Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-27760 May 29, 1974 CRISPIN ABELLANA and FRANCISCO ABELLANA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE GERONIMO R. MARAVE, Judge, Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch II; and GERONIMO CAMPANER, MARCELO LAMASON, MARIA GURREA, PACIENCIOSA FLORES and ESTELITA NEMEN0, respondents. Prud. V. Villafuerte for petitioners. Hon. Geronimo R. Marave in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:p This petition for certiorari is characterized by a rather vigorous insistence on the part of petitioners Crispin Abellana and Francisco Abellana that an order of respondent Judge was issued with grave abuse of discretion. It is their contention that he ought to have dismissed an independent civil action filed in his court, considering that the plaintiffs, as offended parties, private respondents 1 here, failed to reserve their right to institute it separately in the City Court of Ozamis City, when the criminal case for physical injuries through reckless imprudence was commenced. Such a stand of petitioners was sought to be bolstered by a literal reading of Sections 1 2 3 and 2 of Rule 111. It does not take into account, however, the rule as to a trial de novo found in Section 7 of Rule 123. What is worse, petitioners appear to be oblivious of the principle that if such an interpretation were to be accorded the applicable Rules of Court provisions, it would give rise to a grave constitutional question in view of the constitutional grant of power to this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure being limited in the sense that they "shall not diminish, increase, or modify 4 substantive rights." It thus appears clear that the petition for certiorari is without merit. The relevant facts were set forth in the petition and admitted in the answer. The dispute had its origins in a prosecution of petitioner Francisco Abellana of the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence in driving his cargo truck, hitting a motorized pedicab resulting in injuries to its passengers, namely, private respondents Marcelo Lamason, Maria Gurrea, Pacienciosa Flores, and Estelita Nemeo. The criminal case was filed with the city court of Ozamis City, which found the accused Francisco Abellana guilty as charged, damages in favor of the offended parties likewise being awarded. The accused, now petitioner, Francisco Abellana appealed such 5 decision to the Court of First Instance. At this stage, the private respondents as the offended parties filed with another branch of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, presided by respondