral
discourse,
;
and the thoughts engendered by
it,
even were
there no such connection
among
them.
Nor can we
54 and his followers, that Plato presuppose, with Socher could only have expressed himself in this manner at the time when he had or was about to
commenced,
commence,
place, there
his school in the
Academy
for, in
the
first
was nothing to hinder his exercising that intellectual influence on others the planting of words in souls fitted for them of which he here speaks, even
the establishment of regular teaching in the secondly, it is quite possible that in this passage he is not contrasting his
before
Academy; and,
literary activity
with that kind of instruction which, as a matter of

Plato s Schriften, 307. Likewise Stallbaum, Hermann, SteinSasemihl (Genet. Eritwick. i. bart,
286
ami further references!

128)
Ue-
bervveg (Plat. Schr. 252
114
PLATO AKD THE OLDER ACADEMY.

he
with the kind he desired, employed, but the Socratic precedent, kept before and, according to 55 from Still less can the quotation him as his ideal.
fact,
the com the Pheedrus lend support to the theory that the dialogues was bound up with Plato s pilation of all
instructions in the
will, it
Academy
5G
;
for,
understand it as we
particular adopted or
of the author at that only expresses the opinion we do not know how early it was time, and
how long
retained.
That
in
his
more
at least, he entered upon subjects comprehensive works or which in his oral teaching he either passed over, and is con is in itself likely, dealt with more
slightly,
it If, however, firmed by the citations of Aristotle. either to discover is impossible, even from this passage, followed by Plato in the arrangement of the
57
principles his writings, or the time
when these were composed, themselves contain evidences by the scientific contents which we can distinguish, with more or less certainty,
the earlier from the later works. It cannot, indeed, his whole be expected that Plato should expound the contrary, it is, on in each individual work
system
sufficiently clear that
he often
starts in a preliminary
which and tentative manner from presuppositions of

he
is
himself certain.
But
in all the strictly philo
the state of his own scientific conviction sophic writings, he either directly is sure to be somehow betrayed: enunciates
when he isonly by isolated hints, to a subordinate and an enquiry designedly confining K In the Protagoras also (347 E, cnco. Cf. too the Phsedrus.
it,
if
329 A), which most critics rightly he conplace lav earlier (387 B.C.), trasts the songs of poets, and books with personal confergenerally,
5(i
Ueberweg, Ztschr.
Cf.
f.
Philos.
Ivn. G4
page 74.

merely preparatory stage; or
lie
115
allows
it
to be in
directly perceived in ordering the whole course of the
argument towards a higher aim, and foreshadows in the statement of problems their solution in the spirit of his system. If, therefore, out of a number of works,
we find some that wanting in certain fundamental determinations of Platonism, and do not even indirectly require them;
are
otherwise related to one another,
others these very determinations unmistak ably appear we must conclude that at the time when the former were written, these points were not clearly established in Plato s own mind, or at rate not so
while in
any
clearly as
when he wrote
the latter.
writings
stated
essentially presuppose stand-point, but in one of them
the
it
and more
fully evolved;
if
If, again, two same scientific is more definitely that which in the
probable preparatory and less advanced exposition was purposely meant to precede the more perfect and more systemati The same holds good of Plato s re cally developed. ferences to the pre-Socratic doctrines. He indeed
is only prepared for indirectly, or generally established, in the other is distinctly maintained and carried out into particulars, it is that the
one case
may
been acquainted with these doctrines to a greater or less extent, without expressly touching on them but
luivr
;
as
we
find
him
in the majority of his
works either
openly concerned with the most important, or at any rate unmistakably pointing to them, while in others he
it is at least silently passes them by highly probable that the latter, generally speaking, date from a time when he did not bestow much attention on those
i2
16
PL A TO AXD THE OLDER A CA DEMY.

was much
less influenced
doctrines, or
by them than
he afterwards became. Even if we suppose that he we must purposely abstained from mentioning them, in the absence of any internal proof to the con
still,
as the earlier in which trary, consider those writings for in that case the most such mention does not occur
;
silence proceeded probable assumption would be that his from a desire to ground his readers thoroughly on a Socratic foundation, before introducing them to the
pre-Socratic science.
Lastly, great weight must allusions of one dialogue to another.
be
allowed
to
the
These allusions
indeed, as before remarked,
58
can very seldom take the
form of direct citation
indi yet there are often clear
cations that the author intended to bring one of his works into close connection with some other. If in a
where
taken up at a point particular dialogue an enquiry is in another it is broken off; if thoughts which in
the one case
are
stated
problematically or vaguely
announced and suggested, in the other are definitely or if, conversely, conceptions, scientifically established attained only after long .and theories are in one
;
place
search,
and are elsewhere treated
as
acknowledged
that the one truths, everything favours the supposition and in dialogue must be later in date than the other,
tended as the application of
its results.
The author
may either, in the composition of the earlier dialogue, have had the later one in view, or he may himself only have attained to the more advanced stand-point in the
interval
of
time between them.

58
In certain cases
it
Pp. 95, 9G.

may
still
11?
bo doubtful whether a discussion
is
related to
another as preparatory groundwork or complementary superstructure: in general, however, further enquiry

will decide.
If
then we attempt to apply these principles to
the question before us, we shall find, as might be that none of the theories we have been expected,
considering can be rigidly carried out; that the order of the Platonic writings cannot depend wholly either on design and calculation to the exclusion of all the influences arising from external circumstances
and Plato
plan;
of
own development
s
growth of Plato
or,
still
or on the gradual mind, to the exclusion of any ulterior less, on particular moods,
;
and impulses.
Plato
in
of
We
occasions,
shall not
Schleiermacher to the
press the assumptions extent of supposing that
s whole system of philosophy and the writings which it is contained stood from the first moment
literary activity complete before his mind, and that during the fifty years or more over which that activity extended he was merely executing the design thus formed in his youth. Even Schleiermacher
his
did
not
go
so
far
as
this
stantly refers the order of the Platonic
and though he con works too ex
clusively to conscious design, we shall not very greatly diverge from his real opinion if we suppose that when
Plato began to write, he was indeed clear about the fundamental points of his system, and had traced out the general plan by which he meant to unfold it in his
writings;
that this plan, however, was not at once its details, but that the grand outlines which alone in the commencement floated before him
completed in
118

afterwards
were
gradually filled in perhaps, also, sometimes in compliance with special circumstances altered and enlarged, according to the growth of his
scien knowledge and the recognition of more definite 59 On the other hand Hermann s point tific necessities. of view does not involve the conclusion, though he
himself seems to arrive at
it
that Plato put together
his system from outside, mechanically joining piece to it in writings farther and farther, piece, and expounding or that according as he became acquainted with this
older
school.
The same
principle
of
interpretation
that he developed applies equally on the supposition the Socratic doctrine from within and that, instead of
;
his acquaintance with another system of philosophy of his being the cause of his advance to another stage
of his own philo philosophic development, the progress was in fact the cause of increased sophic conviction
attention to his predecessors. Lastly, if, in explaining the origin and sequence of the Platonic writings, we
on external circumstances and personal 61 even then we need not, with Grote, pro moods, nounce the whole question hopeless, we can still do not enquire whether the contents of the works a gradual change in their author s stand-point, prove This or the relation of one dialogue to another. is not to be decided on d whole matter, however,
chiefly rely
60
59
So Brandfs,
i.
a.
1GO, defin-
ing more precisely Hermann s obiections (p. 351) to Schlciermacher a

evolved from the Socratic doctrines the outlines of his future system ;
clear their
and precise from the
first,
innate strength attained a gradual and regular development.

61
Plato,
i.
186
sq.
///;
<>/;/)/:/!
OF TUK PLATONIC
\vitiTix<;x.
\\\\
priori grounds, bub only by careful consideration of the Platonic writings themselves.
Among
several
these
writings,
then,
there are
certainly
which not only make passing allusion to pheno
mena of the time, but are only comprehensible in relation The chief purpose of the is to the speech of Socrates in his own Apology give
to definite historical events.
defence; that of the Crito, to explain the reasons by which he was deterred from flight out of, prison G2 the
;
have been occasioned by the in dictment of Socrates, in conjunction with another conto
r
Euthyphro seems
current incident
C3
;
the
Euthydemus by the appearance
of Antisthenes together with that of Isocrates, and the 64 But even in charges brought by both against Plato.
such works as these, which, strictly speaking, are to be considered as occasional, the stand-point of the author is so clearly manifest that we can without difficulty
The assign them to a particular period of his life. main purpose, however, of the great majority of the dialogues, be their outer motive what it may, is the representation and establishment of the Platonic phi
it is therefore all the more to be expected we should in some measure be able to trace in them how far Plato at the time of their composition
losophy:
that
had either himself advanced in the formation of his system, or to what point he then desired to conduct the reader; and on what grounds he assumes that his
system might be known to the reader from earlier
Ami at the same time in the defence of his friends against the rumours intimated 44 B.
^
C4
Part
i.
161,
1.
Cf. p. 84, 94.
120
writings.
Now we
can discover in one part of these
writings, nothing that carries us essentially beyond the In the Lesser Hippias, Lysis, Socratic stand-point.
Charmides, Laches, Protagoras, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, there is as yet not a hint of that doctrine which
marks the fundamental distinction between the Platonic and Socratic conception al Philosophy the doctrine of the independent existence of ideas, above and beside
:
that
Neither do they contain any phenomena. 6G the discussions on Natural Science or Anthropology belief in immortality is but doubtfully touched on in
of
;
65
7 and the Crito (54 B) only presupposes the Apology the popular notions about Hades, without a reference
;
to the
more philosophic belief, or to the Pythagorean myths, which later on are hardly ever left unnoticed in In none of passages treating of future retribution.
these dialogues does Socrates occupy himself with any thing beyond those ethical enquiries, in which, accord~
Socrates desire in tlie Entliyphro, 5 D, 6 D, to hear, not merely d\\ e/cetico of some particular avrb TO eTSos, $ irdvTa ra oaid ecrri, and his explanation fju$ ISeq. rd re av6<ria dvoaia dvcu nai TO.
o<noj>,
after all
means merely method
or
Plato in fact is standing on form. the threshold of the Socratic doctrine of ideas, but has not yet
Still less can stepped beyond it. be inferred from the Lysis, 217 C sq. and even if with Steinhait, i. 232 sq., we discover here the dawn of the doctrine of separate Ideas, we must still allow that the passage, as universally understood, does not pass out of the circle of
;
o<ria
o<ria
(cf.
Kitter,
ii.
208
Steinhart,
ii.
1( J5;
made
Susenrihl, i. 122), must not be to prove too much. Socrates

:
had, indeed, already insisted on the constancy of universal ideas the separate existence of genera is not, however, hinted at in the Euthy-
cannot draw any inphro. ierences from the names etSos and I8â whereas in Xcnophon univerPlato sal concepts are called 7^77. can express them in the Socratic acceptation by tSe a or eT5o?, which
:
We
Socratic tenets, w E.g. that the Platonic divisiori of the soul is intimated in on which the Protagoras, 352
:
I>
point I cannot agree with Ritter. G7 Vide Part i. 149.
Till:
ORDER
(>F
Till
PLATONIC WlllTIXGS.
121
ing to history, the real Socrates was entirely absorbed in none does he exhibit more intimate of
;
knowledge
the earlier systems, in none does he cope with other adversaries than those who did actually
oppose him,
the Sophists.
The doctrine of virtue has

:
still
the older
the virtue of the wise is stamp alone regarded as virtue, and all particular virtues are
originally Socratic
reduced to knowledge, without the recognition of an unphilosophical virtue side by side with the philosoph ical, or the admission of a plurality of virtues, such as
we afterwards
find.
68
A
110
certain crudity of
69 also evident in all these dialogues.
method The amount
is
of
proportion to the meagreness of the philosophic contents throughout the dramatic description is lively, while the scientific conversation
:
mimetic by-play bears
the Protagoras, with all not free from discussions of fatiguing prolixity, and the explanation of the verse of
its artistic
proceeds laboriously tary determinations.
and interruptedly with elemen
Even
is
excellence,
Simonides (338 E sqq.) especially disturbs the trans parency of its plan, and looks very like a piece of
Finally, if we compare the argument of the Gorgias (495 sqq.) against the identity of the good and pleasure, with that of the Protagoras (351 B sqq.), which leaves this identity still as a hypo thesis, it is clear that the latter must be earlier than the former, and consequently than all the
youthful ostentation.
tween
dialogues 70 succeeding it. Separately all these indications may 58 As regards the division be- Crito arc to be excepted, which
philosophic and ordinary Mono, 93 I) sq. Only the Apology and the
virtuo,
are not concerned with philosophical enquiries. 70 The opposite view is main-
122

collectively,
they certainly warrant of his composing the abovethe opinion, that at the time named works, Plato, as regards the scientific form, was
be inconclusive;
less skilled in the art of
developing conceptions
still
71
and
This
his
as regards the contents,
was
to essentially limited
the scope and results of the Socratic teaching.

tained by Schone, Plat. Prot. 88 sq. He wishes to make out that the advance is rather on the side of He says that the Protagoras. whereas the Gorgias identified the
acted
in upon by Socratts whole argument Protag. 351 U, is 1 cannot fundamentally contested.
crya^ and the ux^X^, which
is,
Socrates believe, that after making refute a principle so decidedly in this passage, in the Republic,
however, nothing else than the continued eC /3twu of the Protagoras it contents itself with a mere apparent difference between &ya9bv the Protagoras on the and i]8v
;
other
hand abolishes this appearance, and draws out in outspoken eudsemonisra the consequence of
the Philebus, and elsewhere, 1 lato make should, in a later dialogue, him repeat the same principle without the slightest modification and the same must, I think, hold ot the good in a still greater degree Philebus, which Schone, following
;
Weisse
theory
(supra
the Socratic stand-point, However, supposing eudsemonism were really

this consequence
this,
considers 43), likewise
p. later
107,
than
the Protagoras,
1 The above holds good we suppose that the object
-
Part
i.
(we have examined 124 sq.), are we to
also if
believe that Plato recognised it as such? According to our subse-
ot the kindred dial Protagoras and the so much the exlogues was not
nuent knowledge of his Ethics, cer. And is it correct to tainly not. say that the Gorgias by to0eXt/xoj>, which is identified with the good, means merely the same as the
e5
fw
of the Protagoras (351 B),
theories as position of philosophic the painting of the character ot case this For as Socrates. of the question the (leaving out Apology and the Crito) the qucstion is still not about historical
viz.
to the rjSeus piuvai continued
end of life ? Surely the discussion with Polus, 474 C sq., refutes this for although it shows supposition that the right is, indeed, not more areeable, but more profitable than
;
the wrong, yet it seeks this profit of the exclusively in the health Further on, soul (47 1 sqq.). 495 A, the position that 7?Su and ayadbv are the same, and that all pleasure as such is good, and the therefore very supposition
picaccuracy, but about an ture of Socrates, we must ask why the same man, as regards his pluloshould be here sophical convictions, dittedepicted in so many respects rently from the representations of, and Phttdo e.g. the Symposium and it would be very difficult to reason bring forward any sufficient for this, if Plato himself as a philoso-
ideal
pher took just the same stand-point there as he does here. The truth is, the two sides, the depicting of the
>r
THI-:
I>LAT<>XK<
1V
theory ould not be extended without ascribing to the youthful Mato an improbable amount of creative skill in the use )f the philosophic dialogue, an artistic form which he
Socrates, might all these dialogues in :he period before or immediately after the death of 72 Socrates. But there are many to which this
therefore
must doubtless have been the case while he remained under the personal influence of and we
be inclined to place
iv.
and even if we restrict it to works already named, it may still be asked 73 vhether Plato, while his master was still alive, and
;
lad himself introduced
he
-veryone might listen to his discourses, would have asBribed to him other discourses of his own invention. , however, does not make it impossible that Plato
I
"his,
nay have attempted to compose Socratic dialogues, ven in the lifetime of Socrates, and have
rritten
may perhaps down, without allowing them to go eyond the circle of his intimate friends; 74 but it is ery unlikely that he should at that time have prothem
uced so elaborate a work as the Protagoras, which, by whole plan and design, was evidently meant for the ublic. This may more properly perhaps be assigned 75 ith the Apology and Crito to the interval between
of a
:s
philosopher and the exphilosophic system, innot be divided in Plato he aws Socrates for us in such way, that he at the same ic leaves to him the developent which to his mind was the that is, the true philoso>cratic,
jsition
:
jnuine
Schone, PI. Protag. 72 Grote, Plato, i. 196 sq. (whobrin^s forward my view with less authoritative grounds) with him, Uebcrweg agrees in what follows, supr.i
;
73
Cf.
p. 100, 41.
"
The Hippias may be such an earlier literary experiment cf.

:
So Hermann, Stc nhart, Suseearlier also Teberweg, supra,
pp. 85, 80.
>.
105, 106.
probable that the Apology was published immediately after Socrates death, perhaps written
7n
It is
124

commencement
of
th<|
the death of Socrates arid the

76
Egyptian journey;
down even
and
a
in
Plato
conjunction with
s life
th<
before, inasmuch as faithful report of the speech which Focrates delivered before the tribu
are not known.
If hi
laste<
stay at
the
Megara could have
longer, he
nal
must have been the more easy to Plato, the fresher it was in his remembrance. And indeed it was then that he had the most pressing
to set right the ideas of his fellow-citizens about his teacher The by a narrative of the facts.
might have compose, there dialogues in question been already remarked But it that we have no righ p. 17 sq.,
has"^
to
make
wide
this supposition,
and
it
summons
departure
from
authen
ticated tradition to speak, as Hei mann docs, of a Megaric
perio<
latter reason, however, would lead us to place the Crito not much because here the later, the more so interest intimated in the Crito itself is added, namely, to defend
and Megaric dialogues.

76
(Zeitschr. sq. supra,
f.
Uebenvej
Phil.
Ivii., 1870, p 100, 41) wishes t
the friends of Socrates against the
appearance of having done nothing It might cer at all lo save him. Plato could not tainly appear that have spoken of the preparations for Socrates escape, immediately after his death, without endanger
in ing the safety of the parties volved therein. But it is question able whether, on the whole, the
and th put back the Protagoras n.c. kindred dialogues to 387 and he believes that for thi extei chronology he finds a strong
nal support in the fact that Isc crates (Bus. 5), six years afte Socrates death, reproaches th rhetorician Polycrates: AA/a/3tct5i;
?5uKa$ CU T
ov v* (Socr.) /Aa^rrjv, fKeivov ptv oi)5eis 17 (rdero Traidevt, which, after the appearanci.
fj,6i>ov,
of the Protagoras, could no lunge
remained discovery of a plan which could have led to unaccomplished the plan prosecutions, and whether was not already known even be fore the appearance of the Crito;
again, Crito
have been
tion is not
said.
But
if this asset
(an<
mere imagination
in
certainly
pays
little
^hic Busiris, regard to histoiicc

the
well
we do
not
know how lorg
and out-lived Socrates, whether Plato does not wish to de fend the dead against unfavourable
_
expec truth, we may very this from Iterates), it cannot mea of Ale the intercourse to
deny
biades
to
with
Socrates,
but
onl
judgments: moreover, if Crito was no longer living, he had greater freedom in referring to him yet besides Crito, he mentions by name none of the persons implicated (p. 45 B), such as the Thebans Simmias and Cebes, who without doubt had already returned home. r6 A more precise arrangement
;
al* Mem. i. 2, 12 sq. refutes, that were met opinions and conduct tived by the Socratic teaching That oii the other hand he w| connected with Socrates for a cal siderable length of time must aW be universally known from
deny,
what
Xenophon
loc.
result, however, || also obtained from the Protagoras

cit.
This
is
Xvj
is
impossible
from the fact that

of this
Alcibiades
as
not here
represenfcj
the
particulars
period of
Tra.i5fv6fJ.evoy virb
mi-:
&
i)iu>i-:n
OF
Tin-: rr.
ATOXIC WRITINGS.
125
Laches, (Jharmides, and Lysis, may have been intended is a portrayal of Socrates and his philosophy, which, though full of poetic freedom and invention, was in the
Jnain
true to nature, and might therefore be used by as historical evidence. 77 About the same {Aristotle date,
f-faut
j;
pay
It
rather earlier than the Apology, the Euthyphro have been written with a similar design unless
:
[ndeed
;etus,
it
is
78 belongs to the time of Socrates trial. otherwise with the Gorgias, Meno, Thea3-
These four dialogues, judging to contemporary events, nust not only be later, and for the most part many ears later, than the Protagoras and the death of 79 but they also in their scientific content derates;
and Euthydemus.
in
rom the references
them
Cf. p. 85.
8
The
fact,
however, that the

s
iew of Plato
lot
literary
.eveloped above
makes him begin,

all
activity
able to produce such a work of art as the Protagoras, we have no reason to look in vain for traits of his high genius even in the
with
essays
after
epoch-making
with
irhich
give a glimpse of
but follow, mailer scientific

o
works, that is essays of

(as
ii.
of this period
on the other hand
we can hardly imagine how,
pretensions
iibbing, Plato s Ideenl.

is
70 sq. bjects), can hardly be construed to

prejudice.
to
The same
the Phaedrus, he could have written a Lysis, a Laches, and a Charmides, and also in the Protagoras how lie could so entirely have re-
is
the
say nothing of our great oets) with Kant, Leibnitz, SendBefore ng, and many other.-!.
use
J
framed from any reference to the theories which separate his standpoint from the Socratic.
79
It
lato
had discovered
the
in the theory
p.
f
f
Ideas
his
peculiar
principle
93, 3 that the
has been already shown, 18, 31 pp. 83, 84 Meno cannot have been
; ;
;
system, which could only after ave^ happened long^ prearation, no was of necessity lito
_
demus
written before 395, nor the Thesetetus before 394 B.C. and the Euthyevidence of the gives
;
lited
lere
the
setting
forth
the
That was need of some practice in be literary form which was first sed by him can cause us no surocratic philosophy in detail.
rise
ftcr
seeing, however, that, so soon the first experiments, he was

:
activity of Antisthenes in Athens, and his attacks upon Plato, as well as the attack of Isocrates on the Sophists (cf. on this point also p. 132, 94). Even apart from the obvious allusions, ( Jorg. 486
508
sq.,
521
A,
gq.,
we must
12(3
when Plato had alreacl point unmistakably to a time laid the corner stone of his system in the theory 80 when he had appropriated the Pythagorea ideas,
(
notions of the transmigration of souls and a retribi 81 tion after death, and connected them by means of tb
doctrine of
Anamnesis with that theory

(cf.
82
;
with whic
ni? cvui/iiui
.
been suppose the Gorgias to have written not before Socrates death us this, however, does not help
:
vol.
i.
380, oj suuwo
much. 80 In the Euthydemus, 301 A, KctXa Trpcfyuara are erepa auroO 76

TOU KO\OV
see
irdptffTt \iivTQi eKaa-Ttf)
TI.
acquaintance with Pythagoreism Gorgias, 393 A, D, Plato employ Philolaus comparison of the crw// to a awa (v. vol. i. 388, 5), and ind cates its source by the words
/co/ii/
avT&v KciXXos
not
merely,
In these words I with Steinhart,
ds dvrjp is the begii
a close approximation to the doctrine of Ideas, but the actual The enunciation of this doctrine. avTOKaXbv, the ideally fair, which, separate from individual things that are fair, gives them their
fairness
is
by its present indwelling, actually the Idea of the Ka\6v.
of Tin* ning of a well-known song creon s, given in Bergk s Poet: and the addition Lyrici, p. 941 IraXt/cos points to the Italian Phil to Phil sophers, and in particular The referenc laus of Tarentum. is not quite so clear, 523 A sqq where the ordinary notions abon
<
This
enunciation is immediately followed by an objection which
Antisthenes appears to have used

against the participation of Things in the Ideas v. Part i. p. 255, 2. The words of the Thesetetus, 176 E, are even clearer: Trapa:
the judges of the dead, the island of tlie blessed, and Hades, are givei But the belief in immortaliti here, as i
i
appears unequivocally the Theaetetus, 177 A, and i:i 524 B is connected with the sarn thoughts as meet us afterwards i
_
j
the Phsedo, 64C,80C. The
5et7/xctTWi
ev
rp
&VTI
e<TT&T(*)i>
cf.
525
175
is
doctrine,
which
a plain assertion of the is expressed in the

1),
Parmenides, 132
in
almost the
as the
Gorgiaf distinguishes betwee. incurable sins, temj curable and ii poral and eternal punishments the future world just as later oil
15 sqq.,
;
same words.
dwelling-place
The
of
Here
evil,
and
are
the
told
There
to
which
we
176 A, to flee another decisive example of is Plato s idealism being already

in the TheEetetus,
the Republic, x. 615 sq., doesf following Pythagorean doctrines So we cannot doubt that at time he wrote the Gorgias, Plato
th<
1
views of a future state were in
th(i
main
82
settled.
formed.
81
These Pythagorean doctrines
in the
are seen clearly, not only in the following note), but in (v. of the latter 508 the Gorgias.
Mono
further in a subsequent place, 81 A The reference in this to the sq. Pythagorean doctrine of metem-
Vide the well-known passage Meno, which will be noticec:
127
indeed the whole belief in immortality as he under stood it was so bound up that both must have arisen almost simultaneously. 83
psychobis is perfectly plain, though Plato (with I hilolaus, v. Ft. i. 327, 1) only appeals to Pindar and the Orphic tradition the proof, as is well known, is in a teuet of the Pythagorean Mathe
;
Since therefore
seen
these
dia-
maticsthe Pythagorean
mental
funda
And it seems theory. equally clear to me that the doc trine of Reminiscence (drct/inprt*)
really Ideas.
presupposes
that
of
the
ohjects of reminis cence can only he the universal the concepts (dXyOela T&V ftvrwv} sensuous forms of which meet us in individual in not things dividual presentations which we
The
.vat TCI frdade Kal ra iv "A5ou Kal irdvTa ^pi^ctra. Similarly in the Republic and the Timseus in the former (x. 614 E), the souls after their wanderings through the world above and the world beneath are represented as narrating to one another what they have seen in both; in the latter* (41 D), each of them before entering into human existence is placed on a planet, in the revolutions of which it con
:
(have experienced
[lives: v.
in
our
cf.
former
109 E.
iif
Phiedo, Plato expresses himself as
Meno, 86
A;
the latter were his meaning, but is merely the same mythical form of exposition which we find
this
elsewhere
|72
with unmistakable sqq., reference to the Meno, the par

ticular way in which he wishes Ito be understood. I cannot, any noiv than Ideenl. i. Ribbing
(PI.
17:5
j-<|.)
he states in the Phaedo,
or
iv.
l-
>
;igree
Steger (PI. with Steinhart

85, 383, 416)
Stud,
i.
(loo. cit.
|(1,
>f
and Suse85 sq.) in lading in the Meno an earlier and nore immature form of the theory Reminiscence than in the hsedius, nor with Schaarschmidt 8am ml. d. plat. Schr. 356 Bq.),
;
96
nilil
(ienet.
Entw.
i.
vho avails himself of the passage question as evidence lor the The puriousness of the Meno. leno says, 81 C, that the soul has ,3arnl every as it has thing,inasurach
fl
of proof in the Phredo, 70 C sq., has in this respect any advantage In over that of the Meno ? point of fact, our fallacy is ex pressly mentioned in the Pha;do, 72 E, as a well-known Socratic evidence for the immortality of the soul. 83 himself his Plato gives
with the templates the universe the Phaxhus description, agrees on the whole, although in it the ideas stand for that which the souls see during their The journey round the world. Meno again reckons moral and mathematical truths amongst the things which the soul knows from its pre-existence, 81 C, 82 sq. Further on (p. 85 E sq.) we are met If the soul were the fallacy by in possession of knowledge, 6f av Kal &v av /JLTJ 17 Hvdpuiros, it 77 xpovov must always be in possession of knowledge. I will not undertake to defend the validity of this con I would rather ask where clusion. is the valid conclusion, by which is and proved, pre existence whether, for example, the method
;
last
opinions
on
this
connection
iu
128
themselves quite disproportionately with logues occupy the most universal moral elementary enquiries into the oneness and teachableness of principles, concerning of knowledge, and the like; the virtue, the conception advanced reason cannot be that Plato had not himself
essentially
earliest
beginnings methodical calculation.
and the beyond the Socratic stand-point it must lie in of his own system,
The author here

is
intentionally
elementary, because he wants confines himself to what the founda first to establish this on all sides, to secure
tion
of his building, before raising

in the Cratylus,
it
higher.
His
method
Sophist, Politicus,
and Par-
menides must be criticised from a similar point of These dialogues decidedly presuppose the view.
doctrine
of
ideas:
laying
down
important pression to 85 influence natural philosophy, betraying Pythagorean

It there is, the Phrcdo 70 D sq. he says a beautiful, a good, &c., and generally if there are ideas, the soul must have already been
in the Politicus Plato, besides his theory of government, also gives ex determinations of his several
84
the
in existence before birth: if we we candeny the former position, He says this the latter. not
external appearance, which, with Plato, is closely connected with the theory of the absolute; the soul in reality of the Ideas; the: its higher parts lives upon intuition of the Ideas (24, JJ,
j
grant
is
24813).
-
in
reference
to
the
dvd/wTjo-ts,
indeed really a rccolThe same, of the ideas. however, holds good of the later of the proofs for the immortality bouPs nature (Pluedo, ICO B sq.) as throughout he goes upon the which the soul stands relation and the conto the idea of life
which
lection
be shown later on hovri the Sophist and Parmcnides ostablish and carry out this doctrine, For the Cratylus, cf. 439 I sq.
1
It will
soul in the Phzedrus ception of the as ap-w Kir/iffcus T245 C Sll-), all the separation along presupposes of the eternal and essential from
(where the expression 6vei.p(Lrr^9 can at most only mean that the doctrine is new to the readers, not that it has occurred to Plato only then for the first time) 386 D, 389 B, D, 390 E, 423 E ; and the Politicus, 285 E sq., 2(39 D.
5
Polit.
209
sq.,
we
find
the
opposition of the
iuimutabw
THE ORDER OF THE PL ATOXIC
WRlTIXCtf.
129
not only in these, but in other more distinct references to that school of his predecessors. Consequently it cannot be supposed that at the date of these dialogues he had not yet perfected his philosophic principle, nor
s<]
as
occupied himself with the Pythagoreans and though, to contents and method, he is here most nearly
;
with the Eleatic-Megarian philosophy, this merely proves that he desired to lead his readers onward from
allied
that starting point, not that he himself
had not already
passed
it.
compelled, on account of the definite prominence in the Phaedrus of the doctrine of ideas, and the changing existences of the soul, to consider
little
As
are
we
that dialogue as later than the Sophist, Statesman, and 87 Parmenides, or even than the Gorgias, Meno, Euthy
88 demus, Cratylus, and Thea3tetus.
It is quite as pos-
divine existence and the mutable corporeal world, and, as a consequence, the assumption of pcriodical
a reference to Pythagoreism. The B, gives us the Sophist, 252 Pythagorean opposition of the Litnited and Unlimited, which meet us again in the Parmenides, 137 D,
And
get,
in 272
in
changes in mundane D sq., 271 B
affairs,
sq.,
we
connection with this, the that each soul in each mundane period has to run through
doctrine
143 the
I.)
sq.,
144 E, 158
of
sqq.,
with
be-
addition
contrast
tween
;
Odd and Even, One and
a fixed number of earthly bodies, unless previously transferred to a In 273 B, D, the higher destiny. doctrine of the Timseus on matter is
clearly anticipated.
80
In the Cratylus, 400 B sq., Philolaus comparison of crw/j.a and ffû.a, which occurred are before in the Gorgias. further told that this life is a state In 405 D, we of purification. have the Pythagorean World Harin 403 E, the Platonic raony
Many and, ibid. 143 sq., the derivation of numbers is a reminiscence of the Pythagoreans. In the Politicus, we have the Pythagorean tenets of the Mean, 284 E sq., and the doctrine of the Unlimited,
273 D. 87 So Hermann and Steinhart: vide supra, pp. 103, 104 105, 38. ss As Susemihl vide supra, Deuschle (The Platonic Politicus,
; :
we
find
We
p.
4)
puts
earlier,
the Phsedrus rather between the Euthydemus
doctrine of immortality,
which
is
and Cratylus.
130

Plato here mythically foretells convictions his mind during the writing of
Bible that
which were already in
those dialogues, but which, for the sake of the sys tematic evolution of his doctrines, he had for the present
set aside
:
that the Phgedrus
may
thus be the introduc
tion to a longer series of writings, designed from its of the position to afford the reader a preliminary view
goal, hereafter to be frequently
hidden from his eyes,
he presses towards it by the long and tortuous road of methodical enquiry. This possibility rises
as into probability if we take into consideration all those 89 traces of youthfulness which others have observed;
if
that some important points of doctrine are in this work, as in the glow of a first discovery, still wanting in the closer limitation which Plato was
we remark
afterwards obliged to give

In Diog. iii. 38, OlympiodoruH 3 (vide p. 92, 1), it is declared to be Plato s first written treatise, by reference to the /xei/xx/atDSes of its the dithyrambic character subject of the exposition. Schleiermacher,
89
them
lited
90
;
if
we
note how, in
W. 1 a. 09 sq., gives a more thorough exposition of the youthPI.

fnl
character recognisable
whole texture and colour
He calls Phrcdrus. the tendency to writing for display, and the exhibition of the author s own superiority, which is discernible throughout ; to the proud lavishness of material seen in the second and third refutation of the dialectic adversary, each of which outdoes its predecessor, only to result in the declaration that his whole literary production, and these speeches with it, are merely The Khetors are discoruplay.
in the of the attention to
completeand at every pause the bybreaks out in renewed luxuriplay mice, or an uncalled-for solemnity Such are is imparted to the tone. some of the points noticed by Schleiermacher ; and to these we may add that even the famous myth of the Phrcdrus lacks the
nees
;
with ostentations
which marks faculty Platonic myths as a rule. The dithyrambic tone of the whole work has none of the repose about it with which, in other dialogues, Plato treats the most exalted
intuitive
themes
of the
different
it is indeed so signally from the matured lucidity Symposium, that we can
scarcely suppose there are only a few years between them, x Courage and Desire, which, according to the Timseus, 42 A, 69 C sq. (cf. Polit. 309 C ; Rep. x.
131
the second part, the elements of the scientific method are as if for the first time laid down, and the name and
conception of Dialectic, already familiar to us in the 91 are introduced as something new; 92 Euthydemus,
if,
in fine,
we compare
the remarks on rhetoric in the

93
riui drus with those in the Gorgias:

611
soul
and the judg-
B sqq.\ compose the mortal which only comes into being
justification
for
here,
union with the bo.ly, are 240 A sq., transferred to the 1) pro-existent state, and in 249
at
the
in the dialogue itself thus narrowing down the scope of its second part.
95
The
Phtedrus,
260
is
sqq
shows that Rhetoric

at
all,
not an art
Love which is the sq. we find the main theme of the Phjodnu con
ceived only in general terms as the striving after the Ideal, awakened by the action of beauty. Not till we come to the Symposium do we find the addition, that Love is concerned with production in the sphere of beauty. 91 also Cratylus, P. 290 C
;
but only a
we
find the
sqq.
Tpifir) foexvos, and same in the Gorgias, 403 But the former not only
takes no exception to the general description of Rhetoric as having
only persuasion for its object (how ever little this may have been Plato s own view), but makes this
description the basis of its argu ment. The latter contradicts this
.7.10
C;
P.
Soph. 253
2(55
sq.
Polit.
2S5 D, 287 A.
9-
sqq.
its
I
Dialectic is
here described on
side only
;
and
former logical cannot agree with
458 E, 504 sqq., and gives the Rhetor the higher aim of amend ing and teaching his audience and because Rhetoric does not satisfy these requirements, it is, in the Theflatly,
;
Steinhart (PI. W. iii. 459) in re garding the representation given of it as more mature than that in the Sophist, where, loc. cit., the logical problem of )ialectic is based on the doctrine of the community Stallbanm s attempt of concepts. iDe Art. Dial, in Pluedro doctr.
1
setetus,
201 A, Politicus, 304 C, allowed only a subordinate value, compared with Philosophy though the Pluedrus does not clearly divide the respective methods of the ttvo. In face of these facts (which
;
Uebcrweg
294,
fail
s remarks, Plat. Schr. to display in any other
Lpz. 1853, p. 13) to reconcile the elementary description of Dialectic in the Pktedras with the later enunciation does not satisfy me. lie says that the Phsedrus only wants to represent Dialectic as the Even if this were true art of
L->ve.
light) I cannot allow much im portance either to the criticism of the Phsedrus on single Rh;-tors
anl
I
!
,
their
theories
(Stcinhart,
iv.
the circumstance which alone (Plat. 517) regards as decisive, viz. that the Phajdrua
nor
to-
Hermann
follow that it should be treated as something new, the very name of which has to be enquired. But there is no
so,
it
would not
270
passes
Pericles so much than the Gorgias
The former
judgment on more favourable 515 C sq. 519 A. a praises him as
K 2
132

94
ment on Isocrates with that of the Euthydemus. The opinion therefore seems justifiable that Plato up
remained generally true to the and therefore in the Socratic manner did not essentially advance of this period
to the death of Socrates
of philosophy,
writings
beyond his teacher
but that in the years immediately

leave all other orators far behind, but perhaps himself also turn to
culture
and scientific speaker of genius the latter blames him as ; Both this praise and a statesman. blame are quite compatible (as Krische has already remarked, Plat. Phwdr. 114 pq.) at an y rate
just as
much
as e.g. the praise of
Homer and
expressions D, is compatible Rep. ii. such as Gorg. 502 B sq. 377 C sq. x. 598 D sq. and even were otherwise, the supposing it remains whether the question t-till unfavourable judgment is the the judg earlier or the later one ment of the Gorgias is repeated and as in the Politicus, 303 B sq.
;
;
;
other poets, Symp. 209 with
philosophy. Spengel (Isocrates u. Platon. Abh. d. Mtinclmer Akad. 1855, p. philos.-philol. Kl. vii. 729-769 cf. espec. 762 sq.) is cer tainly right in believing that the Phsedrus must have been written before the character of Isocrates had developed in that particular direction which Plato s defence in the Euthydemus challenges before the hope of still winning him over
;
Plato always considered democracy he to be bad, we cannot see how ever could have arrived at a dif ferent view as regards the states man who most decidedly had paved the way for it. 94 In the Euthydemus, without Isocrates, yet with dis
mentioning
tinct reference to him, his depreci
as regards the atory judgments as he calls them Philosophers for the Eristics, the Sophists) are de and the middle cidedly rebutted, which he himself aimed
position at between
to the side of philosophy had vanished and before he had pub lished that series of attacks on the philosophers of his time (including Plato, though neither he nor any other is named) which we have the in the against speeches Sophists, Hel. 1-7, Panath. 26-32, TT. 195, 258 sq. Philipp. 12. As Isocrates was born B.C. 436, supposing the Phaedrus to have been composed 38 B.C., he had already, at the time of its; composition, attained an age to which this condition clearly no
di>Ti56<r.
longer
a philosopher and a shown to be unten The Pha?drus, on the con able. E sq., represents Socrates trary, 278 as expressing a hope that Isocrr.tes
statesman
is
The remark applied. Steinhart, Plat. Leben, 181 sq., in tended to meet this conclusion, fails to carry conviction with it, as he finally supports his position with the mere assumption that
neither was Plato demus thinking of
in the
Euthy
ten by virtue of the philosophic not merely dency of his mind will
Isocrates of Plato against the Sophists.
Isocrates, n( in the speed
THE
OftDEfi
OF THE PLATONIC
WRTTTXfiX.
133
succeeding that event, he discovered in the doctrine of ideas and belief in the soul s immortality the central
point of his system, and thenceforward began, accord ing to the announcement in the Phaadrus, to develope his convictions in methodical That these progression. convictions became in course of time more
clearly
the horizon of the philosopher gradually enlarged, and his method and form of expression to some extent altered that his relation to the older schools was not
that
.
defined
and more distinctly apprehended
throughout
the same
that
it
was long before
his
political,
and
were completed probably find, even if the traces of such a development should be less marked in his writings than it was in fact but the essential
;
far longer before his cosmical theories as to detail all this we shall
stand-point and general outlines of his doctrine must have been certain to him from the date indicated by the Phsedrus, Gorgias, and Thesetetus.
Meno,
can hardly be doubted that the Symposium and Phaedo are later than the Phasdrus, and belong to a time when the philosophy of Plato, and also his ar 95 tistic power, had reached full the Philebus, maturity can scarcely be assigned to an earlier too, But period.
It
;
the difficulty of determining the order of these dia logues with regard to one another, and the exact date of each, is so great that we cannot be surprised if the views of critics differ widely on these questions. Between those dialogues which definitely bring forward
Soeher would place the 1 beedo immediately after 80crates death (suprn, lol, 25,
"
Ast ami
this supposition, however,

sufficiently refuted
has been
supra
28):
134

life
the doctrine of ideas and the eternal

it
of the soul,
and those from which absent, there must be a considerable interval and if the former were for the
is
;
most part not written
till
after the
death of Socrates,
we cannot venture
to place either of the latter in the period closely succeeding that event.
reasonably suppose that the dialogues concerned with the delineation of Socrates primarily and the Socratic philosophy, as Plato then apprehended
it,
We may
partly in Megara, partly that he then went after his return thence to Athens
written"
;
may have been
or Egypt and Gyrene; that during this journey led immediately after it he formed the views which him decidedly beyond the Socratic stand-point, at any rate then first resolved to proclaim them by his mas and thus this second epoch of his literary ter s mouth
to
;
activity
after might commence about four or five years mere conjecture, and But all this is Socrates death.
cannot be substantiated.
Among
lowed
;
the writings of this time the Phaodrus seems

96
to be the earliest.
their subject
The Gorgias and Meno may have fol and treatment allying them, more
9
than any dialogues of this class, to the Protagoras. 9N From the well-known anachronism in the Meno, it-
would appear that this work was published not much later 99 The Theaetetus is connected with the than 495 B.C.
m;
My own
cf.
arguments
in favour
expressly called 6 vvv vfwcrri

<a>s
ei\t]-
of this supposition are given p. 130

B(].
:
ra Uo\vKpaTovs x/";uara, which
omitted, for the reasons given on p. 84. 08 p 93 3 99 On the one hand Ismenias is
(<f
v The Kuthydemus
;
112
sq.
is
can only be said from the stand-point of the author, not of Socrates on the other hand, if the incident was still recent, and Plato s indignation at it still fresh,
in this case
;

Mono by
its
133
subject-matter
the
Meno
(89
sq.
96
sqq.) reduces the question of the teachableness of virtue to the ? but preliminary question, Is virtue at the
also
knowledge same time recognises that virtuous conduct can spring from right opinion the Thesetetus
;
enquires
into the conception of knowledge,
and
its
relation to
In point of date also, the Thesetetus seems to approximate to the Meno. For if it was not written at the time of the Corinthian war, we cannot place it much earlier than 368 B.C. 100 It is, however,
right opinion.
very unlikely that Plato should at so late a period have thought so elementary an enquiry to be necessary, for we find him in other dialogues 101 treating the distinc
knowledge and opinion as a thing universally acknowledged, and of which it was sufficient merely to remind his readers. Yet if, on the other hand, we
tion of
place the Theaetetus later than 368
B.C.,
the greater
number of Plato s most comprehensive and important works must be crowded into the two last decades of
his life: this
still
is
in hself not probable,
and
it
becomes
that in these twenty years occurred the two Sicilian journeys, and the alteration in the Platonic philosophy spoken of
Aristotle;
less so
when we remember
by
in
which
latter is so entirely untraceable
the writings of Plato that we are forced to assign it to a later date. 102 It is therefore almost certain that the
can easily be imagined how he allow this remarkable to^ anachronism.
it
came
00
11
getlier
with
^TTWT^/XTJ,
5<Ja
and
Cf. p. 18, 31.
Tim. 51
vii.
so.
;
A,
E;
53:5
E
155
Rep.
v.
477
to-
Symp. 202 A;
1),
also
Parmen.
appear, plainly the two concepts, the separation of which from Knowledge is the suhjcct of enquiry in the Thejetctus. 102 the Laws form an exception:
afaOrjtrts
where,
considering their general attitude
i3d
PLATO AND
Tttfi
6LDER ACADEMY.
after Theastetus must have been written a short time
the
103 between 392 and 390 B.C. The Sophist is connected with the Theaetetus in a manner which seems to show that Plato not only meant
Meno; most
likely
in the former to
refer his readers expressly to
the
the way, in the conclusion latter, but also to prepare of the Theretetus, for a further enquiry of a like
nature.
104
The
Politicus, too, is
105
;
with the Sophist
and there
is
immediately connected in both dialogues the
announcement
of a third discussion
of a philosopher; reason unknown to us, never fulfilled. If this is not sufficient to prove that all these dialogues were com
a promise
on the conception which Plato, for some
the interruption of posed in direct sequence, without

we cannot expect them to touch upon the metaphysics of Plato s
later doctrines.
103
The
point which
Ueberweg,
Plat. Schrift. 227 sqq.^ lays stress upon in support of his own and Munk s supposition that the There-
& depart to the court; faOev Se, Qcudwpe, Seupo iraXtv airavT^fJ-ev. In reference to this, the Sophist opens with the words of Theo Kara rty x^ s b/j.o\oyiai>, dorus
:
&
2w*7>aTes,
-rJKO/Jiev.
It
is
true,
tctus
to
was written before 368, seems
too uncertain to prove On the contrary, it harmonizes very well with the common view, that Euclid and
me much
the concluding words of the Therenot certainly esta tetus would blish any design of a continua
tion in further dialogues (Bonitz, Plat. Stud. II., 41 in reference to the end of the Laches and Prota
anything.
Theodoras
Thesetetus
;
play
part
in
the
goras)
but
if
and with them, not
them with
Plato has connected such a continuation,
long before the time assigned for the composition of the dialogue,
Plato
(,
f.
we may
pose
it:
that he
in this case certainly sup refers to them in
had had friendly intercourse.
p. 18, 31.
In the Thesetetus, after it has been shown that of the different definitions of Knowledge, ti
fj-era
104
tisfactory (210 A); in conclusion that
\6yov, no one is sa Socrates says

lie
and, again, the beginning _of the Sophist would have been unin readers if it was telligible to his separated from the Thesetetus by a very great interval and by a scries of other dialogues. lor) Sophist, 21G Politicus, init.
;
sq.
must
now
THE ORDER OF THE PL A TOXIC WRITIXG&
137
other works, it is at any rate clear that Plato when he undertook the Sophist had already the Politi
cus,
planned and he probably allowed himself no great delay in
unlikely that many years can have intervened between this dialogue and the Sophist ; and thus there is some for believ
it
about the
the execution of his design. Theastetus ; but
We
is
cannot be so certain
ground
ing that the Sophist and Politicus also were composed 106 before the first Sicilian journey, or about that time.
in the observation that the movement in the Ideas maintained
by
the
Sophist
(vide
on
this
point, supra, note 42) must belong to a later form of the doctrine
than
lute
the
view
of
their
^
absois
immutability
therein.
which
of the Politicus to the Republic, at once falls to the ground when we consider that in the account of the theory of Ideas known to us from Aristotle the characteristic of motion is wanting throughout,
im
and
moreover
this
deficiency
is
pugned
the
to
Still, however, question remains whether the
view attacked here is that known us as Plato s from writings

the
Phaedo,
Timaeus, &c. (cf. p. 215 sq.), and whether the view of the Ideas as
,
like
the
and animated, sinks into the background in the remaining din,

1
moving
expressly made an objection to the doctrine (cf. Fart ii. b. 220, 2nd so that the Sophist cannot edit.) be considered as an exposition of the Ideas in their latest form, but merely as the transition to it. Uebefweg further (p. 290 sq.) thinks that he discerns in the as Politicus, .. well as in the Phredo,
;
logues besides the Sophist (that it not quite wanting was shown loc. citj, because he had not yet bund it out, or because it lay too ter out of the domhiant
is
_,
-.,
anthropological views which must be later than those of the Timaens.
The
will
incorrectness of this
remark
tendency
his thoughts, and the difficulty bringing it into with
Jther
Jut
more important designs was him to follow it further; or whether \re have
Teat to allow
harmony
Jf
n the Sophist really a later form the doctrine of Jdeas, and riot
r
be proved later on (in chap tcr viii.). Finally Schaarschmidt (Saminl. d. plat. Schrift. 239 sq.) endeavours to point out in the same dialogue a whole series of imitations of the Laws, but I cannot enter upon the theory here
in detail I have, however, not found one out of all the passage a vnoan which he quotes, which contradicts
;
an
attempt
to
bandoncd;
(subsequently include motion in
the [supposition that the Politicus
138

refers to the
108
;
The Parmenides
to the
107
Sophist,
the Philebus
and both the Philebus and the 110 These Politicus 109 are presupposed by the Republic. must therefore have succeeded one another dialogues in the above order. 111 The precise date of each, and
Parmenides
them, cannot be ascertained
one of Plato s works which pre ceded the Laws. 107 1 have endeavoured to show
is
where the Euthydemus and Cratylus came in among the Symposium was pro;
the
Meno
in the
Laws,
v.
739
B
ob
sq. (cf.
111
Plat.
Stud. 16 sq.) to tho

p.
Republic.
the probability of this (in Plat. Stud. 186 sq. 192 sq.) by a com parison of Farm. 128 E sq. with
Ueberweg,
correctly
204
sq.,
serves
that in
the
So
253 D, 251 A; Farm. 143 A 13, 145 A with Soph. 244 B sq., Farm. 133 C with 254 1) sq. Soph. 255 C.
Soph.
;
phist, and in a still higher degree in the Philebus (to which the
Supra, 70, 56. With regard to the latter I shnll content myself with referring to Susemihl, Genet. Ent\v. ii. 303
109
los
present work refers later on, in are there many chapter vi.), points of agreement with the later of Ideas form of the doctrine But as represented by Aristotle. it does not follow that these dia
logues are later than all those in which these points of agreement dc not appear in the same way. As soon as the theory of Ideas arrived at a definite completion it must have also comprehended those views witb which its later form was connected but Plato would only have had oc casion to bring these views int( prominence if the doctrine of Idea. ;is such had been propounded wit! the object of a dialectical discus while in expositions like sion Republic and the Tinueus, the chie object of which is the applicatioi of the theory of Ideas to the worh of morality and the world of nature they would not be mentioned. Ue berweg, however, himself remark of the Timreus that the construe tion of the world-soul goes on tin same lines as that in the Sophis and Philebus. Cf. also p. 137, 106
1
sq.
and chapter viii. of this volume, and with the remark that there seems to me to be no occasion for the conjecture that we have it
not in its original shape, but in a second elaboration (Alberti, Jahrb. f. Philol. Suppl. N. F. 1, 166 sq.)
110
When
P>:
it
is
said,
Rep.
vi.
505
OTL
^,
dXXa pty r65e ye

n-lv
ol<r0a,
rots
TroXXotj
TjSovr)
8oKfl
rb dya.06v, rots 5e Koôre pots \\lien the question which forms the subject of the Philebus is thus discussed here as if it were a well-known one, and tho two theories there criticised at length are dismissed with a few remarks, we cannot help seeing here in the Repub. a direct allusion to the Philebus, just as in the above-cited passages of the latter we find an in the allusion to the Parmenides
flvat
(J>p6vr)<ris,
;
th<
Phcedo, 72
supra, p. 83, 91), to
THE OlWEll OF THE PL ATOXIC

.bly
!
WlilTIXd^.
139
written in 08 1
11 -
lie.,
but this fact gives us
little
help as to the chronology of the other works, since
AV cannot with certainty determine the place of the .Symposium among the Platonic writings. Possibly
Plato
)
may have been
prevented by his
first
Sicilian
:..
113 journey from completing the Trilogy of the Sophist, ind after the dialectical labour of the Parmenides he
tnay
have set aside his intended enquiry concerning the and produced instead in the Sym posium and the Phaedo those matchless descriptions
deal philosopher,
show us in the one the wise man enjoying his and in the other drawing near to death. 114 The ife, Philebus forms the most direct preparation for the Republic and the Timseus, and therefore we
.vhich
may
sup-
l.i
immediately preceded i:hem. These two dialogues must certainly be assigned o Plato s maturity 115 the only approximation we can
:
3ose that in order of time, too, it
The mention (Symp. 193 A)

Arcadi;m
8ioiKHT/j.6s,
f tbe
which, cconling to Diodor. xv. 12, took

lace in the
autumn
Kepublic before bis first Sicilian and in modern times journey there have been many scholars of
;
of
Olymp.
98,
i;,
probably to be ex;j plained by supposing Plato to have A>een induced by the recent impresiion of that event to commit an inachronism tolerable only in the nouth of Aristophanes, and under he influence of his overflowing
(3S5
B.C.), is
jj
note to support the assumption that Aristophanes in the Ecclesia/.usie (01. 97, 1, B.C.
391) satirised
tf
,jf
the Platonic stale, getting his mateiials either from the Kepublic or from orally delivered doctrines to the same effect, may name
We
it
>ujnoJ
Supra,
l
p.
l:>7.
It will be
hap. ix.)
,,,
"
shown later on (in that we have no reafcon

with
Morgenstern, Spengcl, Bergk, Meineke, Tchorzewski, and others vide the references apud Schnitzcr (Aristoph. AVerke x. 12G4 sq.)
;
;
irt
0r
considering,
Uebenvcg,
;hat the
,j
Pluedo was later than the

Platonic letter 30) does actually Plato had written the
rimseus.
5
The seventh
p.
vide
17,
if
peak as
Susemihl, loc. cit. ii 290. Jiut such a doubtful source as the seventh letter cannot c allowed much weight; and with regard to I can Aristophanes, only agree with Susemihl (to whom I content myself with referring, as he gives the
1
140
to a more precise date is through the fact that the Critias has not only been handed down to us in an unfinished state, but was apparently never anything
make
116 This phenomenon argues than a fragment. hindrance which prevented the com some external led to think of pletion of the work, and we are thus
else
views of his predecessors in full) that the Platonic Republic is not contemplated in the Ecclesiazusse. If the attack was aimed at some definite person, the poet, to make himself intelligible to the mass of his audience, would undoubtedly have marked out this person (in spite of the new laws against ridiculing people on the stage, which still did not restrain others
having arisen quite independently from the supposition of such a, community existing on Greek soil.
Such particular instances must not

be pressed too far, or we shall get at last a connection between Ecclesiaauros zusje, 670, ty 5 airodvy y and the corresponding Gospel There is nothing to be precept. said for the supposition (Ueberweg, Plat. Schr. 212 sq.) that Aristo phanes had in his eye Plato s oral teaching, for in this case we should all the more expect something to point out that Praxagora was in debted to Plato for her knowledge,
8(b<rei,
from
personalities against Plato, supra, p. 30, 82), as clearly as he had done in a hundred other cases. This is not done and in verse 578 he says explicitly that these pro
;
jects,
to
parody Plato, been set on foot.

reminiscence
which have been supposed have never yet Nor do the con tents of the play necessitate any
of Plato broadly speaking, it is concerned, as the and asserts beyond poet repeats possibility of mistake, with the
;
or
at least (if Aristophanes had suddenly become too cautious to venture what others had ventured and could venture without any dan ger) to the Philosophers: it is, moreover, very improbable that Plato had at that time so far de veloped his theory of the State as to require community of wives and the participation of the women in
same moral and

stances
in
political
circum
Knights, Wasps, Lysistrata, and Thesmophoriazusse,
as
the
which there had been no altera tion since Thrasybulus was re The community of women stored. and goods is brought on the stage
as a democratic extreme, not as the mere fancy of an aristocratic doc
trinaire.
Besides, government. the fact that Ueberweg makes Plato s (loc. cit. 128) plainly activity as a teacher begin 3-4 years, at earliest, after the represen tation of the Ecclesiazusaj. Again,
war and
is
there
The resemblance
>35
to Plato
in some particular traits, e.g. verse 590 sq., sq., in my opinion Susemihl s differs from (which
ii. 297) is not so special as to pre clude the possibility of these traits
Hep. v. 452 A, 45(5 (J, throughout contains no allusions to any plea santries which the comedians had already indulged in at the expense of his proposals.
116
Supra, 49,
9.
THE OH DEB OF THK PLATONfC

tlie
WltlTlXGH.
141
two
last
117
entailed.
journeys and the troubles they Even independently of this, we could

Sicilian
hardly place the Republic and the Timseus later than the years in which those troubles occurred, or there would not have been time for Plato to write the Laws
ind to modify his system, as Aristotle tells us he did. Supposing the Republic to have been finished before
second Sicilian journey, therefore in 370-368 K.r., ind the Critias to have been interrupted by the third
lit
1
ourney
in
3G1-2
for a
118
.c.,
there would then be an interval
sufficient
comprehensive, thoughtful and artistic work like the former for studies preparatory to the
;
which despite its deficiencies in natural science, and the help derived from Philolaus and other Dredecessors, must doubtless have occupied a considerible time; 119 and sufficient also to account for the
rimaeus,
striking difference in tone
and
style
between the two
iialogues
>n
difference
not
so
the
diversity of their
contents,
entirely dependent 120 as to make a
urther explanation, from the more advanced age of he author, unwelcome. 121 Plato s experiences in Syra117
Suscmilil,
CJenet.
Kntw.
cf.
ii.
0. },
18
agrees with this. On the chronology
p.
32
nJ
Before writing the Republic, have entered upon studies, at least it at that ime he had not yet conceived the
lato could not
liese
19
To which alone Susemihl would here suppose a reference. 121 The solemn dogmatic tone of the Timaeus ia partly connected
with purposed avoidance of a dialectical treatment, partly with the adoption of the Pythagorean Physics
and
the
writings
of Philo-
lan of the
i
Timrcus
is
and that
this
laus.
Still,
however,
wo cannot
likely from the fact liat the Republic contains no llusion to the persons who appear i the beginning of the Timaeus, or to the dialogue carried on with really so
^ ,
maintain that these reasons rendered a lucid exposition throu^hout impossible; and as, on The other hand, in spite of the difference
of subject, similar traits are met with in the Laws, we may con-
342

may have
led
cuse
him
to
abandon the further repre
sentation of the ideal state,
designed for Hermocrates
begun in the Critias aiK and in its stead, after hi;

account to himself
own
practical
failure, to give
am
to the world, of the principles
philosopher in such enterprises;
which must guide the and also to enquire
what means under existing circumstances are at his That this work -is later than the Bepublk disposal.
and belongs to Plato
that he devoted
s
old age is beyond question

to
it
12:
;
much time
is is
also evident, nol
which greater than am only because of its compass, other of his works, but from the mass of legislative The Republic too may have occu detail it contains.
pied
him
for several years,
and
it
is
possible that the

this
12
different parts
may
have appeared separately, but
theory has no trustworthy evidence to support

jecture
it.
that they
at
deTie
least
advancing
lations,
were in some owing to Plato s years and increasing
inclination to Pythagorean specu-
statement not only lacks authcnticity, but carries with it its own Neither at the end refutation. of the second book of the De
public
nor in
any other passage

j
speak with greater detail on this point later on (in Provisionally may be chap. xi.). compared, besides the statements the quoted pp. 138, 110: 03, 2,
-\Ve shall
ii
between the beginning of the first and the end of the third is there: a single paragraph which could justify the supposition of a special
publication
finished,
of so
the
part
assertion
c.
(in
Ding.
iii.
37,
Suid.
and
much
far so at least must
4>iX6cro$os.
4>iXo(r.
HpoXeybfj-eva T. TTXcir. 24) that Philippus of a Opus published the Laws from rough draft of Plato s. ]ts only authority is in the assertion quoted p. 92, 1, in Gelthe lius, that Xenophon composed to the Cyroprcdia in opposition Platonic State, lectis ex eo duobus
to write
to induce Xenophon the Cyropaedia ; Gelling, however, openly presupposes our division of the books, âlready familiar to Thrasyllus (Diog. iii. 57). Compare on these questions Susennhl, Genet. Entw. ii. 88
sq.,
have appeared
rect
whose judgment is more cor-j than Ueberweg s, Plat. Schr.
i ere
libris
qui
primi
this
in
volgus
212.
exierant.
But
anonymous
TIIK Oli D Ell

y!i
OF
TllK PL ATOXIC
W1UTIXG&
143
there any proof or likelihood that he recast the 124 Modern critics have endialogue a second time.
is
Nor
fa:
.:
irest of
deavoured to separate the first and last book from the the work, but neither tradition nor valid interither
Li
nal
evidence favours the supposition; hand the artistic and essential

is
while on the
ppcars throughout
be contrary. 125
1 - 1
^
unity which an unanswerable argument to

and 7th books were inserted be tween the 4th and the 8th book by way of a supplement. However, he has not shown much care in sub
stantiating this sweeping assertion. I will not here enter into particu
lars,
According to Diog.
iii.
37
:
luphorio and Pametius reported oXXd/as (TTpa.fj./j.frr)i> evpTJaOai rj]v 9Xn v T ns TToXtreiay. Dionys. De
omp. verb.
uintil.
st)
:
p.
0,
208
f.
R; and
viii.
the ly Dion the
epublic
iflerent
04, says more prefour (or according first eight) words of the were written in many
first
because
Hermann
assump
arrangements, on a tablet But from lat we cannot with Dionysius, c. cit., go so far as to conclude uvt Plato was engaged in polishing s writings up to the time of his 2ath we plainly have here to do ither with an experiment before
und
tion has already been tested, with especial reference to the first book, v. 07 by Steinhart, PI.
"W.
after Plato s death.
sq.,
675 sq., and Husemihl, Genet. Kntw. ii. 05 sqq. I would only point out that the end (x. 008
sq.)
is
already prepared for in
the introduction (i. 330 The D). discussion on Justice, to which the whole of Ethics and Politics is
iblication to sec how the opening ords would look in different posions.
icse
Still less
mark,
must we magnify
of style of the
into
subordinated, starts from the re that only the just man awaits the life in the world to
corrections paratc revision

25
a whole
oik.
ann,
>ok
It was, as is well known, Plat. i. 537 sq., who
Herput
first
and at the tranquillity returns, after settling all the intermediate questions, to the starting point, to find its sublime conclusion in the of
;
come with
ît
end
ward the assertion that the
contemplation
originally a s -paratc and dependent work of Plato s first Socratic period, and was afterirds prepared as an introduction the Ivepublic, and that the tenth ok was only added after a longer riod. Also that the 5th, Oth,
was
process is still designed in accordance with a definite plan.

of elaboration,
reward in the world to come. This framework at once proves that wo have to deal with a single selfconsistent work, which, with all its freedom in working out the details and additions during the
144
CHAPTER
),
IV.
ON THE CHARACTER, METHOD, AND DIVISION OF THE

PLATONIC PHILOSOI LOSOPHY.
Platonic philosophy is on the one side the combut on the other, an extension pletion of the Socratic
;
THE
and an advance upon
it.
As
Socrates in his philosophic
enquiries concerned himself with the moral quite as much as with the intellectual life as with him right
was inseparably united with right cognition, philosophy with morality and religion, being indeed one and the same thing so is it in Plato and as the aim of the one philosopher was to ground intelligen and conduct on conceptual knowledge, so to the otli the standard of all action and of all convictions is the
action
;
contemplation of universal ideas. Plato s views con cerning the problem and principle of philosophy thus But that which had rest entirely on a Socratic basis.
been with Socrates only a universal axiom became with Plato a system that which the former had laid down
;
the principle of knowledge was announced Socra the latter as the principle of metaphysics. had sought that conceptual knowledge for which
as
claimed existence, but he had only reduced to thei
primary concept particular
activities
and phenome
HARACTER OF PLATO S PHILOSOPHY.
145
connection with the given case. He had never to gain a whole from scientifically combined attempted
in
concepts, and thus to explain the totality of the Real. He confined himself on principle to ethical enquiries, and even these he pursued, not systematically, but in
a merely inductory manner. It was Plato who expanded the Socratic philosophy into a system,
first
com
bined
the earlier natural philosophy, and founded both in dialectics, or the pure science of
its
ethics with
ideas.
But the necessity immediately became apparent
of a principle not only to guide thought in the scien tific method, but also to interpret material things in
in transcending the Socratic ethics, transcends also the Socratic accep tation of conceptual knowledge. The cognition of
Plato,
ideas, Socrates
their essence
and existence.
had
said,
is
the condition of -all true
knowledge
Plato,
and
right
action.
is
logical
thought
Therefore, concludes alone true knowledge. All
other ways of
afford
knowing
presentation, envisagement
no
scientific certainty of conviction.
But
if
the
alone real knowledge, this knowledge can only bo, according to Plato, because that alone is a knowledge of the Heal because true Being be
is
;
of the idea
longs exclusively to the essence of things presented in the idea, and to all else, in proportion only as it in the idea. Thus the idealizing of tha participates
concept, which with Socrates had been a logical postu late involving a certain scientific dexterity, dialectical impulse, and dialectical art, was now raised to the
objective contemplation into a* ay stem.
of the world,
and perfected
146
This, however, was impossible without introducing a sharper discrimination between intellectual and moral Their direct and unconditional unity, which activity.
Socrates had demanded, can only be maintained so long as no advance is made beyond his general view of the two-sided problems. The moment we proceed to
either, on the one hand, examining the con particulars ditions of scientific thought, and directing that thought
to subjects of
no immediate moral import or, 011 the other, fixing the attention more steadily on that which is peculiar to moral activities and their various mani
;
festations
we can no longer
is
conceal from ourselves
that there
a difference, as well as a connection, be tween knowledge and action. It will be shown here
after that this difference forced itself
upon Plato
too
herein, however, as in his whole conception of philo sophy, he is far less widely separated than Aristotle
from his master. He distinguishes more sharply than the one between the moral direction of the will and
scientific
cognition, but
other,
tivity.
moke philosophy an
does not therefore, like the exclusively theoretical ac
He completes the Socratic ethics not only with dialectical but with physical investigations the
:
and what latter, however, never prosper in his hands the obligations of this branch of en ever may be
;
quiry to Plato, it is certain that his genius and zeal for natural science were far inferior to those of
Aristotle,
and that
his achievements in this
department
bear no comparison with those of his scholar, either in extent of knowledge, acuteness of observation, exact
ness of interpretation, or fruitfulness of result.
He
CHAR A CTER OF PL A TO S PHILOSOPHY.
147
gives to concepts, as separate substances, the reality of Ideas but in holding Ideas to be the only reality, and material things, as such, to be devoid of essence,
;
and non-existent, he makes impossible to himself the
He perfects the into a system, but is not im conceptual philosophy pelled, like his successor, to enter deeply into par
explanation of the phenomenal world.
ticulars
to^jiim the idea only is the true object of thoughtj the individual phenomenon possesses no inteivst. He can indeed make use of it to bring to light
:
the idea in which
it participates, but that thorough with which Aristotle works his way through completeness The study of par empirical data is not his concern.
seemsjto_him_scarcely more than an intellectual pastime, and if he has for a while occupied himself with
ticulars
it,
he always returns, as if wearied out, to the contem plation of pure ideas^ In this respect also, he stands
first
midway between philosopher who
Socrates and Aristotle; between the taught the development of the
concept from presentation or envisagement, and him who more completely than any other Greek thinker has
carried
it
into all the spheres of actual existence.
In
same proportion, however, that Plato advanced beyond Socrates, it was inevitable that he should go back to the pre-Socratic doctrines, and regard as his
the
co-disciples those who were then seeking to apply those theories to the perfecting of the Socratic doctrine. To
what an extent he did both is well known. Plato is first of the Greek philosophers who not merely knew and made use of his predecessors, but consciously completed their principles by means of each other, and
the
L2
148
bound them all together in one higher principle. What Socrates had taught with regard to the coiiceptT~oT knowledge Parmenides and Heraclitus, the Megarians and Cynics, on the difference between knowledge and opinion Heraclitus, Zeno, and the Sophists, on the
;
all this he built up subjectivity of sense perception The Eleatic into a developed theory of knowledge.
principle of Being, and the Heraclitean of Becoming, the doctrine of the unity and that of the multiplicity of things, he has, in his doctrine of Ideas, quite as
much blended
as opposed
while at the same time he has
perfected both by
means
of the
Anaxagorean conception
of Spirit, the Megaro-Socratic conception of the Good, and the idealised Pythagorean numbers. These latter,
properly understood, appear in the theory of the Worldsoul, and the mathematical laws, as the mediating ele
ment between the idea and the world

one
element, the
of sense.
Their
held
concept
of
the
Unlimited,
absolutely and combined with the Heraclitean view

of the
sensible world,
gives
the
Platonic
definition
of Matter.
The cosmological part
system
verse
:
is repeated in Plato s while in his theory of the elements and of
of the Pythagorean conception of the uni
physics proper, Empedocles and Anaxagoras, and more distantly the Atomistic and older Ionic natural philo
His psychology is deeply the teaching of Anaxagoras on the immaterial nature of mind, and with that of Pytha
sophies, find their echoes.
coloured with
In his ethics, the Socratic basis goras on immortality. can as little be mistaken as, in his politics, his sym
pathy with the Pythagorean aristocracy.
Yet Plato
CHAKA C TER OF PL A TO
is
ti
PHIL 08OPHY.
149
neither the envious imitator that
calumny has called
him, nor the irresolute eclectic, who only owed it to favouring circumstances that what was scattered about
in earlier systems united in
him
to form a
harmonious
say more truly that this blending of the rays of hitherto isolated genius into one focus is the work of his originality and the fruit of his philosophic
whole.
principle.
|
We may
The Socratic conceptual philosophy is from the outset directed to the contemplation of things in all their aspects, the dialectic combination of those
various definitions of which
now
one,
is
mistaken by a one-sided apprehension
and now another, for the whole
multiplicity of experience to Plato applies this method uni versally, seeking not merely the essential nature of moral activities, but the essential nature of the Heal.
its
to the reduction of the
permanent
base. 1
He is thus inevitably directed towards the assumptions of his predecessors, which had all started from some but while these assumptions had re true perception
;
lated entirely
scientific
all
one another, Plato s principles required that he should fuse them

to
and exclusively
into
the
world.
earlier
and more comprehensive theory of Plato s knowledge of the doctrines gave him the most decided impulse
a higher
As
therefore
development of the Socratic teaching, it was conversely that development which alone enabled
in the
him
to
use,
the combined achievements of the other
philosophers for his
own
system.
The
Socratic con
ceptual philosophy was transplanted by him into the fruitful and well-tilled soil of the previous natural
1
Cf, Part
i.
page
93,
95 sqq.
J50
philosophy, thence to appropriate to itself all kindred matter and in thus permeating the older speculation with the spirit of Socrates, purifying and reforming it
;
by
dialectic,
which was
itself
extended to metaphysical
speculation, losophy, and
in thus perfecting ethics by natural phi natural philosophy by ethics Plato has
accomplished one of the greatest intellectual creations ever known. Philosophy could not indeed permanently
remain in the form then given to
it.
Aristotle soon
made very
them
essential alterations in the theories of his
master; the older
Academy
and the
itself
could not maintain
in their purity,
later
systems that thought
to reproduce the system of Plato were self-deceived. But this is precisely Plato s greatness, that he was
able to give the progress of Philosophy an impulse so powerful, so far transcending the limits of his own
system, and to proclaim the deepest principle of all with such right speculation the Idealism of thought energy, such freshness of youthful enthusiasm, that to him, despite all his scientific deficiencies, belongs the
honour of
for ever conferring philosophic consecration
method, also, we recognise the the purification and the progress of the Sodeepening, From the principle of conceptual cratic philosophy.
s
on those in In Plato
whom
that principle lives.
scientific
knowledge arises, as its immediate consequence, that dia 2 lectic of which Socrates must be considered the author.
But while Socrates contented himself with developing

2 The dialectic of Zeno and the Sophists differs in being concerned with refutation only: Socrates uses
dialectic as a real agent in defining the concept,
HIS SCIENTIFIC METHOD.
151
the concept out of mere envisagement, Plato further de manded that conceptual science should be drawn out by
methodical classification into a system while Socrates, in forming concepts, starts from the contingencies of the
;
given case, and never goes beyond the particular, Plato requires that thought shall rise, by continued analysis,
from conditioned to unconditioned, from the phenome non to the idea, from particular ideas to the highest and
most universal.
The Socratic
dialectic only set itself
to gain the art of right thinking for the
immediate use
of individuals to purify their crude presentations into concepts the practice of dialectic was therefore at the
:
and moral activity work of the philosopher in itself as for its effect on others. The Platonic dialectic, on the other hand, was subservient to the formation of a
;
same time education
intellectual
coincided, as
much
for the
system
it has, therefore, as compared with the Socratic, outlines and a more fixed form. AVhat in the one larger was a matter of personal discipline, in the other becomes
:
conscious method reduced to general rules whereas the former aimed at educating individuals by true con cepts, the latter seeks out the nature and connection
;
of concepts in themselves
enquires not merely into moral problems and activities, but into the essential * nature of the Real, proposing as its end a scientific
:
it
But Plato does not go representation of the universe. so far in this direction as Aristotle the technicalities
;
of logic were not formed
by by his pupil, into an exact, minutely particularising theory neither for

him, as
;
the derivation nor for the systematic application of concepts does he summon to his aid such a mass of
152
He cares far less for that equal spread of scientific knowledge into all departments which Aristotle desired, than for the contemplation of the idea as such. He regards the Empirical partly as
experimental material.
be
a mere help to the attainment of the Idea a ladder to left behind if we would gain the heights of thought partly as a type of the nature and inherent force
;
of the ideas
a world of shadows, to which the Philo
sopher only temporarily descends, forthwith to return into the region of light and of pure being. 3 Whereas,
therefore, Socrates in the
main
confines himself to a
search for concepts, the cognition of which is for him moral education whereas Aristotle extends induction
;
and demonstration, purely in the interests of

over
is
science,
alj
the Actual,
the special peculiarity of Plato
science
that Amoral education, intellectual teaching, and, in their itself, the formation of concepts and
development, in spite of partial separation, are yet, with him, internally held together and united by their common aim, both leading to that contempla
tion of the idea,
which
is
is
at the
same time
life
in
the idea. 4
see, in
This position
not indeed invariable.
We
the dialogues, Socratic induction at first de cidedly predominating over the constructive element, then both intermingling, and, lastly, inductive prepara
tion receding before systematic deduction correspond ing to which there is also a gradual change from the
;
form of conversation to that of continued exposition. But the fundamental character of the method is never
J
Vide_ especially
sq.
;
vii.
514
Eep.
vi.
oil
ff.
my
Plat. Stud. p. 23 sq.
sqq.
DIALOGUE.
effaced
;
153
and however deeply Plato may sometimes go
into particulars, his ultimate design is only to exhibit with all possible clearness and directness the Idea
shining through the

reflection in the finite
phenomenon
;
to
to
fill
with
its light
point out its not only
the intellect, but the whole man.
the
This speciality in the philosophy of Plato explains form which he selected for its communication.
artistic
An
tion
nature was indispensable for the produc

;
of
such a philosophy
conversely,
this
philo
sophy would infallibly demand to be informed artis The phenomenon, placed in such direct rela tically. tion to the idea, becomes a beautiful phenomenon
the perception of the
aesthetic perception. 5
idea
in
the
Where
one
science
phenomenon an and life so com
pletely interpenetrate another, as with Plato, science can only impart itself in lively description ; and as the communicating medium is ideal, this de
scription
will
time,
if
it
however,
is
At the same necessarily be poetical. the exposition must be dialectical,

subject
to
correspond with the
matter
of
conceptual philosophy. quirements in the philosophic dialogue, by means of which he occupies a middle position between the per sonal converse of Socrates and the purely scientific con tinuous exposition of Aristotle. The Socratic conver
sation
5
.Plato satisfies
both these re
is
here idealised, the contingency of

fi
its
motives
thus (says Plato himthe Phiedrus, 250 I) ; Symp. ^L 06 D) that the philosophic idea first dawns upon the consciousness.
It
is
Aiisiotle
chose
the dialogue
self in
P>,
form only for popular writings, and apparently only in his Platonic
period,
154

is
and conduct
corrected
by a
stricter
method
the
defects of personalities are covered by artistic treat ment. Yet the speciality of verbal intercourse, the
reciprocal kindling of thought, is
still
retained.
Phi
not merely as doctrine, but as a living power, in the person of the true philo sopher, and a moral and artistic effect is thus pro
losophy
is
set
forth,
duced, of a kind that would have been impossible to bare scientific enquiry. Unbroken discourse is doubt less better suited to the latter and Plato himself shows
;
this, for in
proportion as his scientific discussions gain and scope, they lose in freedom of conversa in depth In the earlier works, this freedom tional movement.
not unfrequently disturbs the clearness of the logic, while in the dialectical dialogues of the middle order
it is
more and more subordinated

In the
to the logical deve
lopment of thought.
later writings, dialogue is

skill for intro
indeed employed with the accustomed
7 ductory discussions or personal delineations; but so far as the exposition of the system is concerned it
sinks into a mere form, and in the Timaeus

at the very
is
discarded
commencement. 8 We need not, with Her 9 mann, conclude from this that the form of dialogue had for Plato a merely external value that, in fact, it was like some favourite and traditional fashion of dress
;
and
8
E.g. in the Symposium, Phaedo, first two books of the ReOf.,
public.
on Plato
s oral
instruction,
adapted for dialogic exposition, This does not really contradict what has been observed above. Even where dialogue is employed
throughout, there are
Plat. 352. vi. 44) explains Steinhart (Plat. the withdrawal of the dialogue form in the Timseus and Critias by saying that their subject was not
pp. 25-2,
and Hermann,
"W.
many
parts
open to the same objection. 9 Loc. cit. 352, 354 sq. Abhdl. 285 sqq.
Ges.
DIALOGUE.
inherited from his
155
predecessors, adopted in his first as a Socratic pupil, and then adhered to out attempts of piety and loyal attachment, in opposition to general
He certainly had an external motive for the usage. choice of this form in the conversations of his master,
and a pattern
for its
artistic
treatment in dramatic
poetry, especially such as dealt with reflections, morals, and manners, like that of Epicharmus, 10 Sophron, 11 and
12 chat before his Euripides; but it cannot be proved time dialogue was already much in vogue for philoso phic exposition and even if it could, we might still
;
be sure that Plato, independent and creative as he was, and endowed with rare artistic feeling, would
10
11 12
Vide
(If.
vol.
i.
page 362 sqq.

note 11.
passage
Suckow
Form.
d.
Plat.
page
8,
Zeno, Sophron, and Alexaof Teos are named as predecessors of Plato. It is hardly probable, however, that Zeno used the dialogue form (vide vol. i. page 494) the Prolegomena, c. 5, end,
menus
Schr. p. 50 sq.). And this solitary instance of dialogue being used before Plato by a writer so little
known and
go
"
so unimportant cannot far to prove that the dialogic treatment of philosophic material
"
"
"*
name Parmenides with him
an
addition no doubt due to the Pla tonic Parmenides. Of Sophron,
Diogenes (iii. 18} says he copied, Aristotle remarks (Poetics, c. 1, 1447, b. .)): ovScv yap av tx l V* KOLVOV TOVS 2o>0/30J OS KO.I
whom
and popular. Indeed, it only became so through the Socratic school, in which the dialogue form was common enough. Vide Part i. pp. 198, 1; 204, S;
established
was
HS
ATOI)S
Kal T0l)s Zw/C/HXTl-
\6yovs.
These mimes
may
indeed have been written in prose (Arist. ap. Athen. xi. 505 ( ), but sire no proof of the existence of
philosophic dialogues. Finally, Alt x.umnus may have written Socratic conversations but they must have been very unlike the Platonic dialogues, as Aristotle
;
speak of the Memorabilia (with regard to the Diatribes of Aristippus, we do not know whe ther they were composed in diaand are equally logne form ignorant w hethcr his twenty-five dialogues were genuine v. p. 298\
;
we"
:
205, 8 not to
20(>,
207, 2
242, 7
It is plain that the prevalence of dialogue in the Socratic school was due to its master. Perhaps, how
ever,
when Plato wrote

were
his
first
pieces, there
not, as yet,
(ap.
Athen.
loc.
with
Sophron
KO.I
cit.) classes them s mimes as prose

cf.
many
tales, \6yoi
on the
Xeii. dialogues extant. iv. 3, 2, cannot be alleged to the opposite. prove
Socratic
Mem.
156
form
to
never on such purely external grounds have held to a all his life long, even when it was most irksome
;
him that mere antiquity would not have deter mined him in its choice, nor custom in its persistent employment, unless there had been the closest internal connection between that form and his whole concep tion of philosophy. What this connection was Plato
himself points out, 13 when in the Phaedrus (275 D) he censures writing, as compared with speech, with its inability to defend itself, and its openness to all
attacks and misconceptions for if this censure holds good of written exposition in general, Plato must have been conscious that even his dialogues could not en
;
tirely escape
it.
Yet, on the other hand, his convic
tion of the advantages of speech presupposes the de sign of appropriating as far as possible those advantages
to his writing, that
14
image of the living and animated those advantages, in Plato s opinion, word; 15 depend upon the art of scientific dialogue, we may
and
if
13
i.
Cf.
a.
14
15
17
Phil. vi.
Schleicrmacher, Plat. W. Brandis, Gr.-rom. sqq. a. 154, 158 sqq.

;
Phsedrus, 276 A. Phaedrus, 276 E: iro\v 5
Cratylus, 390 0), from the etymology given in Pliilebus, 57 E Kcp. B (against vii. 532 vi. 511 ; which the derivation ap. Xen.
;
ofyiat,
Mem.
and
iv. 5,
12, proves nothing),
Ka\\i(t)v crirov5i] Trept airra yiyvcrai, 6rav Tis r?7 StaXe/crtKf; rex"V XP&fjievos
Xa/3i!;j>
from the opposition hetween
dialectic
and
loc.
rhetoric,
cit.
in
the
is
"^w^v
irpoar)Kovaav
eiriffT-r]-
Phffidrus,
And
in
this
(pi/revy re nai ffirdprj /ter

/z?7S
expressly
gorîs, p.
affirmed
the
Prota-
Xctyoi/j,
defined
by
as
&c. Dialectic is first Plato (Phtedr. 266

the
art
328
sqq.,
where people
B)
only
logical concepts and Its most suitable form divisions. was dialogue, as we may tee from
of forming of making
the explanation of StaXc/crtKTj as the art of scientific question and answer (Rep. vii. 531 E, 534 B,
are censured for purely continuous discourse, because, like books, they cannot either answer or ask questions, and are therefore deficient in those advantages which the Phrodrus ascribes to oral instriiction (Hermann s infelicitous conjecture,
ovx
&<rirep
/3i/3Mo,
com-
DIALOGUE.
157
art.
reasonably derive from this his own application of that But the dialogues themselves manifest
beyond
imaginary knowledge by the essentially Socratic method of prov ing ignorance, only isolated and apparently uncon nected lines of enquiry ? why should some of these be hidden by others? why should the argument at last resolve itself in apparent contradictions ? unless Plato
presupposes his reader to be capable of completing
participation what is wanting in any given enquiry, of discovering the central point in that enquiry, and of subordinating all the rest to that one point such a presupposes also that
design of compelling the reader, by their peculiar form, to the independent origination of thoughts. Why should there so often be found in them, after the destruction of
possibility
of mistake
the
by
his
own
active
only reader will attain any conviction of having understood at all/ lc The above-named peculiarities are un favourable to the systematic of objective
development
Plato has employed them with the most consummate art and the most deliberate intention, he must have had a reason for it.
Since, therefore,
special this can only be that he considered objective expo sition as generally insufficient, and sought instead for
science.
and
to possess
some other manner which should stimulate the reader knowledge as a self-generated thing, in which
objective instruction should be conditioned

the The dialogue is accordpassage). ingly recommended (348 C) as the best medium of instruction, and the retention of the dialogue form repeatedly insisted on, as opposed
of
pletely misses
by previous
from Brandis, with which I
the
sense
to the Sophistic declamations- cf
334
"
sqq.
quotation
loc.
cit.
159
sqq.,
fully ngree.
158

If this were the design of Plato, same time convinced that the form
and he were
subjective culture. at the
of dialogue suited it better than continuous discourse, it naturally follows that he would select that form
for his writings.
Thought
itself
17
;
is
to
him
a conversation
of
the
soul
with
philosophic
;
communica
the logical tion, an engendering of truth in another element is therefore essentially dialogical. His writ
were probably in the first instance designed, not for the general public, 18 but for his friends, to whom he himself would have imparted them they were in
ings, too,
:
tended to remind those friends of the substance of the

scientific conversations
he was accustomed to carry on
with them, or perhaps as a substitute for these. 19 What therefore could be more natural than that he
should adopt the form of their usual intercourse
of the Socratic
sequel, wisely
that
dialogue
20
Stricter science, in the

;
abandoned
to nature,
all
was according
17
KO.I
this form but for Plato it and he stands alone and im-
approached among
Sophist,
Ao-yos ravTov
writers of philosophic dialogues,

fj.fr
2G3 K: Sidvoia
TT\T]V 6
fj.ev
O.VTTII>
evrbs
rijs if/vxfy irpbs 8id\oyos &vev avrb -rjfuv yevo/j.evos TOUT didvoia . . TO 5 7 air r) fjia Sia TOV <rr6;uaTos LOV /X.CTOI KK\t]Tai \6yos. Cf. Theajt. 189 E. 18 There was as yet no bookKelling in our sense of the term, althotigh the first beginnings of it seem to come in that period. The usual method of making a work known was by means of recitation, which method Plato would have
<f>66y*yov
before
writings had attained a circulation extending beyond his own school his death. After that event, Hermodorus is taxed with made a trade of selling having Plato s writings cf. the passages
;
quoted in chapter xiv. 9 Vide p. 112.
From their original determination in this form we can partly explain the freedom with which Plato in his dialogues makes use of and
characterises living personages of his acquaintance, e.g. his brothers in the Keptiblic, and in the intro-
employed
question
The (vide p. 27, 50). arises whether Plato s
duction to the Parmenides.
nwnox OF SOCRATES rx THE DIALOGUE*.

writer did
159
before and after him, because in the case of no other the conditions under which his dialogues were produced exist in similar measure in his person that rare combination of intellectual and artistic
gifts,
philosophy that equal perfection and inner fusion of the theoretical and practical, of the philosophic
in his
and of dialectic. The central point of the Not dialogues is Socrates. only does he appear in most of them as the leader in conversation, in the rest as an acute and important listener and occasional is speaker, but his
Eros,
personality
pre-eminently the bond which artistically unites the

several pieces
;
and some of the most powerful and most
delightful of the dialogues are devoted quite as much to the painting of this personality as to the philosophic 21 This trait is development of doctrine. a
tribute of gratitude ciple to his master.
bo
and veneration
Plato
is
offered
primarily by the dis
conscious that he owes

life,
Socrates what
is
best in his spiritual
and, under
this conviction, gives
back
to
him
loblest fruits of the
borrowed
in his writings the seed as his own. That
Socrates should be brought forward was necessary, too, artistic grounds; for the unity of the Platonic doc
:>n
devoted to
and the intimate connection of all the writings it, could in no way be more artistically re presented than by their association with one and the same personality and that the of
trine,
;
was far more suitable than any other

pleasanter picture
21
Socrates personality that a nobler, a picture more capable of idealisa;
Socrates
is
ue Laws, the
last of Plato s
only omitted in works;
urn! the omission
is
but one of
its
peculiarities.
100

resulted from Plato
s placing his opinions in the instead of enunciating them him of Socrates,
tion
mouth
self,
needs no proof. His procedure has doubtless another and a deeper

foundations of his
reason, rooted in the
manner
of
his acceptation, Philosophy, according to thought. not merely a set of doctrines but the perfecting being of the whole spiritual life and science, not a finished, communicable system, apart from the person that knows, but personal activity and mental development, true be represented in the perfect philosophy could only and demeanour philosopher, in the personality, words, 22 This view of philosophy is closely con of Socrates. nected with another trait, by which Plato s literary
;
individuality
his
is
marked with
of myths,
special clearness.
This
is
employment
which he loves to combine
with philosophic enquiry, and especially to bring for 2 ward for the opening or conclusion of a discussion.
--
Of. the striking

IJauV,
of
in
his
observations Socrates and
203
Christ,
>23
Tubingen Journal,
1837,
.",,97-121.
A sq.. the begetting of Kros sqq., tnpl Kepublic, Hi. 414 classification of men ;- I lirodrue --*I5 sqq. sqq.; Meno, 81
list
subjoin for convenience sake of all that properly belongs to

:
(Jorgias, 52, )
P>
this class
Protagoras, 320
sqq.,
on Prometheus
and
Epimetheus
and the origin of political virtue, of perhars from some writing v. vol. i. page 575 Protagoras Politicus, 269 C sqq., the sq
;
sqq.; Phredo, sq Kepublic, x. 614 sqq. it sqq., the Nnil, Timseus, 41 con its pre-existence, wanderings, dition hereafter, its recollection o
1>
changing
Laws
world-periods : cf. the 713, 13 sq., for a short mvthic picture of the Golden Age; Tinifeus 21 A sq., and Critias,the cosmic revolutions, the Atlantides,
iv.
and Athenians
Symposium, 189
tale of
;
sq.,
Aristophanes
how
previous perceptions. Ihe^vhol investiture of the Timrcus is ais mythic the Demiurgus, togcthe with the subordinate gods, and a the history of the creation ot tin c world; so is the Name-giver I shall go more at the Cratylns. of these length into the import myths in their proper places. The short narratives ot the Cicadai
the difference in sex arose
Ibid,
and
of
Theuth have no
esoteric
Here, however, another motive comes into play. On mythus is the expression of the re and poetical character of the Platonic philo ligious 21 Plato makes use of the traditions of the sophy.
the one side, the
popular faith and of the mysteries (in which beneath the veil of fable he divines a deeper meaning) for the
artistic representation of his ideas;
he also extends and
multiplies
them by
original inventions,
which
rise
from
the transparent personification of philosophic concep

tions, into lively epic description fully and drawn out. But, on the other side, the
exuberantly
mythus is not a mere garment, thrown over a thought that had pre
viously existed in a purely scientific shape; in many.-j.) cases it is for Plato a positive necessity, and his/
masterly use of it is a consequence of the fact, that he does not turn back upon the path of reflection to seek a picture for his thought, but that from the very out set, like a creative he thinks in pictures: that artist, the mythus does not reiterate that which the author has elsewhere dialectically expressed, but seizes by
anticipation, as with a presentiment,
logical
that for which
expression
in short,
myths,
scientific
The Platonic wanting. almost always point to a gap in knowledge: they are introduced where some
is
still
thing has to be set forth, which the philosopher indeed acknowledges as true, but which he has no means of
reference to philosophic doctrines, Phredr. 250 The sq. 274 C sq. legend of Gyges, Uep. xi. 359
of which a myth could be constructed, but the narrative form is
wanting.
-4
used by Plato for the elucidation of a position, but is not introduced in his own name. Hep. 514 sqq. is an allegory, out
sq., is
""
of the
loc.
the religious signification Platonic myths, cf. cit. HI sqq. Theol. Stud. u.
P>aur,
;
On
Krit. 1837, 3,
552 sqq.
162

25
establishing scientifically. it in two cases (1) when

:
is
This takes place chiefly the required to explain
material things, the methodical derivation origin of which is impossible, according to the presupposi 26 and (2) when circumstances tions of Plato s
of
system;
are to be described which have no analogy with our
which cannot be more exactly present experience, and The first is found in the mythological delineated. 27 the second in the nar of the Timseus
cosmogony
of
rations concerning
the future
life
and the primeval
history
latter is
the essential purport of these also the determination of the state in which
man
for
human
society
would
find itself
under
altered, ideal
conditions.
When
Plato
mythical representation,
his ordinary style
these cases adopts the he indirectly confesses that

in
to him.
would be impossible
Hi
myths
tistic
still
ability,
are consequently not only a proof of his ar and an effect of the intimate relatio
and his poetry subsisting between his philosophy of his methodic but they also betray the boundaries However admirable in themselves, therefore, thought. of are, in a scientific point of view, rather a sign they
25
Plato
his
114 D Gorg. 523 A, 527 A and Timreus, 29 D, 59 C, he speaks of the et /cws Stmnpf. (Yerh. d. Plat. Gott. z. idee d. Gut. 37) confounds the myth with allegory in asserting (though he retracts
; ;
i*.v6o<>.
eschatologic
himself shows this in myths: Phoedo,
This cannot be general sense. got out of Plato s words, ând The signiis in itself mistaken. fication of a myth is bimply whatever the author wishes to express
_
by
it:
but must this be invariably

will be
true?
* As
place.
-7
shown
in its proper
the assertion virtually, p. 100) the myth excludes probathat if taken literally, it bility, because, could only be false, while it could in its only be true if understood
lus
The Name-giver of the Cratj and the (fivrovpybs TT}S K\bnfi c
Republic, x. 597
this class.
sqq.,
belong
tc
MTTH8:
:
163
Weakness than of strength they indicate the point at it becomes evident that as yet he cannot be wholly a philosopher, because he is still too much of a
which
\J
|
28
poet,
28
Cf.
Hegel
remarks, History
of Philosophy, ii. 103 A. sqq. Jahn (Dissertatio Platonica, Bern,
and unsatisfactory division of the myths (ibid. 31 sq.) into theological, psychological, cosmogonical, and
a division that reminds physical us of Ballast s dc Mundo, c. 4.
183 ( 20 sqq.) has rather J, p. strengthened than refuted Hegel s position, though his perverse philo sophic assumptions have done much to obscure the simple understand ing of the case e.g. the arbitrary
;
to import of which is pictorial envisagement, where pure thought can no longer
essential
give
help
us,
of the
transition of
the
Idea into phenomena. We may, therefore, expect a mythical re presentation wherever (Deuschle,
Plat.
M.
a difficulty between truo Being and a process of Becoming

volves
:
10)
Plato
doctrine in
the former belongs to intellectual the latter has to bj investigation brought before us by an envisage
;
Deuschle(Plat. Sprachphil. 38 sqq. Uebcr plat. Mythen, 3 sqq.) is much more satisfactory on the nature and import of Plato s myths and Susemilil (Genet. Entw. i. 228, 283 sq.) and Steinhart (PI. W. vi. 73) in the main agree with him. He shows that the Platonic envisagenicnt of the world, and the method of its development, was essentially and that, ontological, not genetic Platonic philosophy was therefore, not concerned, even if it had been
;
;
;
of these deductions, I am prevented by ^ the following reasons from giving full adhesion to the theory. First, I cannot concede that Plato
ment which fills up its outlines. While acknowledging the ingenuity
uses
mythic
representation
to explain a process of Becoming. For (even to pass over Phaedr. 259 sq., 274 sq.,
when he has
only
A
;
and 247 (), 250 B Kep. x. 5L7 P.. where the Ideas themselves are
thus treated)
the myths in tin Symposium and Politicus (as will be shown further on) are not con
able, to explain the genesis of the
Existent. The Become, however, forced itself into consideration

;
be found at once capable of a speculative con tent, and demonstrating by its unphilosophic stamp the nothingness of the experiential snbstratum. This form was the mythus, the value and charm of which (as Bteinhart says, loc. cit.) lie in that mysterious union of Being and Becoming, which, unattainable by cognition, may only be grasped the by imagination and feeling;
to
^
and some form had
explanation of in the former ; the object is to give a description of Eros a definition through con which might just as well cepts
purely dialectic considerations decided Plato to clothe his thought in the light and transparent en velopment of the mythus. In the Politicus, he merely follows out the position that the reduction of statecraft to the pastoral art is at most applicable only to the golden
ill
cerned
with the anything Become
have been given
form.
But
artistic
10

s
Plato
more
comprehensive
and
methodical
also
de
necessitates velopment of philosophy

distinction of its several branches with
earlier philosophers.
clearer
j
him than with

lines
Yet the dividing
are not
his writings as in those of Aris nor is the precise determination of each branch totle 29 Modern writers have not unfrequently certain.
so sharply
;
drawn in
quite ascribed to Plato classifications which are manifestly 30 and the same is true of the previously alien to him
;
age and
our that, applied to
own
overlooks times, it is wrong and the real distinction between the All the philosophic opinions two contained in the myth of the States-
dispensed with as Jar as its immediate object the myth of is concerned. Again, in the Eep. iii. dots not stand
place of
;.n
man might have been
Fuller enquiries into the this. Platonic myths are given in Alb. Fischer De Mythis Plat. (Konigsb. 1865), 27 sq. ; Ueberweg, Grnndr. To these must now be i. 129. added Volquardsen on the Platonic myths, Schlesw. 1871. Fischer s of the myths into classification
poetical and philosophical (loc. cit.) is inexact, because, if we understand by the first the purely poctical (for they are all poetical on the whole, else they would not be
explanation.
On
this
acccunt then I cannot concede to Dcuschle (Plat. M. 12) that a myth like that of the Symposium is necessary on philosophic grounds,
myths)
this class
must be limited
(of the Cicadas)
;
though I entirely acknowledge
its
to the Plucdr.
259
artistic propriety. Generally speakit best not to ing, we shall find
press
the
tion too
strii-tly
regards do not the Platonic myths, I think niv judgment on them overthrown by the remark (Piat. Sprach. phil. 38) that this exposition was necessary to Plato from
his
philosophical construeto confine too As poetical invention. worth of the scientific
much, not
Phrcdr. 274 C sq. (about Theuth) is a didactic narrative, though without any philosophic content, Of the other instances placed by
Fischer in this
class, Rep. ii. 359 no myth at all, while Prot. 230 C sqq., and Symp. 189
sq,
is
sqq., express definite philosophic The further division suppositions. of the philosophic myths into on-
This I have of view. endeavoured to prove myself: and the assertion that the deficiencies
point
of
Plato
scientific
procedure
cosmological, tological, methodic, is at psychological, and political, once useless and inaccurate, masmuch as not unfrequently several of these elements are treated in
come
very
sition
into
need is no contradiction.
of
prominence in this a mythical expoJ>eu-
the same myth,

-9
ii.
Cf.
on what follows
lutter,
244
j
sqq.
Bchle, plat,
M.
4,
virtually admits
E.g. the division into a general
\ or
his
nv>
mentioned attempts 31 of the old grammarians works according to their contents.

ternal
far
to arrange
32
Though the ex
there
is
evidence in
its
favour
is
insufficient,
more
to be said for the theory that
he divided the
:
"
three, parts 33 Dialectics (or _Logic), Physics, and Ethics. For not 34 isitEis" distribution only presupposed by Aristotle
whole subject matter of philosophy into
//)
and
employed
of the
by Xenocrates,
35
but
the
most im
dialogues, in regard to their main subject, fall into three corresponding groups ; though scarcely one dialogue is wholly contained in either.
portant
find an .applied part Gesch. d. Phil. i. 215,
(Marbach,
who
second and third century of tho

Christian era.
further
subdivides the latter into Physics and Ethics similarly Schleiermacher, Gesch. d.^ Phil. 98, speaks of a twofold direction of cogni;
Acad. i. 5, 19, who, ace. 14 (cf. Fin. v. 3, 8, 4, 9), follows Antiochus in this instance! Diog. iii. 56 to Physics Socrates
Cic.
4, to c.
:
tion to unity and totality, and in the latter to Physics and Ethics to Plato himself is attributed merely the threefold division into
;
added Ethics, and Plato Dialectics

(more correctly Apul. Dogm. Plat. he had Ethics and Dialectics from Socrates). Atticus ap. Euseb. Ev. xi. 2, 2 sqq., Apul. loc. cit., pr.
3
:
Pialectics, Physics, and Ethics) a distinction which nowhere oc;
both of whom, however, show their

untrustworthiness, in ranging Thcology and the doctrine of Ideas under so also Aristocl. apud Physics
;
curs.
Nor
again
do
we
;
find
between theoretical and practical philosophy (Krug, Gesch. d. alt. Phil. 209 Buhle, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 70 sq. and Tennemami, Plat. Phil. i. 240 ?qq., add as a third division Logic
;
a distinction
Euseb.
c.
loc. cit. 3,
G,
and Alcinous
Isag. 7, who mentions the three divisions of dialectical, theoretical,
which, however, they only understand the theory of
or Dialectics, by
and practical philosophy. Sextus Math. vii. ID, after detailing the
three parts of philosophy, savs far
Van Heusde s distinccognition). lion of a philotopkia jml-ri,

r<-ri
more
^v
/ecu
&v 5vfd/j.ft circumspectly TiXdruv dpxifyli ....

:
<TT\V
cf jtinti,
See preceding note. The eclectic Antiochus is not an original

source in questions of the Platonic philosophy and this is true without exception of the writers of the
;
is entirely unplatonic. P- ^7, 14. ^

52
modern
and
ol
ol
irepl
rov tZ
airb TOV -rrepiiraTov tn 5e vl TTJS trroas ^x oVTai TTJade TT)$

b.
Top. i. 14, 105, Anal. Post. i. 33, end. * See note 33.
19;
cf.
100

so
far
The Timaeus, and,

to
as
Anthropology may be
classed under Physics, the Phaedo also,
contents
gias, ethical
dialectical.
We
is physical as the Republic, Politicus, Philebus, Gorthe Theaatetus, Sophist and Parmenides, may therefore venture to derive this
from Plato, though it is never brought for ward in his writings, 36 and at any rate cannot be
division
But, proved in the case of his oral discourses. however applicable it may be, it does not exhaust It has the philosophic content of the dialogues.
already been pointed out that in these the Socratic discussion for scientific preparation and induction,
moral education,
is
lopment
to
of doctrine,
combined with systematic deve and at first even asserts itself
far
greater
all
extent.
What
?
place,
be assigned to such arguments
Where
then, are
is
to to
we
those refutations of popular opinion and arrange of customary virtue, of the Sophists and their Euda3-
those passages which treat of the conception and the method of knowledge, the one ness of virtue, and the relation of knowledge to moral
monistic theories
all
action, of philosophic love

?
and the stages of
its
deve
place one part of them lopment under Dialectic, another under Ethics. But by this
It
is
usual to
procedure,
either
the coherent
trine
exposition
of
true
of
these
is
33 By Dialectic Plato understands Philosophy generally, as will be shown more thoroughly He acknowledges a later on.
existences
not
He does opposed to his views. not know the names Physics and Kthics. Instead of the latter he
would rather say Politics cf. Polit. 303 E, 305 E, 259 B and Etithydem. 291 C sqq. Gorg. 464 B.
:
;
strictly
where
with
;
tation
procedure only concepts are dealt and, therefore, the limiof Dialectic to the doc-
scientific
pure
DIVISION OF PIiATO* 8 8Y8TBM*
107
sciences
is
Plato, even
interrupted by elementary discussions which where ho introduces them, has left far
behind
and right
mingled,
articulate
or the enquiries concerning true knowledge action, always in him so closely inter are
division
forced widely apart. To renounce an of the exposition based on the contents, and to adhere only to the conjectural ar 37 rangement of the dialogues, seems unadvisable for
;
if
we thus gain
a true representation
of the
order
in
which Plato propounded his thoughts, we get none of their internal connection and it is evident
;
from the frequent discussion in widely distant dialogues of one and the same thought, that the two orders do not necessarily coincide. Unless we would follow Plato even in his repetitions in the want of perfect syste
matic clearness inseparable from his manner of explana tion we must, in considering dialogues which are the
this
But if in manner the order of the writings be once aban doned, we have no longer any reason for adhering to it
;
stronghold of any particular doctrine, adduce instances from among the other dialogues.
all parallel
the problem will rather be to place ourselves at the inner source and centre of the Platonic system, and to rally round this nucleus the elements of that system,
at all
according to their internal relation in the mind of their 38 On this subject Plato himself (Hep. vi. 511 B) author.
17
A
11)2
commencement
cf.
:
may
cit.
be
p.
found in Branch s,
loc.
182, afterwards, however, he returns to an arrangement according to matter, which in the main agrees with the ordinary one. w I need not protest that in
into
remarks I do not disparage the worth of investigations the sequence a.nd respective
these
relations of the Platonic dialogues, or accede to the sweeping sentence of Hegel against such
enquiries (Gesch! d.
liiil. xi.
150),
108
The highest division of the hint. gives us a pregnant he says, and the proper object of philosophy thinkable, What the reason as such attains by means of is this
:
the dialectic faculty, using the hypotheses not as first as hypotheses, like steps and principles, but merely 39 in order to reach out from them points of departure, to the unconditioned, the first principle of all things ; and laying hold of this, and then of that which follows from it, it again descends to the last step so that it nowhere makes use of any sensible object, but proceeds
;
In this to ideas. wholly from ideas, through ideas, in a noteworthy passage of Aris passage, and also 40 a double way is clearly traced out for thought totle, from beneath, upward and that from above, the
:
way downward
the inductive ascent to the idea, effected the cancelling of final hypotheses, and the systeby matic descent from the idea to the particular. Now
:
that these two ways correspond with the two elements united in the doctrine of Plato, and also distinguishable from each other in his literary therefore pursue this indication, COn-
we
already
know
exposition.
We
by Marsuperficially reiterated bach (Gesch. d. Phil. i. 198). These investigations are in their
proper place of the highest value, an exposition of the but, in Platonic system, merely literary subordinated to points must he
questions nection.
y9
40
eff
Eth.
KO.L
yap
N. i. 2, 1095 a. 32 U\dra}v jvfyci TCVTO KUI

:
tfijm, Trbrepov airb ruvdpx^, ?} eTrt rds dpxds tffriv r) 6 5os, tiffTCptv rep OTTO T&V a.d\odtTuv iirirb <rra5iV
TJ
e/ms
/)
dj/ctTraXti
This expression
seems
in
of the
philosophic con:
to refer to Plato s procedure The words oral instruction.

/ecu
but Properly, onsets, bpna.1 here the word .seems to signify not as the BO much the actual onset,
starting
point.
ui<nrfp
Similarly
Symp.
xpu-
e^rei are suitable the passage in the the analogous llepublic nor to in (though not coincident) passage Cf. the referthe Phaedo, 101 D.
-rjirbpei
neither
to
211
eTravapadfj.o is [rots TroXXots /caXotsj.

:
ence later on from Phfedr. 205

sqq.
"/
PLATO* 8 SYSTEM*
first
109
sidering in the following pages,
the
groundwork, and then the systematic construction of

f
the Platonic theory. This latter, again, into Dialectics, Physics, and Ethics. 41
proof to show that could only 1 have been arranged in the order and the reverse order | given above,
It
ll
may be divided
needs
r.o
these
three
divisions
p.
futation as his assertion (loc. cit. 288) that Plato, as a true So-
adopted by Freis, ^Gesch. i. 08 sqq., requires as

>;
d.
Phil,
re-
was occupied entirely with philosophy, and in his method did not go beyond the
cratie,
practical
little
epagogic process.
170
PLATO
AXI>
THE OLDER ACADEMY.
CHAPTER
DOCTRINE.
V.
THE PROPAEDEUTIC GROUNDWORK OF THE PLATONIC
SPEAKING generally, Plato
Propaedeutic
consists
in
applying destructive criticism to the unphilosopliical

point of view, and demonstrating the necessity of true In particular, three stages may be dis philosophy. in this process. tinguished Ordinary consciousness
point of departure. By the dialectical analysis of the presuppositions, which were regarded by ordinary consciousness as primary and certain
truths,
forms the
we next
1
Sophists.
till
When
arrive at the negative result of the this has been surmounted, and not
then, the philosophic point of view can be positively
evolved.
Plato has refuted the position of ordinary conscious ness both on its theoretical and on its practical side.
In theory, ordinary consciousness may be generally defined as the Envisaging Consciousness (Vorstellendes
Bewusstsein)
it
;
or,
more exactly
to discriminate its ele
ments, apprehends truth partly as Sensuous Percep and partly as Envisagement (Vorstellen) in the tion,
1
Grotc
objections (Plato,
i.
259
sq.)
have been answered, Part
i.
p. 157.
x
narrower sense
2
AM>
orixiox.
Opinion,
or
what a man conceives
(8o ?a).
In opposition to
that
this,
Plato shows in the Theaetetus
something different from Perception (sensation, aiaOrjmg) and Right Opinion. Perception is not Knowledge, for (Thesefc. 151 E) Per
Knowledge
(tTnorr^rj) is
ception
is
only the manner in which things appear to us

:
(âvrao-m)
ception,
it
if,
therefore,
Knowledge
for
consisted in Per
would follow that
each
man
that
must
jbe true which appears to him true the principle of the Sophists, the refutation of which wr e shall presently
i
<
consider. Perception shows us the self-same object in the most contradictory manner at one time great, at another small; now hard, now soft now straight, now
:
crooked
I
be regarded as equally true with thought, which abolishes these contradictions? 3 lût even Right Opinion is not Knowledge inasmuch as
:
how then can
it
Knowledge is to be sought in the activity of the soul as such, and not in yielding ourselves to external im
4
pressions
Opinion
is
inadequate to the problem of
Knowledge. by way of indirect were indeed Knowledge, the possibility of False proof) Opinion would be inexplicable. For in the first place,
False Opinion could relate neither to what is known nor of the former we have Right Opi to what is unknown nion, of the latter (if Knowledge and Opinion be really
:
If Right Opinion (this
f.
liep.
v.
475
sqq.,
and
^relv aM/v
aiadrja-et
ssages to be presently cited. 3 x. G02 Rep. iii. 5 23 E sq.

;
(r^v rb irapdirav, d\X

8ri TTOT
eiri.<TTrj/j.r]i>}
tv
r$
Trepl
<Ji>6/xcm,
sq.
4
Theret. 187
&TO.V avrrj KO.6 avrrjv

:
wpa-yâTev^T
6>ws
TO/XT/
ra
tivra.
76
Trpo/ê/Sij/caêi
wcrre
172
5 Further, if we suppose False identical) none at all. to be an opinion corresponding to no object Opinion that the non-existent might be this would
conceived
presuppose but that is impossible, since every notion If it be made a notion of something that exists.
;
if-
to
consist in the
mistaking of one notion
for
another
(aAAoo( a),
it is equally inconceivable that a man should mistake one thing that he knows, by virtue of his very knowledge, for some other thing that he knows,
or even for something he does not
know. 6
That
is
to
cannot be the same, say, Knowledge and Eight Opinion for Right Opinion does not exclude the possibility of
False,
5
and Knowledge does exclude

bination
tions
\V.
:
it
7
;
Opinion can be
the
sq.
Vide 187 C sq. and Vide 189 B-200 D specially the end of this section.
;
of
15
pictures
our
memory makes with our percep

190
Steinhart (PI.
44, 93 sq.) lays such stress on this positive side of the dialogue the genetic that as to assert development of the process of
iii.
Briefly, the drift of the
whole
in
particular of the elaborate com parisons of the soul to a waxis to tablet and to a dove-cot show that in supposing the identity of Knowledge and Bight Opinion there is an incorrect combination
opinion with a perception, a confusion of the concepts and that, therefore, themselves such a supposition is incorrect.
of an
not
thought is to be recognised in it, as well as the refutation of error as to the nature of Knowledge. I cannot agree with him here there is no investigation into the
:
false, Plato generally gives hints of the truth ; and we find a series of acute and striking remarks in the course of
In
refuting what
is
his demonstration, specially in the distinction (afterwards so produc tive in Aristotle s hands) between
actual
and
potential
knowledge,
the dictum that error is based, not in onr particular opinions about or cnvisagements of things, but in an incorrect com bination of these ; in the case of
and
in
and even only indirectly hinted at in separating it from Perception and Opinion. 7 On the other hand, Bonitz thinks that (Plat. Stud. i. 09 sq.) the question at 187 B, 200 C, is not as to the possibility of error, but the explanation of what goes on in the soul when error arises. To me the point seems to lie in the demonstration that if 56a dX 56c with coincided eTriffTrj/j.-r), would be inexplicable i/ euSrjs
genesis of its nature
Knowledge
is
Theffitetus
definition of eVton?
is
sensible things, an incorrect
com
as
66a dX^^s
refuted apa^
.V
JA7>
KNOWLEDGE.
:
IT;;
Knowledge only true we cannot know but only know or not know. 8 This diversity falsely, m;iy also be proved by experience, for Knowledge is
true or false
:
only produced by instruction Right Opinion, on the not unfrequently, as by rhetoricians, through contrary, mere persuasion. Knowledge, therefore, cannot lie in
;
cally different activity.
the sphere of Opinion, but must belong to some specifi 9 For the same reason, it cannot
be defined 10 as Right Opinion along with an explana tion (Xoyoc) for whatever may be comprehended in the
;
explanation, if this itself does not start from a cogni tion, but only from a right envisagement, its addition can never transmute Opinion into Knowledge. 11 The
gically.
is
favoured
it
and
This view, in my opinion, by the fact that it, alone, can bring the section
This
is
directly enunciated
:
by
elf,
the Gorgias, 454 1)

TTLCTTIS
u>s
ap
"
<TTI
rts
we
\f/v8qS Kdl d\T]0r]S] 0CUT/S
are discussing into harmony with the theme of the whole dia logue. Regarded in any other light, tlii;-; section becomes an unof disproportion length, interrupting the en quiry into the concept of eirurT nfj.-r].
ir.otivcd episode
e-ycu dtfjiai.
Ncu
rl
;
Tt<m}/tilJ
earl êvdrjs Kat dXrjdris Ov5a.fj.us. ArjXov yap av on ov ravrbv e<m.v.
ate
And
the
subsequent
the dialogue confirms lion. The difficulties
my
progress of explana-
here equivalent to the 56a of other passages cf. Rep. iii. 534 sq. (infra, note 14), where that part of 56a which relates to Reality as distinguished from mei\:
is
Hians
pictures of things
is
called
:
Trfo-rts
with which
finally
and
rb
ibid. v.
477 yap
uyzoX67s
^(f>tj,
nrj
the explanation to contend
of
False Opinion
:
ai TO
flvai
eiriffTrj/j.T]v
come back
86i;ai>.
Fliis
av
re KO.I TO ye
to
contradiction what I enow I must at the same time not or must confound with vno\v,
the
ravrbv TTore rts vovv

9
Cf.
Schleiermacher,
ii.
Platon
v.
something
19ii
(
else
cf. p.
109
<
sq.
\\ erke,
10
1,
170.
et alibi,
lint
the contra-
With Antisthenes,
Part
i.
liction disappears as
soon as
supposition of 187 C (that opposite of 56a êi>5T7s,56a d\?707?s, coincides with eVi (77-7^07) is given
ip.
I
the the
p.
11
252 sq. V. 201 C-210.

details
;
go into the
I cannot here of the argu

(
ment
v.
Susemihl,
i.
l ,) ,l
sq.
may
)7
fight Opinion (8<5fa d\?70r?s) (as Plato says in the Aleno, Tim. 51 E) pass into error
;
Hermann s Steinhart, ii. 81 sq. opinion (Plat. 498, repeated by Albert!, z. Dialektik d. PI.,
<>">9,
Knowledge
(e7n<7TT7/-f>?)
cannot.
Jahn
Jahrb. Suppl.,
New
Series,
174

tells
12
Meno
us wherein they differ: Opinion lacks in-: the thing it II telligent insight into the necessity of even if true, an uncertain and variable consequently,
:
possession.
Knowledge
alone,
by supplying
this want.
guarantees abiding cognition of truth. And summing up all previous discussions, the Timaeus (51 E) declares that Knowledge is implanted in us by instruction, Right
Opinion by persuasion;
13
the one
is
always accompanied
;
by true reason, the other is without reason the one is not to be moved by persuasion, the other may be
moved
and
lastly,
every
man may
be said to parti ci-
pate in Right Opinion, but in
Reason only the gods, and The Republic, 14 in a more objective very few men. manner, proves the inferior worth of Opinion, in th
Knowledge has pure Being for its subject matter, Opi nion only something intermediate between Being an Non-Being consequently Opinion must itself be inte
:
mediate between Knowledge and Ignorance.

i.
This e
p. 207,
123, and favoured by Susemihl, and Steiuhart, p. 85) that the position apparently disputed really contains Plato s own view, contradicts the obvious sense of the
533
E sq., the
of
and
domain of the Visii Becoming is assigned

to
Opinion, that of the
and of Being
further
Knowledge.
of
Intellectual Tlie
subdivision
56a
into
Kight Opinion, according to Plato, becomes Knowledge, not through any explanation in Autisthenes sense, but through cog nition of causes (airias Xoy iff/Ay, Meno, 98 A). 12 cf. 97 sq. Symp. 202 A ; The same cha Kep. vi. 506 C. racteristic distinguishes r^x v from tfjureipLa in the (iorgias, 4G5 A. 13 Gorgias, 454 E. 14 V. 476 D-478 D. Cf. Symp. Simi Phileb. 59 A sq. 202 A vii. larly in Kep. vi. 509 D sq.
passage.
;
"n
opinion about (or envisagemcnt oH real things on the one hand (Trams)
and
their
mere
pictures
on the
other (ekaata) is made to parallel the subdivision of Knowledge into symbolic and pure Knowledge v.l In other places Plato p. 510 D. puts afodrjais side by side with 56a, e.g. in the Parmenides, 155 37 B besides Timseus, 28 B the Thefetetus. Of. also the passage (to be noticed presently) in Aris
:
totle,
De Anima,
i.
2,
404
b.
21.
CUSTOMARY VIRTUE.
ft
175
ti-;
position to some extent presupposes the distinction between Knowledge and Opinion, and in some degree depends on limitations which belong to the further
development of the system. That which in the sphere of theory is the antithesis of Opinion and Knowledge, becomes in practice the antithesis of common and philosophic Virtue. 15 Ordi
nary virtue is even formally insufficient it is a mere matter of custom, without clear understanding allowing
:
be guided by Opinion instead of Knowledge. It thus becomes a plurality of individual activities,

itself to
which are bound together by no internal unity nay, which even partially contradict one another. It is also
;
deficient in content, partly in

its
making
evil as well as
good ; partly in desiring the good, not for its own sake but on extraneous grounds. In all these rela
tions Plato finds a higher conception of morality to be
aim
necessary.
Customary virtue
arises
from habit
it is
action with
;
out intelligent insight into the causes of that action 1(i 17 it depends on Kight Opinion, not on Knowledge:
whence
it
virtue is not
;
evidently follows that the possession of such combined with the capacity for imparting to others and that according to the usual view, or
it
at
any rate the usual

15
<
practice, there are

self
no teachers of
f.
following note.
32
Mono, 99
:
sq. et al.
oi
TT]V
di]fj.OTiKriv
Pbredo, re Kal
by an unwise choice in his second life) 5 avrbv rdv IK

:
eli>ai
a-perty ^TriTeTTjSev/core?, vvi au<ppoavvt)v re Kal

e
fi.i>ev
rod ovpavov TJK^VTWV^ Iv TTay/j.^vj] TroXiretp ev ry Trportpy jSi y ftefiiu0ei &vfv *6ra, dpcrî
<pi\ocro<plas
ZOovs re Kai /neX^ri;? 0cAoao$i as re /cat
jUereiX?706Ta.
vii.
Cf.
Uep.
;
iii.
402
Hep. x. 019 (of one who las brought imhappiness on him-
522 A. ]7 Mono, 97 A-C Kep. vii.

;
sq. 53-4 C.
especially 99
17<)
PLA 10 AND THE OLDER ACADEMY.

18
virtue
for
those
Sophists) are, as as such neither by Plato, nor
who profess to be teachers (the we shall presently see, recognised

by the popular
itself
verdict.
19
For the same reason this virtue has in

;
no war
subsistence ranty of its own continuance its origin and All who are dependent on chance and circumstances.
are content with
it,
the famous statesmen of ancient
Athens not excepted, are virtuous only by the Divine virtue to appointment that is to say, they owe their
:
accident
18
20
;
they stand on
110
essentially higher
ground
oi>
Protagoras, 319
pq.
;
B sq.
of
Mono,
87
B
19
93 sqq. Meno, 91 B sq., where

the
Any las
represents apery.
-
men
lliis
view of the
Oel
ii.
was enunciated by
Bitter,
472,
and opposed by Hermann (Jahn s cf. Plat. Archiv 1840. p. 5(3 sq. Ent. i. 71), 484), Susemihl (Genet.
;
6eov /jLolpav avrb ffuurai \eyuv KO.K&S epets. (Schaarsehmidt gives an inexact account of this in mak Plato say that if a moral ing character does appear in the world, it is only through divine aid; the question is not of the world in /cageneral, but of the existing Here rdcraffis TUV TroXtretwv.) the divine dispensation includes
Fencrlein (Sittenl. d. Alterth. 82),
both
Schaarschhndt (Samml. d. Plat. Kcli. 350\ and Stallbaum (Vind.

loci leg. Plat.
ordinary
vidual,
ways of help endowment

and
the
the
extra-;
of the indi
dis-:
favourable
22
pq.).
It
may
be
easily
The
explained and supported. divine expression denotes any the dispo dispensation, cither in sition of outward circumstances, or in the natural endowments and
position of outward circumstances, which unite to preserve him from the bad influence of a corrupt
inward
We
)U,7?5
motives of individuals. sec the former exemplified in

eis
t
Socrates
/uot pas
words Aidov
ibvra.
(Phsedo, 58 E): &vev ddas

d<pii<6-
Apology, 33 C the dreams (vide Part i. 49, 5), and oracles urging Socrates to oc cupy himself with philosophy are In other attributed to 0ei a juot/ja.
larly,
state;
cf.
ibid.
496
s
sq.
Simi
in
Plato
dXXa Kcl/ceare the latter in Hevov f& ITpawns is said Kep. vi. 492 E, where it that with ordinary human endow ments no one can be saved for
eVcu,
to
passages the expression is applied natural disposition, natural ex
of any sort, 6 da ôipa divine in properly denoting the man, the divine inheritance which is his, because of his kinship to
cellence
; the gods (e.g. in Prot. 322 Phrcdrus, 230 A). In this sense the true ruler who has been brought
philosophy in the present corrup tion of States; but 6 rt nep o.v

re
ffu<f>rj
/ecu
yfi -yrai
olov
Set
iv
TOiavrr)
/caraoTcicrei
TroXtreiW,
to
right
practical
knowledge
r,s7YU/J/,T 17/r/TA
177
than soothsayers and poets, and all those who produce what is true and beautiful from mere inspiration (/tcav/a,
by an unusually happy natural disposition, and has learnt act correspondingly, is said to (Laws, ix. 875 ( ) to be 6ciq. /xotpct The same or a similar yfvvr}0eis. designation for the natural dis position of men is found in Xen. Mem. ii. 3, 18 Arist. Kth. Ni. x. 10, 1179 b. 21, as pointed out by
;
individual in an state, as an ex ascribable to a special ception only Ana dispensation of providence. logous to this is the opposition we find in the Phaxlrus, 244 C sq ,
virtue of
evilly constituted
an
between prophetic which is spoken of

praise as resulting the ffirrjo is r&v
inspiration, in terms of
fJioipa,
:
deiq.
and
Hermann,
Kpinomis,
loc. cit.
(
p.
56
In
cf.
also
.85 A.
all
these
instances, deia /jLotpa is simply used of the derivation of some fact from divine causation, without ex
the opposition is used in the 534 B, with reference to Ion, poetic inspiration : poets are said
efj.(pp6i>wv
same
to utter themselves ov
dciq.
jj.oipq.
:
Tewy dXXa
of
pensation, as in Hep. vi. 4T)2 E ; Laws, ix. 875 C. In other places, 6eia /.loipa is opposed to eTrtanj/x?;, prhen a thing is spoken of as due,
cluding conscious human activity ; thus knowledge itself may be ulti mately referred to divine dis
and we may compare

expressions
<ro</>ta
the
similar
the
not to conscious
human
activity
motived
by knowledge,
but
to
nvl Kal and Laws, In the Mono, the con iii. 682 A. trast to knowledge and to virtue dependent on knowledge denoted the great by deiq. /j.olpg, is clear
evdovcndfrovTes
K.T.\.,
:
Apology, 22 C. 6 rt ov & TrotoFej , dXXa (pvaei
Troiolev
mere natural
disposition, to cir cumstances, or to some inspiration of which no clear account can be
given.
6ttg.
Thus
fJ-oipa*)
in
Ixep.
ii.
3(36
C,
(f)V(Ti
(essentially
to
dfla
and
e-mcrTr)fj.-rj
(
equivalent are
all
opposed
injustice
in
)
the words
TrXr/j/
love
cret
rts
?}
deia 0i
statesmen of old, we read in 99 achieved their business by sq., nvl pure ei;5ota, ov as far as tlieir wisdom tivres went, they were on a level with soothsayers, &c. (ov8i> diafaptivTos ^Xoi-res 7r/)6s TO typovtlv % ol XV57? pyooi K.T.X.), who often hit the
1>
<ro(pig.
<r60<H
"-
ftvayje pa.lv wv
rb aoiKelv
etntjr qiJ. qv
truth unconsciously (vovv

res A irtue
/J,rj5i>
/J.TJ
%x ov -
Xa/3wp OLireêrai avrov. in the Laws, i. 642 C,

is
Similarly
deiq. /j-oipq,
ei S6res
&v
\tyovau>}.
comes
it
to those
who cannot
parallel to ai)ro0yws, as the man who opposed to avd-yicr) is righteous at Athens, we are
:
made
impart
0eip
to others
by teaching,
[j-oipq.
dvev vou: he
impart
Tiresias
:
it
may
who can so be compared to

crKial
there
told,
must
be
really
and
olos TrfTrvvrai, al 5
unmistakably righteous, for there is no compulsion in the laws or institutions to keep him so, and he must be simply following the
dictates of his
own natuie. lino, as in Hep. vi. 4 J2 E (v. supra), the 6eiq, (j.oipq, must denote the
(
viitue to which such expressions are applicable is so far below philosophic morality, that if Plato in the Meno derived deia fjLoipa, he the latter from
ataaovvLv.
could
cit.)
not
(v.
Feuerlein,
in his
loc.
have been clear
own
178
PLATO AXJ)
21
.
TJiK
OLD till ACADEMY.

619 D)
On
this account Plato (Rep. x.
makes the majority of those, who through unphilosofail phic virtue have gained the heavenly blessedness, and in the Phasdo on their re- entrance into this world
;
(82
A) he says,
satirically, that
they have the cheerful
of their trans prospect of being placed in the course ants, or some other wellmigrations among bees, wasps,
mind
virtue
(loc.
;
as
cit.
to
the
and Hermann
p.
61
derivation of s assertion in the sq.) that
a solidity and certainty of moral

action,
commendable
in its sphere,
persons of whom Plato is here speaking, the imperfections of cus tomary virtue are supposed to be complemented by divine aid, ita ut, si quis divinitus reyatur, eum tiGii minus firmiter incedere siynifaet,
having its source, equally with the higher virtue, in the divine life.
It
is
precisely this
certainty
of
moral action that Plato, loc. cit., denies to any virtue not based on et tnc re is no con knowledge;
"y
tradictiou
in
his
deriving ^cus-
quam
is
qui
rationem
ductm
kabeat,
altogether
untenable.
The
passage in the Politicus, which he quotes to support his view (309 C), is not to the point it deals not with the virtue dis cussed in the Meno, but with
:
from a divine dispensation, and we need see no irony in the expression (as Mor-
tomary
virtue
Stallbaum, and others do; cf. Hermann, loc. cit. p. 52 A, 4) he recognises the disposi
genstern,
;
tion of
God
in the fact that virtue
philosophic virtue ; if right opinion (dX^s 56a), as to Right and Wrong, duly substantiated (/xerd
j3e/3cuo!<rews),
has not yet died out of the world,

careless as vation by
men
means
are of its preser of thorough
has been appropriated then (according to the Politicus) the moral faculties
by the
soul,
of the soul are bound together by a divine bond. It is precisely in virtue of this confirmation (Setr/xos) that, according to the Meno, 97
sq., right
opinion becomes
I
know
cannot admit that Steinhart has given an ade quate account of Plato s view,
ledge.
Finally,
teaching just as in Rep. \i. 492 E, he ascribes the appearance now and then in corrupt states of a genuine philosopher to the (Aistomary mercy of heaven. virtue, then, though not absolutely a thing of chance, is such to those who possess it, because they have not the means of producing it by
scientific
method
it
in others,
or of
sq.
;
AV. ii. 118. According to him, in practical life, even where cognition fails, or is incomplete, Plato would say that the element
PI.
and it is only in this sense that I have here, and in my

;
keeping 100 A)
safe
(Meno, 97
Platonic Studies, p. 109, spoken of dda fjioipa as at all approximating

to
of divinity in man, combined with the correct practical judgment that experience gives, is able to produce
chance.
-1
Meno,
96
to
end
cf.
Apology, 21
sq.
C&8TOMARY
rntrr/-:.
179
only because they mistake evil for good. Consequently where there is true knowledge of that which is good and useful, there of necessity must be also moral will
;
regulated race perhaps even once again in the ranks of peaceful citizens. The only means of delivering virtue from this sphere of contingency is to ground it upon knowledge. The theoretic apprehension of morality alone contains the cause of moral All desire practice the good even when they desire evil, they do this
:
altogether inconceivable that anyone should knowingly and designedly strive after that which is hurtful to him. All sins arise from ignorance, all right 22 action from cognition of the no one is volunright ; bad. 23 tarily While, therefore, want of is
for
it
is
knowledge
usually made an excuse for crimes, Plato is so little of that opinion, that he rather maintains with Socrates, that 24 it is better to err designedly than
for
undesignedly example, the involuntary lie or self-deception is worse than conscious deception of others, and that
:
that,,
much
every
organ
for the
attainment of truth
Gorg.
sq.
;
is
wanting
25
to the
ir.r,
- Prot. 352-357, 358 C I); 468 E; Mono, 77
Thefet.
D
to
sq.,
170 sq. Euthyd. 279 where tvrvxia, is reduced wisdom. The euda?monistic
;
assertion forms the but it is clearly to be seen in other places, v. pivvions and two following notes, and Part
i.
which theme;
this
p.
123,
1.
may seem to underlie these passages must be any taken as KO.T avOputrov; where Plato gives us unconditional enunCiation of his own views, the eudaemonistic basis of morals is most
premises that
of
irpbs
Hep. vii. 535 D: OVKOVV K al dXÔeiav Tavrbv TOVTO avdirrj-
pov
<pepr,
^vxw
Ortaofjiev,
f,
&i>
T 6 uty
vuv
<rd
CKQVULOV êOSos piay K al xaXeTrws alrf re Kal ertpuv ilsevdo^vTrepaya.va.KTrj,
decidedly rejected. lim. 8b D; vide beginning of next chapter

_
eMXws Trpoê^ rcu

irov
rb 5 aKouatov K al duaOabov-
We
in
d\V
382.
aXta-Koêvrj c& X cp&*

P.O\VI>^TO.I.
rf dyavaKT^
0-npl ov
&<rirep
vaov
ii
only
get this fully enunciated the Uippias Minor, of
duadia,
Cf.
ibid
N2
180
man who
quence
in a far greater only avoids the one, and not the farther consedegree the other. Hence, however, of the simultaneously follows that the faults
wise are not real faults, but only infringements of the
from a higher stand ordinary code of morals, justifiable

26
point.
With
this
want
of self-consciousness
is
conventional of particular activities, not as morality as a plurality in all its various expressions. one and self-identical
virtue
closely connected
on the part of its view of
like Socrates, maintains (what against this, Plato, the reduction of virtue to knownaturally results from and he establishes this -* of all virtue ledge) the unity the argument that virtues can be contra position by means of the persons who distinguished neither by nor yet by their own content not by possess them, the former, for that which makes virtue to be virtue 27 and equally not by the must be the same in all;
As
latter, for
the content of virtue consists only in

28
know
It will
in science or intelligence. ledge of the good

2(!
Vide Part
i.
p.
123
and Hipai>
6 &pa ZKUV a/mappins Minor, 376 B: rdvuv t iirep TIS evriv oSros owe
of the virtues mentioned resemble each other, but maintains that Courage is altogether diverse from
#AAo5
27
-8
^ 6 AyaOds. Meuo, 71 D sq.

ei T?
Plato
repeats
this
Socratic
each of them, he is shown (358 C what (1) that no one chooses he deems an evil rather than
sq.)
: ;
his earlier dialogues, The specially in the Protagoras. assertion that faccuootfnp, au<ppo-
dictum in
good
(2)
that fear
is
the expcctherefore,
tation of evil; (3) that,
fffanj,
60-16x775,
ffocpia,
and &v8pcta
are so
many
(329 C-333 B) by more subtle jections,

vincing,
parts of virtue is several
met
obcon-
than
but seriously meant by

;
chooses what he deems fearful; (4) that the distinction between the courageous and the timid comes to the one knowing, ami the other not knowing, what and and what not fearful is
no one
Plato: then in 349 B the question and, as Protais taken up afresh that the first four goras concedes
that, therefore, Courage is aoQia delir&v deivwv /ecu /*?? deivwv. nition identical with this (noticed
CUSTOMARY VIRTUE.
hereafter be
181
shown that Plato, notwithstanding, again assumes certain distinctions of virtues, without preju dice, however, to their essential unity but he probably
;
arrived at that determination (which is to be found in the Republic alone 29 ) only in the later development of
Part i. 120, 3) is combated by Socrates in the Laches, 198 sq. l!ut the objection brought against
]>.
it
there
is,
that courage, so defined,
cannot be a part of virtue along with other parts, because we can

not
know what
not,
is to
be feared and
without knowing gene rally what is good and what evi! ; and such knowledge embraces all This plainly does not virtues. amount to a rejection of the de finition as the point useless: enunciated is, that the different virtues are not a series of inde pendent qualities, but merely dif ferent forms of virtue as a whole,
what
what bad), we get the concept of courage, he thinks, as equivalent to constancy dependent on moral This connection seems to insight. me, however, to be reading more into the dialogue than is there In 192 sq. Socrates properly. does not merely combat the notion that an unintelligent hardihood deserves the name of courage, but shows further that even to define the latter as <ppbviô3 Kaprepla is The arguments he uses incorrect.
to
prove
this
may
perhaps
be,
and the essence of virtue, according

to
the
well-known Socratic
resides in cognition In the Charmides,
doc
of the
trine,
good.
")
A sq., where a doubt is 17 as to the usefulness of (Toxppoauv-r], regarded as self-knowledge, and therefore knowledge of our know ledge, there is not really any ob jection raised to the reduction of to knowledge we are au(ppo<Tvvrj only shown that the relation of
;
again, raised
the Socratic-Platonic point of view, not irrefutable, but there is nothing to show that they are not seriously meant. Courage is proved to be neither a Kaprepia. nor an &(ppov KapTtptjcris <pp6vifj.os we can but conclude that its essence On the is not napTepia at all. other hand, the really Socratic definition proposed by Nicias, as has been remarked, is not uncon
:
even
from
it is shown ditionally disputed to be irreconcilable with the sup

;
knowledge to happiness requires a more exact determination than

that hitherto given.
-9
position that courage is merely a part of virtue, but we are not told whether the fault lies in that
JJonitz
(Hermes
v.
444
sq.)
thinks that the definition of courage in the Laches virtually coincides with the later definition of the liVpublic. Taking the definition of 192 D (0p(5vtynos Kaprepia) in with 194 E and 199 1J connection
eq.
(where virtue
is
said to consist
is
in
knowing
what
gooJ
and
supposition or in Nicias definition. former, in my opinion, is Plato s meaning, judging from the point of view he adopts in the Protagoras; so that the positive side of the question (hinted at by the apparently rcsultless discussion of the Laches) is given by the Socratic principle, that courage, like all virtue, is reducible to know the knowledge of the good. ledge
The
182
But if traditional virtue is imperfect his system. because wanting in discernment of its true essential nature and the internal coherence of its parts, it is so
no
the
less
with regard to
its
contents and motives.
For
to generally received principle of doing good friends and evil to enemies, makes not only the doing
;
30 and the incentives of good but of evil to be virtuous to virtue are usually derived, not from itself, but from
external ends of advantage or pleasure. tue, however, allows neither the one nor
31
True
vir-.
the other.
He who
is
the good man do good for the attainment by his virtue of ulte For to be valiant rior advantages present or future.
for really virtuous will do evil to 110 one, 32 will such a and as little can only do good;
through
fear,
and temperate through intemperance,

sake of vice.
is
to love virtue for the
This
is
only a
mimicry of true virtue, a slavish virtue in which there a justice which has selfis nothing genuine or sound
interest for its heart s core,
chiefly prevented by 33 True weakness from breaking out into open wrong.
is
30
and
Hep.
sq.
:!1
Meno, 71 E; Crito, 49 Cf. Part i. i. 334 13.

Phsedo, 68
B
p.
sq.
142
i-q.
82
liep.
ii.
Justice is recommended only because of the reward men and gods, in it wins from tin s world and the next, net for its own sake; indeed, the happiness of the unjust is the subject praise and envy, and even the gcds are believed to be not in-
302
sq.
that Plato (Phil. 49 D) regards as joy at an enemy s misfortune allowable ; cf. Susemihl, ii. 38: here he is repeating a Socratic definition, v. Part i. p. 142, 3. a Plato shows (Kep. ii. 365 A reckless selfpq.) that the most seeking is a strict consequence from the motives generally ad-
exr.rable (of :!
to their sacrifices.
i.
duced for justice and in Ixcp. vi. 492 A sq., he points on I that the masses which in political assemblies rule states and statesmen are
;
Kep.
of
334
]J
sq.
Crito loc.
cit.
It is only
from the point of

consciousness
view
universal
the only real perverters of youth, whom the sothe great Sophists, called Sophists merely follow, in
SOPHISTIC ETHICS.
virtue,
183
on the contrary, consists in a

all
himself from
ledge
as
31
the
man s freeing these motives, and regarding know- x coin for which all else must be ex
blames in the ordinary point/
changed.
AV hat Plato, therefore,
of view
its
general want of consciousness regarding own action, and the contradiction in which it
is its
iaf
involved; it is satisfied with a truthcontaining error, and a virtue containing vice. This, very contradiction the Sophists had pointed out, and
consequently
for the bewildering of the popular con but instead of proceeding to a more thorough establishment of knowledge and morality, they stopped
employed
science
;
We
short at this negative result, and only positivized the unconditional validity of subjective opinion and will. have shown in the foregoing pages that Plato
builds on quite another foundation, and pursues quite another end. shall now turn to consider his proced-
We
__
ure in the scientific refutation of the Sophists. may again distinguish a theoretic and a practical side.
We
,
The
of
theoretic principle of the Sophists may be generaTTyexpressed in the proposition, Man is the measure
all things.
Theoretically regarded, the import of that true for every man which proposition
IsT"*
"Is
appears to him true; practically,
that
is
right for every
studying and
inclinations.
pandering to
their
of the purest
and most beautiful

wrote.
Sophistic ethics, in his opinion, are the simple consequence of the ethics of custom.
"
that
Plato
to
ever
One
is
tempted
rhaedo,
08
x.
83
sq.
82
C;
first,
Rep.
012 A.
The
is
specially, of these passages
one
quote many kindred passages; perhaps I may be allowed to refer to the noble places in Spinoza, Eth. pr. 41 Ep. 34, p. 503.
;
134
PLATO AND THE OLDtiR ACADEMY.

to
man which seems
him
thoroughly refuted by 35 As against the theoretic principle, he adduces first the experimental fact that judgments about the -future at any rate have often no truth even for the person that
is that judges but in his opinion the decisive proof such a principle would destroy all possibility of know If all is truth that appears true to the indivi ledge.
;
right. Plato.
Both principles were
dual, there can be

tion,
no truth
and of
this
:
among
at all for of every proposi the rest, the contrary would be

;
equally true there can consequently be no distinction of knowledge and ignorance, wisdom and folly, virtue and vice all must be in accordance with the doctrine
;
of Heraclitus, in constant flux, so that all attributes, and equally their opposites, 36 may be predicated of each particular. Above all, upon this hypothesis, that
must remain unknown which forms the
sole true sub
the essence of things (the ject matter of knowledge for this is unattainable by the sensuous percep oucr/a)
tion to
which Protagoras
true,
restricts us
there could be
nothing absolutely self-evident

itself
and fixed
;
nothing in
beautiful,
knowledge of
truth.
and good therefore, also, no Truth and science can only be
spoken of when they are sought, not in sensuous expe rience, but in the soul s pure energizing in the sphere
Plato has expressed himself more fully of true Being. with regard to the ethical code of the Sophists, for the
combating of which the Cyrenaic doctrine of pleasure

85
0-187
Thcat. 170 A; 172 A Cratyl. 386 A

;
P>;
177
;
sq.
439
sq.
the doctrine of Hcraclitus and Protagoras as denying the principle of contradiction.

iv. 4, 5) refutes
Similarly
Aristotle
(Metaph.
SOPHISTIC ETHICS.
(coupled by
It
is
185
him with the foregoing) gave an opening.
in the Gorgias 37 in its association with the Rhetoric of the Sophists. On their side it is
first criticised
here maintained that the greatest happiness consists in the power of doing what one likes, and that this happi
ness is also the natural object of our actions for natural The Platonic right is only the right of the stronger. Socrates shows, on the contrary, that to do what one likes (a Sojca TLVL) is in itself no happiness, but only to
;
ilo
what one wills (a f3ov\^rat) this alone will really benefit the doer, for all will the good. But the good
:
not pleasure, as common opinion admits, when it discriminates between the beautiful and the pleasant, the shameful and the unpleasant. This is required
is
one another
;
by the nature of the case for good and evil exclude pleasure and pain mutually presuppose each other pleasure and pain belong equally to the
;
good and to do not. So
the
far,
goodness and badness from pleasure being the therefore,
bad
man
highest good, and the striving after pleasure the uni versal right, it is, conversely, better to suffer wrong
than to do
to
3s
it
to
be cured of
;
evil
remain unpunished
for that
by punishment than s only can be good which

establishes
*>
is just.
The argumen| 3a in stinu- conclusion more

"
the
fully,
Philebus
the -
but
do
011
that very account
Cf.
488
specially 466 C-479 E; B-508 C. The conversation
what the world
with the politician Calliclcs belongs to the refutation of the Sophistic

principle, as
p.
I
is accustomed to without talking about it: v. supra, p. 182, 33. Cf. Part i. p. 2. !. 1JS Cf. Thcajt. 176 D sq. As to
have shown
in vol.
i.
(22, 6. According to Plato, Sophistic ethics are only the enuiN ciation in general principles of
the apparently different exposition of the ProtagoVas, v. p. 188, 4

i.
:!1)
Specially 23
B-55 C.
180
belongs rather to the objective part of the system. The question here discussed is, Whether pleasure or know
ledge be the highest good ? the former the principle of the Sophists ; the latter that of Socrates, and more The answer definitely of the Megarians and Cynics.
imports that to perfect happiness both are requisite, but that knowledge is incomparably the higher and the
The main marked by the observation that pleasure belongs to the sphere of Be 40 the good, on the contrary, must be an abso coming lute and essential existence that all Becoming has
to the absolute good.
line in the proof of this proposition is
;
:
more nearly related
Being for its j3nd but the good is itself the highest end that pleasure is most nearly akin to the Unli mited (Material) knowledge to the Divine Reason as the ordering and forming cause. Plato further draws attention to the fact that pleasure and pain are not seldom based upon a mere optical delusion that pleasure in most cases only occurs in conjunction with
?
;
;
its
41
contrary, pain
that the intensest sensations of
pleasure arise from a state of bodily or mental disease. Discarding such, there remains as unmixed pleasure
only the theoretic enjoyment of sensuous beauty, of

40
Cf. Rep.
ix.
583 E:
KO.I
tv î X?7
Kivrjo-is
(54.
41
yiyv6/j.(voi>
rb TO \vjrr)p6i
r/5i>
rts d/x0or^/)w tffTiv.
Tim.
deed, in the Philebus, 27 E, 41 D, rjSovr] is shown to be the feeling of pleasure unmistakably by its opIt is without position to \vTnj. limit (or indefinite), because always
do snmm. bon. doctr. p. 49 sq.) thinks that Plato cannot be here sneaking of the feeling of pleasure as such, and would, therefore, understand, There is no by i]Sov7], Desire. hint of this in Plato s words in(Plat,
;
Webmann
combined with its opposite (v. supra, and Pluedo, p. 00 B Phaedrus, 258 E), and hence containing the possi;
of continual increase, in proportion as it frees itself from that opposite.

bility
SOPHISTIC ETHICS.
187
which, however, Plato elsewhere declares (Tim. 47 that its true worth lies only in forming the indis
s(|<[.)
pensable groundwork of thought, and which, even in

Ilir
Philebus,
Lastly, these discussions, and an evident reference to them in the remarks as to the doctrine of pleasure (vi. 505 C).
in the .Republic,
he decidedly places after knowledge. we find an agreement with
Even the adherents
of that doctrine
must admit that
there are bad pleasures, while at the same time they hold pleasure to be the good this is nothing less than
:
to declare
good and
evil to
be the same thing.

i
Simi
42 The philosopher only has larly, in another passage true happiness, for his pleasure alone consists in being
filled
with something real

is
that
to
is
the sole pleasure
which
unalloyed, and
bound
The question whether

injustice, is
justice is as absurd as would be the enquiry better to be sick or well ? M3
no conditioning pain. more profitable than

is it
The
refutation (in the Republic 44) of the Sophistic
assertion that justice is merely the interest of the ruler, by the exclusion of paid service from the art of govern
ment, is only a special application of the distinction between relative and absolute good for this is mani
;
grounded on the universal presupposition that the end of moral activity must be in, and not outside,
festly
itself.
And when,
is
finally,
45
the superiority of justice to
injustice
4-
proved
from the argument that the just

the
Ix.
;>S3
B; 587 A, and
from 370
sq.
pvevious quotations onwards.

^
E,
u
45
Kep. Hep. 348
iv.
i.
445
sq.,
339-347.
where,
the clearness of the thought (corin itself) is marred by the equivocal use of the word Tr\eovtKrelv, the propriety of which I cannot recognise with JSuseiuihl, ii. 101.
rect
13
however,
188
only tries to get the better of the unjust, but the latter is at strife both with the just and unjust and, there
;
fore, that
mon
without justice no social polity and no com for not even a band of action would be possible
robbers could entirely do without this virtue the prac the Sophist is refuted in the same manlier as the theoretical has already been refuted.
tical principle of
possible if instead of the concept, of the thing, the opinion of each individual holds good, so no reasonable and teleological action is possible if
110
As
knowledge
is
the individual will and advantage become law, instead 46 of being subordinated to a law of universal validity.
46 The exposition given above seems to be contradicted by the treat
ment of the ethical question in the To support his defini Protagoras.

tion of courage as crotyia
Kai/j-T]
We might, specially the Qorgias. however, well hesitate to ascribe to Plato, even such inconsistency if we held with Grote that the
sensualist theory of the Protago ras were correct in itself. The Crito and the Apology, which can scarcely be younger, at all events not much younger, works than the Protagoras, enunciate views which are incom
T&V
fteiv&v
Seivwj^SGO D), Socrates asserts (350 B) that r/Sews rjv is coincident with e 5^7} v, or the ayaObv ayd&s fjv with the Ka.Kbv. Protagoras objects that not every i]8v is an ayaQbv, nor every dviapov a KO.KOV. To this the answer is, 353 C sqq., that the Pleasant is called evil only when
productive of greater unpleasant ness, the Unpleasant is called good only when productive of greater pleasantness and that the art of
;
living consists in rightly estimating the proportions of Pleasure and
patible with Grote s interpretation of that dialogue (cf. p. 128). Plato shows that the theories put in Socrates mouth in the Protagoras are not his ultimatum, by the re peated reference to the TroXAoi (351 C, 353 E), who are mainly concerned showing them that they have no right to assume the possi
bility of doing evil knowingly, be cause evil, in the end, is always harmful to man. But why this is it remains unde so, is not said cided whether the Pleasure, which is to form the standard of the good, is sensuous pleasure (to which the concept of rjSovrj in the Philebus is limited), or that higher content ment which arises from the healthi:
Pain resultant not merely with reference to the present but the from our actions. future If, with
Grote (Plato, ii. 78 sq. ; 120, 559; i. 540), we here recognise the positive expression of Plato s own convic tion, we are obliged to concede the existence of an irreconcilable
contradiction between the Prota goras and the other Dialogues,
189
The
Ethics
pleasure
fundamental
appears
it
defect,
:
to
be this
then, in the Sophistic that by its doctrine of
sets the transitory in place of the
perma
nent, appearance in place of essence, ends which are relative, and therefore always changing into their opposites, in place of the
The
one absolute, self-consistent end. against their theoretic principle had established exactly the same point. Their doctrine in is therefore apprehended by Plato as the con general
polemic
summated perversion
;
of the right view of the world, the systematic supplanting of Essence by show or ap pearance of true knowledge by appearance-knowledge
of moral action by a debased utilitarianism, in bondage it is to finite ends (according to the definition at the
;
conclusion of the Sophist) the art of giving, by

of
means
quibbling criticism, an appearance of knowledge where none is possessed, and when there is full con
and so Rhetoric, the gene sciousness of the deficiency ral application of Sophistic doctrine, is the art of
:
producing glamour in whole masses of people, with the same show that Sophistic uses to glamour individuals. 47
if we take both together, the art of the Sophists consists in the study and dexterous management of that 4H C4reat Beast, the people, in all its moods and tempers.
Or
the soul. This question is not discussed till we get to the and the later Dialogues, Gorgias nor is the Good expressly distinguished from the Pleasant (v. supr. thus see an adp. 121, 70). vance in the development of Plato s Ethics, not to much in contrast as
r.css of
ism
such as Grote attributes to Plato, is .alien even to the Prota-
goras. 47 V. Soph.
"
2G8B;
We
sq.
Gorg. 455
Phsedrus, 2G1 4G2 Ii-4GG A.
The Euthydemns
the
vol.
**
is
a satire on
(T.
Eristic
i.
of the
Sophists.
in scientific elahoration.
Eudaemon-
885, 910 sq. Kep. vi. 493.
190
PLATO AND THE OLD Eli ACADEMY.

professes virtue
40
:
The Sophist neither understands nor

he
is
nothing better than a huckster and craftsman, who praises his wares indiscriminately, no matter how
they
their
may be made
50
;
and the Rhetorician, instead of
being a leader of the people, degrades himself into 51 In place of instructing the ignorant slave.
(which he, as possessing knowledge, ought to do), and improving the morally lost and neglected, he, being induce persuasion, and ignorant, uses ignorance to
Sophistry and Ilhetrue arts, are rather toric therefore, far from being to be described as mere knacks (t/unrtipiai), or, still
basely natters folly and greed.
52
more
law-giving
as accurately, as parts of the art of flattery, which are just as truly caricatures of spurious arts, and the administration of justice as the
arts of dress
and medicine. 53
this
and cookery are caricatures of gymnastic There is only a passing exception to
judgment when Plato in the Sophist (231 B sqq.) of Sophistic, glances at the sifting and purgative efficacy
but he immediately retracts the observation, as doing it too much honour.
If such be a true account of
Philosophy, and
sciousness
49
be
what usually passes for the position of unphilosophic con equally inadequate, where, in contraif
;
Meno, 90
sq.
with which
the dialogues contrasting the Sophistic and Socratic theories of virtue: e.g. Hippias Minor, Protagoras, Gorgias, the first book of
cf. all
applied equally to the most famous Athenian statesmen, we are told,

ibid.
5a
515 C
sqq.
504
5J
Gorg. 458
sq.
sq.
Cf. Theaet.
463 201
A sq. A sq.;
the
Republic,
and
ibid.
vi.
495
Polit.
304 C.
sqq. Prot. 313

50
;
Gorg. 402
B sq. Demagogy
is
B-220
51
A Rep. vi. 495 C sq. Gorg. 517 Bsq. This judgment
sqq.
Soph. 223
compared to
Cookery by phanes, Equites, 215 sq.
Aristo-
distinction
?
to
both,
shall
we seek
for
true
Philo
sophy It has already been shown that Plato gives to the idea of Philosophy a far larger signification than that to which we are now accustomed while we understand
:
by
it
only a definite
manner
of thought,
it
is
to
him
>\
which he cannot conceive the theoretic element at allv x Heroin he closely resembles Socrates, whose philosophy
coincided with his personal character and Plato transcended this narrowness of the Sothough cratic view in order to develope the idea into a system, he himself never apprehended in so ex
entirely
;
quite as essentially a concern of life ; nay, this practical element is the first, the universal groundwork, without
Philosophy
54 If there clusively a theoretic light as Aristotle. fore we would understand his determinations of the
with
essence and problem of Philosophy, we must begin its derivation from practical necessity, with the/
The theoretic description of the philosophic impulse. form of Philosophy, the philosophic method, will oc
cupy only the second place
both,
and arising from view of Philosophy, and he philosophic education of men.

;
thirdly,
we get
Plato
s collective
The general groundwork of Philosophy is the philo But as with Socrates this never took sophic impulse.
purely theoretic form of an intellectual impulse, simultaneously with the personal acquisition of knowledge aimed directly at the engendering of know;he
3ut
edge and virtue in others
so with Plato it is essen-
ially related to the practical realisation of truth,

54
and
Cf. pp. 144, 14G.
102

as generative impulse Philosophy, according to him, springs, like
is
therefore
more exactly defined
or Eros.
all
55 higher life, from inspiration or enthusiasm (/wvm). When the remembrance of the archetypes which the
soul beheld in its heavenly existence
awakens
in
it
at
with a won sight of the earthly copies, it is possessed 56 is beside itself and falls into an ecstasy ; dering delight, and herein, in the overpowering contrast of the Idea with the Phenomenon, that wonder which Plato
lies
the
ultimate ground of
calls the beginning of Phi 57 of that bewilderment, that burning pain losophy: which consumes every noble spirit when first the pre
of sentiment of a higher than itself arises in it, that singularity and maladroitness in worldly matters,
5s
trait superficial gaze is the most striking 59 The reason that this ideal en in the philosopher. thusiasni assumes the form of love is said in the
which to the
Phredrus (250 B,
55
D)
to
be the special
brightness]
tion
Religious or artistic inspiragenerally is called frenzy in Cf. quotations in vol. i. Greek. and Heraclitus on G51, 1 759, 3 p. Plat. Pyth. orac. c. 6, p. 397.
; ;
ing ordinary notions It is precisely or envisagements. in which the Idea announces these
tionsenconpas>
itself indirectly,
Phtedr. 244
A sq.
249
Ion,
215
251 B.
The
unconditioned praise
given in the former of these passages to divine inspiration is in keeping
251 A sq. Syrnp. Part i. p. 153) 2 1 s A Theset. 149 A, 151 A Pep. sq. vii. 515 E Mono, 80 A. 59 175 Theaet. 173 C sqq. E;
;
M Phredr.
I.)
;
sq. (v.
P>,
E sq. Phfcdrns
(cf. itself,
w Thet.
derived from the intuition of the various contradicfit.,
Metaph. i. wonder is, loc.
248 D. 155 D; 2; 982 b.
~>q.,
cf.
Arist,
221 1) sq., and my "translation, Part i. p. 8(3. Cf. Schwegler, on the Composition of Plato
p.
s
12.
This
Symposium,
sqq.
Steinhart, PI.
W.
iv.
258, &c.
EROS,
which distinguishes the
above those of
all
193
visible copies of the beautiful

:
make
therefore it is that they the strongest impression on the mind. In the

this
other ideas
Symposium,
phenomenon
is
more precisely ac
counted for by the striving after immortality of mortal nature: having none of the divine unchangeableness, it feels the continual necessity of sustaining itself
by
This propagative impulse is love. 60 self-propagation. Love therefore on the one side springs from the higher, related nature of man, 61 it is the divinely yearning to become like the immortal. But on the other, it is no more than a yearning, not yet possession thus far it ; to the presupposes a want, and not
belongs only
finite,
to the perfect divine Essence. 62
middle term between
Love is consequently having and not having,

Eros
is
the transition from the one to the other; the son of Penia and Poros. 63 The
yearning endeavour
object of this in general, the Good ; or more of happiness ; for exactly, the possession of the Good,
is,
happiness is what all men desire. And therefore it aims at immortality, because with the desire for happi
ness
the
is
generally speaking, the endeavour of the finite to expand it

self to infinity, to
fill
Good may be
directly given the wish that the possession of 64 eternal. So Love is,
itself
with what
is
eternal
and
Thej
imperishable, to
generate something enduring.

is
external condition of Love s existence

r no
the presence
3 773
Symp. 206
;
iv.
721
B sq.; B sq.
cf.
Laws,
vi.
63
64
LOG.
Loc>
cit.
cit>
f Tores, the father of Eros, is called the son of Metis; v. note G6.
LOC.
cit!
202 B sq. ; 203 199 B 204 E-200 A
Q^
sq.
194

65
of Beauty,
harmonious form, desire corresponding to the desire in ourselves, awakes 66 But Love is as various as Beauty, in for the infinite. kind and degree he does not reveal himself from the
for this
alone by
its
beginning fully and perfectly rising step by step from incompleteness to completeness, he is realised in
;
a graduated series of different forms.

of one,
-
The first is the and then of all a love of beautiful shapes, higher step is the love of beautiful souls, which ope:
65
cf.
Loc.
rhsfidr.
66
plain
is
206 C sci. -209 B ; 250 B, D. The above may serve to ex the Myth in Symp. 203. Eros
cit.
struggle
203
towards with 206
the
Good
(cf.
sq.).
These
one of the beings mid mortals and immor tals, mediating between them. Ac cordingly, ho is at once poor and
a
8ai/Jiwv,
are the main features of the doc in trine, laid down clearly enough the myth, and hitherto pretty
(v. Susemihl, with his quotations and Deuschle, Plat. Myth. p. 13), with- only unimportant differences
i.
way between
generally agreed on
393
sq.,
rich,
ugly and
full
of love for the
beautiful,
knowing
after
nothing
and
;
ever
striving uniting the
knowledge
most
contradictory
Any of interpretation in details. class as poetic thing beyond this I ornament, and I cannot, therefore,
seen by agree with the meaning Susemihl, loc. cit., in the garden of Zeus and the drunkenness of Still less can I accept the Poros.
(with interpretation given by the partial approval of Brandis, ii. in his Dissertationcs a. 422 sq.)
is
qualities, because in Love the finite .and the infinite sides of our nature
meet and
the
find their unity.
He
is
son of Penia and Poros, be cause Love springs partly from man s need, partly from that
Jahn
higher faculty, which makes him able to get the thing needed (iropos is not Wealth, but Getting, Indus His father is called a son of try). Metis, because all gain or getting is the fruit of wit or cunning, and
;
which Platonics, 64 sq. ; 249 sq., to the Neoreally a return Platonic expositions collected with learned industry by him on p. 136
8 q. (cf. sq.).
this
particular gain, the gain of higher good, springs from the of reasonable spiritual nature
man.
And
s
Eros
is
born
on
birthday, because it is the revelation of the Beautiful that first awakens Love, soliciting the higher in human nature to fructify the lower, finite, needing element, and unite with it in the
Aphrodite
W. iv. 388 Jahn, Metis means the divine reason, Poros and Aphrodite the Ideas of the Good and the Beautiful, Penia soul. Matter, and Eros the human This interpretation is as clearly is un excluded as the right one in mistakably enunciated by what
Steinhart, Plat.
to
According
the dialogue precedes and follows
about Eros without metaphor.
EROS.
rates in moral
art,
195
words and
:
efforts, in
is
and
legislation
a third
works of education, the love of beautiful

3
the seeking out of beauty wherever it may be found the highest of all is the love which rises
sciences
;
to the pure, shapeless, eternal
up and unchangeable beauty,
unmixed with aught finite or material, to the Idea, which brings forth true knowledge and true virtue, and 67 which alone attains the goal of Eros If immortality. this be the first adequate realisation of that for which
then plainly he has been aiming at from the very beginning all subordinate nothing stages of his satisfaction were but imperfect and un 68 certain attempts to seize on the Idea in its copies. Eros therefore, in his true nature, is the
strives,
Eros
else
philosophic ]/ impulse, the striving for the representation of abso lute beauty, the struggle to inform the Finite with the Idea by means of speculative and a
knowledge
67
Symp.
208
K-212
A.
In
the
does.
the less fully developed exposition of the Phaedraa, 249 sq., this
aim and scope of what he But this does not alter the
;
case
the lower forms of love are

first
barely hinted at, and the philosophic fyws is still in imme(liate connection with Tcufepaffrla in the good sense.
distinction
is
only
steps to
(Symp. 211
in,
sq.), or,
if
continued
misundcr-
This
circumstance
is
over-
by Deuschle, Plat. Myth, 30, where he objects, as against

the
looked
standings of, the true philosophic Eros. Properly, it is always the (Joed and the enduring possession of the Good that all crave Phrcdr. 249 (Symp. 205 sq.
comparison of fyws with the
that the philosophic impulse, former only coincides with the letter in its highest completion, The proper object of Love, accordto Plato, is ing primarily the Beautiful as such, the Eternal, the Idea ; this can at first be only
its sensuous and copies, and the lover gets only by degrees any insight into
Immortality itself (the business, according to Plato, of all, even sensuous love) is only to be won through a philosophic life (Phoxlr. 248 E; 256 sq. Svmp 212 A, &c.). Plato does* not merely understand by philosophy
sq.).
scientific
investigation, but, so far
apprehended
in
as
finite
bears relation to Truth and Reality, every branch of human

it
activity.
o2
196

delight in any particular to be considered as a moment only, in the
life;
philosophic
and
all
beauty
is
development of this impulse. is then, in the first place, ^The philosophic impulse but if we further for the possession of truth a
striving enquire as to the
:
69
means
Plato answers (somewhat nary enthusiastic admirers)
of attaining this possession, unexpectedly for his ordi
The
dialectic
method. 70
All other moral and spiritual training that whole course of preparation, which the Symposium has described to leads will more exactly describe and the
us,
Republic but to the threshold of philosophy domain, Dialectic alone can guide
Besides the Phsedrus and the Lysis deserves mention here cf. chap. ii. 99. The result of the enquiry into the con 219 A, is Tb cure cept of 0aos, p. KO.KOV cure dyadbv &pa 5;a TO KO.KOV earlv ical TO ex dP ov ToC ayadov And ZveKa TOV dyaOov KCU this formula suits the doctrine
69
us.
through her proper That this must
Symposium, the
;
but only those who are midway both given in almost If we arc not the same words. to suppose that, at the time of writing the Lysis, Plato had found
between
the leading thoughts of his later system, there remains the hypo ana thesis, that the psychological is the basis of his later lysis which then led him exposition had even of the Symposium on _Eros com to the point attainable from Love, according to the up pletely. Socratic principles, but the farther springs from a defect Symposium, of these and a need (5m TO KCIKOV, therefore, metaphysical elucidation did not psychological phenomena or as we have it more precisely in the This view come till afterwards. Lysis, 218 C, 5id /caKoO vapovffiav), might gain, some confirmation directs itself, for the sake of the fact that the Symposium absolute Good and Godlike (Ve/cct from the 199 C sq. makes Socrates say only TOV dyadov], towards Beauty in Existence (TOV dyaOov what we get in the Lysis, whereas eternal and belongs only to a all advance on that is put in the between mouth of Diotima. This circum being standing midway cannot be pressed Finite and Infinite (the OVTC KaKbv stance, however,
<f>i\ov
(f>l\cv.
<j)l\oi>\
And in p. 218 OVTC dya.Qbv). find the dictum of Symposium that the Gods, or the 203 sq. wise in general, do not philoso the utterly ignorant, phize, nor do
we
far. 70
Stegcr, lektik (Plat.
Die Platonische DiaStud.

i.
Instr.
1869,
p.
33
sq.),
where passages
in point
are fully given.
DIALECTIC.
be superadded
to
197
the
philosophic
impulse
is
first
announced in the Phasdrus, the representation of Eros in the earlier part of that dialogue being followed by an enquiry into the art of discourse further on. 71 And
though at
first the necessity of the latter method is established (261 C) on the wholly external ground that without it the end of eloquence, namely the guidance
of souls, cannot be attained aûment this external view
is
yet in the course of the again discarded (266 B,
270vD). The Sophist, going more deeply into the matter (251 A, 253 E), shows that as some concepts
allow,
and others
resist,
must
this
Concepts,
necessarily that is, Dialectic.
be
science
mutual combination, there of Combination of
The Philebus
declares
science (16
the gods and the true
sqq.) to be the highest gift of fire of Prometheus, without which
no workmanlike treatment of any subject is possible. Concerning the essential nature of Dialectic, we must it premise that its object is exclusively the Idea is the instrument means of which the pure Idea by is freed from all sensuous form and presupposition, It is therefore peculiar to the and developed. 72
:
71
V.
lisp.
Schleiermacher,
Introd.
sq.
reXevryv Karaâivrj
ra.Tro.aiv ovdevi
cuV07?T<
irzv-
to the riisedrus, esp. p.

-
65
(v. supra, 167): rb roLvvv erepov ^dvBave roO VOTITOV \eyovTa fj.e TOVTO, T/J.Tju.a ov ai/rbs 6 \6yos ctTrrerat rrj TOU 5ia\6yc<rdai Svvdfj,ei, ras vwodecreis OVK dpxas, dXXd ry tvrt.
vi.
511
TrpoVxpw/ievos,
5i
dXX
aura
\ii.
eiSeaiv
aurcns
tirav
auruv
eidrj.
els
nal
reXevra
et s
532
IJop.
rts
r$
8ia.\6ye<r6ai
eTrixeipr) &vev iraauv TWV alffOrjaeuv 5td TOU \oyov CTT avr6 6 IGTIV
ZnacrTov
8p/J.g.,
K&V
IJ.T]
diroffrrj
Trplv
olov
e7rt/3ci<rets
re
/cat
fJ-^XP 1
tirl
T v
dwiroOfrou
dpx^jv
iwv,
TOV iravrbs rT)v d /duei os avT7)s,

e /cetV?7s
&v avrb 6 tariv dyadbv av-y Xa/377, ^TT avTty yiyverai rt$ TOU Ti oiV ov ?mvoyrov re Xei.
.
.
. ;
vo-f]<rei
ird\ii>
ruv
exo/jLtvuv,
aC ex&/J-fvos ovrus tiri
\HTtKr)i>
TavTrjv rr\v iropeiav KaXe??; Ibid. 533 C: T) 8ia\(KriKT] /J.{0o8os
198
PLATO AND, THE OLDER ACADEMY.
73 for he alone can recognise Being in philosopher; 74 the essence and concept of things, and by this itself 76 knowledge can regulate all other arts and sciences.
Dialectic has a double task
the Formation of
tion.
76
The
into
its
first
avvaywyii and Siatptwf concepts and their Classifica reduces the Many of experience
to one Genus, the second divides this
Genus organi without breaking any of its Species, cally natural articulations, or overlooking one division that
really exists.
He who
is
skilled to recognise the
One
concept pervading the Many and Divided versely, to carry out the one concept methodically
and, con
through the whole graduated scale of

ravrrj Tropeverai, rots
i>7ro#ecreis
its
sub-kinds
with the
identifies the true
ruler
avTTjv TTJV apx^ dvaipovcra ^TT Dialectic Phileb. 58 A. K.T.\. is rj irepl TO 6V Kal TO oWws Kal TO
true philosopher, we may transfer the assertion to philosophy. 76 Heyder (Comparison of the
Kara ravrbv del ire(pvxbs eTrtor?^??. Cf. following notes.

73
Aristotelian and Hegelian Dialec

tic,
i.
49
sq.)
is
wrong
in
adding
Soph. 253
dXXa
^v
r6
to these,
ye 5ia\eKTiKov OVK &*XXy Suxretj, tl S Kadap&s re Kal eyu/Jiai, ir\T]v T

dtKatus
(f>i\o<ro(povvTi.
(T.
Phrcdr.
278 D. 74 Kep.
75
v.
the
Phileb. science
end vi. 484 B. 58 A. Dialectic is irdaav rr)v ye vvv i]

;
a third element, the The Combination of Concepts. passages to be presently quoted from the Phredrus, Philebus, and Sophist plainly show that Plato regards the business of Dialectic as finished in the determination
as
and
\eyofj.^vtjv
&c.) 71^0177. Euthyd. 290 B sq. oi a 5 yew/j.eTpa.1 /cat darpovofiot Kal

:
(Arithmetic,
d eonietry,
5
ol
The division of concepts. Sophist specially shows that the knowledge of the universality of
concepts
is
given
in
division
\oyiffriKoi
7rapa5t56a(rt drjirov TO?S dtaXeKTiKois KaraxprjffdaL avruv rots ye avriJov JJ.T) Travrdevprj/j-acriv,
6<rot
and
Plato
it
would be contradictory to view to say that division
7ra<nv
eicriv. di>6r]Toi Cratyl. 390 the Dialectician has to over look the activity of the vop-oOer^ The Poli6vo/j.aTo6^Tr)s}. (here ticus, 305 B sq., gives the States man s art the earne relation to all but as the Re practical arts
:
limits off concepts from all others, combination of while concepts them their due relations to
gives
others.
The Sophist
tells
us that
this relation is given by showing how far the concepts are identical or different, i.e. by their spheres
being limited
off
from each other.
public
(v.
473
C and
passim)
DIALECTIC.
down
cepts,
to
particulars,
procedure, to establish
and the
he
and, as a consequence of this the mutual relations of con possibility or impossibility of their
combination
is
the true
workman
in Dialectic. 77
Of these two elements of

tion of concepts, had
Dialectic, one, the
Forma
already been apprehended by Socrates, whose philosophic merit is essentially based on this fact. Plato throughout presupposes this Socratic induction, and his own method with regard to it
generally distinguished from that of his master only its more technical and conscious use. In the Con cept, the What of things is to be not
is
by
determined;
this or that quality only in

77
them must be
6 ât
given, but
TOVTO Swarbs
Fhsedr.
265
sq.
(cf.
261
OVKOVV
ftiav
K, And specially 273 1), 277 13) ; the art of speech has tsvo ensential
b ye
Sp$v
i8fai>
Sid
elements:
PUVTO.
fj.fra, iroLr)
CKdffTOV KtfJ.fV
^
et s
fj-lav
re i8tav avvoSiea-n-ap-
ayew
TO.
TToXXaxy
TroXXds
TroAXcDi
IV ^Kaarov bpib/u,evos 8ij\ov irepl ov av del StSatr/ceti etfeX??

ird\iv
K<XT
Trpiexo[Jitt>a?,
er^pas virb /itay Kal filav av

tvi
i}
81
tv
and
veu>,
eiSrj
77
SvvavOai re yu-
\)vrin.ij.v*r\v,
Kal
Trtyvxe, Kal /XT; .eirixeipe tv KarayvCovai KOLKOV jjiayci-
KO.T
apOpa
TroXXds TOVTO 5
pi*
irdvTTj
77
?<TTii>,
Sicopiainefas re Koivuvetv e\-acrra
Swarat, Kal
7<W
b irr)
pov rpbiry xpufJ-evov duvafj,et>ovs avrb 5pq.v

/XT;
^,
;
diaKpiveiv KO.TU.
Polit.
KO.I
TOVS
(
Tri<rTaa6ai.
(
2S5 A
el p.ev
Phileb. 16
.-^.
irpoffayopei u,
Oebs
sq.
olde,
Only
one
of
Soph. 253
(TT-fuj.^
sq.
Tiros
ov yuer dvayKOiiov dia

:
eVi-
T&V
here united in Dialectic is brought into
vide subtcr, note the elements the concept of
^byuv
ra.
Tropfue<r6ai
TQV opdus
/j.e\\oi>-
Tro/ots avfj-ûve? rCcv deiêii> irola ~ytvuv Kal iroia &\\7j\a ov O^TO.<,
by RepubRo vii. 537 The disposition towards Dialectic, we are there told, consists in the
(
.
nence
promi
Kal
811
Kal 8ia Trdvruv
ability
a^
KOS, b 8
to
bring particulars under

6 O-VVOTTTIK^
oil
el
&TT
VwtxprFn
aTd
earlv,
were
concept
/x-5?,
StaXe/crt-
<rv/j.fj.iyvv(r6ai8vi
and
in x.
atVm
Kal
elvai, Kal ird\iv tv rais diaiptacaii St* tiXwv ertpa rijs Sicu/seVews e^
:
596 A,
--r6
Kara
the peculiarity of dialectic process is described as the seeking one
y^vrj
SiaipficrOai
(j.r]T
Tavrbv elSos erepov

erepov &v ravrbv,
ffaaOai
fj.r)0
531 E-534
general concept under which to Cf. Rep bring the Many. vii
]J,
The
Cratyl.
390 0.
dialectician
is
the
man who
200

;
78 not the marks that distinguish them from all others 79 for with the contingent in them, but the essential
;
Science concerned. 80 But the essence of that only things consists solely in that wherein all belonging to
is"
the same class agree, in the common attribute, The determination of the concept is therefore something quite other than the enumeration of the multiplicity
comprehended within that concept

that which
individuals
;
it
has to do with
is
equally present in all particulars
and
with the Universal, without which no par be understood, because it is contained in ticular can
each particular and is presupposed by it. Briefly, then, the concept must determine the Essence of
can give account of his convictions in question ami answer, and this ability conies from \6yov eKdcrruv
Xa/ZjScti etJ r?5$ ovcrias. 78 Polit. Thcret. 208 ; 79 71
81
want a
d/>er77,
cy-tôs dperuv, but the
jiu
not
;
a Virtue, but Virtue
285 A.
6 8i
ti)j
V.
e.g.
Meno,
B:
oI5a ri cert, irws
SLV
oiroiov
yt
ri
or, in other words (72 E), (73 E) he wants that in which the virtue of man, woman, &c. is not sepa So rate, but one and the same. Theaet. 146 C sqq., where to So
Euthyph.
rb
ovfflav
11
A:
KIV-
crates
is,
question,
what Knowledge
& l&tfdvfipov, 8n TTOT &

j.oi
avrov ov
8t
ri
trepl
TrdOos
avrov
Thefetetus at -first answers witli an enumeration of the various sorts of knowledge, and is then told that he was not asked rivwv
?)
Gorg. 448 B sqq., where Polus is asked what Gorgias is, and on answering that his art is the sovereign ait, is informed that
the question is not Trola ris Topyiov rexvt], o.\\a rls,
60
ftrj
i)
eirio T
/i/ut rj,
oi)5
6ir6cra.t
TIV^S
ov
yap
api6jnf)aai
ai ras
(3ov\6/J.ei>ot
tTri<TTr]/ji.i>]v
ypopeGa, dXXA yv&vai avrb 6 ri TTOT eortV the thought of any special form of knowledge always presupposes the general
:
point,
fuller
V. supr. p. 175 sq. On this and the nature of real Being,

details
concept of knowledge
twurrfaM)
vTrodrj/jidrwi
;
a/cim/a; is
with
no
in the exposition of the tlieory of Ideas.

81 Secrates Meno, 71 eq. Meno re asks what Virtue is. plies that the virtue of man is so and so, the virtue of woman so
concept of eTrto-Tîu; in general, there can be no concept of O-KVTIKT]

in
particular.
Cf.
Eu-
D, 6
fj.iav
into the avrb air<^ TWO, ISâv the elSos avrb
(the enquiry is 8/j.oiov nnl %x ov
and
&c., and is brought up by Socrates saying that he does not

so,
jravra.
ra
sq.,
Sffii
8<rid
191
tvnv\ Lach.
p. 198.
and supr.
DIALECTIC,
FORMATION OF CONCEPTS.
201
things, by establishing the distinguishing characteristics of (lasses. For this purpose Plato, following his
muster, starts as
much
as possible from the
known and
He will not only express universally acknowledged. the truth, but will do so in such a manner that others
may be
that
convinced by
of
it:
the progress
and he therefore requires knowledge be brought about
82
through examples, so that we may understand the un known from the known, and learn to recognise in the
unknown, characteristics elsewhere familiar to us. 83 This procedure is very usual with Plato. 84 It brings with it a clanger already perceived When Socrates. by we start from individual observations and examples, and above all from individual experiences, we must
take care lest our concepts represent only particular sides of the objects in question, and not the whole of
their essence.
Socrates tried to escape this danger by
of that dialectical comparison of the different in which we have learned to cases, recognise one of the \
means
most important
peculiarities of his
is
method.
of Plato in this dialectic
also well
The skill and even known,

in
Mcnn, 75
Set STJ
Trpadrepfo
do as
TO.VTO.
is
done
<?TT
TTWS Kal 8ia\fKTiKUTepov diroKpivetart dt fous TO SiaXe/crt/curre<r0cu.

poi>,
teaching
Iv
,
di>dyeu>
irpurov
ticfiva
ols
ravrd
f.i.r)
phvov
Ta.\t]0ri dTTOKpiveffdai,
dXXa,
Cf. ^0X0777 dMvai 6 epUTU)[j.evos. the quotations as to Socrates, Part

l
Kaiî
fKclvuv &v av
dpdus e56afci dvdyovras Se nOevai irapo. TO. /^TTCO yiyvw<TK6/J.ei a

xa.i
-rrpo<TO-
ai/rriv
Trapa/iJciXXoi^ras cvdeiicvuvai rrjv ofjLOidTrjra Kal Qixnv Iv d/JL.
ôrepcus
Af -
oTxrav
tlie
rats
as children in learning to read go wrong over the same letters, in complicated words, as they read easily in simple ones, so with us in regard to the ruv irdvrwv: and we must
sqq.
;
^?\!r V *$ loht. 277 L
use of examples is that, by putting together related cases, we get to recognise an unknown as identical with a known.
-
rA
eruAwrXo/cats
aiul
**
So Gorg. 448
;
Meno73Esqq.
Polit.
279
li sq 449 Theaet. 1461) sqq.
D
:
sqq.
202
works show him to have been in this respect the apt disciple of Socrates. But as he has given to the Socratic philosophy in general a more scientific
his earliest
a stricter pro form, so in this particular he requires The truth of the conceptual determination is cedure. to be tested by individual instances which not
merely
are always selected with a certain arbitrariness, but each assumption is to be developed in all its positive
and negative consequences to prove its admissibility and necessity: all the results that may arise, on thej one hand from itself, and on the other from the oppo site hypothesis, are to be drawn out, and in this way we are to ascertain whether it is compatible with, and therefore required by, that which is elsewhere acknow
of ledged as truth. This is that hypothetic discussion which Plato so emphatically recommends the concept as dialectic training, on the ground that thus alone can
85 the correctness of presuppositions be perfectly tested.
85
The
fer
to is
sqq. into perplexity by the objections to the theory of Ideas, and Pannenicies says to him: irpy yap, irpiv
yvfjutaadrjvai,
eTTixetpets
passage to reParmenides, 135 C Socrates has been brought

principal
"the
its
consequences),
XW
<^
xal r68e
Torfry iroieiv, HT] fj.6vov cl ZCTTIV eKaffTov virodeêvov aKotrelv T& e/c TTJS inroOfoews, dXXct orv/j,paivoi>Ta
ZTI TT/OOS
Kal
el /r/J
el
eort TO avrb TOVTO VITOT L-
Oeadat
& Sowpares, bpLêoOat KaXbv re TL Kal diKaiov

eiStDj/
r]
And
povXei/uLaXXovyvjuLvaffOTJi ai.. of this the whole of the second
Kal ayadbv Kal fr %KO.GTOV r&v

KO\T]
6/o/xTj
fj.ev
olv Kal 6eia, eS fodi,
ty
TOI)S XcVyows opyucTs tirl
?X-
KVffov 5e ffavrbv Kal ytpvaffai fj.a\\ov dia rrjs SOKOUO-T?? axprivrov clvai Kal
i
part of the Parmenides gives a de(Jf. Phsedo, 101 tailed illustration. I): eid^Tis avTTJsrTJs VTrcOcaeus ZX OL TO, -x,alpLV tyy* CLV Kal OVK vato, ws &v TO, CCTT eKtivrj
flUCÔto, ei aoi dXX??Xois 8ta0o. êr; eireidr) de e/ce^T ae 5i86vai \6yov, uffatrus av 5t5oi r;s,
7ro
T&V TroXXwj dSoXe-
tri vtos el
T?
dXêia.
8e fJ-r], ere Tis ovv b

TTJS
a\\rjv ad vir66eaiv viroBtflcvos,

TI IKUVOV ^Xôts, a/xa 5^ OVK av
TJTIS
fir I
To67ros,
eras
<f>dvat,
&
\IapiJ.vL8rj,
TUV avudev f3e\TicrT-r)(paii>OLTO, ews

wa-nep
yv/J.vaaias
Oi5ros, elirelv, Sv-rrep TJKOV-
<pvpcto,
Zfyuvos (the indirect proof of an assumption by development of
x^ s
ol avriXoyiKol irepL re rijs dpeKeLStaXeyo/xevos Kal rCiv e
DIALECTIC,
DEVELOPMENT OF CONCEPTS.
to
203
t-
have been motived not only by the Socratic teaching, but also by the Eleatic dialectic as worked out by Zeno 8G Zeno, however, only aims at
;
The method seems
>
refuting the ordinary notions by inference; Plato, as a true Socratic, has for his ultimate end a positive result, an exhaustive definition of the concept. And as he
insists that
be thoroughly
with each assumption its opposite also shall his sifted, in the manner described
method where fully carried out, as in the Parmenides, tak\s the form of an antinomic exposition, the ultimate aim of which is, by refuting one-sided presuppositions,
those that are true. But however great be the value set by Plato upon this hypothetic development of the concept, it is still, as he himself says, only a preparation, or, more exactly, a moment in
to establish
may
the dialectic method
a part of that which Aristotle
vys
up/j.rifj.fi
uv, elwep fiovXoio rt
TWI>
KparvXe, ovbtv
effriv
dirb\6yrj/ji.a
Ti0e/ji.ei>os
OVTUV evptiv. (P. 100 A, treats not of the proof of the principles, but
their
ei yap TO wp&Tov a(pa\ds 6 TaXXa -rjo-rj trpbs TOVT e/Stdfero
/c?.t
application
H<>
to
particulars.)
e
Meno,
avyx&P naov Bcaeus avrb ffKoireivGai. .Xt yw 5e TO

:
inro-
curry &TOTTOV
6i>ra
ii>
v/j.<pwi>f
-fjvdyKaêv,
ovdcv
ijorj
ra Xonrd
Trd/j-iroXXa
eTrd/jLeva
bô\oyelv dXX^Xots
e$ vTToOtffeus w5e, wffirep oi ycu/j.ecl [j.v Tfiai 7roXXd\-ts (FKOirovvrai.

. .
TOUTO 70 XWpiOJ TOIOVTOV 010V irapd TTJJ/ doOflffait avrbv ypafj.fj.rjv TTOLfffTi
Tra^ros Trpdy77 irfpi T^$ dpxijs yuaros TtcLvrl avftpi rbv TrcXiV \6yov flfOl Kdl TToXXT/J/ ffK^lV, fire 6pT7]l>
Set
farevavTa eXXetetv TOIOVT<? %wp^w, olov a.v avrb TO Trapa.TTa.fj.6i>ov &\\o TI av/j-alveiv /J.OL ZoKet, KO.I &\\o av, el dovvaTcv iffTi raCra -naOtiv. (^ llt 54 B sq. There is only p. vii.
-fj
.
;").
0ws etre JUT) VTrbKeira Tacrddays iKavu$,Ta Xocird eKeivrj 0atfe<rdat
eirofj-eva
-for
it
is ni terwarcls
shown that ( Vatylus one-sided supposition becomes involved in contradictions in its consequence because the dpxy has no real proof. 8(i This he shows by the introduction and investiture of the Parnienides the whole procedure of the dialogue reminds one forcibly of Zeno s method. Cf. vol. i. 494
:
:in
apparent contradiction in
(
the
Oratylu?, 436
mark
sq., where the refj-tyicTov 8e aoi tai w TtKn-fipiov OTL OVK tff<pa\Tai T^S a\T)6fias b TiOt-
ov yap av TTOTC OVTW ^yu0wfiews va i]v ai)ry diravTa is met by the answer dXXd TOVTO cD yaftt
:
fji,tt>,
-l!M)
sqq.
204
calls

induction
:
for
its
aim
is
to
enquire into the
truth of concepts, and to make possible their right If the presuppositions of unphilosophic condefinition.
sciousness are subjected to this treatment, they are refuted and annulled in the Idea ; if it is applied to
as in the Parmenides, these philosophic propositions, dialectical establishment and more exact receive their determination but if by this process we have arrived
:
the indirect develop ment of thought must give place to the direct, the 87 analytic to the synthetic. have remarked before that the speciality of the
at the Idea as the
Unconditioned
We
Synthetic method
cation or
lies,
Division.
As
according to Plato, in Classifi the Concept expresses the
common
87
attribute wherein a
number
by
Division expresses the differences

Brandis (Gr.-rom. Phil. ii. a. U7ro0e0-ews 264) calls this ireiv a process of dialectic
<TKO<!
of things agree, which a class is
higher has genecompleting Division. He rally brought out this side of Plato s dialectic acutely and corbut I cannot agree with rectly him here. The object is not to find a corrective for Division, but to determine the truth of the viromental grasp 0^0-as, i.e. the ris-lit of the Concepts on which an en;
parison of Aristotelian and HegeHan Dialectic, i. 99 sqq.-113 sqq.) in thinking that _the hypotheticdialectic process aims not so much
at the introduction and verification of means whereby Concepts in themselves are explained or limited, as at the introduction and verification of certain Combinations of Concepts. Apart from what I have
quiry proceeds and this pitted in the Meno, the Parmenides, and the Protagoras before them, 329
:
is
exem-
sqq.
And again,
seems to
this
<?
U7ro0<?<rews
observed (note 70), this view will not agree with Plato s own explanations, that throughout, the object of this process is only to test the iVo0&rets, the correctness of the Heyder cannot leading Concepts.
quote Aiist. Metaph. xiii. 4, 1078 b. 25 on his side, and with as little reason can he appeal to the procedure of Plato s Parmenides, which is expressly concerned with ij vestigating the Concepts of Unity
not to be esthe elements sentially separate from of Dialectic above mentioned (forma-KOireiv
me
of Concepts, and Division), but to belong to the former of them, as the critico-dialectical test of
ation
I canrightly applied Induction. not either agree with Heyder (Com-
and Being,
DIALECTIC.
-
CLASS1FICA TION.
205
88 separated into its kinds. He, therefore, who would make a right division must not introduce arbitrary
"
distinctions
into
existing in
them
89
things, but seek out those already the natural articulations of the con
ceptual group. be observed, :l
pat
For this purpose two things are to the division is to be according to
real differences of
1
parity
Kind, not merely Quantitative disby which the lower kinds are connected with the higher are not to be
; j
fcnd that the intermediate links
90 The former passed over.
is
â logical,
and not a merely external division

class
necessary in order to obtain 91 the latter, ;
that
we may judge
rightly the relation of concepts,
and
learn to
8s
_
combine the unity of the

(j.rj
with the multieidrj

8iaipov/u(.ei oi
285
^
Phaei!r.2i,5E(v.p.l99?); Polit. did 8e TO fj-rj /car ei8r) avv:
ouvao~6ai /car
\ey6fj.ei>ov
rb
eVta/coTreip,
Stw/ceti
dXXa
/car
ci6i<rdai
ffKOTrelv
diaipovfj-tvovs
raurd
auTo TO oVo/xa
Trjv
90
re TOffouTov dizcfiepovTa
ffiv ei/Ovs et y
i
v[j.8d\\ov-
tvat>Tiu<Tii>.
roO Cf. note 92.

/XT;
TavTov
Kal
TovvavTiov
8/j.oia vofj.io~avTes, ai5 TOVTOV
Polit.
262
A:
fffJ.iKpbvfj.6-
dpuffiv
piov
v Trpbs /j.eyd\a Kai

fj.r)8
fTepa ov /card
fJ-eprj
diaipovvTes, 8eov,
TIS irpo-
pu/j.ev,
eioi/s
OTav
X upk
TroXXd d0atdXXa rb
/j.ev
TTfV
TUV TTO\\UV
av ev avTrf
Tepov aiffdrfTai KOivwvlav,
U,T]
irpoa-
yu^po? a/za eTSos e x^rw. 91 Cf. foregoing note
and
Polit.
<i;s
Taadai
i8r]
irplv
TO.S
5ta0o-
2G3
.
.
Trdffas, 6ir6aai -rrep iv
/rat,
,
rds 8e av iravTodi OTav ev

Trplv
CLV
<rOai,
^v/j-Travra TO, ot /ce?a
ov yfros Kal ptpos TO.VTOV dXX eYepc^ aXXv^Xoii .e?56j re Kal ju.e pos %Tepov dXX^Xwi/ eifat. .u;s eI5oy fj.tv oTav TJ rou, Kal avTO dvayKaicv elvat TOV irpds, OTOVirep av eTSos X^yrjTat.
A
.
sqq.
e<7Tov,
/xias
1U
6/j.oi6TT]Tos
epâs ytvovs
5e elSos ovdefjila dvdyKTj.
AVe
ovfflq, Trepi(3d\r)Tai.
the T^vttv /car apOpa. often insisted on by Plato Phsedr. loc. cit. Ibid. 272 D: /car Te diatpeiadai rd OVTO. Kal
is
.
This
get a hint of this distinction in the Protagoras, 329 D, in the question

Aristotle s distinc (anticipating tion of 6fj.oiofji.epts and dvofj.oiofj.epes)
fj.ia
whether the alleged parts of
vir
Ko.0
$v
e/ca<rroj>
7repi\a/ui.pdveii>.
277 B: KaO avTb re

6piadfj.ev6s
TTO.V
bpLe<rda.i.
re TrdXt^ /car fiSr) /ue xpt rou dr/xTjroy T^veiv. Polit. 287 C irard ^^77 Tolvvv avTas olov ifpeiov SiaipuneBa. Hep. v. 454 A: the main reason of Eristic error is r6
:
tue arc as distinct as the parts of the face (nose and mouth, for in stance), or only wo~Trep TO. rou xpuaoO fj.6pia ovdev Siatp^pec rd eTtpa r&v Kal TOV 6 Xov, &\\
206

which
is
plicity of that
first
comprehended under
;
92
it.
The
conditioned by the second for only by a from universal to particular can regular progression we be sure that the kinds are rightly determined, and
is
that merely
collective
concepts are not confounded

93
with concepts of kind.

logically,
The problem
a
is
to survey
by means
:
of
complete
and methodical
9Phileb. 16 C it is one of the most important discoveries, a true fire of Prometheus for science, cbs e eôs i*.ev /cat e/c TroXXtDj UVTUV r&v
del Xeyo/x.eVwf drai,7rôas 5e/cal aTretiyj^vTUV. piav ev auTots oew ovv fyuas TOVTUV oi rw 5ta/ce/co%V/J.<J)VTOI>
this place a misunderstanding of Aristotle s statements as to the ele ments of the Ideas, and a consequent proof of the spuriousness of the PhU lebus. It has been, however, already
del /xt af ioeav irepi iravros eKdarore 0fi&ovi farcif evprja-eiv yap evovvav eav o$f yueraXd/Sw/xej
,
/jiera [Jiiav
dvo
ei
TJ
TTWS
eiffl,
cr/co7reu>,
el
5e
/cat
fJt,Tj,
TUJV
Tpeis eV
eKeivdov
TLva d\\ov dpid^bv e/caoroy (we
should either read /c. T&V cv e/cei^ e/c. with Stallbaum, ad loc., or ical
eKacrTov) TrdXtv
P & v T & Ka v Kai TroXXa Kat dirtLpd OTI. TTJV povov i8r] rtr, d\Xct /cat oTrocra 8 TOV direipov ideav TT/JOJ TO TT~\TJ9os &v TIS rov dpidfjLy irpoaQepeiv, irplv yttoV aurou TrdVra Karidrj rov /xeraî) rbre TOV direipov re /cat rou evjs 5 TJ8f] rb v eKavTov r&v Trdvruv eis
7r
e<m
pointed out (p. 398 sq.) that Aris totle used the Philebus as a work of Plato s and Schaarschmidt s object on really rests on an incorrect interpretation of the passage before us. We have not to do here witt the question as to the final meta< physical elements of things (still jl wi less, as Schaarschmidt says, those of material things as sucl,^ but simply with the logical per ception that inâll -Being-thcie is unity and multiplicity, so far as on
;
one
may
every class of existent be reduced to one generic con cept, and on the other every generic concept is brought before us in a
side
multiplicity multiplicity
of individuals.
is
not
merely
This an
TJ dwcipov fji.edevro. %at/3et// is revealed of the gods

:
eq.v.
This
vvv
01
TVX.UGI rl TroXXd darrov /cat fipaovrepov TTOiovcri roj SCOVTOS, /nerd 5 v Aireipa ev6us rd oe TO
O.VTOVS fK(pcuyet,
ots
unlimited multiplicity (ctTretpoj), but also a limited, in so far as the generic concept resolves itself, not directly into an indeterminate num ber of individuals, but into a de
TO re
5taXe/crt/ca)s ird Kiv /cat

7rotet(70at
TO
epi-
ort/ctDs r//4as
Trpos aXX-?;-
\6yovs (with the latter Phsedr. 261 1) Rep. of. ibid. 15 D vii. 539 B). Schaarschmidt, Samml. d. plat. Schr. 298 sq., tries to show in
Xoi s TOI)S
; ;
terminate number of species and subordinate species in succession the indeterminate manifold of in dividuals, susceptible of no further articulation, only begins with the
:
lowest limit of this conceptual divi 1 fail to see anything unsion.

Platonic in
thi.-j.
DIALECTIC.
CLASSIFICATION.
207
enumeration of its divisions and subdivisions, the whole area included under a class; to follow all the
ramifications of the concepts to the point where their regular co-articulated series ends and the indefinite mul
tiplicity of the
it is
in
phenomenon begins. By this method shown whether concepts are identical or diverse, what respect they fall or do not fall under the same
;
how far they are consequently allied or in a opposed, capable of combination or the reverse,
higher idea
word, their reciprocal relation is established, and we are enabled by this knowledge to make a methodical descent from the highest universal to the particular, 94 to the But while very confines of the ideal world.
on the continuity of the progression and the completeness of all intermediate links, Plato as con stantly urges that we should start from the simplest divisions. What he prefers, therefore, is bisection, which becomes quadrisection, when two grounds of
insisting
division cross
ticable,
but where such a classification is imprac some other must be chosen which approaches
:
05
dichotomy as nearly as the given case will allow. 96

...ore
B (cf. 264 A) a procedure has something wrong about it; dXXd ydp, w
Polit,
93
262
hasty
treating the infinitely various races of non-Greeks as one race,

Si V. supr. notes 92 and 7 J. Plato has no fixed phrase for the division of Genus and Species expressed in this and the related pasis not frequent) sages 7^05 (which and eldos arc equivalents with him (e.g. Soph. 253 D; Polit. 262 D 263 A vid. supr. note 91), and sq. in Tim. 57 C sq. he absolutely uses the former = species, the latter = uenus rav TCHS eideffi yev-n
:
\eirTovpyfiv (to go immediately into details) OUK dcr0aXes, 8ia utcruv 5 dcr0aXe (7Te coj iVj/at
<t>i\e,
re>-
fia\\ov ioâts irpovTvyxdvot. TOUTO 5e

OVTO.S,
TTO.V
/cat
5ia<f>pi
-rrpbs
ras
^7/r^crets.
6v TIS rb An exis
ample _of this faulty procedure

;hen
in the division of manp;ivcn and into Hellenes and Barbarians, in w Inch one step is taken from the
""
most universal to the most parocular, and the mistake is made of
>
/cara TrXdros
and Kara
rfyvciv.
Soph. 266 A.
208

completed logical system
;
A
Plato
is
not to be found in
and neither by inferencesxfrom his own method,
nor by combination of single incidental expressions, are we justified in supplying this want. The whole gist of the question is, How far did he enunciate the laws of thought (which, in common with every reasoning man, he must certainly have followed) in the shape of
logical
ob systematise those individual the forms and conditions of our servations concerning
rules,
and
thought which occasionally obtruded themselves upon him into a distinct theory ? This he has only done in For that have just been considered. the two
the
points his writings do indeed contain hints rest,
and germs
of the later logic, but no comprehensive combination and development of these. Thus he sometimes says
that
97 that contradic our convictions must agree; cannot at the same time belong to tory determinations 98 that it is a proof of error, if one and the same thing the same concerning the same thing the opposite in
all
reference
06
is
affirmed.
cit.
;
99
He
C
:
also declares that
knowledge
Phileb. loc
/j.4\r)
Polit.
.
. .
287
Kara
Tolwv avras
Sicu/ow/xe-
del yap 6a, eTretSr? Si xa a8wa.Tovfj.ev ei s rbv eyyvrara 6 ri /xctXiara re/Jive iv
103 C Theset. 190 B. In 162 the world of phenomena, opposite combined in/ properties are seen
;
;
one
The Sophist (218 D231 E-235Bsq. 264 C sqq.) gives

&pi0nbv
def.
;
subject: but, according toj Plato, as will be shown presently,

!
elaborate instances of dichotomy carried out in detail cf. Polit. 258

;
B-267 C
97
279 C sqq. ; E.g. Phaxlo, 100 746 C.

98
ira<rx.
A; Laws,
v.
these properties do not belong to: the things simultaneously they, arc detached in the flux of Becomand the subjects themselves ing are not simple but composite substances; so the properties are not,
:
Rep.iv.436B:3^Xoi
6 rtTai)r6
strictly
e v Kara ravravavria iroitiv ?} rbv ye /cat irpbs TOLVTOV OVK ede^crei &aa, wore idv irov ctpiffKUficv tv
in
One and
;
speaking, found the Same.
together
Cf. Uep.
;
loc. cit.
128
93
atfrots
#rt ou ravrov fy
raura ytyvfacva, dêOa d\\a TrXeiw. Phfedo,
Phwdo, 102 D sqq. Parm. Soph. 258 E sqq. E. Soph. 230 B Kep. x. 602
sqq.
;
;
LOGIC.
209
can only exist when we are conscious of the reasons for our assumptions. 100 But though we may here recog nise the two laws of modern the Law of Conlogic
tradictories
and that of the
Sufficient Reason, 101 Plato
to these
nowhere says that all rules of thought may be reduced two propositions. He has indeed enunciated
them, but he has not yet placed them as the most uni
versal principles at the
apex of the science of thought.
Further, investigates the nature of concepts, the combination in them of the One and the Many, the
possibility of their being connected, their
patibility
when he
mutual com and incompatibility, the relations of Genus
in all this he considers concepts, not as the product of our thought, but as something actually
still
and Species,
and absolutely existing independently of it Logic is veiled in Metaphysics. These enquiries, and others I
:
j/
connected with them, into the conditions of truth and error, we must for that reason relegate to another
place.
In the remark that
all
discourse consists in the
union of the concept of a predicate with that of a sub 102 and that thought, as discourse without sound, is ject 103 we can trace nothing else than affirming or denying,
;
100
N*
Phil.
Cf. p. 174 and Tim. 28 A. Tennemann, S.yst. d. ^plat.

ii.
217 sqq.
Brandis,
ii.
a.
260
sq.
-
bination of the &voâ denoting an ovaia with the prj/na, expressing a doing or not doing 103 Thea3t. 189 E: r6 dt diavoetff6aiap 67repey&Ka\eis. Sv O.VTT] irpbs avTTjv
17
. .
Soph. 259 E: if the combination of concepts is denied (as by Anti.sthenes), the possibility of discourse is taken away dia yap TTJV
:
\6yov
5tee>-
\fsvxn
xercu
avrrj eavrijv
epurwaa Kal
Kal ov
diroKpivofj.^ Kal
(pdffKOvaa.
<pd<rKov(ra
6 dXXTjXwv rCiv ffVfj.irXoKrjv \6yos ytyovevw iv. Ibid. 26 B: mere like Lion, Goat, Horse, 6v6fj.ara, and mere verbs like paSifa, Tpfai, Ka6i>8ei give no continued meaning this is only given by (lie comddui>
:
:
158, 17), iv \6yois avrol re Kal

therefore an
So Soph.263 E (v.supr.p. and immediately, Kal ^v
la^v
f>v
(pdaiv
dir6(t>a<ni>
opinion (56a) is affirmation or denial
without discourse.
210
of only the first, though very important, beginnings Still less can a doctrine of the theory of judgments. lw be derived from Platonic intimations syllogisms and though, in the method of divisions, there is fore shadowed the demonstrative process by which Aristotle descends from the universal to the particular, we must
;
remember that
medium precisely the syllogistic 105 On the of this progression that is here wanting. but recognise in whole, therefore, though we cannot Plato essential elements of the Aristotelian logic, it
it is
would be a mistake
to force these out of their original
connection in order to construct from them a Platonic model. 106 logic on a later In relation to his scientific method, Plato also dis
cusses the question of the significance of language for An opening for such a discussion was Philosophy. 107 sides. Among the older philo given him on several
sophers, Heraclitus especially
104
had
106
laid stress
on
lin-
174 412
12;
g the passages quoted p. Crat. cf. Polit. 280 A;
Tenncmann makes
cit.
this mis:
take, loc.
Phileb. 11 B. 105 Aristotle speaks clearly as to the difference of the two methods, ^viun. J.UBU. i,. Anal. Post. ii. 01 rrior. ,1. Anal. Prior, i. 31
A;
though pp. 214-259 he observes correctly enough that we must not (as Engel does in his into a method of develop-
Enquiry
the"
D
ff
He
calls Division ofo^
d<r0^s
v\\ayiffpbs,
its defect lies
and points out that in the minor being

<<,
Logic of Plato s^ Dialogues) ing of his lay down, in an exposition the rules actually follogic, all lowed by Plato. Prantl s procedure
(Gesch.
d.
assumed without demonstration &v0pwTros ire^bv}. (e g tiivdpwiros f
Log.
i.
59 sqq.)
is
much
He
is
therefore
enabled
to
say
b. 34), (Soph. Elench. 34, 183 without disparagement of Plato s treated Division, that the subjects of in the Topics (among which the Conclusion stands in the first series here the Conclusion of Probahave never before received
) bjlity any scientific discussion.
follows Classen, Gr. Primordiis (Bonn, Lersch, Sprach1829), p. 15 sqq. 4 ii. philos. der Altcn, i. lO^qq. ; 11. 535 PL sqq. ; Steinhart, Steinthal, Gesch. d. Sprachsq. wissensch. bei (Jr. u. Rom. 72
more accurate. 107 Cf. on what
De Gramm.
WW.
sqq.
LANGUAGE.
guistic expression ; with their quick wit
108
Z.
211
and indeed the Greeks in general, and ready tongues, were fond of 109 deriving and playing upon the words they used. Various sophists had afterwards occupied themselves
with philosophical questions, 110 while at the same time the Sophistic art of disputation necessitated a closer study of forms of speech, and the relation of .expression
to
111
thought.
Of the same date
are also extant en
112 and it is quiries of Democritus concerning Speech; clear from the Platonic that in the school of Cratylus
Heraclitus the principle that everything has its natural name, and from names the nature of things is infallibly
to be
had led to endless and most arbitrary play upon etymologies. This seems to have been likewise the
known 113
114 case in the School of Anaxagoras.
Among
;
the Socra-
108
cannot, however, point out any really scientific enunciation of his on speech (cf. vol. i. 588, 2), and even Schuster (Heracl. 318 sq.) Joes not appear to have made
We
much
raclitus
given to
name shows
men by the gods, or re marked incidentally that the very
of this point. Even if did say that speech
He
was
Crat. 383 A 428 E sqq. 435 438 .0 439 A 440 C Lersch, i. 30 and Lassalle, Heracl. ii. 394 compare Hippocr. de Arte, ii. b. i. TO, [j.v yap 6v6jj,ara 7 K But w.e cannot vofj.odcT-fitJ.a.Ta ean. draw any inference from this as to
113
;
<f>vjios
Heraclitus doctrines
loc.
cit.
the Being of the thing (both of which are possible), this would not warrant our ascribing to
as Steinthal, 90, remarks, Hippocrates continues, TO. 82 6i5ca ou vo/j.oOe:
him a
Still
definite
for
:
theory
of
speech.
TTûara dXXa/SXaa-Târa; he knows the doctrine of Ideas, and, with Plato (v. subt, p. 213), attaches
less
sought
school
109
can any such thing be in Pythagoras or his
cf. loc. cit.
Cf.
Lersch,
110 111
12
iii.
410, 1. the instances quoted by 3 gqq. from poets.

i.
Cf. vol.
V.
loc. cit.
i.
932 sq. 913 sq.

745,
1
:
cf. p.
903.
ix.
and Diog. 48, who names some of De

Cf. vol.
mocritus
pression.
writings
on vevbal
ex
greater importance to the know ledge of conccp .s than the know have no right ledge of names. to derive what he says on the latter from Heraclitus, especially with the ( ratylus as a much more ob vious source for him to draw on. 114 Crat, 412 C sqq. Plato herq says that the name of the Sinaiov is thus the supporters explained by of an universal llux in things
We
p 2
212

Antisthenes had written on names and languages as
tics,
115 connected with his dialectical theories.
And
to say
was necessary for a nothing of these predecessors, 116 who distinctly acknowledged philosopher like Plato, the close affinity between speech and thought, to
it
mind as to the significance of language for to the knowledge. It was of the greatest consequence Ideal philosophy to ascertain what worth attached to of things might words, and how far a true imitation His ultimate conclusion, how in them. be recognised that Philosophy must go her own ever, is only this
make up
his
way independently
product
In the Cratylus 117 he shows that language is by no means to be regarded as of an arbitrary enactment, of which each the
of Philology.
man may
dispose as he likes for if there be any truth, and if everything has its determinate essence, those names alone can be true which, corresponding to the
:
nature of
118
things,
instruct
essence;
which,
in
other
us with regard to their words, rightly imitate

:
This is the problem of speech To provide us things. with a picture, not of the external phenomenon, but of the
there is a something which pervades the flux, and ^TrirpoTretfet TO, &\\a Travra 8iaii6v and the name Ai a is connected with this. If we enquire
;
Zu;/c/)arej, TO.VTO. p.lv a.KrjKotva.1

Ka.1
TOV
oik avrocrxeSidfctJ
15
Cf. part
i.
p.
250
7.
;
116
V.
siipr. p.
158, 17
and note
of
what this is, one answer will be, the Sun another Fire a third, not Fire itself, but rb dep^bv TO ev r$
; ;
103 of
117
this chapter. Of. on the interpretation
this
while a fourth, ridiwvpl fvbv: culing them all, will make the SlKaiov equivalent to Anaxagoras Plato Cf. Pt. i. 804, 1. vovs.
W.
dialogue Schleiermacher, PI. 284 ii. 2, 1 sqq. Braudis, ii.

;
sqq.
;
Steinhart,
PI.
W.
ii.
and specially Deuschle, sqq. Plat. Sprachphil. (Marb. 1852),

is
8
543 Die
who
seems to have some definite treatise in view which brought all these
etymologies together gones says, 413 D,
;
followed almost throughout byi Susemihl, Genet. Entvv. 144 sqq.
for
<pa.Lvci
Hermopot, w
V. 385 E-390 A.
LANGUAGE.
;
213
essence of things 119 and this it accomplishes by express ing the properties of things in sounds, which require cor responding conditions and move?nents on the part of
the organ of speech. 120 On the other hand, however, as Plato remarks, we must not forget that a picture never completely reproduces its subject and that as
;
painting, that other art of imitation, there are better and worse artists, so also the makers of words may have
in
committed mistakes which perhaps may run through a whole language. 121 This may explain why particular
words are not always logically formed, 122 and why, as a whole, they do not represent one and the same view of
the world. There are many etymologies, for instance, on which the Heraclitean doctrine of the flux of all
la3 but against all of them others might things is based be advanced with equal conclusiveness to support the 124 opposite view. Accordingly we must allow that ca
;
custom, and common consent have each had a share in language, 125 and we must consequently give up 120 As the first seeking in words a knowledge of things.
price,
naming presupposes a knowledge
of the things
named,
127
we must,
like the first word-makers, turn our attention,
not to names, but rather to the things themselves, 128 and acknowledge the dialectian to be the superior critic, who has to overlook the work of the language-maker,
422 C-424 A ; 430 A, E. Motion, e.g. by II; smoothness Ly L size by A, &c. pp. 424
iii>
mologies which
and
pushed
to
are accumulated the absurdest
A-427 D.
-1
428 D-433 B ; 436 B-D. 434 C sq. We get a parody of the

style
lengths in 391 D-421 E, and 426 C. 124 43 6 E _437 434 E-435 C.

D>
i*5 127 128
435 D-436
437 439
438
sq.
purposely exaggerated and extravagant ety-
Heraclitic
in
the
sqq.
sq.
;
440
sq.
214
and decide on the correctness or incorrectness of the names bestowed. 129 Dialectic alone is that which go
verns and perfects
all
other arts
and philological en
130
confirmation of this truth. quiries only afford another
have now considered separately the two con ditions of philosophic activity, philosophic impulse and philosophic method. It remains to show how, in the union of these, Philosophy as a whole developes
itself in
We
man.
Plato, after
131
some imperfect and
partial
hints in the
Symposium,
gives a full representation
The groundwork of of this process in the Kepublic. all culture and education is here said to be Music (in
the larger sense given to the word by the Greeks) and the two will Gymnastic a harmonious blending of
:
effemi temper the soul aright, and free it alike from The chief thing, however, and and rudeness. 132 nacy the only direct preparation for Philosophy is Music. The ultimate aim of all musical education is that chil
dren growing up in a healthy moral atmosphere should a taste for all that is good and noble, and accustom
get
129 100
38Q A-390 E.
cit. p.
8 sq.
:
so Classen, loc.
cit.
p.
Deuschle, loc. cit. pp. 8-20, points out all that is strictly grammatical in Plato, besides these phidiscussions: some points are borrowed from his predecessors, others are Plato s own. Among them are the distinction of 8vo/j,a.
lological
45 sq.) the concept of tiruvvîa. (Farm. 131 A; Phsedo, 103 B, et

the division of the letters ssepius) into Vowels, Semivowels, and Mutes
;
(Soph. 259 E; 261 E sqq. ; y supr. note 102; Theset. 206 431 B, and 425 Crat. 399 B passim: cf. Eudemus ap. Simpl. Fir 8,- 21 b. Deuschle points out that the py/Ao. is not merely the
au<l
pâ
B sq. Oat. 424 C cf. Number (Soph, 203 B) 237 E) Tenses of the Verb (Parm. 151 E-155 D ; 141 D, alibi) Active and Passive (Soph. 219 B Phil. 26 E). 1M V. supra, 193 sq. 32 Kep. ii. 376 E sqq., and specf. Tim. 87 cially iii. 410 B sqq.
(Phileb. 18
;
Theffit.
verb in the sense of Time, but every loc. denotation of the predicate
;
sqq.
PHILOSOPHY AS A WHOLE.
themselves to practise
result in love of beauty,
it. 133
215
Musical education must
is in its nature pure and undisturbed by sensuous admixture. 134 (Here, also, Eros This education, how is the beginning of philosophy.)
which
ever, is as yet without intelligence (Aoyee), a thing of mere habit ; 135 its fruit is at first ordinary virtue, guided
tific
by Right Opinion not philosophic virtue, ruled by scien 136 To attain this, scientific education Knowledge. must be added to musical. But the highest object of science is the Idea of the Good and the inclination of
;
;
the spirit to this Idea is its highest problem. The turn ing towards true existence is in the beginning as painful to the spiritual eye as the vision of full sunlight to one
who has
lived all his life in a dark cavern.
On
the other
accustomed to the contemplation of Being will at first only grope about uncertainly in the twilight of the world of phenomena, and so for a
is
hand, he
who
while appear to those
who
inhabit
it
as
an ignorant
is,
and incapable person.

but only that
1
The inference
not
that
this turning to perfect truth should

17
be unattempted,
gradations. the sciences,
it should be accomplished by natural These stages or steps are formed by all
which,
pointing out the

TOU Ka\ov
133
inherence
of
:!:!
IV
ioffirep
iv vyieiVip
dirb
T)
T<$7ry
oi-
KovvTsciv{oia.Tr6TravTbsu<t>\u>vTa.i,
Of. note
birbOev
&i>
cu roTs
&\l/Lv
r&v KO.\UV
a.KOr]v TI
A;
t-pyuv
T)
Trpos
Trpbs
(musical education is ZOeai iraidevovcra OVK ^TROTTÛ?;*

vii.
. . .
522
A
.
133;
Rep.
iii.
402
p aupa fapovcra dw&

e/c
Trapadidovcra
1:w
/J.d6rjfjia
ovdtv
TJV
/cat
TraiSluv \avddvr] ets 6/xoi6r7?rd re Kal ^v/JL(f>d}viav rip /ca\cp <pi\lav

&yov<ra.
Of.
Sjmp. 202 A, and

vi.
cf.
supra,
p.
175
1:!7
sq.
l\ep.
iii.
401 C.
Set
TO,
Kep.
sq.
504
sqq.
vii.
514
sq.
;
134
TTOV
Rep. 402 I) sqq.; 403 C: reXtVTf* T ^ V-ovaiKa. eis
A-519 B;
175
Thet.
173
216
thought even in the sensuous form, at the same time induce consciousness of the inadequacy and contradictoriness of the sensuous Perception. The mathematical sciences, e.g. (including Mechanics, Astronomy, and
Acoustics), are a middle term between the ordinary Perception or Opinion attaching to Sense, and pure
sciences, just as their object, according to Plato, stands
midway between the Idea and the Phenomenon.
They
are distinguished from Opinion, as being occupied with the Essence of things, with the common and invariable
basis
which underlies the plurality of
different
and con
tradictory perceptions. science in the narrower acceptation, as making known the Idea, not purely in itself, but in the objects of
And they are distinguished from
Sense
matic
they are therefore
still
fettered to certain
dog
premises, instead of dialectically accounting for these, and thus cancelling them in the first prin
without presupposition. 138 If, how ever, the mathematical sciences are to be of any real use, they must be treated in some other than the usual
ciple
of
all, itself
manner.
tical
Instead of being pursued only for prac ends, and in their application to the corporeal, the transition from Sense to Thought must be upheld
as their proper
;
aim the pure contemplation of num ber, magnitude, and the like, must be made their main object in a word, they must be used philoso 130 In that case they phically and not empirically.
;
133
A-533 E
211 C.
13
Rep.
;
vi.
510 B sq. vii. 523 and Symp. 210 sq.

;
;
subt. note 158), 62
cf.
Tim. 91
Plato
PI. St.
D;
Phoxlo, 100
sqq.
v.
On
Rep.
vii.
;
525
529, 531
sqq.
527
as a mathematician, 357.
my
Pbileb. 56
sq. (v.
PHILOSOPHY JL8 A WHOLE.
217
necessarily lead to Dialectic, which, as the highest and best of sciences, forms the coping stone of all the rest
which alone comprehends
all
other sciences, and teaches
their right application. 140 In the whole of this exposition, the

relation of the theoretical
and
practical, the
unityand internal two consti
tuent parts which together form the essence of Philo sophy, are set forth with more than usual decision.
Dialectic
Elsewhere Philosophy is viewed, now as Eros, now as here it is most positively affirmed, that while
:
mere love of beauty

beauty
in
:
is
culture, scientific culture is
inadequate without scientific impossible without love of
they are mutually related as different stages

Philosophic love consummates itselij/ Science, on the other) [ not a mere concern of the intellect, but is
of one process.
scientific contemplation. 141

is
hand,
also practical in its nature, occupied not with the ex ternal accumulation of but with the turn
knowledge, ing of the spiritual eye, and the whole man, to the 142 Ideal. As they are one in principle, 143 they ultiV. notes 72 and 150. V. supra, p. 69 sq. and Symp. 209 E sq. where the contemplation of the pure Idea is discussed as the completion of the Art of Love. Eep. vii. 518 B (Set 8ij ^fis o iav Tives tofUffai) rfv Traiddav
11
;
apart ffrpetfxiv irpbs TO CK TOV cr/corwSouy, ourw $vv 0X77 rrj ^vxi) e/c TOV yiyvo^vov irepivrpewTtov etj/cu, ecus av els rb cv nal rod OVTOS TO <pav6raTov Swarf
8\<p
<r
<f>avbv
y^rai dmaxÔat
5
elvai
<pa.fj.ev
ufi^
a^d
TOVTO
pro-
oi>x
TayaOov.
^"
The
irayyf\\6fj,ei>oi (fraffiv
dvai. TOLO.VT-TJV
blem is not d\\ ws

5e
e/i7roi^crat atrrcp
oi)5e
o"^
TO 6p$v, OVK
ol
p.a.lvei
8vvafj.il>
dov ri/0Xotj 60âX/xots 6\f/iv ... 6 Scyc vvv \6yos. 0-77Ta&njr rfv^cvovaav e/cdcrToi/ Ty ifrvxjj Ka Tb 6pyavov,
.
0s
cm.
Tcrpa^vif
TOVTO
:
ftXcirovTi.
I5,
1
dia/Ji.r]xavrjaa<Tda.i.
533
ti>
(?
Ka.Ta.fj.av6dvfL
MO.
bra^rtt, olov SvvaTbv TJV fiXXwj rj
d
vv
( ?; 8ia\cKTirf fiÔoSos /J.6vtj TOL^T-TI iropcveTai rds virodtveis dvatpovaa eVai5rrji/ rfv dpxyv iva pcpaua<rrrrai, KCU T$ 8vTi poppdpy
ei>
TLVI
TO T^J $vxf)*
*/*/*
218

and manifestation.
mately coincide in their working 144 the pain of the philosophic new In the Symposium, birth is represented as an effect of philosophic love
;
here it appears as a consequence of the dialectical as In the Phaedrus, philosophic love cent to the Idea.
described as a juavm in this place the same is vir attention to Dialectic; Dialectic tually said of close
is
;
at
life
first
:
causes
unfitness
for
and it is the very the eye dazzled with the vision of the Ideal finite 145 Prac associations and relations should disappear.
tice
the affairs of practical essence of /uavt a, that to
and theory are thus absolutely conjoined.

146
He
;
who has alone capable of philosophic cognition con of things sensuous early learned the renunciation 611 D), Philosophy appears versely in the Republic (x. as the raising of the whole man out of the ocean of shells and weeds that sense, as the scraping off of the
is
soul; and in the Phasdo (6i as the complete liberation from the dominion of sq.), the body the death of the inner man thought being
have overgrown the
set forth as the means of this liberation, since by
it
we
the above sensible impressions. In Philosophy, then, there is no longer any opposition of theory and prac different kinds of theoretic activity tice, and the
unite into a whole.
Perception,
-r}pt}j.a
<!\/cei
All the various forms of knowledge are but Opinion, intelligent Reflection
KCU dvdyei. &vw,
ou Kal
crvn-rrepiayuyols
XP W
ah
ibid
514
A
;
8irj\6of.Lv
râts.
Of.
sq.
517
B;
Tkeset.
175
Soph. 254 A. Science, according to Plato later on in the (as will be shown
sq.
143
anthropology) is essentially nothing but reminiscence of the Idea and Eros (cf. supra) is the same. 44 215 E sqq. ; v. Part i. 153. 45 Cf. supra, p. 191.
;
14G
Cf.
Rep.
vii.
519
sq.
147 stages of philosophic or reasoned Knowledge. stand to this last, therefore, in a double relation.
219
They
On
the one hand, they must be transcended

ledge
is
if
true
Know
to
be attained.
He who would
behold the
absolutely real
himself from the body; he must renounce the senses, which draw us away from
free
14r
must
Aristotle, I)e
An.
i.
2,
404
b.
22, thus gives Plato s enumeration of the stages of theoretic conscious
ness
ev
(nXdrwi/) vovv
fj.ev
TO
v,
in-
TOV
TOV fTmrfdov
}
api.0fji.bv
(triad)
86av
aiydrjaiv
ffTepfov
tails
(four).
TOV TOV For further de

5
v.
on the passage,
103,
chap.
St.
7,
note
sq.
I
and
my
or
Plat,
227
there stands first (vovs or are equivalents), Sidvoia second, 7rt<ms third, elKavla fourth. The first two, dealing with the In combined under the visible, are name of vbycris the two others, dealing with the Visible, under the name of 56a. Plato himself tells us that eTTicrr^yLtT/ here is the same as vous elsewhere (as in Symp. loc.
(TTr)[j.r]
vorjcns
So
in
the dialogues,
Percep-
tion
and Opinion,
Envisagement,
and Phaedo, 247 C). Aidvoia. corresponds to the Aristotelian tiricit.

crT^fj,Tf),
are assigned to the unscientific consciousness, directed towards the
Kep. 533
phenomenal world (v. supra, p. 70 sq.) and the eTriarij/j-ai are noticed cf. (Symp. 210 C; Phil. 06 B Rep. ix. 585 C) as the next pre
; ;
clearly shown by B sqq. 511 sq. There is a confusion here between the division elsewhere given of as
is
510
liminary stage of pure thought, or Dialectic: the highest stage is called j/oDs (Tim. 51 D), and vovs Kai In (Phil. loc. cit.).
<f>p6i>r)(ris
Knowledge based on Opinion and another division, not so important from Plato s point of view vide
note 14. By Sidvoia or eTrto-TT?^?; Plato means (asT Brandis observes) exclusively mathematical science. This is expressly stated, Kep. vi. 510 B sq. 511 C sq., and is a natural consequence of his doc
;
Symp. 210
firi(TTrifj.r}
(
,
211 C,
/j.ddtj/ji,a
it
;
or
appears as but Plato
draws a clear distinction between the one iri(TTr)/u,T}, directed towards tli2 pure Idea, and the other e?rtaTrj/jiai, which are merely prepa The most exact ratory to it. correspondence with Aristotle s ex
position
us,
;17
I
trines:
mathematical laws are

subter)
;
to
him
(vide
the
sole
me
is
:
found
in
the
Timae-
S6cu and
TriVreis are
there assigned to the Sensuous and Mutable (TTt orts is used alone, 29 C), while vovs and eTTtcrr^/ij; (dX^-
29 C) belong to the Intelli and Immutable. Rep. vi. 509 1) sq. ; 533 E sq. is only a deviation from this tinpartial
0eia,
diating elements between Idea and Phenomenon and therefore only a knowledge of these laws can me diate between Opinion or Envisagemerit and the science of the Idea. In enumerations like the above Plato allows himself considerable laxity, as may be seen from the Philebus, GO B, besides the places
i.s
gible
vi>.
already quoted. The terminology a matter of indifference. Eep.

vii.
533 D.
220
/pure contemplation, and intervene darkling between the 148 he must turn his eyes away from spirit and truth;
shadows and direct them to true Being, 149 must rise 150 he must from the irrational Eiivisagement to lieason remember that eyes and ears were given us, not that
:
revel in sensuous sights and sounds, but to lead us, through the perception of the heavenly mo tions and of audible harmony, to order and harmony
we might
in the soul s
movements. 151 We must not stop short at conditioned, mathematical thought, which makes use of 152 certain presuppositions, but does not analyse them.
But, on the other hand, the sensuous Phenomenon is at any rate a copy of the Idea, and thus serves to awaken
in us the recollection of the Idea
Right Opinion is from Knowledge by the want of dia only distinguished 154 The mathematical sciences, lectic establishment.
:
153
too, are, in Plato s view,
the most direct and indispen
sable preliminaries of Dialectic ; for they represent in sensible form the concepts which the philosopher con
155 It is therefore one and templated in their purity. the same matter with which the different intellec tual activities have to do, only that this matter is
not apprehended by
all
That which loyed. in Opinion and in

148
is
as equally perfect and unal true in the sensuous Perception,/
reflective
;
Thought,
;
is
included in
Plisedo,
vii.
Hep.
149
150
65 A-G7 532 A. Kep. vii. 514 sq. 51 Tim. 28 A

;
67
D
;
sq.
cf.
Phredo, 75 sq. V. supra, 174. On account of this connection, Kight Opinion is actually set by the side of Know154
supra, 174.
151
Tim. 47
Hep.
vi.
A sq.
;
ledge and
commended
Phileb.
510 B sq. ; vii. 533 cf. note 72, p. 215 sq. 15:5 Phazdr. 250 D sq. Symp. 210
152
202 585
D
;
e.g.
;
Theat.
ix.
66
13
Eep.
155
Laws, x. 81)6. Cf. p. 215 sq.
:
22
Philosophy as pure thought the Idea is there grasped whole and entire, its confused and partial appropriation
having already given to the lower forms of knowledge an import, and a relative share in truth. 156 Philosophy is consequently not one science among others, but
Science absolutely, the only adequate manner of know157 must fall under Ing and all the particular sciences
;
so soon as they are rightly treated. They thus 158 and find in belong to the propaedeutic of Philosophy,
this,
Dialectic their
tion
end and they are worthless in propor and as long as they are withheld from the use of
;
the dialectician. 159
Nay, even the handicraft
arts
T&V
confjLvpi
156 As will bo proved in the fol lowing secJions. 157 Confine.!, however, in Plato, as we have seen, to the mathema
/novddos e/cacmys
rts
dr/ffet
and the mathematical

are
ai
Trepl
(f)i\0(rO(pOUl>T(>}V
sciences thus treated

TT]V
tical
158
branches.
T&V
OtVTUS
6pfJ.^V.
Rsp. vii. 525 B: the guar dians are to be admonished, ewl XoyiffTiKr]! levai
fj.rj
Ibid. 57 C.
For further
vii.
details, v.
supra.
159
Kal dvdaTTeadai avrrjs
iStam/fcDj,
dXV ws
0u<reuy
Rep.
wotrep
534 E: ap otv
SoKfi
av
tiri
deav
TTJS
crol
TUV
dpidfj-uv
avT-fj
dtfriKUvrai
I))
vor)<?i
they are (525

?}
ry no
longer opara,
dpiOfiovs
dTrrd crw/xar
TrpoTfiveadai, but rb Kacnov irdv iravrl Kal
BpiyKos (coping stone) TO?S /J,a0rju,aatv i] 8ia\KTiKTj i}fuv lirdvu KflvOat., K.T.\. Ibid. 531 C: Kal i] TOVTWV ol/j.ai 8t 7 ty 8 eav
y<j},
d<pi-
Astronomy rightlv use the course of the sq.) (529 only as an example rCov dXrjdivuv, d? rb dv
studied
stars
is to
eavru)
ovdfr.
Kal
i]
Kal
o&ffa (3pa5uTr]s ev TrdffL rots
rtfi
Kal %vyy&eiav, Kal v\\oyiaOfj raCra, 17 ianv dXXTjXois oiKfta, Ti avrwv els d /3ofX6/xeâ TTJV (ptpeiv Trpayfiareiav Kal OVK dfdvtjTa iroveld 8t Cf. note 75. a.vbvrjTa. Ribbing s idea that Plato here
KTjrai
<r8ai,
identities
lectic, is, I
mathematics with Dia

think, sufficiently dis
rat Kal
TO.
oi fjLtv
fiXX^Xc fvdvra (pepfi. Phileb. 50 yap TTOV [JLOvaSas dvivovs

cis
re
?r/)6s
<t>pe-
KaTapiO/m.oui Tai riw irepl dpiO/j.6v t olov (TTpaT6TT8a 8vo Kal /SoOs 8vo Kal 5vo rd afj.LKp6rara T) Kal TO. irdv-
proved by foregoing remarks. Ma thematics with him are only a preliminary to Dialectic, not Dia lectic itself: they have to do with
similar subjects number, magni but are differen tude, motion, &c. tiated by the method of procedure.
iara
oi
OVK
av
et
TTOTC
<rvi>aKO\ovOr]<Teiai>,
a;
222
PLATO AND THE OLDBR ACADEMY.

160
and temptuously as the Kepublic repudiates them, little worth Plato in reality allowed to them however
even they, by virtue of their relative share in truth else where conceded, belong likewise to the first stages of
161
Philosophy.
in a word, the focus which unites all the scattered rays of truth in human opinion and action; 162 it is the absolute consummation of the the royal art sought in the spiritual life generally, 163 Socrates, in which making or pro-
Philosophy
is therefore,
Euthydemus
by
of ducing, and knowledge
the use of that which
is
made, coincide.
Plato
is,
however, quite aware that Philosophy
is
never fully and perfectly represented in actuality. As we find him desiring that no man early as the PliEedrus shall be called wise, but only at most a lover of wisdom, 164 So in the Parmenides (131 C) for God alone is wise.
he declares that God alone has perfect knowledge and on that ground he claims for men, in a celebrated Theeetetus (176 B), not divinity, but passage of the Still less .likeness to God. only the greatest possible
:
does
it
that the soul in this appear to him conceivable
the incessantly disturbing influ earthly life, among of ences of the body, should attain the pure intuition 165 even the endeavour for wisdom or the philo truth derives not merely from the inclinasophic impulse, he
:
1CO
m
sqq.:
Vii 522
of,
vi.
495 D.
Phik-b. 55
d.
Symp. 209
C
ii.
289
291 B.
cf.
Ritter, Gcsch.
Phil.
1W 278
0eu)j>
D:
Symp. 203
907
2
Cf.
Rep.
v.
473
rrjs
rbv 0tX601),
o-oâs
ov XT}?
(priffofifv
l*-tv
eiridv^TTiv
5
0cXo(T00e? ov8 crowds yevtedai tari yap. 55 Phsetlo, 6G B sqq.

<w5ets
dXXa
tion of
223
man towards wisdom, but

1C6
:
also
Good or God, is only to be arrived at with difficulty, and only to be beheld at spe 167 Yet it by no means fol cially favourable moments. lows from this that what he himself calls Philosophy is that he gives to to him but an impracticable ideal the Divine science alone that high significance and un
bounded range, and regards human science, 011 the con trary, as a manner of mental life, side by side with It is assur other activities equally good and useful.
edly human science developing itself, by a long series of means, out of the philosophic impulse, to which in
and he of ignorance of knowledge, the object
confesses
from the feeling that the highest
Symposium and Republic he assigns so lofty a place for the engendering of which he gives detailed directions on which he grounds the whole organism of
the
; ;
his state
without which, as a ruling power, he sees no
period to
human
misery.
The philosophic
sobriety
and
moderation of our own times, thankful for any crumbs that may be left for thought was unknown to Plato.
To him Philosophy
ties in their
is
the totality of
all
mental
activi
completed development, the only adequate realization of reasonable human nature, the queen
all
whom
other realms must serve, and of
whom
alono
they hold in fief their allotted share of truth. Whether or not this view is well founded, whether Plato con
ceives the idea of Philosophy with sufficient clearness, whether he does not over-estimate the compass of
human
166
167
intellectual powers, or rightly determines Ilio

V. supra, pp. 192, 193. vi. 500 E; vii. 517 B; Tim. 28
Kep.
Plueclr.
248 A.
224
dif relation of spiritual activities and the limits of tlie of life this is not the place to enquire. ferent spheres
For the further development of the Platonic system, we distinguish, in accordance with the foregoing ob
the doctrine of the Idea of the Phenomenon of the Idea Physics, or the doctrine in nature Ethics, or the doctrine of its representation human action. The question as to the relation of in
servations
Dialectic,
or
the Platonic Philosophy to Religion and Art will after
wards be supplementary considered.
225
CHAPTER
DIALECTIC, OK
VI.
IDEAS,
THE DOCTRINE OF
ACCORDING
to Plato, the specific
and primary subject-
matter of Philosophy consists, as already shown, in Ideas for they alone contain true Being, the Essence of
;
The enquiry into Ideas, which is Dialectic in the narrower sense, must therefore come first in the construction of his system on that foundation only can a philosophic view of nature and of human life bo This enquiry is threefold (1) built up.
things.
:
:
Concerning
j
the derivation of Ideas; (2) their Universal Concept
and
I.
(3) their
expansion into an organised Plurality, a

- 7/
World
of Ideas.
the Doctrine of Ideas. primarily connected with the Socratic-Platouic theory of the nature of Knowledge. Concepts alone guarantor true Knowledge. But in the
The Establishment of
of Ideas
is
The theory
same proportion that truth belongs

(for
Plato,
1
like
),
to our opinions other philosophers, starts with this
assumption
jpParmenides
essed
;
reality
must belong
to their object,
and
had already said
KNon-being cannot be thought

bught (see
that only Being could vol. i. 470, 1).
was frequently taken pnct
Simiimpossible (ib. 005, 3, 4). De larly the so-called Hippocr. ra î Arto, c. ii. b. i. 7 Kiihn tbvra del opdrai re Ka.1 yivuorb. 8e /JLTJ e6vra otire cpdrai
:
-
ge of by the Sophists, in prove that false opinion is
226

\
vice versti.
That which may be known is, that which cannot be known is not. In the same measure that a Absolute Being is thing exists, it is also knowable.
therefore
absolutely knowable; absolute Non-being, 2 in itself absolutely unknowable ; that which, uniting lies in the midst between the ab and
Being
Non-being,
must have a solutely real and the absolutely unreal, to it, intermediate kind of knowledge corresponding
between Knowledge and Ignorance
vince of Knowledge but
therefore, as
4
;
it is
3
not the pro-
of
Opinion.
As
certainly,
Knowledge is something other than Opi must also the object of Knowledge be other nion, than that of Opinion the former is an unconditioned the latter a something to which Being and
so
:
reality;
Non-being equally belong.

Material, our concepts
is
If
can only
5
Opinion refers to the refer to that which

j
Immaterial be
and
to this alone can a full
and true
existence
2
attributed.
Plato
thus
expressly de-
We
Rep.
shall find this later

v.
on in
the case of matter.

3
476
sq.
vi.
511 E.
Plato clearly Cf. supra, p. 175 sq. expresses his agreement /with the
He refers of Non-being as such. error to the notion of relative Non-being or Other-being to the confusion and incorrect association
of
notions.
fundamental
position
that
it
is
Soph. 261
subter.
4
5
Theset. 189 B sq. ; further details sq.

:
impossible to conceive Non-being 6v (loc. cit. 478 B: ap oSv rb /J.T] 5odfri; ?} dtivvcnov Kai 5od<7ai rb
IJ.T]
Cf. note 147,
Rep.
v.
and p. 170 sqq. 477 B: ap ovv \ô^v
6v
<W6
8t
ovx
b
?}
5odfav
016^
e?rt
TL
56cu>
efrcu; II ws
yap
ov
irbrepov
TL 0^pei rr]v
56av,
re
;
ai5
doêiv
fj.ef,
Similarly
&c. dotdfeiv 51 /iT/SeV Theret. 188 D sqq. (cf.
AXXrjv dvâfMif en-KTTT^s ?) ri]v avEir dXXy &pa Tera/cTT)^; "AXX^.
rat
86a
rrjv
OL>
Kai
TOJ.
eV
fiXXy
Farm. 132 B, 142 A, 164 A), and

his attack on the sophistical conelusion just mentioned is not di-
Kara
&\\T]i>
dvva/uu
avrrjs.
eiri rep
OVKOVV
tcrri.
&VTI irtyvice yv&vat. ws
rected against the major proposihe allows that there can tion be no notion of Non-being, but denies that error is the notion
:
TO 6V;
opinion, on the other
hand
D), belongs to something which being at the same time existent and non-existent, is between
(478
yi-:
OF
//>/<;.!
x.
/y.s-
I^TMUJÎIM^XT.
_>_>
signates the distinction between Knowledge and Kight Ôpinion, as the point on which our decision concern If ing flic reality of Ideas depends. are iden
they
tical,
we can only assume the

;
existence of the Cor
poreal
Ideas,
but
if
they are different, we must ascribe to

are
underived, unchangeable and im apprehended not by the senses but by reason alone, an absolute and independent existence. The reality of Ideas seems to him the direct and in
perishable,
evitable
which
consequence
of
the
Socratic
philosophy of
Concepts.
existence,
Knowledge can only be employed on true
on the colourless, shapeless, immaterial Essence which the spirit alone beholds. 7 If there is any Knowledge at all, there must also be a fixed and invari
For us
able object of Knowledge, an object that exists not only and by reason of us, but in and for itself.
the Invariable can be known.

lity to
We
vootpwa.
verac,
Only
can attribute no qua
that which
is
conceived as constantly changing.*

vdvrus
fj.bvov
the ciXtKpivus 6v and the

&
lira.
oi
56a
ws THTI 0atTO
&p ftm
Ko.0
the question is: TI Trvp avTb eavTov Kal

(f>
51
B:
d\rj6r]s vov Staêpei
M*&,
irdvtf oirda
a5 did TOU craym-
iravra TTfpl &v \^ynfj.ev oi/rws ai ra avra ovra e/cacrra, r) TO.VTO.

airep p\Trofj.ev, &c.
fj.6va fffrl rot,
Tos alfft)ai>6/j.fda, dtriov /3e/3at6rara. 5io S^ Xe/cre o fVetVw (here follows what was quoted, p. 4J5). TOIJTUV
5t
î>
O&TUS
^6vruv
6/m.o\oyr)T(oi>
i>
OVK
&\\a te tx ovr a dX^êwtJ ten irapa.TO.vTa oi)3a^?} oi Sa^wr, dXXa fidTijv eKdaTOTe elvai ri
ai njv
<}>a.p.iv
elvat TO
Kara ravra
etSos
fyw,
eI5oj cicdffTov voTjrb
ty
ir\T)v
\6yos
TO 8t ovtev ap this question is not

-
to be discussed
plac-^
:
more
fully in this
aycvvrfTov Kal avu\e6pov, ovre eil eavro etV5e%6,ueôi &\\o (L\\oOei> oure avrb e/y &\\o TTOL ibv, abpaTov 5^ Kal &\\ui> dvaiaerjrov, TOVTO 5 dn vbyffis eiXyxev eTnvKoweiv T6 5
ft ot rts opos bpiadeis [ityas
b^vvôv
o.l<r6^Tbv,
6/j.oi.6v
dia ppaxtutv tpavd-r],
JOUTO /idXtor
av.
tDoe
yei>i>-r)T6i>,
re e/caVy detrepov, Tfôprjjj.ôi del
fyituipiATaTov yevoiT
TT)v
otv
yt.yvbiJ.fvbv re eV nvi Tbiry Kal TrdXiv
iptjv
CU /TOJ
Ti0CfJUU
\f/rj(poi>-
CKeWtv
7
I
a.iro\\vfjievov,
/j.ti>
vovs Kal 56^0 dX-rje-ris tarov iravTdiraviv elvai Ka.6 ai>Ta

.
5brj êr
ai-
a6ri<rews
irepiXyTTTbv.
_
liaulr.
47
|)
dvaiaO-,]Ta
i0
iiftdv
(iSrj,
rat. ;isi;
t:i!
sq.
Soph.
Q 2
228
is altogether to Therefore to deny the reality of Ideas 9 What annihilate the possibility of scientific enquiry. from the idea of Knowledge, Plato also is here derived as the deduces from the contemplation of Being ; and, the one side, a result of the doctrine of Ideas is, on it follows from the Socratic philosophy, on the other, and the Eleatics. As Ideas are teaching of Heraclitus so is true Exist to Opinion in the region of Knowledge, to the Material ence to Phenomena, the Immaterial The Sensible, then, is a some of Being. in the region 10 but the end of Becoming is Being. thing Becoming, these many The Sensible is many and divided; but reason of that what they are, only by things become
which
is
common
to
them
all
and
this
common
ele
can any ment must be distinct from the particulars, nor for these notion of it be abstracted from individuals, but only an never show us that common quality itself,
11 No individual presents its essence imperfect copy. but each possesses its own qualities in combina purely, The manifold just is also tion with their
opposites.
unjust,
the manifold beautiful, ugly
and
so on.
This
therefore to be regarded as a middle-term totality is and full reality between Being and Non-being: pure
249
B sq Phileb. 58 A. Of. also the remarks, p. 174, on the mill aand the imD bility of Bight Opinion
niutalility of
i
cpyava Kai iraffav iraem/, iKdorip tt yfafftr

fiAX7?s
&\\r,v
octets
rirds
Knowledge, and
vol.
>fyrfa<,
Etyiwa
on the consequences of the doctrine of the flux of all things vhich are drawn out in the Cra-
CC2
ng
10
jL^v
Pannen. 135 Phil. 54 B:

tvcKa
sq.
STJ
eW/ca ylyr(ff8a.t The doctrine of Flux and the p;unon-existence of the Eensil le tial willlc discussed at greater length in the beginning of the next chapter.
ciVt as
0i#*l
yivtffcvi
Parm. 132 A;
sqq.
hado,
<4
jdrfinKd
re Kal
iravra
DoorsnTB OF IDEAS. ITS ESTABLISHMENT.
229
can only be conceded to the one absolute self-identical beauty or justice, exalted above all opposition and re
We must distinguish between that which and never becomes (Tim. 27 D) and that which is ever in process of Becoming and never arrives at Being. The one, remaining always self-identical, can be apprehended by rational the other, Thought arising and passing away, without ever really being, can only be the subject of Opinion and Perception without Reason the former is the the latter the
striction.
is
12
ever
The contemplation of Nature
prototype, copy. leads us to these proto
types; for the world is perfect and beautiful, simply because it is fashioned after an eternal and
unchange
good and this they are, because they participate in beauty, and goodness itself, in absolute Existence. 14 Our moral
life,
able pattern. 13 Things can only be understood by us in relation to their ultimate aim their true causes are those by means of which become and fair
;
they
too,
of which
must guide
presupposes moral prototypes, the perception us, so that our actions may tend
towards right ends. 15

(
There
vii.
is,
in short, nothing in the
Rep. v. 479 A sq. Phdo,loc. cit. 78 D
524
J5.
Sm
(
sq.;
103
-*
,
A
40
3(H
h the passages of the

(viz.
Phdu
08
and rimaena
and 100 B-E respectively) to be noticed later on.

1
sq.;
Tov,ToG8ia0tov adXtuTdrov: Parm. 130 ]{ phfedo, 05 L) Rep v 470 A of tll ldea ot th SlKatoy, /caXdv, and the highest of all dya06i>, &-;.
:
>
Ideas to Plato is, as that of the (iood.
we
shall find
Still
(as Rib-
baedo, 247
250
P,
sq., in
his sketch ot the world of Idea, Plato expressly particularises the

O.VTT]
bjng remarks, PI. Ideenl. i. 310 sq.) we cannot conclude that the practical Ideas alone or at any rate in preference to the others, formed
the starting point of the doctrine of Ideas. In the Parmcnides (loo
GucaHMTforj,
ffufyorfrij,
eVt-
WTJui),
together with the Idea of

;
beauty
of the
Iheret. 170 E, he speaks ropoftefypara eV rci; &VTL

ei
eorwra, TOV ntv Odov
5ayuoê(rra-
and Phsedo (78 101 even before the Idea of justice, those of simicit.)
;
sqq.), together with or
230
world which does not point us to the Idea; nothing which has not in the Idea the cause of its existence,
and of such perfection as belongs to
it.
The
dialectical
of the theory of Ideas is exposition of this necessity in the Sophist, and more fully in the Parattempted the doctrine of as menides. The first
proves,
against
an original plurality of Being, from the concept of as Being belongs to Being itself, that the All, in so far 16 as against Materialism, from the facts is also One
it,
;
larity,
equality,
unity,
,
plurality,
are duality, greatness, &c. from the passages tioned, and we quoted in the preceding note see how great was the influence of
men
cf. Pt.i.
as Parmenides and the Atomists; 47 J sq. 687 sqq. ) d^brepa v v y^P 6/xotwj etVcu Aeyere* ax e ^^
( ;
d/x0ore/)cjs
(i.e.
whether we
j>,dXX
call
Plato s teleology on the formation It was not of the theory of Ideas. merely on the basis of a definite kind df hypostasized concepts that this doctrine arose, hut from the universal conviction that in all ex istence and becoming the thought given by its concept was the only
i
other an only the one or only the ou dvo eiY^f. existing tiling)
A\r)dTJ \eyeis.
AXX &pa rd
ov
;
o>0cj
Bov\fff6e
KaXew
"Icrws.
AXX
rd 6^0
this explanation the above view seems to me to be per It might indeed fectly justified. be objected (Bonitz, Plat. Stud,
P>y
rue reality.
16
243 D, Plato asks those who two original existences and the (the warm and the cold TI wore &pa TOVT CTT d/j.cpo ii like)
suppose
:
ii.
men 51) that the possibility tioned by Plato in the above pas is sepa sage that existence itself is rate from the two elements
This supposition, it is overlooked. true, is not expressly contradicted by from the reasons Plato,
;
elvat
ri TO
;
elvai
TOVTO
j.uiv irbTfpov rpirov irapd rd dvo f/cetVa, /ecu rpia rb irdv, d\\d p.T] 8vo CTL /ea0 t âs TidufJ-ev ex (That this is not so is not
:
Plato any pressly proved, nor had need of proof, because the triplicity of existence directly contradicts its supposed duality, and the existent
as such
is
apparently but his design in indicated above mentioning it can only be to show the untenability of the assertion of an original duality of existence in any sense that could possibly he assigned to it. In the case before the us, this is done by showing
contradiction such an assumption involves (viz. the necessity of three existents instead of the prcsup-
only one, although
it
is
a third together with the two ele Svolv ments.) ov yap TTOV rolv ye
/caAoufTes ddrepov ov (calling only the one of them an existing thing,
pcsed two).
The same argument

with
equal
force
would
ap ply
DOCTRINE OF IDEAS. ITS ESTABLISHMENT.

of moral
231
and mental conditions, that there must be some other Being than that of Sense. 17 The Parmenides takes up the question more generally and from a logical
point
of view
{
(Farm.
137),
developing
both hypo
One is and the One is not in their theses, From the Being of the One, contradic consequences. tions arise conditionally from the Non- being of the One, absolutely. It is thus proved that without the One
the
;
Being, neither the thought of the One, nor the Being of the Many, would be possible however inadequate
:
may be
the Eleatic view of the

it
One Being, and however
necessary
may
be to
to
rise
from this abstract Unity
the comprehensive Unity of excluding Plurality, the Idea. 18 The proper connection of the Platonic doctrine, however, is more clearly marked in other ex
positions.
The theory of Ideas, then, is grounded on these two main points of view, that, to its author, neither true
possible without the of Ideas. These points of view overlap, and Reality are mingled in Plato s expositions for the reason why
;
Knowledge nor true Being seems
Knowledge
at;. mist
is
impossible without Ideas
is
this
that]
the
assumption of three,
original elements: really an indirect of what has been
in
lour,
or
any additional quantity

h;
OVK aTro5cx6fj.i>oi ws eV ovcrias /J-epa, are treated with unqualified con-
and we
of ve assertion here directly stated cases, that the
whatsoever,
tempt.
the
two other
This view of the Pannenides, I first propounded in my Plat. Stud. 15U sqq. a: d defended
1H
which
in the
({//a
17
originally existent, existent, can only be one. 246 sq.; cf. Theset. 155 E,
those who would allow nothing to be real, T) ov civ SVVUVTCLI xepoiV Act/3e (r0cu, Trpciêts airpit; 5 /ecu ycvfoets KO.I TTO.V rb doparov
whore
first edition of the present work, part i. p. JUO sqq., I cannot substantiate with greater detail in this place besides the disserta;
tions
TOLI>
mentioned above, cf. SiiMMiiihl Genet. Entw. i. 341 sqq. Ribbing,

:
loc. cit.
221 sqq.
232
permanence and self-consisAnd is unthinkable. lenCYj without whicli Knowledge that the material phenomenon has no true Being is
lensible existence wants
it ideally. proved by the impossibility of knowing same conclusion is reached by the Platonic proofs The of the theory as represented by Aristotle in his work on 20 19 so far as we are acquainted with that work. Ideas,
The
first
of these, the Aoyot
tic
rwv
tTntrrrjjuwv,
coincides
with the proof above developed

refers
to
that
all
the permanent,
self-identical
is
is
Ideas.
Knowledge The
TroAAwv, second, TO tv that the Universal which
based
011
the proposition
same Genus, must
in all particulars of the The itself be distinct from these.
third (ro voctv TI fyOaptvTuv), which is closely connected with the second, proves the independent existence of re Ideas, by the argument that the universal concept
Two
mains in the soul even if the phenomenon be destroyed. that things other proofs, adduced by Alexander. to which the same predicates belong, must be copied from the same archetype, and that things which are
one another can only be so by reason of participa concur with those already tion in one Universal, 132 and Phredo 74. The doctrine quoted from Farm. of Ideas therefore is ultimately based upon the con
like
viction that Keality belongs not to the Phenomenon with its self-contradictory divisions r.nd variability,
but to the Essence of things in its unity and iden but to the logically tity ; not to the sensibly perceived
thought.
is Cf.
20
ray Plat, Stud. p. 232 sq.,

I3onitz
From
b.
Arist.
and Schwegler and

Arist.
ad
loc.
990
sqq.
22,
Metnpli. i. 9, and Alex, ad
locum.
&6GTMINE OF IDEAS. ITS DERIVATION.
233
The theory being thus derived, we can also see how the hypothesis of Ideas connects itself with Plato s his torical position. Besides his relation to Socrates, Aris
totle refers us to the influence of the Heraclitean philosophy, and also to that of the Pythagoreans and Eleatics. These systems/ he says, 21 were followed by the enquiries of Plato, which indeed on most points wore allied with the Pythagoreans, but in some par
(
ticulars diverged
from the Italian philosophy.
From
his youth he
agreed with Cratylus and the Heracliare in continual flux,
teans, that all things sensible
and that no knowledge of them is possible; and he remained true to that doctrine. At the same time, however, he embraced the Socratic philosophy, which occupied itself with Ethical investigations to the exclu
sion of natural science, yet in these sought out the universal and applied itself primarily to determination of concepts and so Plato came to the conclusion that
;
this procedure
must refer
to
something different from
Sense, for sensible things cannot be universally defined, being always liable to change. These classes of ex
he called Ideas concerning sensible things, he maintained that they subsist side by side with Ideas, and are named after them, for the anifold which bears like name with the Ideas is such by virtue of par
istence, then,
;
This last definition is only a dif ticipation in the Ideas. ferent expression of the Pythagorean tenet, that things are the copies of numbers. Moreover, continues Aris
totle at
irliQ
spectively to his
-
conclusion of the chapter, he assigns re two elements, to the One and to

i.
Mctdpli.
0,
bcginn.
f.
xiii.
It
;
1080
a.
35 sqq.
234

;
Matter,
the causes of good and evil in which he was anticipated by some of the earlier philosophers, as This passage sums up Empedocles and Anaxagoras.
nearly all the elements from which the Platonic theory of Ideas was historically developed the Eleatics and
;
Megarians might, however, have been more expressly mentioned. The Socratic demand for conceptual know
ledge unmistakably forms the starting point of the theory; but Plato, by the utilization of all that the
earlier
philosophy offered, and in the direction which

;
it
traced out for him, enlarged this ground his greatness, indeed, consists in his having been able to draw forth
the result of the whole previous development, and shape from the given elements an entirely new crea
tion.
Socrates had declared that

rest
must
upon right concepts
all true knowledge he had recognised in

ha<T
thTscooceptualknowledge" the rule oTall action ;Jbe
shown that Nature

victions,
herself finnld
the concept of an End.
^nly ho pyplainprl by Plato follows him in these con
and combines with them what earlier philoso Parmenides and Heraclitus, Empedocles and phers Democritus had taught on the ifncertainty of the senses, and on the difference of rational Cognition from Opinion 22 together with Anaxagoras doctrines of the world-forming mind, and the intelligent dis
position
of
all
23
things.
With
those
older
philo-
See above, p. 170 sqq
\viih
sq.
;
which compare vol. i. 583 sq. 651 741 gq.

; ;
p.
47G
- :i
Plato
himself,
;
sq. (vide vol. i. 811) sqq., tells us what
Phsedo, 97 B Phileb. 28 C,
attached to this doctrine, and what conclusions he drew from it, and at the san:e time how he regretted the absence of its further develop-
ment
in
Anaxagonis.
importance ho
CONCEPT
ol
IDEAS.
235
sophers, their view of knowledge was only a consequence of their metaphysics; Plato, on the contrary, reduces Socrates principles on scientific method to the meta
He asks, How physical ideas they presuppose. Jleal to be conceived by us, if only reasoning
assures a true cognition of the Real ?
tion Parinenides
;
is
the
thought
To
this ques
had already replied The one eternal invariable Essence can alone be regarded as the Eeal.
And
a similar answer
was given by Plato
fellow-
disciple Euclides,
who may
possibly have anticipated
Plato in the
drawn
the
of
to
such
place,
formation of his system. 24 Plato was a view by several influences. In

it
first
seemed
to
him
direct
result
the Socratic theory of conceptual knowledge that something real should correspond to our concepts, and that this should excel all else in reality as far
science
5
as
excels
all
it
other
ways
clear
of
knowing
the
in
Similarly of our thought must not
truth.-
object^/ be sought in the pheno menon. 26 This, however, ensued still more definitely/ from the Heraclitean doctrines of the flux of all things
a
became
that
for the
permanent element,
lie
to
which our ideas
relate,
could not
27 in the sphere of unconditional change.
The Eleatic arguments against Plurality and Mutation at any rate so far acknowledged by Plato that he excluded from true Being that unregulated movement
were
not comprehended in the unity of the Idea, not co-articulated according to fixed differences of kind which the world of Sense appeared
-4
:<
and unlimited Multiplicity
Vide Part
i.
p.
A ide supra, p.
218 225
sq.
-~
sq.
Ibid. p. 22r,. Ibid. p. 228.
236

him
to
offer.
28
to
And Parmenides, having already) denied to Being all sensible pro^ on these grounds, in their miniperties, and the Pythagoreans having, is not palpable to the senses bers, declared that which 29 Plato may have been to be the Essence of things
all
the more inclined to maintain the same of the Im material which forms the subject matter of our con Nor, lastly, must we estimate too lightly the
cepts.
influence of that aesthetic view of the world which
was
the
always uppermost
in
Plato
artistic spirit.
As
Greek everywhere loves clear limitation, firmly out lined forms, definiteness, visibility, as in his mythology he places before us the whole contents of moral and so does Plato natural life embodied in plastic shapes,
feel
the
necessity
of translating the
matter of his
thought out of the abstract form of the concept It does not into the concrete form of an ideal vision. that our reason should distinguish the quali satisfy him
that we should in things, fying realities embodied in which we per the connection separate them from ceive them they must also exist in themselves apart from this inter-connection they must condense into
; ;
must become Ideas. independent essences, concepts The^ doctrine of Ideas thus appears as a truly Crreek creation,
** Vide loc. cit. and note .2. Further details will be given in the paragraph on Matter. -9 We shall find an opportunity later on to return to the importance attached by Plato to the Pytl;anumbers. Arisgorean doctrines of tutle s statement, Metaph. i. 6 in most beginn. that Plato had to the Pythagopoints adhered
(
roans, goes too far. Asclepius (ad loc. JMctaph.) corrects Aristotle, but is also mistaken in his assertion that he ought to have said in
all
points,
for
Plato
was a
tho-
The same rough Pythagorean. statement was frequently made in Ncothe Nco-Pythogorean and
Platonic schools,
CONCEPT OF IDEAS.
and,
237
more particularly, as a fruit of that union be tween the Socratic and pre-Socratic philosophy, which was accomplished in Plato s comprehensive mind. The Ideas are the Socratic concepts, elevated from rules of
knowledge into metaphysical principles, and applied
to
the speculations of natural philosophy concerning the essence and grounds of Existence. :r
II.
Tlw Concept of
Ideas.
If,
clear as to the general concept

it
then, we would be and nature of Ideas,
that
is
Reality, unaffected by the change and partial non-being of the phenomenon, and, as uniform and is
self-identical,
primarily follows from the preceding discussion they are that which, as unconditioned
untouched by the multiplicity and contradictions of con crete existence. 31 Plato takes for this permanent and
Further particulars on the relation of the doctrine of Ideas to earlier philosophic theories will be
given presently.
Gescli.
d.
?0
Parmenidis; halelis ideas Plutonis in spite of (for which Ueberwcg, I we could plat. Schr. 40
"liters,
Phil.
Schleiermacher, 104, combats the
just as well say conversely
die id?
above-mentioned Aristotelian ex planation, and wishes to refer the Ideas to a combination between Heraclitus and Anaxagoras to a of remodelling of the doctrine homopomeries. The theory is en tirely without historical justifica
Ilerbart, more correctly ^Sn his treatise, which will still repay perusal, ])y Plat. Svstematis funtion.
ovffiav Parmein dis, &c.), is better adapted to the Atomistic doctrine than to that of Ideas: vide vol. i.
C.S7 sqq.
:!1
In the
first
reference
Plato
calls the Ideas ovala. (Phsedr Crat. 386 I) Phado, 78

;
l-
!f>
A)
didios ovcria
;
247 ; Parm. (Tim. 37 E)
O
;
damento, Wcrke,
tion
Go sq.), sees in the doctrine of Ideas a combina

xii.
del o^ (ibid. 27 ])) 6vrus ftv, &VTUS 8vra (Pluedr. 247 ( E: Eep. x. 597 D) Tra^reXws ftv ^Soph. J48
,
;
Rep.
v.
477
/card
ravra
U<TO.VTUS
ftv,
ad Kara
ov,
TO.VTO,
Eleatic and Jleraclitean elements, but leaves entirely out of account the main point, viz. the Socratic conceptual philoso
_
of
$x ov
awr/rus
A; 38 A; Phjedo. 78D;cf. Soph. 248 B); the adjec

(Tiin. ;]5
phy.
The formula
the
gist
JI>
in
which he
his
sums up
of
view:
overly.
radii i
yei>f(ri.i>
avrb 6 tan (Pliredr. 175 C; rat. 389 D; Soph. 226C; Parm. 130 B; 133 134 1) Phaedo, 65 D 78 Dgq. 100 C Phileb. 62 A ; Kep. vi.
tive cu/rds or
247
D; The?t.
;
238
32 element (as the name of Ideas shows ) the Universal or Genus tfcat which is conceived This alone it is which concepts.
self- identical
general
as early as the Theaetetus appears as the Essence of 33 with the of science; things and the sole object
507 B; 493 E; Tim. 51 B; is an equivalent term cf. Aiist. Me997 b. 8 vii. 16, taph. iii. 2 1040 b. 32 Eth. Nich. i. 4 1096 Other passages may be b. 34. found Ind. Aristot. 124 b. 52 sqq. the Ideas are de Farm. 132 A sq. signated as eV; in Phileb. 15
;
Theog. 452 Ox., who was indebted He to Proclus for his knowledge. says that idea with a simple i sig
nifies the
purely simple, the CLVTOCV, the avrodvas, &c., eTSos with a diph thong ra avvdeTa eK fivxys re xal
0-w/xaros
T)
fJLOpcprjs
(add nal
tfXijs).
These
are, of course,
mere
fictions.
j
as evdSes or juo^dSes. 32 idea eI5os and

jUo/)07? is
which 104 used Phsedo, 103 E

(for
;
I cannot agree with Richter (De Id. Plat. 28 sq.) and Schleiermacher (Gesch. d. Phil. 104),
Phileb. 12 C) signify in Plato generally any form or shape, espe however, species or genus
I)
;
would make
type
etSos signify the
con-i
whoj
cially,
(for
arche cept of a species, idea the nor with the view of Deu-1 ;
as yet these were not distin and from guished, vide note 94), a subjective point of view the Idea
or
e.g. Euthygeneral concept Gorg. 454 E Theaet. phro, 6 Phsedr. 249 B 72 C ; 148 ; Msno,
;
and (Plat. Sprachphil. 73), Susemihl (Genet. Entvv. 122), that in elSos we arc to understand the
schle
1
I
subjective concept, in idea the ob- I jective fundamental form (Stein- } hart inverts this order, but acknow
to be ledges both the expressions compa essentially the same). rison of the above and other pas no sages proves that Plato makes distinction at all between the two,
265 D; Soph. 253 D; Parm. 129 ( 132 A-D ; Symp. 205 B 210 B Eep. v. 454 A vi. 507 B 23 D Phileb. 15 D viii. 544 D
; ;
32
cf.
Ast, Lex. Plat.
Brandis,
Ac gr.-rom. Phil. ii. 221 sqq. cording to Aristotle, Metaph. i. 6 to (supra, p. 233), Plato seems have established this usage. Both ancients and moderns have in vain tried to discover any distinc tion in the signification of the two Seneca e.g. has the expressions. assertion, of course not original, that Idea is the exemplar. eTSos the forma ab exemplari sumta the archetype and the copy re
spectively.
as regards their scientific ing; cf. e.g. Parm. 132
mean
sq.
135 B.
a;}
Theffit.
concepts
rctOra
SiavoeT:
î/
STJ
;
185 B, after several have been mentioned Travra 5ta TWOS irepl O.VTOLV
:
otfre
yap
Si aKoijs ovre
61
ews 010^ re rb Koivbv \a/.i,[3dveiv 5id TI VOS Ibid. i) 8 Trepl avr&v. Stra/iis TO T e Trt rraffi KOivbv /ecu rb
: ;
of this
is
Further development found in the Neo-Platonist

lies.
186 eiri roi/rots 677X0? crot (with ev fikv reference to this passage) rols Tradr]iJt-a<rtv (sensible im dpa ev pressions) OVK evi eTTiaTrifJ.ri,
:
Johannes Uiacoiius, Alleg. in
TOJ
-rrepl
txdvuv
CONCEPT OF IDEAS.
239
search for which, according to the Pha?drus, all Know34 which the Parmenides describes as ledge begins alone true Being; 35 to say nothing of the above;
36 quoted distinct and reiterated declarations. Plato, therefore, expressly defines the Idea as that which is
common
defines
it
to the
37
Many
of like
iiri
name
as the \v
TroAAwi;,
and on
Aristotle similarly this founds
his objection that it is a contradiction to assume the Universal as Substance and, in so far, as a par 3s ticular. The view of modern criticism 39 that Ideas.
yap Kal
i-oiKe,
dXrjOeias evravda fivvarbv atyaadai,
IJLV,
e/cet
w$
5
that,
by the same name, ami he infers inasmuch as not merely every

individual but also every attribute, every condition, and every relation, and even the variably can be set
aovvarov. :u Phaedr. 265 (vide p. 199, where further proofs are adduced) ; ibid. 249 B.
forth
;!
K.g. 132 C,
eiroit
where the
eirl
/j.lav
eTSos is
designated as the tv 6
vo7)fj.a
t
TrdVt TO
voel,
nvd ovvav
Sea^the Iv dei ov r6 avrb eirl Tracriv. 135 A wj Zffri yevos TI fKaarov Kal ( f. ovffia avTT] Kad avr-qv. Hep. vi. 507 B TroXXd /raXd ... /cat TroXXd dyaOa Kal eVaora OVTUS elval 0a,ueV
:
names, and every name an Idea, therefore the Idea cannot merely express general con He iv, however, the main cepts.
in
signifies
;
viz. that point is neglected the Idea corresponds to is the
what
oVo/to,
common
37
to
many
.
t/tiiif/s.
4,
Metapli. i 1079 a. 2):
re Kal Siopiofj.ev rep \6y({) Kal avTo 8i] Ka\bv Kal avro dya66v Kal OVTW Trepl iravruv, a r6re us TroXXd
.
. .
9, 990 b. 6 (xiii. K aP tuaffTov yap
6fj.wvvfj.6v ri
tan. (ev ro?s
etSecrt) /ecu
ericê/uev,
TrdXiv
av
/car
i$av
/j.iav
Trapd rds outrias (i.e. oixriat in the Aristotelian sense, subs ances) TUV re (? cf. Bonitz ad Inc.) a\\wi> &v
<JTIV
ws
Kal rd /xev
8
STJ
fj-ids
ova"r]s
TiBevres 6
. . .
& e?ri TroXXwj/.

v firl
Hence
in \vhat
is
irpoaayopevo/jLcis
<pafj.ev,
follows the
TTO\\J>
mcn-
vofladat opdaOai av I5âs voelff6ai p.ev oi5, TO.S 5 starts on opdaffat 5 ov. Tim. 31 the same supposition that for every an Idea must be assumed plurality
tioned under the Platonic evidences for the doctrine of Ideas, vide p. 232. Cf. Metaph. xiii. 4, 1078 b.
30
OV
d\X
6 y.tv
^WKparys
Ov5
TO.
Kado
.ov
XW/KCrrd
oi 5
^TTOl ei
as unity.
36
Rep.
x.
596
07*01)5
:
exwpto-ai
6pt/ecu TO. TOIO.VTO.

.
TOVS
elSos
7<ip
TTOI;
TI
^KacrTOV
eiw6afj.ci>
ridfadat
-rrepl
ra TroXXd
T&V &VTUV ideas Trpoarjyopcvaai 1079 a. 9, 32; Anal. post.

beginn.
:<8
Ib.
i.
11
0^9
(ii.
ravrbv
8i>ofj.a
A 3)
we
eiri<t>fpofj.ei>.
liitter
306
c.
:
r
.
303
Metaph.
sqq.
9
;
vii.
1C,
a.
1040
b.
26
translates this passage

is
An
xiii. 9,
1086
loc.
Idea
assigned to each thing which designate as a number of things
Ixitter,
31 sqq. cit., with
whom
d.
Volquardsen agrees, Plat, Idee.
240
contain not only the Universal in the sense we associate with the word, but also the individual, besides being to Plato s incapable of proof, is thus evidently opposed This Universal, which is theîdeay clear definitions. he conceives as separate from the world of Pheno
It is the mena, as absolutely existing Substance. in which alone lies the field of truth, heavenly sphere,
40
in
which the gods and pure souls behold

incorporeal
sq.,
colourless,
shapeless,
pers.
Existence;
how
Hit
efre 6
41
the justice,
/caAeu
:
tem
Geist. 17
without,
Set
but the latter
ever, adducing anything ter brings the following points in view: (1) what support of his has already been refuted, note 36. (2 The feet that in Oat. 386
)
new.
qualification
only proves that in the present case we have not to deal with the stricter philosophic
usage of
Se et or eTSos.
The word
and elsewhere
istence
is attribute.
permanent ex d not merely to

actions or
stands in an indefinite sense, just as in Tim. 28 A, 49 A, 52

;
A
;
the things, but also to activities of things.
From
follow
this,
however,
these
it
does not
that
go cepts respective Ideas. (3) to Plato the soul
as activities individually distinct from their general con to form the content of the
That according
is
non-sensible
and
far
proving that it is an Idea. (4) That according to Therct. 184 P, the individual soul is con sidered as an Idea, and (Phaedo,
in perish able.
But
^
this
is
(where matter is called an etSos) 59 C, 69 C, 70 C, 71 A Rep. vi. 507 E, &c.; and also in the pas sage Theset. 157 C, wrongly cited by Hitter on his side. It is dis tinctly stated (Phaedo, 103 E, 104 not C, 105 C &q.) that the soul is an Idea in the proper sense of the Vide infra. term. 40 This word, taken in the
ori-<
from
ginal Aristotelian sense, signifies generally anything subsisting for itself, forming no inherent part of anything else, and attribute
<r
Socrates is, is distinguished from what is both of them. The latter rather goes however, passage,
is
102 B) what Simmias
is
and what
what Simmias against Hitter, for and what Socrates is, i.e. their is here se individual existence, the Idea or common parated from element in which both partake. In
the
first passage (Theset. 184 D), is that the certainly the argument of sense coin single experiences cide ei s fJ.ia.i- Tiva iSeav, ei re
having no need of any substratum Of course if separate from itself. we understand by substance, as Herbart does (loc. cit. Werke, xii. several 76), that which contains mutable properties, itself remain
ing constant in the permutations of these properties, we have every reason for combating as he does the assertion that the Ideas are substmces. 41 Phaedr. 247 C sq.
XCEPT OF IDEA x.
,
241
and science that are exulted above

exist not in another, but in their
all
ing, and
Becom own pure

n\
Essence. The true Beauty is in no living creature in earth or heaven or anywhere else, but remains in its
purity everlastingly for itself and by
itself,
in one form
(avTO KaB avrb /mtO avrov /uovoti$t cm oy), unmoved by 42 the changes of that which The participates in it. Essence of things exists absolutely for itself, one in 43 kind, and subject to no vicissitude. The Ideas stand as the eternal of all other prototypes
Being
things
are copied from them. 44

K*a0
Purely for themselves (aiVa aura), and divided from that which has part in
(xwptc), they are in the intelligible sphere (roVoc
45
them
VOTITOC;) to
alone;
visible
be beheld not with eyes, but by thought 46 things are but their adumbrations:
say, are relative
;
phenomena, we might
4-
the Ideas alone

.
Symp. 211 A.
iii.
;
Steinhart (PI.
iv. 254, 641), 424, 441 following the Xco-Pl;itoniVs(cf. vol. iii. b. 695; 723, 3, 2nd ed.), says: The Ideas must not be cot) founded with the general concepts of the in the Sympounderstanding sium (loc. cit.) they are most de-
Wk.
garded as a Genus. C furl her, Rep. vi. 511 C (v. sup. p. 168); Parmeu. 130 C sq. Phileb. 16 C (v. sup. and subsequent remarks 206, 92) on the extent of the World of
;
;
Ideas.
4:J
Pluedo, 78
5
del
a&ruv eVa-
cidedly distinguished from generic the concept of Speconcepts cies becomes an Idea only so far as it participates in the Ideal concept of Genus. I agree with Bonitz Stud. ii. 75 sq.) and others in The conopposing these views. tent of the Ideas is given by gcneral concepts, hypo>tatised by Plato without any difference being made between Ideal and other concepts: nor arc Species excluded from the sphere of Ideas every Species, except the infima species, m;iy be re:
avrb Ka9 avrb, wtraurwj Kara raura ZX L Ka-l ovStwore ovSa/j.rj ouSa/itDj d\\o:Wtj>
<rrov
&m,
fj.ovofi8s
oi>
Phileb. 15 ouSs/j.iai ^Se êrcu. Tim. 51 13; vide note 6. 44 Tim. 28 A; Parm. 132
Tlicret. 17(1 Iv
45
DE
;
9>lat.
P. 556, Pt.
i.
130
Rep.
(ii
sq.
135
(vide note 35). They are represented as such in the famous allegory of the Cavedwellers,
vi.
507
Parmen. 128 Ph;cdo, 100
516
Rep. 517 D.
vii.
514
sq
242

47
are absolute.
illustration
In a word, the Ideas

48
:
are, to
i.e.
use an
s, -^piaral and longs to them a Being entirely independent of, the Being of things they are self-subdifferent from, 49 which sistent entities. Consequently, those theories
:
of Aristotle
there be
have confused the Platonic Ideas with sensible sub

stances, hypostasized
images of the fancy
(ideals), or
with subjective conceptions, are neither of them correct. The first 50 is now pretty generally abandoned, and has refuted by the preceding quotations from been
:
already we might the Phredrus, Symposium, and Republic also refer to the assertion of the Timaeus (52 B), that in general, the Becoming, only the copy of the Idea is in space not the truly Existing together with the 51 It may be said Aristotle. corroborative testimony of
;
47 Plato draws a distinction in a general logical sense between the Ko.6 aiirb and the irpos TI: cf. Soph. 255 C (dXX ol/J-aL ai^ Ta Ta ffvyx wP ^v T ^ v % vrwv
<re
The
latter is a relative, only a exist copy of the Idea has its ence only in and through this re
48
lation.
/*"
K0.9
MyeffBai)
iv.
also Parm. 133 C Rep. 438 A. HenuodoruB, ap. Simpl. ruv tivruv ra fj.tv Phys. 54 b. says Ka.6 aura dvat X^yei [IlXdrwj ], ws
; ;
:
ai/ra,
TO,
?r/)6s
a\\rj\a
ad
9,
Metaph. 1086 a. 31
;
i.
9,
;
901
xiii.
b.
xiii.
sq.
Phys. ii. 554, 1 cf. Anal. Post. i. 77

i.
2, a.
;
4; vide p. 193 b. 35; 5 Metaph.

;
6,
987
b.
8,
29
and
my
;
Plat.
avdpuirov
K-ai
d7a#6i>
/cat iirirov, TO. 5e

TCL
TOVTUV
pev
tOs TT/JOS ej
TrposeVfpa, ajrta, ws
Stud. 230. 49 ovaiai as Aristotle calls them

cf.
rt. But Ka/cy, TO, 5 W5 7r/)6s ex although this logical distinction
tends as such through both worlds the world of sense and the world of Ideas (cf. on the Idea of the Re 126)-in a subter, note lative, Idea alone metaphysical sense the It is, as we have is an absolute. avrb K0.0* avrb] just been told, Vhile of the phenomenon of sense
it is
991 b. 1 29 vii. 10, 1040 b. iii. G, 1002 b. How this determination har 2(5. monises with the other, that things
Metaph.
i.
9,
990 b. 30
;
exist only in
will
50
and through the Ideas, be discussed later on.

Tiedemann,
ii.
Geist.
d.
spek.
sul
Phil.
91
are
;
sq.,
where by
stances substances
51
understood
sensibl
Inil
cf.
ii.
Van Hensde,
Phil. Plat.
said ertpov ri.vbs det 0e perat 0dira0yxa, 5id raOra cv er^py -jrpoffrivl yiyeadat (Tim. 52 C). ?)/cei
Phys.
TO.
3, 30, 40. iv. 1, 209 b. 33:

.
II\(TWW
Tt OVK
1
jaCJ/TOl
\KTtoV
ci5r).
5td
4,
iii.
203
a.
CONCEPT OF IDEAS.
243
that Plato speaks of the super-mundane sphere, and that his disciple describes Ideas as cutrflrjra at Sta.
But the
tion
is
the former representa figurative character of too apparent to allow of its serving as proof;
s
and Aristotle
Plato
s
remark
is clearly
not intended to convey

53
The
view, but to disprove it by its consequence. other supposition, that the Platonic Ideas are sub
own
jective
Hardly anyone thoughts, is more prevalent. would now regard them as mere conceptions of human 54 but it has been maintained, even recently, reason; that they have no absolute existence, but are only the
55 thoughts of God.
This theory
{J.tv
is
as untrue as the
the Platonizing
ITXarw^
rb
u [TOU ovpavov]
<ru)/ia,
is
common among
moderns, Wissensch.
cf.
ii.
;
ovdev elvat
82
oi)5
ras t Sâj, 5ia

b.
realists of the
middle ages.
Among
/J.t]5irov elvan.
auras.
the
d.
Mei tiers, Gesch.

803; Stallbaum, Parm. 269 sqq.
;
Arist.
;
sq.
53
54
cf. vii.
Metaph. iii. 2, 997 1(5, 1040 b. 30.
Plat.
Tim. 40
Cf. Plat. Stud. p. 231. Melanchthn, Opp. ed. IJretsch.
xiii.
ii.
96
520; Buhle, Gescli. Tcnnemann, sq.

;
d.
Phil.
d.
Syst.
36 sq. Trendelenburg, l)e Philebi Cons. 17 The latter says that the Ideas sq. are formce a mente artifice susRichter,
Id. Plat,
sq.,
;
Do
21
Plat.
d.
Phil.
ii.
ii.
118
sq. (cf.
Gesch.
of ceptce, creations
son,
<[uce
the divine rea
Phil.
29(5 sqq.),
who makes
coyitnndo ltd ideas gig-
the Ideas (viewed as archetypes of things), notions or envisageinents ; viewed as in the spirit of man, works of the Deity. -Plat. ii. 125
;
nat, ut sint, quia cogitentur ; and when they are described as abso lute and as %u>/H(rrai, the meaning merely is that they continue in the
iii.
11
ii.
v<
sq.,
155
sq.
is
Gesch.
d.
Phil.
3i5J sqq.
thoughts of the Divinity indepen dent of the vicissitudes of phjieno-
This theory
met with
later
in
antiquity
tonists,
among
the
Pla-
menal same
appearance.
effect,
Kettig,
A ma
Cf.,
to
the
in the
;
and is general in Xeo-Platonism (cf. vol. iii. a. 726 ; b. 469 571, 5 ; 694 105 411 sq. 723, 3, 2nd edit.). There, however, it was connected with the belief in
:
Philebus, &c. (Bern, 1866), 24 sq.
it
the substantiality of the Ideas, and was not observed that the two The theories are contradictory. same view of the doctrine of Ideas
Volquardsen, loc. cit p. 16 sq., who, to support his view, quotes certain dicta from Rep. iv. 435, not to be found there at all. Kiihn, De Dialectics, Plat, p. 9, 47 sq., ap proximates to this view in suppos ing that the Ideas (as was held
by the Neo-Platonists) subsist
in
R2
241

is
Plato s hav altogether wanting in proof. his enquiry ing been led to the doctrine of Ideas by into the nature of knowledge proves nothing indeed,
other and
;
it
is
more
56
of Ideas.
in agreement with the objective derivation The description of the Ideas as archetypes,
57 according to which Divine Reason fashioned the world, or again, as the objects which human Reason con 58
templates, divine or
make them mere products of human Reason. The Ideas are here pre
does not
supposed by the activity of Reason, just as external

things are presupposed by the activity of the sense which perceives them. Nor can this theory be de
duced from the passage in the Philebus (28 D, 30 is said to be the C), where the royal mind of Zeus which orders and governs all. Zeus here stands power
for
is
the soul of the universe the

59
that which he governs

is
world,
and reason, as
to
is
him from the cause above him
remarked, belongs the Idea, 60 which
accordingly treated not as the creation, but as the The propo condition of the reason that thinks it.
Parmenides (134 C) that God has know for this having is not more conclusive is expressly described as participation, and the gods, not God, are spoken of 61 as the possessors of that
sition in the
ledge in itself
istence,
(iod as the most perfectly real exand at the same time are comprehended by his thoughts, Similarly Ebben, Plat. id. doctr.
K 6o-/Aos
/ecu
/ecu
dartpes
??Atos Tracra
/ecu
i)
<re\rii>r)
/ecu
Trepupopa,
the
78 sqq.
nti
Supra, p. 228 sq.
Tim. 28
8
cviavrol re /ecu &pat /ecu /j.r)ves. (0 1 shall return to this later on. 61 ciXXo avrrjs OVKOVV e iirep en-torT^s /xere xet, OVK &v riva po\
n
.
Hep.
x.
506
sq.
\oi>
T)
6cbv
<palr,s
%x
eit>
T
.
V o-xpiêOVKOIV
. .
rhaedr. 247 A.
or6.rf\v
(TricrTrj/jLrjv,
fl
Tim. 52 A, and frequently.

T65e TO
Ka\ov/j.(voi
irapa
T<
Oe$
avrrj tffrlv
i]
ct/e/3t-
69
oXov, the
CONCEPT OF IDEA
knowledge.
It is impossible to
ti.
245
deduce from the pas sage that the Idea of knowledge as such exists only in the divine And though, lastly, in thought. Republic (x. 597 B) trod is called the Artist (Troiijrr/e),
or Creator
itself,
($vrou/>yoc),
tEe"
who has
it
created the
Bed-in-
the Idea of the

this
from
bed; by no means follows that that Idea is only a thought of God, and
62 has no existence except in the divine thought. must remember that this is not intended for a strictly
63 philosophic explanation of the origin of Ideas; and, that the Deity with Plato we shall presently find) v (as is convertible with the Derived Ideas highest Idea.
We
very fairly be called his creations without in volving the existence of the Idea only in the thought, and by the thought of a personality distinct from it
may
self.
64
_^
substantiality of Ideas is certified not only by the testimony of Aristotle, but also by the above-cited
The
ovre
-
yiyv&ricovffi TO. n-pdy/j-ara Oeoi tores.
wdpuirfia.
othei
vol.
ii.
hand b. 276
tlic
passages
quoted
so that
the that the world, we world is merely a thought of God. With the Greeks, as everywhere else, whatever is not mad; by man (and consequently all the works of Nature) is referred to the here, the K\ivi) cv Divinity. ^So
say, (Jod do not assert
;:!
When we
sq.
2nd
it
edit.)
made
we cannot make
tenon of
is
any
real cri;
views. Tin of the case particularly before us; for the sake of symmetry, three different K\woiroiol must exist, to correspond to the throe different sorts of K\ivat.
scientific
true
Hermann
has
therefore
no
T-fj
(pvffei
oiVa
of
is
MS such
made
l>y
God.
But
this
is
planation
popular
merely the exreligion, a
reason for discovering in this passage an entirely new development
tigure of speech used just as easily
denco
the
by those who expressly deny the attribute of Troieiv to the Divinity, as Aristotle does (cf. De Ccelo, i.
4,
of the doctrine of Ideas, and an cvifor the later composition of
271
i.
a.
24;
10,
33 ; Eth. N. 1099 b. 11
x. 9,
;
1179 a. and on the
book of the Republic 540, 695); cf. Suscmihl, Ei.tw. ii. 262 sq. ; Steinhart, iv. 258.
tenth
(Plat.
Genet,
246
PLATO AND 1HE OLDER ACADEMY.

Ideas which, exist absolutely, in no
Platonic passages.
which remain for ever the Archetypes of things, uncreated and imperishable, to which even the divine intelligence moves
other, but purely for themselves,
according at the same time be creatures of that in itself, cannot
85 in it, owing their existence telligence subsisting only The eternity of Ideas is proclaimed by to it alone. and regarded as the most most
Plato
emphatically,
by which they are to 66 How then be discriminated from the phenomenon. be likewise thoughts which first sprang from can
essential of the characteristics
they the thinking soul ? This difficulty 67 that the origin of Ideas saying
is
not obviated by
from the Divine of as an origin in time Mind is not to be thought all and every for not only an origin in time, but 68 to them by Plato. Again, Plato origin is denied
:
the passage of the 211 A. Could Plato have thus maintained that the Idea
65
Cf.
e.g.
K6<r(*ov},
irpbtTrbrepovTu
Symposium
fjidruv 6
/ecu
TtKTturipaw*
irpb>
O.VTOV aireip-
ydfrro, irbrepov
ihrarfrws
rb /caret ravra
s T0 7 e 7o^s. the creator ot
of the Beautiful existed absolutely in none other, if his own opinion had been that it did exist only in some other, viz. the divine, under-
x"
*>
So in what follows
*7^
:
standing?
1(50
E.g.
Srj
Tim. 27 D:
86ai>
&m>
oiV
irpurov Siaipertov r65e- rl rb 6v del -ytveffiv 5t OVK fyov K al ri rb y^vb^vov ptv ael ov
/car
<>!0
toto
the world looked only irpbsro ttfcof not iryris rb yryorif. A\ e see plainly tnat Eternity and immutability ot existence on the one hand, and Becoming on the other, are to
o&terore, &c. Ibid. 28 C; Symp. Aristotle frequently designates the Ideas as eternal ; e.g.
S
Plato opposite and contradictory antitheses the thought that anyand thing could spring into being yet be eternal and unchangeable,
;
which
is
990 b. 33; 991 a. 26; iii. 2, 997 b. 5 sqq. * Trendelenburg, loc. cit. 20 Stumpf Verb. d. plat. Gott. zur Idee d. Guten, 78 sq. w E.g. Tim. 28 C r6de St otv
Metaph
9,
the Ideas,
Trendelenburg s view of is quite beyond Plato i

horizon.
CF.
b.
intellectual
15 B ovaav
ffiv
^v
ad
eKderyv (each Idea) rrjv C.VTTJV Kal pyre ytve&\e6p OV
Mre
rpo*kXUinp.
p.
Further
2 28 sq.
details,
supra, note b,
TrciXtJ
iri<TKfirTtoj>
TTpl
ai>TOv
(EC.
Tov
CONCEPT OF IDEAS.
247
himself mentions the supposition that Ideas may be in the merely thoughts, having no other existence than
soul
;
and
sets
it
aside with the observation, that
if it
were so, everything that participates in them must be 69 it is self-evident, he says, that a thinking subject;
70 absolute entities as such cannot exist in us.
And
in
71 another place, he expressly guards himself against the notion that the Idea of beauty is a speech or a know Nor can Aristotle have been aware that the ledge.
the thoughts of the Essence of not this Essence itself. Not only does things, and he never imply that they have their abode merely in
Platonic Ideas were
human
with
all
or Divine
possible
73
72
thought,
distinctness
but he describes them

as
self-subsistent
sub
and on this presupposition, subjects them stances; to a criticism which would be utterly groundless, and
su-m. 132 15; cf. Tim. 51 C. has been already remarked, Ft. that Plato here i. p. 254, 1, end, lias in his mind the nominalism of Antisthenes.
l!!)
and the other?

7:! This is clear from the passages cited supra, notes 48 and 48, and indeed from the single expression xwpttrrds, to explain which as Trendelenhurg does (vide note 55) is made absolutely impossible by Aristotelian usage and by the eonnection in which it is used of the Cf. e.g. .(not to Platonic Ideas. cite the whole of the passages a-1-
It
70
Farm. 133 C:
ofytcu
cb>
KOLL
<?
Kal
&\\ov, oorts a.vrr]v riva avrr]v fKaffrov ovtriav riderai

6fj.o\oyij(ra,t. cLv
O.VTUI>
/ca0
elvc.i,
Trp&rov
THJUV.
fjLfi
/^Se/a af
elyou
ei>
irws
;
yap
civ
ai-TT/ /ca0
"i
avTrjv ZTI
firj
Symp. 211 A.
describes Aristotle nowhere the Ideas either as thoughts simply, as thoughts of the Divinity; (ir
"-
but, as
we have already seen, lie calls them eternal substances. Can we, however, imagine tbat it he had known anything of
expressly
dnced, Ind. Arist. Si d) a. 35 sq.) ^letaph. vii. lii, 1040 b. 26 sq. xiii. li, Insij a. 31 sqq., where lie charges the doctrine of Ideas witli a contradiction, in that the Ideas as concepts must be general and as
;
%W/H(TTCU individual.
With Trendc-
the
theory discussed above/ he would have neglected to object to
the doctrine of Ideas the contradiction
between
this
determination
interpretation of x^ptthis criticism is objectless: the archetypes in the thoughts of God anterior to individual Being can only bo general concepts.
lnlmrg s
<rrbs
248
must throughout have taken quite another turn, if he had understood by Ideas either concepts abstracted by us from things, or such prototypes as preceded things
74 It is equally only in the creative mind of God. evident that he was unacquainted with any theory of
the Ideas being the creations of the Deity. 75 are. therefore, fully justified in asserting that Plato held the Ideas neither as the thoughts of man nor of God.
We
But
if
the Real, which
is
the object of thought, must
be a substantial entity, it cannot on that very account be conceived in the manner of the Eleatics, as Unity
without Multiplicity, Permanence without Motion.
74
If
As
regards the
first
of
the
as
above supposed cases
(viz that the
Ideas are the concepts of human intelligence), this will be at once conceded. And as to the second not tlie slightest doubt can remain. Of all the objections of Aristotle against the doctrine of Ideas (a review of them is given, Pt. i.
1).
the agent through whom the Ideas are copied in things still less would he have done so in order to explain the origin of the Ideas themselves, which were at once eternal and without origin. 76 If we say with Stallbaum (Parni. 209, cf. 272; Tim. 41) idea*
;
esse
seiupitenias
miminis divii
21G
its
sq.
2rd
edit.),
there
is
not
lose
a single
force
one which does not
as soon as we un derstand by the Platonic Ideas, not substantial and self-subsisting concepts, but the thoughts of the Divinity expressing the essence of certain tilings.
<<J
Tins definition
is
never
men
tioned cither in his account of the doctrine of Ideas, or in his criticism of it, though the question was obvious (had he been awaro of How does the creation of the it)
cof/itationes, in quibtis inest ipsa re ruin ewentia ita quidem, utcjiialc* res coffitantw, tales etiam sint et ri sita consistant in ideis veraiu ouaiav routiner!, the question it once arises: Have the Ideas the essence of things merely as. content and object, so that they themselves are distinct therefrom as subjective and objective, or are they actually the substance of things? And how
.
Ideas agree with their eternity? (an eternity so fctrongly emphasized by Aristotle). Plato, in the dis
can they be so if they are the thoughts of the divinity ? Must not we admit in full the inference by
means
cit.)
of
which Plato (Parm.

:
loc.
which Aristotle heard, seems never to have

quisitions
lu-d
re
refutes the supposition that the Ideas are mere thoughts eV ?) elf at Kal iravra
8vra
ferred to the Deity (vide p. 70, 70)
COXCEPT OF IDE. &

I
249
rh- All
is
77
Sophist
established as One, nothing (as shown in the can be predicated of it; for as soon as we; )
combine a predicate with a subject, a name with a
we at once introduce a plurality. If we say the is, we speak of the One and of Being as of two things if we name the One or Being, we distinguish
thing,
One
this
naming from the thing named. Neither can Being

;
be a whole, 78 for the conception of a whole involves that of parts the whole is not pure Unity, but a Plurality, the parts of which stand in relation to Unity. If Unity
be predicated of Being, and Being thus becomes a Whole, Unity is therein discriminated from Being; we have then consequently instead of One Being, two the One and Being. If Unity does not belong to Being, and Being is therefore not a Whole, then, supposing the
conception of Whole to have a real import (the Whole as such exists). Being lacks the existence that belongs
to the
Whole, and
is
so far Xon-existent.
is
maintained that there
If it be no Whole, then Being would

-
be deprived of magnitude, nor could it. generally speak But still less can tining, be or become anything."
1
All
be assumed as merely Multiplicity. 80
The
right
course
plicity.
must
be
to
admit
both
Unity and Multi-^
as
before
of
-
are they to be reconciled? Only, shown, by the theory of the communion If no combination of concepts. concepts were
J
How
r 244
3
,-245 K.
DC
a<>
Soph. Plat. ord.

sq.,
(Kiel. 1871 \
\Vliich
to
nil-ding
i.
must be the case Parmenides. Vide Pt.
p.
1)
38
f(\.\
and the authorities

is
471, 1; 473. 79 Cf. as to the train of thought of the above passages Ribbing, Plat. Ileenl. i. 196 sq. Petersen,
;
there quoted. It me to substantiate

here.
80
impossible for
my
view
in detail
Vide
p.
228
sq.
250
possible,
no attribute could be predicated of anything 81 we could, therefore, from the thing itself: in no relation, that it of Being that it exists only say does not exist whence, as a farther consequence, the
different
; :
Unity of
all
Being inevitably
follows.
This presup
position is, however, untrue, as indeed it must be, if 82 speech and knowledge in general are to be possible.
Closer investigation convinces us that certain con cepts exclude, while others are compatible with, and With the concept of even presuppose, each other.
Being, for example, all those concepts are compatible which express any determination of Being, even when
these
mutually exclusive, as Rest and Motion. far, then, as concepts may be combined, the Being denoted by one of them belongs to the other. So far
are
So
as they are different, or mutually exclusive, the Being one does not belong to the other; conse denoted
by
quently the Being of the one is the Non-being of the other. 83 And as each concept may be combined with many others, but, as a concept, is at the same
time different from
all others, so to each in many relations there belongs Existence, but in an infinite
84 The Non-existent, therefore, number, Non-existence.
81
The
assertion of Antisthenes
i.
81
;
256
ov
<rTii>
&pa
vide Part
s8
5
259 D sq. 251 B sq. Motion e.g. can be united with

;
p.
252.
TO
??
/J.TJ
ciri
re Kivrjvcws elvai Kal
Kara
TTO.VTO. TO. yevij.

<f>i>ffis
KaraTravrayap
at the
fur
Bein^, because it is/it is, however, same time erepov rov 8vros,
its
darepov Hrepoita.irfpyaiof.ifvr) rov OITOJ enaffrov OVK ov Trote?, Kal ^v/juravra 677 Kara ravra oi Jrws OVK
yuere xet ovra. 6p#o)s epovêv, KOLI TrdXiv, OTL roO OITO?, elvcu re Kal ovro.
irepl fKacrrov
e<m
concept
:
is
different
from
i)
OVKOVV drj that of Being &VTUS OVK ov Kivr]<rts eirfltrep TO? 6Wos fj.fr^x f
<-
<ra0ws
<TTI
Kal
oi>,
...
fJ.ev
/U.TJ
apa TUV fiduv TTO\U
250 D:
TO
ov,
aireipov 8e irXydfi rb
254
1>.
ov.
CONCEPT OF IDEAS.
is
251
itself a
as well as the Existent
for
Non-being
is
of the Other (and therefore Beincr, namely the Being not absolute, but relative Non-being, the negation of a and thus in every Being there is determinate
Being)
:
also a
the veritably Existent is not pure but determinate Being: there is not merely One Ex and these many stand reciprocally in istent but
Non-being, That is to say
the Difference.
85
,
many
the most various relations of identity and difference,

exclusion and communion.
86
The Parmenides attains the same result, by a 87 more abstract and thoroughgoing dialectic discussion. The two propositions from which the second part of The One is and The One is this dialogue starts, as the two assumptions refuted not, affirm the same The All is One, and The All is in the
Sophist
Many.
absurd nin
Both
these propositions are reduced the derivation of contradictory conseby
ad
85
Cf.
on this particularly 25G

2G<>(
E-259 B;
86
It is contrary to Plato s clear definite opinion to reduce the doctrine of the KOivuvia. TUV yevuiv to the possibility of some things
then (not, as we have expected, that anything in motion may at the same
lutoly
affirmed,
should
and
time
be
at
rest,
but)
re
&v, xai aurrj TravTdira.<nv i crratr araffit TrdXiv avrTj KLVO ITO, and
jcwô-t
s->
connecting themselves with others in the being of the individual, as Stumpf does (Verb. d. plat. Gott. z. Idee d. Gut. 48 sq.). The question whether put was (p. 51 D), not a thing can partake in several Ideas at the same time, but whether ovaia, KLV-rjais, (rrdcrij can enter into communion with one another. AVe are then shown that if it is absoaraffis lutely denied that KiV^crts and partake in ovffia, the consequence is that they are not; if it is abso-
throughout, e.g. 254

KiVr/cris
orct<ris
15
sq.,
254
1);
are d/xi/crw 717)65 and dXX^Xw, Being on the contrary HIKtcrov yap rbv dôlv TTOV, neither /averts nor 255 A sq. 255 ordcris is ravrbv or Odrepov.
&/u.<f>w
sq.:
Ktvrjffiy _is
Hrepov ^rdaew.
it
participates in Being, in TOLVTOV Odrepov, without being iden icnl it with them /, and it is a ravrbv or trfpov, ^ With respect to which cf.
:
and
&\
snpra, note is?.
252

v/
;
quences
defined
and the inference

the
as a
But
.
at
Unity same time, from the manner in which
that true Being must be including in itself Multiplicity.

is
concept of Being is regarded in this apagogic proof, and from the contradictions which arise from
that view,
essentially
it
the
is
intimated that this true
Being
is
from empirical Being, which, different bounded by time and space, has no real Unity. With
this
exposition
result
is
closely
allied
that
of
the
Phileit.
bus 88 (14 C, 17 A), which unmistakably refers to
The
of
the earlier
enquiries
is
here briefly
summed up in the assertion that the One is Many, and the Many, One and this holds good, not only of that
;
which
arises
and passes away
jucvov),
but also of pure
(TO yiyvoiutvov KOI aTroXXuconcepts they also are com

;
pounded of One and Many, and have in themselves Hence one and the same limit, and unlimitedness.
j
thing appears to thought, now as One, now as Many. Plato therefore declares true Existence to be only the
Eternal,
;
89
Indivisible, Uncoutained by on the other hand, he does not conceive space but it, with the Eleatics, as one Tniversal Substance, but as a multiplicity of substances, of which each without
Self-identical,
detriment to
88
its
Unit
combines in
itself
a Pluralit
Vide
15
p. 70, 5G.
question is n* t whother a subject can unite in itself many attributes or a \\hole ninny parts on this people are now figreed but about simple or unit-concepts-, irp&rov ytv ei TIVCLS
Set TOiai^Tas
89
B:
the
avrr)v Kal ftTjre yeveffiv /XTJTC oXe0/;o irpoaêxo^viiv, 6 juws elvai /3fj3cu6rara /j.iav TavryV fj.era 8e TOUT ev
TCHS yiyvc,u.evois aft Kal direipois fire
5ua-iraa/j.(i
Qtrlov,
elvai
fJLOJ>a.8as
i>7ro>.a/u-
Kal TroXXd yeyovvlav avryv cuV^s xupis, 6 dr] irdvTuv d8vva.TUTa.TOV 0airou Tavrbv Kal ajj.a ev hi Te KO. &v,
-t]V
ei
Q\T\V
i>
fidveiv
s,
dXyd&s oiVas
JJLIO.V
tK.Q.<jTT}v
eiTa
TTOJS
av
TroXXoFy
yiyveadai.
Cf.
quotation
ovffav del TT]V
on
p. 206, 92,
CONCEPT OF IDEAS.
of relations and determinations. 90
253
This was required r by the origin of the theory of Ideas; the Socratic concepts, which form the logical germ of Ideas, arose
from the dialectical combination of the different sides
and qualities of things into one. And such a defi- * nit ion was indispensable to Plato there would be an end of any participation of things in Ideas, as well
;
as of
any combination of concepts,
if
these were to be
This,
91 regarded as Unity without Difference.
then,
K)
336), that every Idea is also a concrete existence, allowing that concrete here has its true meaning, not of sensible being or individual exist
ence, but simply (as in Hegel, when he speaks of the concrete concept)
:
bing
There is no objection s view (Plat. Idcenl.
to Ixibi.
define the individual as the really
he wished simply to show existing the necessity of a constant Being as separate from That Becoming. the latter was his intention is
;
beyond
all
doubt
but (as unde
of the universally Determined. On the other hand, I cannot see what llibbing has to object from a hisi
niably shown by his most definite explanations) he knew that this constant Being was only to be found in the universal existence
Uorical point of view against my assertion that the Platonic Ideas [are the universal, nor do I find any explanation in tbe detailed discus;,sion of the matter, loc. cit. p. 325 sq.. sq. saving that the Ideas are the universal, we mean that every Idea contains that which occurs equally in several individual these individual things things nay be more or fewer, and the scope of the Ideas may be accord
:;.">5
He hypostasizes this genera. universal he attributes to it, as

of
;
we
shall find,
even intelligence and
P>y
and, generally, determinations which we are accustomed to attri bute to individuals only. But we cannot say that he was still unde cided as to its universality or not
life,
we can only say that to him these determinations did not seem in compatible with the nature of that
which
is
thought of iu general
ingly greater or less. It has already (p. 237 sq.) been incontrovcrtibly proved from Plato himself that this is the Platonic doctrine; nor indeed does Kibbing combat it,
loc. cit.
:)74.
consistent
of
him
It is, therefore, in to say (ibid.)
Plato no more intended to define the universal by the Ideas than to
concepts. 91 Plato himself emphasizes this In the above-quote point of view. passages of the Sophist he proves that the combination of concepts and the recognition of a Manifold in them are mutual conditions, and in the Philebus, loc. cit,, he finds the key to the problem of the or unit-concept simple
I
compre-
254
is
the point at which the metaphysical doctrine of Plato most definitely diverges from that of the Eleathat its concern is not the denial tics, and shows
but the explanation of Actual existence (des Gegebenen).
The union
in Ideas of the
One and
the
Many was
92
also
as numbers. expressed by describing the Ideas view must have belonged to Plato s later development
it
This
:
has no place in his writings.

scientific
We
can distinguish
between his
and empirical treatment of num 93 but his well as of Mathematics in general; bers as a preparatory stage oi pure Mathematics is primarily it has to do are Dialectic, the numbers with which not identi not Ideal, but mathematical numbers cal with Ideas, but intermediate between them and 94 Side by side with numbers of sense. the
;
things 95 but onl the Ideas of numbers are also spoken of, the same sense that Ideas generally are oppo in
Mus.
562 315
la
Lending the Many of the phenomenon, in the position that actual includes unity and plurality, In the iiniteness and infinity.
"the
Pihein.
ii.
(1828)
ii.
sq. sq.
:
Gr.
-Rom.
Phil.
a.
liavaisson,
Essai
sur
Me*ta
Parmenides, too, after the speculations ahout the participation of things in the Ideas (130 E sq.),
ve
sion
find
that
dialectical
last
discusis
of
p.
which the
result
251) a progress from the to the pure Being of the Eleatics expanded and manifold Idea. More details on this point will be given
(vide
later on.
92
physique d Aristote, î. 176 sq. Schwegler and Bonitz, ad loc. Susemihl Metaph. (xiii. 6 sq. Genet. Entw. ii. 525 sq.). 9:{ See p. 216. 04 The so-called numbers in whicl as (Phileb. 56 D), unlike units, oxen are e.g. two armies or two
;
numbered
bpara.
rj
together, dirrd
cru>,
the
Cf.
my
nt.
;
Plat.
Stud.
p.
239 ex
in
vii. 525 D); the dpid/toi as Arist. calls them, Metaph.
i.
sq.,
236
Id.
Trendelenbnrg, Plat,
de
et
Numeris
;
doctrina
;
Arist. illustr. p. 71 sq. Arist. de An. p. 232
Comm.
end; xiv. 3, 1090 b. 36; cf. c 5, 1092 b. 22 (dp. a(j}fj,a.TiKoi). 95 Rep. v. 479 B Phredo, 101
;
Brandis in
THE IDEAS AS NUMBERS.

to things
:
255
so that
under the
totality of Ideas, Ideas of
numbers
not that Ideas in general are as numbers, or that all Ideas, as such, are represented Aristotle at the same time denoted as being numbers.
also appear,
likewise points out that the doctrine of Ideas was in its 96 The origin independent of the doctrine of numbers.
germs only of Plato s later view may be perceived in some passages of the dialogues. The Philebus declares the Pythagorean doctrine of the universal Combina tion -of the One and the Many, of the Limit and Unlimiteduess, to
be the keystone of Dialectic

to
97
;
this
dialogue, therefore, applies which the Pythagoreans had

bers.
concepts those
laws
demonstrated in
num
recognises in numbers and ma thematical relations the connecting link between the
Plato further
98
Idea and the Phenomenon.
Numbers represent the Ideas to us as the measure of the Corporeal and of that which is contained in Space and if a symbolical
:
expression had
be employed instead of a purely it was most obvious to logical one, express the Idea and its determinations in arithmetical formulas. The
to
actual blending of the two

totle.
was
first
asserted
by Aris
According
to
his representation,
the Platonic!
Plato)
Ideas are nothing
but
numbers,
JO
sq.
;
99
and when
8,
%
Se
Ti]v
Metaph. xiii.4, 1078 b. .l: ircpl TUV ideuv irpurov avTyv T^V Kara
ibeav
66âi>
c.
end;
Ij
c.
9 sqq.
tails
xiii.
sq.
9, 091 b. Further de-
eirKrueTrTeov,
TUI>
TT?I>
\j.t]Q(.v
717165
,
d\\
tus
vTrtXafiov
.
apidn&v dpx^J oi
eii/cu.
Plat.
TOLS ideas
)7
^ô-avres
-.
Vide
p.
20<,
following note, and 239. Theoplirastus, Metaph. 313 I3r. (Fragni. 1^, 13, Winim.), refers to the same form ot tlic doctrine: l\\a.rwv eis ras t Sc aj
in
the Stud.
y3
As
E.g.
will
vii.
be
shown
i.
later
on,
b.
avdirruv, TO.UTO.S 5
e/c
clsToi>sdpid/j.ovs,
in chap.
99
TOVTUV
e^s TOIS
Metaph.
0,
987
256
PLATO AND THE OLDtiK ACADEMY.
said that things are what they are by reason of par ticipation in Ideas, he only departed from the Pytha
gorean doctrine in distinguishing between mathematical and Ideal numbers, 100 and separating the latter, as tc their existence, from things perceptible to sense. 103
The more exact distinction between the two kinds ol numbers is this that Jjie mathematical consist of homo
:
geneous
unities,
which can therefore be reckoned
to
gether, each with each, whereas with the Ideal num bers this is not the case: 102 consequently jthe forniei
expi ess merely quantitative, the latter, logical deter In the one, each number is like each iu minations.
kind, and only different in quantity whereas in the ^ other, each is discriminated from each qualitatively. But a definite succession is also involved in the logi
;
the lower concepts are the numbers correspond higher, ing to them must also be conditioned; those which express the most universal and fundamental Ideas
cal distinction of
numbers.
As
conditioned by the
must precede
all
others.
The
Ideal
numbers have
therefore, as distinguished from the mathematical, this that in them there is a Before specific characteristic,
and After
100
103
;
that
is,
a fixed succession.
]
"-
Though
this
dpi.dfj.oi eid-rjTiKoi
(Metaph.xiii.
2,
Aris-totle
expressly treats of
,,
108-5
c.
a.
:
5;
xiv.
b.
7,
1088
dp.
a.
b.
TU>I>
this distinction,
34,
8,
fidw
3, ibid.
b.
1090 x ii.
3
;
35),
namely,
31.
J
"
c.
0,
1081
3,
i.
21,
c.
Cf. Plat. Stud.

!
1083
xiv.
(ibid,
xiii.
1090
8,
b.
In
my
Metapb.xiii.6-H; c. 8, 1083 a. 240 sq. Platonic studies, 243

beginn.
33), dp.
Trpcoroi
vorjroi
end),
b.
dp.
7,
1
(ibid.
a.
6,
1080
;
22,
c.
beginn.
01
b. 34, is
sqq. expression, questionable.
1081
21
xiv. 4,
0,
The
i.
987
I referred tliis expression with Trendelenburg to the mathematical numbers, al^ consequently agreed with his conjecture, that in
sqq.,
Metaph.
p.tv
dpi9/ui.oi>s,
xiii.
6,
1080
<f)a.alv
-
b.
11
(ol
Metaph. 987 a. 29 b. 22
i.
especially p.
ajjufiorcpovs
eivat
<>
TOVS
sq.
rbv
fj.kv
ZX OVTO T Trp&Tepcv

Academy, and though much quibbling and
Kal vffTfpov ras
t
257
form of doctrine was in great favour with the older

scholastic
Se as, rbv S
fj-adrj-
ftaTlKOV TTapd TCtS t S^ds) ft fJ.r] luiS I must fallen out before ^x ovra now, however, concede to Brandis,
-
as
Trendelenburg does, that this

is
supposition
inadmissible,
not
merely because the manuscripts and commentators know nothing of it, but also because Priority and Pos
teriority
are
attributed
to
Ideal
and not to mathematical number. In Metaph. xiii. 0, 1080 a.^lG,

TO ptv irpGirbv from the premiss n avrou [TOV dpi9fj,ov]To 5 exb/J-evov,
:
stand in the relation of Priority and Posteriority that they must, therefore, be Ideas, and that an Idea must consequently be com posed of several Ideas (e.g. the Ideal Eight of two Ideal Fours). Further on, 1082 b. 19 sq., we read if there is an dpid/j,6s Trpwros Kal devTepos, then the units in the Three-by-itself cannot be homogcneous with those in the Two-by;
itself
c.
8,
(d5id(popoi-(rvfj.[3\i]Toi), and 1083 a. 6, the supposition
Tpov
TUV
ZffTIV
ov
ry
et Set
:
f/ccuTTO?,
/ecu
we get
?)
the conclusion
fj.ova.5uv
TOVTO
eirl
eitdus
virdpx^
that
Kal
that the units of the Ideal num bers are heterogeneous (Sidôpot = dcru/j.pX rjTOi) is met by the ques Whether they differ quan tion
:
aCTL yUjSXlJTOS
fj.6va.oc:
CTTOtaOUf
f-lOVCLS
titatively
or
qualitatively,
and
oiroiaovv
so
those
(dvvfj.-
numbers are heterogeneous

P\r)Toi},
of which, on account of their diversity in concept, the one So wo is earlier, the other later. find in c. 7, 1081 a. 17 : if all units were heterogeneous, there
whether, supposing the former to be the case, al Tjp&Tai /xeiôus ?) eAdrrous Kal al vcrrepov e-rrididbacnv
TOvvavTibv Finally, p. 1083 b. it is inferred that, as unity is to duality, unity must (ac prior cording to Platonic doctrine) be the Idea of duality. Here, then, the Ideas stand in tho relation of Priority and Posteriority. From these passages it is clear that with Aristotle the irpbrepov Kal verepov marks the peculiarity of at the the Ideal numbers, and
r)
;
32,
could be not only no mathematical, but no Ideal number: ov yap &TTCU

77
Suds irpuTf]
^Tretra oi e??s
dpi0fj,oi.
Hence a Before and After
supposed in the Ideal numbers. This is still plainer in what fol lows, and Z. 35 sqq., where both times the povdoes irpoTepai Kal
is
vvrepat
fj.ovd8fs
arc
substituted
(cf.
for
the
d<rv/j.(3\-r]TOi
also c. 8,
So too 1081 b. 28, 33). where, in reference to the irpurr]
1083
a.
Sudj, &c., it is
asked
K TrpoTtpuv
crvyKflvTai
;
fj.ovdo(ji}v
riva rpbirov Kal vGrtpuv

p.
;
further,
1082
a.
same time somCilight is thrown on the meaning of that expression. That number is prior out of which another proceeds the number two the number four; e.g. is prior to four is prior to eight for the Four proceeds from the Ideal Two and the Suds dbpurros, and from these
; ;
Aristotle very clear Platonic objects, as against the theory of Ideal numbers, that not
26
sq.,
is
merely
all
whole
numbers,
as well,
but
the parts of
them
must
the Eight proceeds (Metaph. xiii. 7, 1081 b. 21 ; 1082 a. 33), only not (cf. Arist. ibid.) Kara irpbtras if the Two were contained in the Four, but by ytwrjffis (what6e<nv,
258
the relation of num pedantry have been expended upon 104 it can only have had a secondary importo Ideas, bers
be the exact meaning of mysterious phrase), so that number has the other as its The Before and After, product. therefore, signifies the relation of the factor to the product^ of the conditioning to the conditioned.
ever that one
may
p.
which Aristotle is considering, cf. 998 b. 14 sqq.) we find, not ihe relation of Conditioning to Condi
tioned, of higher to lower concept, But but a logical co-ordination. how can this view of the Before
and After
:
:be
reconciled with the
In
support
of
this
interpreta
tion Trendelenburg (Plat, de id. doct, p. 81) rightly refers to

TO. pkv v. 11, 1019 a.: ourw X^yeTdi 7rp6repa Kai vffreKai pa ra 8 Kara
Metaph.
877
<pv<TLV
ov<rlai>,
avev
cKeivwv,
JJ.-TI
(cf.
Phys.
ii.
viii.
i.
7,
260
b.
17; Eth.
Eudem.
8;
Theophr. Metaph.
statement (Metaph. iii. 3, 999 a. Eth. 6 Eth. iv. 1, 4, 1096 a. 17 cf. my Plat. Eud. i. 8, 1218 a. Plato and Stud. p. 243 sq.) that no Ideas of his school supposed things in which there is a liefore and After? Against Brandis expedient, of taking the irpoTepov Kai vvrepov in these pas sages in a different sense to that
; ;
12 Br., where the apxal correspond to the 7rp6repaand TO. virb ras apxasto the vorepa) 77 Siaipfoei Cf. also Categ. aT nXdrcoi 12 c. crtpov crepov Trpdrepov X^yercu rerpdxws, -jrpCjTOV p.tv Kai
p. 308,
.
^X/"7""
of those here as
Seure/aop Kvpi&Tara Kara XP^ VOV TOU Kara 5t TO fJirj

a.vTi<JTpi<t>QV
rr]t>
previously quoted, viz. signifying numerical, in Metaph. xiii. as signifying con ceptual sequence, 1 must repeat my former objection (which Susemihl, loc. cit. ii. 527, has not a succeeded in refuting) that
^
elvat
aKoXovOtjcnv,
olov
TO
fr rCjv
8vow /J.& yap OVTWV Sfo irpdrepov dKoXovdei evdbs TO fr elvai, eVos 5e OVK avayKalov 8vo elvai, &C. Plato, Parm. 153 B: iravruv &pA
8t>TOS
technical expression like irporcpov Kai varepov used by the same writer in the same way and in
rb fr TTp&Tov ytyove rCjv apidp.bv

VT uv
tX<>
irpwTOi>
8^ ye, ol/xat,
ytyove, ra 8^ d\\a varepov. The consideration which formerly made me doubtful of to Metaph. this, viz. that according iii. 3, 999 a. 12, there is no Before
7670^6$
Trporepov
or After in individuals (&TO/UI), I
no longer consider of any import

these are condi other individual in individual exist still thing, which the lowest ences (into concepts of species finally resolve themselves and it is these alone
ance. tioned
Though
by some
analogous connection, cannot^ pos meanings. opposite sibly have Hitherto everything proves satis the that expression, factorily Things in which there is a Be was the stand fore and an AfterJ ing denotation in the Platonic school for the peculiarity of cer How could this tain numbers. the expression be used to signify of exactly opposite peculiarity The difficulty class? another comes before us in another way. If we ask why no Ideas were
presupposed of things in which there is a Before and an After, Because things Aristotle answers which are separated in species,
:

tance in
259
its bearing on Plato s other original system, wise more decided traces of it must have been somewhere
î
stand in of sequence, so that one of them is always another second, &c. cannot first, be reduced to any common conThis reason is stated, Poh t. cept. iii. 1275 a. 34 sqq. Aet 8t 1,
definite
but at
the
same time
LCffT
OVK av
relation
(or as it is
TIS TTl TOVTMV put subsequently K av el r] KOIVOV TI Ka66\ov

(ITJ
KOIV"?)
:
Kal
&>}.
For the same reasons,

if
they stand as con ceptually separate in the relation of the Before and the After, can
numbers,
JJ.T]
\av6dvftv,
OTI
run/ irpay/jLaTuv
be reduced
is
tv
oh
TO.
viroKfifj-fva
Siafapei
e<rrl
r<p
to no common concept, and therefore to no Idea. But it
Tb plv avT&v irp&Tov TO oe ofirrepov rb 5 exofJ-evov, v) Toirapdirav ovStv eaTiv, 77 roiavra, rb Koivbv, ?} yXiaxpW This is just the case in the constitu tion of states 5tathey are eu5
cfSei, A-ai
:
Ideal stand, and the Ideal num bers only. There is consequently no Idea which includes them all in
in this relation that the
numbers
d\\ri\uv ; at the samo time, however, ai ^tv vvTepat ai d* for the perverted are irpoTfpai
4>tpov<rai
;
Each is an Idea by itself Metaph. vii. 11, 1036 b. 15, where the following statement is
itself.
(cf.
necessarily
states, from
later
than
the
rise.
good
of
the
deterioration
which they take their

question,
therefore,
iroXiTTjs
The
answered according
cept of the
be con ade by any

to
cannot
the
put in the mouth of the advocates of the doctrine of Ideas: ZVLO. tfv yap tlvai Tavrd Tb i5oy Kal oC rb the avroSvas etSos, olov dvdda Kal Tb ddos 8vd8os\ which in cludes in itself a plurality of homogeneous things (e.g. the Ideal duality, the avTodvds, includes all
quate definition no characteristic mark can be given which is ap

plicable
to
all.
On
the
same
ground, Aristotle, Eth. N. loc. cit., supports an objection against an Idea of the Good. The origina tors of the theory of Ideas, he says, OVK twoiovv t Se as iv oh TO irporepov xal TO vvTfpov ZXeyov, Sioirep ovd
mathematical dualities), but all of them together have no Idea above themselves, as they cannot be brought under a common con
rdv dpid/j-Cw idtav Ka.TcaKtvaov. Accordingly, they ought to suppose no Idea of the Good for the Good occurs in all the categories there is a Substantial Good (Divinity and a Qualitative, a Quantita Nous), tive, a Relative Good, &c. the Substantial, however, precedes the &c. the Good, there Qualitative, falls under the determina fore, tion of the Before and the After,
; ;
The Ideal two, three, four, &c., are specifically distinct they are not co-ordinated as species in but are to be juxtaposition, subordinated as prior and poscept.
;
. terior,
.
conditioning and condi tioned; they therefore cannot be looked upon merely as separate expressions of one Idea, the Idea of number. Eth. Eud. i. also
8,
:
contains a reference to the doctrine of Ideal numbers ZTL tv &rots VTrdpXfi Tb irpoTfpov Kal vaTtpov, OVK Hart KOivbv rt wapd Tavra Kal TOVTO xup"TT6v cir) av TI TOV
yap
wpurrov irpbTfpov
irpbrtpov
yap Tb
A So
260

is the point, to him, underlies the doctrine of numbers that,
found in his works.
The main
thought which
KOivbv
Ka.1
x }P lffToi;
l*
^ ia T0 ttvcupoi
dvaLpd<T0CLL
Ta
U,VOV
TOV
KOIVOV
TO
TP&TOV. olov
TO 8tir\do-iov Trp&TOv
Koivrj
TOIJTWV yap ooKel fj.d\i<TTa ddrj. elvai yfrr]. Moreover, of those cases eirov TO nkv (3f\Tiov TO 8
rb 7ro\\air\do tov TO
for X^pov, there can be no 76/0?, Aris the better is always prior.
totle is
&TTCCI yap povfMfvov elva.1 yjdouj rbv. TOV dnr\acriov irpbTepov, d crvâivei. In the TO KOLvbf elvai TTJV ideav.
speaking quite generally, but in the example that he quotes: olov d irpwTTf] TUV dpidpuv T] dvas,
lie
words, TO
tonic
onr\d<riov,
&c.,
Eudemus
seems
to
have
the
TrpwTos
xiii. 7,
Pla undoubtedly had in view the

indefinite of the theory duad from which, through its con nection with the unit, the Trpwr?; ovds must proceed as the first
5fds in his
mind (Metaph.
which alone is 1081 a. of that qualified to be an example in which the Before and After is,
23, b. 4),
this being
supposed to exist only
actual
number (Metaph.
xiii.
7,
The
a. 14; 21, 1081 b. 1 sqq.). in only peculiarity is that order to prove the impossibility of an Idea of that in which there is a Before and an After, he lays stress on the supposed separate existence of the Ideas. In Metaph. iii. 3, this reference to the Platonic
1081
in the Ideal numbers. However, the interpretation of these words is of no importance to the present
question.
I
loc.
cannot
cit,,
Susemihl,
agree with that neither
Eudemus nor
Aristotle
would have
Ideal numbers appears to me to hold good although Bonitz (Arist. Metaph. ii. 153 sq._ 251), while above agreeing generally with the 11 (ibid.) explanation, here and v. denies it, with the concurrence of
;
Bonghi (Metafisica d Arist. 115 253 sq.) and Susemihl. Aris sq. totle raises the question, whether
;
the the ytvrj or evvirdpxovTa of things) (the material elements are to be considered as dpxai, and remarks among other objec tions to the first of these suppo TI ev oh TO irpbTtpov Kal sitions eiri vffTepdv eaTi, ovx olov Te TO TOVTWV elvai TL Trapa TavTa. olov ei ZffTai irpurri TWV dpi6fj.wv T) 5i;as, OVK
:
expressly proved the impossibility of Ideas of the Ideal numbers, be cause the impossibility is selfIt is not proved, either evident. in Eth. Eud. i. 8, or Metaph. iii. Ideas of the 3, that there are no Ideal numbers. In the former pas no sage it is shown that there are Ideas of the things in which the Before and After is, and the num bers are merely taken as an êxample, but not the only possible In the latter there is. example.
,
no proving at all it is laid down as something acknowledged, and again illustrated by the numbers, And only by way of example. it is far from being self-evident that there can be no Itleas of
;
Ideas
i.
indeed, Aristotle, Metaph.
9,
TIS dpidfjLOSTrapd TO. dotjTuv dpi0fJ.uV TO. etorj ofJ-oius o ovde cr%^/xa Trapa
b. 3,
991 a. 29 sq., xiii. 5, 1079 remarks that Ideas of Ideas
rdv axw^TWi
Still less, in
any
other cases, will the 7^77 be
are a necessary consequence of the Still less can I doctrine of Ideas. concede to Susemihl that my view
THE IDEAS AS POWERS.

in Keality,
261
Unity and Multiplicity must be organically

opposed to the distinctionless Unity of the
combined.
Plato
is
Eleatic Substance.
its
He
motionless Invariability
declares himself equally against and here he is in colli

:
sion with his friend Euclides, who at that time ap while pears to have admitted the Plurality of
he denied to
it
all
motion and
105
activity.
Being, This view,
says Plato, would
make Being
incognizable for us,
and irrational. If we are to par ticipate in Being, we must act upon it, or be acted upon by it if we are to know Being, a capacity on
in itself lifeless
:
and
its
side of suffering (Traaytiv, the power of becoming must correspond to our faculty of knowledge. known)
106 suffering without motion is impossible.
And
is
If true
the passage of Eth. iv. 1, 4. Susemihl thinks that, as the Good, an Idea of which the Idea of the Good is, is not it self this Idea, the numbers of which
inadmissible
in
kinds of the Good. Therefore, there can no more be any Idea of these
than, according to Plato, there can be of the numbers. This conclu sion remains equally valid, whether Plato eays of the Ideal or the mathematical numbers, that they stand in the relation of the Before and the After, and therefore can be reduced to no Idea. 104 p ar ti cu arg on thig point
]
Plato supposes no Idea, cannot themselves be the Ideal numbers. But because the separate kinds of the Jood, which Plato reduces to one Idea, arc not themselves Ideas, we can by no means infer that the numbers which he docs not reduce to one Idea, are likewise not Ideas. However, in the comparison of the several kinds of Good with the several numbers, the point is not whether one or the other arc Ideas or not, but only that in both the Before and the After is found. Aristotle says that whatever stands in the relation of the Before and the After, has, according to Plato, no Idea. But not merely do the numbers (as Plato supposes) stand in this relation, but also the several
<
below.
05
0(5
Cf. Part
Soph.
..Plato, Plato s
ii.
i. p. 218 sq. 248 A sqq. Grote 439 sqq.) has mistaken

;
meaning in trying to prove that Plato here represents the Ideas as something relative ex
relation to the and that he subject thereby returns to the theory of Protagoras, refuted in the Thezetetus. Plato does not say that the existence of the Ideas is con ditioned by our knowledge of them ;
isting
merely in
knowing
262

is
Existence
must
deny
also
have
not to be without mind and reason, it 107 cannot life, soul, and motion.
We
to
it all
;
be possible
permanence of Being, if knowledge is to yet we must not conceive it as absolutely
unmoved,
108
The concept
but as possessing reason, life, and energy. of Being must be reduced to that of
energetic,
Power. 109 Ideas are described as something

what he
asserts is merely that the
TUV
Ideas, among other attributes, have the attribute of being known by us. If we follow Grote we must suppose that in speaking of a know ledge of the Absolute or of the deity, we are at the same time making them into relatives of some
sort.
107
v $i Kal TO, TroXXo. etdr] \eybvTUV TO irdv e<?T7)Kbs a7ro5e xea 0at, K.T.X. 109 Plato meets Loc. cit. 247 the Materialists with the funda mental position Xeyw Srj TO Kal birotavovv K(.KTt]iJ.ivQv ovva/JLLv etr els TO
L>
ercpov OTLOVV ire<pVKbs etr eis TO iraOelv Kal crfJ-iKp^Tarov virb TOV
iroteiv
<pav\oTaTov,
K$LV el
Loc.
cit.
u>s
248
^QVQV
et <rct7ra,
sq.
T* Se
Trai
ToDTO OVTWS
TO,
ivaL
TiBefJiai
yap
dXrjd&s Kunfffiv Kal irpbs Aios; Kal ipvxty Kal <pp6vr)(Tiv 1) i"wV
padiws
(ppovelv,
7reicr077cr6/u,e#a
TQ
rjv
7rai>reX<3y
ovTa, ws ZCTTIV OVK &\\o TI ir\7]v 8vva/uis. Kven this we are told, 248 C, is position,
opov opifeiv
SVTI, JUT] irapelvai, fj^rjS^
avTo /môt
dXXct
>
vovv OVK %X OV Aeivbv IJ.VT
Kal dyiov, dKLvrjTov eaTos elvai ;

<re/j,i>bv
not conceded because doing
by the Megarians,
and
suffering
be
long
c&
ai>,
fre,
\6yov
fil>
>
o-vyx^po ifJ.ev.
farjv 5
fj.rj
AXXa
<p0}fjiv\
vovv /*& ?x Kal TTWS
merely to Becoming, and as the above instances will hold good on the other side, the de
termination
that
the
existent
AXXa raOra ptv

,
dfj.(poTepa
is
ov
:
<}>-f)<rofj.ev
avrb ^x LV avrd Kal riv av erepov %x L Tpdirov, AXXa 5^ra vovv ptv Kal farjv Kal ^VXTIV, dKivrjTOV ^VTOL rb wapdirav ^^vôv ov eardVat; HdvTa(-fj.oiyea\oya raur
flvai (paiverai.
nothing else than SI/OSI/AIS, is all proved quite generally of I can that is real and actual. not agree with Deuschle (Plat.
Sprach. phil. 35)
that
we
are to
It is impossible to
understand this passage as Her
understand by 5iW/m not power, but possibility of entering into relation with anything else. In the first place we can scarcely
believe that Plato defined the oVrws 6V by the concept of possibility, the very concept to which Aristotle reduces the Platonic /U.TJ 6V, Matter.
mann
does,
viz.
that intellect and
motion are declared to be a true Being, but are not attributed to

all
108
true Being. Loc. cit. 249
sq.
v/j.f3aii>ei
5 oPj , &QeaiTTjT,dKivr)T(i0j re QVTUV vovv /J.rj8evl irepl fj,r)8ei>bs elvai /J.ij8a~

/AoO
.
Again, no single passage is to be found in Plato where StW/xts

signifies
Ty
v,
drj
<pi\oa
.
6<f>(f)
Trdaa,
variably
mere possibility means power or

it
it
in
ability
dvdyKi)
5ia raOra, /xijre
wherever
stands
in
a connec-

iii
263
the Pligedo, where they are

110
made the proper and only

and
still
efficient causes of
things
more
definitely
tion analogous
cussion.
to that under disFinally, Plato himself ex-
plains
unmistakably what mean-
ing he attached to the expression, in Rep. v. 477 C: ^yofj-ev Svvd/taj -yeVos TI

Tj/j-els
activity, and presupposes an active power. no 95 E, Socrates passes on to speak of the doctrine of Ideas with the remark: we have now
TUV OVTWV, ah
OTJ
Kai
8vvdfj.e6a a 5vvd/j.e6a Kai dXXo KQ.V o TI irep av dvvrjTai. olov X^yw Each of these 6\îv Kai cLKorjv, etc.
yevecreus Kai (pdopas rrjv atTiav In his youth he had been addicted to natural philosophy, to searching out the
irtpi
8iaTrpay/j.aTev<Ta<T6ai.
owd/jieis is something colourless and shapeless, generally speaking something not an object of sense,
causes
of things, dia T L KO.I 8ia rl

;
yiyverai
only known in its operat in a word, power. Stumpf, again (Verh. d. plat. Got. z. Idee d. Guten. 19, 30), asserts that Plato nowhere calls the Ideas efficient and operative causes that Soph,
;
bia ri j-ffri he gave it up, however, without havin attained any satis Hence he was all the more sanguine about the Nous of As a cosmoplastic Anaxagoras.
faction.
Mind must
the
best,
adjust everything for
he attributes to them merely the passive motion of becoming known, not the faculty of putting in else something motion. This latter passage is
248,
sq.,
hoped to hear from Anaxagoras the final cause of all things. In this hope, however, he was miserably deceived ;
instead of intellectual causes
he had
An
axagoras
had
only
mentioned
quite irrelevant: for though Plato proves that the Ideas, in so far as they are known, or suffer are passve and therefore also moved, they are not excluded from the possibility of having active as well as faculties. passive in order to Stumpf, support his view (to say nothing of the
material causes. But in reality these are merely the indispensable means (tKeivo avev ov TO ainov OVK B.V TTOT etr) O.ITLOV) the actual and only operative causes are the final causes (ryv 8t rov cos 016^ re /Se XTia-rct [-ov] avra [he is speaking of the heavenly bodies] refloat SiVavvv KT<r6ai, Tavrijv oiVe
;
passages which I quote from the and the Philebus), is Republic obliged to pervert the perfectly clear enunciation of the Phaedo (quoted in the following note) and the definite statement of Aristotle while with regard to the Sophist he has to maintain that soul is attributed to the Ideas as having only in a broad sense, self-movement, but not the faculty of operating on anything else, But even this self-movement is an
:
ovre TWO. oiovTcu
As then no OIOVTO.L, 99 B). one has proved these causes to be in things, he has himself looked
ov8li>
for them in the Ideas, and so sup poses that it is the presence of the Idea (the Ka\6v avTb, etc.) of anything which makes a thing what it is. In the whole of this explanation not merely is there no distinction drawn between tho
264
in the Philebus, where Plato ascribes to the highest 111 cause (by which we can only understand Ideas),
and the conceptual, the efficient, three are all final cause, but as one and the clearly enunciated
same.
totelian tual or
ovffiav
K T&V
fJiera
TOU
Tre paros
aw-
Brandis (gr.eipya.o fj.&tev /j-^Tpuv. rom. Phil. ii. a. 332), Steinhart

(Genet. Entw. ii. 13), and Rettig c. Bern. (Atria in the Philebus, 1866, p. 13 sq.) refer the Finite to the fourth principle, the the Idea
;
The
Ideas,
or,
in
Aris
(PL
W.
iv.
641),
Susemihl
terminology, the concep formal causes, are to do in vain just what Plato sought for in Anaxagoras, viz. to bring out
the &pi<rTov and jSeXTioTov they with the final causes. coincide Plato declares his unwillingness
;
to
have anything to do with any

causes
besides these (100,
:
Cause, must, they think, signify the Divinity either as identical with the Idea of the Good, or (as Kettig would have it) the creator
of tins
other
and
all
other Ideas.
first
But
D
5
TO.
TO/JLCLI
nty dXXa xat petf ecu, rapdryap iv rots SXXots Tracn, TOVTO
/cat
with regard to the

:
of these
cbrXws
TI
evrjBus
^x w
drex^cos K.a.1 I crws 7ra P tpa- VT $ on OUK

>
is [that which beautiful] KaXbv ?) r? e/cetVou TOU KO\OU etYe irapovvia ei re ei re OTTTJ 5rj /cat
#XXo
iroi.fi
Plato, suppositions otherwise always opposes the Ideal as a whole, to the phenomeworld, nahvorld, have made in this one case
Would
who
ov
yap dXX on
TI
TOVTO
/caXy
TTOLVTO.
Tig
ra /caXd
suffi
yiyvcTai /caXd).
cient
for
They
him, nor
are does lie
find
;
any further
they
the
are,
principle necessary as Aristotle says, in
on the
before
passages quoted, p. 398, 1, occasion of the passage us, /cat TOU elvai Kal TOV
/cat
yiyveaOai at rta, at rta

/cat (f>6opas. 111
yeveffews
Plato
(Philebus, 23
sqq.^;
cf.
16
C)
the
makes a
fourfold
di
vision:
Finite, the Infinite, the Compound of the two, and the Cause of the Compound. He goes on to describe the Infinite in such
a total distinction between the highest Idea and the derivative Ideas, as to place them in two and to par quite separate classe?, allel the distinction between them by that between Idea and pheno menon? If, on the other hand, we understand by at rta the Di Ideas dis vinity as the creator of tinct and separate from the Idea of the Good, this view is not only opposed by all the reasons (to be discussed later on) which favour the actual equalisation of the Good and the Divinity, but also obliges us to refer the Good to the sphere of the Trepas, whereas, ace. to l\ep. vi. 508 E sqq., it is elevated
such,
above
as
all
the
a way that we can only under stand by it the so-called Plutonic Matter. By the Compound of the two he means the world of sense, in so far as it is ordered by defi nite proportions, the 7eVco-ts ct s
0et as.
it is
being and knowledge fTrtoTT^s /cai d\rjIn the Philebus (64 C sqq.)
atrta
;
clearly described as the Cause of the Compound even a product of the good, yoOs and eTrtor??/^, is classed (28 C sqq. ; 31 A) with the airta. And Plato s de-
TllK
reason and wisdom
!
IDEAS AS POWERS.
;
205
and thence deduces the adaptation
of
means
to ends in the
economy
of the universe.
112
scription of the suitable to all
Tre pcts
is
not
at
the
Ideas.
To
the finite (p. 25 A,
D) must be
does not
the composite life of pleasure and knowledge, because it belongs to the Tphov 7^0?, ^vfJ-iravTuv T&V
dTTfipUV VTTO TOV irtpCLTOS
deO/J.<;l>()t>.
long
everything which
admit (5e xe<r0cu) of more or less, but only of the opposite determi
nations,
TTpClTOV (JitV TO iffOV tV6r?7Ta, /zero, ok TO Lvov TO ffiov Kal irav o irep av Trpos a
This preference of the compound to the Traces will not harmonise with the supposition, that we are to think of the Ideas under the
dpi6fj.bs ?) that is to
/j,eTpo-s
77
TT/SO
say, everything which is capable of exact numerical and metrical determination. The sphere of mathematical relations is thus
by what would be a very imperfect description of the

clearly denoted
The fact that elsewhere (Phaedo, 74 78 D 100 D sq. ; Rep. v. 479 sqq. sqq.) makes use of the Equal, the Double, &c., as examples to elucidate the distinction between the Idea and the things in which the Idea occurs (Kettig, p. 15),
latter
principle.
Plato
;
Ideal world.
is in
The
field of the
Ideas
is irrelevant
no way limited to numerical
in similar passages he makes use of other Ideas (the

;
and metrical determinations.

it is
And
improbable that this point of view is emphasised merely in without opposition to the airetpov excluding the other determinations loc. cit.), of the Ideas (Brandis, because Pluto clearly intends to accurate and universally give an
to
Just, the Beautiful, the Great, the Small, &c.) in a similar way ; this has nothing to do with the Eettig is also present question. wrong in saying (p. 10) that the
Trtpas
tical Trepaj, for the Trefpas,
valid enunciation of what we are think of under the different Further, as voOs and principles.
cannot signify the mathema according to 23 E, has different kinds, where as quantity alone cannot estab
lish differences of kind.
The
lat
:
reckoned not under but under the fourth the 7rf a (v. sup.), and principle, the as according to a well-known fundamental principle of Plato s (supra, p. 225 sq.) the value and truth of knowledge depend on the nature of its object, the Ideas,
TrtaT-r)/j.rj
are
/>cty,
ter statement is signally mistaken the Tracts in numbers is different from that in figures, and that in
am
(which are the highest object of contemplation forpoDy, and through

the possession of which knowledge
as such originates), cannot be placed a degree lower, in the sphere of the Tre/ms. Finally 27 sqq., the preference is given to
or movements is diffei ent Plato says, 23 E, 26 C, again. Infinite and the sq., not that the Finite, but that the Infinite and the Mixed, are split up and di vided in many ways, whereas TO V ^r -ye Trôas oirre TroXXa c?X OUK fy v
tones
eOv<TKo\a.ii>o/j.e}>
u>?
<f>vcrfi.
Iiettig (p. 10), quote one only of the many passages which he brings against me, represents the well-known place in Aristox. Harm. El. 11, 30 Meib. (subter, note IM)
to
266

shall also find that the
We
nite
Idea of the Good
is
at
the same time the highest efficient cause, the
infi
Reason
and
Aristotle, as
we
see
from his writings,
as being on his side, because the Tracts here is put in the same position as, according to Plato s expositions elsewhere, is held by Dialectic or the docti-ine of Ideas. I cannot, however, see how he rb /cai understands the words rb OTL ayaObv tariv %v.
:
is
evidently adverbial, and

;
but Kettig seems it to be the subject of a sentence which in this connection would go tho roughly against the sense. I can not give up the view which I en deavoured to establish in my Plat. Stud. 248 sqq., and with which in the meanwhile others have agreed (e.g. Siebeck, Unters. z. Phil. d. Gr. 80 sqq. Schneider, d. mat.
finally
means
to
have considered
This the entrance of the airfipov. objection arises from a misunder standing: the Philebus says (loc. direipov admits of cit.) that the the More and Less, &c., the irepas, on the contrary, only admits of the opposite (cf. on this mean ing of 8e xe0"0cu Tim. 52 A). As to the assertion that the Finite and the Infinite cannot exist to gether in things, Plato states the exact contrary (supra, p. 206,
92).
Finally, Schaarschmidt (ibid. find in the expres sion yfros used for the &ireipov &c., not merely a departure from Platonic usage, but a proof that these are, to the author of the
295) would
but
dialogue, not world-forming Powers only subjective pictures of
Princ. d. plat. Phil. 14), viz. that it is not the irepas but the aiTiov, which in the passage before us fills the place otherwise occupied by the Ideas. If this is described as the world-creating intellect, it merely shows that to Plato vovs and the Idea coincide in the latter reference ; and the two positions, everything is the work of in
tellect
(VoOs),
He is satisfactorily Thought. answered by Schneider (loc. cit. p. 4), who refers to Tim. 48 E sq. ; 50 C 52 A. n - The cu rt a, which, p. 26 E
;
or described p. sqq., as KOfffj.ovffa re /ecu <TVVTO.Trovaa eviavTovs re /cat wpas /cat a /cat vovs \eyo/u.evij> /ZTjfaj,
sqq., is
drjfjuovpyovv,
is
i>0
also called the TTOIOVV
<ro0t
and
everything
is
through the Idea, mean the same. This is seen unmis
what
it is
has been already cf. 22 C, that vovs adjusted the world and still
5t/cat6rar
&v. (It
shown, 28
sqq.;
takably in the enunciations of the Phaedo, noticed above. My view at once clears up Schaarschmidt s objection against the Phi(Saminl. d. plat. Schr. 294 sqq.) that there is no reference in it to the Ideas. He objects further that a mixture of the Finite and the Infinite is impossible, because the Tracts would be destroyed by
lebus
it
It is in all things, regulates it.) invests us with the soul, which (as Socrates said, Xen. Mem. i.
4,
8)
must have
its
origin
from
the soul of the universe, just as our body from the body of the universe, and from it springs all through it the uniknowledge verse itself is endowed with its OVKOVV soul and intellect, 130 :
;

knew
267
of no efficient cause as held by his master above and beside Ideas. 113 We cannot doubt that Plato meant
to set forth in Ideas not merely the archetypes
and
;
essence of all true Existence, but energetic powers that he regarded them as living and active, intelligent
and reasonable.
Nor
is
this
view prejudiced by his
distinguishing, in mythical or popular language, the 114 efficient cause from Ideas. This is a necessary
TTJ
TOV
Atos
epcts
(pvcret.
never mentioned special

Cf. p.
114
efficient
8e
causes in conjunction with the Ideas.
vovv eyyiyveffdat 5id rty TTJS alrias
76 on this point.
Plato,
AXXots Cf. subter, note 172.

Sijvafjt.iv ,
tv
<$XXa
Ka\d.
113
Aristotle
frequently
of
to
the
doctrine
objects Ideas, that it

:
as is well known, often speaks of the Divinity and its activity in the world; he calls God the author of all good and of
wants an efficient principle. E.g. Gen. et Corr. ii. 9, 335 b. 7 sqq. rr ^^^ generation and decay presuppose matter and form, 5e~ trpoaeivai Kal TT)V Tpirrjv, ty awavres fJ.ev
ovdels.
ifj$j)ffa9 airlav
ctXX
flvai
good only (Ixep. ii. 379 A sqq.) he says that all things, lifeless and living, must have been produced by God, and not by a blind and unconscious power of nature (Soph. 265 C cf. Phileb. 28 he sqq.)
;
; ;
irpbs
r6
ylveffdai TTJV wffirfp 6 e
&c. 19 sq.
ldt,i>
(xiii.
5,
Metaph. 1079
be
i.
9,
991
:
a.
extols the care of the Divinity or of the gods for mankind, the, righteousness of the divine govern ment of the world (Phsedo, 62
b.
cannot
:
the
the 23) causes of
B,
899
Rep.
x.
612
E sq.
Laws,
x.
things
avra
rb 6e \fyciv Trapa.8eiyfJ.aTa clvai Kal /xer^%ei^ avrwv rdXXa

Kal
rl
TCIS
i
KfvoXoyelv tcrri \tyfiv TronrjTiKas.

pya6/j.evoi>
p\ewoi>:
/xeraôpas
yap etrn TO
Sâs
diroa.
?rp6s
b.
Jbid.
24
7; xii. 0, It is remarkable that here takes no notice of explanation of the Timauis probably because he attached no scientific value to it, owing to its
viii.
6,
1045
?qq. ; 1()71
b.
14.
Aristotle
tli<-
And his ex mystical character. pressions make it highly probable that Plato in his oral discourses
says highest object for mankind (Theset. 176 15, and further below). Such popular expressions, however, can not prove much his scientific conception of the Divinity is the Is the really important thing. Divinity actually a second cause with the Idea, or merely together another expression for the causalitv of the Idea? The fact of God being called the author of the Ideas is of little weight, as has been shown p. 245. The explana tion of the Timacus, which makes
;
sqq.; iv. 715 E, &c.); he that to imitate God is the
203

:
result of the system
if
Ideas are
the*
impossible. are the efficient principle that imparts Being to They is of a kind that can only things, and as this Being
primary Reality, an equally primary beside and together with themselves
efficient
is
only true and cause
be explained by Reason working to an end, Reason must be conceded to them. This position was certainly open to criticism. It was a difficult problem to con but it was ceive classes as self-existent substances
;
far
more
titles
endow these unchangeable en-! with motion, life, and thought to suppose them
difficult
to
as
moved, and yet as invariable and not subject to

115
as powers, in spite of their absolute The soul which Plato in the ness, operating in things. attributes to pure Being, he afterwards places Sophist
Becoming;
midway between the world

the world-creator build up nniverse on the pattern of the the
of Sense
and the world
of
Ideas, is, as we shall find later on, so mystical in all its parts that no dogmatic conclusions can be Phsedr. 247 D, drawn from it.
Plato the Idea of motion is superior to that of Becoming, and that therefore all Becoming is to bo considered i\s a motion, but not every motion as a Becoming. If
where
merely a god, proves nothing, and Parm". 134 C sqq. not much more. ^ 15 Deuschle has very rightly (Jahn s Jahrbb. B. Ixxi. p. 170 sq.) to a called attention difficulty
0e6s is
Plato in isolated passages (Thcset. Parm. 138 B, where 181 (J sq.

;
involved in the question how the can partake in Motion ideas without partaking in Becoming, and how the soul can be that
which
at
nal
absolutely the same time have an eterThis question, as nature.
is
moved and
are separated dAXotWts and kinds of inoas two distinct of motion) assumes a concept tion which is not applicable to the Ideas at all, and only improperly to the soul, we must be content to make allowance for a mere inaccuracy which might easily have been corrected by a The more exact determination.
0cy>d
!j
Deuschle rightly recognises, is to be answered by the fact that with
actual difficulty, however, of imagining motion without change, is not removed,
THE IDEAS A8 POWER*.

:
200
Ideas.
So
far,
came
sarily,
into collision, the dynamical aspect
however, as the two points of view must neces
logical.
with Plato, have been overpowered by the ontoHis whole philosophy is from the outset
directed far less to the explanation of Becoming, than to the consideration of Being; the concepts hypos;
tasized in the
which
t
is
Ideas represent to us primarily that permanent in the vicissitude of phenomena,

If Plato conceives
not the causes of that vicissitude.
them
it
as living powers, this is only a concession forced from him by the facts of natural and spiritual life. But
is
antagonistic to the
main current
of his system,
and cannot be harmonized with his other theories re

can easily understand how in his specting Ideas. ittempt at a comprehensive establishment of his doc
trine of Ideas, this thought was not excluded. Such a determination naturally resulted from the univer
sal presuppositions
We
of that
it,
doctrine
and we there
difficulties
fore
find
traces
of
as has
been shown, in other
116 dialogues besides the Sophist.

116
But the
Schaarschmidt, loc. cit. 204 in the above-mentioned discussion a distinct proof for the
sq.,
fundamental determinations of his

doctrine
viz. that the of Ideas, Ideas on the one hand do not come into contact with the mutability,
sees
But spuriousness of the Sophist. is only taking one side of the case into consideration. It is of course a contradiction to attribute motion, life, &c. to the Ideas, and at the same time (as in the pasthis
partiality,
and incompleteness of
sage
mentioned, p. 241 sq.) to assert that they are capable of no
sensible Being, while on the other hand they are the only original reality and the only source of derivative Being, all reality for ]t is just the same as with the
But it is a change whatever. contradiction, in which Plato must have become involved as soon as ever he tried to reconcile the two
theological problem, which has so often involved the greatest thinkers

in
flagrant
contradictions,
to
the
problem how
imagine the Divinity as at once a "creative hi-
270
PLATO AND lHE OLDER ACADEMY

r
which
involved were too great to allow of much 117 in this direction. Although, therefore, the progress of regarding Ideas not only as archetypes, necessity
it
but as
efficient causes,
was constantly obtruding

niably
sq. for
false
itself
an absolute ex telligence and istence elevated above all incom

mutability. pleteness contradiction in the Platonic êxis not to be denied, pressions
argument
248
C,
and
The
coming known
as
it 7rcicrx, (if ovffla is known, a TroietV, be if knowing is is a Trdo-x""), just
much
as with
many
189
other
;
diffi
but we cannot say how Plato should have undertaken to escape from the contradiction on his own
culties
in
his writings
e.g.
the
i.
dictum
a
/xrj
;
that
we cannot imagine
Its occurrence, presuppositions. however, does not justify the denial of a Platonic origin to a dialogue Avhich shows such obvious traces of Plato s genius, and which has such distinct Aristotelian and even in its (indirectly) Platonic evidence
478 B Soph. 240 D sq.), or the argument Rep. i. 349 ft sqq., which turns on the ambiguous meaning of TrX^ exetp the deri vation of the elements Tim. 31 B like. sq., and the 117 In this point seems to lie the
;
ov (Theset.
Rep.
In Rep. vii. 529 D, Plato els TO ov rdxos speaks of the KO.I i) ofoa (3pa8vTT]s ^perai. It would not follow that all other Ideas are moved even if the ov rctôs were the Idea of swift ness ; but it does follow that lato did not think motion in compatible with the immutability He has, moreover (as of the ov. Peipers, Philol. xxix. 4, 711 sq.,
favour.
<f>opal
rightly tion to
34 A ; 77 B Symp. x. 897 C ; 898 A), though he could not have meant either of the mo
;
observes), attributed voDs (Tim. 47 B: 89
mo
A;
explanation of the fact that the predicates, which Plato lays claim to for them, are not attributed to the Ideas with such definiteness in any other dialogue. This exposi tion does not show us the latest form of the Platonic doctrine oi ideas, as Ueberweg thinks (Unvide p. ters. plat. Schr. 275 sq. 106, 41), but is one from which Plato so far subsequently departed as not to pursue the road here in dicated any further without en
;
life
tirely giving up the movement andjl (the efficient 5v.vafj.is] of
theji
described in the preceding note, or have considered vous to be moved in the sense in which things of sense are, in opposi What we are tion to the Ideas.
tions
really to understand by this tion of vovs he does not tell
A\ e
r
In the latest form of the,! Ideas. doctrine of Ideas known to us? from the accounts of Aristotle
point of view recedes alto It has been already gether. proved, p. 136 sq., that all evi dence from other sources forbids
this
mo
us.
must, after all, credit Plato with the remarkable and unde-
our reckoning the Sophist amongst Plato s last works.
THE WORLD OF
him,
<
IDEAS.
271
he
could
never
to
preferred thought world by those mythical representations which poorly ^compensate for the gaps in the scientific develop
;
he
carry out this the phenomenal explain

really
ment.
So much the more productive, however,

is
for
the other determination, that Unity and Multiplicity are combined in the Ideas. This alone enabled him to set in the place of the abstract
Plato s system
Eleatic One, the concrete unity of the Socratic conto join concepts dialectically, and to place them a positive relation to phenomena, where only a relation had existed. The Plurality of the ^negative is sustained and {phenomenon comprehended by the icept
in
;
j I
lUnity of the
Concept. Only because he ackiiowIledges Plurality in the Unity of the Concept has he the to maintain not only One Idea, but a multiplicity
|;ight
>f
logically co-articulated Ideas

III.
World
of Ideas.
l
Plato hardly ever speaks f the Idea, but always of Ideas in the plural. 118 How:ver little he himself would have allowed us to say
The World of Idea*.
the Ideas, arising out of the Socratic concepts, them, abstracted from experience. They eprosent primarily a particular and thought can onlv
o,
119
re,
like
;scend step
18
by step from
rightly
this particular to the unihimself speaks of rb eloos not onlv where (e.g. Parm. 131 A; Phrcdo, 103 E) he is treating of a definite Idea, but also where he is treating
of the concept of the eI5os generally: Polit. 203 B : cf. Symp. 210
As
Hitter
remarks
Grott.
188); nly it does not follow from this bat in explaining the Platonic octrine we are not to speak of be Idea to express generally the oncept connected with the word
:Sos or
Anz. 1840, 20;
St. S.
Pha>dr.
5c a, as Aristotle does, e.g. Plato letaph. xii. 4, 1079 b. 9.

i
Jlu
Cf.
249 B. on this point p
>;)0
272

from the lower concepts to the higher.
But
versal,
in them the concepts being hypostasized, the particular the universal that collective cannot be so cancelled in be reduced to one Highest prin concepts shall at last several such, and, according to their whole ciple, or be derived from these principles, as mo
contents, ments of their
logical
development.
;
Each concept
and, the re is something absolutely self-subsistent of concepts (like the intei ciprocal interdependence with phenomena, to be COD connection of concepts the form of participate has
sidered presently)
"and
only Plato s design does not exten it only embrace to a purely a priori construction the Ideas whic a complete logical arrangement of if we he himself has found by means of induction, or, deve means of Kecollection, prefer the expression, by 121 itself in the region of Sense. loping 1* Of these Ideas there is an indefinite number. Since every generic and specific concept is, according an Idea, there musl
communion.
120
to Plato, something substantial, be as many Ideas as there are
Genera and Species. Keal by virtue of whic And since Ideas alone are the can be nothing, am all things are what they are, there there is n there can be imagined nothing, of which Such a thing would be altogether non-existenl Idea.
12
and that which

conceived.
124
absolutely non-existent seems therefore to Plato a culpablf It

1
is
cannot
i-o
121
Cf
Supra, p. 249 sq. p. 204 sqq.
rourots Wear ras alrLas trepafcc. &* ri v tpM* MfMWj

>
122
Avist.
Metaph.
TWfSi
i.
9, init.
oi
-3
TO.S
Mas
-4
curias ridepcvoi irpjuTov
Supra, p. 237 sq. Supra, p. 225 sq.
U.tV
frTOWTeS
TWV
OVTWV
Till:
WOULD OF IDEA&
273
want of
philosopliic maturity, that there should be any hesitation in assigning Ideas even to the very meanest
125 He himself reduces to their Ideas not only things. those things which are great and perfect, but also the
smallest and most worthless
productions conceptions of quality and relation activities and ways of life, mathematical figures and grammatical forms. He recognises Ideas of hair and of dirt, of the table and
; ;
but
artistic
not only natural objects, not only substances, but mere

:
of the bed, of Greatness and of Smallness, of Likeness and Unlikeness, of the Double, &c. an Idea of the
;
noun, even Ideas of Non-being and of that which

its
is
in
nature the direct contradictory of the Idea, Evil and Vice. 126 In a word, there is absolutely nothing which
1 -5
In
the
13
well-known
passage
which
the
is
After Socrates sqq. has spoken of tlie Ideas of Simi
Parm. 130
larity,
same holds good

;
distinct from visible fires; of the re
the Many, Bighteousness, Beauty, the Good, Parmenides asks him whether he supposes a self-subsisting Idea of man, or of fire or water, and then whether he supposes an idea of Socrate?, already hairs, dirt, &c. embarrassed by the first of these questions, thinks that he must answer the second in the negative. the
(
)ne,
maining elements) Rep. x. 596 A 597 C sq. (the Idea of a bed,

;
the
K\tvrj
K\lvrj,
6vTb)$
oPera,
eKtivr)
5
;
Zen
Crat. 389
r,
the Idea of a table)

/cfp/ct s)
;
(the Idea of a shuttle,
avro 6 fan.
Parm. 133
deairdTrjs aiid
(the avros 8c(nr6TT]s, d tan the at/r6s 5oC\os o

;
fan
Phasdo, 65 5oOXos) (the Ka\bv, ayadbv avrb, the ova-ia of Health, Greatness, and
dt /ccuoj
,
;
Parmenides, however,
tells
el
him by
tn,
way
of advice
/ecu
vtos
yap
&
Strength) Beautii ul
Sniallness,
ality, Ka.6
ibid.
Ka.6*
100
avrb,
sqq. (the
2Sw/k pares,
ov
TTW
trov
avrd-
ATJTTTCU
77
(f)i\oao(j>ia
us In dvn-
ctTuiacms
vvv de
en
irpbs
5ta TTV
1-
The
proofs, for the
most part
mentioned by Hitter, ii. 302 sqq., are to be found in the following

passages besides those just quoted Tirj. 51 B (the fire /ca0 avrb,
:
Plurality, avrb] liep. v. 479 sq. (the Beautiful, the Just, the Double, the Great, the Small, the Heavy, the Light, Ka6 avrb. In vii. 529 D, by the motions of actual swift ness and slowness in the actual numbers and the actual figures are meant, as the context shows, not the Ideas, but the intuitions of
;
Greatness, Unity, Du
pure mathematics, which, however,
274
PLATO AND THE OLDEll ACADEMY.

its
has not
several
Idea.
Wherever
a uniform Character of
exist,
phenomena can be proved to

ii.
the sphere
in this place are not distinguished the corre clearly enough from Phileb. 62 sponding Ideas).
(avTTJs
SiKaLOffvvrjs
A
.
197) would make out that not merely the Ideas of the bad, but also the Ideas of special virtues
are
TL
ecrrt
KVK\OV
Betas);
Kal Phajdr. 247

,
<r<paipas
avTijs
TTJS
(the
&VT<J)S
the
eV TCJ 3
;
%<TTIV
dv
eiri-
ffTfoi, ofcra)
Crat. 389
390
F
TO
(avrb
e/cetVo,
TO? (pvvet
6 ttrriv ftvo/ni dv 6vo[j,a} ; ibid.
...
423
E
;
simply a provisional supposi because the latter only be long to appearance, and because the Ideas of the bad would be in direct contradiction to the doc trine that God is only the cause of the good. But Plato, as we see, supposed Ideas of many things
tion,
of colour and sound) (the oixrla ibid. 386 (all things, and con
which belong only to appearance and if the Ideas of the bad or of

;
sequently
all
;
activities,
have an
ovaia jS^Saios)
pa5et.y[JidTUV
Theset. 176
TO;
(ira-
ev
6Wt effT&Tuv,
,
TOV TOV
delov euSai/j-oveardTov, ptv cf. the adeov dflAtwrdroi 5 x. 617 D, jrapaoeiynaTa /3iW, Kep. 618 A, which of course taken by themselves would prove nothing on account of the mythical cha racter of this exposition); Soph. 254 C sqq. (the most general eUdij, Kivycris, ravrbv and the
Qi>,
ffT&<ris,
(Set 6appovi>Ta edrepov] ibid. 6v peâLus \tyeiv tin rb /*ij ijdrj ^%0^ gffTt TT)V aVTOV T&V TTo\\uv 8VTUV eWos ev&pid/Jiov . cbs dv rb cf. 254 tv
;
258 C
us in contra a contradiction does not, any more than the other in stances objected by Aristotle, jus tify us in departing from Plato s definite statements where the state ments are supported by the conse If quences of Plato s doctrine. there is an Idea corresponding to every concept, this must unavoid ably hold good of the concepts of badness, Non-being, &c. The Idea of Being ought not to give us
Non-being entangle
diction, such
greater
offence
than
any
other.
ii.
4>VfflV
As Bonitz
Zffnv 6vTM fo} Kal irepi diKaiov :
lie P,
v 47G
-
KO.L
dyadov
v
/cat
KO.KOV Kttl
ddiKov /cat Trdvruv rCiv
82) rightly remarks, reality as such (Being itself) does not belong to the essence of things represented in the Ideas, though Plato scarcely
(plat.
Stud.
makes
there
this
is
distinction.
Accord
eiduv irepl 6 ai;r6s X670S, ayro
^v
ing to his
original
supposition,
eKaaTov
402
el s?;
TTplv
ibid. iii. clrat, &c. ; cf. fa TO. TT?S ffw^poavyris

;
Kal avSpelas, &c.
/cat
rd rofrrwv
ai5
7rept0e/oTravraxov and Theaet. 186 yvuplo/j.ev to those things which the soul the aid of contemplates without and the the
6fLi>a
;
tvavTia
corresponding without This Idea is the con exception. and one of tent of the concept the most general concepts is that Plato speaks of of Being. Again the fj.ovds (Phaido, 101 C), in which
to every general concept
;
an Idea
sense, belong
ai>6/u.oioi>,
#/xoioi>
the
ravrbv and
e repov,
the Ka\bv /cat alcrxpov, the ayaObv K al KaK6v. Susemihl (Genet. Entw.
everything must participate in order to be one, although unity is given with the concept of the thing Bonitz just as directly as Being.
THE WORLD OF IDEAS.

of Ideas extends.
275
Only where that uniform character and the unity and permanence of the Concept ceases, fall asunder in the conceptless plurality and absolute
the Ideal World finds its limit. 127 unrest of Becoming, Plato seems subsequently to have become somewhat
his
confused, as well he might, as to these deductions from According to Aristotle, he assumed no theory.
relation
Ideas of things artificially made, nor of negation and 128 but the original point of view was in
;
Snds the Idea of Being explicable enough, but he does not think it was required by the consequences of the doctrine of Ideas. Schaarschmidt (Samml. d. plat. Schr.
202) cannot be attributed to Plato, but which might just as well be main tained of the Ideas of the table,
bed, /Si os #0eos, unity, &c., and would actually be maintained, even
if
not exist except with the matter ;

possible,
:
in
conjunction
if this is at all
t is only met with in natural products Sib 5q ov /ca/cws
nXarwi
(feva-ei
0?7,
6 rt
eidrj
Iffrlv
sees
in it
something which
birtxra
many
(that there are just as Ideas as there are kinds of
they occurred in the Sophist or
natural products. The fact would remain the same even if Plato s name did not originally stand in the text but was first introduced from Alexander, as Rose (Arist.
libr. ord. 151) conjectures with great probability, for in any case Plato is meant). Ibid. i. 9, 991 b. 6 TroXXd yiyvera . erepa., olov olKla Kal SaKTuXios, oO
1 :
&i>
Parmenides instead of the Repubic, Phnedo, and Theretetus. 1-7 That Plato did suppose such a limit, is clear from Phileb. 16 C sq., not to mention other pas
sages
soint
fers
TU>I>
vide p. 200, 92.

Hitter, loc.
To
5e
5rj
this
(t>a^v
eidrj
etrat.
Ibid.
990
b.
8,
Tim. GO
7"6
cit.,
rightly re
TTJV
irepl
fj-VKr-qpuv dvva/uiiv etdrj fj.v yap ruif
OVK
the evidences for the doc of Ideas are (1) not valid, (2) would lead to Ideas of things of which we (i.e. the Platonic
sqq. trine
:
ft
ovdevl
TO nva Distinctions of kinds of smell are lere denied, because smell always
rpla
TTpoy
cism
is
in Aristotle his schools of the doctrines of
criti
Ideas
to
vnd )ecause it belongs, as is said in vhat follows, only to a transient
do with an incomplete undetermined Becoming,
unintentionally communicative) /card re presuppose no Ideas K rCiv CTTI\67ovs roi)s yap

;
roi>s
noment.
Metaph.
;
xii.
3,
1070
as
a.
13
U eiat (which was actually Plato s original intention, accord ing to the above account), Kal Kara rb v i
\6yuv
ol
u.kv
>qq.
in
many
things,
e.g. in
irtistic
products
the
form
can-
ruv
TT/>OS
TI
T2
276

In this way many
difficulties
these cases abandoned.
were evaded, but others arose in their place which were not less dangerous to his system.
as we already know, are related to one not merely as a multiplicity, but more pre another, a whole. What holds good of con cisely, as parts of also hold good of the entities that are must
Ideas,
cepts,
thought in concepts.
descending in
They form a graduated series, ordered co-articulation, and a sequence
of natural subdivisions, from the highest Genera to the lowest Species, from the most universal to the most
129
particular.
In
all
conceivable ways they cross,
com
130 It is the in each other. bine, exclude, or participate task of science fully to represent this system, to rise
from the particular to the most universal principles, to descend again from these to the particular, to define
all
middle terms that intervene, to ascertain all rela 131 Plato did not aim at a purely diations of concepts.
according to Proclus in Farm, as 136, Cons, defined the Ideas Kara atria TrapafciyfjiariKri
ru>v
totle
(bv<riv
ad
ffvvcvrurwv.
From
this.
mentions (in speaking ot Health in itself) the Idea of a mere concept of an attribute, Metaph. avrb yap aviii. 2, 997 b. 8
:
<
it would as Proclus remarks, follow that there are no Ideas of tlie products of art or of things similar contrary to nature. definition is attributed to Plato in the exposition of Platonic doctrine,
vyieiav
dpuirov Qacriv elvai Kal ITTTTOV Kal (they speak of an avroav-
epuiros, &c.). 29 Cf. p. 204 sqq., and the quotations from Kep. vi. on pp. 108, 196.^
;o
Vide
;
p.
248
sq.
ap. Diog.
is
iii.
77,
which
the
is
131
possibly
Phileb. 10
throughout inauthentic.
This view
later Pla-
511
common among
Soph. 253 190, 205.
B sqq.
sqq.; Rep. vi. vide pp. ;

j
THE WORLD OF IDEAS.

;
277
lectical construction lie argues rather from several 132 given concepts yet he demands that by an exhaus tive enumeration and comparison of the sum total of collective concepts, a science comprehending the whole world of Ideas shall be attained.
;
He
himself, however,
made but
a small beginning in
this direction. 133
He names
as examples of universal
concepts, Being and Non-being, Likeness and Unlikeness,
Sameness and Difference, Unity and Number,

134
He uses the categories Btraightness and Crookedness. of Quality, 135 of Quantity, 136 of Relation; 137 and ac
138 cording to Hermodorus, distinguishes
among
24
the last
sq.
:
32
So
follow
1-12
the
in the expositions which idea of an immanent

;
a iroaou.
Phil.
the
More and
Soph. 244 B sqq. Parm. in both the separation of the One and the Existent is supdialectic,
P>
sqq.;
and Less, the rjpâ., make the irotrbv (determined magnitude) impossible.
<T<p5dpa
137
posed, and
further
inferences are
follows,
/j.et>
T&V &VTUV TCL Soph. 255 C aura xad aura, TO. 8e Trpdy
:
drawn from
13:5
this supposition.
Cf.
on what
;
Tren-
. . &\\r)\a. del \?ye<rdai 5 Zrepov del TT/W erepov, &c.
rd
olcc
i.
delenburg, Hist. Beitriige zur Phil. 205 sqq. Prantl, Gesch. der
i.
iv.
4 JS
A: 6Va 7
TO.
fj.ei>
Rep.
TTOLOU
ccrrl
Toiavra
elvai TOU,
iroid &TTO.
Logik,
J:U
73
sq.
Rep. iv. 38 A sqq. (vide note G), where a distinction is drawn between the TTOLOV TI and
new,
the ai ro eKaffTov
:
The discusTheret. 184 C. sions of the Parmenides, 137 sqq., are occupied with similar concepts, and a further series sucli as the concept of the Whole and the Parts, Motion and Rest, Finite and InCf. my Plat. Stud. IG .L finite. 1:w Theret. 182 A, where the expression Troi jrTjj is brought in with an apology as something
TWOS TCL 8 aura e/caora avrov eKacrrov ^vov. Science e.g. on knowledge simply, proceeds
e<TTii>,
definite science (?rotd rts
einffT-fjfj.-rj )
rat. 4:52
sq.,
between qualitative and quantitative determinations (of number), Phileb. C Soph. 202 K. 36 is Soph. 245 D: every
:>7
on definite knowledge. Parrn. 133 C, and the quotation from Her47. modorus, p. 241, M In the passage apud Simpl. 54 b., just Piiys. mentioned, after the words quoted pp. 214, 47 Hcrmodorus goes on to say of that which is irpbs erepz, the one is wy irpbs evavrLa, the other ws ?rpjj T i /cat TOVTWV TO. p^v wj w/Hoyx& a, rd. 8 wy d6ptcrra. This latter distinction he explains in the words
:
&W
(which I quote at length, because shall have to return to them
later
on):
/ecu
TO
êv
278

The
distinction of the
several kinds.
Absolute and
Relative forms the logical groundwork of his whole system; for the Idea exists in and for itself; the
Phenomenon, and
in
relation to
to the fullest extent, Matter, only 139 He further affirms something else.
that
in all Reality, Unity and Multiplicity, Limit and Unlimitedness, Identity and Difference, Being and 140 He determines the con Non-being are combined. cept of Being by the two characteristics of doing and
142 instances in the Sophist, Being, Rest, and Motion (to which Sameness and Difference are after wards added), as the most important generic concepts ; 141
suffering.
He
and, at the same time, determines which of these are
compatible with, and which exclude, each other.

Trpbs
(sc.
He
irdvra fJiLKpov \ey6f. .eva \eyeL IlAdrwi ) TO /uaXXov Kal fore yap uXXoj elVcu rb r}rrov. fJitifrv Kal \a.rrov els aireipov (pepo/
from Dercyllides) is again given with unimportant variations, p. 56 Kal 1). wore acrrarov Kal
:
ajj.op(f>ov
/j.fva.
/cat ir~harvrepov (jL-oavrus S Kal crevorepov [crrevdr.!, Kal (3a6vrepov [/3a/H>r.] Kal Kovîrepov, /cat Trdvra TO. OI TW "Xeyo/meva els aireipov. cJ s rb LVOV Kal rb /j.effov Kal TCI
aireipov Kal OUK ov rb roiovro \e~yea6ai, Kara a.irb<pa<nv rov OVTOS. rip
roiovry 8
ctjre
ov
Trpoo-riKei
oi?re
ctp%-l]S
oiffias,
ctXX
is
iv diKpacia
(for
ripôafj-evov \eybp.eva
/j.a\\oi>
OVK
^
A
iv
70
Kal rb
LV -
ifjrrov,
ra 5^
evavria.
TOVTUV ^x
t ffrl
V&P
SXXov
the better reading) Of the distinctions rivl (frepeadai. here made, that of the trpbs erepa into the Trpbs evavria and the ?rp6s rt, is not found in the Platonic writ
ings,
which dKpiaia
&VIGCV avicrov Kal Ki.voviJ.evov KIVOVfj-tvov Kal dfdpfJ.oa TOV dvapfj.6arov.

ticre
though
for
this
need not be any
aôrepuv
eitlior
avruv
[avrCiv
should
into
be excised or altered
mistrusting the state ment of Hermodorus ; on the other hand, the opposition of wpicr/xeVa
reason
rotrwv} r&v <rviryiv trdvra [perhaps Karc\ irdvrd], TT\T]V rov evbs aroixôv rb na\\ov Kal r]rrov
acrraKrov [aararov~\ Kal aireipov Kal &fj.op(pov Kal OVK rb roiovrov \tyea6ai Kara airo(paciv rov ovros. rep roLOvrig 8f ov
dedeyfjifvov [-wv],
&t>
and doptara together with a more

detailed
is
189
description of the
latter
met with again lower down.

Cf. p. 241, 47, and the quota made later on as to the
tions to be
140
phenomenal world and matter.

141
irpco"fiKeiv
ofire
clXX last
eV aKpicria
apxys otire ovcrias, nvi (^^peadai. The
ltf
Vide p. 204 sq.; 249 sq. Vide p. 262, 109. 254 C sqq.: cf. supra, 249
position (as that just quoted,
Eq.
THE WOULD OF IDEAS.
279
discriminates in the Republic 143 between the knowing subject and the thing known, Knowledge and Reality,
Science and Being. But though in these and simi lar definitions 144 the germs of the Aristotelian theory of Categories are clearly discernible, yet in none of
the specified places does Plato attempt a complete catalogue of the highest concepts or an arrangement of
them according
would have been
which,
to their internal relation.

ill
This want
when
supplied by the numerical system, the fusion of Ideas with the Pythagorean
numbers had begun, he subsequently attempted by 145 deriving numbers from Unity and indefinite Duality, even had this derivation been more fully accom 146 plished than was actually the case. In designating the point in which the graduated series of Being terminates, Plato is more explicit. The highest of all Ideas is the Idea of the Good. ^ As
in the
visible
world, the
life,
neously knowledge and Vi. 508 E sqq. vide p.

14;;
;
sun brings forth simulta as he enlightens the eye

objection (Metaph. xiv. 4, beginn.) against the supporters of the Ideal numbers, viz. that they do not derive the first odd number, seems to refer, as Bonitz ad loc. supposes, simply to the fact that they did not account for the origin of the first odd number, the unit, whereas (ace. to the passage before us and xiii. 7, 1081 a. 21) they did try to derive the first duality. And as the unit is the root of all odd numbers, what holds good of it holds good indirectly of the odd
generally. According to Metapli. the Platonic school re7, garded other odd numbers, for instance, three, as derived,
xiii.
269,
110.
144
E.g- Tim. 37 A, where Pint,
first
(Procr. an. 23, 3, p. 1023) sees the sketch of the ten categories.
45
Arist.
b.
;
:
Metaph.
17 sqq.
3,
xiii.
;
7,
1081
a.
9,
a.
14, 21
31, 1082
a. 4,
1,
cf. my Plat. Stud. 220, shall have to speak sqq. 242. of the d.6pi<rTos oi as in treating of the doctrine of matter.
13 b. 30 990 b. 19
xiv.
1091
We
S, 1(173 a.
According to Arist. ibid, xii xiii. 8, 1084 a. 12 18 Phys. iii. 6, 206 b. 32, it is in any
; ;
4(5
ten numbers, and perhaps did not go so far, for Aristotle does not express himself quite clearly. Aristotle s
case limited to the
first
280
PL A 10 AND THE OLDER ACADEMY.
and reveals things seen, while everywhere causing growth and increase; so in the super-sensuous world, the Good is the source of Being and of Science, of Truth and of Knowledge and as the sun is higher than light and the eye, so is the Good higher than
:
147 But this definition has its diffi Being and Science. In the whole treatment of the question in culties. the Philebus, we can only understand by the Good
the goal of
for
human
men. 148
activity,
that which
is
is
the highest
an express reference Good to this dialogue in the passage above quoted from the 149 it might seem as if here, too, the Idea of Republic,
there
147 Hep. vi. 508 E, after the rovro digression about the sun roiwv TO rr)v dXrideiav (real exist ence, actuality) irdpexov TOIS yiyKal T$ yiyvdxTKOVTl. VUCTKOfJieVOlS, rov aTTodidov 8vva/jLiv rrjv TT]v dyaOov ibeav (pddi. elvai alrlav 8
:
As
question
side
is
so
put
that the one
asserts : dyaQbv elvai. rb XalpeLv TraVt fyots /cat rrjv Tjdovrjv
the other TO (ppovelv /cat TO voelv Kal TO fjie^vTiffdai &c. TTJS ye
&C.
i)doi>T)s
d/êtVw
.
.
^v/J-Tracriv
/cat Xyw yiyvetrdai. &(pc\i/JUi)TaTov dirdv-
ovvav Kal
*.ev
d\-r)6eias,
cJs
diavoov,
re Kal d\r)6eia$, &\\o Kal Ka\\iov
en rovruv
7)yov/J.evos
avro
Kal
opflus
d\r)6\f/iv
So the object isî X^s dirotyaivew Ttva TTJV ^vvap.evi]v dvOp&irois Tracrt the TOV /3to^ evSaifJiova Trapexeiv one considers ydovrj as this e^ty,
rwv
(p.
elvai
Tra<ri.
11 1))
e^LV
re
/ecu
i]\iOidrj fj.ev voyeur dpdbv, r)\LOV ^ rw de riyeiadaL OVK dpdws #x et ?
So again 14 the other, <f)p6vtjcri.s. B, 19 C (Tt T&V dvdptJTrivuv Krtjpdruv apicrrov} 20 B sqq. cf. 27 D, where a life combining wisdom
;
ivravda. dyadoeidrj JJL& vo/miêtv TO.VT dyw06re/3a 6p6bv, dyadbv o yyeTorOai biroTepov atiruv OVK opdbv.
/cat
and pleasure is pronounced to be the Good; GO A sqq., where the

elements of the perfect
KTTJfj.a
life
(the
j
:
d\\
%Tl
Het.$bv<j)5
. .
TlfJ.T)TOV TT]V
.
TOV
dyaOov
eîv
ffKO/Jifvots
Toivvv
<f>dvcu
JJ.T]
t
Kal ro?s 717^0;fj.bvov rb 717-
enumerated.
v&ffK.ffdai
Trapeiva.1,
T7]i>
TTO
rov
eti
dyaOov
re Kal
are the Subsequently original question is enlarged into ri irore (G4 A) the general one
Trp&rov,
Sevrepov
&c.)
dXXa
I)TT
/cat
TO
at
%v re dvdpwTTU) Kal T^J iravrl treffrvKev
ovcriay
eKeivov avTols trpocr-
dyadbv
149
etVat,
OVK ovcrias ovros rov dyadov, dXX en fireKeiva. Tr}5 oucrt as irpeff]3eia Aai dvvd/Jiei virepcxovros. 148 At the very beginning the
After Socrates has observed that the Idea of the Good is the highest object of knowledge, ha continues with unmistakable re-
THE GOOD.
I
281
the Good were set forth only as the goal of an activity (which in this case could not be merely human ac
tivity)
end of the world, or typical concept to which the divine intelligence looked, and 150 by which it was guided in the framing of the world.
as the ultimate
According to this view, the Idea of the Good might 151 still be held as something real and substantial, but it could not be an efficient cause and it must be dis
;
tinguished in such a manner from the Deity that either tlic Idea must be related to the Deity or the Deity to
the Idea, as the conditioning to the conditioned. The the Idea of the Good to be the genus former, supposing under which the Deity is contained 152 the latter if
;
it
expressed a work or a thought of God, inherent determination of His essence. 154

fercncc
to
153
or even an
But Plato
:
1
dXXa
TOiS
KO.1
fj.Tji>
the Philebus, 505 15: r6de ye olcrOa, on
sqq.
Plat.
Parm. 272
Trendelen-
^V
;
TToXXoTs T]doVT]
OOKL
eZVcU
burg, De Philebi C onsilio (1837), 17 sq. ; Wehrmann, Plato de s.
TO ayaObv, ro?s de KO/j. fioTepois (pp6and then, after a short of both views. refutation tlic question with which the 15,
vt]ffL<;
bono
doctr.
70
sq.
Martin, Etudes
5<n;
above-mentioned
introduced,
is
exposition
was
thus
:
wound
up
<f)rjs
& 2w/i parfS, irbrepov fTTicrTrjfj. rjv TO ayaBbv elvai, ?} &\\o TI irapa ravra rioovf]v, in the middle of this statement
dXXd
ffv
5rj,
-J)
;
sur le Timee, i. 9 sqq. speaks less definitely for the separation of the Divinity from the Idea of the Good he supposes that Plato sometimes identified the two, as, for instance. in the Ixepublic.
;
K>1
As Hermann and
Trendelen-
burg.
1; So Trendelenburg, loc. cit. with reference to Tim.ous, A. 133 Orges, Comparat. Plat, et Arist. libr. de rep. (Berl. 1st,] 23 sqq.: the Idea of the Good is
.">(>
jthe
i
remark again occurs, 50
A:
Socrates does not consider pleasure to be the Good.

Jlcusde, Init. Phil. Plat, ii. ;!, S8 sqq. ; Hermann, Ind. lect. Marl. 182 1 (printed in .Tahn s and Seebode s Archiv, i. G 2 2 sq.);
150
Van
Yindicue Disput. de Idea boni, Marb. 1839 (A. u. d. T. Vindicifo Marb. 1840) StallClatonicae,
;
;
baum
xxxiv.
in Phileb.
Proleg,<r.
(ls_ (i,
the power and completeness of (Jod displaying itself in things; Kbbcn, Plat, idear. doctr. (Bonn, 1849), p. 05, says it is an attri bute of God viz. that which dis plays itself in the limitation of the unlimited.
154
Ixxxix.
Plat.
Tim.
40
This
supposition
is
fre-
282
PLATO AND -THE OLDER ACADEMY.
own
to
If it is the declarations forbid the assumption. Idea of the Good which imparts to things their Being,
if it is intelligence its capacity for knowledge, called the cause of all truth and beauty, the parent
of light, the source of reality
and
155
i-eason,
it is
not
merely the end but the ground of all Being, efficient 156 Plato cannot have contem force, cause absolute.
or in this plated another and a separate efficient cause ; where he is specifying the ultimate ground of
place,
all
things, and the supreme object of knowledge,

158
157
it
He saya must necessarily have been mentioned. in the Philebus that the Divine Reason is none] clearly 159 and in the Thnaeus, he so speaks other than the Good
;
quently found with regard to the Ideas generally vide p. 266 sq. n5 5 Rep. loc. cit. and vii. 517 B:
;
-
voelaOaL ravrbv Kal

ycDs
rdyadbv,
6i;o
i/ca-
elprjcrdai /mot
doKei.
yap,
Philebus
replies,
aos
vovs,
w
ei~ei
tb.
oft
rot
ovv
e/mol
(paLvofteva
ovrw
r\
Sw/cparfy, evri rdyadbv,
(baiverai, ev ruj yvwo~ru3
re\VTaia
elvai
ravrd
fj.evrot
ey/cXTûara.
cD
4>i
Tax
6
dXX
^
roO dyaOov Idea Kal

6(f)OeLffa
/j.6yis
bpdadai,
answer,
X77/3e,
ye euos
<r\>\\oyi(rrea
us
apa
Kal Kal
Tracri
Ka\&v
rbv
vof]r<^
re
irdvruv avrr/ bpdCjv re atria, ev re opary TOVTOV Kvpiov re/coucra, ev avrri Kvpia d\7]6etav Kal
</>ws
ravrbv
n-pdêiv
15(5
idelv
TI
rbv fj.e\\ovra
T)
e u0poJ
/
WS
rov ye d\r/6ivbv aua Kal 6eiov ot/J.ai vovv dXX a\\<jis TTWI Hermann, A indic. 18, mis-j Zxet-v. takes the meaning of this passaga in saying that the answer applies only to the last words of Philebus, the comparison of intellect wit
self
tola
driôaia.
pleasure.
generally,
as
it
As the Ideas
are
vide p. 263 sqq.

157
The
It
[AeyLcrTov
/nddr//j.a
Neither of them is il the Good, and only in th sense could Socrates admit th assertion of Philebus of the hi
is called, vi. 505 A. 158 been has
man
sion
intellect.
Its further exter
already re marked, p. 255* sq., that he has mentioned no such causes in any scientific connection w ith the Ideas. ir 9 22 C. Socrates has proved that pleasure could not be the good but again knowledge with out pleasure is not sufficient and roivvv then he goes on cij /j.cv
r
; ; :
he could not allow becaus (as he has hinted 11 D, and fo lov.ed out in detail, 28 A sqq.) i
men
the intellect
is
more nearl
related to the
Good than pleasure consequently what he dei

intellect
is
the divine
separate
(p.
that
it
No Good. again can we say with Wehrmar

from
the 80) that
rr,v
ye
*tXiJj8ou 6ebv
ov
Set
5ta-
God
is
here describe
77//;
GOOD.
283
of the Creator, that in order to get a consistent mean ing we must abandon the notion of His being separate
from the Ideas, from which

the universe. 160
He is said to have copied This hypothesis seems indeed to be required by the whole inter-connection of the Platonic doctrine. For in whatever way we may conceive the
relation of
self,
God
to a
world of Ideas distinct from
Him
A iv
we we
of
are everywhere
met by insuperable
obstacles.
tions of
God ?
to suppose the Ideas to be thoughts or crea or are they to be immanent determina
tions
peril
His Essence? The one theory would im their eternity and self-dependence the other,
;
their absolute existence
161
;
and both would make the

is
Idea of the Good, which, according to Plato,
the
this
Highest of the Thinkable, something derived.

jis
Not
Good or the principle of but that the Good is not described as divinity or intellect, the Good is only one side of the divine being. if this were so, the Good could not, at the same time, be a self-subsisting Idea, as it must be according to the Republic Plato, however, not merely says that tlie divine in tellect is the Good, but that it is
the
all
Good
TO.VTOV
160
KO.L Ta.ya.6ov.
E.g. Hep.vii. (vide note 155), the Idea of the Good is described as the summit of the supra-sen
suous world and the cause of

things,
all
1
which
is
only
perceived
("
with difficulty. So Tim. 28 , the Divinity as the aiVioj/ is thus spoken of: rbv ^v ovv iroi^Triv Kal Trare pa rov5e TOV TTO.VTOS fvpeiv
re tpyov tiSiWroi/
it is
dpurrov (the words are to be thus and connected, vide Stallbaum) there is just as little mention of the Divinity there as there is of the Good here. Further, whereas according to Tim. 28 A, C, the Creator of the world looks to the archetype in order to make the world like it, he himself appears as this archetype 29 F, 92 JJ (where the world is called dK&v TOV vorjTov [sc. 6eov] Oeos a.ladr]T6^. The same statements are made with regard both to the Divinity and the Idea, and both change When finally, 37 C, the places. world is called TUV ai diuv 6euv &ya\/jLa by the eternal gods as distinguished from the gods that become, we can only understand the Ideas and then the dei &v 6fbs
;
;
Kal
\{ycii>
fvpbvTa.
,
et s
TTOLVTO.^
and Tim. 37
called
TUV voriruv da re OVTUV
(Tim. 34 A) becomes identical with the highest Idea. :61 Cf. p. 240 sq. on this point.
284
PLATO AND, THE OLDER ACADEMY.
Idea, but the Deity to
whom
it
belonged or by
whom
it was engendered, would be the First and Highest. ^But neither a thought nor an attribute, nor a creature
of God, could be called

is
thought possible Idea no creation except by the imitation of the Idea no quality or attribute .except through participation in
:
;
by Plato an Idea; since no except through an intuition of the
the Idea. 162
Are we then on the contrary to suppose God
to be a product of Ideas ; an individual that partici pates in the Idea of the Good ? In that case He would
not be the Absolute Eternal God, but only one of the created gods. He would stand to Ideas in the same
relation that the spirits of the stars men stand to them. Or, lastly, are
we
and the souls of 1G to assume

j
that
He
exists side
by
side with the Ideas as a special,

?
that He neither brought them independent principle nor was brought forth by them, and that His. forth,
activity essentially consists in working out the combina in forming the world tion of Ideas with Phenomena,
\according to Ideas
In favour of
this
view
it
may be
the* urged, not only that Plato so expresses himself in but that there are important reasons for such Timanis, a theory in his system. Though he himself would not his Ideas are undeniably wanting in have admitted
it,
the moving principle that impels them to the Pheno menon. 164 This want appears to be supplied by the concept of Deity indeed in the Timaaus the World;
framer
be no
1(? -
is
only required, because there would otherwise
efficient cause.
242 sqq.
So
far,
we might hope by
1<i4
this
Cf. p.
Cf.
p.
2G8
sq.
Further
163
wi^
Hermann,
details below.
Till]
GOOD.
difficulties.
-285
virw to avoid essential
But
we
shall
only have prepared for ourselves others near at hand. Could Plato really have placed his
highest principles
so dualistically in juxtaposition, without attempting to combine them ? If Ideas alone are true Reality, can another essence side by side with them, distinct from
them, and equally original, find a place? Must it not rather hold good of the Deity (as of all things except the Idea) that He is what He is, only through participation in the Idea? which is in no way com All things con patible with the concept of God. we may say that the Unity of the Platonic sidered, system can only be established on the supposition that
own belief never really separated the from the logical cause, the Deity from the But it lias been highest Idea, that of the Good. 165 that he identifies them, that he already shown
Plato
in
his
efficient
attributes efficient
tin if*
power and designing reason, someIdeas in general, sometimes to the highest Idea in particular. This is confirmed by the state ment that in the oral discourses of his later life
to
the
supreme
>^t,
Unity
*oo
:
is
designated as the
OLfj.ai.
Good;
100
p.
-<_
bij.,
sij.
Aristox.
p.
Harm.
Klem.
11,
Arist.
begmn.
30, ^Meib. ^ nadd-rep TOVS ApiaTOTfXys del OL-qyeiTO,

s
TrXaVroi
TUV
aKovadvTwv
trapa
uXdruvosT^vTeplTd.ya0ovaKp6afftv Traddv Trpoffitvai ^kv yap tKaffTov Oro\anpdvovra \Wtadal TI ruv romfrntvuv dvepwirlvwv a.ya6uv
ore
5<^
irapaooôv TL etpaivcTO avTois Mctaph. xiv. 4, 1091 b. 13 ruv te rcis aKurffrovs oucn as efrai oi ptv avTb TO eV \ybi>Tuv rb dyadbv avTb dvat, which the 1 seudo- Alexander ad Ice. refers
<pa<?Li>
Qavdrjffa*
/cat
oi
\6yoi
Kal
Kal
irepl
Ha.6riiJ.dTwv
"
dptdfj.u)i>
yeuTb
as
,
Kal
to Plato. Ibid. i. G, end. Plato considered the one as the basis of Good, matter as the basis of evil with which we may connect the words of c. 4, p. a. !) TO
affrpoXoytas,
v,
TV
<J85
on ayaOov eori
dyaOdv airdvTwv
CJTI.
atrio*
avTo
also
iravTfXus,
rayaOfo
TJicojihrasttis
286

this
for
supreme Unity must

It is mentioned,
have
been
identical
with God.
of too, as a departure the doctrine of his Master, that he Speusippus from
from the One and distinguished the Divine Reason 167 The same view is presupposed by Aris the Good.
totle
two says that Plato recognised only kinds of causes, the formal or conceptual, and the 168 and on this he grounds his complaint material cause
when he
that Plato omits to state

Ideas.
169
who forms
things according to
To us
it
may
certainly sound incomprehen
sible that a theological concept like the concept of the
but Good, should not merely be generally hypostasized, active energy and the highest positively declared to be
reason.
accustomed to conceive of Reason which it would seem only in the form of personality, But it may be idea. impossible to attribute to an
are
We
questioned whether
to Plato, as
it
all this
appeared so inconceivable
of
thoughty
modes appears to us, with our altered The mind that could allow relative de
the Same, the
Great,
terminations,
the
Small,
&c.,
to precede as ideal
entities the things in
which we
perceive them, could also

of the Good recognises the identity and the Divinity in Plato, in saying of him apud Simpl. Phys. 860 m. (Fragm. 48 Wunm) 6 ras povXerai 7roie?v, TO
:
"b.
make an aim
cure, &c.
into a self-
Krische, Forsch. i.25(3,
rightly points out that Speusippus
must have opposed himself modes of thought whicb he h

found
previously
in
apxas
/J.ti>
Plato,
anc
{j-jroKfi/j-evov cos
v\r)i>,
6 irpoaayopevei
iravdexts, TO 8 us OITIOV Kal KLVOVV, 6 Tre/ndTTTct Trj TOV 0ov /cat TTJ
rd.ya.0ov
107
twdpei.
i.
which put vous on a level with the One and the Good. lti8 Metaph. i. 6, 988 a. 8 rStv elpwtvwv e 5 JTI
:
/c
<f>avepov
Stobfeus. Ekl.
58
STTCI;-
ovolv aiTiaiv ôvov K^X/^TCU,
rrj
re
tTTTros
Tf
vTov,
ry
[fledy evl
a.Tre<pr]i>aTo] a.ir<i(j>riva.TO~\
otiTe
oe.
Idiocy
TOV vovv, T$ 0,70.6$ rbv In the words
r TOV T L
Ka fan Kal
f<7Ti
Tr Trj
KO.TO. /caret TTJV
i!>\rjv.
Theophr. preceding note. lti9 Vide p. 76, 70, sq.
THE GOOD.
tin-
287
subsistent Reality, and the absolute aim and end, or 170 Good, into absolute Cause and absolute
Being.
That step once taken, it is not surprising that the Good, like all the other Ideas in their own spheres, should have been invested with further qualities such
as Power, Activity
not be that infinite essential nature at
and Reason, without which it could all. But what
relation it then bears to personality, is a question which Plato probably never definitely proposed to himself. The ancients were generally wanting in
the distinct concept of personality, and Reason was not seldom apprehended as universal
world-intellect,
hovering uncertainly between personal existence and 171 Plato says indeed that Reason can be im impersonal.
parted to no essence without a soul, and he accordingly makes reason inherent even in the Cosmos by means of the soul. 172 But in the first place, we cannot conThat
tins
disadvantages
is
case before us. explain, e.g. the
must lead to many shown in the We have thus to

mixture above
sq.),
world? The answer, however, can only be the same which we have had to the more
general question as to the causality of the Ideas: viz. that here we have an instance of the inadequacy of the system, which Plato himself inthe by passes by the
in
vol.
i.
remarked
(p.
280
of
the
highest Good with the metaphysical concept of the absolute. The ooncept of the Good is abstracted from human life it signifies that
;
directly acknowledged silence in which he

critical points.
171
which
is
advantageous to mankind
Plato (as it did _to Socrates). then generalises it into die concept af the absolute, but its original
Vide the remarks
p.
and subsequent 808, vations on Aristotle s

God.
17 -
obser-
concept of
meaning
into
!
is
it:
hence
continually playing the confusion;
Tim. 30
ovdtv
o\oi>
neither the ethical nor the mctaphysical ^concept of the Good is xttained in its simplicity. Further
ii. (cf. Brandis, i. ::_ 7 sq.) when we ask how the Idea of the Good is the cause of ill other Ideas of the sensible
Xoyto-d/xej/os
ow
vow
eupicr/cei/
6pa.Tui>
[6 6eos]
K ruv Kara rov avb-^rov

5
0tW
tvxw
*x"s
6 \oi/
lifficulties
arise
Trore tpyo-;,
vow
/cciAW a& X upu
&re<r0cu
d8ut>a.TOJ>7rapayev{<r0atTy 5ih8bToi>
Aoytcr/xoV fvtfiv fc
rovde
vow
& âan f mrrij rbv&i
fr \Lv\f,
288
elude from this that the Divine Keason in itself exists
however inseparably they may be bound is always a principle distinct together, the World-soul from and subordinate to Beason, which only com bines with it, because in no other way could Reason
as a soul
;
for
impart
itself to
the world
173
;
and in the next place, a
sense can scarcely be ascribed personality in the specific Still less can we derive such a to the World-soul.
the logical application of the Platonic principle from about God. If an original existence belong hypotheses alone to the Universal, God, as the most original, must
also
;.
"
be the most universal
174
;
if
separate individuals
In the light of this D. s Phileb. passage we must explain vovs avev /ecu 30 C /JL^V
:
croc/>ia
than the soul, and the only thing denied is that reason can belong
to the corporeal.
173
"&VXTJS
VK av Trore yfvoiffdr}v.
Ov
rov
yap
ovv.
QVKOVV
ev
fj.ev
rrj
tainly explains
Ai os, &c.
in
its
Vide
is
question here
The p. 266, 112. not as to intellect

existence,
it
is_
supramundane
but intellect in so far as
im
Plato cer sqq. himself otherwise, Soph. 248 E sq. (vide p. 262, 107) ; this expression, however, is not to be identified with the confused is it theories of the Timseus ;
Tim. 35
manent
mythically the supramundane in of Zeus) tellect is, however, separated from that which dwells in the world, when it is said that Zeus possesses a kingly soul and a kingly under
;
in (he universe (or as it is expressed, in the nature
merely an inaccuracy which was subsequently corrected by Plato

himself.
Stumpf, Verb. d. Plat. Gott. Idee d. Gut. 94, raises the ob jection that, as the Ideas are hyz.
174
standing 5id rrjv rfc curias dvvatJ.iv. the absolute sense, can Deity, not have its reason imparted to it by some extraneous cause. The same holds good of Tim. 37 C
"in
reason and knowledge are only in ruv yap &VTWV the soul, and 46
postasized and therefore separate from things and from one another, the Idea of the Good must be the most individual, and the Platonic God must be absolutely transcend ent and individual. I3ut substan tiality and individuality are not
identical to Plato, though they It is Aristotle s are to Aristotle.
Here
question as i/ovs
also
the
well-grounded
and repeated
ob
asked is not whether such can be imagined without soul, but whether it can be immanent in anything other
jection against the theory of Ideas that the Ideas ought to^ be the universal the to individuals,
the genera,
whereas they cannot
THE GOOD.
289
are what they are only by participation in a higher, that essence which has no higher above it cannot be a separate individual if the soul is contra-distinguished
:
from the Idea by its relation to the material world (by the share which the Unlimited has in it), a soul cannot be attributed to the Idea as such, nor consequently to God, who is identical with the highest Idea. Plato has nowhere expressly drawn out these consequences, but, on the other hand, he has done nothing to guard He often speaks of God as a person against them. and we have no right to see in this only a conscious
;
1
I
adaptation of his language to the popular religious Such a mode of representation was, as before remarked, indispensable to him (on account of the
notions.
deliberately translating philosophic ideas into a language grown strange to him, but rather that he himself shares the religious belief, and holds it in the main to be well
immobility of Ideas) in order to explain phenomena all that he says concerning the perfection of divine Providence, and the care of the Gods for God, 175 men, gives the impression, not that he is
;
and
Yet he never tries to reconcile these religious notions more definitely with his scientific conceptions, or to demonstrate their mutual can compatibility. therefore only conclude that he was unconscious of the
founded.
We
problem.
176
In his
scientific
enquiry into the highest
be so as x^p^rai. It has already been shown, p. 237 sq., that the Platonic Ideas are the hypostasized
But the highest concepts of genus. Idea as such must be necessarily highest genus, and conse-
most universal Vide p. 267, 114. 176 This Ribbing, Plat Ideenl i. 370 sqq., candidly admits, though he will not allow that the Ideas are the universal, and that therefore
qtiently the
5
290
causes he confined himself to the Ideas, and when, as in the Timseus, he found it necessary to introduce the does so without proof Deity side by side with them, he but merely as a presupposition of or accurate
definition,
faith.
178 and for practical For his personal needs, in Gods, purifying it to the belief application, he held 179 but not in indeed in the spirit of his philosophy, 177
its relation to the doctrine of vestigating very narrowly Ideas contenting himself with the thought that both asserted the same truth; that the Ideas were truly Idea coincided with the divine, and that the highest 180 The difficulties besetting the comhighest Deity.
;
the
would
predication contradict
this
to
loc.
of personality their concept.
simply down side by side. 178 This is unmistakably

real point,
the.
Whether
honourable
(as
is supposition the philosopher

cit.,
and so far I agree with Deuschle s remark (Plato, Mythen,

16
sq.)
Stumpf, against me)
maintains
or
question which we have simply quirer has to put to discover what can he proved, It is or at least made probable. that even certainly not improbable Plato was unconscious of a problem
;
not, is not the the historical en
personal
cation.
that to Plato s mind the God had a meaning be

personifi
yond a mere mythical
This, however, holds good, not only of a God, but also of the gods. 179 On this point more exact
details will be given later on. 180 But does not this
which remained a secret to all of Ploantiquity up to the time tinus, and that he overlooked the of difficulty in which the theory
Ideas involved him just as
make
this
Plato a pantheist?
Even
if
were
much
as many others which lay nearer to hand.

177
Tim. 28
sqq.
it
is
proved
would be misfortune, and still less a valid result of an objection against the historical enquiry. This, however, is not the question here, and the title which Rettig bas given to?
so,
it
no great
that the world must have a cause, it came into for, as being corporeal,
existence, ry 5 av yevopfva) alriov rivbs I/TT dvdyKyv
yfvtffOai.
(pa/JL^v
his treatise,
AiY/ct in the Philebus
dva.1
shown
not, further that this
It
is
however,
ai riov
is
the personal Divinity of Plato or Plato no pantheist, implies a very vague conception of pantheism. If Plato had repudiated the per
reducible to a
piovpyos
beliefs
we have here dogmatic

scientific
Trot^rrjs, irar^p, 5y-
and
ideas
set
he would sonality of the divinity, In his still not be a pantheist. latest principles he has neither removed the dualism of the Idea
THE GOOD.
291
parison of things so essentially different seem to have been overlooked by Plato, as by many another philo 181 sopher before and since his time. In thus determining the highest Being as the (Jood,
and as Reason assigning an end, Plato apprehends it as the creative principle, revealing itself in the Pheno menon because God is good, He formed the world. 182
:
mid
of
so-called Matter, nor the sepa ration of the Ideas from things and
with Steinhart
ferring
(iv.
645),
in
to
re
Phileb.
30 A,
the
the Ideas from one another, lint the statement against which Rettig takes the field does not assert that Plato repudiated the personality of the divinity, but
In divinity in an absolute sense. Phaedr. 246 C, which he also Plato is not expressing quotes, his own views on the
divinity,
did not enquire into the question of personality. 1 The view above developed, that the Idea of the Good is iden tical with the divinity, is found with different modifications of de tail, which affect the question of the personality of the Platonic God (not to mention the Neo-
merely
that he
d. phil. fund. ibid.
Platonists), in Herbart, Kinleit. in i. 248 Plat. Syst.
WW.
xii.
78
ii.
cher, PI.
AVW.
C
311
Schleierma134 Hitter,
;
but simply the ordinary opinion, which he declares to be mistaken. It appears to me a very improbable conjecture of Steinhart s (vi. 87 sq.), that Plato distinguished be tween a principle of rest or per manency and an efficient principle of motion, an objective and sub jective, an Ideal and a real side in the divine Being the former the Idea of the Good, the latter Spirit. Both forms of statement are found in Plato, but he does not in any
indicate that different sides of the divine principle are thereby intended. All the objections of
way
Gesch.
Hist.
1
d. Phil.
ii.
sq.
phil. gr.-riim. 2 Bonitz, Disputatt. Plat.

.Hindis,
ii.
A
3
Preller, p. 241)
sqq.;
a.
:J22 sqq.;
Schweg-
ler,
Gesch.
Gr.
d.
Phil.
56
Striimpell,
d.
Mus. ix. Entw. i. 360,
Gesch. d. tlicor. Phil. 131 ; Ueberweg, Rlicin. 6 J sqq. Susemihl, Genet.

;
c. to Rettig, Volquardsen, my view, so far as they seemed to me to be of any will be importance, found to have been noticed either
with or without express reference. Tim. 29 D \tyuncv 5% di

:
ii.
iv. 644 sq., Steinhart, PI. 659, v. 214 sq., 258, 689 sq., vi. 86 Stuinpf, loc. cit. ; Ribbing, Plat. Ideenl. i. 370 sqq. (Other authorities apud Stallbaum, Plat.
;
WW.
22,
196,
202
ijv
TWO. air Lav yeveviv Kal rb iran rode 6 ^yj/icrrds iW(rr?7crej>. dyados
Jjv
Tim. 47.)
the
reasons
(pdwos (the same important position very which Plato brings as an objec
tion,
(f>Qovepbv
oi)5ets dyadtj) 5 oudfTrore tyyiyverai
irepl
oi Sevo?
I cannot,
above
stated,
however, for agree
Pluedr. 247 A, to the eiov of the popular creed).
u2
292

doctrine of Ideas is in this
The
way connected with the
study of the Cosmos,

rot
TO.
Dialectics with Physics.

faov
^
8 e/crfo
&v
irdvra.
8n nd\w-
fy
iral
oparbv
^
ira.pa\a.pw
rff
o^x
yevtffdai
.
.
eôv\rjdr]
eavru
dyada.
Pov\r)6els
Trdi>ra,
irapaX^ffia. yap 6 6ebs
^vx ^v&yov^XXaKivovêvov ir\r]^

/xeXws
5^
<f>\avpov
f*h>
M^
drdxrw?,
TT}J
rdfw avrb
CK
dvat Kara
dvvafj.iv,
ovrw
5fj
irdv
^yayev
e/ceti/o
dra|faf,
Tjyn<rd
TOVTOV irdvTM
&fACU>W.
293
CHAPTER
VII.
PHYSICS.
THE GENERAL CAUSES OF THE WORLD OF PHENOMENA.
name of Physics we include all discussions to the sphere of natural relating existence; on the general causes of the world of Phenomena, as contra
the
distinguished from the world of Ideas
;
UNDER
on the Cosmos
parts ; and on Man. The first of these enquiries has three divisions (1) the universal groundwork of the Sensuous as such, the relation namely Matter ;
its
:
and
(2)
of the Sensuous to the Idea
(3) that which mediatises between the world of Ideas and that of Sense the World-soul.
;
understand Plato s doctrine of look back to his doctrine of Ideas. Matter, Plato considers Ideas as the only true existence: he
1.
Matter.
To
we must
regards the sensible Phenomenon as a middle-term between Being and Non-Being that to which only a transition from Being to Non-Being, and from NonBeing to Being, only a Becoming, and never a Being, can belong. In the Phenomenon the Idea is never
;
purely presented to
its
opposite,
but always intermingled with confusedly, broken up in a

us,
Plurality
294

1
of individuals, hidden beneath the material veil. Phenomenon is not an absolute self-dependent existence,
but
all
its
Being
is
Being
for another,
by means of
2
for the sake of another. another, in relation to another, The objects of Sense are therefore, in a word, only a shadow and mimicry of true Existence. That which in
the latter
is
One, in the former
is
Many and
Divided
what there
and by itself is here in, and reason of, another; what is there Being, is here by of the Idea Becoming. But how is this metamorphosis about ? The cause of it in the Phenomenon brought
exists purely for
cannot
lie
in the Ideas themselves
enter into a
community
:
of existence,
these, even if they still remain indi
vidually distinct,
without interminglernent, each in its own specific essence an Idea cannot coalesce with its 3 into it. Therefore, if one Idea opposite or pass over
1
C vi 493 E 476 A, 477 Svmp 211 E, 207 D; Polit.
Vide supra and Eep.
vii.
524
^vt\v,
eft/at.
269
p
typal
Symp. 211 A, where archeBeauty in opposition to phenomenal beauty (r& TroXXa

-
TO irapairav v. 476 Phsedo, ; 102 B sq.; also Crat. 386 D; Theset. 160 B, in which latter not is passage, however, Plato
?}
^h
Cf.
Eep.
as ov rrj ntv A-aXa) is described 5 alaxpof, ovoe TOT T-fj
speaking in his own name. 3 Phsedo, 102 1) sqq.: âlverai ov fj.6vov avrb TO
ou5^7ror
e>ol
yap
K0\bv, rore 5
/j.ei>,
e0t\eiv
TO ovdt irpbs 5e r6 alffxpbv ovtf Ka\bi> Trpbs 5 alffxpov Ivda p.kv Ka\bv, ov Ka\bv, Ttffi 52 ws rial
ov,
?t>6a
^v
fffJUKpbv ftvai,
TO
fffJiiKpbv
&c., ws 5 ai rwj KO.L TO iv -rjfMV OVK eOe\ei
TTOT
plv
yiyvea0a.i ovoe &\\o 1 o this ouSev T&V evavTiwv, &c.
^ya
Phileb. alffxpov. Tim. ii. n. 10.
54 C, vide chap,
52
clic6vi fj.ev
objected that Socrates himself had just said that opposites ^coine
it is
ou5 (sensible appearance), fircl-rep avTO TOVTO e^ y yeyovfv (the of which Actual, for the exposition it serves) eai-r^j iffTLV, trtpov 5e
TICOJ
del
from opposites, to which
it
is
e/e
re-
0^perat
(pdvTaff/J.a,
oia
plied : r6re ptv yap eXêro TO evavTiof evavTiov TrpdynaTos^ vvv 5e OTI airrb Trpayfj.0. ylyveffOai, TO evavTiov cauTy tvavriov OVK &v
.rare ytvoiTO,
TOU
Tavra
ye<r0at,
cv irtptp TrpoffrjKei Tivl
oiV/as
ct/xw<r76rwj
ylyavreô-
&c.
Cf.
Soph. 252
D, 255 A.
MATTER.
295
goes through many other Ideas, and includes them in 5 4 itself, each must still maintain its unchanged identity,
after its
own fashion. One concept allows itself to com bine with another, only so far as it is identical with that other. Sensible objects on the other hand, in
;
contradistinction from Ideas, are capable of assuming not only similar, but also opposite conditions and this
them, that Plato plainly says there is not one of them which is not at the same time its own
is
so essential in
which is not simultaneously This imperfection of the Pheno menon cannot spring from the Idea it rather proves that necessity as well as Reason is the cause of the
opposite, the existence of
its
non-existence. 7
world, and that this irrational cause cannot entirely be
overcome by Reason. 8
Consequently to explain Sense
as such, a special principle must be assumed, and this principle must be the direct contrary of the Idea, for it is precisely the contradiction between the Phenomenon
and the Idea which has to be derived from it. It must contain the cause of the Non-being, the divisi bility, the mutability of the Phenomenon, and only
this
;
for
whatever
1)
is
real, one.
and permanent,
vov S
aurriv
dj/ay/crjs
origi-
Soph. 253
I
vide chap.
v.
vr)6r)
dpxovros T
rot,
note 78.
1
ireideiv
lf>
r&v yiyvofAtvuv
rb
hileb.
vide note 88).
pp. 22S, 240. It will be shown presently that Re-pub, v. 470 docs not contradict this view. K vide p. 249. Soph. 7 Rep. v. 47 (vide p. 224)
<
A
;
/SArtaTOJ/ Ayeiv, TO.VTTI Kara ravrd re di dvdyKTjs

Tjrrw^j/rjs
VTTO
TrXeterra
ewi
Treidous
Zfjufipovos
orrw
TTO.V.
/car
ei
dpx^s
otiv
rj
wi
<rraro
r68e rb
TO.VTO.
TIJS
2f>")
s(|<[.
ns
yeyove Kara
77
&VTUS
epet,
(
Phaedo, 102.
8
TrXayw/i& ^s
/cat /juKTeov cISos atrt aj,

f.
rb
<f>epiv
Tim. 48 A:
roOSe
^^y^vrj yap
ovv
irftyvKev.
Tim. 50 C, 08 E;
roO
re
KO.L
KO<T/J.OV yevecns e$ vov cruffTdcreus eyev-
Thefet. 170 A.
296
PLATO AND THE OLDLR ACADEMY.
nates exclusively with the Idea. Therefore if the Idea be the purely Existent, this principle will be the purely Non-existent ; if the one be uniform and invari
able Essence, the other must be absolute division and absolute change. This principle is what is usually,
9 though not in Platonic phraseology, termed by us
Platonic Matter.
*/
9 The word v\tj in Plato bears the same signification as in ordi
nary speech it means a wood, timber, and sometimes generally

:
The later philosophic material. application of the word to signify the abstract concept of material
substratum is expressed by Plato, so far as he has that concept at all, This holds good in other ways. of Tim. 69 A, -where, after a dis cussion on the two kinds of causes to be mentioned later on, we read or ovv 8?j ra vvv olov reKTOffiv ijfjuv v\i] irapa.KiTai ra rdv alriuv
:
position of the Platonic doctrine. It does not, however, follow that he had heard the word from Plato s own lips in the oral dis courses ; for, as is well known, Aristotle does not hesitate to enunciate the views of earlier thinkers in his own terminology.
In Phys.
:
iv. 2,
209
b.
ii.
210
a. 1,
he
Plato in the Timasus (where, says however, this denotation never oc curs) calls V\T] the /j-cGeKTiKhv, in the dypacpa 56y(j.a.Ta. It is the Great and Small. If we consider how foreign the word is to the
7^77
since
5iv\aafj.^va
(or
:
-At<T/uî>a)
Timseus,
Aristotle
how
is
closely its usage in
we have
set
of
causes
the different kinds out before us, as
carpenters have their timber, Phileb. 54 B (supra, chap. The context gives n. 10).
occasion
for
and
vi.
no
with the peculiar leading ideas of his sys tem, and how little it is suitable to Plato, who did not, like his scholars, seek for the basis of the
connected
corporeal in a positive substratum and if again we observe that, for the reasons given above, it could not have occurred in the tiypatpa 86yfj.ara, and that Theophrastus (in the passage quoted chap. vi. note 165) does not appear to know the term as Platonic, it will seem far from probable that Plato in troduced it into philosophic lan guage. Although therefore I shall make use of Aristotle s term for the sake of brevity, I do not wish it to be considered as Platonic.
;
understanding liX?/, with Susemihl, Genet. Entw. ii. 43, and Wohl stein, Mat. w. Weltseele (Marb. 1863), p. 7, as matter in
general,
analogy of
so-called
and not rather (on the and ftpyavcC) ^>dpfj.aKa
in the sense of
raw
uses sqq., 97 F), where Plato (93 (Timseus, 48 E sqq.) has v.) yevtatus, (fivais TO. Trdvra crw/uara Sexo^^T/, Seâ/x^?;, fK/J.aye iov, eKeTvo *v $ yiyverai, x^P a T^TTOS, c. TX?7, as a technical philosophic
Timreus
material. of Locri
The
>
term,
is first
met with
in Aristotle,
and
is
frequently used in his ex
2cûa may be more correctly re garded as an ordinary Platonic
MA TTER.
297
description of it is given in the Philebus and Timaeus. 10 The Philebus (24 E) designates the uni versal substratum of the sensible Phenomenon as the Unlimited, and ascribes to it all that is capable of more and less, of stronger and weaker, and of excess that ; is to say, the Unlimited is that within which no fixed
and exact determination

at
is
possible,
the element of
conceptless existence, of change, which never arrives

11 The Timeeus (48 E) enters Being and permanence.
A Polit. 269 D, 273 B (where Schaarschmidt, Samml. d. plat. Schr. 210, thinks he finds an evi dence of spui iousncss in this un248
;
denotation of the corporeal, in its general character and as distin It guished from the spiritual. occurs in this sense, Soph. 246 A-
Woblsteio, loc. cit. 3 sq. 8 sq., would understand by the yiyv6fj.evov ad in this passage not the world but matter, and would refer the yevvfirbv irapddeiyfjia mentioned
in
what
follows (28 B, 29
A)
first
to
matter
signification of the word) and also Phileb. 29 C: cf. 64 B, and particularly (together with the equivalent awârofiS^y. in Tim 28 B) 31 B, 34 B, 35 A, 36 D, 50 B. The concept of how ever, does not coincide with that of matter: the adâ. is visible and
;
Platonic
of these suppositions there is the cir cumstance that the yiyvbêvov del
also.
Against the
not merely perceptible and pre sentable but also subject to be coming and perishing. Matter, according to Plato (cf. note 14), is
is
<riD/*a,
28 B, 31 B eqq.) the so-called matter, on the contrary, is anterior

;
palpable, and this presupposes that it consists of the elements (Tim.
show both suppositions to be With respect equally untenable. to the yiyvbfj.evov del it is remarked that it must have an author. The
will
neither. complete and accu rate consideration of the passage
elementary bodies, yet it has none of their determinations in itself, and is therefore not per
ceptible tothe senses. TheTrai/oexej becomes the ff,ua because it admits
to the
the form of the four elements. 10 In the passage quoted

Cf.
p.
263,
I), where it is said of the sensible as a whole,

."
Tim. 27
question follows, What archetype the author used in its creation? That is fashioned after an which^ archetype is itself neither the arche type nor the material in which it is fashioned. Nor can the material be identified with the archetype which it is to represent, as Wohlstein maintains. By the yevv^bv TrapdSeiyfj.0. is not meant
that
it is
yi.yvQij.evov
uev del 6v 5e
anything which actually preceded the crea tion of the world it is merely something laid down hypotheti;
1X6701;
Boâarbv,
,
iiro\\v/j.evoi
&VTUS
yiyv6/j.evov 8e
Instead of saying, the cally. creator fashioned the world on an
5><8
into detail. Plato here distinguishes first the arche Essence Ideas. Secondly, comes typical, self-identical which is imitated from them, the sensible Pheno that
more
In the third place we have that which is at once the groundwork and the receptacle of all Becoming. ele the common element which underlies all corporeal In the ceaseless matter. ments and all determinate
menon.
Becoming this perma common element runs through them nent substratum: it is the something in which they It is never repre become, and to which they return. in them purely, but only under a particular sented form 12 it is the impressible mass (iKfiaytiov) out of
flux of all these
forms in the
circle of
as their
which they were all formed, but which, for that very or definite reason, must itself be without specific quality must be presupposed, That such an element form. Plato proves from the continual flux of things sensible,
the constant passing of the elements one into another. This he says would be impossible if the determinate a kinds of matter in themselves were something real, modifications of one comand not
Something,
merely
mon and
therefore
13
necessarily
indeterminate
third
That Something he more precisely de Something. of scribes as an invisible and shapeless nature, capable
eternal archetype, Plato says lie fashioned it not according to the but according to the
wav
8*1
Becoming,
Eternal.
13
49
1)
sq
we must not
call
material (as fire, water, &c.) a r65e or TOVTO, are only a rowkror, because they always passing into one another rov Qeuyei yap ovx virbfJievov TT,V r65e Ko.1 TOVTO Kal TT)v T$5e Kal
any
definite
V evSeixwrai 0cuns. . . . O.VTW tyyiyrbfura del ticaffTW ftcfWcv airoXXureu, rdfcrcu Kal v&\iv pbvov tuewo au Trpovayopevew T(? re TOVTO K al T$ rode irpoffXP^vovs
<
^â
us
cWa
aura
0cu>-
l>ut
6j/6âra, K.T.\.
"
41)
sqq.
We
have already
i
something similar vol. i. Diogenes of Apolloma,
met
with
p.
219.
MATTER.
taking any shape
14
;
2011
imperishable, the Other, in which

;
as Space, which, itself eternal and provides a home for all Becoming; as
all
Becoming must
be, in order to
exist at all while true Existence, as in itself sole, can not enter a sphere so entirely different from itself. 15 The statements of Plato s disciples are all to this effect.
According to Aristotle, Plato in his discourses reduced Matter to the Unlimited, or, as he usually says, to the
14
50
A.
sqq.
e.g.
as
gold
all
Klvai
rCiv
et ScDi
dib
5rj
rr)v
continually
transformed into
yeyot>6ros
oparou Kal Trdirwy

Kal inro8oxfty
irvp
e/c
fj-r/re
yrji>
would still be possible figures called gold, so with tbe nature
TOU
/j.r)Tepa
depa [tyre
jTe
6<ra
/^rjre
vdtop
0wm)
CK yap
which admits
avryv del
all
bodies in
e!56s
TL
TOVTUV
^re
itself: TOLVTOV
irpotrpTjTeov
&v raura ytyovev

Kal
fj.era\d}Jiâvov
dXX dvbparov
,
TTJS eavTrjs TO irapdirav OUK îVrarat Si^d/ieus. Se xercu re yap del ra Travra, Kal ovdeuiav
fj.op(j>T]v
aôpfpov
iravdexes
irore
ovSevl
r&v
flffibvruv
6fj.olav
yap
(pi crei
iravrl /cetrat, KivovfJ-evov re
Kal 5iacrxf]P-o.Ti^6fj,vov virb T&velaLbvTUV, (paiverai 5e 5t e/cetVa #XXore
Se dTropurard irr) rou VOTJTOV Kal SvcraXwToTaTov avrb ou \j/ev(r6fj.eda. The cor \eyovres rect view is simply that irvp ^v avrov TO TO ds vypavOev s
:
<f>aii><j-6ai,
/c.r.X.
aXXotop.
TO.
eiffiovra /cat eîovra
13
52
A
Tb
sq.
bfJ.oXoytiTfoi
i>
TWV 6vTuv
dei /u/uûara (that
which
fj.ev elvai.
/caret
TavTa
eTSos
%X OV
. .
>
enters into that nature is in each case the copy of the Ideas}, TVTTUBivro. air avr&v Tpbirov riva dixrKal That
<f>paffTov
dy^wrjTov Kal dvuXeOpov, &c. TO 5^ b^(!jvvfj.ov 6fj.oi.bv Te

(sensible Being) devrepoi
.
Oavfj.a<TT6i>.
TOV d
aS yews
o<ra
oi>
Tb
TTJS
in
which an impression is to be taken must in itself be apopôv

Kcivuv
airacrCov
dei, (fidopav ou irpoffdexbueitov,
Zdpav
O.ITTQV
ruiv
Se o;^,
6 tras
5^ Trapexov dt /ACT
TI.VI
?x et
ytveffiv Tracrtv,
TriaTOv,
dvaiffdrjcrias
vbdtj),
fj.\\oL SexeaQa-i troOev. If it
already
fjioyis
had any of these forms, it would give back the impression badly.
Just as
the oil, out of which ointments are to be pre pared, scentless, and the wax form
TO.VTOV OVV Kal
we make
irpbs 6 5rj Kal 6vetpoTro\oi (J.cv /3XeTTOires, /cat <pa/j.ev dvayKalov elvai TTOU Tb bv dirav Zv TIVI Toiry Kal
KaTexov x^P av TWO-,

yrj ftr/re elvat . .
TTOV
/car
.
7"6
5e
/J.T]T
ei*
intend to mould, TO, TUV TTaVTUV &el re 6vTb}v Kara irav eairoD (in 3ach of its parts) TroXXd/as d(pofj.otless
TCfJ
which we
ovpavbv ovdtv rdX077ey, ws dKbvi fttv, K.T.\. (vide note 2) ... offros p.tv
ovv
877
ffdels tv
KaXws
fj-eXXovn
/cat
\oytirapa T^S t/J.i)s /ce0aXat a; 5e56cr0w X670S, QV x^P av Kal yeveaiv etvat rpta Kal irpiv ovpavbv
\f/r](f>ov
300
specific
that its Great and Small, in order thus to express essence consists, not in fixed, self-identical,
but only in extensive or Ideally defined properties, intensive quantity; that it is capable of enlargement and diminution, of increase and decrease to an indefi 16 Hermodorus says he described it as all nite extent.
that has that stands in the relation of Great and Small, more and less, that falls in itself an endless gradation of the under the category of the inconstant, the infinite, neither be and as such can formless, the Non-existent, 17 What then are we to called a principle nor a Being. from these statements was Plato s real opinion?
gather
It
was once generally supposed that Plato taught the at any existence of an eternal corporeal Matter,, or,
Matter that preceded the creation
first
rate, of a corporeal
of the
18
world.
Aristotle
this gave occasion to
later though he does not share it; among view, times it writers it is almost universal, and in modern 19 a has found many noteworthy supporters, though not 21 Much may be urged in its favour. few 20 opponents.
Phys. iii. 4, 203 a. 15, c. G, 27; iv. 2, 209 b. 33, 1, 9, 192 a 11 Metjiph. i. 6, 987 b. 20 iii. 3, 998 b. a. 25 sqq. 1, 7, 988 This statement is more fully 10 discussed in my Plat. Stud. p. 217 sqq and later on in this chapter. 17 in the statement of Dercyllidcs as to Hermodorus (borrowed from
1(i
306
b.
p. 283, 100. Bonitz, Disput. Platonicae, bo hil. 11. a. 295 sq.; Brandis, Qr.-rom.I
19
1S
Vide
sqq.
StaUbaum
; ;
Plat.
Tim p
43,
hil.
205
i.
sqq.
Kcmbold, Gescli. d .1
125 Hegel, Gescli. der Phil. n. 231 sq. Strum pell, Gescli. d theor. Phil. d. Gr. 144 sqq.; Ueberweg lib. d. pi. Welts., Khein.-Mus. ix.
;
Simplicius),
vide
p.
277,
137,
quoted in detail in my Diatribe de Hermodoro, p. 20 sqq., and again by Susemihl, Genet. Entw li 522 sqq. The quotation from Eudemus, vol. i. 302-3, 3rd edit., agrees with this.
which
is
d. Volquardsen Idee. sqq. ; D. pers. Geist. 70 sq. ; Schneider, Mat. Princ. d. plat. Metaph (Gera,
57
1872) 11 Welts. 11
sq.
sq.,
Bockb,
\Vohlstem, Mat. u. &c. in Daub and Creuiii.
zer s Studien,
26 sqq.;
lutter,
MATTER.
The groundwork of sensuous existence
is
301
undoubtedly
;
described in the Timasus as a material substratum it is that in which all particular forms of matter
;
arise,
and into which they resolve themselves 22 it is com pared with the unhewn mass out of which the artist
fashions his figures
;
it
is
set forth as the
TOVTO and
ij
TOE, which, never departing from its own nature, assumes sometimes the form of fire, sometimes that of
water,
:i>
&c.
lastly,
mention
is
made
of
something
visible, which, before the beginning of the world, had, j in the restlessness of lawless motion, the forms and
;
itself.
,|
qualities of all elements confusedly and uncertainly in 23 But this last enunciation contradicts others
I too palpably to be maintained.
Plato repeatedly de-
der Phil. ii. 345 sq. ; Hist. phil. Gr.-rom. Mist. plnl. Ur.-rom. 257; Schleiermacher, Gesch. der Phil. p.
rreiier, Preller,
Gesch.
105; Steinhart, Plat. W. vi. 115 Susemihl, Genet. Entw. ii. 105 sqq. Bibbing, Plat. Ideenl. j. .333 sq. Siebeck, Unters. z. Phil, l.Gr. 103 sqq. Cf. my Plat. Stud,
sqq.
;
being from the elements. By that out c which these become we are of not merely to understand the tri
angl ples (vide chap,
viii.)
of
which
-12, 225.
Marbach, Gesch. der Phil. i. 8( an d Sigwart, Gesch. der l-i P; 113. rail. i. 117 sqq., express themselves^
Plat composes the elements. The *lato expression seems designedly general, to suit any other supposition which represents the elements as derived e.g. the theories of the
;
Ast (iiber die vaguely. Materie in Tim. Abhandl. der MiinAkad.

i.
phener
.
:learly state ^ his lato s

22
own views
45-54}
does not as to
Atomistsandof Anaxagoras. There is no real question as to what the elements are composed of. The object is rather to guard against any confusion of the primal substratum with the components of
the elements (determined in form or quality), whatever they may be. a Tim. 30 A, vide p. 291, 181 ;
me.-ming.
Vide supra, 298. Thestatement
Tim. 51 A, that the virodoxT] rov /eyevbros is neither one of the four loments, /UTjre ocra CK TOUTUV /u.^re
52
I),
sqq.
273
B:
09 B cf. Polit. 269 TOVTUV 8t avr$ [np

;
wv ravra. yeyovev, is merely inended to exclude the notion of any lefinite matter the individual
^
:
/c6(T/xy] r6 crwâToeiSf s TTJS 01 ira.\a.i OITLOV, rb rr}s

<rews
<f>v<reus
avvrpoQov,
on
/xcr^xoJ
KO<TIJ.QV
dramas
d(,
irpiv
ei s
iroXX^s .,, rbv vvv
ensible things are
what come
into
S02
all elementary dares that the common substratum of Here beginnings of forms must be entirely formless. Elsewhere he holds attributed to it. configuration are 24 Accord created. the visible was
that
all
originally
25
a visible ing to this passage,
the creation of the world.
something existed before He makes all motion in
Here inanimate the corporeal to come from the soul. These contra to be continually moved. matter is said be evaded by the distinction of a dictions are not to 2G as wholly double matter primitive matter which,
;
(a
shapeless,
24
a5
is
likewise invisible
and uncorporeal,
and a
Tim. 28 B.
The expedient, which Stallbaum (Plat, Tim. 205 sqq.) and

apparently also Volquardsen ([too. cit. 70 Bq.) adopt in the supposition that God first made matter and then fashioned the world out of it,
is
(30 puv.
irav oaov
r)v
08
E
.
ravra
.
bparbv irapa\a. rbr STJ iravra

,
b ravrr] irefpvKora e^ dvdyK-rjs

.
TGV avrdpicr) re
6ebi>
/cat
TOV rfXewraroi
this
it
thoroughly inadmissible. been Plato s meaning he must

or other
is
Had
Expressions like thij cannot mean that God created _i for this end and then formed it and Plato could not possibly have
eyevva).
somewhere
;
have declared
not a single pas of matter sage in which a creation or hinted at (on Tim. 52 is
but there
assumed this. Supposing that there were in the world no ele ment in its essence and origin
^
taught
cf.
independent of the divine causality,

u<
D,
note 27), nor does Aristotle know anything about it the Timseus rather distinguishes the foundation of the corporeal from the archetype is all Becoming:
;
the limitation of that causality necessity, and the opposition

voOs
and dray/c?;, so expressly em would have no| phasised by Plato, foundation for (Politicus, 273 B)
:
one, the copy is two, yvc<riv Kai bparbv, the forodo;^ yo dirav offovwep three (48 E) vide note 12) is a ~jivtG(.v (49 E, the not a rode mere TOIOVTOV,
; ;
only good
is
communicated
to the
;
world by its author, everything incomplete and bad can only origlnate from its corporeal nature.
\
1
Were
this likewise the
work
of the
parated from the TOV and ^fvvrjrbv (52 A, vide note

:
on Plato s, Divinity, there could be, as evil in thei theory, no such thing world.
-6
One is fashioned by God of 15). the other it is said that he has re ceived it to form it into the world
62.
ix. Ueberweg, Rhein. Mus. Siebeck loc. cit. is opposed to;
him.
MA TTER.
secondary matter, which even before the creation of the world was to a certain extent Not only formed).
27 dors Plato give no hint of such a but he distinction, expressly excludes it, by attributing to the same sub stratum which at first, before the Deity has begun to
set it in order, is
ties
described as entirely without proper an unregulated motion, and those beginnings of "lemeiitary forms, which it is difficult to conceive as
joint
11
28 This rigiuating prior to the framing of the Cosmos. must therefore belong to the mythical expressions
which the Timseus abounds. 29 It is the ancient lotion of Chaos which Plato temporarily appropriates,
Tim. 52 (supra, note 15 end) might perhaps suggest itself; where by y&eais, as distinguished rom %c6/)a, the so-called secondary natter might be understood. But
-"
he comparison of
piTTa, TO
)
p.
50
(76*77
fj.fv
yiyv6/u.fi>ov,
TO 8 tv
yiyverai, TO 5 o6tv d(pofj.oioi>fj.vov 01/ercu TO yiyvoufvov] and 52 A supra, note 15 beginning) proves hat the yeveais applies to that vhich is fashioned on the model f the ideas the word of sense. ?his would of course not be ante rior to the world Plato does not ay that the yiyv6f.t.fvov was before
:
and transition, presupposes such an unchangeable substratum, he repeats, 50 C (vide previous note), his enumeration and explains that none of the forms and attributes which it is to appropriate can belong to that substratum then, 52 A (vide note 15), lie again re
;
curs to the same classification, which, 52 I) (ibid, end), is repeated a third time, ami immediately adds the words Tr/v Se drj
:
TiOrjvr}v
vypat
\j.
&c.
5ia d
TO
Iffoppoirwv
fj.TriTr\aadat
/car
he world, but simply that the 6V, he x^P a an d tho yfreais are disj
ai)r^s
icroppoTTe tv,
&c.
Here
it
is
inct (Tpla. Tptxij), ar were always o, i.e. they are distinct in concept.
"d
obvious that the T(.Q-r\vr] is the sub stratum previously described as
Tim. 48 E, Plato says besides he previous two classes (eidrj}, the rapadeiyfj.a and the /m.ifj.r]/j.a Trapa:
!8
cannot
formless, which however possibly be liquid, fiery, &c., before it has taken the forms of the elementary bodies.
entirely
there is a third, the or TiOrjvt] yfvefff.ws. After
aving shown that
all
determinate
natter, in its continual interchange
according to Bockh, loc. all that goes beyond the tlreory of matter in this dialogue.
So,
fit.,
29
with
304
when he has to explain replacing it by something else The rest has more weight, himself more definitely. but is still not decisive even if that which underlies
;
determinate matter, as substratum and as cause of its apparent constitution, be, according to our view, still be asked whether that view is it Matter
all
alone,
may
shared by Plato.
He
constantly declares,
and the
Timseus reiterates the declaration (27 D), that only to the Idea does true existence belong but how can he maintain this if Matter be set beside the Idea, as a
;
second substance, equally eternal, and according to its essential nature equally permanent and self-identical, So far, however, in all the vicissitude of its forms ? from doing so, Plato designates matter with sufficient According to the clearness as the Non-existent,
Timgeus, it is neither to be apprehended by Thought, like the Idea; nor by Perception, like the sensible Phenomenon. 30 Since then, true Being, according to is absolutely knowable, while that which is inter
Plato,
mediate between Being and Non-being is the object of 1 it is wholly unknowable/ perception, and Non-being to Non-being. follows that Matter can only belong And the same inference is deducible from the definition Nonof sense as a middle term between Being and
being.
arises from par can only be Non-being Ideas, ticipation from whereby Sense and Ideas are contradistinguished has expressed himself still each other. Plato, however,
32
If all the in
Being of Sense
that
33
20 31
52
sq.
vide note 15.

1
x.
vide p 266 32 47 J ;ep. v. Hep. V. 477 A, 479 597 A.
B
1>
sq.,
Rep. v. 479, vi. 509 B, 517 C sq. Phcedo, 74 A sq. 76 D, iuu u Symp. 211 B; Farm. 129 100 D a A, 130 B.
ra
;
vii.
MATTE
:
1}.
305
more clearly That in which all things appear, grow 34 It is, therefore, that Third up and decay, is Space. Element which, side by side with Ideas and the Pheno menal world, is required as the universal groundwork
of the latter. 35
It is conceived, not as a
mass
filling
the Empty, which receives ace, but as Space itself into itself the forms of the corporeal. Hence the
never speaks of this groundwork of the sensiblyperceptible as that out of which, but always as that lii
36 which, things have become. Aristotle, too, agrees with this his testimony is all the more weighty, as his inclination to fit in the views of others under
;
Timreus
34
Cf.
with Tim. 49
(ev
8t
tyytyvfrfJieva del
rdi"era
eKaara /cai ird\iv eKeWev
avru>v
(fiav-
dtTroXXurou)
ibid.
fJ-eVOV
52 T
A:
%.V
(TO aiffd-^rbv]
TlVi
T07TCJ
KCLL
ytyvotrd\lV
"
J.oc. cit.
6i>
TO
rfjs
%u>/>as
rpirov 5e av ytvos del (pdopdv ov

de
ral one of Space. Plato himself, according to Aristotle, did not dis between and TOTTOJ tinguish v. subter, note 39. 38 He says, j& A, 53 of the elements, that things are fashioned e for they have determined
%w/><x
avru>i>,
irap^x ov %a yevetriv Tracriv, /c.r.X. vide note 15. Tim. 53 1) oBros /ie^
Trpoa-8exofJ.voi>,
tbpa.v
8<ra
irapd TTJS e,u?}s Xo-ytK(pa\aia) dedoffOu \6yos,

ij/r)<pov
6i>
forms, they are bodies (which is not the case with the 8ea.fjLfrr) cf. note 9, end), and therefore con stituent parts of things. With re spect to that which precedes the elements as their general substra
;
re
It
KOLI
xupw
/cat ytveffiv
eli/at,
&c.
tum,
it
is
merely
the
said,
it is
is
unimportant
whether
we
C-E, 52 A-B, that

yiyverai,
sion,
49 E, 50 that lv
<
space, or with Schneider (d. mat. rrinc. d. plat. Metaph. 12) by place, for as well as space can be place just imagined empty or full. The only point here is whether it is a full or an empty space, which, accord
translate
%wpa here hy
^KdexofJ-evov
TTO.VTO.
yevrj ev avry, Sac.
ing to Plato, forms the original substratum of the corporeal world. But as Plato expressly marks the Xupa as the sphere of all Becoming, we need not give it the more limited signification of Place (i.e. deter mined space), rather than the gene
Such an expres repeated six times, cannot be unintentional, but can only be ex plained on the view enunciated above. What, again, is the mean ing of the statement, 50 A (supra, note 14), in a comparison, that as the figures which we make K are all gold, so it is with Xpv<rov rd TTO.VTO. the 0i 8ex~ it is to be considered in all fj,tvri of them as one and the same ? In both cases the substratum remains
<ris
<ru>/xara
306
categories of his system would have disposed him rather to ascribe to his master the notion of Matter as
a positive principle side by side with the Idea, in oppo sition to Plato s real meaning, than to deny, without historical reason, that Plato held such an opinion.
Aristotle,
Unlimited
however, assures us that Plato made the in the sense in (a-rrupov) a principle, not
which
unlimited
might be the predicate of another
substratum, but so that the Unlimited should itself be 37 He distinguishes his own view of Matter subject.
from the Platonic view, by the definition that while Plato regards Matter as wholly and absolutely Nonbeing, he himself regards it as only relatively so (/caret
:
negation
essence of Matter
;
(GTtpiiaic;)
is
is
the
to Aristotle
it
only a quality of /
Matter. 38
As
to the oral discourses, Aristotle
makes
it
appear that in these, far more than in the Timseus, Plato avoided the appearance of presupposing a positive
Matter
he merely designates the Great-andSmall as that which receives Ideas into itself. 39 But
;
since
the same, in spite of the multiplicity and change of its forms but it does not follow that this substratum is in one case that out
:
scarcely need detailed examination,

;i9 Phys. iv. 2, 209 nXdrajp rrjv v\rjv Kal
b. TTJV
ii.
33
x^P av
TO
v
TOLVTO
<j>7}<ni>
eu/cu cv T
Tipaly
of which, and in the other that in which, the things become. 37 TrdvTes Phys. iii. 4, 203 a. 3 (TO airfipov] cl? o.p X. nv Tiva Tidtaai
:
yap
iJ-eTaX-rjirTLKov
Kal TT}V
x&pav
Kal TOLVTOV. a\\ov 5 Tpoirov &ca re \tyuv TO ueraX??7rTt\-<ij Kal iv

/
TCHS \eyoju.vois
dypd<pois
c6y/u.aaiv
TUV
.cis
8i>Tui>,
oi
/*}>,
&<rirp
ol IIi;0a-
yopeiot Kal
nXdrwj
/ca^
(rvfj.^fj3 rjK6^
TLVL
avTb, ovx eT^py, dXX
ovaiav avTb ov TO atreipov. S8 vide my Plat. Phys. i. 9 Stud. p. 223 sqq. Kbben s objections to my elucidation of this pas:
(De
Plat. id. doctr. 41 sqq.)
note 7) OJULUS ôv TQTTOV Kal T^V ^^pav TO avib dw e (p-flit ar o IIXciTum ytt^rot Xe/crôv Sid Tl OVK iv r67ry rd ci5?7 Kal ol dpid/Aol, etVe/) TO jj-fdeKTixbv 6 TOTTOS, cire TOV /jLtyd\ov Kal TOV (jiiKpov UVTOS TOV f eire T^S uXijs, fcairep tv T
(on
cf.
which
chap.
. .
ii.
MATTER.
307
the most striking proof of the correctness of this view is given by Plato himself in his mathematical construc tion of the Elements. 40 philosopher who should
conceive of a mass filling space, assuming different forms, and thus changing into the several elements,
could only seek for the ultimate constituents of these elements in the smallest bodies. Plato, however, supposes the Elements to be composed of planes, and,
in their passage into each other, to resolve themselves into planes. Thus he makes bodies to originate not
from atoms primarily, but from
figures,
by means of
41 the mathematical limitation of empty space.
Plato in the Timseus docs not use the expression V\TJ (vide note 9), but he describes the basis of the sensible in such a way that Aristotle ascribes that denotation to him. As he expressly makes an
.
Teichmuller s objections (Stud. Gesch. d. Begr. 328 sq.) to the above view seem to me to prove
z.
41
little
is
exception in the case of the tiypafa o6yjj.a.Ta, there can have been no de scription in them similar to that of the Timams ; Metaph. i. 7, 988 a. 25, the Great-and-Small are ex pressly denoted as a V\TJ
d<ro>/iaroj,
Matter, according to Plato, the basis of motion and change but this does not apply to space. But the basis of motion with Plato is the soul ; matter so called is basis of Becoming, of the only^
: ;
shifting change conditions.
between opposed
should not this
Why
and Phys.
:
iv. 7,
<t>a.aL
214
a. 13,
Aristotle
basis, on Plato s theory, reside in the fact that that which,
according
rives eli/cu rb Kevbv says 5io TJ)V TOV (Tii /JiCLTOS V\7]V, o l1Tp KO.I T&V
T6TTOV, which certainly refers to the Platonic school, and probably to Plato himself. Plato had ac tually described the x^P a as the rbiros of Jill perceptible existences (in the passage Tim. 52 sq., quoted in note 15 and note 34).
to its conceptual essence, is
some
This point, which is decisive the present question, and too little considered by the supporters of a corporeal primary matter in Plato (as Susemihl, loc. cit. 409,
for
10
remarks)
will
be
discussed
in
greater detail below.
thing ordered and regulated, be comes, when it admits the form of space, something unlimited and therefore un-ordered? It could not be said of space (vide note 15) that we perceive matter as in a dream when we say that everything must be in a determined place. But Plato does not say that we he perceive matter as in a dream says that the x^P a is that in refer ence to which we imagine (dvetpoTroXoO/uej ) that everything must be in a place somewhere, whereas this is not true of the actually
;
existing.
308
For these reasons we cannot admit that Plato held But it does not follow a corporeal primary Matter. 42 in assuming him to have regarded is right that Hitter
the sensuous notion as something merely subjective. According to Hitter, all Ideas (with the exception of the highest) possess only a limited existence. This involves the hypothesis of a limited knowledge which does not adequately distinguish the pure essence of
The
expression oveipwrreiy does not imply that %wpa cannot he per ceived in the waking state, hut that we imagine what holds good only of sensible heing, to hold good of all heing generally. Teichmiillev s final objection is that Plato s description elsewhere of matter does not apply to space. This in a certain sense is correct the delineation of the antemundctne
;
did afterwards, to be Potentiality
The onlv proof which quotes to support his view, Tim. 50 B, does not prove it in the least. It is there said of the (pvcris ra TTOLVTO. (rdf-iara Seôêi^ (vide note
(StW/zts).
lie
TO.VTOV avTT]v del Trpoffpujrôv 14) CK yap TT;? eavTrjs rb Trapdirav OVK
:
chaotic matter (mentioned supra) cannot he transferred unchanged

to the concept given in the passage But Teichmuller, like hefore us. all who deny to Plato the notion
determined Swd/iewj. 5wa,ats (here identical with 0u<ns), i.e. a determined property, is cer tainly thus attributed to it ; and
ei<rrarcu
of such matter, is forced to reckon this delineation amongst the thical elements of the exposition. On the other hand, as regards Plato s manner of envisagement, I cannot see the impossibility of
my
according to what follows this con sists in its heing the Tra^Seê ?. But we cannot conclude that in its essence it is nothing else than Svvawhether 5vi>a/jus is understood /M.S as the potentiality to become every thing, or the power to produce In Teichmiiller s fur everything. ther remarks, there is nothing to;
prove that,
according to Plato,
saying that space becomes watery or fiery (rrjv d 5?j yevtveus nQ t]-
the essence of matter is the poten tiality of the Idea, or mere possi
bility,
52 D).
In the formation
of the
elements, the iravdexts becomes water, fire, &c. simply through a determined fashioning in space. This paragraph, however, by which every theory of Platonic matter has to establish its correctness, Teichmuller passes by unnoticed. He believes (p. 332 sq.) that Plato determines matter, just as Aristotle
and nothing more. /- Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 303-378;-
vide
especially p. 3G9, 374 sqq. Similarly Fries Gesch. der Phil. i. 295, 300, 330, 351, and Maguire, An Essay on the Platonic Idea
(Lond. 1800), 102
sq.,
who, how
ever, has strangelv misunderstood
the words (Tim. 52 B) TO

to 777, K.T.\.
300
things,
and only apprehends Ideas Hence partially. the notion of an existence in which the Ideas are inter
Intelligent natures, however, strive for and thus the notion of Becoming ap
;
mingled, and their absolute Being becomes a merely

relative Being.
perfect knowledge
The sensuous notion, therefore, results pears to arise. from the imperfection of Ideas in their separation from one another the world of Sense exists only in relation^ to the sentient So the Platonic theory of subject. Matter would be in effect identical with that of Leib
;
nitz,
sensible existence would be only the product of confused notion or opinion. Of this line of thought (as Bitter himself admits 43 ) there are, in the Platonic writ
f
ings, only very obscure indications, and even these, on closer consideration, Plato certainly says disappear. that there is a KOIVUVIO. of Ideas and that in the sen ;
suous notion and sensuous existence Ideas intermingle with each other. 44 But he nowhere makes the com
concepts, as such, contain the ground of this 45 Even in the Republic (v. 176 it is intermingling.
munion of
A)
only asserted that, beside the combination of concepts with the corporeal and Becoming, their combination among themselves might make it appear as if the con
cept,
which
cit. p.
is
essentially One,
were a Plurality.
TroAXo, (paiveaOai.
But
fKarov,
Loc.
370.
vii.
Ta6fJ.ej>a
MV
A
;
Kg.
Ifep.
524 C
ffp.LKpbv
^ya
etipa,
<t>atj.tv,
^-cu 6$i^ ciXX cv
K al
KexupKrvtvov, dXXd
Cf. Hep. v. 471) ffvyKcxi tMov TI. vide pp. 228, 295. UdvTuv ruv fiSwv irepi 6 avrbs
\67os, airrbub, $v fKaarov wat, rfj Si ruv irpdtfuv Kal Kal <rufj.dTiw
one and the same concept appears in different places the concept of unity, for instance, not merely in the separate individuals of most widely different kinds, but in all the concepts which particiin it hence the appearance pate of unity as such being manifold.
i.e.
;
;
310
as this only happens in the case of persons unacquainted 46 it must with the dialectical discrimination of Ideas,
result from the incapacity of the individual to distin
guish the copy from the prototype, the thing partici 47 Nothing pating from that in which it participates.
is
If we bring said as to the origin of that distinction. other passages to our aid, we shall find that Plato, so
far
from deriving material existence merely from the sensuous notion, rather derives the sensuous notion from the nature of the corporeal. According to the Phaedo,
it is
the union of soul with body which hinders us from

:
48 at our entrance into this life, by a pure cognition means of that union, we have sipped the draught of Lethe and forgotten the Ideas. 49 At the beginning of
its
earthly existence, the soul loses reason in the ebb and flow of sensation not until this has abated, does
;
it
50 and then, only by once more partake of reason 51 The soul itself inwardly from the body. disengaging
:
cannot hope for the full possession of reason till it is wholly freed from this lower life and exists in itself 52 The tone and connection of these enuncia alone.
tions being almost wholly didactic,
46
47
we ought not
TO.
to
Soph. 253 Rep. v. 476

,
Trpdy/uara vofj.ifav,
^n?re,
TT)v
Phileb. 15 D. 6 oiV KctXa avrb 5 /cdXXos

fj.ei>
avrb
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<roi
effrlv,
fdv re Iv
ijirvif
TLS,
eav re
:
eypyyopu? TO ofJioibv TU /J.TJ 6fJ.oi.ov d\\ avTb Tj-yrJTai dvai y toiKcv T L 82, 6 ra.va.VTia. TOVTCW yyov.
Gil B. 49 Phsedo, 76 D Kep. x. 021 A. 50 Tim. 44 A /cat 6ta $77 ravra TO. Tra.drnj.aTa (the previously described cuV07?(reis) vvv tear apxa*
65
;
Phfedo, 60
B
;
sqq.
Cf. ibid.
Rep.
x.
Te &VQVS
îx^
<rufj.a
OTav
5l
et j
/j.ei>6s
TC Tt
aM
yiyveTai. Tb irpuTOit, evdeBfj OvrjTov, &c.
Ka\bi>
/cat 8uvd/Jt.-
Phaedo, 04
65 E, 07
vos KaQopq.v Kal avTb Kal TO, e/ceiVou
Tim. 42
r>
B sq. Phdo, 00
E, 67 B.
MATTER.
consider
311
are contradicted
them mythical and exaggerated unless they by definite counter-explanations. But
Plato s having recognised in the sensuous perception a means for attaining the know 53 The sensuous percep ledge of truth, proves nothing. tion is such a means only so far as the sensuous element
in
is
this is not the case.
abstracted, and a return made to the Idea that revealed in it. On Hitter s theory Plato must have
it is
communion of Ideas with each other, and from the manner in which this communion is presented by particular Ideas or
54
derived the sensuous notion from the
souls,
the sensible
phenomenon being afterwards de
rived solely from the perception of sense. So far from Plato takes the opposite course, and explains the this, intermingling of Ideas from the nature of the sensuous
notion,
and the nature of the sensuous notion from that of sensuous existence. Such is the only explanation given in the Philebus and Timgeus and Aristotle knows
:
of 110 other.
56 Indeed, as Brandis well remarks, the s ubj octi ve._ idealism which Hitter ascribes to Plato is
55
altogether foreign to antiquity, and must necessarily be so from its whole point of view it presupposes a con
;
sciousness of the importance of subjectivity too one sided and powerful for any but modern times.
is
If, then, the Universal, the basis of sensible existence, neither a material substratum, nor a mere phantasy of
the subjective notion, what

53
"
is it ?
Plato, in the passages
Hitter, p. 350.
.Hitter s
theory of souls being
Ideas,
and
its
already
adverted
chapter). ever, can be adopted, with slight
incorrectness, 1 have to (preceding Ilis view of matter, how-
from that modifications, apart theory, and no further stress need be laid here upon the point.
55
Hee
my
Plat.
Stud. p.
ii.
216
sqq.
6t!
Gr.-rb m. Phil.
a.
297.
312

and Aristotle agrees
all
[quoted above, tells us himself, with him. The groundwork of
material existence
is
the Unlimited
Small
Unlimitedness, the Great-andconceived not as predicate, but as subject not,

i.e.
;
;
however, to be described as corporeal substance

^"on-existent,
i.e.
the
Non-being;
57
that
is
to say,
empty
In Space, as the condition of separation and division. the place of an eternal Matter we must therefore
suppose the mere form of Materiality, the form of Existence in Space and of Motion; and when the Timaeus speaks of a Matter restlessly moved, before the creation of the world, this only expresses the
thought that separation and Becoming are the essential forms of all sensible existence. These forms Plato would
sensible
have us regard as something objective, present in the Phenomenon itself, not merely in our notion.
On
!
the other hand, Matter can have no reality or sub It stantiality of its own, for all reality is in Ideas.
remains, therefore, to explain Matter as the negation of the reality supposed in Ideas as the Non-being of the
;
Idea, into
tiux
which the
latter
cannot enter without dis
Unity in Multiplicity, its Permanence in the Becoming, its definiteness in the unlimited possibility of augmentation and diminution, its selfidentity in an internal contradiction, its absolute Being in a combination of Being and Non-being. This con
solving of
its
certainly hard to realise. Putting aside the question whether a Space without a substratum in Space a Non-being, which exists apart from the notion
cept
is
57
For the
it.
dv cannot here be the predicate of a
from
subject separate
MATTER.
of
;
313
it is thinkable reserving to another place the en quiry about the participation of this Non-being in Ideas, and passing by all the objections which might be raised
from without, against this portion of the Platonic doc there are still two considerations which from its trine, own point of view cannot be overlooked. One is the
Matter to our knowledge; the other its re That which absolutely is not, Plato maintains 58 cannot be conceived consequently, if Matter
relation of
lation to things.
;
absolute Non-existence, the notion of it must also be It cannot be the object of impossible. perception- (as he says himself 59 ), for perception shows us only de terminate forms of Matter, not the formless
is
pure
ground of
TO&?.
.or
the material, only a rofourov, not the But .still less can it be the object of thought,
all
thought has to do only with the truly exis And it is impos tent, not with the Non-existent.
sible
to
see
how we
arrive
at
the notion of this
ubstratum, if it is neither in a condition to be perjeived nor thought. It is only a veiled expression of his perplexity when Plato that it is apprehended says G0 and when he adds that )y a kind of spurious reason
;
is
very hard to comprehend, the embarrassment

p.
is
Vide
220.
Tim. 51 A, 52 4 and 15), where it

-HLTOV,
B
is
categories.
Tim.
Socr. 94 B, nnder-
(vide notes called avoairTuv,
stands him to
mean a knowledge
by analogy
/car
/ACT
di>ai(T6r)aias
49
sq. (supra,
60
note 12).
.
/*er dvaiffd-rjffias O.TTTOV In what this yyuTAiv TIVI v6e v
52 B:
(\o-yt<rfj.$ v6dtp,T$fijiru tvdvupiav vorjff6ai, dXXa /car and so Alex. Aphrod. dva\oyiav)
;
spurious thinking consists Plato nmself can hardly explain he nakes use of this strange expresion from to bring the inability otion of Matter under any of his
:
Qu. r.at. i. 1, p. 14; Simpl. Phys 49 b u. Plotin. ii. 4, 10, p. 104 118 Kirchh.), interprets the (i.
expression as abstract thought, the dopiaria resulting from the removal of all sensible attributes.
314

The
fact is that,
61 openly confessed.
when we
abstract
the particular qualities of that which is sensibly perceived, and seek for its common property, we find that it is only something thought, a universal concept
all
;
according to Plato s presuppositions, is pre The same result follows if cisely what it cannot be. we keep in view the import of Matter for the Being
which,
Inasmuch as Matter is absolutely noii-exand the sensible phenomenon is a middle term istent, between Being and Non-being, an inferior proportion of reality must belong to Matter as compared with the
of things.
sensible
Phenomenon
to the one,
a half-reality
is
to
the other, none at
all.
But Matter
also to
be the
permanent principle,
that which, in the vicissitude of sensuous properties, maintains itself as something essen 62 It is the Objective, to which tial and self-identical.
menon must
the images of Ideas reflecting themselves in the Pheno cleave, in order to take hold, and become
participant in Being.
63
It is that irrational
remainder
which is always which in them
abstract from things that However is the copy of the Idea. be conceded to it, it has the power little reality may of receiving the Idea, at least for its manifestation in
left
when we
the flux of Becoming and the externality of existence 64 and also of occasioning the vicissitude of in Space,
birth
61
and
cit
:
65
decay.
[r6 TTJS x^pas]
These
/^V ts
characteristics
<i:i
certainly
3.
Loc.
5Cf.
*-
v dc notes 2 and
K.T.\. (vide note 15), 49 A: vvv 5e 6 \6yos ZoiKev elaavayKaêiv
XaXeirbv Kal
\6yoi.s
(i
a/j.v5p6i>
etSos eTrixetpeu
e/j.<f>avi(rcu.
The
equivalent
ro5e and TOUTO, which are vide notes 12 and 14.

;
subsequent remarks in this chapter and in chap. x. on the relation of reason to natural necessity, on the origin of the latter and on evil. b5 Cf. the quotations from Eu(54
MATTES.
315
earn- us far beyond the concept of mere Space, and to Matter, instead of a Being which, in give Non-being,
its very permanence, has a certain similarity to that of the Idea, That which Plato adduces 6G as the special
characteristic of true Being, the power to do and to is also attributed to suffer, Matter, when it is described
as a cause restraining the operations of reason. 67 this may help to explain those expressions in
And
the
Timams, which represent the groundwork of sense not as mere capability of extension, but as a mass con
tained in Space. But we have just obtained.
we must
Plato
abide by the results

view, according to
s real
his plain statement, tends to deny all Being to Matter, to abolish the notion of extended substance in the
This was necessitated by concept of mere extension. the first general principles of his Whatever system. contradicts this view (so far as Plato seriously means
we must regard as an involuntary concession to which refused to give way to his theory. 68
it)
facts,
The Eelation of Sensible Objects to the Idea. above conception of Platonic Matter explains, on one side at least, Plato s theory as to the relation of
II.
Tin-
material
things to the
Idea.
It
is
usually believed
that, to Plato, the world of sense and that of Ideas stood over against each other, as two separate spheres,
clemus
d
M
P-
and Hermodorus, note 277 137.

>
17,
dualistic character of the Platonic
^
58
Vide
TO
r.
p. 202, Ins.
T?)S Tr\avu/u.tvr]s
atrias etSos,
lim. 48 A.
I cannot, however, appeal to 242 D) quoted .he^passage (Soph. Teichmuller (Stud. z. Gesch. d. Begr. 137) as evidence against the
>y
system. In that passage the question is not as to dualism in general, but as to the assumption of two or three material principles, and especially as to the half-mythical
cosmogonies
of Pherecydes and (apparently) of Parmenides in the second part of his poem.
310

different classes of existence.
two substantially
objections
The
the theory of Ideas 69 are chiefly grounded on this hypothesis, to which Plato has undoubtedly given occasion by what he says of the
of Aristotle
to
We
existence of Ideas for themselves and as archetypes. must nevertheless question its correctness. Plato
how it is possible that Ideas can be in the Becoming, and in the unlimited Many, without
himself asks
losing their Unity and Invariability
?
70
And he shows
with what
it
difficulties this enquiry is beset. Whether be assumed that the whole Idea is in each of the
many
participating in it, or that in each there is only a part of the Idea, in either case the Idea would be 1 divided. Again, if the doctrine of Ideas be founded
the necessity of assuming a common concept for all Multiplicity, a common concept must be likewise
011
assumed
for
:
phenomena
and above the Idea and its synonymous and so 011 ad infinitum. 72 This diffi
culty presents itself again on the supposition that the communion of things with Ideas consists in the imita tion of the one from the other. 73 Lastly, if it be
maintained that the Ideas are that which they are, for themselves absolutely, it would seem that they could never have reference to us or become known
by
li9
us,
but only refer

Ft.
ii.
to
themselves. 74
These ob-
Cf.
b.
216
;
sqq.,
2nd
edit.
70
Plnleb.
15
13
vide p. 252,
usually expressed by saying that the doctrine of Ideas necessitates the supposition of a rpiros &v6pwis
TTOS.
7
-
89.
71
Fhileb. loc.
cit.
Farm. 130
E-
Vide infra. Farm. 132 D sqq.

s
Cf.
Alex-
131 E.
"-
nnder
Farm. 131
quotation
from
ii.
Eudemus
b. 15).
sq.
The same
Aristotle,
(Schol. in Arist. 560 a.

74
objection, often
made by
Farm. 133
sqq.
-MATTER.
jections
to
317
the
doctrine
of
Ideas
would not have
,been suggested by Plato, had he not been convinced that his theory was unaffected them. How then
by from his own point of view could he seek their solu tion ? The answer lies in his view of the nature of
ascribed to the Material no from that of the Ideas, but simply and solely, in the Idea, and
material things.
all
As he
specific reality, distinct
places
reality,
regards Non-being as the special property of the world of sense, all difficulties in this form vanish. He does
not require any Third between the Idea and the Phe nomenon, for they are not two separate substances, standing side by side with one another the Idea alone is the Substantial. .He need not fear that the Idea
;
should be divided, because of the participation of the
Many
in
it,
for this
plurality
is
nothing truly
real..
Nor need he consider how the Idea, as existing for itself, can at the same time stand in relation to the Phenomenon for as the Phenomenon, so far as it as its allotted share exists, is immanent in the Idea,
;.
is so the only the Being of the Idea in it, of Ideas, and their reference to one Being another, is in itself their reference to the Phenomenon and the
of
Being
Being of the Phenomenon
is its
reference to the Ideas. 75
While, therefore, in places where he has no occasion to develope more precisely his view of the nature of
material
notion,
things,
Plato
may
adhere to the ordinary
and represent the Ideas as archetypes, over against which the copies stand, with a reality of their
own. like a second world side by side with ours
75
in
Of. Plat. Stud. p. 181.
318

he
is still
reality,
only expressing the qualitative dis
tinction between real
and merely phenomenal existence.
between only giving the metaphysical difference and the world of sense; not an. the world of Ideas actual partition of the two, in which each attains its
He
is
and the sum total of Being is divided between them. It is one and the same Being which is contemplated whole and pure in the Idea imperfect and turbid in the sensible Phenomenon. The unity
specific reality,
76 in objects of sense as Multiplicity of the Idea appears the Phenomenon is (Rep. vii. 514) only the adumbra 77 tion of the Idea, only the multiform diffusion of its
;
rays in that which, by space of the Unlimited.
itself,
is
the dark and empty
this opinion the above-mention intrinsically tenable, and whether difficulties as to the theory of Ideas do not, after all
is another question reappear in an altered form, 78 will come before us further on.
76 Rep. v. 476 A; Phil. 15 B. See note 47. 77 Cf. the well-known allegory of the prisoners in the cave, Rep. vii. 514 sqq., according to which the of sensible perception stand
whic"
But whether
known
objects to true existences in the relation of the shadows to the bodies; when we take any object of sensible per
that Plato ascribes a beinj (and that too of a particular kirn not merely to Ideas but to soul and sensible things. We have seei (note 15) that, together with tl Ideas and the corporeal world, mentions space as a third and he considers the of Being
cl<
Becoming and change

totle,
we are. ception for something real, for the simply taking the shadows
things an objective incident.
things themselves. 78 The view developed abovo is essentially accepted by Susemihl, Genet. Entw. i. 352 Deuschle, Plat. Sprachphil. 27 sq.; Ribbing, Plat. Ideenl. i. 252, 262, 333, 360
;
therefore, with reality of the latter was an article of faith, in representing the dSy as as a second world besides!
I
of sensible Aria whom the
Xwpi<TT<x,
the
sensible
justification
trine.
world, in the
had
sufficient
j
Platonic
doc
The Ideas may be
indepen-j
sq.
and
is
combated by Stumpf,
Idee
d.
dent of and uninfluenced by thej
Verh.
d. plat.Gott. z.
Guten,
is
23
sqq.,
and
others.
It
well
phenomenon, and there may something in the phenomenon which

^
MATTI IU.
All that
310
we have
said,
side of the relation of the
however, concerns only one Phenomenon to the Idea

:
the negative aspect, in which the self-subsistence of
duced
far
sensible things is cancelled, and the to the Idea, as its substance.
Phenomenon is re The other side is
more
it
difficult.
;
so little reality
if,
If the world of sense, as such, have apart from its participation in the
be even regarded as non-existent, how is this Non-existence generally thinkable beside the absolute Being of the Idea, and how can it be explained from the point of view of the Ideas ? To this question the Platonic system as such contains no answer. The
Idea,
separates
it
from the Idea.
was shown above, it does not follow that the phenomenon has equally an existence in and for itself; that its
being does not rise into that of the Ideas lhat consequently it exists without the Ideas, just as the Ideas exist without it. I do not assert that the Platonic view on the relation of things to the Ideas
;
But, as
is
of the
exhausted by the explanation immanence of the one in the

:
other.
I merely say that this expresses one side of the doctrine the other side, the distinction of things from the Ideas, the separateness of sensible being, which makes the Ideas the
how Plato could have proceeded in order to escape it on the supposi

tions of his system and why this contradiction is less possible than the others which Aristotle has so
;
things, in short all the reality that they is imparted to them have, by the If it seems Ideas) holds good. to attribute such a impossible contradiction to Plato, we may ask
prove this is impossible so long as the passages above quoted are allowed to stand, and so long as the oft-repeated explanation (that only the Ideas have real Being, and are the object of knowledge, and that all the attributes of
something beyond
world of sense, eidrj xayuffrd, can not only not be explained by that determination, but cannot even be brought into harmony with it. An objector therefore must not be contented with showing that the latter determinations arc to be bund in Plato (which I do not ieny), but must prove that the are not to be found and are lot needed by the universal pro>thers
forcibly pointed out.
And we may
notice that even Spinoza, whose conclusions otherwise are educed with the utmost rigour, continually involves himself in analogous con
tradictions, explaining the plurality of things and finitude as
something which
ultntiii specie],
generally vanishes under
reflective contemplation (sub cetertive reality, not
and yet as an objec merely a datum in our envisagemcnt.
suppositions
of
his
system.
To
320
real principle
assumption, side by side with the Ideas, of a second which should contain the ground of finite
impossible, by maintaining Neither can he that reality belongs alone to the Idea. for what derive the finite from the Ideas themselves
existence, Plato has
made
should determine the Idea to assume the form of Nonbeing instead of its perfect Being, and to break up the
unity of
He partition in space ? each individual concept, as allows, indeed, but this is such, there is an infinity of Non-being
its
essence into
that
in
quite other than the Non-being of material existence. The Non-being in the Ideas is only the distinction of
Ideas from one another, the Non-being of sensible distinction of the objects, on the contrary, is the
Phenomenon from the Idea. The former completes itself by means of the reciprocal relation of the Ideas,
so that the Ideal world, taken as a whole, includes in
itself
all
reality,
and has
abolished
all
Non-being.
The
the
latter is the essential

finite,
and constant boundary of of which each Idea appears (not by reason
a mul only in relation to other Ideas, but in itself) as in part non-existent, inseparably tiplicity, consequently combined with the contrary of itself. Again, there;
in fore, it is impossible to point out
Plato any actual from the Ideas. We phenomenon can but enquire whether he ever sought to establish such an interconnection, and if so, how he attempted it. We get our first hint on this subject from the fact
derivation of the
that the Idea of the
Good
is
system,
or that God, as the

79
placed at the apex of the 79 Timoeus expresses it,
29
sq.
vide p. 291, note 181.
NO DERIVATION OF THE SENSIBLE.
321
however, deducible from the foregoing pages, could not thus develope it. The only conclusion he draws is that
visible
formed the world because He was This thought, good. developed, would lead to such a concept of God as would make it essential in Him to manifest Himself in the Finite. Plato, for reasons
fully
(rod brought into order the lawlessly moved mass of things, in which Matter, or the Finite, is
assumed, 81 could bring forth nothing but perfection. Similarly tin* Thesetetus declares: Evil can never cease, (176 A) for there must always be something opposite to
already generally presupposed. To explain this latter, 80 the Timaeus can only appeal to Of the necessity. Divine causality, on the it is that it contrary,
and as
good can have no place with the gods, it neces sarily hovers about in mortal nature and in our world.
this
And the Politicus (269 C) speaks to the same effect, of the alternation of cycles, of necessity from following the corporeal nature of the universe. All this, however, does not bring the question a nearer
single step
answer, for this necessity is only another expression for the nature of the which is here presupposed Finite, and not derived. In vain do we seek among the writings of Plato, for any express mention of such a derivation. are therefore forced to construct one
its
We
5 C 8 5 ,, f, especia lly 47 sq At least in 41 C.

1<
^ D
S(
ancl
>
The
mortal creation, and the whole distinction, to be mentioned later on.
funda-
TO is applied to ifdXXi^), that God Himseli can
mental position propounded, 30 A, n another connection ouV our tori T V ~ -I--F- &\\ TT\^ aplffjv dp*?
,.
mean
between that which i/ow and that which AV^KT, has done in the world, points that way Cf Polit 209 K OL. It will be shown below -Wi/ -IJ sq. JL \V1U UC BUOWU that no evil comes from God
(chap. xii.).
produce no
322
from the whole tenor of his system. How Bitter has attempted to do this we have already seen, but were unable to agree with him. Aristotle seems to point
82 the Great-andout another way. According to him, is not merely the Matter of Small (or the Unlimited)
from its union sensible objects but also of the Ideas 83 If with the One arise Ideas or intelligible numbers.
:
we adhere
view, Materiality, in which the of the sensible phenomenon consists, specific property would be accounted for, by means of the participation
to
this
82 18 sqq. Metaph. i. G, 987 (where in the sentence so often quoted e eKeivuv, &c., the words TO. ei S?; are to be struck out), 988 a. 8 sqq., xi. 2, 1060 b. G, xiv. 1, 1087 b. 12 Phys. iii. 4, 203 a. According 3-16, iv. 2, 209 b.. 33.
l>.
tion from Arist.

sqq., b.
the
number two.
xiii.
(Cf.
a.
Metaph.
7,
1081
13
17 sqq. 31, 1082 a. 13, b.
30
4,
c. q. 1,
9,
1085 b. 7, 990 b. 19
xiv.
:
3, 1091 a. Alex, ad Me-
taph.
to Simpl. Phys. 32 b. ra. 104, b. m. cf. 117 a. m. (Schol. in Ar. 334 b.

25,
i. 6; Schol. 551 b. 19; Ps. Alex, ad Melaph. 1085 b. 4, and my Plat. Stud. 220 sqq., with the results of which Brandis (ii. a. 310)
362
a.
7,
368
a.
30),
other
and
iii.
Schwegler
64) agree).
(Arist.
Platonists, e.g. Speusippus, Xenocrates, Heraclides, Hestiaeus, gave a similar account, following the Pla
On
M.etaph. the other hand
we
see from Theophrastus, Metaph.
On tonic discourses on the Good. the Great-arid-Small of the early and on the part of this chapter, whole doctrine, cf. my Plat. Stud.
252 sqq., 291 sqq. a. 307 sqq. 8:i V. p. 253 sqq. The indefinite duad together with the unit is mentioned instead of the Greatand-Small as the material element (Alex, ad Metaph. i. 6, 987 b. 33; i. 9, 990 b. 17. Idem apud Simpl. Phys. 32 b. m., 104 b.
216
sqq.,
Brandis,
ii.
(Frag. xii. Wimm.) 12, 33, that the indefinite duad was made use of in the Platonic schools, like the aTTcipov of the Pythagoreans, as the basis of everything unite and sen Instead of the term Greatsible. and-Small we find the Many and Few, the More and Less, Plurality, the Unlike, the Other, used to material element the represent
(Aiist.
sqq.).
Metaph.
xiv.
1,
1087
b.
Each
of these
is
added as
;
Porphyr. and Simpl. ibid.). Plato himself, however, seems to have used this exposition only with
reference to numbers ; the indefinite or the Great-and-Small of number is the even, the duad, which is called the dîcrroj, is distinc
i>&j
Platonic to the disputed determi nations of the Platonists cf. on Unity and Plurality, Phileb. 16 c. on the Like and Unlike, Tim. 27
;
D sq., Phil. 25 A, Farm. 161 c. sq. r on the Unit and the Odrcpov, Parmenides, Tim. 35 A, Soph. 254 memues, urn. oo -tv, oupn. tu* the sc jqq. ; on the More and Less, Many and Few, Phileb. 24 K. Many
323
of the world of sense in the Ideas, and the difficulty of explaining the origin of material existence from Ideas would be removed. 84 But it is removed only to return in greater force. It is certainly more compre hensible that things should have in them Ideas in
conjunction with the material element, but it is all the less easy to see how there can belong to Ideas, which are to consist of the same elements as material
things, an existence essentially different from sensible It is in effect to cut existence. away the ground from
under the whole Ideal theory, and at the same time to leave the world of sense, as distinguished from that of the Ideas, unexplained and unexplainable. And the same
85 to explain the dif against the attempt ference of the sensible, and the super-sensible world,
may be urged
by making Ideas originate from the immediate activity and sensible things out of the common material primary cause by means of the activity of 86 Ideas. If it is the same One, and the same Unlimited which in a first combination produces Ideas, and in
of the One,
a second, brought about by Ideas, produces sensible things, it is impossible to see where the extension and
variability
come from, which belong

;
to sensible things,
yap
eidrj
84 Stallbaum (Proll. in Tim. 44 Puna. 136 sqq.) thinks that Platonic matter can be explained as
167):
TO,
TOU TL
1
e<rr/
atria TO?J aXXois TOIS 5 &/. Kal (sc. t}>avepbv} T/J

viroKet/Ji.ei>r),
efSecri
ij
T&
?)
ij\rj
simply
equivalent to the eternal or
Kad
rb
rjs
ra
infinite,
3i)
which
is
also the matter of

ii.
I).
TUV
a.laQ-r\r^v
eidrj
p.tv
tni
&
eV ro?s erSeo-t
the Ideas.
Brandis,
Gr.-rora. Phil.
622
86
\tyerai (of which in that place the Ideas, here the One is predicted, so
far
cf.
i.
a.
307
sq.
i.
Avist.
Metaph.
6,
988
a.
10
ii.
(following the quotation, chap.
as they contribute properties, definiteness of form), 6Vt aunj Si/ai eVrt. rb Ate yct Kal TO fj.iKp6v.
324
.PLATO
AND THE OLDER ACADEMY.

The
essential difference of Idea
and would be There phenomenon is still unaccounted for. one way out of the difficulty: to assume with only Weisse 87 that the same elements constitute Ideal and
but not to Ideas.
that in Ideas, Being, but in diverse relation; rules and encompasses Matter, in the world of the One But it is overcome and embraced by Matter.
finite
sense,
how
relation of the perversion of the original can only retreat two principles brought about? AVe a part of the upon an inexplicable deterioration of 88 But neither the Platonic nor the Aristotelian Ideas.
is this
a deterioration. The writings give the least hint of such which might be adduced in support of it, only passage the Platonic doctrine of the sinking down of the soul
into corporeality, has not this universal cosmical im the existence of a material port, and presupposes If this way, however, be closed, it is no longer world. the doctrine that the same possible to ascribe to Plato Matter which is the groundwork of sensible existence,
also in the Ideas. Together with Matter, he must have transferred to the Ideal world Becoming, extension,
is
and all that the Philebus predicates of the Unlimited, and the Timsous of the Universally-recipient. But in so doing he would have abandoned all ground for the of sensible assumption of Ideas, and for the distinction He would have flatly contraobjects from the Idea.
87
De
summ.
Plat, et Arist. in consiit. philos. princ. differentia
(Lpz. 1828), 21 sqq. and in many passages of his notes on Aristotle s
Physics and Do Anima Pla t. Stud. p. 203. Stallbaum s remark
cf.
my
cit.
loc.
that the sensible is simply copy, the Ideas the archetype, plains nothing; the question how the incompleteness of copy can be reconciled with in equality of the elements thin Ideas and the sensible thi
the exis,
the the the
XO
r
J>Eni\
ATIOX OF THE SENSIBLE.

by Aristotle, groundwork
the
specific
89
325
dieted the proposition, quoted Ideas are not in space. The

sensible,
that the
of
things
which Plato describes in the Timanis, was

because without
it
necessary,
difference
between the world of Ideas and that of sense could not be explained. It was to provide a home for the Be coming and corporeal. the visible and the sensible to be the place for the copies of the Idea, which, as
9(>
merely, must exist in another 91 it is the ground of change and of extension, the cause of the resistance experienced by the Idea in natural neces
copies
;
How then can it be at the same time the element which forms the Ideas and Ideal numbers
9-
sity.
receiving
by Unity into itself? Would not the Ideas directly become something extended ? Would not that 93 be true of them which Plato that expressly denies
they are in another namely in space ? From these considerations it seems safer to charge Aristotle with
a
misunderstanding of the Platonic doctrine into which he might easily fall, rather than Plato with a con
system.
utterly destroys the coherence of his That Plato spoke of the Unlimited, or the
tradiction that
believe.
8
Great-and-Small, in reference to Ideas, we may well He actually does so in his writings. In the
V.
3 p.
242, 50.
this is in
A, 50 B, 51 A, 52 A. 52 13 vide notes 15 and 2. lira. 47 E Details on sqq.

;
tins point later on.
porfos 6 Si d*/N0cfa \6yos, us e ws &v n r6 ^v &\\o rj, rb 8t &\\o, ovderepov ev
6vrus
6m
something
else
rw
dX^s
Vide supra, p. 240 sqq., but particularly the passage just quoted Tim. U it is true only of the copy ot Real Existence, that every1
ovderepy TTOTC yeyevrjftfvov tv

TO.VTOV K al 8vo
&fj.a
^v^^Bov.
Plato
of
could
not
have
expressed more
f>2
definitely
the independence matter and the Idea,
thing must be somewhere,
for oiilv
326

lias said, at first
Philebus (1G C) after he
quite univer
Ideas (15 A), that all sally, and expressly including pure have in them by nature limits and unlimitedthings to this, divides existence ness, he subsequently, referring and then describes the into Limited and Unlimited,
manner that could not unlimited (21 -s^.) in a the Unlimited in the apply to the Idea, but only to he material sense. Similarly in the Sophist (256 E) elements remarks, in regard to the infinity of negative that there is in every Idea plurality and
class-qualities,
of
Being and
infinity of
Non-being.
s
;
There
is
no doubt
language we must always presupposes confusion of thought, he lias not distinguished with sufficient admit that clearness the elements of Plurality and Difference in from the cause out of which arise the the
Ideas,
divisibility
a confusion here in Plato
and
so far as this
and mutability of phenomena.
the Unlimited, in he, therefore, transferred sense in which it is the specific property of sensible called it existence, to Ideas also, or that he actually the Matter of Ideas, we are not justified in asserting.
Aristotle, however,
But that the same
makes
critics
is
ix.
110
such allusion to a
differ
ence between the Matter of Ideas and that of sensible

things,
94
as
modern
have professed to find in

positively excluded
him,
tj4
and the theory

Eliein.
by his
Uebenveg,
Mus.
<>4
convince himself that Plato identified the Indefinite in the Ideas with the
sqq.
who cannot
sensible things, and to recognise it in the accounts given by Aristotle. These
material of
also refuses
accounts, he says, designate the One and the Grcat-and-Small as the
elements of all things; but tins does not prevent the homonymous as considered elements being specifically distinct, at the same time as their generic similarity is In the Ideas, the first recognised. element is the One in the highest sense, the Idea of the good or the ])ivinity. The second is the 6arepov
NO DK1UVA TJOX OF THE SENSIBLE.

95
:J27
that,
whole exposition. We can, therefore, only suppose on this particular question, he somewhat misapthere is nothing in the things of sense that can supply its place as the Idea in them supplies the place of the One. Nor can I agree
or the separation of the Ideas from one another. In mathematics, the former is the number one, the
latter
is
arithmetically the indefi

;
nite duad, geometrically space
in
corporeal substances, the former is the tvv\ov eldos (determined The qualities), the latter matter.
with Stumpf s conclusion. It is much more probable that Aristotle, had he meant that the aireipov
stands in different relation to sen from that in which it stands the Ideas, would have to^ said so, just as he does say in reference to the One. But in Metaph. i. G, 988, a. ii. (vide note 1), he says of one and the same that in \?;, the Great-and-Small the Ideas, the One in things, the Idea, is assigned as the determina tion of form and though in Thys.
sible things
i
;
same view
loc. cit.
is
supported by Stumpf
Aristotle often mentions the o.Treipov or the /j.eya Kal fUKpkv as the i \?7 of the ideas but he nowhere gives us to understand that this is an of a different
;
77 sq.
aireipov
sort or the
same
aireipov in a dif
ferent
is in
way to that of sensible things. ( hie and the same aireipov both. Cf. Phys. iii. 4, 203 a. 9 T& IM^VTOI. dtreipov Kal ev rots
:
ulffdljTOit
t
Kal
(v
fKfivais
[rats
&cus] eivai. i. 6, 987 b. 18: Plato considered the aroixô- of the Ideas as the (rroixeia of all things us V.tv ovv fi\rjv rb ^ya Kal rb HiKpov dvai dpxas, ws 5 overlay rb
:
203 a. 15, 206 b. 27, he ascribes two aireipa to Plato, in so far as Plato breaks up the tiireipov
i.
4,
G,
&.
Ibid.
988
2,
a. 11
1<JK)
vide note
b.
(5
:
8(3.
. . .
Metaph.
xi.
into the Great-and- Small, there is not a word of different sorts of Great-and-Small in his accounts of Plato s doctrine as to the matter of Bodies. lie says that in the Platonic school (and perhaps even
rots
K TOV evos Kal TTJS vXrjs rbv dpidV-bv (viz. the Ideal number or the Idea) ycvvwffi -rrpurov. xiv. 1,|us7 b. 12: the 1 latonists do not cor rectly define the dpxal or aroixâ 01 fj.ev TO /JLeya Kal TO /JUKpbv \fyovT6S [Aera TOV evbs rpia ravra OTOXfta TWV
rb 6
cit.
with Plato himself) the Long and Short, the Broad and Narrow, the Deep and Shallow, were placed under the derivation of
lengths,
surfaces,
and bodies
of
respectively,
( J
apt0fjLuv t TO. /ntv

rrjv /moptfiyv.
860 vXrjv
loc.
remarks on this that, according to Aristotle, the tv the immediate

cause only for the Ideas, and the same explanation holds good of the I cannot under ptya Kal iJ.LKpbv. stand how the Great-and-Small can possibly be called the imme diate cause for the Ideas only
1
Stumpf
oncept comprehending them, viz. the ( reatand-Small (Metaph. i. 9, 992 a. 10 xiii. 9, a. 9 But he nowhere states that for the derivation of the Grcat-andphysical bodies Small was replaced by other
:
instead
the
Generic
HiS;->
any
concept (such as that of the Full and Void). On the contrary, he meets Plato with the question, How can the Ideas be out of space, when the Great-and-Small or Matter, is the ^6f K TiKbv = space ?
PLATO AND THE OLDEK ACADEMY.

pretended Plato.
If such a view
seem
to
impugn
too
disrespectfully the historical credibility of the Stagi96 we must remember that the vagueness of Platonic rite,
doctrine would be very likely to cause a misapprehension of its real meaning in the mind of one who every
where sought for fixed and accurately defined concepts. The physical part of the system which obliged Plato to determine the concept of Matter more accurately,
and to distinguish the corporeally Unlimited from the

element of plurality in the Ideas,
was,
if
we may
judge from his quotations, chiefly known to Aristotle from the Timgeus and similar and even more striking
;
misconstructions of Platonic expressions can be traced 07 to him, with regard to many writings that still exist.
He
points out himself that Plato described the Greativ.

i.
(Phjs.
2, 9,
Metaph.
In 209 b. 33.) 992 b. 7, he draws
the inference that
if the v-rrepox^l ?\Xei^ts (equivalent to the are causes of Great-and-Sniall) motion, the Ideas also must be
thing of its distinction from the Great-and- Small in mathematical not numbers. Aristotle could
and
moved.
32 (where
Metaph.
cf.
xiv. 3.
1090
b.
have Stumpf, says charged Plato with such a contra diction, as that the matter of the Ideas was identical with that of
possibly,
Bonitz on the text), in opposition to Plato, he asks, whence the mathematical num If from the bers are derived. be (Ireat-and-Small, they will identical with the Ideal numbers. Phys. iii. G end, he concludes that if the aireipov is the comprehensive
principle in sensible things, Kal ev rots forjTols TO fj.^ya Kal TO fJUKpbv
^5et
sensible things, while the Ideas themselves were not in space still less would he have left this con tradiction unnoticed in his criti But cism of the doctrine of Ideas. a mere glance shows that he has done both he has charged Plato with the contradiction in question, and has made use of it in criti
;
;
cising the Ideas.

93
These objections and inferences would be impossible if Aristotle had not sup
7re/ne xetJ>
TO,
VOI^TO..
Brandis
loc. cit. p.
1, 03.
322
s
Stall-
baum in Jahn and Seebode

1842, xxxv.
97
Jahrb,
posed that the Great-and-Small, which is intended to be an clement of the Ideas, was identical with the cause of extent and motion in bodies, or if he had known any
Plat, Stud. p. 200-10, an enquiry too little considered by the uncompromising partisans ot
Cf.
my
Aristotelian
accounts
of
Plato
s-
philosophy.
NO
JjKllirATIOX OF
THE M-JM/tLK.
329
and-Small, as the element of Ideas, differently from the Matter of the Tinia?us. a8 Even the defenders of Aristotle are forced to admit that he mistook the im
It is
98
port of Plato s doctrine on several essential points." true that Plato s disciples themselves acknow;
Phys. iv. 2 vide notes 39 and I no longer appeal to Metaph. i. 6, 987 b. 33, as the words there, T&V TrpLirruv, are too vague in their meaning, and Bonitz ad loc. has proved that my former refer ence of them to the Ideal numbers is unlikely. Probably these words, for which no suitable sense can be found, are an interpolation.
9.
o>
foisting
tradictory to Plato s true meaning, on something foreign
Plato? Stallbaum (p. 64) consoles himself with, the fact that Plato the one applied the expression and the infinite to the Ideas as
well
his
as to sensible things. But meaning was indisputably not
Weisse ad Arist. Phys. p. 448 remarkable that none of his followers, not even Aristotle, un
>9
It is
that the content or the matter is the same in all and everything. In the Ideas the infinite is the being of the Ideas in their indeter
derstood the meaning of this theory [of the derivation of Ideas], and its
full
Ibid. p. 472 signification. sqq. the identification of the Great-
minate state, which is without any determined predicate and therefore cannot be thought of or known by itself particularly but with
;
and-Small with space (consequently with the v\rj of the Timaeus) is mentioned among Aristotle s mis understandings. Stallbaum (Jahn a Jahrb. 1842, xxxv. 1, 65 sq.) admits that Aristotle may have mistaken
the
true
sensible things the case is quite different for in them the in finite is the unregulated and inde
;
sense
of
the
Platonic
that not unfrequently doctrines, he attributes to them a
terminate principle of the sensible matter. This whole defence amounts, as we see, to the fact that Aristotle made use of Platonic ex pressions, but probably attributed to them a sense completely con
tradictory to their real meaning. philological correctness of the word is maintained, where the real point is its true meaning in the ex position of philosophical opinions. Brandis does not go quite so far ; he concedes, that though Aris
meaning
which
contradiction to Plato and particularly that the of the Ideas is objective being falsely converted into the v\tj and
s--,
is
in direct
The
to
substance,
time
some extent into a material though at the Fame it must be conceded that
totle
anything foreign on Plato, but has actually

transmitted to
Aristotle has not foisted
Plato
cannot misunderstand any of s fundamental doctrine, he
has failed to notice in his criticism

the
means
to
Plato s .scientific foundation of the doctrine of Ideas. But is not this attributing a meaning quite con-
us accounts, by which it becomes possible and partly fill up comprehend

of
and aim of the principles theories, and has regarded their

mythical dress or complement not as such, but as integral parts of doctrine. This grants nearly all
that
we
require.
330

100
edged the doctrines attributed to him by Aristotle, but it is equally true that in so doing they departed from true Platonism, and, especially, almost forgot the theory of Ideas, confounding it with the Pythagorean
1
It is far more unlikely that Plato should himself have applied his theory in a way that was virtually its destruction, than that his dis
doctrine of Numbers. 101
the rest, should, in the same same reasons, have departed from These reasons lay, on the one its original meaning. in the obscurity and discontinuity of the Platonic side, doctrine and, on the other, in the dogmatic appre hension by his followers of indefinite and often merely
ciples, Aristotle
among
manner, and
for the
With this not only Speusippus and Xenocrates, but Aristotle himself, judging from It is his procedure in other cases, may be charged. that Plato in his later years may have quite possible
figurative expressions.
recognised more clearly than at first the gap left by and he his system between the Ideas and Actuality
;
may have attempted
to
fill
it
up more
definitely.
He
may, therefore, have pointed out that even in Ideas there is an infinite plurality, and designated this
plurality by the name of the Unlimited or the GreatHe may have observed that as sensible aiid-Small.
things are ordered according to numerical proportions, so Ideas in a certain sense might be called Numbers.
He may,
KKI
101
further,
have derived particular numbers from

TJ
Brand! s, i. a. 322. The evidence for this

as
is
given
X<*P
0tAocro0ta, (f)a.<TxbvTuv r&v iV ai rd de?v Trpayfj.aTVa6ai,

a. 2, xiv. 2,
and
9,
l:elo\v;
a preliminary
may
the expressions of Metaph.
xiii.
merely refer to Metaph. i. 0, 992 a. 3: yeyove TO. /naOrj/JLara ro?s vvv
1080
1088
b. 34.
NO DERIVATION or THE SENSIBLE.
331
Unity and Plurality, the universal elements of Ideas, 102 and lie may have reduced certain 103 concepts to numbers.
Vide p. 279, 145, 140 and note 83 of the present chapter. Arist. J)e An. i. 2,404 b. IS in accordance with the principle
;
12
and body from
four.
He
compares
[):!
reason with unity, knowledge with

duality, &c., and he therefore calls the former the unit and the latter
that
like
is
that the soul must be composed out of the elements of nil things, inasmuch as it could not otherwise know everything. This was the doctrine of Empedocles and of Plato in the
;
we conclude
known through
like,
the number two, &c., following out this Pythagorean symbolism, whilst to each act of cognition he assigns a higher number, further
removed from unity, belonging sensible and corporeal things,

is
to in
Timreus
6
?
0/xo/wj 8e Kai ev rots irepi
TO c3oz/ f airr??y TIJS TOV Kai TOV Trpwrou fJ.riKOvs TrXdrous Kai (3ddovs, Ta 5e dXXa
[j.tv
iotas
proportion as the act of cognition further removed from the single intuition of the Idea and turns to the manifold and corporeal (cf.
219, 147). Finally he asserts that the Idea of living Jteing (on
p.
TO
8e Kai #XXwj, vovv S Ta f, TriffTTJ/J.TJV ev TOV 8e TOV y&P

8>JO.
<
fTrnrc8ov lipidjuov Soâv TOV TOV ffTepeov oi fj.fv
cf. Tim. 30, c. 39, E 28 c.) composed of the Idea of the unit and the Ideas of the corporeal, and
which
is
alffdricrii
de
yap
.
dpi6/j.oi
Ta
6to?7
tlffi
ai/Ta Kai at dpxai K TUV CTTOlêt wZ
\fyoi>Tc
KpivfTai
i>$,
5^ TO.
o
f TTtCTTTÛT/, TO,
fiSij
irpdy/naTa 5f
oi
TO.
p.ev
TO. 8
86i;"r)
TO, 5 alffd^fffL
TU>V
rest of living beings be supplied with &\\a), each in its kind, are composed out of elements. corresponding By the d"XXa faa we may either under stand actual living beings, or more
is to
the
dpi6/j.oi
OVTOI
wpaya.
V-dTuv. Metaph. xiii. 8, 12 aXXa fiTjv el fji^xp 1

: -
1(>84
TTJS
5e/id5os
6 dpid/jLos,
p.tv
L
&<nrep
rti/es
<j>a<n,
irp&Tov
olov
Taxu
e7ri\d\l/ei
rd
(iSrj-
(according to Tim. 30, the Ideas of separate living beings comprehended under the Idea of the avTofaov. So much may be concluded from the state
probably
_
c.
39),
T] T/)tds aVTodvOpWITOS, TiJ ârat dpid/j.6s avToiiriro<i. Still, it does not follow that Plato him
ZffTlV
ment
besides
of
is
Aristotle. Everything his own addition. "We
simply example chosen by Aristotle, to show the

;
self or one of his scholars referred the Idea of man to the number three this is an
cannot therefore assert that Plato himself compared reason with

unity, reflection with duality, &c., because he believed the soul capa
ble of
it
absurdity of the Platonic identifi cation of Ideas and numbers. Nor must we conclude too much from the passage of the De Anima. As has been already shown, vol. i. 349, from this and other passages, Plato derived the line from the
had
the
in itsi-lf in the
all
first
knowing everything, only if numbers the

things.
elements of
is
Aristotle
who propounded that theory and combined it with the

further
number two,
superficies from three,
determination that the are the principles of We must not attribute things. to the statements about the avro-
numbers
332

lastly,
He may,
have ceased to insist upon the difference between the world of sense and that of Ideas, side by All this would side with the analogy between them.
be quite possible without belying his main philosophic far have transmitted to position, and Aristotle may so
rectness.
us his propositions on these subjects with literal cor But it is incredible that Plato should have-
intended in these propositions to annul the distinction between the Unlimited in space, and that plurality which is also in the Ideas. If his disciple so under
stood them, he must be charged, not indeed with false witness as to his master s words, but with a view of them that is too external, too dogmatic, too little
observant of the spirit and interconnection of the Pla

tonic philosophy.
104
We
must then abandon the hope

.
of finding in Plato
the object for which Aristotle
These seem rather to used it. have sprung from the consideration, that just as living beings are composed of soul and bodv, there must also be in the Idea a something corresponding to the soul, and a something corresponding to the body. But as Aristotle usually looks for the most remote traces of
consider this treatise to be the same as that on the GooiU I cannot here enter further into the treatise on the Soul, nor the explanation?,
somewhat different from own, to be found in Trendelenburg (Plat, de id. et num. doctr. 85 sqq.; in Arist. de an. 220-234) ;: Brandis (perd. Arist. libr. 48-G1 ;
my
lUiein.
every doctrine in his predecessors, he recognises the doctrine of the

soul
itself (as
including all principles in necessary to its universal
power of cognition), wherever it is composed of the most general elements of things. (The explanations of Simplicius, De An. 7 loc. and Philoponus, De An. C 2, cit, m. sqq., of the passage irepl \fsvxv
is
TT.
Mus. ii. 1828, 5G8 sqq.) ;. Bonitz (Disputatt. Plat. 79 sqq.); Stallbaum (Plat. Farm. 280 sq). I Susemihl (Genet, Darst. ii.543 sq.).. Cf. my Plat. Stud. 227 sq., 271 it is unnecessqq. on the subject here to discuss some vana* ary tions in the present exposition from
;
my earlier 101
Arist.
Amongst
views. others
who
express
themselves to this
effect are Bonitz,.
not from the Aristotelian treatise as Simpl. himself 0tXo<ro0i a5, gives us to understand still, both
:
Metaph. ii. 94; Susemihl, Genet. Entw. 541 sqq., 550 sqq.; Ribbing. Plat. Ideenl. i. 390.
NO DKliirATIOX OF THE SENSIBLE.
:>:;:;
a derivation of the Sensible from the Idea; and this is to acknowledge that his system is involved in a contradiction, inextricable from its own point of view a
;
contradiction already latent in the concept of Ideas, but which only at this stage becomes The fully apparent. Idea, according to Plato, is to contain all reality, yet at the same time there must to the
belong
phenomenon
not merely the existence accorded to it by reason of the Idea, but, together with this, a kind of existence that cannot be derived from the Idea. The Idea is to be therefore on the one hand the sole and sub
reality,
stance of the
for itself,
it
phenomenon
is
on the other,
into
it is
to exist
the plurality and vicissitude of sensible and not to require the objects, latter for its realization. But if the phenomenon is not a moment of the Idea itself, if a Being belongs to it which is not by reason of the Idea, then the Idea has not all Being in itself; and that which
not to
enter
though
it
dis
tinguishes the
phenomenon from
may
be defined as
Non-being, it is not in truth absolute Unreality, other wise it could not have the power of circumscribing the Being of the Idea in the phenomenon, and of
separat
Neither is the Divisibility and Becoming. phenomenon in that case absolutely immanent in the Idea, for that which makes it a cannot
ing
it
in
phenomenon
be
derived from the Idea.
Plato, in his original design, intended to represent the Idea as the unmistakably
sole
"Reality,
and
all
ihe Idea.
:
He was
other Being as a Being contained unable, however, to carry out this
i, ,j design tempting to do so, he comes to the conclu sion that the Idea has in the phenomenon a limit, a
L
:
334
The cause something impenetrable, external to itself. in the abstract view of the Idea as an abso of this lies which does lutely existent, self-completed substance, In for its realization. the not
require
phenomenon
the Idea as such excluding the phenomenon from itself, receives limits from the phenomenon the Idea remains on one side, the phenomenon on the other, and the pre
;
into their supposed immanence of both is transformed dualism and the transcendency of the Idea. Here there a contradiction the fault, however, does is
certainly not lie in our representation, but in the subject of it. It was inevitable that so defective a beginning should and in acknowledging this con its result be refuted
by
tradiction,
we
state only the objective
matter of fact
for it
and the internal
historical connection
was
this
took hold of the very contradiction by which Aristotle Platonic principle and developed it into a new form
of thought,
10:5
105
The
if
case,
of course,
is
ul-
tirely
abolished
s
(Stud. z. Gesch. d. Begr. 280 sqq.) is right in seeing in the above statement the most striking indirect proof of the incorrectness of a view which leads to such inextricable
tered
Teichmuller
Plato
system
(p. is
154-166
(p.
sq.).
a Pantheistic
254)j
H.ylozoism and
Monism
We may
such
certainly call for proot ot assertions, in the face, not
He would escape contradictions. this contradiction by representing To use Plato as a pure Pantheist. Teichmiiller s own rather infelicitons phraseology,
of only of all previous expositions Platonic philosophy, but of llatos own enunciations in a contrary
direction.
But Teichmuller scarcely
Plato must be understood in an Athanasian, not I.e. the Intelligiau Avian sense. ble forms only the immanent soul of the Becoming, the world is .the continuous birth of the Deity (who is at once its father and son), and so the transcendence of the Idea as
can see seeks to give us one. as plainly from our investigations, far as they have hitherto gone, that there is an element in Plato s syswhich, taken separately, might lead to Teichmiiller s position but we also see that it is countertern,
;
We
balanced by another, which prevents it from becoming dominant,

If
we keep
opposed to the phenomenon
is
en-
tion that things are
exclusively to the posiwhat they are
yO DERIVATION OF THE SENSIBLE.

As with
regard to its
335
the origin of the world of Sense, so with subsistence. Plato is as little able to explain satisfactorily the co-existence of the Idea and the phenomenon, as the derivation of the one from the
other.
It is perfectly comprehensible from his point of view that the Idea should have room beside the phe
for no specific reality is to belong to the which the reality of the Idea could be cir latter, by cumscribed. But it is, on that very account, all the less easy to understand how the phenomenon finds room beside the Idea how an existence can be as
nomenon,
cribed to
summons
are
all
Plato here it, if all reality lies in the Idea. to his aid the theory of participation things
:
"
Idea. luc
only
that they are only by participating in the But as Aristotle complains, 1 7 he has scarcely
ignoring one-half of the
doctrine.
through the presence of the

conclusions we consider doctrine of Ideas arose
_
Platonic
Teichmuller s Ideas, are unavoidable. If
The
relation to the world
that Plato s out of the sharp distinction between the Constant and the Changing, the immutable Existence and the mutable contradictory pheno-
mcnon, and that
it
never enabled
him
to explain
former,
we
the latter from the are forced to allow a
of Reality in things not derivable from the Idea ; and the world of sense appears as a second world, with a Reality of its own, as opposed to the world of
residuum
assigned by Teichmiillcr (p. 24o sqq.) to the Platonic Deity is rather attributed by Plato to the "World soul. The World-soul is inserted between the Ideas and the phenonienal world, because such a relation was unsuitable to the former, 1CM5 Pann. 129 A, 130 E Phiedo 100 C sqq. Symp. 211 B; Rep. v! 470 A Euthyd. 301 &c. This
; : ;
relation
is
expressed by /xeraXoyu-
jSdveiv, yuer^ftr, yii^0ety, Trapovcria
Concepts, which latter, according to the original view of the doctrine

of Ideas,
is yet the sole Reality, The^ Ideas have passed from being the immanent Existence in things
987 b. 9 acMetaph. i. cording to Plato the things of sense are named after the Ideas (i.e. they receive their attributes from them!
:
<;,
107
/card
fj.tdeit>
yap
elvat TO. TroXXd
T&I>
into
B
It something transcendental. the part of historical investigawith such a contra:ion_to grapple liction, but not to remove it by
avvuvvnuv rots dSeffiv (the many which are synonymous with the
Ideas exist only through participacf. Plat. Stud 234 Schwegler and Bonitz ad
tion in the Ideas
; ;
336
PL A TO AND THE OLDER ACADEMY.

to
made an attempt
;
determine
that concept
accu
and in all that he says on the subject, this rately He refers indeed to perplexity is clearly to be noted.
some of the
difficulties
involved in the notion of parti
10 the way to solve them ; cipation, while pointing out but the main question how the one essence can com bine with that which is absolutely divided, the perma
nent with that which is restlessly changing, the uncontained in space with the. contained, the wholly real
with the non-existent, to form the unity of the pheno menon, and how they are mutually related in this
combination
is
left
unanswered.
It
is
only evident
that even in his most mature period, however settled of might be his conviction as to the participation
find no adequate formula for things in Ideas, he could 109 Nor is it any real explanation, to represent the it. Ideas as the patterns which are imitated in pheno
mena. 110
The
111
objection,
that the likeness of the

their
copy
loc.
).
to the archetype
would only be possible by
TT]v Se fj-edîv rouVo,ua (JLOVOV v oi fj.eu yap TLv0a.yopei.oi
OVTO. 0acrip
emu rdv
r&v
dpi-
nXdrwi MtraâX^.
?}
5
T>
fie#eei, rovfO/J-a
H&TOI ye
pMc^
eldutis,
TT]v
/uil/jirjffw,
TJTLS a.v ci ?7
that matter in and by itself is a vot}TOV in a certain sense, but they are to be interpreted in the light of 50 C. no Thcaet. 176 Crat. 389 sq.; ; Parm. 132 C sqq. Phredr. 250 ;
d(f>e?<rav
fv KOIV$ frTeiv.
Ibid. c.
9,
a. 20 (vide p. 266, 112). Vide supra, p. 316 sq. 109 Cf Pksedo, 100 D (see prcceding chapter, note 109). Tim. 50 C vide 299, 14): the forms which Center into matter bear the
991
Rep. \i. 500 E 28 A sqq., 30 C

;
108
592 B Tim. The sqq., 48 E. attributes of things are the copy

ix.
;
impress of the Ideas rpbirov rivb

/ecu
ov<r<t>pa.<rTov
6avfj.acrT6i>.
Ibid,
the basis of all determined 51 A bodies is an eiSos auopffiov, Tra^Sex^s, jueraXa/x./Scij OJ 5 aTropwrard Trrj TOV the latter words do not state VOTJTOV
:
of the Ideas, and so far, Plato says, (Tim. 50 C, 51 B) the corporeal admits in itself the /n/^/uara of the Ideas and as the things themselves thereby become like the Ideas, they can be directly called imitations of them (jcu/âTa), as Tim. 49 \
;
cf.
30 C. ll Parm.
loc. cit.

common
both,
totle
is
113
337
participation in an Idea separate from them 112 but the question of Aris easily removed; as to the efficient Cause which imitates*
is
things
from Ideas
much more
;
serious.
Here
Plato, as far
as his philosophic concepts are concerned, leaves us in place of scientific entirely at fault explanation, we have the popular notion of the Framer of the world,
who
fashions Matter like a human artist, only with the wondrous might of a God. Âccording to Plato, the
Ideas are indeed the archetypes of material things, but they are at the same time their essence and their
reality.
Things are only copied from Ideas in so
far
as they participate in them. Consequently, if their participation in Ideas remains unexplained, this want cannot be supplied by what is said of their being
imitated from the Idea.
So far then as the things of sense are the manifestation and copy of the Idea, they must be determined by the Idea so far as they have in Matter a specific principle in themselves, are
;
they
same time determined by Necessity,; for though the world is the work of Reason, 114 it cannot be denied
at the
that in
its origin there was, side by side with Reason, another blindly acting cause and even the Creator could not make his work absolutely perfect, but onlv
;
as
good as was permitted by the nature of the Finite. 115

-
Vide supra, p. 317 Vide p. 2(36, 112.

Cf.,
sq.
besides the following note, Soph. 235 C sq.; Pliileb. 28 U sqq.; Laws, x. 897 B sqq., and supra, preceding chapter, notes 111, 158,
a Tim. 48 A (vide supra, note 4G C: raOr ovv iravra. rCiv
r
<rrt
114
^wairiuv, o?s 6ebs virrjpeTovo-i TOLL rty TOV dplvrov Kara rb S (this has occurred p. 30 A)
airoTe\uv.
4(>
xy-
E:
Xe/crâ
fj.lv
(p&repa TO, TUV airtuv yevrj, 5 Saai /*er& vov KO.\UV Kal d 5-rj/j.iovpyol Kal ocrai /jLovudelo-ai
<f>pov-
^creus
rb rvx^v
&TO.KTOI>
e/cdororf
;
6).
tS-epydfovTai.
56 C, &c.
vide
fol-
338

its
working than the Idea of the Good, that highest Idea from which all others arise, and by which they are ruled: material things, as the work of Reason, must be explained from the Idea That in them of the Good, that is, teleologically. Reason has no higher law in
which
resists this explanation, is to
product
of
mechanical causes
the
be regarded as the work of natural
necessity.
These two kinds of causes are in no way

:
to be compared the specific and essential grounds of material things are final causes the physical grounds
;
lowing note.
tations
Polit.
Cf. further the

last
quo
in
the
273 C (TO Trjs fjioarias 7rd0o?, which by

in the world left to
chapter, and irdXaids avapits
071 TTOXX^S ei s TOV vvv
r)l>
fJLTX ol/
aTtt^l dS TTptV
K6<T/J.ov
d0t/ce <70T{.
The
Timseus makes no mention of a
growth
intro
itself,
duces a continual decrease of the good, and an increase of the bad, and would bring the world to dis solution if it were not for the in terference of the divinity in the
&TTipOS T07TOS
will be
T7JS a.VOlJ.OLOT ^TO^].
bad World-soul but (46 E) we find express mention of the corpo real (47 E), matter and material
;
causes are spoken of as TO, 5i dvdyKrjs yiyv6fj,va, TO TTJS irXcuw/t&ip eTSos curias ; 52 sq., to matter are ascribed heterogeneous powers
It
on how this gives rise to a bad World-soul in the Laws. Still, Plutarch s opinion C 5 sqq.\ (Procreat. Anim. in Tim.
shown
later
and an unregulated motion, before the formation of the world ; where

as from the soul are derived only
which is followed by Stallbaum, Plat. Polit. 100 Martin, Etudes i. 355, 369, and Uebcrweg, llhem. Mus. ix.
;
The visible, order and proportion. which the soul (ace. to 37 A) does not belong, is represented as ordered by God; the soul as the
to
76, 79, viz. that Plato in the earlier
writings derived the bad and evil from this and not from matter, is not correct, even if, with Stallbaum the one World-soul, quern renim divinarum invasit inciiri(t, is put in
cause of regulated movement is formed not from an older unregu lated soul, but from the Ideal and
The
the place of the bad World-soul. Politicus, 269 sq., derives the confused condition of the world from the nature of the corporeal
Phaedr. 245 corporeal substance. sq.: the world directing soul, not the unregulated, is unbecome. It is therefore no misunderstanding of Plato s doctrine when Arist. Phys. i. 9, 192 a. 15, speaks of its
B, we find : rov(the declension from com pleteness in the world) aur$ TO
and again, 273

TCOV 8t
<T(i)fj.orofiOS
Tr)S
ffvyKpdffeus
to the Ka.Koiroi.bv with reference Platonic matter, and Eudemus (ace. to Plat. loc. cit. 7, 3) accuses Plato of calling the same principle at one time MTrip /ecu Tidrivr), and at another representing it as atVt a /cat
KO.K&V.
Cf. Steinhart, vi. 95.
PARTICIPATION IX THE IDEAS.

are to be considered as merely concurrent causes, or, more precisely, means to Reason that is working to an end. lltj But still they are not so powerless as to be
altogether obedient instruments of Reason. already seen that Matter in spite of its
We
have
Non-being,
;
hinders and disfigures the Idea in the phenomenon here, Plato speaks of a resistance of Necessity to Reason
a resistance
hsedo, 18), Socrates
I
which yields only partially to the perTO,
90 A sqq. (cf. p. 10, blames the Physicists, particularly Anaxagoras, because they wish to explain all things
IM
bbâvTa
vi>3
/AOL,
dXtjdT]
TrottD
av \eyoi
cos
fj.fvTot
did TavTa.
TTOIW Kal
TavTa
fj.aKpd
TrpaTTU,
aipeo~ei,
dXX
j3e\Ti<rTov
merely out of air, lether, wind, water, and the like, instead of de monstrating their proper reason
teleologically
is
;
yap
ClXXo
/J.TJ
for
if
mind
(vovs)
it
a\\o
pad\ /j.ia irj 5ic\ffdai olbv T elvai OTI /J,tV Ti IffTl TO aiTlOV Tlj) 6vTL, S eKfivo dvev ov TO aiTiov OVK
ov Trj TOV av Kal TOV \6yov. TO

Tro\\r)
the
creator of
the
:
world,
must have arranged everything
in
the best possible way e/c 5?j ToO Xoôii TOVTOV ovStv dXXo o~KQireiv
irpocnrjKii
d-rj OLTIOV, &c. (cf. p. 202, Tim. 40 C (vide 109). preceding TOV 8e vov Kal iiriGT-r}note). 40 ])
:
av TTOT
fJ-f)S
dvdpwTTtt}
dXX
.
?}
TO
vos
(f>v<Tb)s
pao~Ti]v dvdyKTf Tay T^y ^/m.d>poaiVi ay irp&Tas p.f.TabnjjUTT
dptffTov Kal TO /SeXTicTTO*
Having
/>oOy,
KUV, oval, be
d\\uv
Anaxagoras doctrine of he hoped that with regard to the

formation of the earth, for instance, and all other points, he would
eKdiT]yri<Te<r0at
learnt
ph
KIVOV-
TT\V
avdyK-r)i>,
\eyovTa TO a^Lvov
ei
aiTiav Kal Trjv Kal
yiyvovTai, devrepas, &c. (precedin< r 48 (vide p. 227, 8), 08 E (at the end of the review of the phy sical distinctions and causes of
note).
things)
TauTa
77
irdvTa TbT
/j.oi dirocpaivoiTo irapea Kevda /j.rjv coy ovKtTi Trodeabfj.e~ vos aj ciXXo ciooy, &c. In this
Kal
TavTa
Te Kal dpiffTOv
/J.CVQS
fj.fv
dr)fj.Lovpybs ev TOIS yt.
am
yvoptvois Trapeydfj-Pavev
Taty irepl
xpu
TavTa amots
expectation, however, he was en tirely deceived; Anaxagoras, like all the rest, spoke merely of phy This pro sical, not final, causes. cedure, however, is no better than if one were to say, Socrates acts in all things reasonably, and then mentioned his sinews and bones as
the reason of his acts. dXX curta fttv TO, TOiavTa KaXelv \iav &TOTTOV (I te Tty Xe 70i OTL avfv TOV TOiavTa OVK av olds T rjv TroifTf ?X fiV
-
ev Train TOIS Sib yiyvofjifroti avTos 077 XPÎ ^ v ctiVi ay fidf] 8iopi^ffdat TO
jj.v
fj.v
dvayKatov, TO 8
delov
v
deiov, Kal TO dtraat. {IJTCIV KTrj&eus

fiiov,
eveKa evdaifj-ovos
P.UV
ttvev
e
TI
<pv<ris
Kad
6<rov
?;-
fvSfx^Taiy TO d
dvay-
TOVTWV ov SvvaTa avTa

<rirov8do[jiev,
oiy
fj.6va
oi)5
aO
Xa/3etv oi S dtXXws
z 2
540
suasion of Reason, and so prevented the Creator from 117 In the same producing a thoroughly perfect work. 118 it is the body which as we shall presently find, way,
hinders
him
from pure knowledge, which calls forth in desires, and moral disorder of every kind. Aristotle, indeed, plainly says that Plato held Matter 119 To comprehend both causes in as the cause of evil.
evil
man
one
to recognise in natural Necessity the proper
work
of Reason,
and the positive medium (not merely the is limitation and negative condition) of its working 120 But his tele to him, in this dualism. impossible
character of ology preserves in the main the external the Socratic view of Nature, though the end of Nature is no longer exclusively the welfare of men, but the
The natural Good, Beauty, Proportion, and Order. forces of Nature are thus related to world and the
117
121
S).
Ibid.
Tim. 48 A (supra, 56 C (on the

:
p.
227,
Xeyova tv,
TroXXa;
d\V 6\lyuv
eXdrrw Kal r&v
fj.cv
rots dv-
forma
tion of the elements)
rb
TUV
ava.\oy<.&v
nal STJ teal rbv 0ebv,
yap
TJJUUV
ra.ya.6a
JJL^V
T&V
K.aK&v
ayad&v
OTTT; -rrep 77 TT}S
dvdyK-rjs e/coO<ra Tretadeiffd re 0wris vtre iKe, ravrri irdvTt]

8t
a.Kpifieia.3
a.TroTe\e<r8et(T&i>
i>ir
ovdeva &\\ov airiareov ruv 5e KO.K&V
dXX firra Set ^retv ra airia (by which primarily, though not exclu
sively, the
avrov
Cf.
^vv7jp/j.6crOaL ravra ava\byov. Theophr. Metnph. 33 (vol. i.
human
Polit.
will is to
be un
fffwcpa.
derstood).
fjL^v
273 I):
314, 3).
118
119
Pp. 227, 241
sq.
Metaph.
i.
6,
end,
it
is
said
of Plato,
KO.K&S
Zn
5k ryv rov e5 Kal TOTO?S

crTOixetoiT?
alrLav
(the
rdyada, Tro\\T)v 5e rr/v T&V tvavriwv Kpacnv eTreyKepavin /Ji.evo$ (6Theset. 170 (infra, K6a/j.os}. chap. x. note 6). lal Cf. Phileb. 28 C sq., 30 A
unit and matter) o.irtwKev eKarea. pois eKaTepov, and Pliys. i. 9, 192 14 Aristotle, as already remarked, speaks in Plato s sense of the KO.KOiroibv of
]
64 Tim. 29
sqq.,
In other passages the reference to the interests of mankind comes forward more
sq.
sqq.
Phaedo,
loc.
cit.,
matter.
Cf., also,
Rep.
ii.
379 C:
ws
ol
oi)5
&pa, ty 5 e7cb, 6 Oebs,
cireiS?)
ayaObs*
TroXXol
particularly in the last strongly part of the Timseus, the contents of which naturally lead us to ex
;
&v
etri
ai rtos,
pect this.
HEA SOX A
\/>
NECESSITY.
:
341
122 hence there was consequences external to themselves a special necessity that Plato should here use not only personification, but mythical language, with regard to efficient causes. Aristotle was the first to conceive
the notion of inner activity working to an and and even he leaves much to be desired in his scientific view
;
of this activity, and
still
more in
its application.
Although, however, Plato did not succeed in over coming the dualism of the idea and the phenomenon, he yet attempts, while presupposing this dualism, to
point out the middle terms by means of which the Idea and the phenomenon are combined. And this he per ceives in mathematical proportions, or the Worldsoul.
III.
The
World-soul.
As God
desired
that the
world should be framed in the best possible manner, 124 He considered that nothing unin says the Timaeus, taken as a whole, could ever be better than telligent, the intelligent and that intelligence could not
;
(vovg)
anything which was devoid of soul. For this reason He put the intelligence of the world into a soul,
exist in
82
Cf.
note
116, particularly Phsedo, sqq. O-* T^ 1 1 /~\ ,1 /

,
on this the quotations in 98

n
365
et
sq.
396
num.
putatt. m-* .1
Trend!. Plat, de id. doctr. 52, 95; Bonitz, DisPlat. 47 sqq .; Martin * A
;
/J
tem (1852),
peril.
ii.
18 sq.; Brandis, De Arist, libr. 64, Khein. Mus.

p.
sq.
gus, sqq.
ii.
;
Snpplementbl. (1863), p. 211 Wolilstein, Mat. ond Welt-
a.
1828, p. 579; (Jr.-rom. Phil. ii. 361 sqq.; Stallbaum, Kchola crit. et hist. sup. loco Tim. 1837 ; Plat. Tim. p. 134 sqq. Hitter, ii.
;
seele, Marl).
PI. de
1863; Wohlrab, Quid An. raundi elementis docue1872.

cf.
rit, Drcsd. 124
30 B;
supra, p. 228, 171.
342
and the soul in the world as into a body. He prepared the soul as follows. Before He had formed the corporeal elementSj He compounded out of the indivisible and self-identical substance and also out of the divisible and
corporeal, a third nature intermediate Having mingled in this substance the
between them. Same and the
Other, he divided the whole according to the cardinal numbers of the harmonic and astronomical systems, 125
/cat ciet 35 A: T /;? ovaia^ /cat TTJS Kara ravra ex aft TTfpl ra erayiara yiyvo/nfrys fi-epict//,e/>tcrrou
"*}*
rpirov e d/j,(potv ev /wecry ^vvt5os TT}S re rai roG KepaffaTo ovcrias (ptiffcus av \Trepi\ /cat TTJS darepov,
ffTrjs /cat
connected with the Divided, and the ddrepov with the Undivided, they in no way coincide ; both pairs of concepts have a separate import, and in their combination
give two classifications which cross each other. The ravrbv and ddrepov both occur in the Indivisible and the Divisible, in the Idea and the Corporeal, and arc found in sensible intellectual as well as
Kara ravra
^vv^ffTrjcrev ev
yU&ry
rou re
d/j.epovs O.VT&V /cat

/cai
TOV Kara
TO. (rciywara fj.epiaTov.
rpia Aa/Scl^
vvp.iK-
ai Ta &VTO. ffvv e/cepdcraro ets filav TTO.V-
ra
TOV
ISfav, TTJV dartpov

o$<rav
<pv<ru>
els
ravrov ^vvapfj.bTTWi
oi^crtas /cat
knowledge (Tim. 37 A sq. Soph. 255 C sqq., vide pp. 250, 278).
;
e/c rpiuv TOVTO fjioipas Scras TrpocrTJKe Stcêiuer, 5e e/c re TO.VTOV /cat Oarepov (KdffT7]i> In tcai T^J oiWas /J.e/j.LjfJ.ev rjv, &c. the interpretation suggested in the text, I have gone on the lately universal supposition that the un meaning 7re/u, here enclosed in On brackets, is to be struck out. the other hand, I believe that we must retain the ad before it, which
The soul is indebted to the d/j.epurrov for its power of knowing the Ideal, to the /j.eptffTbv for its power of knowing the sensible, to the ravrbv for its ability to conceive (in sensible and Ideal alike) the relation of identity, to the ffdrepov
for its ability (equally in both)
to
Stallbaum ad loc. changes into 5?, and Bonitz, Hermann (in his edi tion), and Susemihl agree in wish ing to remove, not merely because
this is the easiest explanation of the insertion of irtpi. (from the pre ceding a 5 Trept), but because the separation of the ravrbv and Bdrcpov from the d^piarov and the liepiffrbv, thus expressed is really Platonic. Although the ravTov is
conceive the relation of difference (see on this point Tim. loc. cit. to gether with the elucidation of the passage later on in this chapter. Sensible perception is here repre sented as proceeding from the KVKXos darfyov, thought from the /ctf/cXos rayroD; but this does not prove that the Bdrepov is identical with the alad-rjTbv, and the ravrbv with the vQT]rbv\ the circle of the ravrbv
is,
according to p. 30 C, that in which the fixed stars move, the circle of the Qdrepov, with its seven-
TUN WORLD-SOUL.
343
and formed from the entire compound, by a longitu dinal bisection, the circle of the heaven of fixed stars, and that of the planets. 120 In this representation the mythical and imaginative
at once apparent. The division and spread ing out of the World-soul in space, prior to the forma
element
is
tion
its of the corporeal origin from a chemical admixture, the entirely material treatment even of the Immaterial, can never have been seriously intended by
;
Plato
otherwise he
would deserve
&c. on
all
the
censure,
fold
divisions,
planets move.
cles,
cf.
that in which the Each of these cir

is
0u<r.,
e:
is:
Between the
divisible
so that the sense and indi
however, according to 35 B,
note
137,
composed in
ravrbv,
all
its
parts Bdrepov,
out
of the
oi cria).
the
and
In order to
express this different import of the
two pairs, Plato keeps them apart in his exposition. Ueberweg cor rectly points out, p. 41 sq. that
,
he mixed a third, composed out of the two, and fur ther also (aC) composed out of the nature of the TO.VTOV and 6drepov, and formed it so as to stand mid way between the indivisible part of them, and the part which can be
visible substance
the substance of the World-soul is formed by a kind of chemical mix ture out of the aêpLVTov and the both are completely blended and no longer appear in it The ravrbv and ddreseparately. pov do appear separately, both ac cording to the passage before us, and 37 A. Only these two are men tioned as parts of the World-soul, together with ovcria, the Indivisible and the Divisible are merely ele ments of ovffia. (Cf. Martin, i.
/j.pi<TToi>
divided in bodies. Instead of TOV re d/j-epovs avTuiv Steinhart loc. cit. would read, with Proclus in Tim. 187 E, TOV re d/ze/>oCs O.VTOV but in the present passage Plato had no occasion to speak of the Indivisible Ko.6 aura. Wohlrab, p. 10, on the other hand, would refer the airroi* to the Tpirov oixrias etSos but it is hard to see how this could be placed between the adepts and tho
; ;
fj.pi<TTbi>
in
it,
consequently between
s
its
own
elements. Susemihl
v.
conjec
ture (Philol. Anzeiger,
on 358 sqq. Steinhart, vi. 243 the other hand, Snsemihl, Wohlrab, with Kickh that and others consider the ravrbv and 6drepov arc identi cal in signification with the /J.epiarov and The genitives )
;
;
aiVwi
is to
fully into the various inter pretations of the present passage,
more more
likely.
be changed 1 cannot here enter
672), that into dvrb. is
a/j.epi<rToi>.
TT?S
d/Jt,fpi<TTov
me
to
;
-/xe/HOT??? appear to depend on the following ev

T?;S
given most fully by Susemihl in the Philologus, and by Wohlrab. 1 Further details on this point,
(i
p.
212.
the genitive
re TO.VTOV
344

127
whicli
Aristotle,
strangely mistaking the mythical
form, casts
upon
this portion of the Timseus.
With
regard to his real scientific views, it is first of all undis
puted (and the Timaeus places it beyond a doubt) that he held the cosmos to be a living creature, and attributed
to it not only a soul, but the
most perfect and most,
This conviction partly resulted from! intelligent soul. the universal consideration of the relations between the
and the body partly from the particular contem If God created plation of nature and the human mind. a world, He must have made it as perfect as possible, and this perfection must belong to the Universe which
soul
contains in itself all essential natures, in greater measure than to any of its parts. 128 But the intelligent is always
more
perfect than the unintelligent, cannot dwell in any being, except by

If,
and intelligence means of a soul.
is the most perfect of all created as possessing the most perfect intellimust, beings, 129 All that is gence, possess also the most perfect soul.
therefore, the world

it
moved by another must be preceded by

this alone is
a Self-moved
the beginning of motion. But all the/ is moved by another, the soul 011 the corporeal contrary 130 is nothing else than the self-moving motion. The
soul is consequently prior to the body and that whicli belongs to the soul is prior to the corporeal. Reason and art are older than that which is generally called
;
nature
and
this
name
itself is in
truth far more applic
able to the soul than to the body.

127
The same must

p. 238, 171.
<LVTT]V
also
De An.
i.
2,
406
b.
128
Tim. 30 A,
sq.,
25 sqq. 37 A, 92
129
13
Vide
T)
5wa/j.tvi) aurij
end.
niv-riffis.
Laws, 896 A.
THE WORLD-SOUL*
hold good with regard to the Cosmos. the soul must be the first and
345
In this
also,
governing principle;.
the body the secondary and subservient. 131 Or if we -consider more particularly the constitution of the uni
verse,
there
is
shown
comprehensive
in its whole economy, such a adaptation of means to ends, and,
especially in the motion of the stars, such an admirable regularity, that it is impossible to doubt the Reason
and wisdom that rule

soul of the world,
it. But where, except in the can this Reason have its dwelling ? 132
in
The same universal mind or reason proclaims itself, our own spirit for just as there is nothing inour body which is not derived from the body of the
lastly, in
:
incomparably more glorious, mighty, and perfect than in our body, so must the soul of the world proportionately transcend -our soul in perfection. 134 In a word, therefore, the
World-soul
is
133 there could be in world, so says Plato (with Socrates), us no soul, if there were none in the universe. And as the corporeal elements in the universe are
Reason impart
necessary, because only through it can itself to the corporeal ; it is the indis
pensable intermediate principle between the Idea and

Laws, x. 891 E-890 K. The leading idea of this proof has, however, been already expressed in the
J*
,
dea-roTu? xal aptovaav

ea-Trjffaro.
];! -
apô^vov
*vv-
Phdrus,245 C:
tfvov
or?
rbavrb
KLVOVV (the soul), are OVK aTroXetTOj eairro, ou Trore XT^CI Kti>ov/j.evov, dXXd /ecu rots aXXots 6 aa /afetrcu
Phileb, 30 sqq. (p. -jr.l, 111). So, J8 sq., the stars and their motions were appealed to, to
Crat.
T. apxy Kivr)<Tws. Tim. 34 B: God did not form the soul after the body ov yap &v&pxe<r6ai irpffffivrepov virb
(
40<)
TOUTO
7T77777 Ko.1
da<rcv ... 6 6^ vcwrtpoy frvfyfrs KO.I yeveffei KO.I apery irporepav nal
prove that not chance, but reason and intellect govern the world. Cf. Tim. 47 b oph. LY,;. w. sqq. Laws, x. 897 13. sqq. Vide part i. p. 147, 1. 1:u Philcb. 29 A sqq., and supra,
J:{:{
loc. cit.
S4G
the phenomenon. As such, it is, 011 the one side, the cause of all regulated motion, and of all the configu ration thence proceeding on the other it is the source
;
of all spiritual life
and especially of
all
knowledge, for
knowledge, according to Plato, is that which distin 135 These are the points guishes man from the beasts.
of view from which he starts in his description of th$ ft is compounded of the indivisible and World-soul, of the divisible essence
sole Idea
itself
;
that
is
to say,
it
combines the
with the sensible phenomenon, by uniting in
130 It is incorporeal, the specific qualities of both. but is at the same time, related to the like the Idea it stands over against the unlimited Multi corporeal
; ;
plicity of
phenomena
it
lawless vicissitude as the
introduces into
1:i3 J:!6
Unity: against its permanent element which But it is fixed proportion and law.
An.
dis
b. o. rightly
as its ideal
240 13. Tim. 35 A, Plato says

Cf. Phsedr.
remarks merely
tinctly that the ovffia aftepiaTos de notes the Ideal, the ovcria fj.epi(TTT]
while he repeatedly the latter irepl ra aw/nara and describes the former just as he previously, 27 1), de del /caret scribed the Ideas (there del here ravra eôiV^s ovcrLas Kara ravra 6v). It does not fol low that the Ideas as such, and sensible things as such, are in the Plato World-soul simply says that the substance of the Worldsoul is a mixture of the sensible and the Ideal substance. The sub stance of the sensible and the Ideal is something different from the in
the Corporeal
calls
;
/j.epi<TTTj,
the voyrbs and cuV^ros dpos, theyeviKa (rroi%aa TOV faros, the ele ment of the Ideal and the Sensible, the universal essence of it. After ex the deduction of figurative pressions (as Simpl. loc. cit. 72 b. o. virtually acknowledged, the general result is that the soul stands midway between Sensible
and
Ideal, and partakes in both. Plato speaks of a participation of the soul in the Idea. In the
dividual Ideas, and the individual sensible things (cf. Ueberweg, p. 54 sq.); it signifies (as Himpl. l)e
Pluedo, 105 lisqq., et siepius, Mar tin, i. 355 sqq. explains the nepurrbv as the un -ordered soul the d/ê/otarov as the POVS which emanates from God. The former supposi tion has been already refuted, note 115; the idea of an emanation is. quite un-Platonic.
:
TIIK WORLD-SOUL*
347
not. like the Idea, altogether outside this multiplicity;
being involved, as the Soul of the body, in space, and as the primary cause of motion, in vicissitude. The union of the Same and the Other with this substance of Soul has reference to the combination of uniformity and change in the motion of the heavenly bodies; 137 of 138 In the comparison and difference in knowledge. revolution of the heaven of fixed stars, and in the
rational cognition, the element of the Same predominates; in the movement of the planets and in the
sensuous notion that of the other.

ever, restrict
We
must
not,
how
any of these
phenomena
to either of these
two elements, nor must we in this half allegorical delineation seek a complete and developed system, or be too anxious and precise about its connection with
other theoretic determinations. 139
1:;r 36 C, the motion of the heaven of the fixed stars is as-
The
division of the
sphere of the fixed stars the TO.VTOV, in that of the planets the Bdrepov, is
signed (cire^fjutr^v} to the TO.VTOV, that of the planets to the ddrepov. Plato, however, cannot mean that n the former there is no mutability, and in the latter no fixedness,
predominant, as Plut. 24, says. 138 37 sqq. 139 Ancient and modern commcn-
tators have combined the TO.VTOV and 6drepov of the Timseus in dif-
Without mutability no motion at

without fixedness no regulated motion is imaginable but (Soph, 255 B), both these qualities are attributed to motion, and the PolitiCIIH, L OO I) indicates the element of mutability in the motion of the uni verse while (Tim. 35 B), in the .livision of the World-soul it is exremarked that each of its nressly is ravcomposed out of
all,
;
; [>arts
ferent
ways with the other

principles of the
well-
Platonic Modern interpreters usu. system. ally presuppose the identity of the TOLVTQV with the d/J-tpurror, and of the ddrepov with the fiepurrbv. Hitter, especially (ii. 366, 396), understands the Ideal by the TCLVTOV, and the Material by the ddrtpov
:
known
so too, Stallbaum (Plat.
Tim. 136
ov<ria,
rbv,
and Bdrepov ; and (37 sq.), he knowledge both of Identity and Difference is ascribed to the circle of he ravrbv and that of the ddrepov uike. The meaning is that in the
the former with sq.) the Finite, the latter with the Infinite and most of the corn-
who compares
mentators. Tennemann (Plat. Phil, iii. 66) understands Unity and Bockli plurality or Mutability ;
348
soul as to its whole substance, according to the relations of the harmonic and astronomical systems, 140 implies
of. Cosmic system (loc. cit. 34 sqq. of PI. p. 19), Unity arid the inde
;
do not coincide with the
d/j,epi(TTOv
and the nepurTw.
And
the Greek
duad, which is more Platon Trendelenic, instead of the duad burg (Plat, de id. et num. doctr. 95), Ueberweg (54 sq.), and appa
finite
;
interpreters as a rule (Prod. Tim. 187 C, says not all), distinguish the
rently Brandis (Gr.-rom. Phil. ii. a. 360), would say the Infinite or I the Great and Small. cannot agree unconditionally with the lat ter explanations of the ftepiffrbv and the djJLepKTTov. The mixture of these two elementary principles must clearly represent the soul as something midway between the Ideas and sensible things. But this is not favoured either by the theory that it is composed out of Unity and Duality, or the theory that it is composed out of the Unit and
two, e.g. Xenocrates and Crantor ap. Plut. c. 1-3; Proclus 181 C sqq., 187 A sqq. Simpl. de an. 6
;
C 2, 7 (the details of these explanations are to be found in the passages themselves and in
b.
u.
:
Philop.
De
an.
Tim. Locr. 95
Martin,
243).
i. 371 Steinhart, sqq. Plutarch c. too, 25,

;
vi. 3,
the Infinite. Unity and Duality are merely the elements of number to the later form of the (according doctrine, of ideal, as well as mathe matical number) the Unit and the
;
agrees in distinguishing them ; by the fj-epiffTov, however, he under stands (c. 6) as does Martin, i. 355 sq., not matter, but the ordered soul, which even before the forma tion of the world, moved the Ma terial, and became the World-soul through its association with Reason Ti(the dutpHTTov: cf. note 115). mseus of Locri (90 A) makes two motive powers out of the TO.VTOV
conversely, must exist in everything, Sensible and Ideal alike. Ueberwcg s expedient, of supposing a threefold Unit, and a threefold
Infinite,
and darfpov by an arbitrary limita meaning. The sup positions of Brandis in the two
tion of their
older treatises, that the Great-and-
Small
is
meant by the nepiarbv
which only the second the mathematical unit and the mathematical or, more accurately,
Infinite (of
the spatial infinite are to be taken as elements of the world-soul), has been already refuted, p. 327 sq. own view is that the a.ju.epicrToi> denotes the Ideal, the fMepiarbf the To say that these two Corporeal. are in all things (as Pint. c. 3, 3 ;
My
and Martin, i. 379, object) is only correct if we include the soul, by means of which the Sensible parti
cipates in the Idea, in our reckon
ing.
p.
It has been already proved, 343, that the TO.VTOV and 6drepov
the ravrbv and and the kindred theory of Stallbanm, sup. loco Tim. p. sqq., who would understand the indefi nite duad or (sic} the Ideal and the corporeally Infinite, have been refuted by Bonitz, p. 53 those of Herbart (Kmil. in die Phil. W. i. 251), and Bonitz (p. 08 sqq. | and cf. Martin, i. 358 sqq.), viz. that \ the soul is composed out of the Ideas of Identity, Difference, and Being, by Ueberweg, pp. 40-54. Even Plutarch, c. 23, shows that the soul is not an Idea. 140 Tim. 35 B-30 B Bockh loc.
dfj.epKrTov, or
and
darepov,
Till]
WOltLD-SOUL.
349
that the soul comprehends all proportion and measure primarily in itself : it is wholly number and
harmony,
pp. 43-81 (cf. metr. Find. 203 following Crantor, Eudoxus and riutarch, gives an exhaustive elucidation of this passage, and a catalogue of the ancient interpreters as far as they are known to us. All the moderns follow his example, e.g.
cit.
Proportion of
1
:
Rqq.),
4)
384 512 570 70S 708 1024 1152 1530 8) 1530 2048 2304 3072
2)
Stacr
(B) for ^the Tpnr\d<rti. Proportion of

1
:
Btellbaum ad
6(j([.
8<|t|.
loc.
Brandis.
;
i.
ii.
ii.
a. 3(33 sq.
view, p.
;
35 sq. 203 sqq.

; ;
Martin,
tiller,
i.
457 383
vi.
in his re
384 570 708 1152 1152 1728 2304 3450 9 27) 3450 5184 0912 10308. According to this scheme, in tho
3)
9)
Steinhart,
99 sqq. Suscmihl, Genet. Entw. ii. 357 sqq. and others, though not all with equal understanding. Briefly,
Plato the collective represents World-soul as divided into seven parts, which stand to one another ns 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27, that is to say the two and three follow unity, and then the squares and cubes of two and three. Both these series of numbers, that progressing in the proportion of 1 2, and that in the
:
series of the Si-n-Xdcria Stcia-râra, the first of the four numbers of each series stands to the second
(e.g. 384 512), and the third to the fourth (570 708) as 3 4 the second to the third (512 570) as 8 9. In the series of the rpiirXdcria Staarâra, the first stands to the second (384 570), and the third to the fourth (708 1152) as 2; 3; the second to the third (570 708) as 3 4. Hence (Tim. 36 sq.) arise the proportions 2 9. The first two of 3, 3:4, 8 these fill up the Tpnr\d<na, the second and third the 5t7r/\d<rta If we try to reduce diaffTrj/jutTa. the proportion 3 4 to the propor tion 8 9, which serves to complete it, we find our progress arrested but if we advance from the number 384 in the proporlion of 8 9, we get the numbers 432 = x 384, and 486-|x432; for the remainder, instead of the proportion 8 9, we get only 480 512 = 243 250. The same holds good of the resolution of the proportion 2 3 through the proportion 8:9; 2:3 is greater than 4 by the interval 8 9. All the proportions depending on the fundamental proportion 2 3 and 3 4 can be resolved into the two proportions 8 9 and 243 256. If this process be applied to the
: :
:
;
proportion of
1:3
(the
8iir\d<ria
and
Tpnr\d<na
Staor^yuara ),
are
then further completed in such a way that between each two terms of
the system two means are inserted, an arithmetical and a harmonic ;
i.e.
one which
same number
is less
greater by the as that by which it

is
;
than the larger term and one such that its difference from
the smaller divided by the smaller equals its difference from the larger divided by the larger (cf. vol. i.
34S, ;). If this requirement is satistied, and the smallest number put as
unity, which will allow the expres sion of the rest of the series in
>
whole numbers, we get the follow ing scheme. (The second number of each series gives the harmonic,
the third the arithmetical mean.) (A) For the dnr\d<na
350

it
and from
harmony
in
spring all numerical definition and all the world for with Plato, as with the
:
whole of the numbers in the above scheme, we get the following re

sults
:
384
432
1st;
,
2018
8
:
\
)
256
2187
273
213 :256
,
tones of the octachord stand ac cording to a diatonic classification, the strings going from lowest to highest, and consequently the tones are numbered from the high to the low (which is not always the case,
e.g. Arist, Metaph. v. ii. 1018, b. 28 ; x. 7, 1057, a. 22, the procedure:
is
I
2304
243
:
256
2592
-
8:9
8:9
243
:
512
-
8:9
2916
8
:
from the
vrrdrr]
through the
576
I
to the
in the following pro-
256
portion
648 729
3072
{
[8:9
!-
8 :9
3156
risss
9 9
243
256
9
-8:9
768
:
18:0
213
:
8
rpri)
864
:
4374
9
256
243
256
972
"
4608
\
"
243
Q
258
1024
.
5184
n
I
1152
5832
8
)
8:9
1296
!-
6561
8:9
243
:
243
8
256
Trapvirdrv]
.
).
8:0
243
:
1458
I
256
256
1536
7776
[8:9 1728 [8:9 1914

243
:
[8:9
8748
213
:
256
If we reckon these proportions in accordance with a single measure

for all eight tones,
9216
10368
and make the
256
8 :9
2018
this series, derived from the three numbers, Plato recognises fundamental determinations of the the astronomical and harmonic sys tem. In the former, according to
In
Jirst
higher tone the lesser (as is usual with the ancients, because the height of the tone, as is well known, stands in inverse proportion
to the length of the sounding-string with equal thickness and tension, or because, as Bockh supposes, loc.
cit. 49, the higher tone requires just as many vibrations in a lesser I cannot, however, find this time. in the passages quoted by Bockh, and in any case the first method of measurement seems to me to be the original), we obtain the following formula if the tone of the vrjTr) be set down as = 384, then the irapa= 432, the rpiTrj - 486, the 1/777-77
;
his of course entirely arbitrary sup cf. 38 ; ; position (Tim. 36 llep. x. 617 sq.), the distances of
the planets depend upon the nnmbers two and three, and their powers ; the sun, Venus, Mercury, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn are respec tively 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 27 times as far from the earth as the moon. So in the harmonic system. The eight
THE WORLD-SOUL.
:iot
ythagoreans, musical harmony and the system of the leavenly bodies are the principal revelations of the inisible
numbers and
= i)l2.
708.
their accord. 141

,
In this respect,
6etcD>),
Trapa.]j.(0 7)
the
/j.e<rr]
= ol$, the
2
:
in Hiilolaus ^5t
,
or
the
TTCITT;
(Other numbers
would
result, if
we put down
the
larger number for the higher tone and the smaller for the deeper, as we should do in determining the proportion of the tone according to the number of its vibrations, Then if the virdT-r) were put down at 480,
the fourth (Sid retraapuv, in Philol. triAXa/ST?), or 3 : 4 (^r/T/Hrw), the tone, or 8 : 9, and the lesser semi-tone, or 243 : 250
(i)fu6\toi>)
(this lesser half of a tone is called in Philolaus Ste<m, later Xet/â, the
greater = 250
TO/iTy).
(jLtcrr],
273f
is
called diro-
From
is
the
vrjTtj
and from the

/u-ea-rj,
to the irapa^yt] to the
we should have
512
:
for the
irapvirdr-rj
;
for the
/ue cTT;
048
\ixavbs 570 for the for the Trapafj.ô-r) 729

;
for the Tp iTT] 708 ; for the Trapavrfrr/ 804 for the vr^rt] 972. Hut clearly this is not Plato s way of reckon
:
ing, and Martin, i. 395 is mistaken in believing that Plato intended to
ace"
larly to the to Tim.
assign the larger numbers particu higher tones, because,
07 B; 80
sq.,
with
Aristotle
tones.
and others he considers them to be quicker than the lower As Martin himself remarks, ven those old musicians who knew
the higher tones consist of more parts than the lower or proluce more vibrations in the air, do lot invariably do this, because they
that
a fourth, from the vrjrrj and from the Trapa.fj.ecn] to the virdTij is a fifth the distance of the particular strings amounts partly to a tone, partly to a XeZâ. It is obvious that these are the same proportions which form the basis of the series of numbers. All the derivative tones (e.g. the did iraffCiv /cat did 7reVre= 1 3, and the 5ts did Tracrit}i>= 1 4) can easily le shown in it (cf. Plat. an. procr. and it contains in itself a 14, 2) system of four octaves, a fifth and a tone the sequence of the tones likewise comes quite right, if with
virdrrj
to the
Bjckh and the pseudo-Timcieus (who

can only on this supposition give the sum of the numbers in question as 114, 695) we interpolate the number 0144 between the numbers 5832 and 0501. This number is distant a \ei/j./j.a from 5832, and an Then there diroTO[j.ri from 0501. remains only the unimportant ano maly that two tones (2048 2304
:
Calculate the proportion of the tone iccording to the length of the

)thers, of tilings. course, e.g. Vrist. ap. Pint. Mus. 23, 5 ; Arist. robK-n: xvii. 2: ,: Plut. an. procr.
(
mmber
assign the larger higher tone. Furhe r details on this point are to be ound in Mai-tin, loc. cit.) The undamental proportions of the bove scale, as the Pythagoreans ad already taught (see vol. i. 305 i. 345 sq ), are the octave (did cwwi^, or the proportion 1 2 \67oy d;ir\d<rios), the fifth (Sid
8, sq., 19,
1,
to the
and 0144
0912) are resolved into

:
a semi-tone, and that in the fourth octave (3072 6144) the fifth pre
ceding the fourth. 141 :f. Kep. vii. 527
<
sq.
529
;
sqq.
530 D; Tim. 47
i.
sqq.
and
vol.
374.
352
therefore, the
World-soul has the same import and comprehension as that which Plato, in the Philebus,
calls the Limit, and Aristotle represents him as calling the Mathematical principle. For of the Limit it is said 142 that the whole sphere of number and measure
belongs to it ; and Aristotle assigns to the Mathematical principle the same place that is occupied in the Timaeus by the World-soul it stands midway between material
:
143 It is quite in harmony with objects and the Ideas. this, that Plato should make the Mathematical sciences,
and these
alone,
form the transition from the sensible

144
;
for perception to the contemplation of the Idea in conformity with his principles, this pre-supposes that as these sciences themselves lie in the midst be
tween the sensible notion and pure thought, 145 so must their object lie between the phenomenon and the Idea. The two concepts, however, are certainly distinct in their points of departure and in their apprehension. The notion of the World-soul, starting from the con templation of Life and motion, represents primarily the
efficient
ner of the
powers in the universe, conceived in the man human soul the Mathematical principle
:
represents the formal determination of things, accord25 A vide p. 264. Metaph. i. 6, 987 a. 14: eVt 8e trapa ra alcrd-rjTa /ecu ra eidtj ra /j.adrj/j.artKa T&V Trpay/j-druv elvai
42
;
143
expression aKimjra is, 1 lato in inaccurate; neither the AVorld-soul nor, ace. to
b. G.)
The
however,
Rep.
<f>T)(ri
juerai>,
dLafapovra
/ecu
rui>
fjitv
a.i<rdr)Tui>
r$
aiSia
dKivrjra elvcu,
TUV
ei8ut>
ry
TO
TO, fj.lv
o/noLa
eu>cu
5e
eTSos
7r6\V ar- a avrb $v
%Ka<rTov
fjibvov.
(Similarly in the
1,
vii. 529 C scj. (supra, p. 221, is 158), the mathematical principle absolutely unmoved ; they arc only free from Becoming and the change ability of Becoming. 144 A ide p. 215.
"
shorter
vii.;
2,
allusions
1028
b.
18,
9, xi.
991
:
a.
14
4,
Of. p. 225.
1,
1059
Till-:
WoltLD-Sol
l^
p,53
111 But as in the Platonic ing to number and measure. Ideas, the highest efficient and the highest formal causes coincide, and arc divided only temporarily and
in inexact description, so
in itself all
it
is
hriv.
The \Vorld-soul
mathematical proportions in comprehends unity and occupies the position, which according to the Philebus and to Aristotle, is exclusively filled by
;
the
Mathematical principle.
Though we should not
assuming that Plato has expressly iden tified them, and must indeed acknowledge that the problem of finding a middle term between Idea and
be
justified in
phenomenon
is
different sides (this
apprehended in the two doctrines from middle term being regarded in the
concept of the soul from the point of view of livinoforce, as cause of motion and of opinion, while in the concept of the mathematical principle it appears as a
yet both have ultimately the and take the same place in the Mntonic system. 17 They show us the Idea in reference to the world of sense and the world of sense embraced
specific
;
form of Being)
1
same
I
signification,
4t;
On
this
depends Plutarch
an.
procr. 23, 1, to the theory that the soul is either a number or a space rots
objection,
:
De
gether with the irepa.? (by which 1 understand the mathematical standard of determination), goes
neither against my explanation of the repay, nor against the correct ness of the connection given above. 1 do not, of course, suppose thiit Plato expressly identified the ma-
irepac-i
pyre
rots
^re
a.pi.6 juots
/j.edh
frvirdpxeiv f/cai^s rijs Svvd/xewy, 7; TO aivdyTov 77 ^v^n Kpiveiv neither thought nor conoeption nor sensation can bo derived from units, lines, or superIflcies, v. note 154.
TT<J>VK
txs
soul
thematical principle and the Worldso I am not concerned with

;
]4:
|
Ilctlig s
80 Siebeck,
101 sq.
Phileh.
is
citation (p.
20,
AMa
in
1.
Gr.
Uriters. z. Phil, The fact that in
the
Juoul
especially
30 A, 0, the Worldmentioned
Philebus) of this passage against the assumption that means the World-soul.
the
as
t<>-
A A
354
In mathematical forms, tlie relations. of the Idea does indeed separate into plurality ; unity but these forms are not subject to the vicissitude of
by firmly limited
sensible things.
148
The Soul
corporeal
enters into the corporeal

itself is
is
and While
soul
its
motion, but the soul

all
that
is
moved
not corporeal. 149 by another, the
the self-moved, and moves everything else, 150 and though distinct from the Idea, the soul is of all
is
things most closely related to it. Strictly speaking, we should go a step further, and declare both the
151
World-soul and mathematical forms to be the Idea

itself,
as the formal determination
of the material world.
and motive principle For as Matter as such is the
Non-existent, the Heal in the soul can only be the But the same reasons which obliged Plato to Idea. separate the Idea from the phenomenon, necessitated
also the distinction of the soul
is
;
from the Idea
the soul
derived, the Idea original the soul is generated, the Idea eternal the Soul is a particular, the Idea a 152 the Idea is absolute reality, the soul onlyuniversal;
;
As the Ideas are placed side I participates in reality. with one another, although, properly speaking, by side the lower must be contained in the higher, and all in
the highest
;
153
as the world of sense
is set
beside the Ideas,
although, in so far as it possesses reality, it is imma nent in them, so the Soul appears as a Third between
148 149
V. note 143.
Soph. 246
sq.
;
79
A
150
151
Tim. V. supra, p. 345. Phsedo, 79 A sq.

of
soul),
E sqq. Phsedo, 36 E et alibi.

;
must hold good even more of the World-soul. "Rep. x. 611 E.

this
So, too, mathematical things in relation to the Idea vide pas;
152
(where
is
sages quoted, note 143, from Aristotle.

153
the
subject
discussion
the
human
but ace. to Tim. 41 D,
See
p.
346
sq., p.
239, 39.
m&
the Idea and the
355
phenomenon, instead of merely repre senting that side of the Idea, which is turned to the phenomenon and we find that the mathematical forms
;
retain a place beside the soul, while at the time mathematical are within it. 154 proportions
still
K)4
same
selfmoving number. So (ace. to Procltis in Tim. 187 B) did Aristaiulcr, Numeniuf, and many others and to this view belongs the statement
;
The old Platonists reckoned^ the Point and the intermediate the sonl for the most part among Space (Procl. loc. cit., whose state mathematical things only they ment with regard to Xenocratos were not agreed as to whether its will receive further confirmation nature was arithmetical or geome iosidonius, however, refers them trical, a number or a magnitude. to the voijTbv and spatial magnitude The Conner was the view of Xeno[Tip rdv TrepdTuv ofotav Trepi rd crates, who, as we shall see later ffwftara, the limitation of bodies on, defined it as a
;
1
m
u
4 7
the Timseus he
space). Aristotle, De An. 1 2 obj ects to J>Iato that ml
;{
i"
makes the
same view.
soul a
magnitude.
74
Ueberweg,
(Dice. iii. 07) that Plato attributed the soul an apxr] dptd/j.r)TiK7], to the body an apxy yeufj.fTpiKr),
to
sq. holds the
loc. cit. 50,
Tho
according to Teberweg is a mathematical magnitude, and in

of its elements, th,e TO.VTOV number, the 0are/x> space which admits of all figures; and this space is the principle of motion
soul
space
what immediately
the
soul
is
TravT-t)
which, however, hardly agrees with

follows,
signifies
where
TOU
defined
as
idta
dia.aTo.Tou TrvfujmaTOs.
The
other view belongs not only to Severus, as mentioned by Proclus

loc.
oil.,
the irrational
Positioning.
but to Speusippus and The former of these

its
secondary matter, and, as such soul (v. note Ihe quarrM of Xenocrates 115). and Speusippus* seems to show that
imagined
(ci>
P.eing
Idea. TOII TVO.VTT]

i.
space Statrrarou, Stob
as
in
Kkl.
862)
more precisely as
8ia.ffTa.Tov
1
the latter defined it Idta TOU TTCLVT^ Kad api.dfj.bv ffuveaTuicra

;
Plato had not expressed himself definitely in favour of one view or the other. Aristotle had to form IMS doctrine as to the soul from the Tmneus alone; for his quotation
I>e
An.
1, 2
apuovlav
procr. 22,
TTfpLexovra.
1,
(Pint.
an.
Irom the Discourses on

is
(supra, p.
-Jo.;.
[08
mean a formation
in
understands the T. TT. Starr. as an Idea, whereas it must rather of that which is
according to harmonic numbers). In the first the elements of the view, soul,
space
fashioned
who, however, wrongly
Ma
drawn from the Timaeus

the
soul,
irrelevant to the present question. Ihe probable conclusion to be

is
Philosophy
that
incor-
in
spite
of
its
d^pia-Tov and /^fpurrof, would be referred to the Unit and the

indefinite
the
poreahty and invisibility, is en visaged as being diffused through the body of the World-whoK Such
envuagementi of the
duad
in the second, to
mated treatment of the
relation of soul to body, especially in an anisubject,
A A 2
35C

The
activity of the Soul
155
is
intelligence.
It
is
the
156
first
partly motion, partly principle of all motion,
for
it
alone
is
the Self-moving, and in
moving
itself
it
The Pha-drns says that the also moves the body. soul has the Care of the inanimate, traverses the world 157 The more fanciful imagery of the and is its ruler.
are scarcely to be avoided ; but I cannot believe Plato to have repre sented it as a magnitude in space, in the direct mr.nner Ueberweg All the expressions supposes. in favour of which can be
quoted
his view are veiled in a mythical and symbolical twilight which for bids our conceiving them as dog
peculiar to Xenocrate?, we cannot, The of course, ascribe it to Plato. most probable view is that Plato did not expressly declare himself on this point, and left the relation of the soul to the mathematical principle generally in that indeter minate state which our text pre
supposes.
155
156
matic. No one takes the division of the world-soul into eight circles, and all the connected details, as a literal expression of Plato s belief;
De An. i. 2. Vide note 131. Phrcdr. 24a TO O.VTO Kivrjfffws /Jtev dpx sq.
Cf. Aiist.
:
f)
nor can the general supposition ex (only used in that allegorical is extended position), that the soul in space and divisible in space, be Otherwise we strictly pressed. should be obliged to consider the not merely as something soul, extended, but as something cor
avrb KIVOVV ^VXTJS ovaiav re Kii \6yov TOVTOV O.VTOV rts \tyiov OVK
.
.
titffXWfiTCU
157
fJ. }]
aXXo
i) ij
"^VXT)
TI
tlvai
TO avrb eavro KIVOVV
^vxyviravros rravra Sc
cv cl\Xoty
fj.tv
240 B:
Tracra
eTTtjUeAetrai
rov
dif/i>xcv,
oupavcv
ei 5e<n
Tre/atTroAe?,
dXXor
reXe a
yiyvofMevf]
/cat
ovv
oiVa
eirrepwfjL^v-rj
/j.Tewpoirop(?
Stot/ce?.
i]
anything filling space and poreal not material can be no more

;
>et t
re Kal iravTO, rbv KO^JJ-OV
8k irTepoppwrjcraffa (peperai., &c.
split
it
up and bent into circles than can be mixed in a caldron (Tim.
41 D).
Tiirueus
From the exposition of the we can really infer nothing, simply because we should infer too
may possibly arise,whether are to understand the Tracra as the whole collective soul, i/a xr] i.e. the soul of the All, or (with
question
we
In itself, however, it is mr.ch. incredible that Plato, who con siders the fact of filling space to be the distinguishing t-i-n of Body, should have expressly attributed the same quality to the incorporeal, standing in as close connection lie with the Idea as the soul. might rather have called the soul a number but as this determina tion is unanimously quoted as
;
Snsemilil, ii. 39U, and others) each In favour of the individual soul. first view we have besides the iratra
which also Tracra $VXT\ \f/vxTi (for occurs) the words TravTos Tri/j,e\e iTOLI TOV a\{;vxov .... jrdvra rbv KOCFIJ.OV oioiKfi, for each individual
i]
soul
all
supposes only
individual
its
body, and
;
collectively suppose only their collective body whereas the soul of the universe, and it only, cares for everything
souls
THE WORL&BOUL.
Timaeus
is
:\:>1
same effect. The entire Worldwas divided lengthwise into two and these two halves wêre bent into an outer parts and an inner circle, of which the outer is named
to
the
soul,
we
are
told,
the circle of the
Same
the inner, that of the Other.
These
is
circles, laid obliquely within each other, are the

:
scaffolding of the World-system the circle of the Same the sphere of fixed stars the circle of the Other
;
forms by further division the seven spheres of the In the circular revolution of these spheres planets. the soul, turning in itself, moves it is interfused every
;
where from the centre of the universe to the circum and as all the ference, and envelopes it externally
;
>rporeal
is
built into these spheres, the soul effects also
As Plato s real opinion, we can only maintain this much, that the however,
soul
its
the motion of the corporeal. 15 *
diffused throughout the universe
and by virtue of
laws
nature, ceaselessly self-moving, according to fixed causes the division as well as the motion of
:
and
the
matter in the heavenly spheres and that its harmony life are revealed in the order and courses of the
M;tr.s.
The
World-soul with
Tiingeus also connects the intelligence of its motion and harmonious dis
tribution.
_By reason of its composition (o7,

is
ff),
and
because
it
divided
and bound together in
itself
according to harmonica! proportion because it at last d urns into itself by its circular motion, it tells itself
I
inanimate, including inorganic naHere, however, though less clearly than in the Timst-us, the soul of the All is thought of as including and embracing the colture.
lectivity of the individual souls in

itself.
158 34 B, 3(3 H-K. The astronomical part of this exposition will be discussed later on.
358

its
throughout
its
whole essence of
all
that
it
touches in
:
in what course, whether Divisible or Indivisible it is the and in what diverse, whether respect same, and how it is related to Being or Becoming. But this
speech, spreading itself soundlessly in the sphere of the Self-moved, generates knowledge. If the faculty of
perception is touched by it and the announcement comes to the soul from the circle of the Other, 159 then true notions and opinions arise 16 if it is
;
signified
the Same, rational cog nition and intelligent knowledge are the result. Here
circle of
to thought,
from the
again the literal and figurative are freely intermingled, and Plato himself might, perhaps, scarcely be able to
to
define with accuracy where his representation ceases be dogmatic and begins to be mythical. He is
1G1
doubtless in earnest
soul,
when he
ascribes to the world a
and
to this soul the
can belong to
1<i2
most perfect intelligence that and though the more aught created
;
precise concept of personality hardly applies to this soul, yet in all that he says on the subject, he abun)9 In the al70r}TLKbv, reading of one of Bekker s MSS. is be adopted instead of aiird fjTov to^
;>7
]>,
(as
is
shown by the opposition

and
rqv
it
of
receives a more natural colouring, In the above, therefore, I follow this conjecture. The expressions irepl r6 ai<rQr)Tov Trepi TO
yiyi>e<rdai,
\oyi<TTiKbv\
is
to this that
the
oi rou
vfri XT?"
of our text
The alffBrjriKov must signiiy, not the faculty of perception,

refers.
\oyiarLKov elvat are generally referrcd to the objects of the Xoyos

(cf.
Stallbaum in
to
loc.);
but
this
teiids
but the subject capable of perception, which, however, can, at the same time, be one admitting of It is, howthought, a XoyiaTiKbi*. ever, more convenient to read avrbv then the aiffBtj[sc. rbv
\t)yoi>]
;
embarrassment -with the \oyurTiK6v, which ought to be vorfrbv to meet this view,
16
On
279
these stages of cognition

sq.
:
cf. p.
1W V. pp. 325 sqq.

1M2
288, 172;
2G6, 112.
TIKOV
may
be
ception,
and
the faculty of perthe whole passage
What
personality
can we understand by which comprises
THE WORLD-SOUL.
clantly
to the
359
it
shows that he himself conceives
human
soul.
The question which

far the
will,
as analogous to us would
immediately occur, how

self-consciousness
It
and
World-soul possesses he has scarcely even raised. 163
sounds to us strange that the intellectual activity of this soul should coincide with the revolution in space
of the heavens
;
that reason and science should be as
signed to the sphere of fixed stars, and opinion to that of the planets. Even Plato probably did not intend
yet he has cer and the movement of the tainly brought knowledge soul into a connection which must have made any
this exposition to
literally
;
be taken
1C4
accurate definition almost as difficult to

selves.
him
as to our
He
into itself,
regards knowledge as a motion returning and ascribes to the World-soul a knowledge

is
of all that
1
in itself
it
and
in the world, just because
here belongs to
this perfect
iN;>lf.
Other philosophers
motion in and around had similarly combined
100 and Plato elsewhere compares knowledge and motion, llicm in ti way that shows us that he conceived them to
be governed by analogous laws. 166

numberless other existences, and
possessed of life and soul V How could the soul be a World-soul, unless it were in re lation with all parts of the world, just as the human soul is with the parts of the body ?
those
too
13
1(U
The same holds good
however, can be got out of this, whether we understand Thought and Opinion to be the Thought
and Opinion
of the
human
soul, or
the passage just B as it stands, Ilic result would be that Right Opinion is brought about by the motion of the planetary circle, Thought and Knowledge by that of the fixed stars. No clear idea,
Cf. p. LV,I;. If we t;ikc
can hardly suppose that Plato would have attributed to the World-soul, be sides Thought, mere Opinion, even though it were Kight Opinion.
of the World-soul.
We
quoted from Tim. 37
Anaxagoras and Dio i. 804 sq., 220 i. 2, 405 a. cf. 13, 21. In Tim, 34 B is mentioned the circular motion T&V
E.g.
;
165
genes
1(!(i
vide vol. Arist. De An.
TT]V trepi
vovv Kal
300
of the mathematical partition of the Soul.

167
As Plato expressed the differences of knowledge by means of

he might also place knowledge generally, numbers, in combination with number. The infinite Many, as
Philolaus had already taught, 168 becomes cognisable by
being reduced through number and measure to definite

proportions.
as
Plato
its its
derives
World-soul from
well as from
this is in the
the knowledge of the harmonious distribution of parts, 169 and composition and motion,
main
his real opinion.
The Soul could
material things did it not bear within it self, in harmonic proportions, the principle of all de termination and order. As its motion is regulated by number, so is its knowledge and as in the one case it effects the transition of the Idea to the
;
not
know
phenomenon
and brings the unlimited plurality of material things

so in the other it com bines Unity and Multiplicity, the cognition of lleason and the perception of Sense.
oiVcu/, similarly
into subjection to the Idea,
39 C, 40 A.
Law.s,
x.^898
i
A:
thought
motion,
soul.
1(i
is
eu/cu re
avrrjv rrj TOV
and more
described simply as a particularly a

(TTfpKpopa]
uv Tre/HoSo; TroVrws ws dvvarbv otKtioTcirT/i re /cat 6/j.oiai> .... /card
circular motion
~
of the
rcuVa
UI)T<
b-fjirov /cat
waai^rcos
/cat
eV
T<$
/cat Trepi TO.
avra nal
irpbs
ra
ai>
Vide 25G, 10o.

1(J8
p.
-19,
147
und
p.
aura
eVa \6yov /cat rdîv jtu 0^00) Kiveladat and Tim. 77 Ji, 89
/cat
:
lli9
Vide vol. i. 294, 1. Tim. 37 A are ....

:
di>a
A, 90
sq.
cf.
43 D, 44 D, 47 D,
\byov
//e/)t(rê?(ra /cai
vv5tdfi<ra.
CHAPTER
VIII.
ITS PARTS.
THE WORLD-SYSTEM AND

tE
foregoing pages contain the leading thoughts of Platonic view of Nature. The World is the phe-
sible
lomenon of the Idea in Space and in Time, the sen and variable copy of the Eternal it is the common
:
product of the Divine Reason and of Natural Necessity, of the Idea and of Matter. That which mediatises be
tween them, the proximate cause of life, and knowledge, is the Soul.
all order,
motion,
The Timsous shows how, from these causes, the origin and economy of the universe are to be explained
;
and
11 ie
to
do
so, it
It
enters deeply into the particulars of
phenomena.
into natural
may
well be conceived, however,

s
from
character of
Halo
genius, that
science would be little

find,
these inquiries to his taste: ac
cordingly
we
not merely that the TinuiMis alone
of his writings discusses this subject, but that it does not seem to have been pursued even in his oral dis
courses.
Aristotle,
at
any
rate,
his theory solely to the Timanis.
appeals for this portion of But Plato himself
declares that he esteems such discussions as inferior in
value to more general philosophic enquiry.
Our words,
362
lie
PLATO ASD THE OLD Eli ACADEMY.

says, are constituted like the objects they describe.
Only the doctrine of invariable Being can lay claim

to perfect certainty and exactitude ; where the mere phenomenon of true Reality is in question, we must 1 be content with probability instead of strict truth.
These things are therefore rather a matter of intel lectual pastime than of serious philosophic investiga
3 Perhaps he is not quite in earnest, but from these remarks we may infer that Plato was to some extent aware of his weakness in natural science, and at
tion.
the same time believed that from the nature of the

to be attained.
subject, greater certainty in such enquiries was hardly On his philosophy, indeed, the bearing
of his
own
enquiries in this direction
is
unimportant
Tim. 29
1),
13
sq.; cf.
44 C, 56 C,
.
?}
. .
raOr
effriv
77
TOIO.VT
arra
57
68 D, 90 E. Even in the important questions about matter and the unity of the world Plalo uses this caution. Tim. 48
67
I),
TOVTO Kdl
TTpeTTeiV yUOi 5o/Ce, K .T.X.
(on the text cf. Bo ckh, Kl. Schr. iii. 239), he says that about the Sensible as the etVobi/ of true Ueing, only ct/c6res X670i are pos sible, i.e. such as are like the truth, but not the truth itself, just as an
J)
This myth, then, cannot indeed lay claim to complete truth, but to a certain probability and the same result is derived from Gorg. 527
;
A.
-
Cf. 523 A. Tim. 59 C
ra\\a
5t
rCov
ovdev
u, rrjv
i>Ta
TTOLKI\OV
n
8raf
Trepl
oia-
r&v eiKoruv
fyv
I5eai>,
fj-vGuv rts
eiKwv is that which is like a thing, That but is not the thing itself. winch is merely like the truth merely probable includes not only
(eientific suppositions,
eW/cct,
roi
TUIV
del Karadefj-evos \6yovs, TOJ)S
KTarai
Traidiav
]
Susemihl,
but also (as Genet. Entw. ii. 321

expositions.
/ecu
points cut) mythical Plato himself clearly
understand
this
in
gives us to the passages

;
he says, already quoted, p. 485, 1 however, in the Phaedo, 114 D, at

it
the end of his eschatological myth would in truth be foolish ravra

:
TraiSia, at least in the passage just quoted, recalls the correspond ing and clearly exaggerated expres sion of Phscdr. 265 C, 276 D,and the whole depreciatory treatment of physical science is in harmony with the solemn tone of the Timseus.
PHYSICS.
3rt3
they contain Ideas and observations, which are some times ingenious and sometimes puerile, interesting no doubt for the history of natural science, but for that of
slight connection with
Much
from
ance
philosophy in great measure valueless, because of their Plato s philosophic principles.
appears to be borrowed from others, especially Philolaus, and probably Dernocritus. Three
main points have, however, a more universal import these are, the Origin of the World, the deriva tion of the Elements, and the concept of the AVorld:
System.
I.
tin-
Thl Origin of the World. This is described in Timajus as a mechanical construction. The uni
versal Architect resolves to

visible
make
perfect as possible, mi t ure after the eternal

tial
as
by forming
the totality of the a created
nature.
For
this
pupose,
archetype of the living essen He first mingles the
World-soul, and divides it in its circles. Then lie binds the chaotic, fluent matter into the primary forms of the four dements. From these He prepares the system of the universe building matter into the scaf In its various folding of the World-soul. He
parts
places the stars, to be the dividers of Time.
i-liut
Lastly,
nothing might be wanting to the perfection of the world, He forms living beings. 4
Tally cannot
the mythical character of this description genebe doubted, but it is not easy to deter.mine how far the extends. have already mytlnis n reference to this subject spoken of the Creator, of
Now
We
Concerned
he Soul, and of Matter we are now more immediately with the question whether, and to what
:
See
x.
27
K-57
1).
364
extent, Plato seriously maintains the beginning of the 5 On the one world in time, and its gradual formation.
hand, not only does this seem to be required by the whole tone of the Timaeus, but it appears to result still more definitely from the explanation (28 B), that the
world as corporeal, must have become for all sensible and corporeal things are subject to Becoming. On the
;
other hand, however, this assumption involves us in a For if all that is cor series of glaring contradictions.
poreal must have become, or been created, this must
5 The views of the first Platonic scholars were divided on this point Aristotle (De Ccelo, i. 10, 280 a.
4, 1),
Taurus
vi.
np. Philop.
De
setern.
and most of the Platonists who inclined to Pytha

mnndi,
21,
28 ; 251
b.
iv. 2,
300
;
b.
16
Phys.
xii.
viii. 1,
b.
17
Metaph.
An",
,11,37;
De
i.
1071 3,406 b. 25
3,
sqq.)
in his
criticism
of the
Pla-
gorean views the Neo-Platonists without exception. On the other hand, Theophrastus(Fragm. 28 sq.; Wira. ap. Philop. loo. cit. vi. 8,
31, 27) rejects this supposition though not so decidedly as Aristotle and with him Alexander ap. *1 rrr _ _ _. -_il-_ il_ Philop. vi. 27, and apparently the whole Peripatetic school agree. Among the Platonists, Plutarch,
T>1
cosmogony takes the Timseus literally throughout and considers

tonic
the temporal origin Iff 11 _ 1 the World-soul, and Plato s real meaning.
il_
_ 1
;
of the world, il J.^ !, time, to be

Still
.1
even he says (Gen. et corr. ii. 1, 329 a. N 13 that Plato did not clearly ex plain whether matter can exist otherwise than in the form of the four elements and that if this question be answered in the nega live, the beginning of the world must also be denied. Another view (ace. to Arist. De Coclo, i. 10, 270
;
(on whom 722, 2nd edit.) en deavour to prove that the theory of the world being without a I lato. to begii foreign Among the moderns Bockh (On the
loc.
cit.
and
Atticus
sec vol.
iii.
a.
32) was, that I lato represented the formation of the world as a temporal act merely for the sake of clearness. leavn from Simpl. ad loc. Schol. in Arist. 488 b. 15
b.
World-floul, p. 23 sq.) has repeated the view of Xenocrates and is followed by Brandis (ii. a. 356 sq., vi. 68 365\ Steinhart (Plat.
:
WW.
We
6,
Susemihl (Genet. Kntw. ii. 326 sqq.), and others, to gether with my Plat. St. 208 sqq.
sqq.,
sq.),
94
(whose statement
others,
is
;
489
a.
9)
repeated by Pseudo-Alex.
and the
Martin,
:
1st ed. of the present work.
1091 a. 27; Pint. procr. an. 3, 1, that Xenocrates availed himself of this expedient
ad
Metaph.
and was followed by Crantor and Kudorus (Pint. loc. cit. and c.
Etudes i. 355, 370 sq., 377 179 sqq. ; Ueberweg, Rhein. Mus. ix. 76, 79; Plat. Schr. 287 sq. ; Stumpf, iVerb. d. plat. Gott. z. Idee d. Gut. 36 sqq. declare in favour of Plutarch s view.
ii.
ORIGIX OF THE WORLD.

also hold
;
:;<;:,
good of Matter yet .Matter is supposed to preDede the creation of the world, and (80 A) is repre sented in this its ante-mundane condition as something
alivjidy
visible.
But
if
we
are to include the notion
eternal matter in the mythical portion of the dialogue, where is our warranty that the creation of
of an
the world
meaning
physical
for
is not part of the same, and that the proper of the latter theory may not be the meta
dependence of the finite on the Eternal? The dogmatic form in which it is proved argues little;
the point
is
gical beginning,
primarily to show, not a chronolo but an Author of the world. And

7 dogmatic tone
we constantly
J
Cf.
find Plato adopting this

vKtirrtov
. .
.
Tim. 28 H:
first
in one direction
and then
in
ovv irepl ai Tov irp&rov fy del, yeveffews dpxw

ftiav,
r)
Ttbrepov fyuv ovde-
another
world,
by
this
^yotf/tcpor.
The
al
therefore,
can neither
ytyovev,
.
d?r
.
dp^d/mevos
yevo/JL^vi^
ytyovev
(pa^v
vir
apxys TLVOS TO; 5 av alriou nvbs

.
.
dvdyKrjv etVcu yevtvdai.

7 Hero the E.g. PoHt. necessity of a periodical alternation between the self-motion of the
(><
ways move itself nor always be moved by the divinity. Xor can two gods move it in opposite ways. The only conclusion remaining is that at one time it is moved by
God,
and at another being
left
by divine agency (the starting-point of the well known cosmological myth) is insisted on as dogmatically and with the same apparent earnestness as the necessity of a beginning of the world in the Tinireus. The corporeal cannot possibly be always the same. The world has a body.
its
It
world and
motion
alone, it moves in an opposite direction of itself. This is just as didactic as the passage of the
Timreus, and can be made to give just as valid and formal conclusions as Stumpf has derived from the
latter
J>ut
passage (loc. cit. can we conclude from
)>8
it
f.\ that
Plato really considered the world as alternately moved by the di

direction,
this
tion.
must consequently change and change consists in its revolu But it is impossible that it
;
and again (in an opposite and with a complete change of relations) by its fyi0vros
vinity,
should
self.
vui>
continually
revolve
of
it
The
rjyovfj.evov
T&V
KIVOV/J.C-
has this power. And its nature doos not allow (ov that it should be moved 9e^.is)
TTCLVTUV alone
he lays down in iridviu,ia, while question and answer that with the changed direction of the world s revolution the life of the things in it must also suffer a change ?
366

where
literal
it is
in places
real
impossible
lie
meaning. cannot, it is true, rely much on inferences from the Platonic writings, never 8 perhaps drawn by Plato himself; but the case is different with the assertion in Timseus (37 D, 38 C), that Time first began with the world. This assertion
if there is any one point in the Platonic system established by the most distinct explanations on the part of its author, it is the doctrine that the Ideas are un created. Yet, as we have seen supra, p. 226, 3, Plato spc-aks of God as the creator of the Ideas
and
We
can be stating his
Again,
one,
it is
and yet Plato expressly says

not.
The
(p.
discrepancies before
mentioned
301
sq.), in
his ex
and in his lectures explained his views as to their origin in such a
pressions as to Matter, and in the discussion of the Protagoras, quoted p. 188, 40, might also be adduced to show how little the apparently didactic tone of a passage justifies
way that Aristotle (as in the ques tion of the formation of the world) regards a yevecris T&V apidjULuv not as merely TOV deuprja-ai eveKev.
xiv. 4 beginn.) That the here are to be understood as the Ideal numbers, and that the passage refers not to the Platonists only, but to Plato himself, is shown from Alex, and Metaph. i. 6, 987, b. 33 Schol. 551 a. 38 sqq., be sides all our other authorities for this doctrine of Plato s. The literal interpreters of the cosmo gony in the Tinueus might appeal confidently to Plato s own ex planation if the words (Tim. 26 D)
us in considering everything in it to be Plato s scientific conviction, and how many reasons there are, in a question like the present, for thinking twice before we commit ourselves to an assertion (Ueber-
(Metaph.
weg,
suited
apid/ji-oi
plat. to
Schr.
287
sq.),
more
theological
apologist
than a historical enquirer. If Plato (Tim. 28 B) declared him

created world, believing the while that it was eternal (which, however, the passage itself does not suppose unconditionally)
all
;
self for a
we can then, says Ueberweg, only characterise his position by terms which we are heartily
ashamed of applying to him. He must either have been a hypocrite or a fool/ Which of the two was
lie when he wrote the above quoted passage of the Politicus, or when he ventured to declare the fable of the people of Atlantis to be true
v6ov
d\\ a\r-
divbv \6yov elva.1 Trdfj./ui.y& TTOV, were applied to it. Htumpf, indeed, loc.
cit., thinks that he can support his theory by these words. But, as a glance will show, they refer, not to the picture of the formation of the worl i, but to Critias narrative of the struggle between the Athe nians and the Atlantids. This is a Tr\a<r6ds fj.v6o$ if ever there was
history ?
8
That
e.g.
the
(Tim. 29 E) created
ness,
must be just as
world, if God it out of goodeternal as the
goodness of God.
ORIGIN OF THE WOULD.

is
367
a beginning of the world be assumed, for that which alone previously existed, the world of Ideas, is not in Time, and Time is
perfectly
logical
if
empty
the more difficult to see how notwithstanding this, Plato can always speak of that 9 which was before the formation of the world, while he nevertheless acknowledges E that this Before (37
nothing.
it
But
is
all
sqq.)
and After are only possible in Time. 10 The unoriginated pre-existence of the soul which Plato taught, 11
itself
excludes a beginning of the world for the Soul is a part of the world, and cannot be conceived
;
without the body which it forms and animates. These may not suffice to prove that Plato made use of the theory of a historical deliberately
contradictions
creation as being in itself untrue, retaining as his
belief that the
own
but they at least show that the theory was not brought forward
;
world had no beginning
by him didactically, as part of his doctrine; that was regarded as one of the presentations he
it
occasionally
employed without feeling moved to investigate or to pronounce upon them definitely. This view is countenanced not only by the fact that
;
disciples of Plato have explained the origin of Time as merely figurative investiture 12 ; but also by the whole of the Timrcus.
many
the world in
composition
Meno
For
"?.
3 OA,34B,C,52D,53B.
Sqq ; * ? 86 A; lluedo 106 D; Eep. x. 11; A, &c. cf. Laws, vi. 781 E, where the supposition that man;
without beginning or end is viewed as at least possible and even probable.

is
kind
World-soul sketched in the Tim8ens but the unregulated soul of the Laws that is without beginning has been refuted, p 338 ll V The Plwedrus expressly designates the soul, which it has proved to be without beginning, as the mover of heaven.
r>s
The theory
that
it
is
not the
ee note 5.
a08
the formation of the universe, instead of following the the chronological sequence of its parts, as would be
case in a historical narration,
is
represented altogether
according to ideal
fully
sqq.)
Plato speaks first very moments. of the works of Reason in the world, then (47 V* of the works of Necessity; and lastly, of the
itself (69 sqq.), as the
world
told
common
product of both
these causes.
of
In the
first
composition before that of the World-soul which preceded this pro cess and we find that the same object, because it may be
;
the
of these divisions, we are of the corporeal elements,
regarded from two different points of view, .is doubly re presented like the above-mentioned origin of the ele
ments.
that
it
Thus by its very form, this represention show s was designed to set forth not so much the his
as the universal
torical order of events in the creation
causes and constituents of the
World
as
it
now
is
exists.
The mythical element,
therefore,
becomes strongest
at
those points where something historically new 13 duced (-30 B, 35 B, 3G B, 37 B, 41 A, &c.).
intro
The formation of the Elements. The esta II. blishment of a well-ordered universe required that bodies should be reducible to the four ele all
ments. 14
But here the two ways

the teleological
of Aristotle s taking
of regarding
the
elements
ia
and the physical

name
derails
0"rojxe?oj>,
directly
The
s
fact
exposition literally is no Similar misconceptions of proof. the mythical form are common in him see my Plat. Stud. p. 207. The doubts there expressed against the meteorology I now retract. 14 Plato was the iirst to use the
Plato
(ap.
Schol.
in
according to KtiSimpl. Phys. 2 a. u. Arist. 322 a. 8), and

iii.
Phavorinus, ap. Diog. gave the same name to his most general causes, the unit and the Great-and-Small (Arist. Metapli. xiv. 1, 1087 b. 13).
24.
He
ORIGIN OF THE WORLD.

eucouuter one another. view the Timaeus (:J1 B
:
THE ELEMEXTS.
369
ground .Midway between these, however, there must be a third element which combines them; and as the fairest combination is Proportion, this Third must
solid.
the teleological point of The world being corporeal, must of necessity be also visible and tan it could not be visible without gible fire, nor tan gible without earth, which is the of all that is
sqq.)
From
says:
stand in proportion to both. If planes only were con cerned, one mean would be sufficient, but as bodies
15 are in question, two are necessary.
]j
e thus obtain
After Plato
loc. cit.
has shown
that the body of th? world must consist of fire and earth, he con tinues Two always require a third as their 5e<r/i6j fr /xory
:
d/j.<f)oiif
i;vi>aywy6s
<r/j.b$
the most beautiful 5e-
is the proportion (dpaXo-yia) found where, out of three d/xfytoi,
oyKoi,
or
t.
8vvdfj.ets
147 sqq., not powers, but roots ), the second stands to the third as the first to the second, and to the first as the third to the Ei /afr ovv tiriireSov second.
fiddos 5e fJLySfr T:J rov iravrbs
o.v
ThcR
(here,
as
in
ix w
<r>ia,
fj.fr,
5ei yiyvecrOai
fiia
/j-eaoT-qs
and ffrepeov be understood in a geometrical or in im arithmetical sense. Jn the former case it is clear that not only between any two squares but also be .ween any two plane rectilineal figures similar to one another there is one mean
proportional,
iii. 2^9-265) thaf, under certain determinations which we must suppose Plato assumed, between any two ewi-rreda there is one mean proportional, and between any two solids two proportionals, whether the expressions trlmto;
Klein.
Schr.
between
any
two
f^Yipicei TO.
KiSl
re peff eavTijs guvSe iv eavryv. vvv 5e . . crrepeoeidrj

.
yap avrbv
orepfa
/j.ia
TrpocrrJKev
fj.fr
eiVcu,
TO.
ovdtTTore,
duo
52
Jtwigned stated above. This passage gives rise to considerable difficulties, even apart from the erroneous arhficiality of the wliolc deduct ion.
t
and therefore (iod has put water and between fire and curtli, and air^ to them the relations
ZvvapfjdtTTOVffiP,
del êcrorTjres
cubes and any two parallelepipeds Similar to one another there arc two mean proportionals. In the latter, not only between any two square numbers, but also between any two plane numbers (i.e. num bers with two there is one
factors)
proportional, and not only between any two cubic number* but also between any two solid numbers generally (i.e. formed out ot thno factors there are two
rational proportionals, provided that the factors of the one number stand to one another in the same relation as those of the second
J{
rational
is
true
Plat. corp.
Irith
Bockh shows, DC mund. fabrica, reprinted

(as
valuable
additions
in
M^
JJ
170

them form one propor
air,
four elements, which among tion so that fire is related to

;
as air to water
and
air to water, as
number. numbers
there
is
:
water to earth.
plane numbers, there result between them, not only two mean propor tionals, but one besides (e.g. be tween 2 3 = 8 and 8 3 = 512 there are the two proportionals 32 and 128, and also the one mean 64, because 8 = 1 x 8 and 512 = 8 x 64 ; between
these comes
2x2 = 4
:
(K.g.
between the square and 3 x 3 = 9

:
2x3 =
the
the proportional number 4 6=6 9; between
numbers non-square and 4 x G = 24 the propor tional number 2 x (5 or 3x4, be cause 6 Between 12 = 12 24. the cubic numbers 2x2x2 = 8 and 3 x 3 x 3 = 27 occur the two numbers 2 x 2 x 3 = 12 and 2x3x3 = 18, 27 because 8 12= 12 18 = 18 between the non-cubic solid numbers 4 x 6 x 8 = 192 and G x 9 x 12 = 648 occur the two numbers 4x6x12 or 4x9x8 or 6x6x8 = 288 and
2x3 = 6
plane
8x8,
1
or
;
what
is
the
x 64) and if the roots of two cubic numbers have a mean proportional which can be expressed in whole numbers, the cube of the latter is the mean proportional between the former. 3 i/rhisis the case, e.g. between 4 = 64
same thing
and 9
and
for as
:}
= 729;
:
their
4 x 9 x 12 or 6 x 9 x 8 or 6 x 6 x 12 = 432, because 192 288 = 2SS 432=432 648; the same holds good in the analogous cases in
; : :
tionals are not only
Plato asserts, not merely that there is one mean proportional between any two planes and two between any two solids, but that the latter are by no means bound by one Such a generality, how /ue0-6r?7s. ever, is not correct ; as between
planes
solids.)
and
But
= 6 9, 4 6 = 6 9 i.e. 64 216 = 216:729. So again, 3 between 5 =125 and 20 = 8000

4
6
:!
:
>
4x9x9 = 324,
: :
4x4x9= 144
but also
:! :
:
mean propor
6
::
:{
,
:i
there are the two proportionals 500 and 2000, and also the one propor tional 1000, for as 5 10 = 10 20,
:
:!
:
10
::
=10
:
:? :
20 3
two similar planes or plane num bers under certain circumstances there occur two further mean pro portionals besides the one mean = 4 and 16 2 = 256 (e.g. between 2L>
there come, not only 2x16 = 32, but also 4 2 = 16 and 8 = 64, became 1(3 both 4 32 = 32 256 and 4 16 64 = 64 256), so between two similar solids and two analo
: :
: ;
8000.) pose that this was unknown to Plato. How then arc we to ex plain his assertion that the (rrepea never have a /uecr^T^s between lliem? The simplest explanation would be to translate his words Solids are never connected by one /xe(r6T?7s, but always by two at
:
= 1000
i.e. 125 1000 AVe cannot sup

:
,
And this explanation might least. indeed be defended by examples,

e.g. Arist.
8, c. 8,
gously formed solid numbers, to gether with the two proportionals which always lie between them, there occurs "one besides in certain
-cases.
18,
Metaph. ix. 5, 1048 a. 1050 b. 33, xii. 3, 1070 a. and others. It is, however,
;
almost too simple as Plato loc. cit. wishes to prove that two inter mediate terms must be inserted
If
two
solid
numbers are
at
between
is
fire
and
the same time analogously formed
to
show
not merely
earth, his object that at
THE ELEMENTS.
This,
it, is
371
though Plato may have seriously intended

16 reality but a flight of fancy.
in
The
four ele-
least (\vo terms, but
that neither
more nor less than two terms occur between two solids; and as
the two proportionals between cer
tain fTriTreSa belong to a different series from that to which the one
and by the oreped only the numbers which have three prime numbers
as factors: Konitzer (Ucb. d. Elementarkorper nach. PI. Tim. 1846, p. 13 sqq.) would limit them still closer to the squares and cubes of With this elu prime numbers. cidation Susemihl, Genet. Entw. ii. 347 sq. agrees, and Bockh (d. Kosm. Kyst. PI. 17) allowed him self to be won over to it. In the end, however, he returned to his original view (Kl. Schr. iii. 253
limitation of Plato
sqq.), seeing no justification for the s statement to
interpreters therefore seek variously to limit Plato s statement to such crepca as have actually only two proportionals between them. (Hee the Review in Martin, Ktudes, i. 337 sqq.) Nicomachus,
modem
the two all be long, we should still have that which Plato denies within each of those proportionals. Ancient and
proportionals occurring
in
occurring in all of them and the one proportional certain areped belongs to a series from that to which
belongs,
between
different
example (Aritlmi. ii. 24, p. 69), understands by them, not merely cubic numbers generally, but still more definitely KVÔL avvexets (1 2 I5 &c.), and by the plane numbers he understands
:!
:! ,
tor
the plane and solid numbers de rived from prime numbers, and the further limitation to square and cubic numbers. He appeals to the fact that in the cases where there arc
two proportionals besides the one

planes or plane numbers, and one proportional be sides the two means between solids or solid numbers, these latter do not proceed from the geometrical
or arithmetical construction, and that two plane numbers can only have two rational proportionals between them, if they are at the same time similar solid bodies,
mean between two
:!
rerpdyum
such numbers of course position holds good without between 2- and 3-, 3exception and 4-, & c there is only one ra
ffvvex-r].
(
)f
the
tional
>:!
mean
:!
,
proportional] between
:!
,
and ;j ;; and 4 &c. there are But if Plato meant only two. only these special cases, he would not have expressed himself so
:!
and he must have given some reasons why fire and earth were to be
generally,
the
light
exclusively of this
the elucidations of Stallbaum and Cousin ^Muller, PI. "VVW. vi. 2.V.I sqq. can hardly be brought under consideration), wishes to make out that by eTrtVeda are meant only the numbers which have two factors,
Pfartin,
who exhaustively
regarded analogy.
refutes
and two solid numbers can only have one rational proportional, they are at the same time similar plane numbers. This so lution seems to me to be the best. If there are two propor tionals between ^TrnreSa. and one between crreped, this is merely ac cidental, and it does not follow
if
that the one are the fniireda, other ffTepea, and Plato accordingly thinks that this case may be left out in his construction of the ele
ments.
"
Hegel, Gesch.
d. Phil.
Ii
ii.
221
372
ments are only in appearance derived and placed in a certain order, by means of an external reference of aim, and a false arithmetical analogy. This order pro ceeds from the rarer and lighter to the denser and
heavier
and the idea of a geometrical proportion could 17 Still more remarkable not properly be applied to it, 18 Plato derivation of the elements. is the physical 19 that the fundamental here repeats Philolaus theory,
;
form of
the
fire is
the Tetrahedron
;
of air, the Octahedron

earth, the
of water, the Icosahedron
and of
Cube
2U
:
fifth regular figure, the Dodecahedron, he does 21 not connect with an element. By compounding these
at sqq., is unnecessarily surprised
this,
17
with stars (Tim. 40
Rep.
vii.
and misinterprets it. Ancient and modern

fall
com
529 C), to which the dodecahedron might be applied, as coming nearest

to
vii.
into contradictions ns soon as they try to prove the existence and extent of a propor tion between the four elements of
mentators
the same kind as that between the terms of a quadruple arithmetical

proportion.
18
The stars (Rep. sphere. sqq.) are not perfect the analogy of the spheres, but (on owSeKdffKVTOi (rcpoupai, to which the earth is compared, Phtcdo, 100 13) like the universe, the
the
529
Tim. 53 C sqq. cf. Martin, 234 sqq. 10 Sec vol. i. 350 sqq. I lato, 55 D sqq., enume
;
ii.
rates the considerations \yhich led ; him to adopt this

^classification
vi/.
approach, form of the dodecahedron. It seems more natural to refer the Stafw(which is not necessarily 7pa<e or colour-painting) to the plan design of the world which preceded The world and the its formation.
stars
too
are
spherical
in
lorn),
mobility, magnitude, weight, of pene greater or less capability trating other bodies. -1 He merely says, 55 C 2ri 5e
:
oi cr^s
76
meaning
is
What is the (Kflvo diafaypatywi of 5tafw7/)a0e , and what

.
CTTI Î crrciaews /u.tas Trf{J.irTr)s TTO.V 6 6ebs avrr} KaTexpâ
and while the earth (Tim. 33 H, 40 A) is a perfect sphere, the dode cahedron is of all regular solids that which nearest approaches to the sphere, that on which a sphere can bs most easily described, and that therefore which could be most
readily laid the world.
played by the dodecahe part dron? Susemihl, ii. 413, explains: He painted the universe with and refers this painting figures ; to the adornment of the neavcns
down as the plan The dodecahedron
of of
the present passage used to be taken as the plan of the author Philolaus seems to have been
this
opinion
(cf.
vol.
i.
350 sq
THE
A7,/-;j//-AY
/X
373
bodies themselves, not out of corporeal atoms, but out 22 of planes of a certain kind, by again resolving
an d 1 mis no] Jtf
-
r!
(
im l ie 1>latonic K P in ! v and Xenocrates, who,
to Plato
and not
the
to Philolaus,
who
ap. Simpl. Phys. 205 b. Schol. in Arist. 427 a. 15, attributes this
Phsedo, Crat. 109 B), by aether, in ac cordance with ordinary usage, the
view to Plato. Although the later interpreters follow him in this view (see Martin, iii. 140 sq.), we cannot ngree with him as to the form of the doctrine contained in the Pla tonic writings. In the 109
sq.,
dodecahedron as an elementary form with the four other bodies. The form which this theory takes in Plato must be
foreign to Philolaus, because Plato s reduction of matter to
is
classes
unknown
to
him.
pure space Plato himself
Ill
A sq.
clearly gives us to understand that this discovery is his own, when he
(cf.
Plato understands
purer air lying next

sphere, and
says,
still
to
our atmo
introduces the enquiry about the material primal cause and the for mation of the four elements, Tim. 48 B, with the remark: vvv
ouSei s TTW yeveaiv
avTu>i>
more
:
Tim. 58
is
definitely
*\
he
Vi.
yap
d<?/>os
TO e^cn/ew,/\vL/yu,c*
d\\ us
/ecu
HC^WK^V
etr
eldocri, irvp
6 ri irort
*v iy
The
aether
him. cahedron (as Martin proves,

sqq.)
not a fifth element with lie could not admit the dode
ii.
--
245
oroiêta TOV All superficies, he says, 53

,
,.
(
in his construction of the elements, because it is bounded, not by triangles, but equilateral pen-
tagons, which again are composed neither (as Stallbaum thinks, ad loc.) of equilateral nor of rectan gular triangles of one of the two Platonic The elementary forms. conclusion is, that the theory which constructs the elementary bodies out of triangles, and explains the transition of one element into
^
of triangles, and all triangles arise out of two different right-angled triangles, the isosceles and the scalene ; of the scalene, however, the best and
sqq., consist
.mother by the separation and dif ferent combination of its elemen tary triangles, belongs originally
consequently the most congenial for the forma tion of the elements is that of which the lesser cathetus is half as large as the hypothenuse. Out of six such triangles arises an equi lateral triangle, and out of four isosceles triangles arises a square. (Jut of the square is formed tho cube, out of equilateral triangles the three remaining bodies.
fore,
54
sq.
rpiyuva
(There top rd
374

into triangles, in the transition of the
them ultimately
28
one into another, he clearly shows that elements the ground which underlies them is not a Matter From this ground that fills space, but space itself.
these determinate bodies are to be formed in such a
manner
that certain parts of space are mathematically 24 Not limited, and comprehended in definite figures.
larger
mass of the former,
or
if
rpiyuvov The fact that he here attributes to the square four and not two, to the not equilateral triangle six and
lacxriteXovs
two elementary triangles, is ac counted for by his wish to resolve them into their smallest parts (cf. Tim. 48 B). For this purpose he divided the equilateral triangle by the perpendicular, and the square
by the diagonal (cf. Martin, ii. 239 according to Plutarch the Py thagoreans emphasised the three
:
again the elementary bodies of the smaller are united by the pressure of the larger, then out of one part of water arise two parts of air and one part of fire, out of one part of
air two parts of fire, and vice versa; the transition of one element into another is brought about by the elementary triangles out of which it is composed being loosened from one another, and by a new com bination being formed of the ele mentary bodies in a different
fold
bisection
of
the
equilateral
;
perpendicular as an important quality of it see vol. i. From the combination 337, 2). of the elements which he assumes Plato infers that only a part of them change into one another v. next note. 23 not all the elements 54 C pass into one another, hut only e/c the three higher yap cvbs rec^vKdra \vdevruv re T&V
triangle
by
its
numerical proportion. The whole conception is put in a clear light by Plato s words, 81 PJ sq., on the
nourishment, grovvth, old age, and death of the living being. -4 If Plato presupposed for his of the elements a construction Material in the ordinary sense, he must either have viewed it as a
qualitatively equable and quanti tatively undistinguished mass, out of which the elements arose, be cause certain parts of this mass
iroXXtt
oyuKpa CK T&V avrdov

TO.
Ka.1
e^êâ
eauroFs o XTj/.cara,
yevo/j.evos
fj.e
fffJ-iKpa
irpocrrjKovTa &TO.V
StacrTrapT?,
6yt<ov
transiently
take
the form of the
av TroXXa Kara ra rplyuva.

els
dpi6/j.6s
SLV
evbs
&\\o eWos ev. From this point of view the sub ject is further treated, 5G 1) sqq. If one element is split up by an
ya
6.TroTe\eaeLev
other of smaller parts, or a smaller mass of the latter crushed by a
elementary bodies cube, tetrahe dron, &c. (in which case there would be not the slightest reason why every element could not come or he must out of every other) have supposed that at the forma tion of the elements the mass was made in the form of corporeal elements for all time, .But then
;
THE ELEMENTS.
375
indivisible bodies, but indivisible surfaces, are supposed as the primary constituents of the corporeal. 25 These
produce the smallest bodies by combining with certain Bodies are therefore not figures. limited
only
planes, but also
compounded out of them

is
2C
;
by Matter
which assumes corporeal figures
not recognised.
figures quantitative distinctions also arise in these elemental bodies. Of those which consist of triangles of the same kind,
From
the
difference
of their
each is greater or less, according to the number of such triangles which it contains. 27 Similar differences are found within The particular elements.
triangles
any transition of one clement into another would be impossible, and what according to Plato is true
only of the earth, but according to Kmpedocles of the elements, and to Democritus of the atoms viz. that they may intermingle with, but cannot change into, one another must hold good of all of them. In neither case could he speak of the resolution of the elements into triangles, and their formation out of triangles, in the way we have
seen.
transformations hidiûees .sY.vpliquent jiarfaitement con-si derons done les tri angles et les carres de Plato it co mine des fetiil es minces de matiere corporelle. Plato docs not, as Martin believes, inaccurately
Non.<t
les
call plane bodies he s planes thinking of actual planes, which, however, he treats as plane bodies. This is easily explained, if mathe matical abstractions are once taken
;
Martin, in his otherwise ex

cellent
exposition,
<
ii.
241
not quite right in with saying Simpl. De ce!o, Schol. in Ar.

~>lo
sq.,
is
as something real more real than matter. 28 So too Aristotle, who hero understands the Platonic doctrines quite correctly: De (Velo, iii
1
298
35,
-
a.
a.
37
o.)
Philop. gen. rhaniih>SV
et
il,
corr.
x
47 jiurex
b.^3.
;;oi)
Ibid. c.
sqq., gen.
ii.
7,
8;
:;<>5
.-,
a.
et corr.
i.
515 b. 3D sqq.
1,
;52;i a.
21
planes
(jit
if
decrit
>
e*t
sq.
l;j
aivir quelquc j>aisseur dcx fi-in /ft-n mlitrr*

t
Alex. Aphr. (Jua*st. nat. ii. against- the variant opinion

cf.
of
many
-"
Platonists.
figure* qn
ces
f.i-tt
il
iln-ril,
cf
*/
,n
feuilles
rtuuies
de
i-
r n:itre
il
des quatre corfix

laisser
vide,
/
Wont
park, mat s a
54 C, 50 A, I). Ho\v the earth stands to the three other elements as regards the magm tu.!** of its smallest bodily parts is not here stated but as it is the heaviest
:
,,<-
element,
parts.
(
it
f.
must have the largest

,0
tericiir
complement
tou.tes
K.
370
PLATO AXJ) THE OLD Eli ACADEMY.

sort
of each
consequently also the elemental bodies consisting of an equal number of such trian 28 and thus from the bein magnitude, gles) differ
(and
ginning there is a diversity in kinds of matter, which, coupled with the mixture of these kinds in unequal
infinite multiplicity proportions, perfectly explains the of things.
place in regard to its preponderating mass, it has its dwell 29 Lightness and heaviness are therefore relative
ing.
The elemental composition of bodies regulates their Each element has its natural distribution in space. in the universe, to which it tends, and in which,
terms, the
:
signification of
which changes according
on earth, the earthly element appears the to position 30 There can never be heavier in the fiery sphere, fire.
;
-8
57
sq.
this
can be recon
parts of the Timssus

sq.,
:!0
cf.
p.
;]
Jl
ciled with the previous quotation,
304
sq.
by supposing (with Martin,
ii. 254) that the largest part of fire is never so large as the smallest part of air, &c. -9 Piato 52 sqq., 57 B sqq. I) ere derives the separation of mat ter in space from the original mo tion of matter: the result is that the lighter rises and tiie heavier of sinks, just as in the winnowing
From 50 B we might
infer
corn.
But immediately
sq., the explains, 57 as purely physical, springing out of the dissimilarity of the elements. It is, however, difficult to conceive
motion
after, he itself
how elementary
distinctions and into properties could have come matter before God divided the latter into elementary forms, fiom which alone the distinctions can
that Plato identified heaviness and lightness with greatness and smallness. Fire, he says, is the lightest of the three superior elements, be cause it consists of the smallest number of equal-sized parts, and similarly the two others in pro portion. Hence the further notion, that, just as smallness is merely a smaller amount of greatness, so lightness is only a smaller amount of heaviness. Everything tends that which has large to the mean parts tends to it more powerfully than that which has smaller parts. So the latter is moved upward not of its own nature, but by the pros;
mocritus
proceed. this point
We
may, therefore, class amongst the mythical
(So De701, 713.) Plato himself, however, expressly rejects that the bupposition, 02 sqq.,
sure
of
heavy bodies.
v. vol.
i.
("
77/ /;
377
complete separation of material substances. The external orbit of the universe, being circular and con tinuous, presses together the bodies contained in it, 31 and will not allow of any empty space between them. 32 Consequently the smaller bodies are crowded into the interstices of the greater, and there results a continual mixture of the different kinds of matter. 33 The
per
petual motion and decomposition of the elements is a consequence of this admixture. As long as an ele
mental body is among its kindred, it remains un changed for among bodies which are similar and uni form none can change, or be changed by, another. If, on the contrary, smaller proportions of one element are
;
everything
moves
downward
up down, only an inner and an outer nor does he imagine any general cer striving towards the mean,
;
nature, and upward only as a conse*quence of some compulsion. Jn the universe, there is no and
by
v.
133).
:!J
58
sqcj.,
GO
und
516;
Void.
to
Kmpedocles
the,
>
Ânaxagoras,
following
Klcatics
vol. i. 472 (see 020, 2; 803, 1), had denied
Hence a double
difficulty
tainly not a universal attraction of
every
simply savs that has its "natural place, out of which it can be re moved only by force to this force
all
matter.
He
element
First, his four elemen tary bodies never fill up any space so completely that no interrnedialo
Plato.
greater opposition the greater iis mass. The ratural place of all bodies is the KO.TW.
this they strive and the heaviness of a body consists merely in its stiiving to unite itself with
;
it
offers
space is left Arist, Do Co?lo, iii. to say beginn. nothing of the fact that no sphere can bc cntiivlv
>
S,
filled
(.ut
And
by
rectilineal
figures.
the resolution of an elemen

into its
Towards
tary body component tri angles must produce a void each as there was time, nothing lie
congenial (or to prevent j separation from it), fitter, ii. 400, wrongly infers from Tim. 61 that the elements have sensation 0, together with this striving; the
its
what
is
words aiffdijaii virdpxfiv dd sig nify (as Stallbaum rightly explains that they must be an object of sensation.
::1
f.vol.
i.
374,2: 037
these difficulties which, in t],,. case of the first, would have been strange for a mathematician to do or else he dot s not mean to deny void absolutely, but merely to ;iysert that no space remains void which can at all be taken posses sion of by a body.
:;:;
tween them Martin, ii. sj. Plato must, either have disregarded
2;Y>
Kmped.
;.s
q.
378
in conse contained in greater proportions of another, the universal pressure they are crushed or quence of 34 and their constituent parts must either pass cut up ;
make over into the form of the stronger element, or element in their natural their escape to their kindred Thus there is a perpetual ebb and flow of the place. elements the diversity of Matter is the cause of its
:
constant motion.
\stitutes
34
35
The sum
of the four elements consqq.)

water
the universe.
(Tim. 32
lution of the elements,

35
Further details on this reso 60 E sqq. 56 C-58, C (with 57 E

eis
aj>(i}]*a\6Ti>iTa
sition of air into water, or of
into air; in the former case they are called ofilx^-n, in tlie latter
Klvf]ffiv
cf.
del
Tt.dC)-
the quotation Ft. i. 302-3). Hev, This doctrine of the elements is followed by a discussion of sepa
rate
its
67 sqq. cf. 80 treats of tones; 67 0-69 Meno, 76 C sq.), of colours.

:
A sq. A (cf.
To
explain
these
phenomena
Plato
phenomena, remarkable for though naturally of insufficient for the demands He treats modern knowledge. next, 58 C sqq., of the different kinds of fire, air, and particu which he in larly water, under
acuteness,
starts from his pro-suppositions as to the fundamental parts of the seeks to show who elements. the bodies, according to
He
separate the composition of their smallest of the inter parts and the extent
cludes liquid
(i>5w/)
vypbv}, but also
what
is
fusible
(#5.
X VT ^ V \
ne
metals, and then ice, hail, snow, hoar frost, the juice of plants honey, wine), oil, ^particularly o-rrbs (not opium, as Martin thinks, ii. 262, but the acids obtained from so called in plants to curdle milk, Further, 60 B sqq. he Homer). treats of the various kinds of earth,
stone,
bricks,
;
mediate space, at one time admit air and fire to pass through, but are burst by water, at another time forbid the entrance of water Hence he con and admit fire.
cludes that destructible
latter
the
by
two former are water, and the
by
fire.
He
explains
the
hardening of molten metals, the condensa freezing of water, the tion of earth into stone, and the
like,
natron,
lava,
glass,
61 J) sqq., of warmth and cold, hardness and softness, heaviness and lightness 64 sq. of the conditions under which any thing becomes the object of sensa
wax, &c.
by supposing that the parts and water contained in them, passing out and seeking
of
fire
their natural
"place,
sur press the
rounding
air against the materials
in question,
ii.
and
s.~>
tions of pleasure or pain
65
sqq.
Similarly (79
E-80 C
condense them. cf. Martin, ;
of the qualities of things percept ible by taste ; 66 sqq. on smells, which all arise either in the tran
342 sqq.), he tries to explain the downward motion of lightning^ the apparently attractive power of
////;
ELEMENTS.
The
that
379
III.
The,
World-System.
of the universe contains

racter, distinguishing it
much
is
further description of a specific cha
from the theories of Anaxaand Democritus, as also from the system of Phigoras lolaus though in its whole spirit it greatly resembles
;
the latter.
36
globe.
The shape of the universe is that of a Within this globe three divisions are to be
distinguished, answering to the three Pythagorean regions of the world, though they are not actually identified with them by Plato. The earth is placed as
a round ball in the centre, 37 at the axis of the universe. Then follow the sun, the moon, and the five other
planets,
in
circles
described
to the
around the earth, and

stars,
arranged according The heaven of fixed system.

amber and the magnet, and other He observes that phenomena. every sensation depends upon a motion of the object which occa
sions
it this motion is transmitted through the intervening space to
;
intervals of the harmonic
one undivided
regretted having made the earth the middle point of the universe in the Timaeus, because this be longed to a better, i.e. the central fire is with good reason suspected
the senses, and further to the soul, I cannot here enter further &o. into this portion of the dialogue
;
much
251
useful
ii.
matter
is
given by
by Martin, ii. 01, and Bockh, ( osm. Syst. 144 sqq., because ^1) it rests merely on a report which might easily have been transferred to Plato by Academics of Pythagorean
tendencies (Arist. DeCcelo, ii. 13 293 a. 27) because (2) even the latest works of Plato display no trace of any such opinion and (3) the Kpinomis, which was com posed by the editor of the laws one of Plato s most strictly astro nomical pupils, and designed for the astronomical completion of
;
.Martin,
s<|.
Susemihl,
254-294: Steinlmrt, vi. ii. 425 sq., 432
sqq.
This is so according to the Tim. 33 sqq. because the sphere is the most perfect figure, and be cause the universe needs no limbs. 37 40 \\ (with which cf. Jiockh, !osm. Syst. Plat. p. 59 sqq.; Klein. ?chr. ii i. 294 sqq.^ cf. G2 E; The statement of liwdo, 108 K.
J>
16
Fheophrastus
lat. viii. 1, p.
apud Pint,
quaest.
c. ii.
this latter dialogue is acquaint only with the geocentric system of A sqq., 990 the Timfcus see
<<!
98>
1006; Xnma,
cq.
-viz. that Plato in his later years
380
38 The earth is im outermost circle. sphere, forms the 39 The heaven of fixed stars turns in one day movable.
:>
36
sqq.,
40
sq.
(On the
distance of the planets, cf. p. 350.) Besides the above conceptions, d. Gr. 125, (Jruppe, Kosrn. Syst. would attribute to Plato the doc and the ec trines of the
epicycle,
centric
cf.
against him
Bb ckh,
different
Kosm.
of the Timseus system from that the Philolaic system) has (viz. been suspected in the Phaedrus, I think, however, 246 E sqq.
:
Syst,
126
sq.
a follower of Gruppe). This becomes in the highest degree circumstance probable from the that Plato, Tim. 39 B, derives day and night from the motion of the heaven of the fixed stars, and, 38 C sqq., 39 B ; Rep. x. 616 C sqq., the sun throughout he reckons the by the former
against
among
up.
planets the daily, and by the latter the motion of the earth is kept yearly be said that we It
;
might
Genet.^ 234 sq. is right in limiting the in few to a fluence of Philolaus

traits.
that
Snsemihl,
Entw.
i.
I cannot agree
tin
(in
(ii.
138
sq., 114),
with Mar and Stallbaum
could account for the motion of the -constellations by supposing the daily revo that, together with lution of the firmament and the
individual motions of the planets, there is also a revolution of the to west, or earth, either from east west to east, but far less rapid than that of the heaven of the But Plato has no fixed stars.
mythum
cf.
ortu,
de div. amoris Susemihl in Jahn s Jahrb.

Plat,
to make Ixxv, 589 sq.), in trying out the twelve gods of the Phsedrus of by adding the three regions to the earth, water, air, and aether and the eight circles of the stars. Plato would not have called these
where
suggested
this
idea,
nor
elements gods, and the description of moving does not suit them. The twelve gods of the popular religion are meant, and astronomical deter minations are transferred to them. draw no con onsequently we can Further elusion from the passage.
(
made the least effort to explain the phenomena on such j\ supposi There was nothing to in tion. duce him to make such an artificial The and far-fetched hypothesis.
Timseus, 34
sq.,
A sq., 36 B sqq., 38 k 40 A, always epcaks ot two motions only of the whole heaven and the planets, and the Phrcclo,
109
details
39
apud Susemihl. Bockh has shown that
this is
Plato s real meaning, De Plat. vi. sqq. (1810), Syst. Coel. glob. p. in his treatise on and
subsequently the ( osmic system of Plato, pp. 14, 75, and Kl. Schr. loc. cit, (in op
die
undoubtedly treats the Buekh, Kosm. that Tim. 40 Syst. 63 sqq., proves B does not contradict this view means not reel\\o/J.evr)v there but formed into a ball. volvin 01
A,
earth as at rest.
Kosm. Syst. position to Gruppe, d. Gr. 1851, p. 1 sqq. and Grote,

Plato s doctrine of the rotation of
the In the Lawf, vii. 822, we have same statement as Tim. 39

Aristotle certainly says
De
Ccelo,
11.
the earth, 1860, cf. Plato, iii. 257 Martin, vi. 86 sqq., and Sus-emihl in Jahn s Jalirb. Ixxv, 598 sq.
;
13 293, b. 30: ZVLOI be KO.I Kfinevip o-vr^v (the tiri ToO KevTpov earth i XXeatfat KO.L KivelaOan irepi
<f>affiv
TeTO.fj.evov
THE W-ORLD.3Y8TEM.
381
around the axis of the universe, in the direction of the equator, from east to west; and the circles compre hended in it are likewise carried round with the same
They themselves, however, move in various of revolution (increasing according to their distance) around the earth, in the plane of the
periods
Ecliptic,
motion.
Their courses are therefore, pro perly speaking, not circles, but spirals and as those which have the shortest periods move the quickest in a direction opposed to the motion of the whole, it appears as if they remained the furthest behind this
east.
;
from west
to
lotion.
eV rep
The
swiftest
look
like
the
slowest:
those
Ti/j,ali{) yeypairrai, and Kipetcras Prantl shows in his edition, cannot be removed from p. 31 the text (with two MSS. and Bek-
means a motion from west

corresponding
to
#cu
the
1>
movement
of
the
to east individual the planets

;
ker), because it recurs c. 14 begin, unanimously attested. There arc
Timrcus, on the nothing about a

earth.
contrary, says motion of the
things against Bockh s view (loc. cit. 70 sqq.) that the mention of the Timieus (Oxrirep .... 767/0.) refers only to the (AXe<r0cu (or ), and not to the additional and that Aristotle here meant to attribute the assertion that the earth moves round the axis of the universe not to Plato himself, but to others unknown to us. It only does not follow from this that Plato supposed a revolu tion of the earth round an axis, whether daily or in a longer space of time. I cannot of the approve
many
this word from the passage of Aristotle, we can only that in this case acknowledge Aristotle misunderstood the Avords of the Timseus, perhaps led to do
Since,
then,
cannot
be
removed
so by some Platonists who took the passage in that way. This was quite possible from the words, and Plato is even thus credited
with far
less
extravagance
than
ii.
b. 32 The passage of sqq. the Timasus, ap. Cic. Acad. ii. :j i, 123 (perhaps from Ileraclides sec Part i. p. (387, 4, 2nd edit,
t
:
355
wejind
in the Meteorology,
2,
Nusemihl, Genet. Kntw. ii.ljso sq.) that Plato ascribed to the earth at lease a vibrating motion towards the axis of the universe, and that this is what the Kivtiatiai of Aristotle refers to. Aristotle, as is clearly shown by c. 14, a. 34 sq., 7,
conjecture (Prantl, loc.
cit.
;
refers to a daily revolution of the earth round its axis. Cf. Teichmiiller, Stud. z. CJcsch. d.
J. is
Begrinv,
in
its
Kpq., whose explanation agrees results with the

his
2%
pearance of
which was written before the ap

work.
above,
382
which overtake the others in the direction of west to in the contrary direction, to be overtaken
east,
appear
40 by them. These motions of the heavenly bodies give rise to than the duration of their Time, which is nothing else
41
periods.
complete
cosmical
all
period,
or
perfect
the planetary circles at the year, has elapsed, have arrived at the same point end of their revolution
when
of the heaven of fixed stars, from
which they
Plato
set out.
fixes,
42
The duration
conjecture,
Tim. 30
of.
;
of this cosmical
year
not
but by arbitrary according to astronomical calculation, 43 and he seems to at ten thousand years
:
Laws, vii. also Epinom. 980 822 A sq. E sq., and Buckl), Kosra. Syst. 1050; Martin, ii. 42 sq., 80 sq. As
Hep. x. 617
sq.
;
sqq., 39
sqq.
Hence the tenet here that time was created with the world (see p.
009).
Ibid, on the distinction be tween endless time and eternity.
re regards the time of the planets the it volution, Plato supposes same for the snn, Venus, and Mer which he cury (ihis is the order in
tuts
s (PI. Id. 103, see chap, Plato con 42) assertion, that sidered time as something merely without is entirely subjective foundation.
Maguire
vii.
them, reckoning
outwards),
5 he motion of the heaven of the iixed stars is denoted as eirl 5etd, Tim. 30 C, of the planets as er that the dpuTTepa, plainly in order motion may be as more
39 D. This duration of the year of the world (pre-supposed l\ep. vii. 540 B, as will be shown later on)
43
is
cribed
jects.
the more complete ob In this Plato most have by an artifice contented himself with the ordinary usage which makes the east the right and the west the left side of the world. The motion from east to west is therefore towards the lelt, and
to
complete
cice versa.
Laws,
sion,
V. Bockh, p. 28 sqq. 700 1) on another occa Epin. 987 B, in an astrono

vi.
;
expressed more definitely in statement (Phsedr. 248 C, E, 249 B Rep. x. 015 AC, 021 D), that the souls which have not fallen remain free from the body through out one revolution of the universe, while the others enter into human life ten times, and after each period of life among men have to com period of 1000 years plete a the period would (strictly speaking, be 11,000 years, but the inaccu to the racy must be attributed
;
the
mical reference, the east

as the right side.
41
is
treated
15
myth).
tion,
Hence the
Tim. 23
Tim. 37 D-38
<
3D
sqq.
historical
curious asser that the oldest docs not recollection
sq.,
THE WORLD-SYSTEM.
connect with
the world.
41
it,
383
periodical changes in the condition of The particular heavenly bodies are so
inserted in their orbits that they never change their place in them; the forward motion around the universal
centre
is
to their circles.
not to be ascribed to these bodies as such, but 45 Plato, however, gives to each of them
its
movement around
own
46
axis,
but this assumption
Other reach beyond 9000 years. calculations of the great years are not to be taken as Platonic (cf. Plato is so evi Martin, ii. 80)dently giving a round numfcer with his nsual mixture of dogmatism and symbolism, that to connect his great year, as Steinhart does, vi. 102, with observations on the ad vance of the equinoxes, is beside
the question.
xv.
<Jf.
o/j.oiov trepicjiopas /cparoi
/uVy. Plato the fixed stars whether he intended that it should hold good of the planets is ques tionable. In favour of this view we might allege that the motion which Plato considers to be pecu liar to reason (cf. p. 358 sq.)
says
this
of
must
for
also belong to the planets they are rational beings or visi
423
xq.
Gen. Ent.
2(19
Susemihl, Phil. ii. 300, 370.
44
Polit.
(cf.
course
Fqq., where of Tim. 30 K, and else
ble gods. And ace. to p. 40 B (where I cannot agree with Susemihl s explanation, Philol. xv. 420)
they are fashioned according to the

fixed
stars
(/car*
where) Plato is not in earnest in supposing that (Jod from time to time withdraws from the govern ment of the world Tim. 22 B sqq., 23 I) Laws, iii. (577 A sqq. This is clear from Tim. 30 B But it is not sqq., 38 C, 40 sq.
:
tKeiva.
yeyovev}.
These reasons, however, are

decisive.
The
planets
may
not be
fashioned according to the fixed stars without at the same time re
sembling them
Plato himself,
in all points
loc.
cit.,
and
quite clear
how we
8f>8,
are to conceive
this circle itself.
description mentioned p. depicts the circles of the planets as small bands bent into a circle, and the circle of the fixe 1 stars as a band of the same
kind,
The
indicates their the one Kara ravra

(pbjjitva.
distinctly difference, in that

v ravrî ffrpf-
ad ^vi,
/ecu
while the others

Tr\avr)v i&xovTa, latter
are
Tpeir6/mfj>a.
which rather means that the
only much broader; doubt less Plato imagined the latter (as it appears to the eye) as a sphere, uul the circles of the planets only is linear or like a band.
are without motion ev Tairry. In the case of the fixed stars reason
* Tim.
4(i
A:
japcrets
5e
Uo
del
et s
connected with their reflex mo but even the earth, 40 C, is designated as a divinity, al though it has not that motion (as SuFcmihl rightly remarks, loc. cit.)
is
tion
.VT<
/card TO.VTO. irepi TUIV
avTuv
a aiVa eai/rw diavoov/mevu, ryv 5 6 TrpoffBcv VTTO rai roG -n}?
and this also holds good of the central fire of the Pythagoreans and the Ecm a of the Pluedrus
(247
A).
/ecu
As
only two and not
384
is
not of astronomical observation, manifestly the result, 47 The stars must revolve but of speculative theory. is the motion of rea around themselves, because this
son,
Far from and they must partake in reason. and Democritus, only dead seeino-, like Anaxagoras them as bodies, Plato regards
48
masses in the heavenly

livino- beings,
whose souls must be higher and diviner

souls, in
than
human
proportion
19
as their bodies
is
are
evidently fairer than ours. brighter and in which the even and regular motion, influenced by follow pure mathematical the stars as nearly as possible 50 soul is, generally, the moving principle, If the laws. be where there is the most perfect soul must The Demiin- to the gods. in three motions are mentioned for the most urgua formed this the planets (38 C sqq.) the case of so that it might be vi. 109 part out of tire, I u^nk (wiS Steinhart,
;
In this he
fcr
Jiiickh.
planets JîâUriblted axes the motion on their own
felL^sS ,
the
ii.
^r^^.tt
round
rm
of
jo motions
which Martin, Etudes,
83,
and
Pro-
#
/ecu
ys
817
T7?s
da 3
Ivosni. Syst. 50, with ascribe to them. The planets do not, like the fixed stars, belong to the to the Ki /cXos ravrov, but 358). M>/v\os Oarepov (see p.
,
airXafij
TUV
above t^versând ytyovtv ôff WTO, farpuv faa 0a

discussed
:
air/as
/cat Kara TO.VTO. ev raury TO. 8t TperroffTpô^va. del yueVa C
dtSia
u.eva
Laws,
9G<5
47 There no is phenomenon which they serve to explain, nor Plato from to any law known which they could be derived and
;
the coruscation of the fixed stars,

cit. which Suscmihl mentions could at the most have been con
t. Kiva yeyovev. KO.T 88G D, 898 J) sqq., xn. D sqq. Crat. 397 U. vn. o3| 50 As Plato says, Rep. cannot correspond A, even the stars to mathematical rules quite per deviation, fectly, and without any
.
x,
loc.
MI mil sidered
Ut
4S
,,ot
cuimmmiiim merely as a confirmation as th. pn,p., gvouud ,,f

359
because after all they are visible, seems and have a bodv. He thus the phe v to have noticed that , i
""--
nom
the theory.
See p. words irepi r. avT. J0 Tim. 3H E, 39

e<|.
and note
:
th
E sqq. there are four kinds of vital existences the first is the heavenly, belong;
but "I with his astronomical system; instead of giving an astrommncal which solution of the difficulty lie was indeed impossible to him), cuts the knot by a more theory
l
"t
tv
THE
IfE.
VEXL Y B ODIE*.
385
most perfect motion; and if the motive power in the Soul is accompanied by the faculty of knowledge, the highest knowledge must belong to that soul which by a perfectly regular motion of body evinces the
If the Cosmos, absolutely uniform and har monious, circling about itself, possesses the most divine
reason.
51
highest
and most reasonable soul, those parts of the Cosmos which most nearly approximate to it in form and motion will most in this
largely participate
The
privilege.
stars are therefore the noblest

all
and most
intefli-
natures; they are the created 52 gods, as the universe is the one created God. Man may learn how to regulate the lawless movements of
soul by their unchanging courses: 53 he himself not to be compared with them in worth and perfec tion. So strongly was the Greek deification of nature at work, even in the philosopher who did more than anyone else to turn away the thought of his nation from
his
is
gent of
created
the many-coloured multiplicity of the

colourless conceptual world beyond. ality of these gods, and whether
phenomenon
to a
As
to the person
thought combined with self-consciousness belongs to them, in the same 54 way as to man, Plato seems never to have
enquired.
t4 sq Hence in Laws, x 808, sqq (on the basis of the psychology developed loc. cit.), it is shown that the stars are gods.
simply says that souls

stars -are
those cf the
&
f0 l 6parol
cf.
(Ihere is nothing in the passage about the animation of the years, months, and seasons, such as Gesch. IViehmuller, Stud. z. Begr. oG J, finds in 800 wind! he would wake out that the animation of the stars is not to be taken literally; the passage
40 no
D;
e 40.
ir&vrw TOVTW atnai ) Ka l yewyrol Tim 41 A sqq., and

sm>n,
5i
sq Teiciimiillpr fV
Tim. 47
are merely metapho meaning that the Ideas of tV
gods
ica
iust as the
Moas
of mortal
C C

55 sums up the The Timams
result of its
whole
the world as the perfect cosmogony in the concept of Idea of the Living One (the avMade like the
are contained in the Idea of the animal. He can of course appeal to the difficulty which results as soon as ever we endeavour to determine precisely the conception of the individuality of
_
ler
himself has correctly enun ciated the reasons which, according to the above, induced Plato, as they did Aristotle and other philo
to suppose afterwards, sophers that the stars are animated by an intellect far higher than that of men. Where the tenets, which a
all defiphilosopher expresses with niteness, so clearly proceed from presuppositions acknowledged by him, we cannot doubt that they correspond to his actual opinions. Plato certainly does not in the least endeavour to form for us a more precise conception of the ani mation of the stars. He does not
spiritual
the stars, as well as to the ob which viously mythical elements run through the narrative of their
creation (39 sq., 42 sq.). But similar difficulties arise in very many doctrinal determinations
without giving us any right
to re
as e.g. ject them as uu-Platonic ; in the doctrine of the World-soul,
human
parts of the nar the rative of the origin of the stars bears the same mythical character as the whole cosmogony of the
and
of
the
three
soul,
&c.
If
tell
us whether he
them a
self-consciousness,
attributes to sensi
Timseus, it does not follow that Plato is not in earnest in what he and di says about its intelligence also in vinity, not only here but He speaks of the for the Laws. mation of the world in an equally mythical way, but he does not therefore doubt that the world is the most perfect revelation of the
whether, in short, he imagines their life to be personal But has he made any or not. such scientific statement with re ference to the World-soul or the anaDivinity ? Has he accurately
bility, or will,
lysed
human
Whenever the
self-consciousness? doctrines of an an
He tells the become God. Idea, us myth after myth about the ori gin and destiny of the human soul but who can dispute that the soul is to him the divine in man, the teat of the intellect? Plato dis that tinctly gives us to understand
;
cient philosopher give us occa sion to ask questions, to which we find no answers in that philoso-
pher
the
case
is
essentially
different
with the divinity of the stars, and with the divinity of the purely mythical gods Chromes, Rhea, &c. the well-known passage of Tim. 40 E sq., he refuses with withering irony to express his views about these, as he has just done in the case of the former and Teichmiil, ,
s works, our first enquiry should always be whether he ever him proposed these questions to case we self; and in the present are not justified in assuming this. 55 30 C sqq., 36 E, 37 C, 39 E, end. Cf. begin 34 sq., 68 E, 92 ning of the Critias. This exposi tion might, to a great extent, have been borrowed from Philothe laus, if we could depend upon in genuineness of the fragments Stob. Eel. i. 420, the beginning of which has many points of sinnlarky with Tim, 32 C sqq., 37 A,
_
<
THF.
HEAVEXLY
J101>IE,
I winch comprehends in itself all other crea d gods an by reason of the perfection and
U>d
pas S1 ng away- the Cosmos is the best of things cr ated the perfect copy of the everlasting and invisible itself a blessed God, sole in its kind, sufficing to itself and in need of no other. In this description we not fa,l to recognise the characteristic of the ancie t v,ew of the world. Even Plato is far too 1 dee, rrated with the glory of Nature to despise h r asThe 6 t0 rMk her the human self-consciousness. As the 4-itual, bell ^nanTlf heavenly bodies are -sible go s, so the universe is to him the one Sib
roZ&ov) so far as the created can be like the Eternal comprehending in its body the totality of the corporea means of itg J, m]> Pupating, in divine end-ess hfe and reason, never growing old nor
J?2j
cT
"
Pa Plato
<
eUS
t ,t
>fthe
all things necessary to this perfection Cosmos, that as the Idea of the Living include self all
I8
above
intelligent Z o
***** on in he Platonic theory places all other living crei tures with man, will lead us at once to
w So? ch
f
je
them.- They fall, however Jhould two classes the mortal and the immortal. Of the have already spoken and shall have to
:
also include
living beings, so the world, as its co
^
1
Z P,; r
aCC
voi.
i.
again
C
s p t!
the
Anthropokgy
t ,,
38 O. g
Cf, however,
317, 4;
, or
C01
deslro
can pass away. But only their crea
*
end.
E)
41
G9
9-
c c 2
PLATO ASD THE OLDER ACADEMY.
CHAPTER
MAX.
IX.
PLATO has discussed the nature of the soul and of man less both mythically and scientifically. In more or he speaks of the origin and promythical language, and of existence of souls, of their condition after death,
His enquiries into the di Recollection (avajuvijuic). visions of the soul, and the interdependence of spiritual
and corporeal life, are conducted in a more exclusively Our attention must first be directed scientific manner. for to the mythical and half-mythical representations
;
re even the more strictly scientific utterances often Rut we must fullest elucidation from these. ceive their at the general concept of the Soul, previously glance
as
determined by Plato.
We
are told in the Thnanis (41
sqq.) that
when
the Creator had
formed the Universe as a whole
and the
in it (the stars), He commanded the godlike natures They there created gods to produce mortal beings. of fore fashioned the human body and the mortal part
the soul.
Himself prepared its immortal part in which He had before fashioned the the same cup The materials and the mixture were the World-soul.
He
in
same, only in less purity.
This means,
if
we
abstract
VAX.
the form of the
389
representation, that the essence of the conceived apart from its union with the body, is the same as that of the World-soul, except for the difference of the derived from the original, the If then the World-soul part from the whole. is, with
human
soul,
regard to Being in general, the mediatising principle between the Idea and the Phenomenon, the first form
of existence of the Idea in
multiplicity, this
must
itself
also
hold good of the

2
human
soul.
Though not
the
combined with the Idea that it cannot be conceived without it. Reason cannot impart itself to any nature except through the
Idea,
it
is
so closely
essential participate in the life, that death can never enter it. 4 Hence the soul is expressly defined as the self-moved. 5 But this it can
of the
instrumentality
soul;
conversely,
it
is
so
in the
soul
to
entirely Idea of
so far as its essence is
only be
of the body,
mill
and
specifically different fronTthat akin to that of the Idea for life

;
motion originally belong to the Idea, and all life. t-veii of derived existence, comes from The Idea.
it."
in contradistinction to the
is
absolutely uniform and
plurality of Sensible things! self-identical, and, in contra-
distinction to their transitoriness, is absolutely eternal. The soul, in its true nature, is without end or begin1>1
-a.
il ob i ap ou
,
-,
A:
Tb
according (Tim. 43 (
fce
to
the harmonic sysiem

4>>
f q.,
onderrtooSh
previously
p.
L>;!<I.
.be
fn
f nrep
T 6 ye
TOV
plained
3f>8
vTos
<rfyta
Tvy
ical
sq.).
TO.VTO.
ye
Ka\\lova.
11-J
The hnman
the
world-soul
f(T. supra, p.
3
4
See See
;:;
p.
172 287
(
soul
as
Jrell
is
as said to
Plirodo, lof,
I)
lOCD-cf
have the two circles df the TO.VTOV and da.Tfpov in itself, and is divided
sqq.
r>
"
See Sec
p.
p.
345
261
S(j(J
390

all
ning free from

7
multiplicity, inequality,
and com-
More precise explanations positeness. to the universal concept of the soul, regard
seek in Plato.
than these, in
we
vainly
This high position, however, only belongs to the essential nature soul, as contemplated in its pure to the disturbing influence of the without reference
The souFs present condition is so little adapted body. to that essential nature, that Plato can only account for it by a departure of the souls from their original
state;
and he
finds
no consolation
for
its
imperfec
return to that state. tion, except in a prospective The Creator of the world (so the Timeeus continues, as many souls as formed in the 41
sqq.)
there
7
were
stars,
beginning and placed each soul in a
star,
Phaedo, 78 sq. ]?i-p. x. 611 which investi sqq., the results of

;
been raised, I cannot concur with
gation are (x. 80 B) comprehended in the words T$ /J-ev delu /ecu adav:
ciry
KU.I
d8ia\i)r<>
/ecu vorjTi^ KCU /iovoetSe? /cat del ujcrai rws /ecu Kara
rain a. 2x ovTi a ^ T V
^VX-TIV.
fj.ti>
O/XOIOT O.TOV
elvai
:
The creator the view.just quoted. TO IS 5 forms ivapiO/jiovs i/ i/X^ universe to darpOLS, displays the law of them, and proclaims the In my existence. future their none but the individual
_
Laws,
899
on
opinion, souls can be meant.
The number
of the
(sec
re
deovs ffuyyeveLO. TLS iVwj vfJ.<pvTov ayti. 717)6$ TO 8 Susemihl, Genet. Entw. ii. 396, understands by this that the crea tor of the world divided the whole collective soul-substance into as many parts as there are fixed stars, appointed one of these parts
r/7et
need cause no
souls is
Oda
meant
difficulty ; that to be limited
on the below), that of the stars, other hand, is always considered incalculable. The fact that, accord
ing to
star this
view,
every
(fixed)
to
each of the
latter,
and^
caused
the individual souls, in their trans and the plantation to the earth from these to
planets,
parts.
proceed
would have only one reason able inhabitant, is of no import ance whatever. The question here is not about the inhabitants of the fixed stars; the souls are merely divided amongot the stars for a
^
As
far as Plato s scientific
views nre concerned, the meaning of srch an entirely mythical point As the vould be indifferent. actually question, however, has
time, in order that they template the world from

in
may
them
con
(as
PLwdr. 246
sqq.,
only in a
different way). 9 In this case, however,
we
cm
THE SOUL.
391
ordaining that they should thence contemplate the universe, and afterwards be implanted in bodies. At first, all were to come into the world alike, as men. Whoever should overcome the senses in this bodily existence should again return to a blessed existence in
his
star.
Whoever
did
not accomplish
this,
should
;
assume at the second birth the form of a woman

in case of continued wickedness, he should sink
but,
down
among
until,
10
beasts,
and not be released from
this
by conquest over
its
his lower nature, his soul
wandering had
In accordance with were distributed, some on the 11 and the created gods earth, some on the planets, fashioned for them bodies, and the mortal parts of the
regained
original perfection.
this decree, the souls
soul.
This_exposition differs from the much earlier one of the Phaedrus (216 sqq.) as follows. The entrance of souls into bodies, which the Timseus primarily derives from a universal cosmic law, is in the Phasdrus ulti*
mately reduced to a decline of the souls from their Hence the mortal part, which the Tima3us destiny.
only allows to approach the immortal soul
only think of the fixed stars, be cause this transposition of each
Boul to
its
when
it
definite
star
its
is
clearly
distinguished from
subsequent
asserting that the planets have in habitants just as the earth has for the expression 42 I) prevents our supposing that the human
;
E, 42
ii.
transplantation to the planets, 41 1) (overlooked by Martin,

151).
10
souls
come
then to the
and
is
to the planets first and earth. Anaxagoras,
IMiilnlaus
before
There
of this
Plato,
had
further
ment
11
develop
point, standing quite se parately in Plato ,and thoroughly misunderstood by Martin, loc. cit.), cannot be taken otherwise than as
This
point,
Tim. 90
sqq.
supposed the moon to be inhabited Plato seems (see vol. i. 820, 366) to follow them. To understand
;
o ,)2 1J as referring to in Hep. habitants of another world is very hazardous.

ix.
(
392
is, with regard to both its components, 12 Courage and Desire, already attributed to the soul in the pre-existent state there would otherwise be nothing 13 In other respects, the to mislead souls to their fall.
enters the body,
fundamental ideas of both dialogues are the same.
If
a soul, overcoming Desire, follows the choir of the gods

The whole description proves that these two qualities are to be understood by the two horses of the soul, Phsedr. 246 A; cf. also
12
ava.yKa.1ov e if]
e/c
/j.iav
Tracnv
/Stcuwi/
Tra.dri[j,a.TUv
E, 253 sqq., 255 E sq. All that is brought against this view from the Timseus (Hermann,
247
yiyveo-dai, &c.) begin. terrestrial body Plato

rily
^v^vrov Of a super-
not only says nothing (as he must necessa
exist),
De
part.
an.
immort.
sec.
Plat.
if he supposed it to but positively excludes the notion by the whole character of
have done
Gott.
1850-1,
Hermias
p. 10, following in Phsedr. p. 126) would
all, sup prove nothing posing that it was not a mythi cal exposition. Why might not Plato have altered his views? To explain the horses of the soul as equivalent to the elements of the soul mentioned in the TimaMis,
at
even
This body must exposition. have been created by the inferior and their activity only gods
his
;
commences with the

the
earthly
;
creation of
aia-Oâis too body would have been inseparable from it and cuffdrja-is only originates
;
with
there
the
earthly
body.
Nor
is
as
is
Hermann does, after Hermias, more than improbable. These

r3
parts of the soul will be discussed

later on. I
s
anything in the Pluedrns, 245 C sqq., about a sidereal body it is the souls themselves which throng and push and lose their pinc. We might of course mage,
:
cannot concur with

supposition
;
Suse-
(Genet. Entvv. i. Philol. xv. 417 232, ii. 398 sqq.) that Plato imagines the souls to be clothed with a sidereal body In previous to the earthly life. the Timneus 41 C. sq., 42 E, the souls, and these only in only their immortal paii, are fashioned by the Deraiurgus these souls are transported into the fixed stars, and only afterwards do they ob tain a body not perhaps earthly, but simply a body and with tliis the sensible powers of the soul oVore 877 au/j.a<ni tfj.<pvTev(42 A
;
:
mihl
say that incorporeal souls could not live in the stars but just as little could they wander about the
;
heavens and raise their heads intc

the sphere above the heavens, ac cording to the fable of the Phajdrus. cannot expect that such mythical traits should, be tho roughly consistent with one ano ther and in harmony with the se
We
rious determinations of the Pla tonic doctrine. are not justi
We
determinate attributing Plato simplv because are require.! in a purely my they

theories
to
fied
in
thical exposition.
PJtti-EXTSTEXCE
AM) I MMoJlTA LJ I
r.
393
up to the super-celestial place to behold pure entities, remains for a period of one revolution 10,000 years, of the free from the universe, body but those souls which neglect to do this, and forget their
it
:
highest
nature, sink down to the earth. as stated in the all,
At
Phaedrus,
their first birth, are implanted in
years, punishment under the earth, some as a reward in heaven. This period having elapsed, they have again to choose, the
evil as well as the good,
their lots vary accord ing to their merit. After death, all are judged, and placed for a thousand some as a
human, and male, bodies; only
new kind
of life; and in
choice, human souls pass into beasts, or from beasts back into human bodies. Those alone who thrice in succession have their lives in the spent of
this
pursuit
wisdom, are allowed to return, after the three thousand

years, to the super-celestial abode. The latter part of this representation is confirmed by the llepublic. 14 The souls after death are there said come into a
"to
place the just are led away thence to the right, into heaven; the unjust to the left, beneath the earth. Both, as a tenfold reward of their deeds,
where they are judged
for the
lave to accomplish a journey of a thousand years, which one is full of sorrow, for the other of blessed 15 isions. \\ the end of his thousand years, each soul
has again to select an earthly lot, either human or animal, and only thr very greatest sinners are cast for
*
x.
.I.!
faturc
K s (I q. In vi. 1) return to hfe was already

-4<>,S
caused so
tian
much
die
dogmatism,
trouble to 1m,viz. the fate of

(
ti 1( ls l ueshon forward, which afterwards

,
(
i-r
children
,
who
m s-
ref uses to
enter into
it.
304

16
ever into Tartarus.
The
Politicus
17
also recognises
Gorgias the future judgment, again with the qualification that

to be everlastingly punished: incorrigible sinners are
a periodical entrance of souls into bodies. account of The (523 sqq.) gives a detailed
and the Phsedo (109
cosmological describes the state after death in the sarne^ imagery, sqq.): way. Here four lots are distinguished (113
sqq.),
with
much
that of ordinary goodness, of incurable wickedness, of curable wickedness, and of extraordinary holiness. of the first class find themselves in a condition
People
purification which, though happy, is still subject those of the second are eternally punished those of 18 Those who are remarkable the third
; ;
to
temporarily.
for
of
the highest grade goodness attain to perfect bliss, is the por entire freedom from the body 19 This passage is tion of the true philosopher alone. to be taken in connection with the former one, Phaedo
which
(80
sqq.),
number
a necessary things of sense.
the return of the greater into corporeal life (as men or animals) of souls to the consequence of their attachment
which makes
But the Gorgias not only represents
much more
16
the distinction of strongly than the Phsedo

here added
here (114 A) a belief in the
effi-
The peculiar touch that at such persons the abyss is of the world beneath roared a remodelling of a Pythagorean
notion
17
;
cacy of
cf. vol.
i.
389, 3.
272 E; cf. 271 B sq., the development of details is here of course different, but the general
doctrine the
18
same as elsewhere.
448,
is
Brandis, Gr.-rUm. Phil. ii. a. mistaken in trying to find
parted. the offender is punished until 1 lias expiated his offence, and prothere pitiated the injured person ; is nothing about intercession, 19 similar dirision p, a fojj fold state of recompense is reiem from the to in the
intercession for the deThe idea is rather that
x.
904
passage
409. sqq. quoted p.
PBE-EXI8TENCE AXD IMMORTALITY.
395
ordinary from philosophical virtue, and its importance in determining future conditions, but contains a some
what
different eschatology. According to the other descriptions, the departed spirits appear immediately after death before the bar of judgment, and only
resume a body
at the
end of a thousand years.
Here,
the souls that hanker after sensible things are said to hover as shadows around the graves, until their desire
draws them again into new bodies. 20 Plato employs the same method in the dpetrine of
life.
Recollection, to explain the phenomena of/the present The possibility of learning, he says, 21 would be
incomprehensible, the sophistic objection that one can not learn that which is known, nor seek that which is
unknown," would be unanswerable, if the unknown were not in some other relation to the known some
;
thing namely that

forgotten.
case.
man
has once
known and then again
How
Experience shows this to be actually the could mathematical and other truths be
extracted merely by questions from a person to whom they had hitherto been entirely strange, if they were not
How could sensible things previously latent in him ? remind us of universal concepts if the latter were not
known to us independently of the former ? They can not be abstracted from the things themselves, for no particular represents its essence exactly and completely.
But
20
if
these
concepts
and cognitions are given us

I) sqq.
-"-
108 A docs not really balance variation, in spite of the reference to the former passage.
this
I
Plia do.
vol.
.
:
7-
Ksqq.:
I
;
cf.
Tim.
41 E. See
d.
i.
1M2
ranll. (Jesch.
hredr.
2-41
15.
s<[.;
Mono, 80
Log.
i.
,.
$96

we
can
before any presentation has been appropriated,
not have acquired them in this life, 23 us from a previous life. brought them with
of learning,
but must have
The
facts
and of conceptual knowledge
are only to
be
of the soul. explained by the pre-existence of alone makes Thought, distinguishing characteristic
This doctrine
human
comprehensible to us. were That the above descriptions as they stand but as not as dogmatic teaching regarded by Plato 25
nature,
24
myths,
prove:
it
to his express assertions scarcely required the contradic this is unmistakably shown by
tions not only
between one dialogue and another, but with often in the, very same the careless prodigality to which historical and physical wonders are heaped 2G and of irony occasional
;
intermingling gether the are beyond the precise detailing of particularities that less clearly asserts that these all human ken. But he no but were viewed by him not as mere myths,
;
;
myths
also as hints of the truth,

23
worth serious consideration

Se
The
expression
an.
iii.
which
a. 27,
Aris-
ionv
dvd^r}<ns
77
cKelvw, & iror
totle,
De
4,
thniHi wiihout LlltJUKU Y*iaWM which Philop. 1
De
quotes. Plato s name, and an. ii. a.,

f>
429
elSev
wG>v
tan* **
114 1
^.y
;
Phsedo,
Rep.
;
x.
though
refers only conjecturally, to Plato, seems to imply this ongimil possession of the Ideas: e5 5r?
ol
MUML
86 B.
82
Rep. *
cif.
:
Of. Pluedo, x. 62 -
A
;
Inn. 91
D
,
(Jeorg.
elwu r6> \Hyorre9 rip iHtV he has dSQv Perhaps, however, in mind the more general view, on which cf. p. 287, 172. I lisedr loc. cit. only a human s ml can come into a human body, because it alone has heard truth
.
o.Vraura oiVws *x". **

rb
&
523
A
*!<*
Ph*do,
I
.,.
loc.
5u^ P^6
i
irptvci
vow
3
/^T
-rrepl
>4
raj
99 AvSpl. ^Xovri iV ecriv ^ TOWUT * ^ at Tas of;<rf,
$\>\fa
W^
dvOpuirov iWnu /car elSos TroXXwv ibv aiadrjGtuv \f.y&/j.evov e /c TOVTO
teyap
tird rep adavarbv 76 TJ rat oiVa, ravra /cat vptveiv Soicci K al

OI
TWJ
JTr.
397
tions
tain
and he therefore combines with them moral exhorta which he never would have grounded on uncer
fables.
28
It
is
difficult,
precisely where that
which
is
however, to make out intended to be dogmatic
ends, and that which is mythical begins. Plato himself was manifestly in uncertainty, and for that very reason
betakes himself to the myth. The doctrine of immor tality is the point, the strictly dogmatic signification of which can least be doubted. Not only in the Phgedo, but in the Phaedrus and Republic, too, it is the subject of a complete But this philosophic demonstration. demonstration is directly founded on the concept of the soul, as determined by the whole inter-connection of the Platonic system. The soul in its Idea is that
to the essence of
therefore, can
it
which life belongs at no moment, be conceived as not This ontoliving.

:
Iqgical proof of immortality sums 29 and is proofs in the
up
all
the separate
in
Pha?do,
;
brought forward
lot-.
D527B
Ihe
.dt.
Georg. 52(5
sq.;
Rep.
x.
618B
sq.,
details
the
Phndo
about immortality appear to form i series of distinct evidences and

considerations. If, however, we look into them more closely, we see that they all depend on one
pine cndeavour-a postulate of the consciousness philosophic that all philosophising is a loo sine: of the soul from the body a kind
of death ; and consequently that the soul arrives at its determination, the cognition of truth only after the from the separation
i.e. after death only (Whether this exposition be called a proof or not is, I think of no importance the Platonic Socrates, 63 B E, makes use of it as ajubtification of his belief in a happy life after death). Plato himself how. ever, 09 E sq suggests that this kind of foundation is not sufficient hence in a second part (70 C-84 B) he produces some other proofs
The consciousness of thought. lie Ideal Being of the human soul

(which
fecay)
is
body,
is
above
growth
and
here exhibited in its advance to an ever clearer scientific jrtamty, in its establishment with each new step on deeper and Inner convictions. In the end e get (64 A-69 E) as a genepresupposition
of
philoso-
393

it
the Phredrus, where
is
shown
that
as the
soul
is
ever in motion and is the first beginning of all motion, 30 The it must be indestructible as well as underived.
from the nature of the _soul itself, to demonstrate that which he ex immediate pounded merely as an
life presupposition of philosophic These proofs are and endeavour. all distinguished from the decisive and incontestable proof of the last fact that they do not part, by the of the proceed from the concept soul as such, but from individual
the
proof
which Plato considers
This complete and incontestable. the proof is brought in by refuting notion that the soul is merely the harmony of its body (90 C-95 A\ After (95 A-102 A) showing that the starting-point lies in the doc trine of Ideas (upon which all the
previous
hinge),
analogies and facts, by which a mortality may be inferred with but not high degree of probability, with the unquestionable certainty which Plato attributes to his chief It is proved first of argument. all (70 C-72 D) that as everything the originates from its opposite, originate from the living must dead, as the dead from the living
;
im
ultimately develops the final A-107 B) argument as above (102 concept can never pass into its a thing which opposite, nor can has a definite concept belonging _to its being admit the entrance of its But life belongs to the opposite. being of the soul, consequently ît cannot admit the opposite of this, Therefore it is immor viz. death.
discussions
Plato
tal
must therefore exist. It is then shown (72 E-77 A) that the and the generation of new notions,
the dead
formation of general concepts, are to be understood merely as Keminiscence, and are to be explained from a previous possession of those to notions, and an existence piior the present. And (according to the doctrine of the origination of the this prior living from the dead) existence must find its correspond ence in an existence after death. Finally (78 B-81 A), from a com parison of the soul with the body, the result is obtained that the soul belongs to the class of simple
1 cannot and imperishable. here enter into details as to the different views which have been entertained on the composition of the Phsedo, and its arguments fcr the immortality of the soul. Cf., Plat. Schleiermncher, however, ii. 3, 13 sq. Batir, Sokrak-s und Christus (Tub. Ztschr. 1837,
WW.
3),
iv.
114 sq. Steinhart, Pi. WW. 114 sq. (who, however, concedes too much to Hermann s mistaken
;
assertion
that
the
proofs
of
the
Pluedo exhibit the development of Plato s convictions on this subject,

Herra. Plat. 528 sq. See, on the other side, Rettig. ub PI. Phanlo,
Bern, 1845, p. 27 sqq.) ; Bonitz. z. Erkl. platon. Dialogu., Hermes,
v.
and
unchangeable
things
and
these are not liable to dissolution. Still even these proofs are found to be insufficient (85 D, 88 B sq.). third division, distinct from the us to previous sections, introduces
413 sqq. Further Ueberweg, Gesch. d.

sq.OA
>u
details
apud
i.
Phil.
"
135
(-*
>
/~1
:
Z-ii) L,
vvxil
~ ira.aa.
d6dva.TOv, &c.
CX AXJJ IMMORTALITY.
same argument
is
399
it is
used in the Republic,
31
where
said that the destruction of a thing is caused by its own inherent evil. But the evil of the soul, that is
moral evil, does not weaken its If the faculty of life. soul could be destroyed at all, vice, says Plato, would have destroyed it as this is not the case, we see that an absolutely indestructible life is inherent in it. In
;
a word, the nature of the soul guarantees that it cannot cease to live it is the immediate cause of all life and
:
motion; and though both may be borrowed by the 32 soul from a higher, namely the Idea, yet it is only by means of the soul that the Idea can impart itself
to the
33
Corporeal.
dpxy
e
Therefore, in proportion as
dpxy
8e
(
it
is
The
soul is
Kivrjcreus
Id).
irdv TO yiyvo/JLevov yiyvevdai, de fj.r)5 e fV6s et yap ZK TOV
motive power Phaedo, 105 C -Phi30 B sq. see p. 266, 112), and
;
;
yiyvoiTO, OVK dv
eTretSr? 5e
et;
dpxrjs yiyvoiro.
that it therefore belongs to the conditioned and derivative, or, ;is the Timaeus puts it, that it was
aytvyrbv tort, Kal ddtd(pOopov avTo dvdyKTj elvai (cf. supra e irecpap. ]44j .... ddavdrov TOV v$ eavTov Kivovfttvov, ovffiav Te Kal \6yov TOVTQV
.
produced by God together with the rest of the world. This is of no importance to the present question, but still there is a difference the exposition of the riuedru* is less
:
O.VTOV
TTO.V
Tis
\tyuv OVK
aw/jLa
ydp
^v
et
atVîvetrat. ?udev TO Kt-
precise and developed than that of
crewj
eVn TOVTO
TI
&\\o
eavTo KLVOIV
dyfv-rjT&v TC
r)
dvai TO
e
^vx^,
dvdy-
/ecu
dddvaTov
av
31
x.
92
I-]
32
13
608 D sqq. Cf. PhsBdo, sq., and Steinhart, v. 2G2 See p. 288, 172.
s<i.
the later I cannot dialogues. agree with Ueberweg (Unters. plat. Schr. 282 sqq.) that the Tima-us differs from the Phaula in its view of the Being of the soul. Tim. 41 A, the creator of the world 76 fj.tv says to the created gods o$v or) SfOev irdv \VTOV, TO ye /xr?c
:
KctXws
a.pfj.o<r6v
t0\eiv KaKou
dXurot Tb
6r](Tffde
fj.oipas,
81
Kal 2x ov e ^ Ai/et? a Kal eirei-rep ye/ue**
The Phaedrus
itself
yfrrjaOe, dddvaTOi
OVK ÔT^ ovJ
designates the
Kiv^<reus,
soul
Trd/uirav, OVTI /j.v Srj \uoi Se

Tei/e<r0e
as the dpxrj
ye
davaTov
fj.eiovo>
without saying that it is indebted only to participation in the Idea

of
life
In
T^S
/J.TJS POV\TI<T(JJS
6e<rfJ.ou
and the Ideal Cause
Kal KvptuTepov \axovTes
for
its
v, ofs
or eyiyevde
400
in the universe should be mani necessary that the Idea medium of fested in the phenomenon, the soul, as the
that as the soul according to the Tia raaaus has also an origin and TO 5eflb composition, the principle
Hence Uebenveg concludes
which
is
only because it And in where.

fj.tv
referred to here so briefly was detailed else 6Vt the words

:
irav
The
\vrbv must hold good ofît. soul cannot, therefore, be im mortal nature, but only by the
will of
Tolvvv adavarov i) ^vwi xai 6 oi ctXXot avayKdveiav &pTi \6yos Kai we are clearly referred to fur
&i>,
by God.
comparison of this
with thtit of the Phseexposition drus and the Phaedo shows, says stands Ueberweg, that the Timreus between these two and forms the transition from the one to the
other.
which can only be those of the In the argument above Phsedo. mentioned, 608 D sqq., it is evidently assumed that the soul is imperish able by nature, this being the only
reason
ther proofs
known
to the
reader,
The Phredrus presupposes
the
of everything perishableness conditioned, and therefore explains the soul as something uncondi order to vindi tioned, an apx*l, in cate its immortality. The Phffido, on the other hand, considers the soul to be conditioned by the Idea of and gives up the
life,
why its ot/cet a irovrjpia is in it. Again, it is capable of killing incorrect to say that the principle TO 8edev irav \VTOV \s given up in It is stated just as the Phredo. definitely there as in the Timaeus vvTt6evTi re /ecu (Ph. 78 B r fj-ev oWl (ptcrei. TrpO<r7]Kl TOVTO
:
%Vl>deT(j)
Llf
ird<rx
>
accordingly of everything con perishableness that such a it allows ditioned thing may be imperishable, pro vided it stand in an essential rela
;
^vvveTeQ-t]
al>l>()eTOV,
SiaipeOrjvat el de TI
ravrri
rvyx&vei
yirep dv
fJ.T)
TOVTtj} ubvtp TTpOCnf]KL
ir6.ff-x.eiv
TO.VTO. d-rrep
ru dXAy), and
is
611 B. repeated, Republic, as well as Republic and Timreus,

the Phaulo, add that the soul isîot a <ruv6eTov, but a simple Being,
The
tion to the Idea of
life.
The
Ti-
mseus agrees with the Phsedrusâs to the perishableness of everything conditioned, and with the Phrcdo in saying that the soul is a con
and they prove its immortality im mediately from this simplicity. The Phffido (80 B if/vxi 5 ^ a 5 r
:
Hence it denies ditioned thing. to the any natural Immortality soul ; and for this reason it may be considered earlier than the
Phsedo. bination
paid
of
But in making this com Ueberweg ought to have some attention to the Re
public,
which he has left quite out The Republic, consideration. which is prior to the Timseus, dis of tinctly refers to the discussions
elvai T) eyyvs omit to intimate TOVTOV] does not that the indissolubility of the soul is not so unconditioned and original Is this really as that of the Idea. different in the Timaeus? and e-mOvfJiia are first (42 A, 69 ( ) associated with the soul on its but they do entry into the body not belong to its original Being, which outlasts death. If we want
ira.po.irav
dStaXury
6i>/x6?
the Phsedo, 69 C-72 B, and 78 B81 A (cf. especially Kep. 611 B with with Phsedo, 72 sq., 611 of Phsedo, 78 B sq.), the substance
to
know
this
Being we must, as Re
B sq. expressly remarks, public 611 leave them out of the question. Bv its transient connection with
PXE-EXI8TEXCK A Xlt TM
this
4nl
manifestation, is also necessary ; and as it is im possible that the universe and its motion can ever
does not become anything must be denied both to the human This would only be and to the World-soul. But this according to Phaedrus, 240 A sq. Uebenveg believes that the would be going beyond Plato s real The principle that everymeaning. 1 naedrua agrees with the Tim-ens thing composite is dissoluble is as^to the perishableness of every mih Plato a fuadamental meta thing conditioned. But the Ti- physical occurs principle which imeus does not speak of the con equally in the Pluedo, the Republic, ditioned any more than the Phredo and the Tiraamt. The soul in or Kepublic it spite ot this has no speaks of the com dissolution to fear; posite. Is the soul to be considered and this can be substantiated in as composite, and therefore dis two ways. We can either deny soluble, in the Timneus, because, ac that the soul is composite, or we cording to a mythical exposition, it can say that, so far as in a is formed out of its elements ? (see certain sense the p. :)42 sq.) We nrght say in site, it is in itself soul is compo dissoluble, but lavour of this view that the this prin possibility for other reasons ciple TTO.V Ssdev XVTOV is adduced is never realised. We can derive not merely, 41 A, with reference to its immortality either from a me t.ic composition of the stars out of taphysical a moral pr the corporeal elements necessity. he former is the method (40 A; cf. [I pursued K sq.), but also the li-public and presupposed, |2 Phajdo; the 43 I). One of the soul s circles is latter is hinted at in the Timams, there said to be utterly confined by where the psychogony does not the throng of sensible perceptions permit to be attributed simplicity the entry of the soul into to the soul in the same the jit strict sense body. This is the circle of iden as in the other Cf the dialogues. tity (Thought), the Tavrbv. The Republic, Gil B: ou pdhov dttuM* other circle iva.L ffvveerbv re CK (Ôpinion) is so confused, TroAXa;* /cat wore ra^Tou dcwXaa-iou /cat rpnrXa- rrf Ka\\i(TTr] KCKXPWtvov avvdecrci, rpeis e/carepas aTroordVets /cat as is the case with the soul in its ray rCiv yv.ioXlwi> /cat iir(.Tplruv present condition, though not ac Kal eiroybbuv fjieaoTTjTas /cat vvdtcording to its original Being. The (the harmonic proportions of possibility is suggested of the the soul, see ;j49 sq.\ s nil s p. being indeed a vvvOf-Tov, but TrajTeAtDy XvTal OVK 7jffa.v TT, one so beautifully combined that TOV t 57?<raj/ryy, Trdaay it /j.h UI U{ may last for ever. So far as or/)o0dy, &c. But, as we have there is any actual difference on seen, the PlucJo itself suggests a this point between the Timanis and similar restriction. If then we the Phaedo, it proves the Timrciis are to press the words as Uebenveg to be not the earlier, but the later does, we must assert not The simplicity of the soul only of work. the Timaeus but of the Plmlo is modifiel in the Timaeus (and not that it does not assume a natural before) by the doctrines of its com imperishability of the soul. And position out of its elements. The in the Timseus natural immortality same holds good against Ueberit
them
composite. the case
<riov
<rcu
^^
D D
402
that the soul should either cease, so it is impossible 34 have had a beginning or be subject to destruction.
the that this holds good onlyôf view his World-soul, and not of individual souls. In are not emanations of the AVorld-soul, coming these
Plato cannot
mean
forth from
and returning into it Ideas stand side by side with the but as particular so particular souls stand beside the highest Idea, Both universal soul in self-dependent individuality. are of like nature both must be equally imperishable.
it
for a certain time,
The
the principle of motion, and is with the Idea of Life therefore inseparably combined is not each particular soul must be so. This argument 35 It certainly follows from the pre altogether valid. there must always be souls, but not that mises that 36 It is questionthese souls must be for ever the same.
soul, as such,
is
:
wcg
that s assertion (loc. cit. 292) the Politicus also must be later than the Timrcus, because the called higher part of the soul is
o$re yiyvecrOai Swa-rov, i] TTO.VTO. re ovpavbv Traffdv TC yfreviv /cat ^TTOTC aSOis
<rav
ffTTJvat
fj.tpos.
114 C E sq., 621 B Rep. x. 610 D, 613 526 D sq. Theset. tan be drawn from these words it Gorg. 522 E, than 177 A; Laws, xii. 959 A sq. is that the Politicus is earlier 38 It does not follow that Plato we the Timseus. It is not till invalid. his proofs come to the Timseus that we find considered Teichmuller tries to prove in his any mention of the origin of the Studien zur Gesch. d. Begriffe, p. soul iu all the preceding dialogues, Pbsedo and 110-222, that Plato did not believe Pluedius, Mono (86 A), an individual immortality, but A, B), it is regarded in Republic (611 considered the individual in the oV. del as without beginning soul to be mortal, disappearing at Considering the mythical character far as death. (Teichmuller is, as of the psychogony and cosmogony I remember, the first to promul in the Timreus, I should be inclined His view not gate this theory.) to attach little importance to the but con only wants foundation, deviations. Plato s u Phsedr. 245 rovro 8e [TO tradicts every result of most unequivocal explanations. o.vrb KLVOVV] oiV a7r6XXv0"0cu
(309 C)
TO atcycvcs 6v TTJS ^vxv If any conclusion at all
;
;
;
odev KivrjdevTa yevrjireTai. 33 Phaedo, 107 B sq.,
AND IMMORTALITY.
:
403
able whether Plato would have attained his firm conhad it not commended itself to immortality
dividual
Teichnnillei- thinks that if the soul is not an
in
it
have not, however, yet discovered where the contradiction lies. Are there Plato no individual according -Beings by the side of the Ideas? or must they he perishable be cause they are not Ideas? Does
<
imperishable, and con victs me of a clear contradiction havin S represented the PJ. .? individual souls with an indepen dent existence by the side of the \\ orld-soul, while (p. 554) I deny that the soul is an Idea. I
>
cannot he
Idea,
the other returns to its eternal nature. Even if it, were correct to that the individual is to be jay found neither in the Idea* nor in the principle of Becoming, but only in the actual mixture of the two
would not necessarily view belong only to things which originate and pass There would remain the away. possibility that he supposed an enduring and indissoluble connec
(p.
114),
it
Plato
tion of the Idea with the

01
Becoming as well
principle as the tran

is
posite of that Idea? Hence, not only the Idea of life, but the soul which participates in that Idea ex cludes death. Teichmiillcr further remarks (p. HI) that, as the soul is a becoming or actually existin"it tlnng must, like all else which actually exists, be a mixed thine composed of an Ideal and a prin"
ciple of Becoming, of which one part (the individual) passes a waywhile the eternal factor returns into its eternal nature. But he neither has brought, nor could bring proofs to show that Plato thought this to be the case with all actually existing thin-s. Arc not the world and World-soul, the stars and the alar-spirits ac
lato expressly say (Phsedo, 104 B, 105 D, 106 sq.) that bendca the Ideas themselves all things with which an Idea is at any time connected exclude the op
sient connection.
This
undoubt
edly the case in the frequently quoted passage of the Phsedo, 103 L sqq. We cannot, however, sav ab solutely that individuality accord ing to Plato arises from the mixture of the Ideas with the principle of
Becoming ;_ at
least, if
we under
tually existing things? Do they not belong to the category of Be coming just as much as, and in the
vidual souls most distinctly affirmed by llato miiat have been inconceivable from the nature of
origin ?
stand by the latter term what he himself explicitly calls it, the TI9fa yevfoeus (Tim. 52 D) Matter for this is not in the soul. In dividual corporeal Beings do so originate, but how the spiritual in dividuality arises Plato gives us no explanation beyond the mythical partition of the soul-substance into the individual souls, Tim. 41 and it is more than uncertain that he could account for it to himself How can the assertion be jus tified that the of indi eternity
We may
their see that Plato s
same sense as, tho human soul? let we cannot infer that one
of their
part
Being passes awny, while
evidences for the personal duration of the soul after death have no actual cogency; or (which, how ever, would be difficult to prove) that such a belief is not in
harmony
D D 2
404
him
We must remember the strong 011 other grounds. moral interest attaching to a belief in future retribu
which
is
tion
37 and the prominent in his writings, of immortality with his agreement of the doctrine 38 high idea of the worth and destiny of the spirit; of together with the support it gave to his theory
so
Recollection. knowledge, by means of the principle of
As
is
far as the scientific establishment of this doctrine concerned, Plato comprehends everything in the single demand that we should recognise the essential nature of
the soul, which excludes the possibility of its destruction. This argument shows the close interconnection between the doctrine of immortality and that of
pre-existence.
If
it
be
impossible
artifice will
to
imagine
the
with the general suppositions of his But our next question system. must simply be whether he held
this belief himself or not; and to undertake to prove this expressly
to a reader of Plato
hardly serve to reconi-
mend
In his cihis explanation. tation of proofs for immortality obhe considers (p. 115 sqq.), it^ vious and a matter of course that
the question is not about any individual immortality. Throughout he has omitted to substantiate these assertions by any accurate
^
by single paspages, 6.3. Phasdo, 63 E, 67 B sq.,

;
72 A, 80 B, 107 B sq. Rep. x. Gil A where the constant number of the souls is by no means to be set aside with Tcichmiiller as is a mere metaphor (Tim. 42 B) simply bringing owls to Athens. AVitli this belief stands and falls the
theory of future retribution and of which, as will be prePlato seriously shown, sently thought it impossible to renounce, Teichmullcr endeavours (p. 143) to extract from the words (Phsedo, 107 D), ovtih yap &\\o 2x ovffa et * Atdou 4) ^v-)dn fyxercu TT\T]V TTJS 7rcu5e/as re KOLL rpoQw, the followWhat do we take with ing sense us into Hades ? Our Answer
,
:
analysis of Plato s text. ;!7 Pluedo, 107 B sqq.,
114 C B Rep. x. 610 I), 613 E sqq., 621 Therct. Gorg. 522 E, 526 D sqq.; 177 A Laws, xii. 569 A sq. x Cf. Phredo, 64 A sqq. Rep. x. 611 B sqq. Apol. 40 E sqq. He who sees the true nature of the
;
; ;
in its intellectual spirit exclusively nature, and its true determination of the exclusively in the activity a intellect, and in sense merely
to hindering clog, can hardly fail is once suppose that when man free from sense, he will be free from
^ ^
this clog.
Such an obvious
PBE.EXISTEME AXD IMMORTALITY.

soul as
405
existence had
and his expressions are as exîcit and decided about the one as the other. I n his opinior they stand or fall together, and he uses them alike to explain the facts of our spiritual life. therefore cannot doubt that he was thoroughly in earnest in his ssumption of a pre-existence. And that this pre
must equally hold living good he future and of the past; its existence can as little with this life as end with it. _begm Strictly it can never have speaking, begun at all; for the soul being itself the source of all motion, from what could motion have proceeded ? Accordingly, Plato hardly ever mentions immortality without alludin- to pre
this
not
existence
We
imams can hardly be allowed any weight to the conWe must nevertheless admit the
explained most dis tinctly in the I luBdnis cf. supra notes 30 and 34. The Meno is
;
beginning is so often asserted by that a mythical representation like that of the
no
possibility
Jlns
is
Rep.
is
x.
Gil
A:
exist
:
the
must always
immortal
same
souls
for that
which
less
dc-finite,
86 A;
O fo & v
&v
&p
ofo rbv del xpovov

77
fffrai
\fvxT]
avTou
rbv irdvTa
o6i>oj>
d^pwTroj. that this refers only to the since the soul existed at all.
It
yap on tanv OVK HVTIV might be objected

;
STJ\OI>
7*,
pass away but their number is not increased otherwise the mortal clement would in the end be consumed. Pha?do 106 I), the soul is designated as aLdiw fa, Eep. loc. cit. as dd to which ot course refers to endless
cannot
time
however,
is
meaning
paid so.
here,
clearly or he
not
This, Plato s
These expressions show to Plato s mind the absent of a beginning and the absence of an end coincide.
duration.
how
10
would have
holds good of the explanation in the Phcedo, 70 Il that every living thing springs from the dead, and rice versa, and that it must be so un less is to cease So Jife altogether. too in the corresponding passage,
<
The same
already shown what contradictions involved by the sup position of a beginning of the world. In the present case there the contradiction that the soul was fashioned in a determinate moment by the whereas
P. :>W sqq., in 1 lato became
i
It
has been
Demmrgos,
40i>

l>y
the that in his later years he did not strictly abide nor definitely propound to consequences of his system,
himself the question whether the soul had any historical

to beginning, or only sprang,
its essential
nature, from
some higher principle. If the two poles of this
ideal circle, Pre-existence
and
there is no evading the Immortality, be once established, which lies between them and doctrine of Recollection and of future rewards and the notions of
;
Transmigration more we consider them, to be punishments appear, the With regard to Recollection, Plato seriously meant. so dogmatically and speaks in the above-cited passages is so bound up with his whole definitely, and the theory that we must unconditionally reckon it among
system, the doctrinal constituents of that system. The doctrine be escaped if once is an inference which could not well
an the pre-existence of the soul were admitted for have left in the existence of infinite duration must in soul some traces which, though temporarily obscured our consciousness, could not be for ever obliterated. But it is also in Plato s opinion the only solution of a most important scientific question the question as to the of thought trans possibility of independent enquiry Our thought could cending the sensuous perception. not get beyond the Immediate and the Actual we could not seek for what is as yet unknown to us nor recog nise in what we find, the thing that we sought for; if we had not unconsciously possessed it before we recog; : ;
the Demiurgus himself could not It canbe imagined without soul. not be supposed that his soul is eternal and all the rest created ;
Tim. 34 13 sqq. ce.tainly^ looks as ot the if it were ^the primal origin

soul that is. meant,
RECOLLECTION.
nised and were conscious of
11
it."
to?
We could form no conception of Ideas, of the eternal essence of things which is hidden from our perception, if we had not
attained to the intuition of these in a former exist 42 ence. The attempt of a modern work to exclude the
theory of Recollection from the essential doctrines of the Platonic system/ 3 is therefore entirely opposed to the teaching of Plato. The arguments for the truth
and necessity of
this doctrine are not, indeed,

;
from our
point of view, difficult to refute but it from Plato s they are seriously meant. 44
is
obvious that
As
Recollection
commended
itself to
him on
scientific
grounds, the
world.
belief in
retribution
after
death was
necessitated by his moral and religious view of the However firm his conviction that the uncondi41 Meno, 80 D sqq. Sec p. 396, where the question riva Tpbirov
:
Traora
TJ
Toiavr-rj ouffia, Kal

aiff6-r](rfui>
.
ra eK TUV
<f>epoiJ.ev
TTO.VTO.
ewl Tavrrjv ava-
<f?7T?7crets
irav
on
TOVTO, 6 tern T)
. . .
/XT?
ot<5as
Toirapa/xdXtcrra
el
KOI
on
Kal ravra (Keivy direi-
evrvxois avTty, TTWS euret 6 rt TOVT& fffnv 6 ffv OVK -rjdrjcda is answered rb by the doctrine of avd/uLvrjcw
; :
dvayKaiov, ovrus iba-irc^ Zanv, OVTWS Kal TTJV rifierepav ^vxty f ^ a Kal irplv ye(T. supra, note 24. yovtvaL T7/ias.
Kdo/j.ev,
Kal
ravra
<-
yap fyrew apa Kal rb

avd/JLvrjai^
4-
4:>>
/j.ai>6di>fii>
o\ov
effriv.
( Phaedo, 73 sqq., where special weight is attributed to the fact that things always remain I e-
hind the Ideas of which they re the Ideas, therefore, must have been known previously, be cause otherwise we could not com pare them with things and remark the deviations of things from them.
Xo
Tfichmttller, loc. cit. 208 sq., refutat on of my view is here limited to the question Is it meant that the souls saw the Ideaa, before hirth, with the eyes of sense?
whose
mind us
one has ever attributed such an absurdity to Plato, nor has Plato
anywhere spoken of a
Plato therefore pronounces the preoxistence of the soul to be the in dispensable condition of the know ledge and assumption of the Ideas
:
snnsil.le ap pearance of the Ideas in the pre vious life. In fact, he guards rgainst such an assumption even in his
myths
>m
Pluedr. 247
44 The apparent Meno fr the rest
).
in
its
Phiedo, 76
det,
deviation of the of the dialogues account of the doctrine ot
tfv fan A 6p\ \KuX6f re Kal ayaBbv Kal

:
ei
dvdiJ.vi]ff^
has been already
notice:.!.
Supra,
p. 126, S2.
408
PLATO AND THE OLDER ACADMIY.
tioual
worth of morality could be shown without refer ence to a hereafter, he held that there would be a discord in the universal order, and that Divine justice
would be at fault if, after death, good was not invaria whatever might have bly rewarded and evil punished, 45 He, therefore, insists on been the case in this world.
the doctrine of future retribution not only in passages where some concession to popular notions might natu
rally
be expected for didactic or

also
political
reasons,
"
but
in
the strictest
scientific
necessary a the one doctrine is consequence of immortality, that 48 The precise kind and manner involved in the other.
it;
manner which 47 and he
clearly testifies to his
enquiries, in a personal belief in

so
rightly
regards
it
as
of retribution,
determine
however, he thought it impossible and in reference to this, he was obliged
to to
content himself either with consciously mythical repre sentations, or, as in the physics of the Timaeus, with
49
probability.
With regard
43
to Transmigration, too, Plato is
on the
Pep.
x.
612
A
loc.
sqq.
(cf.
ii.
Plato
opinion.
A-3G9 B-905 C.
357
46
<>jtj
B)
Laws,
cit.;
x.
903
(Jorg.
A r.QQ /v
47
E.g
Laws,
.
Knn bqq E.g. Pep.
Ma-xyplffaadai OUTOJS $x iv us e-yw oie\r)\v6a, he says at the end of the eschatologic myth in the Pliiedo, 114 D, Ot TTO^TTfL VOVV iVoiTt CLVOpi v ^
""i
TO p.h ovv ravja
loc. cit.
L>
C\ 95
sq., 114 48 Phfedo, 107 B sq., 114 D. 49 As has been already shown. it that AVe cannot, however, it is a contradiction to acknowledge the poetical play of imagination in
;
Phtedo, 03 Pliredr. 248 K.

;
on
/J.{VTOI
T)
TO.VT
earlv
-1)
TOIO.VT
&TTO. irepl ras \f/vxas

ot/ojo-as,
w&v
Kal ra?
cTreiirep
a9avaT6v
^
ye
^
77
I/^XT? eiv
0atVerai o5cra,Toi;ro
5o/fet oi
ATCU
/cat Trpeir-
say"
the particulars of a theory, and yet to consider it on the whole as an essential and doctrinal element of the system (Teichmiiller, loc. At any rate this is not cit. 209).
all
^n w Zx elv not a philosopher say should I think it can be proved that a future retribution will take place, although t admit the uncertainty of all detailed determinations as to
rws
"
lôi oto/icVy
&îov Kivovvevo-ai
"y
:
the
manner
of its fulfilment?
RECOLLECTION.
whole in earnest.
409
He himself shows us how it is con nected with his whole system. As the living can only arise out of the dead, and the dead out of the living,
souls
in
must necessarily be at times without bodies, order that they may return into new bodies. 50
is,
This vicissitude
therefore,
all
only a consequence of
the circle in which
created things are constantly

poles.
;
moving and vibrating between opposite
The
notion of justice, too, requires such an alternation for if life apart from the body be higher than life in the it would be body, unjust that all souls should not alike
be obliged to descend into the lower kind of existence, and that all should not be given a chance of ascending to the higher. 51 This argument seems, in Plato s
opinion, to involve that the body and habitation al lotted to one rational soul shall not be less perfect
than that of another, unless through the soul s own fault. Yet, on the other hand, he considers it quite
according to nature that each soul should be removed
into a place corresponding with its internal constitution M
50
x. (Ill
1
Pluedo, 70 C sqq., 83 A: cf. note 59.

.
P: Rep.
defeat of ovil in the world might
Tim. 41
sq.
of the
Phtednu is, as Rorae what different. Perhaps Plato had not yet advanced to his later
I
The nc count wo have said,
be assured. TTO.V TOUTO TO votav

e8paj>
[jiefj.rjxa.i a.Ta.i
5rj
TTOibv TL
yevj/j.evoi>
irpbs dtl
Set (jLeraXaft fidvov ct /a-
tadat
/cat
riWy
Trore TOTTOV
8e
determinations, or it may have est suited his exposition to treat the degradation of the souls as a matter
of will. Cf. Deuscble, Plat.
ycvfocus rb [rev] troiov raiy poc ray atrt ay. owy yap
\"qa
e<rii>
at>
em-
Ov/j.rj
Kai OTrotuy rty &v
rr)i>
i/
X^
Mjthen,
p. 21 sq., with whose remarks, how ever, I cannot entirely agree. Tim.loc.cit.; cf.Phwdr. 248J). Laws, x. i*0o D, .H)4 Ji (Jod willed that everything should tal-e smh a position in the universe that the victory of virtue and the
(
:
ravrrf ffxôv eKdarore /cat rotoPrcy yiyverat aTray T)(j.&v u;y TO iroXi
. 1
lvcrythii.g
which possesses a soul

fj.tr<
,
changes
constantly,
KfKrrjiJLtva. TTJV TT}S
to the direction and degree of this change it moves this or that, to the surface of the way
and according
llo

a
and seek out

of the
body that
for
suits
its
54
if.
The
an.
notion
dwelling adopting not only very repugnant to ourselves, but body, in even from the Platonic point of view is involved 55 Plato with and is treated by
soul
is
animal
so
so
many difficulties, much freedom, 56 that
it
is
easy to see
how
ancient
it and modern commentators have come to regard the thought as a merely allegorical rendering of when he loses himself in a life of sensua that man
lity
question degraded into a brute. to Plato, it is probable that been definitely proposed he would not have claimed for this notion the dignity
is
57
Had
the
of a scientific doctrine.
58
Nevertheless,
we
are clearly
not justified in explaining a trait which

earth,
so persistently
into Hades, into a higher into the opposite the just are 177 place. Theaet, like the divine, the unjust like the
and
purer or
can the dull and purely sensual life of the beast serve to Arc the souls of purify the soul? the beasts (ace. to Tim. 00 E sq.)
How
non-divine;
if
the unjust do not

^
all
avrovs amend, Kal TeXevTrjaavras f/ceZvos pev o T&V KOLK&V Kadapbs TOTTOS ou Several, evQdoe 5c TUV
CLVTOIS
eôvffi.
r4
>
souls,
descended from former human and so all intelligent and

to their original
loc.
cit.)
immortal according
Being, or (Phsedr. some of them ? (T. p. 397.
r>(i
only
c/>tot6T7?Ta,
rfjs
diayayrjs del
Hanoi KCLKOIS Phttdo, 80 E sqq. (see p. 396): eis if a soul leaves the body pure, TO ftuotop avrrj TO detSes airepxâL otherwise, are T ffu/j-an del ^vvovva
<rvvbvTe<i.
E.g. among (Jrcek Platonisls, the Pseudo-Timaeus, Plutarch ap

parently, Porphyry, and Hierocles (see vol.
165,
57
lamblichus,
iii.
b.
121,
Kal yeyoriTevêvt] UTT avrov, re Kal J:\KeTai ird\w ct s fiapvveTai Such touls wan rbirov. Tbv
. .
590,
041,
among modern
Genet, Kntw.
edit.); scholars, Stisemihl,

;
084,
2nd
der about the earth, ws av T$ TOV tweiraKoXovdovyTOS TOV <TU[J.aTOfi5oGs

"
bparbv
eTri6vfjiia
ird\iv
is
evtied&aiv
ets
ii. i. 243, 392, 405 Philologus, xv. 430 sqq. 58 cannot quote Kcp. IV. 441 B here. It is said there that beasts
We
have no reason
obvious,
(\oyi<rfj.bs) ;
but
crw/ia.
The
question
How
to whose nature the ac capability of forming concepts, essen cording to Phiedr. 249 B,
can man,
said immediately be Plato might deny fore of children. the use of reason to children, from
the same
was
tially
belongs,
become
a beast?
his point of view, but not its pos session.
TB4N8MIGRATION.
recurs
in
all
411
.Plato s
eschatology,
as
the
conscious
essentially
allegorisation
of
moral
theorem
not
belonging to the representation of the future life. Plato seems to have seen in this theory originally borrowed from the Pythagoreans one of those preg nant myths which he was convinced contained a fundamental truth, though he did not trust himself to determine (and being still a poet as well as a
philosopher, perhaps felt no necessity for determining) exactly where this truth began and how far it ex
souls in their original state, and when to return to that perfected state, are represented as entirely free from the body, 59 and this
sufficiently
tended.
The
doctrine
sophy
is too closely interwoven with his whole philo 60 to justify our that perfect limiting it to mean
incorporeality is merely an unattainable ideal, in reality man even after this present life will
and that
possess a
to
body
a nobler body, however, and
more obedient
whole procedure philosopher consciously and exclusively strives after a release from the body, who so long as the soul carries about with if this evil who yearns despairs of attaining his end to be free from corporeal bonds, and sees in that free dom the highest reward of the philosophic life; who
in his
;
the soul.
who
recognises in the soul an invisible principle, which only in the invisible can reach its natural state C1 such a
;
39
Phaedr.
240
cf.
-Vvol.
Ptoedo, 66 E sq., 80 1) sq., 114 (J 81 I), 83 D, 84 1); Tim. 42

ANith
iii.
sq.,
250 C;
;
that they all foun 1 this view of theirs in Plato) likewise Hitter, ii. 427 sqq. Steinhart, iv. 51 Suscmihl, Gonet. Knt\v. i. 461
;
: ;
obvious
many
on
641, (584,
of
the
earlier
is
1 hilol. xv.
(il
.Neoplatonists,
b.
whom compare
<5<8
417 sqq.
736
(it
A-68 B 79 ( s. 80 D-81 D, 82 P-84 B- cf also

Phredo, 04
412

if
it
philosopher, vinced that
any one at was possible
all,
must have been con
for the
wisdom
assert,
to attain in the life to
come
is
full
disciple of release
true
from
the material element.
Since this
just
what he does
slightest
the without a word to the contrary, 62 In reason for mistrusting such explanations.
we have not
these
main features, therefore, of the Platonic escha63 do with Plato s own opinions. tology, we have to Other points may have had in his eyes at any rate an
approximate
cosmic for example, the 61 the duration of thousand years, revolutions of ten future intermediate states, the distinction between
probability;
curable and incurable transgressions.

Tim. 81 D, 85 E, and subter, note
06.
65
But the further

next
appearance of presupposes the nonit is at our corporeity of the soul entry into the body that we forget them; Phfedo, 70 D Hep. x. 621 A ; cf. supra, note 13.
62
The
original
the
Ideas
object of punishment (see The consideration that chapter). the equilibrium between the num bers of the dying and of those
returning
into
life
(Phdo,
72
sq.; Rep. x. 611 A) might be disturbed, and in the end quite of destroyed, if in each period
ii. 181, therefore incorrect in of the pronouncing the conceptions fall of the soul pre-existcnce, the and avdfjiv^ffis, to be doctrines not reckoned essential to his philo
63
Hegel,
18<3,
(resell, d. Phil.
the
184,
is
work! even a small number with only of incurable criminals drew from the ranks of those set be apart to return to life, could met by the supposition that the
sophy by Plato himself. 64 The whole calcu p. 383.

"V.
punishment (Gorg. 525 0; Eep. 015 C sqq., denoted as endless) of

such persons extended only to the end of each great year of the world. This of course would not be an but still eternity of punishment, such as would extend over the whole period of time comprehended by
Plato
It is, s eschatologic myths. however, open to question whether Plato himself rose to this con I see, therefore, no sideration. sufficient reasons for the assertion
lation is of course purely dogmatic. The world-year is a century (the of a man s life) longest time
are multiplied by itself ; its parts ten periods of a thousand years, of for a which each one allows space single return to life and the possi dura bility of retribution of tenfold
tion.
65
of Plato
This distinction was the result s general view as to the
(Susemihl,
Philol.
xv.
433
sqq.)
U1UTIOX.
details
FUTUBB EXISTENCE.
s
413
concerning the other world and the soul
tions are so fanciful in
migra
themselves, and are sometimes
so playfully treated by Plato, that his doctrine, in pro portion as it descends into particulars, passes into the
region of the Myth. In connection with these notions, by which alone it can be fully understood, we have now to consider the Platonic theory of the parts of the soul and its relation to the As the soul entered the body. body out of a purer life, as it stands related to the in no
body
original or essential manner, the sensuous side of the souls life cannot belong to its specific essence. Plato
in its present condition to the sea-god Glaucus, to whom so many shells and
is disfigured He says that when the soul is recognition. 67 planted in the body, sensuality and passion grow up
therefore compares the soul
<
sea-weeds have attached themselves that he
past
with it and he accordingly distinguishes a mortal and an immortal, a rational and an irrational division of
;
the soul. 68
the
Of
irrational
these, only the rational part is simple is again divided into a noble and an
"
Re
x 611
sqq.
f
\ Another
n-ls Th
lts
V
Tim
&r A
4
C
o"o
Xi
88
r
ro
; fl n
T
I"
,.M
PoUt
P
.;
r
,
%i
/1
("
p * cr.
T 1
*-
aa ul thc 1 ---.,, G T-
^
,
>
the immortal sou1 a d tl,c ly is desi Sated as mortal. exposition must not, owing to character Jtl.ical pre?en?
"
8Cekl
aBU8 .,^^
"S
PIato>s
>eal
cxplicit
th
Laws,
"
are with
lon
f
Ip
i,
}".
later
tilt V they dogmatic determinamuch the views of y***n

t
"V
^,1 V^/WLIIIVICU. P r P un
^d
~
as
it ft
"pi
all
Greek Platonists may be
at
ia (see p.
393) are reckoned
414

The former, the noble soul-steed of the TO Courage or vehement Will (6 0u/xog
69 ignoble half.
Phasdrus,
OvjLioti&s),
is
which anger, ambition, love of glory, and in general, the better and more powerful pas In itself without rational sions have their seat. it is disposed to be subordinate to Reason as its insight, It has an affinity with Reason, an instinct natural
in
ally.
though when great and good often give Reason trouble rated by evil habits it may 71 The ignoble part of the mortal soul
for
the
7U
deterio
enough.
includes the
sum
total
of
sensuous
appetites
and
dominion of under the passions; those faculties sensible likes and dislikes, which Plato usually calls or so far as property is desired as the
iTnflujurjnicov,
a means of sensuous enjoyment, the <{Aox/>Varov. 73 The reasonable part is Thought. Thought has its in the breast, especially dwelling in the head Courage 74 The two Desire in the lower regions. in the heart man alone the inferior divisions are not possessed by 75 the soul of Courage appetitive soul belongs to plants, 76 Even in man the three faculties are not to animals.
; ;
:
/2
in individuals nor in whole equally distributed, neither Plato assigns Reason pre-eminently to the nations.
love of Greeks, Courage to the northern barbarians,
Eep.
1)
iv.
438
1.)
sqq.; sqq.
;
Phsedr.
cit loc. cit.
sqq., ix. 24(5 sq.,
580 253
73 Usually called also \6yos
or
\oyi<TTiKbi>,
Tim. 69 C
;
sqq.,
89 E.
$ na.v6a.vci
of.
;
0tXo/i0&, C AvOpuTros, Phaedr. 247

<f>i\6ao<t>ov,
70
253
<i
Eep. Eep.
Eep.
Phsedr. 24(3 B,
sqq.
iv.
441
Tim. 69
v ovtTirapafjLvOrjTov.
iv.
;
580 D sqq. Tim. 69 D.
Phffido,
436 A, 439 D, ix. 253 E sqq. ;
Laws, loc. cit. and supra, p. 288, 172 also 4 Tim. 69 D sqq 90 A. 75 Tim. 77 B. 76 Eep. iv. 441 B, Eep. ix. 588 C sqq., can prove nothing in favour
,
;
of this.
PARTS OF THE SOUL.
gain to the Phoenicians and Egyptians. 77 Here, how ever, the determination universally applies that where the higher part exists, the lower must be presupposed, 78 but not conversely.
then considers these three faculties not merely as separate forms of activity, but as separate parts of the soul 79 and he proves this from the experimental fact that not is Reason in man in only many ways at strife with Desire, but that Courage, on the one hand,
;
Plato
acts blindly without rational intelligence, and on the other, when in the service of Eeason, combats Desire. As the same principle in the same relation can
have the same
only
there must be a particular cause underlying each of the three activities of soul. 80 The
effect,
general ground of this theory is to be found in the whole Platonic As the Idea stands system. in opposition to the abruptly Phenomenon, the
as
most nearly related to the Idea, cannot have the
soul,
sensible principle originally in itself. discrimination of the mortal and immortal

soul.
If.
Hence the
part of the however, the soul has at any time received

sensuality (as
is
into itself this

::
Ifq>-
certainly the case), a

Tim. 69 C E, 77 Monatschr.
,
iv.
135 E.
Jiep. ix.
9
7,
582
sqq.
Jle
also
uses the expression

;
D, 444 B, 504 A B: cf. Wildauer,

1873,
1(1
1 hilos.
4;1)
~
TI^)
Rep. iv. 442 C, 444 B and G A, he puts the question:

,
p.
J
241.
avTif) roi roj
e/vaara TrpdTTO[j.ev
ufa
Qvj.ovfj.tv o
df
<iXX^
T&v
iv
.
av Tp iTtj} nvl
%K<HTTOV
7}
6X77
XV
j.ei>.
Ka-P
hus poets like Kpicharmu.s, rheognis, and others oppose Ovfj-bs and vovs. and speak of a battle of and vovs (Theogn. v. 1053, where, however, Bergk reads not but Tre rerat 6vfj.6s re v6os fj.dxfrai,
0i>//6s
more frequently speaks of fttrj or ytvij, Phsedr. 253 C Rep. 435 C, 430 K, 441 C 443
1
But
avrCcv Tpdr-
re),
and
.
he
j/6os dv/j.ov
easy step to suppose that botli are really distinct parts of the soul.
Co 1 )
From
this
it is
Kptavuv an
(ibid.
416
a similar reason be mediatizing principle must for within the mortal sought between the two. Hence, the second division of the noble part and the
soul,
ignoble.
In accordance with this theory, the three and fold partition should be still further carried out of Desire, but to to the faculty extended not
only
Sensation might belongOpinion and Knowledge so that to to the Desiring soul, Opinion to Courage, Knowledge are defi Reason. These three forms of presentation
;
81 and even assigned to different nitely distinguished, 82 Plato seems to have been deterred of the soul. parts the circumstance that he this combination
from
ascribes even to
by knowledge derived
from, the senses

to reasoned
and
from envisagement, as preparatory than to Courage and Desire. ledge, a greater worth
attributes Perception,
83
know
He
of indeed, to the appetitive part
But he means the soul, excluding Reason and Opinion. as the feeling by this, not so much sensuous perception and pain. He further contrasts Opinion, of pleasure even right Opinion, with Reason, and says of the virtue that is entirely founded on Opinion, that it is without 84 So that Opinion a mere affair of custom.
intelligence,
bears the same analogy to Reason that Courage does.

Sl
8-
Hep.
See pp. 170, 174, 14. x. 602 C sqq.

;
Tricrrets
vii.
524
cf. pp. 218, 358 tq. w Tim. 77 B, on the vegetative

:
A
to
sq.
The
cucrtfTjcns
which leads us
form wrong judgments must be different from the \oytfffJi.6s which Tim. 43 forma right judgments. A sqq. (cf. 37 B sq.) the two circles of the soul, the /cikXos (or TreptoSoj) ravTOv and dartpov, the former the source of voOs and
:
TOV rplrov ^vxw cfSoi/s /ecu vov ^kv \oyiafj.ov TO ttlfflHjffeut f^rjoev, /z<?reori 775eas nai d\yfivrjs pera eirtOvp to the mortal ibid. 69
soul
.
<
SO^TJS
belong
6vfj.6s.
i)5ovr],
\VTTIJ,
6d/>pos,
^soul
iXirls,
cu<T07?cri?
1X0705
fywj. ibid.
4-iriffT-fiM,
tlie
latter of
S6cu and
65 A, 71 A.
See
p. 175.
PASTS OF THE SOUL.

In their general relation be the same. In the
to
417
moral action they appear Republic, the guardians of State first undergo a complete training as war 85 riors, and then only a part of them are admitted to the
training of rulers. All that belongs to the first educational stage represents the finished development the courageous part (Ovfioei& s ), to which the grade of warrior corresponds in the and to this stao-e
State,
is
88 founded on habit and opinion, But however necessary such a connection may seem to the completion of the Platonic theory, Plato himself, as far as we know, has never expressly enunciated it and as he elsewhere ascribes Right Opinion and even
87 Perception to the rational part of the we should, soul, in pressing the point, be attributing to him what is 88 alien to his system.
lentific
also ascribed the virtue
How
this
the
unity of
partition
the
is
soul
is
consistent
with
which Plato doubtless never definitely proposed to himself, and certainly did not attempt to answer. The seat of personality and self-consciousness could of course only He in the which
question
)ther
threefold
Reason, originally exists without powers, and even after its combination with
3
-
4?
sco p
i in if*? !! the .ktate-courage-is defined as the K al aurrjpia
?iT ,? lv e P)j c*re

.
B
lv
-
y& 4
<W
v p /
Vlrtue
pfo3ot(Tim.44I>,90D)
f 8,V-p
an.l
359
lfi
>.
to
1]
*fe
f tbe
united
soul,
tlie
til
"
which are P rt oftl o

at in
o.,
ii-n
have their
"
twOus Trent
"
icnt
I
attach originally to the human soul as well as to the World-soul,
u / Both belong (see note 82) to two circles of the soul (which
i>
tne head, because thev aro tlm instruments of this part of

soul
;
head. According to the onra w lvy

ii
Tim
l ""
iu<nuu
the sensible
:
is
reason
Gf.
Tim 04 IJ 07 Brandis p 401 sq

>
peeved
bv
E E
418
89 But how the Reason them remains the ruling part, to can become one with these powers when, according
its
own
it is essential nature, it cannot belong to them,
hard to
see.
Plato does not show us
how Reason can
fall be affected by the inferior parts of the soul and 90 nor does he explain why under their dominion:
Courage when he
is in its
tells
Reason and very nature subject to that the covetous part is governed us
:
91
by Reason, by means of the

prophetic intimations,
fanciful
liver,
through dreams and
we
;
are not
much
assisted
by
so
an idea. We have here three essences in bined with one another not one essence operating This deficiency becomes most different directions.
life. s conceptions of the future apparent in Plato bodiless soul still cling to the things of How can the its false sense how by its attachment to earth, and can it be led into the estimate of external advantages,
92 in the choice of its allotted most grievous mistakes how can it be punished in the other world for its life, conduct in this, if in laying aside the body it also lays
com
aside its
own mortal
of plea part, the seat of desire,
Yet we cannot suppose that the sure, of the soul survives death, and that mortal part with the that which first, belonged to it at its union of this union remains when body and in consequence
and of pain?
the union
is
dissolved.
There
is
a manifest lacuna
of here, or rather series

S9
;
contradictions:
nor can we
cf.
13 yyepovovv, Tim. 41 C, 70 the Stoic riyepoviKov. 90 To of say that the perceptions sense hinder the revolution of the circle of the rairrbv in the soul by
their counter-current is merely an of express;OD, allegorical method
not an explanation,
l
Kep.
Tim. 71. x. 618
sqq.
PAJ1TS
;
OF THE SOUL.
419
similar with regard to nother question, which has given much trouble to modern Philosophy,_the freedom of the will There is no doubt that Plato presupposes this in the sense of freedom of choice. He often speaks of voluntariness and involnntanness in our actions, without a word to mply any other than the o f the ordinary meaning terms. He distinctly asserts that the will w i s free I he makes even the external lot of man, the shape under which the soul enters upon earthly existence, the knKl of bfe which each individual adopts, and the events which happened to him, expressly dependent on a previous state of Should this being."
.
wonder at it it would Lave been much more remarkable had Plato succeeded in developing such strange notwns quite consistently. The case is somewhat
obi
!
E.g. Hep. vii. 535 E (t K ofotov and AKofoiar êDSos, and Laws, v. 730C);Poli t 293 A; Laws, ix.
.
quotations, pp. 392, 394 souls at their first birth come
the
rj.
P x G17 E
*
each chooses
life,
o-vvforai e
dvdKt
(i.e
sssttssH?.*
ir\{ ov
avroO [TOV froOJ. This would have no meaning in the mouth of a necessitarian if the behaviour of men
iV
the world as men, Iva /J.TJTIS Aarrotrc
inta
vne
same obviously holds good destiny, which is con ditioned by their behaviour. Hence
causality
;
the
eei.
e\o/j.<ii>ov
6ci>s
of their
avainos.
619
Tim. 42 B eq where the Creator previously makes known to the souls the ordinance that each by its own behaviour will determine its future
.
jps
ffVVTbvus &VTI, KClTCll ou /a6s. d-yargrfc, Similarly

..
f
no necessitarian system has ever asserted that the divinity could not put any men behind others without their being guilty of These
wrong.
the
systems
sibility
appeal
of (Jod
s
to
impos
destiny,
tva.
T^
fKaaruv dvainos, and with especial stress on the freedom of the will Law S x. 904 B sq. SU note (
pra,
têira efy Kaicias
OoJ.
placing indivi duals on a level in their mortal and spiritual beginnings any more than in their corporeal qualities and (heir destinies; because the completeness of the world requires
infinitely
See
p.
390
tqq.,
and specially
many
different kinds
and
grades of being.
420

of so-called
seem to indicate the doctrine

any
Predestina
of passages will contradict tion, a closer examination that is such notion. It is only the outward destiny
decided by the previous choice; virtue

free,
is
absolutely
lie
and no
state of life is
so evil that
it
does
in a
to be happy one is. indeed maintains with Socrates that no Plato 97 But this maxim only asserts that voluntarily bad. that it is evil no one does evil with the consciousness
man s own power
not^ M or unhappy in it.
him what is
for
and in Plato
opinion, ignorance concerning
truly good,
is still
the
man s own
93
fault
and the
of sense. result of cleaving to the things

which here some extent explained, the external cir but not removed
93
And though
ot /ca/cot
The
difficulties
arise are to
TavTrj KaKol TrdWes d/coimwTctTa, yLyvb/JieOa.

vi.
5ta 8uo
(Cf.
Rep.
489
sqq.
especially 492 E.)

/.laXXoi
.
cumstances of
life
are not so inde

del
pendent
that
behaviour former could he deter mined beforehand, and the latter How, for free at each moment. chose the instance, could he who
of
particular
T&V
<pvTevo<Jifr(i}i>
the
TOVS
Tpe<povTas
fJ.T]v,
TUV
Trpo9v}j.if]Tôv
<pvyew
fJ-tv
KaKiav,
Apol.
Cf. TOVvavTiov 5e eXetf. 25 E sq. ; Prot. 345 D, 358
life
of Archelaus or of any groat criminal be at the same time _au
sq.
Meno, 77
B
;
sqq.
Soph 228
C, 230
honest man
618
? Plato himself admits, a\\ov dw/jceu ws tx ei aXKoiav yiyveaOai fitov but according to what [TTJV i/-uxVl has just been quoted, this cannot
A; Rep. ii. 382 A, in. 413 A, ix. 589 C Laws, v. 731 C,

734 B,
rejects
"
\ofj,tvr)J>
refer 1o virtue
97
and
1):
vice.
5rj
Tim. 86
us
oik
<rxeS6i>
ir&rra.,
Plato sqq. (where the distinction of e/coi trta^N and aKovcna dSu Târa, because all would wrong is involuntary, and substitute the terms aKovtrioi and and the quota- /I e/coi-criot /3Xd/3ai),
ix.
860
oTrocra Tjdovuv
6rci5os
KOLKtav
aKpareia /ecu [ ? fxbvTWv A^yercu
ar] ruv
KO.KOS
tions,
p. 179.
Pt.
i.
123,
1,
and supra,
sqq.
:
6/>0s
foeMttnu
98 Cf.
Phcedo, 80
it
all
CKUV ovdels, 8ta S irovrjpait lj.kv yap eiv Tiva TOV crw/xaros Kal airaidevTov
o
Tpo(pr]i>
amounts to whether the soul leaves the body pure, are ov5ev KOIVWOVVO.
avTOJ
v
T<JJ
/ca/cds
yiyvtrat
/cafc6s.
/3tk>
OKOvffa elvai,
ifcc.
87
irpbs 8
roi^rots, firac
OVTU
K a/cws
Kal TraytvTUV iroKireiai KaKal
Rep. vi. 485 C: the primary quirement in the philosophic

position
is,
re
dis
Kara 7r6Xets Kiq. Kal \eX u ffiV ^ Ti ^ (Ji.aOrifJ.aTa

\oyoi.
>
TrpocrSexeo
î
TO e/cojras etVcu fJ.tjSafJ.T} TO \}/ev8os. Laws, x.
TQVTUV lariKa
e/c
vkuv
904
jwei i
5e
drj
421
says that in most cases of moral degeneracy a sickly constitution or a bad education should bear the
lie
blame, yet we are clearly given to understand that those in such a situation are by no means to be
virtue.
sistent
all
chiefly
entirely excused, or shut out from the possibility of Whether these theories are throughout con
with each other, whether ignorance and wickedness
it is
logical to declare
assert that
sible
man s
involuntary, and yet to

to
will is free
and
for
make him respon

be doubtful
;
his moral
is compatible with Divine government of the world, and the whole scheme of nature, appears never to have been raised by him.
was probably unconscious of the dilemma in which was involved. The more general question whether we can conceive a free self-determination and whether such a determination
disregarding the distinct enunciations on free-will that we find in Plato." He
this does not justify
condition, us in
may
but
The
s
relation of the soul to the

difficulties.
with considerable
existence so
body
On
in its essence so entirely distinct, and in its independent, that it has even existed, and bined again to
exist,
is likewise beset the one hand, the
without the body;
and
only attain
perfect
life,
corresponding with
of
ra
ctl
r .If
^\Tr- T
r tion
wAidovtcrai.
Ins
The blame own neglect
Tcichmiiller,
Begr. 140
sq.,
8 ud z 369 sq
I
Gesd,
422
its

true nature,
freed from corporeal fetters. this alien body exerts on the soul the other hand, an influence, that the soul is dragged
when
100
it is
On
so disturbing
down
Becoming, overwhelmed in unrest and confusion, intoxicated by error, filled with 101 and desires, by imaginations, cares and fears. passions The stormy waves of corporeal life disturb and hinder 102 At its entrance into the body it its eternal courses.
into the stream of
103 the visions of its drinks the draught of forgetfulness, are blotted out beyond- recognition. past existence From its union with the body arises that entire dis which Plato paints in such figurement of its nature
Moral faults and spiritual sick strong colours. nesses are caused by a bodily constitution disordered or diseased rational care of the body and judicious exer
104
;
cise are
most important as a means of
spiritual health,
and indispensable as preliminary moral training for 105 individuals and for the commonwealth at large. Descent and parentage are of the greatest moment the of parents are, in the natural dispositions and qualities The entailed upon their children. course of
;
things, better the former, the nobler the latter, as a general 10G From fiery ancestors spring fiery descendants rule.
from calm ones, calm.
Both
qualities,
if
exclusively
.107
transmitted in a race, develop themselves unduly:
79
LOO
See
sq.
p.
412
sq.,
and
105
Phc-edo,
Tim. 86 B-90
sqq.
410
15 sqq.,
R3 P Hi. Details on this subject

.
101 Plifedo, 79* C sq., G6 and elsewhere. 102 Tim. 43 B sqq.

lo:}
will
Kep. See
x.
621
Phsedo, 76
cf. iii. 415 v. 459 A sq. 394 A. It is remarked 19 A, Rep. 415 A sq., cf. Tim.
be given later on.
106
;
Rep.
>;
Crat.
gq
that the rule admits of exceptions.

p. 414.
Further in the
vi.
107
Polit.
310
sq.
cf.
Laws,
Ethics.
773
pq.
SOUL AND BODY.
423
whole nations are often essentially distinguished from one another by some natural characteristic 108 The circumstances under which marriage takes place are therefore an important matter of consideration- not only the bodily and spiritual condition of the indi 109 but also the viduals, general state of the world must taken into account. As the universe changes in
great periods of time, so for plants, beasts, and men there are varying seasons of fruitfulness and unfruitfulness for soul and body; consequently, if marriages are consummated at unfavourable times, the race 1 deteriorates. ^ Thus we see that corporeal life in
08
marpeople, so long as they con tinue to have offspring, must keep themselves from everything un from all healthy^ wrong-doing, and all passion, but particularly from all drunkenness, because such
Laws,
See note 77. vi. 775
thagoreans.
sqq.
:
?<TTI
dt,
ned
yevvrjTy
[sc.
.
irepioSos,
ho says, Bely ty dpi.8fj.bs
\anpdvei.} $ vaij.val re Kal

ei>
7rpd>T
avtfaeis 8v-
dTrocrrao-et?
things transfer their results to the bodies and souls of the children
10
TUl>
Hep.
that lor
nlnilto
viii.
546.
4-C,.^,
all
living
-fl-*^
ofYrn*
Plato says beings as ifor _I* A!
ovaai OIJ.OI.OVVTUV re /cat dvoôLOvvKal CfUÔVTUV Kal $9l.VQVTUV, Trdvra irpoarjyopa Kal prjTd -rrpbs &\-
rpe?s r^rrapas 8t opovs \a{38ui>acrTevo/u.evat,
come periods
of
unfruitfulness, if
!,,*L
>,.
.,
_.
Trpo/j.r)KT]
between the periods of the universe and those of the human race. But
they are caused to return to their former path owin to some revo r ~-.ii.ij iw lution of the This is spheres, &c. further developed by a comparison
5t
Hermann and most moderns, with a few good MSS. Weber s pro posal, Ue num. Plat. 13 to read
;
[so
but
instead of even saying generally: the universe is subjected to a in longer change, only periods of times, while mankind changes in shorter periods, Plato marks the duration of the two periods in de finite numbers. These he states indirectly, giving us a numerical enigma, in the manner of the
iao/j.. ry [j.tv, gives the same sense, does not commend itself] eKarbv plv aptd/muis diro
TreyUTrdSos,
,
êo
d
dpp-fjTUv
dvei
8t Kufiuv rptctoo?. ûfjiira^ 52 euros dpi6p.bs 7ew uerpt/c6s, TOIOVTOV (what

(
follows,
7<Wis)
Kvpios,
dy.eivt)vui>
Kal
xeiphuv yevfoew. This
Py-
the key to which was evidently possessed by Aristotle (Polit. v. 12 131 b. a. 4 sqq.), had by Cicero s
riddle,
421
its

lias
commencement and throughout its course How the spirit. important bearing upon
time become proverbially unintel
Att. 7, 13), ligible (ad.
an
is
this
and in our
;
own day has
variously exercised the ingenuity of scholars see the references ap. Schneider, Plat. Opp. Prffif 1-92 iii Susemilil, Genet, Weber De nuEntw. ii. 216 r,
sqq.;
ber as being a square, but even morn so as arising from the number vol. i. ten, the rAetos d/H0/xos (see
2 mero Platonis (Cassel,18G2 ; Gymn. second pditinnV edition). progr. added to the Hermann, Susemilil, and Weber seem to have come nearest to the truth. Meanwhile, availing my self of their work, and referring to them for particulars (the dis cussion of which in the present
.l
The number ten raised to 342). the fourth power, is multiplied by itself four times (according to the scheme of the potential decad, the To this number sacred tetractys). of the world s circuit is opposed the number which contains the
revolution
of
human
kind,
i.e.
which gives the numbers of years, at the expiration of which a change to worse or better comes about in
the
place
as impossible as a detailed account including all differences of the following as view), I may give own view. God s product, i.e. the world, Plato say?, moves in
is
mankind
production of new races a change to evyovla or
of
my
longer
periods, slighter change,
and undergoes a than the races of mankind, who change more quickly In Pythagorean and decidedly. the former has for its language circuit a larger number, the latter a smaller ; the former a complete, the the latter an incomplete former a square, the latter an ob (Oblong numbers long number. are those composed of two unequal
: ;
( are ). L). dôpia (cf. o46 the first num told firstly, that it js ber in which citterns SwdMerat, &c., occur, pure rational propor tions which can be expressed in
We
whole numbers (iravra irpocr^yopa /ceil OVTCL .... a.ir^<pf]va.v\ Secondly, the errirpLTOs irvQ^v of the series so obtained (for this must be the meaning, whether the &v before C TTIT. be referred to avj-faeis, or, as seems
with preferable, to Trdi ra), joined
the
number
five,
and three times
factors;
rectangle, however, LllC BUUliw| McHiAio IDfirCtl compared with the square, stands on the side of the incomplete; see
the
"Wllll
increased, gives two dp/xon cu, which at are described length. learn further that the whole com bination wi numbers here described iicvtiuii of j ui is geometric/ i.e. all the numbers
We
vol.
3rd edit., p. 341, 3, 4 302, These numbers arc now to^be The described more in detail.
i.
;
3.)
circuit of the world
by
is contained a complete number, for the du ration of the year of the world, at
the expiration of which everything returns to the position which it had at the beginning, consists of
out of which it is composed can bo exhibited in a geometrical construc In the first part of this de tion. scription, the ai^crets ^vva.^va.1 re /cat 8vvaa Tev6/Ji.vaL refer to the fact that we are dealing with equations, the roots of which are the numbers
of the
Pythagorean triangle,
call
3, 4, 5.
The Pythagoreans
three and
number 10,000
The 10,000 years (see p. 344). is a complete num-
four dvvaaTv6fj.vai, five 5uvafj.^tj, 3- + 4- (see details in because 5-
SOUL AXD BODY.

to be reconciled with other theories of Plato does
42
:>
not
appear.
vol.
i.
344, 2, 3rd edit.).
To
start
b. ix.
from these numbers was all the more suitable because the law of the combination of kind, the law of 7ct uoj, was to be here determined,
j
quite right in referring to the formation of square numbers, dvo/j-oiovv to the formation of oblong numbers. and
6/j.oiovv
is
AV^VTWV
and
the
number
five,
in
which
three and four are potentially con tained, is called 70^0? by the Py thagoreans, as the first combina tion of a male and female number
(vol. i. 343, 4 The old 335, 3). commentators recognise ths Py thagorean triangle iti this passage
;
;
are obscure. I do not probable that the former is to G/J.OIOV-J, and the latter equivalent to avop.oiovv (Weber, p. 22, follow
<f>$u>6rTur
think
it
ing Bettjg). that in a

so
seems unlikely ^ description otherwise extraordinarily concise, Plato

It
;
cf.
50, p. 373, this triangle $ /cat eaysjof

:
Pint.
De
Is.
who
HXdrw
fv rfj TroXiret p Sonet
rotr^
(?) trpov-
CCXPtyrtou TO yafj.T^\iov didypa/j./j.a vwrdTTUv. From these elements,

then,^
by repeated
a
augmentation
proportion, or even proportions (for the ex pression otff jjfftts leaves this indefi nite), are to be found with four
(a^cretj)
several
should have used such a pleonasm and the meaning in question cannot be extracted from the original sig nification of increasing^ and di minishing without straining the words. The /cat, too, before avj-6rruv leads us to expect some thing new, and not a mere repe tition of what we have already been
told
by
bfjioiovvTuv
and
a.vofj.oiovv-
TWV.
Weber
believes that the pro
(opoi, which is here used in the same sense as iv. 443 D), and three determinations as to the dis tance (the arithmetical ratio) of these terms, i.e. one or more, pro portions of the form B = B
:
terms
portion intended by Plato (and the only one as he thinks) in the words
ev to TrpwTy dTrty-rjvav must have been formed out of certain powers of five, four, and three, in such a way that the first and third term are square numbers, the second and fourth oblong numbers, and that the terms (an account of the tiri.
words prjrd irpbs &\\T)\a show that we have to deal with proportions). The numbers
:
:
C=C
(the
of these opoi are to be partly 6uoioCj/rey, partly and Avofioiovvres,
Tyotros
Partly
be supplied, Spot fytowtfrrwr, &c. to be ex plained which consist in opoi

Spot
;
on
genitives, oyuotoiWwj/, &c., must, of course, be made to depend

AptfffiQif is to
,
The
afj-ovTes, partly
<f>0wovres.
and
irvQ^v to be mentioned im mediately) stand in the proportion of 4 3. Hence he gets the follow 2 2 ing proportion 5 x 4 x 4 2 4 x 5x 3- 5- x 4 2 x 3 - 3 3 x 5^ x 4 = G400 4800 3000 2700. Here the sum of the first and third term
: :
:!
dpie/j.ol
As the question. square numbers are called fyiowi and the oblong dôioi (Jiimbl. in
JMconi. p. 115 Tennul.),
1ms
ofJioiovvTcs, means is a
&c.)
What
Hermann,
give the complete number 10,000 that of the second and fourth term the incomplete number 7500. But, in the first place, the suppositions from which he starts are very un certain. The tone of the passage itself leaves it undecided whether
;
42 G

Plato connects his
doctrine
of the
soul with
^his
physiological theories by
means
o-euv,
of a teleology, which,
can be obtained by forming a terms (27,
64,
we have
to do with one or several It is proportions of four terms. not said that in this or these pro
series of their collective
36, 45, 48,
75,
80,
100, 125),
the first and portion or proportions third term must be square, and the but second and fourth oblong
;
merely
generally speaking, numbers do oc square and oblong And we can cur in those places. not infer from the eVtrptros -rrvd^v that the proportion (if it is only ratio of 4 3, one) advances in the
that,
:
and summing the numbers of this series (just as the numbersôf the harmonic series are summed in Tim. This would give 600 Locr. 96 B). as the result, and the notion would of then be that evyovLai and mankind change in periods of 600
a<f>opia
years.
We
is
might
further observe
because in every equation proceed ing from the elements 3, 4, 5, there is an eTriT/HTos irvd^v together with the number five. Secondly (and
^
60, and 60 and if at the same time we could assume that Plato
that 600
ten times
= 3x4x5;
determined the yevea in the pre sent case at 60 years (say, as the
:
this is the
main point), Weber gets longest period of procreative power in man) we should get this result two numbers by his proportion for the in these occur in what follows as the As a new circuit begins the dividual souls after 10 hundred sums of the two apôvlai number of the year of the world, years, and for the universe after 10 But thousand years (see above), so the 10,000, and the number 7500. race undergoes a revolution after airtin the words iv y irpuTq Hitherto, how Plato means to describe only 10 generations. one number, that of the period of ever, we have too little ground What to explain Plato s meaning with the avdpuTTciov ytvverbv.
; :
.
<f>T)vav
this
to be found, is stated in ^these is words, so long as their meaning From not more clearly explained. the three elements, 3, 4, 5, which Plato makes the basis of his cal culation, we could derive propor
is,
and how
it is
any certainty.
of
In the second part

the
not
sufficiently
the
.
description,
.
numbers
tirirpiTOs
meant by the words &v

TTl6fji7]V
.
CKCLTOV 5
Kvfi JV TptdSoS
can be more definitely specified. Of the two ap/Jioviai here mentioned, one must give the number 100 x 100
10,000. The other (as Hermann a num rightly explains) must give ber consisting of 100 cubes of the
tions of four terms in such a way that, raised to the third power, they
could be connected, by proportional means (on the system described p. G71, 3), two and two. Then we get 32 33 the three equations 1) 48 4* = 27 36 x 4 3 x 42 3 3 x 52 5 32 x 5 33 64
: : :
number
=
:
; 2) 2 7: 45
3, and a hundred numbers obtained from the rational diago nals of the number 5 after ^ the deduction of 1, and from its irra tional diagonals after the deduc
75
:
125
x 5
4 x 52
o3
3)
:
64
443 80 100
: :
tion of 2.
This number
is
is
7500
From 125. required, the
these the
apid/j.bs
number
yevt-
obtained from 100 x 48. 48
100x3 3 = 2700 and

one less than the
ictfpios
square of the rational diagonals,.
SOUL AND BODY.

though sometimes graceful and ingenious,
entific
427
is poor in physiology are
results.
The
details
of his
and two
of 5
less
than that of the irra

;
tional diagonals o f 5
the former is therefore 50 of the latter 49. Any further steps are uncertain. The two numbers men tioned are to proceed from two
;
= ,/(2 x 5j) = v/50, its rational diagonal = v/49 = 7; the square of
the diagonal
he
portion), which can also be exhibit ed in a geometrical construction, as shows: 1) 45- 4
harmonies, i.e. two series of num progressing in a definite arithmetical ratio (d/yiow a is to be taken inâ mathematical, and not in a musical or metaphysico-ethical
bers
sense),
5 x 4 x 5 = 100. Multiply the first term of the first series with the first term of the second, &c., and we arrive at the oblong numbers 45 x 60 = 2700 60 x 80 = 4800 75 x 100 = 7500. Multiply each of the _three terms of the second
;
3x4x5 = 60; 4x4x5 = 80-
3x3x5 = X3x5 = 60;5x3x5 = 75;2)
by multiplying the
tirlrptros
irvBîjv of the series previously ar rived at (see p. 421) in combina tion with the number 5 three times
(rpis avfrdeis).
f^rjv
The
errirpiros TrvB-
can only be the numbers 3 and 4 themselves, for irvO^ves means (Theo. Math. 125 sq., Bull.) for any arithmetical relation ol
ei>
fXaxifTTis
Kol
7r/jwroij
?r/)6s
. .
Xous \6yots ovres ITTI(dptfyiol) rpiruv St 6 TUV 8 Trpos 7 The rpls as Aristotle ex adfy&h means,
.
.
dXX??-
plains, Polit. v. 12, OTO.V 6 TOV Siaypd/uifjiaTOs
1316
a.
7:
TOV ((he number of the Pythagorean

triangle
:
dpt0/x6s rov-
itself, and we get the square numbers 60 x 60 = 3600 = 6400 and as a third the 80 x 80 sum of both 100 x 100 = 10,000. Symmetry would perhaps require that the three terms of the first series should also be multiplied into themselves, which does not fit into the Platonic construction. But however we are to understand Plato s exposition, and however we are to fill up its deficiencies, we must not expect from the present serious information as passage any to the law the change of governing the races of mankind. Plato him
:
;
series into
self
indicates
as
3,
room two
5) creeds y^rat. series of numbers are to

4,
says, 546 sq. : however wise the rulers of the state it is
much when he
be obtained by a combination of the three, four, and five cubes which give the above sums. We ber s proposal (p. 27 sq.) is worth consideration. He combines 3 and 4 singly at first by multiplica tion with 5, and then again multi both multiples 3 x 5 and 4 plies x 5 with the numbers of the
may
be,
1 Jato s object is rather to show :ho\ the mysterious importance of that law
impossible for them to know the times of evyovia and for our d<popia race, and to avoid fatal mistakes in __. JlllO. Managing the union of parents. *-\
->
He thus gets series of three terms progress ing in the ratio of 3, 4, 5 (and at the same time in arithmetical
two
thagorean triangle.
pro
Py
by giving an interpretation of it in enigmatical formulas but the law itself becomes no clearer (as Ari stotle, loc. cit. objects), even if we could interpret the formula)
;
mathe
The mystic element matically. here, as the mythical elsewhere, is
428

of that science showing the then state his acuteness in explaining the complicated phe
interesting, as
and
data
nomena
;
of life
from such
inadequate
experimental
their but in reference to his philosophic system

is
very small. undisturl That the three parts of the soul may be relation, a separate in their specific nature and proper
importance
is dwelling, says Plato, are placed in the head, circles of the rational soul the whole which is round, that thence as from a citadel, 112 The senses are appointed to be be ruled.
:
allotted to each.
11
The two
may
not belong 113 Sensible perception, however, does organs. to the rational soul, but extends exclusively to the
intended to conceal a deficiency of scientific knowledge under apparent
explanations.
111
67
/Tt ad 291-294 tlU. Zc

J-
44
p.
B 1),
43 D sqq., ^vxn* TreptoSoi, p. 47 D, 85 A, 90 D cf. supra, 358 p. 359, 106. The sutures
;
Martin, ii. 157-171, loc. *w Sleep also is of the derived from the interior fire inner if the eyelids close, the eyes movements of the body must be re
sqq.
Of.
h. Ui
>.^~r
laxed and at
rest,
Tim. 45
sq.
(76 A) of the skull from the revolution of this circle and its interruption by of the soul, the afflux of nourishment (cf. 43
are
derived
The
sensations of hearing are air caused by the tones moving the and this in the inside of the ear, the is transmitted through
motion
sqq.).
"
113
44 D sq. Tim. 45 A.
Of the
parti
cular senses Plato explains sight that there is an by the supposition interior fire (or light) in the eye, out from theeye unites which
soul. blood into the brain, and to the The soul is thus induced to a mo head to tion extending from the seat the region of the liver, to the of desire, and this motion pro is O.KOT] (Tim. ceeding from the soul
(
,7
passing with the kindred iire which comes out of luminous bodies, and trans mits the motion through the whole 45 B-D cf. body to the soul. (Tim. 156 D Hep. Soph. 266 C Theaet. This light dwelling in vi. 508 A.) the eye Plato calls fl^w. The phe
;
sq.).
Taste consists in a
of the,
contraction or dilatation vessels (0V/3es) of the
tongue Smell depends (Tim. 65 C sq.). of vapours on the penetration

see p. 378) (KOLirvbs and o/uxAr?, the head into the vessels between
and the navel, and the roughness

or
nomena of reflected
light,
and
reflec
smoothness
of
their
contact
tions in mirrors, are discussed, Tim. 46 A-C ; the colours of lights,
(66
sqq.).
PHYSIOLOGY.
inferior parts. 114
429
With it is connected the feeling of 115 of which the mortal soul pleasure and pain, only is
Cf. supra, note 81, and what nas just been quoted as to hearing and smell p. 05 C we are told that the blood-vessels of the tongue, the organs of taste, run into the heart.
according to Tim. when an exter nal shock brings about a move ment in the body, which is trans mitted to the soul. Hence it oc curs only to the parts of the body which are mobile, while those which are immobile, such as bones
At<rGr]<n$ }
15
64
sqq., takes place
takes place quick enough to be remarked, while its re-establishment passes unnoticed or the case may be exactly reversed. Then, in the former instance, we have pain without pleasure in the latter that purely sensuous pleasure which is spoken of, Phileb. 51 A sqq., 62 To say that the E, 63 I), 66 C. latter is no longer merely sensu ous, but has become intellectual, mathematical (Susemihl, ii.
; ;
important medium for the dissemination of sensations in the body, Plato considered to be the blood, on account of its superior
mobility (Tim. 70 sq., 77 E, 65 C, 67 B). (The nerves were quite
and most
hair,
are
insensible.
The
does not seem to correspond with Plato s meaning. As he says, Tim. 65 A, that a pleasure without pain affords oaa Kara <rp.LKpbv rds .... /cei/wtrets ei\tj(pe, rds 5 ir\Tjpu(r(i$
429),
unknown
so
for
in his day,
and remained
a considerable time after If the motion wards.) only takes place in the body very gradually, it is not noticed at all, and is not a sensation. If it passes quickly, easily, and unrestrained by any obstacles, as the motion of light in seeing, it creates a very distinct sensation, but one neither pleasurable nor painful. If it is combined with a noticeable interruption, or a noticeable re-establishment of the
natural condition, there arises the former case pain, in the latter pleasure (Tim. 64 with sqq. regard to pleasure and the absence of pleasure cf. Phileb. 31 sqq.,
ddpbas Kal /caret /neydXa, e.g. plea sant smells, so Phileb. 51 B, he mentions, as examples of pure rd? irepi re TO, Ka\d Xeydoval, y6/j.eva xpâra, Kal irepl TO. axn~ rds TrAetVras, fj,ara, Kal rCjv Kal rds rdv <J)96yyw, Kal 6 cra
b<rfj.(iov
generally
cvdeias
eiv.
rrX-iipwo-ets
"everything
di>aia6riTovs
which) ÔVTO.
.
(and rdy rds
Trapadidwsensations of plea sure, however (among which those of smell are of course less noble than those of sight and hearing), 52 A, at TTfpl TO. /mad^jULara ijdoval are In Phiexpressly distinguished. leb. 66 C (as r/5o; ds ZOeptv dXi Trovs
.
cUfffojrfa
Of these
6piad[j.ci>oi,
Kadapds
rats oe
TTJS
^vxw avr^
the
is
42
D
;
where the
ceived
rc-
sqq.; Gorg.
496
sqq.
But pain and sqq.). pleasure are not always conditioned bygone another. It may happen (Tim. loc. cit.) that only the inter ruption of the natural condition
ix.
583
Hep.
with
itself
reading certainly above remarks,

liable
agrees but in
to
verbal
and
there
O.VT.
logical difficulties, I would fore propose rds /J.lv r.

:
\j/.
cTri<TTri/j.ais
(as one
MS.
reads), rds
al<r&.
eir.
430

116
capable.
but being
its
itself
This soul inhabits the trunk of the body, divided into a noble and ignoble part,
of
women
Courage
dwelling has likewise two divisions, as the chambers in houses are partitioned from those of men. has its place in the breast, nearest the sove
117
reign Keason; Desire in the lower parts. breast is the heart, the chief organ of Courage
In the
;
thence, the whole body spread the channels of the throughout direction the blood, which is quick to proclaim in every
118 These chan mandates and threateniiigs of Courage. blood continual nels further serve to convey in the
restitution
circulates,
120
of
119
decaying particles;
in
them the
air
entering and leaving the body partly 121 the breathing passages, partly through the through 122 The lungs are placed about the flesh and the skin.
116
Cf. supra, note 82.
This, how-
human body
same
ever,
sible
can only hold good of sen-
pleasure and its opposite, Plato recognises a spiritual pleasure besides, Rep. ix. 582 B, 583
B, 586
; but, according to^the principle, these are continuinto ally repaired out of the blood,
sqq., vi.
485
Phileb.
52
A;
117
see p. 187.
which the nourishment spread by means of the fire (the inner warmth) in the body, is brought by the air which enters in the act of breathIn youth, so ing (cf. note 122). long as the elements of the body are fresh, they hold together faster
118
Tim. 69 70 A eq.
E
It
eq.,
70 D, 77 B. has already been
noticed, note 115, that the blood is the transmitting medium of sensa-
Tim. 77 C sqq. (cf. Martin, ii. 301 sqq., 323 sqq.) is an attempt to describe the system of the bloodvessels; there is no mention here of the distinction between veins and arteries, still less of the circulation of the blood, which was ention.
and digest nourishment more easily, more goes into than out of ^the body it grows in age, after it is worn out, it diminishes, and finally breaks up altogether. 20 78 E sq., 80 D. Plato hero
;
follows
Diogenes
see vol.
i.
227,
7,
3rd edit,
tirely
119
unknown
Plato
s
to the ancients.
The obscure
;
theory in detail is as follows (Tim. 80 C sqq., 78 E sq.): Every element tends towards what
is
sqq., is elucidated
122
description, 77 by Martin, n.
homogeneous to it parts are constantly disappearing from the

:
Susemihl, ii. 453 sqq. Plato supposes with Empedocles (see vol. i. 647), not only a The respiration but a perspiration.
334 sqq.
PHYSIOLOGY.
heart to cool
it,
43!
violent
to make a soft cushion for its The connection of Desire with beating. Reason is accomplished by means of the liver; as
122
and
Desire, pursuant to its nature, neither understands nor inclines to follow rational it must be ruled
arguments,
infusion of bile, or else restores it thus alarming or quieting the part of the soul which has its dwelling there. The liver is, in a word, the organ of presenti 124 ments and of prophetic in the same dreams;
:
by imaginations and this is the purpose of the liver. The Reason causes to appear on its smooth surface, as on a mirror, pleasant or terrible it images: changes the natural sweetness and colour of the liver by the
;
way,
divination
in
man
air,
general belongs only to the irrational
12
Plato ascribes no great
importance to the
drawn from them.
vaticination from
is
he thinks (78 D-79 E), enters body alternately through the windpipe and throat, and through the skin ; here it becomes warmed by the inner fire, and then seeks its kindred element outside the body by one or the other of the ways just mentioned. There is no void space ; arid, accordingly, other
into the
conclusions to be
He
âlso
rejects
victims.
The
spleen
intended
to
keep the
Jli5
71
liver pure.
:
fj.ai
TiKTjv d^poffvvrj 0e6 s

oi)5fts
&>j>oJs
di>6
pair Ivy
8(5uKW
yap
tychrrcrcu (JLUVTIK^S tvdtov &OVS d\\ 7) K0.6 VTTVOV TT]V
/cat d\-tj-
TT]S (frpovf)-
passing out; through the skin the one current is coming out the mouth and nose, through through the mouth and nose if the
if
air is pressed into the air
body by the
?} 8td vbvov $ TWO. edovffia.fffj.bv 7rapaAXaas. Only the interpretation of prophecy is matter of reason and reflection.
veus iredydds ^vvafjuv
did
Of.
sq.,
Laws, 719 C, and supra,
current
fikin.
12J
_
is
passing out through the

eqq.
;
and, on the other side, p. 191.
p.
176
Prophetic
occur,
and
is
significant
70
is
<lrmk
not only air but supposed to pass into the

after
as
well
sq.,
Phdr.
and
in
GO
the
dreams known, in the and Crito, 44 A
lungs.
4
Tim. 71 A-72 D. Even

Plato,
Ceath traces of prophetic pictures remain in the liver. how

ever, dull
(Cic. Dio. 1, 25, 53) composed by Aristotle as Plato s scholar; and the belief in presentiments, expressing them
Eudemus
selves
sometimes in
observes
that
for
and obscure
they are
too
any
definite
times in waking, may have been seriously held by Plato, the

on"
sleep,
some
432

:
other organs those of digestion he especially regards of as a place of reserve for food, the decomposition of the which he derives from the natural warmth
126
body.
Some
other physiological theories of his can

127
in this place be only shortly indicated. 129 128 he says, are formed for the and animals, Plants to serve as sake of man plants to be his food, animals have rendered an abode for those human souls which
;
Plants themselves unworthy of a higher life. tooâre but their soul is of the lowest kind, living beings, reason nor opinion, but only of desire capable neither of to and sensation a soul only moved from without, denied the motion that proceeds which has been
;
from and
returns
into
itself
13
self-consciousness
their place.
^
never change therefore, plants can animals as having Timseus

represents
precedent of the Socratic Damon, On the other hand, he certainly remarks (and this is the more corof rect consequence from his point asview) that the animal desires sert themselves more unrestrainin sleep edly in dreams, because the rational life recedes into the back-round. (Rep. ix.57lC, where HI. 1Schleiermachor ft. the n to find too much o 601 fri
further
The
been
all
originally
cf. tliequotalion on 302 sqq. fceXe. 77 B:
7P
x
jrdaxo" Trd^ra ffrpa&m 8 avrv <&* irepl eauro
r^ *
fitvi?
TUJJ/
Klvnaiv ry 5 oiMtq.
avrov TL \cylffaffOai
06
<f>vaiv
aKWJC
17
ytvt
WW.
These words have generally been b allwrongly construed, e.g. by 11. 322), baura, Martin (i. 207, The translaand by H Mailer.
tion
cxample
which
Plato
taken from Sopliocl. qo 1 \ cf 80 D so. 71 E sq 127 Cf 44 E sq on the limbs: 73 A sqq. on the formation of mut75 row, brain, flesh, and bones; D on the mouth ; 75 J3 sqq. on the
skin, hair,
quotes is (Edip. Rex,
Its
yte<ru
has not con-
as to upon it such a nature movements coming trom repel in and without, while it moves
ferred
<j>6ffiv
with round itself (or joining Harare, has not granted it to but to avail itself of its repel, &c. ), own motion and so to peireive
and
nails.
i* 77 A-C, see p. 416, 83. 129 90 E, 91 D sqq., with which
somewhat ot its own conditions, and to reflect on tliem.
433
unfaithfulness to its vocation is regulated the animal body it is to 1* So that in this occupy. theory the generic differ ences in the animal world are a consequence of human conduct. Elsewhere, however, these are more truly regarded as necessary for the general completeness of the universe. 133
on the contrary, discriminates etween animal souls proper, and souls which have descended out of human into animal forms at the same time intimating that the soul of man as such can never become that of a beast. According to the mea sure and the nature of the soul s
Phiodnis"
;
men;
the
human
Even the distinctions of sex and the propagation of mankind are made to result from the misdeedsthrou-h which some human souls were into
forms
<
though
this is
lowmdegraded hardly consistent either with
the unconditional 135 necessity of propagation, or with the essential 136 equality of the two sexes, which Plato elsewhere asserts.
Tima3us, in its last section, treats at considerable length of diseases; not only diseases of the 31 body,* but such maladies of mind as result from bodily
J
]
The
cf.
,V, ?? ii 2Jim.911)sq q .;Pha2do,82A, supra, pp. 178, 394, 411, 499 sq.
*>
T-
ep<
>5
quotations from Hippo

pedocle8, vol. edit
i.
and
045 4
KmI
210
passages seâl impulse is thus The ma e semen Can explained. efflux of the spinal marrow) is /ike the correspomhng matter in the fenalo, a fv ov In the one tfiôv. there dwells a des.re for expor,, the other for ntiowta cf. the
return to this point later on. 1:!7 *1 V A TI

disease arVmentned clition of the elementary
T ThTcon
ma
terials"
be too abundant or to scanty, or not ri-htly apportioned or some one organ Lafbe acted
Some may
F F
434

138
causes.
These are
all
placed in two classes
madness
State
and ignorance.
In comprehending under these two
classes every species of immorality; in
making
;
neglect and defective education, as well as bodily con

stitution,
answerable for their existence
in
laying
11
greater stress, for the cure of even bodily diseases, on rational care of the body than on medicine 14 and
;
in insisting on the harmonious training at the whole man, the even balance of physical and mental
above
all,
education, and the perfecting of reason by means of in all this Plato points out the boundary of science Physics, and leads us on to Ethics, which from the
outset has been the proper goal of his physical investi
141
gations.
upon by other kinds of lire, water, &c., than are proper for it (82 A 2. A second source of sq., 86 A). disease consists in the same deficiencies with respect to the organic elements (marrow, bones, flesh, The perversion of sinews, blood). the natural order in the production of these organic materials out of
of diseases spring from irregularity in the apportionment and the condition of the Trvev/j-ara, the mucus, and the bile C sqq.). Further details are given in Martin, ii. 347("84
359; Susemihl, ii. 460 sqq. 138 86 B-87 B. 139 87 0-90 D. 14 Cf. Kep. iii. 405 C sqq., and
Schleiermacher,
phie,
iii.
one another
ous.
is especially dangerNaturally, the flesh together with the sinews is formed out of the blood, the bones out of flesh and sinews, the marrow out of the bones. If instead of this a counterformation in the opposite way sets in, the most grievous sufferings re-
Werke
z.
Philoso-
273 sqq. 141 It is proposed that 27 A. Timaûs should begin with the origin of the world and end with mankind, whose education Socrates
had described the
suit (82
sqq.).
3,
day before the dialogue on the State,
in
third class
13S
CHAPTER
ETHICS.
X.
THK philosophy
starts
of
Plato
is
primarily
Ethical.
He
from
the
furnished
of
his
the
Socratic enquiries on virtue, which material for the earliest
dialectic
determinations
development method, and for those conceptual from which the doctrine of Ideas
science,
His own procedure is eventually sprang. essentially directed not only to theoretic but to moral
training
and
the
Socratic
knowledge-of-self.
He
would have been untrue

of the Socratic
to himself
and
to the spirit
special
attention
teaching had he not constantly paid to such But the later questions.
development of his system required that the ethical views acquired during his intercourse with Socrates should be essentially more
enlarged,
recast,
and applied
to actual
although his own speculation was from the connn.-mvment under the influence of the Socratic In Ethics, form which he gave to ethical theories was conditioned
t
precisely defined, conditions. Therefore,
by his Metaphysics and Anthropology, and also more remotely by his Physics; and apart from these it cannot be fully explained. That which is the startiuo-1
See p. 216
sq.,
and Phsedr. J29
stj.
F F 2
436
historical beginning of his system appears point in the The purity, in the perfected system at the end also.
fervour,
and decisiveness of his moral endeavour, his the conviction of the necessity of moral knowledge,
fundamental conceptions of his Ethics, Plato brought with him from the Socratic school. But the lofty Idealism by which his Ethics so greatly transcended the accurate determination which those of Socrates
of the virtues and of the they received in the concept would never have been attained but for the State
the doctrine of Ideas and the Anthropological part of the Platonic As to their particular contents, system. Ethics fall under three divisions of enquiry
:
I.
The ultimate aim

highest Good.
of moral
activity,
or the
II.
The
realisation of the
Good
in individuals; or
Virtue.
III. Its realisation in the
Commonwealth
or the
State.
The Highest Good. Socrates had designated the Good as the supreme and ultimate object of all human
I.
Good was the endeavour; and the concept of the ethical idea of all the minor Socratic schools." primary had only understood By the Good, however, Socrates is a good for man and conduces to hap that which This, indeed, naturally resulted from the
piness.
Greek view of Ethics, and

atrreed.
so far Plato
and Socrates are
The question
-
of the highest moral problem
Cf. Ritter, See Ft. i.
ii.
445.
sqq., 221, 257,
124
297
sq.,
304.
/ ///;
HIGHEST GOOD.
437
coincides with that of the highest Good, and this with the enquiry for happiness. Happiness is the possession of the Good, and the Good is that which all desire. 4
But wherein does the Good or happiness consist ? twofold answer to this question may be deduced from the presuppositions of the Platonic The system. Idea is that which alone is real; Matter is not
merely Non-being, but the opposite of the Idea, hindering its pure manifestation. 5 The soul, in its true essence, is declared to be an incorporeal spirit
destined for the intuition of the Idea, Hence mo might be regarded negatively: the highest end and Good might be sought in withdrawing from the life of sense and into
rality
retiring
pure contem
plation.
*
But the Idea

E
s<
is
the underlying ground of

tion of morality on external advantage
all
Symp. 204
ot
|(
|.
yap
pleasure
and
fvda.ifji.ovcs
Kal OVKfTl TTpOvSei fpfffddl, IVO. Ti ok (3ov$Tcn ei Sat /iwv eli/cu 6 fiove. All strive after an Xoêvos, enduring possession of the good:
fffTtv
(see pp. 182, 18o,
18! sq.\ proves nothing against Ih is, for happiness is not identical with pleasure or advantage nor is
;
there any real contradiction involved
cipa
tv\\rip8riv 6 fyws TOV TO

eli>ai
ctet. dyadbv avT$ Knthyd. 288 no knowledge is valuable

: s<jq.
unless
H,.,
_>!)(
it is
P>,
useful to us,
1). -j;tl
i.e.
B,
xu
J} (
less
it
11 B sq. see p. 280, 148; cf. Gbrg. 470 D sq., 492 1) sqcj. Hep. i. :!.Jt et alibi; Arist. Ktli. NiA, com. i. 2, beginn. 6v$ô.n otv <TXÔOV virb TWV TrXeiVrwi/ 6/mo\oyei:
:
/u.ti>
makes us happy.
(280 C E) un
Phileb.
beginn. vii. E, he explains that the einjuiry into the State must he conducted with out regard to the of the
f>U
when, in Rep. iv.
happiness
refers
individual members, for this only to the good of the whole
being prior to that of the indivi Indeed (loc. cit. 420 B), happiness is pronounced to be the highest aim for the Slate, just ns
duals.
TO.L
ri
TO a\aObv].
KO.I ol
TT]V
yap
.
evdai-
xa/Neires KO.L r6 ev TaiTOv viro\aiJ.pavovffi TU) J he fact that I lato (.ensures the confusion of the good \\itli the pleasant, or the founda
(v8a.i/j.oi>e?i>.
siav
afterwards, 144 K, the advantage of

piness
in
ix. oTi;
--y.i-j
J{
justice,
TroXXoi
KO.I oi
or unhappiness involved every constitution, whether of
the hap
state or soul, is
"
made
340
the basis of
their different values.

Cf. pp. -U5,
s,,.
438

all
form, and the cause of
that
is
good
iu the world
of Sense. This aspect might be more prominently brought forward for its representation in human life
and thus among the constituents of the highest Good might be reckoned, side by side with the knowledge of the pure Idea, the harmonious introduction of the Idea into sensible existence, and the satisfaction of which Both of these enunciations are to this is the source.
be found in Plato, though they are not so entirely The first occurs separated as to be mutually exclusive.
in passages where the highest problem of life is sought the second, in places where in flight from sensuality is described as worthy of love even sensuous
;
beauty
and external
activity,
sensible
pleasure,
is
included
among
the component parts of the highest Good. meet with the former view as early as the 6 As earthly existence, says Plato in that Theaetetus.
We
dialogue, can never be free from evil, as quickly as possible from this world
we must
to
flee
away
making
wisdom.
Pha?do.
6
17<5
ourselves like
to
Him
God, by through virtue and
further expanded in the where the deliverance of the soul from the
This thought
is still
dXV
oCr
diro\eV0eu
that
ra
Tt
KCLKO,
Svvarov
virevavriov
e
yap
our
and
T$ dyady ad
flvai avdynr)
TT]V
who contemplates God lie His eternal ordinance does himself become well ordered m
soul.
t
lv focus
<pvffiv
avTa ISpvadaL,
0vr)Tr)i>
Xci
<!
Kal rovSe TOV rbirov -jrepurooib Kal ireipdaBau dvdyK-r}*

eKeiae
<pvyfu>
E.g.
<>4
sqq.,
tJ4
E:
ov^
OVKOVV
6ri
TO.-
o Xcos 5o/ce? crot 17 TOV roiobrov (TOV wept rb TTpayâTeia

<f)i\o<r6<pov}
etvai,
KO.TO.
dXXd Ka0
;
ovov
dv-
TO /ccuof Kal
j>e
ovva.T6i>.
o<nov
fj.cTd Qpoirfffcw* yethe latter principle cf. Rop. vi. aOO B ; Tim. 47 B, where it is found as a natural consequence
-/<i
xV
TTpd<p6at
67
A
,
cr0cu.
On
&/*tv OVTM, ws
ôt/cei
av ev y^ eyyvTO.TU.
6Vt
/*a-
eêâ
Xtcrra
TOV
dotvai,
ed^
wtev
6/AtXwêf
THE HIGHEST GOOD.

body
all
is
439
considered the most necessary and beneficial of things, and the philosopher s aim and con
special
cern.
of
To the same effect is the celebrated passage the Republic, 8 which represents us as here
living
the reite this, rated assurance 9 that the true philosopher would never voluntarily descend from the heights of scientific con
dark cave, who are accustomed to see nothing but dim shadows, and are with difficulty brought to the vision of the Real, in the daylight of the Idea. In connection with there is
like prisoners in a
templation to mind the
affairs of
when compelled
to do so.
the State, but only Souls, so far as they are
faithful to their destiny, are only prevailed on by sity to enter this existence and those
Neces
earthly
who have
entered
it,
themselves as
concerns.
and recognise their true vocation, trouble little as they can with the body and its Here the body appears as a a dunfetter,
:
Keon of the soul the grave of its higher life. 10 It is an evil to which the soul is chained, and from which it
longs to be free as soon as possible. 11 indeed, the canst- of all evil for
;
The body
is,
though unrighteous-
M8f
ay K 7),
TOV
Koiwvu}f.w, 6
/J.TJOC
TI
no.
avTOV-
d*ari/MrX<Vefla TTJS
WTOV, ews to 6 0f6s

1
fwewt,
^
dXXd.
rafapc%ie> air
aMs
.
Phrcdo, 62 B; Oat. 400 B. In the former the doctrine of the Mysteries, as (v nvi Qpovpq. eau.ev
ol
10
aTroXiVfl
dvdpuiru,
in
the
latter
the
77^0?.
Cf. 8.
(
\ii.514
Jv
s(,
[.
cf. i. 345 ep.vii.ai9 C S(, (1 347 I) sq. Theaet. 172 C Tt is not Kqq., especially 173 K. con-ret to say that the discussion in Ihesc passages is throughout with only concerne ony concerned wt the immoral
;
sqq.,
and inconip
(,r -r,,m
Orphic comparison of the crtD/m to n ff fa a ant} a pr i son are o note(] but only in the first paseaqe with an expression of assent, CC vol i 383 sq. ll Phredo, GO B: 8 T t, e ws fo rb awfia ^w/*ey /cat frfnrcdtvpuhn ^ V ^v)Ch verb. TOV roiotrov ve
;
fa""
ete
states
:
Plnl n. a 516 Hep. vii. al y treats of the Platonic state.
(Brandw,
/ca/coP,
ov
îrore
a.
ri3s ov
fmBv^v^v
dXê y.
l Ka T ovro
elât TO
440
PLATO AND TEE OLDER ACADEMY.

lias
ness
place at
first
in the soul,
it
and
it
is its
own deed
for
though, consequently, world beyond will be cleansed from

it
;
is
the soul itself that in the
and punished
yet the soul would have 110 motive or inducement to evil if it were not in the body. When it entered the body it first acquired those lower elements by which
its
From proper nature is hidden and defaced. thence proceed all disturbances to spiritual activity
all
12
true
the appetites and passions which seduce us from our 13 destiny. Philosophy is therefore essentially a
14
As perfect deliverance from all evils is to be found only in the separation of the soul from the so the nearest earthly approach to such a deli body,
purification.
verance
is
that philosophic dying, by which alone the
soul even after the
body
death
is fitted for
incorporeal
existence.
12
13
16
Sec p. 414. Pbsedo, loc.
cit.
fivpias
fj.tv
yap riiuv duxoXtas Trape xet TO
crcD/.ia
UTI 8t bia TT/P avayKalav Tpo<prfV &v Tires voffoi TrpocrTTf crwcrip, fîrooifovffiv
TJ/J.UV
64 sqq. : Kep. ix. 588 B sqq. quite in accoivlance with this exposition, in showing all kinds of immorality to depend merely on the triumph of the animal over the
Fq.,
is
TT)v
cpwrwv
/ecu
/ecu fTridviniuv
TOV ojTos Brjpav. Kal Qbfiwv

TroXX^s,
human element
of lust
and savage,
ctSwXwv
TrctfToSaTriof Kal
Tracts
/7tas
û7ri7rX?7<rtJ>
0Xuawore
irrational courage over reason, for these lower elements of *he soul
arise from its connection with
the
TO \ey6fJLevov ws dX^c^ws Ty ovrt t Tr avrov ovSt 6povr)<ra.i Tjfuv lyyivf.ra.1 ovtiroT ovdev. /cat yap TTOXe yuoi s Kal crTacrets /cat /idx as ovSfv ciXXo Trape êi ^ TO crcD/xa Kal ai TOVTOV ewiOvfj-iai, seeing that it is always a question of possession, and possession is coveted for the body s sake. The worst point is that the soul in its thinking aclivities is continually hindered by the body, so that it can only arm e sit the intuition of truth by withdrawing from the body. Cf. 82 E
body.
8e Pha-do, 67 C Ka.0ap<ris dvai ov TOVTO ^vfj-âivei, oirfp irdXai ev TC^ Xoyw \eyerai, TO %w/)ifciv OTI /xdXicrTa OTTO TOU crw/xaros ibid. 69 B; cf. a so TTJV ^vx^v, &c.
: ;
cit. CT. the quotations p. J .3, 13 pp 412, 413, and Crat. 403 E: it is wise of Piuto not to have any intercourse with
(
Soph. 230 D. 15 Phcedo, loc.

,
mankind except
Ka6apa
77
tireidav
irfpl
r/
I//VXT]
<ru/j.a
iravruv TWJ/
TO
KO.K&V Kal
7ri0v/.uwv, for it is
then
THE HIGHEST
If Plato
result
GOOI>.
441
the
had stopped short at this view of morality, have been a negative theory, at variance not only with the spirit of Greek antiquity,
would
but also with

sophy.
many
essential elements of his

it
own
philo
He
proceeds, however, to complete
with other
representations, in which a more positive importance is ascribed to sensible things and our concern w ith them.
r
we have already noticed The proper object of this Love is that which is desirable in and for itself, namely the Idea but the sensible Phenomenon is here treated not merely in the manner of the Phaedo, as that which conceals the Idea, but also as that which reveals it. The enquiry of the Philebus concerning the highest Good has the same tendency. How this dialogue refutes the doctrine of pleasure has been already shown
in his doctrine of
A series of these representations

Love.
it
is
further
to
be noted
that
the
argument
does
not side unconditionally even with the opposite view (the ( Vnic-Megarian identification of the Good and in
tellectual
wisdom
1(i
J,
but describes the highest Good as
compounded Intelligence and reason, we are told, are certainly far above pleasure, inasmuch as the latter is related to the Unlimited or Indefinite, and the former in the closest manner to the First Cause of all. 17 But yet a life without any sensa
of various constituents.
tion
of pleasure or pain
for.
ls
worth wishing
And
would be pure apathy, not within the sphere of intellect.

against the Cynics, that the polemic of the Philebns is dirc-cled. ir Phil. 28 A sqq., 04 (
:
only that any moral influence can be successfully exercised upon it.
16
f>.
We have already seen, Pt. i. p. that it is probably against 201, these persons, and next them,
t<>
HI<|.
cf. p.
"*
18").
21
1>
s|., *)o
sq.,
G3 K:
we
442
PLATO AND THE OLDER ACADEM?.
pure Ideal knowledge (though far higher than aught must besides) cannot in itself suffice: Right Opinion be added to it, otherwise man could never find his way
upon
earth.
Further,
is
mentions music)
life; in fact,
all
Art (the Philebus especially of indispenable to the adornment is so, and every kind of knowledge
each in
knowledge;
truth.
19
for
some
way
participates
in
Pleasure cannot be quite so unconditionally
reckoned a part of the highest Good.
We
discriminate true and pure sensations of
must here 20 and delight,
necessary, harmless, and passionless pleasures (above with reason and health of all, those that are consistent
mind), from deceptive, impure, and sickly pleasures. 21 On The former alone can be included in the good.
the whole
we get
this
result.
22
The
is
first
and chief
constituent of the supreme Good participation in the 23 The Eternal nature of proportion (in the Idea).
may
is
observe
always
how briefly this point doubtless besettled
by the opposite of pleasure, r jis

>
is
cause Plato, after expressing himself elsewhere so strongly against pleasure, is at a loss how to assign it a place and value scientifically, Plato s own explanations, Phil. ii. V, Rep. vi. 505 B, and the Megaric an. Cynic doctrines on the point do (see Pt. i. pp. 221 sq., 257 sqq ) not allow us to suppose that it was ecausc he did not feel the neccsAvho estimate sity of refuting those
I
I
18. Fq.) generally the case (see p. The in the pleasures of sense. connected with virtue and pleasure knowledge is not specially represcnted (see p. 180 Laws, ii. 062
;
sqq.,
1.)
;
007
Kep.
i.
328
;
I),
485 270
2l
-2
2:<
Phileb. 40
sq.
Pluedr.
yi.
I)
Tim. 59 C).
02
D
C
sqq.;
sq.,
:
u>s^
cf.
30 C-53 C.
KTTJM^
*
04 00
06
sq.
ySovii
^
too
<ppbi>tl<ri$
high
who
consider
(more precisely, alone to be
<t>pbvy<ns
Zffn irpurov ov& aO Seure/ Of, dXXa irpurov ptv trr\ irepl p.trpov KO.\^ rb ^rpiov Kal Kaipiov, Kal TTO.VTO. 6*600.
the highest good, entirely excluding pleasure), Ribbing, Plat. Tdeenl.

i.
XPV
TOiavra
vo.uifciv
Trjv
ai8tot>
yprjffdai
[Herm. elpâdai, which,

. SevTtpov Kal Ka\bv Kal rb Kal iKavbv Kal irdvO
107 sq. 19 02 B sqq.

-
however, doos not give a suitable

sense]
irepi
.
.
<f>tffiv
wv
Those which do not depend on an illusion, and are not conditioned
TO
avfj-fj-erpov
reXeoi
THE HIGHEST GOOD.

second
is
443
the realisation of this Idea in actuality; the

is
formation of that which
harmonious, beautiful, and

activities); as the second element, the
n.m cous, it might appear as if something not belonging to man but existing externally were in tended; by the fdrpov, &c., the
f
yeoeas aC ravr^ e<mV. This passage, however, gives rise to a As the ptrpov and (rv/j,difficulty. V-erpov are mentioned here quite generally, and both are separated
TT}S
The first of these points was previously described (64 D .sqq.) more definitely as the unity
thence.
ot
it
beauty and completeness proceeding
AcdXXoj, (TVfji^Tpia and must then be intended
d\ri8cia;
to
stand
generally for the Ideal in
human
Idea
of
lect.
the
Go
>d
1ml.
sq.
048, 650; Trendclenburg Philebi Consil. 16; Bteger, ii. 59) or even the Jdeas in general (Brand is, ii. n 490), by the (nêr/jcw, &c., everything beautiful in the world. On the other hand, the Philebus ge nerally has not only aimed at
Marb
J83if;
(Hermann, Plat. 690
is
de
Pat. Stud.
WW.
s\ver
hends the effects proceeding from the former. But we have still to how it is that both these explain arc brought prominently forward, and that vovs gets only the third place (of. Schleiermacher, Pla ton s ii. 3, 133 sq.; Kibbing, Plat.
i.
which springs all that nature, precious and really true in life, while the second point compre
from
Ideenl.
.uiving a definition of the highest
287
that
sq.)
and the anthe
Good
but
for
mankind
is,
as
(see
p.
it
passage before us treats expressly of the UTTÔ.

devrepois,
is
in
280\
highest
the
rpwrw,
&c
The Good,
here considered not in its essence, but in reference to the subject in which it occurs (so Stallbaum in Phileb. Prolegg. 2 p. 74 sq. Hitter, ii. 46. ]; AVehrtherefore,
;
Good, according to Plato, does not consist in an individual activity, but in the whole of all activities which are agreeable to the
nature,
first
condition
Kal ûdXtor
of
it
(the
atria.
v/tr4*3f M^fwy,
&fj.a
the
TI/JLIWTO.TOI>
A C
OITIOV therein,
64
of of
sq.,
65 A)
is
the
human
this
harmony
virtue
existence.
is
mann,
Plat,
de
s.
sq.; Steinharf, PJ.
bono doctr. 90 WW. i v 659 sq :

.
By
of
the
production
to
l;e
such
at
;
whole
aimed
Snsemihl, Genet. Entw. ii. 52; Philologus Supplementbl. ii. 1, 77 sqq. Gesch. d.
;
this
harmony we have displayed

two
first
in
our
Still
Striimpell,
i.
pr.
il.
d.
BHjsol the
of his
263 sqq. Plato and second term classification that they are
.
Gr.
come the individual Goods.
determinations, and tlu-n
first
Tpirov
TO ffvêrpov, &c., following simply: rb roivvv vovv Kal Timely, &c. As the first element of the highest Good, participation in the
n-epl fitrpov, irepi
Of the
<f>p6vii<Tii>
there remains a certain obscurilv in the exposition of the Philebus, even if it be recollected that one and the same concept, that of the Good, is intended to denote that which is highest in man and in the universe. This inconveiiiciicr
makes
,
itself felt
VCTpov is specified (i.e. immutable laws form the measure of all living
much more
strongly in the Republic, vi. fu-i B sqq than in the I hilebus and
444

The
and
third,
perfect.
reason
and
intelligence.
The
fourth, special sciences, the arts,

v
The
fifth
24
last,
and right opinions, and painless pleasures of the pure

fail to
senses.
We
for
cannot
all
the respect
striving
for
that
is
perceive the moderation, in human nature, the

culture
the harmonious
of
the
whole
man by which the Platonic Ethics prove themselves such genuine fruits of the Greek national mind. Plato is far removed from the apathy of the Cynics,
that it is impossible not to sorrow under heavy trials (for instance, the death of a son) all that can then be expected of a man is moderation and/ control of his grief. That life
as
may
be seen in his remark
25
according to nature, which the older

as
its
Academy adopted
Metriopathy, which perhaps descended to the later Sceptics from the New Academy is entirely in harmony with the spirit of Plato.
watchword
that
II.
Virtu?.
is
The
essential
and
sole
means
of
hap
its
piness destined end by the virtue befitting it, so it is with the the soul live soul. Only in attaining that end can
virtue.
As each nature can
only attain
In the be evil. well; if it misses this, its life must be happy; in the other, miserable. one case it will
therefore cannot be turned into a spuriousness of the
Pluedr. 248
Soph. 231
sqq.,
sqq.
proof of the
latter,
Kep.
-4
ix.
587
;
P>
and supra,
p.
with Schaarschmidt Samml.
219, 147
Plat. St-id. p. 228.
plat.
not tance
Schr. 305 sq.). too much attribute

to
We
must
in
impor-
such
classifications
Plato, nor make the distance bet \veen their particular terms absothey belong to a lately the same mannerism of style in which he
;
the argument of the be compared the dis cu>sion of the Laws, v. 728 C sqq. cf. iv. 717 sqq., on the relative different goods; values of the which, however, is too unscientific to be noticed here,
With
Philebus
may
"
allows himself every freedom:
cf.
Kep.
x.
003
sq.
VIRTUE AXJ) PLKAXrRK.

Virtue
is
26
44.-,
therefore
harmony, and health of the soul vice the contrary condition. To enquire whether justice or injustice is the more advantageous for man, is no wiser than to question whether it is better to be sick or well to have a marred and useless soul, or a soul that
:
misery. ternal order,
Virtue
the cause of happiness, vice of is the right constitution, the in
is
capable and strong;- to subject the human and divine element in our nature to the animal, or the animal to the divine. 28 The virtuous man alone is free,
is
7
and follows
is
his
own
will
for in his soul
it
is
Reason
that bears rule
only
the part to which rule He belongs. rich in himself, cheerful and at rest. Wherever
essentially
disquietude run riot through it. 29 Only he who takes hold on the Internal and fills himself therewith can be truly satisfied. All other delights are alloyed and delusive, in propor-
passion occupies the throne, the soul is poor and enslaved: fear and sorrow and
auTTJs tpyo. eC airfpydfffTai ffTpeô^v^ T^S oiKcias
J!ep. i 353 TTore ijsvxT) TO.
sqq.,e.g.: op
supra,
p.
187.
392
A; Lawn,
ii.
Hence, 660 E BOQ
IW
i||
to
apery?,
r,
ddvvaroi
;^
Aduvarov.
Ka.Kfj\f/vxyKa.Kws Apxeiv 1 ayadrf iravTa. KaiJirifj.fXe iaeai, rr, rafTa e? Trpdrreiv

. .
AvdyK-q&pa
portray injustice as profitable, the bad as happy, the just as nnha ppy, is a heresy, radically pernicious and not to be tolerated the
by
p.h &pa
State.
*
OLKaia
^vxy
Kal 6
5t /catos
d^p
. .
fv
.
piuffCTai,
/ca/cws
AXXA
MV
Kai evoaiftuv, b 5t
5^ 6 (J5t/coj ev fav p.a.Kdpi6s re 7^

/nrj
Ta.va.vTia.
O
P
plv
St /catos
po j nt of y j ew {] ^ an, i m morality exhibited in the demorality tailed discussion, Kep. ix.

],>
om
t ],; g
contrast
of
1 ,
is
;">88
I>-
&pa
ev8ai/uLu>v,
(
6 5
a5t/cos fi^Xtos.
Similarly
n.
S
Jorg.
Ii
506
sqq.: cf.
Lawi,
002
sqq.,
lv x.
v.733Dsqq
4 ,? 44 :, C-44o B:
Phwdr. 230 A 577 I.) BO., with the Kep. addition that this holds ôod in
:
o92
-
cf.
ix.
S
:
^
;
A
cf.
the
vni.
x.
9.9-.
609
87
B C
^P; oa4 K,
;
1
highest degree of those who externally have the very highest

(
so.
Phaedo, 93
sq.
cf.
Laws,
9<6
C
,
Tim. and
power, \r/.. tyrants. TrXo^to^ V(

:
Pluedr 279
446

from the only true pleasureAnd true philosophy and
Virtue can therefore
it
tion as they deviate
that of the
perfect
Philosopher. 30 morality are the same.

31
those impure motives by which dispense with

generally recommended.
It carries in itself its
is
s
own
reward, as vice does its own punishment. Nothing like better can befall a man than that he should grow worse than that he the Good and the Divine nothing 32 Even should become like the evil and the Non-divine.
:
if
we put aside all the advantages which virtue* ensures man if we suppose the impossible case of a.righteous
mistaken by gods and men. or an evil-doer concealing still the former would be his wickedness from both 33 That this, the latter the unhappy. the
happy person,
is
however,
quite inconceivable
life,
that right and wrong,

life
as a rule even in this
but certainly in the
to
Plato constantly affirms come, are duly recompensed, 31 This seems to him necessary, as his settled conviction. on every account as little can the righteous man be 35 as the wicked escape His punish deserted by God, ment he must either be cured by it of his ungodliness
;
:
finally this
583 B-588 A, where thought is, strangely enough, and of course hy a very to arbitrary calculation, reduced the formula that the philosopher is 729 times happier than the tvrant. (On this number of. vol. i. 368 4 3rd edit.) The same re:w
Rep.
ix.
consequently that which he prefers must he the hest. OF. the

quotation, p. 187. !1 See p. 182 ; Therot. 170 B. Theset. 177 B sqq. Laws, iv. 710 C. sq., v. 728 B. Rep. iv. 444 E sq.; cf. with
<
:(;i
ii.
suit
cf.
was previously (580 D sqq.; Laws, ii. 663 C) obtained from

consideration
the
that only
the
to judge of philosopher knows how the worth of different lives, and
x. 612 A sq. 612 B sqq. et passim ; see supra, p. 207 sq.. 134, 218. 35 Rep. x. 612 E Theaet. 176 C sqq. Apol. 41 C sq. Laws, iv.
360 E-367 E,
Rep.
x.
34
21;>,
716
sq.
vi n 7 v
or, if
/:.
447
30 he be incurable, must serve as a warning to others. But as Plato holds moral obligation and the uncondi tional worth of virtue independently of future retri bution, this view does not affect the purity of his 37
principles.
The
Socratic doctrine of expediency

;
38
is
immeasurably transcended by Plato

purified
:w
t
it
has become
and deepened in the
spirit of the Socratic life.

definition does not, such, for ,-instance, as tho punishment of death in civil administra ion, and of eternal damnation in divine justice. Some further end
suffice,
Plato considers punishment as a moral necessity. For its particular justification he combines the two points of view,
in general
of which this
of
Trot.
improvement and deterrence. 324 B: 6 fj-erd \6yov tmez>e/ca
in
X f ip&v KoXdfriv oft TOV TrapeXrjXv00TOS dStx^/ttaros rt/iwpetrai ov yap av TO ye wpaxOtv aytvyrov dXXa TOV /ieXXoiroj titty
iva.
j.
.
punishment must be therefore supposed the criminal who is be

:
yond reformation
useful
for
is
at least
made
o?ros
fj.-f)Te
dXXos
TOVTOV
is
I8<j)t>
KO-
\a.adti>Ta.
Punishment
a means
general good, bv being made to contribute to tho maintenance of moral order as .1 deterrent example (Gorg. 525 15
the
of purifying the soul from wicked ness (Gorg. 478 K sqq., 480
A
;
505 B, 525 B sq.; see p. 379 eq.; Rep. ii. 380 A, ix. 591 A sqq. Laws, v. 728 C, ix. 862 D ibid. xi. 934 A, where retaliation as the
;
sq.,
Laws, v. 728 C, ix. 854 K, sq. 862 K). With this is connected, as regards the future, the concep
;
tion of a natural distribution of individuals in the universe (see
object of punishment is expressly inrejected, as in Proc. loc. cit.)

;
deed, Plato
thinks
this
with refer supra, p. 409, 53) ence to the State, the idea (in which can be traced the germ of a theory of elimination) that it must be
;
it
quite indis
:
pensable
loc.
for
purpose
cit.; Rep. ix. 591 goes so far as to declare that everyone must wish to be punished for his transgressions because it is better to be healed than to remain
,
Gorg. sq he
purified ot irreclaimable criminals by putting them to death or ban
them (Polit. 293 I), 308 K Laws, ix. 862 E. The latter pas sage adds that it is really better for
ishing
;
live
sick,
and Rep.
x.
consider many the just as an inevitable punish ment of previous sins. The theory of the future expiation of curable
_
013 A, he would evils which befall
themselves that such men should no longer). 37 After having first proved the
superiority of justice as such, and apart from its results, he turns to the latter with the words,
x.
612
B:
Rep.
vvv
ij8r]
injustice
is
view
(see p.
based on the same 390 sq.). But, on
dveirtyQovbv
9
(<TTI
TTJ
the other hand, there are absolute punishments, for the justification
irpbs fKeivois /cat roi)s /xr#oi diKatoatv-r} /ecu Trj dXXfj
a8
See Pt.
i.
p.
125 sqq.
448

Socrates had
made
had
virtue
to
consist
entirely in
consequently maintained that knowledge. He there could in reality be but One Virtue, and that the He be similar in all. disposition to virtue must had assumed that virtue, like knowledge, could be
these respects Plato at first followed of virtue he him; against the ordinary notions would indeed always have acknowledged the view of
39
taught.
In
all
as
Socrates to be substantially correct.

tion led
trines
40
But
riper reflec
him
to
in after-life to
modify the Socratic doc
determine them more accurately. He became convinced that side by side with perfect virtue, which is, 110 doubt, founded on knowledge, the un scientific virtue of ordinary men has also its value
and
that though the former
based on instruction, and the latter only on custom, yet that this virtue of custom as an indispensable prepara precedes the higher kind He observed the variety of moral disposi tory stage. and could not deny its influence on the forming
is
tions,
of morality in individuals. Lastly, he learned to com bine the distinction of many virtues with the Socratic
for he looked on doctrine of the Unity of all virtue the particular virtues as so many different sides of a
;
proportion,
which
considered as a whole
to
is
virtue.
detail.
These determinations we have now

a
examine in
All virtue presupposes disposition for on human nature virtue, which is not merely bestowed
natural
in general, but varies according to temperaments Plato instances the contrast of au individuals.
39
and
See
Pt.
i.
p.
117 sqq.
40
Of. p.
175 sqq.
7 A 77 7-:.
140
and av|0m. of
difference
in
fieiy
temperaments and calm, as a

41
natural
gift
disposition.
4-
He
also
speaks
philosophy, 43 indicates a threefold gradation of capacity. public On the lowest stage he places those who by nature
special
of a
for
and in the Re
are limited to the virtues indispensable for all classes. and even in the exercise justice and self-control,
011 the second require external guidance those who, in addition, are capable of valour on stage, the third and highest, such as are endowed with philo
of these
If this series of dispositions be combined witli sophy. the above-stated theory of the divisions of the soul, and
with that of the virtues, on which we are just entering, it would seem that the disposition to virtue varies
according as the moral impulse
is
chiefly manifested in
the appetitive, courageous, or rational part of the soul. It is quite consistent with this that the different grades
of moral disposition should be related to each other, as the different parts of the soul, that the higher should
include the lower.
The
disposition to philosophy
at
any rate (Hep. vi. 187 A) seems to comprehend all and similarly the superior other capacity for virtue ranks in the State are, in addition to their own virtues
;
to possess the virtues of the lower.
Plato, however, has
nowhere expressly drawn out this parallel, and the exposition of the Politicua would not fall in with it.
41
iii.
Polit.
)(J6
<:f.
sq<[.
Kqt.
of the
410 D.
The statement
441 A we certainly find the statement made with regard tu

IJep. iv.
*2
I-u\vs, xii. 0(53 E, that courage dwells even in children and beasts, is not applicable here it is not the mere disposition to courage that is referred to in that passage ; and in
:
Kep.
iii.
v.
474
(
,
vi.
487 A.
4:>>
415, in
the
myth about
111
different
mixture cf the souls
in
the thrco ranks.
G G
450

is
Self-control
there not subordinated to valour
they
are co-ordinated in relative opposition. In directly identifying virtue with knowledge one way open for the cultivation left
Socrates only of intellectual in of the moral disposition, the way in his earliest dialogues expresses Pluto struction.
in the Meno himself in a similar manner, but even are two guides to virtue, he has discovered that there
scientific Knowledge; and though Right Opinion and other is uncertain the one rests on cognition, and the good and blind, still he allows that this traditional 44 In brave men and noble deeds. ness has produced the Republic he goes a step farther, plainly saying founded on habit, custom, and
that ordinary virtue,

Ricrht Opinion,
must precede philosophy and philo

;
sophic morality
to be educated
gymnastic by kind of virtue, and subsequently only, by

45
first for the rulers of his State are to the lower music and
scientific
Thus the opposition of instruction, to the higher. as a and ordinary virtue with which Plato, philosophic more and itself of Socrates, began, transforms
disciple more into
their
close
virtue presupposes
Philosophic interdependence. the virtue of custom, and this again

the virtue of philosophy.
must perfect
"
itself in
Sec
175 su
:
ws eot/c^,
ouSe Trore
ofcro,
rty
f
See B
18 1):
cf. Hep. vii. 214 sq Jf/* rotWctXXcu dperai
d*XXwW Tre/naW (HO Trpos

re
/cat
8e
TO to
K at
-
d
e>a<r0ai
rov
^Mro,re
K al
au
yap OVK tootoai Trpbrepov

19*1
mgly,
that
cco, f i^p* 7 7-ac. P^cedes m what we

read,
uê Xi/^
peculiar catlOU
mcthodica
1S
and
-
nece8Sai
PLEASE
DO NOT REMOVE
FROM
THIS
CARDS OR
SLIPS
POCKET
UNIVERSITY OF
TORONTO
LIBRARY
Philos.H Z51p .Eap.2
Zeller, Eduard Plato and the older academy

Zeller, Plato and The Older Academy

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CD

PLATO AND THE OLDER ACADEMY

Translated by the Rev. O. J. REICHKL,

Translated by the Rev. O.

PLATO AND THE OLDER ACADEMY.

by SARAH F. ALLEYXE and ALFRED GOODWIN, B.A.

THE PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOLS:

OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF GREEK PHILO

ALLEYJTE and EVELYX

8vo, 10s. Gd.

LONGMANS, CiUEKX, AND

THE OLDEB ACADEMY

FROM THE GERMAN OF

SARAH FRANCES ALLEYNE

Felloic and Lecturer of Balliol College,

AND NEW YORK:

All rights referred

BALLANTYNE; HANSON AND CO LONDON AND EDINBURGH

Plato imcl die

Vol. II. of his

pbie der Grieclien

been made from the third and

text lias been translated by Miss

references in the notes require

with or without supra or infra,

indicate the pages

sophie der Grieclien, and Part of the second volume.

the Erste Abtheilimg

preface to the second edition of his Plato.

that the present translation

who German than Greek.

are perhaps less familiar with

Travels Sojourn at Megara. in the Academy .

Second and third

Enquiry into the State of our Collection Genuineness

Value of their Testimony

Criterion of Authenticity in Platonic Writings Particular Dialogues

Writings the Records of his Philosophy

THE ORDER OF THE PLATONIC WORKS.

...... ..... ..... .....

Its application to our Collection

Gorgias, Mcno, Tkeeetutus, Euthydemus,

Parraenides, Philcbus, Euthydemus, Cratylus,

Symposium, Phaedo Republic, Timams, Critias, Laws

HAKACTEU, METHOD, AND DIVISION OF

Character in relation to Socrates

Philosophic Dialogue Connection with the Personality of Socrates

GKOUXDWOKK OF FLAWS DOCTK1XK

I \jl. Sophistic Doctrine. Its Ethics

Ordinary CoiiKciousness. Its Practical Side

Stages of Philosophic Develop

THE DOCTRINE OF IDEAS

of Ideas founded upon that of

Proofs as given by Aristotle Historic Origin of the Doctrine

...... ..... ........

Ideas as Universals or Genera

.240 .248 .254

As Living Powers The World of Ideas

Jeneral Causes of the

Ascription of Matter Not a Primeval, Corporeal Substance

Not the Product Hut of Space

Relation of Sensible Objects to the Idea Immanence of Things in Ideas

Reasons against the Identification of Matter with the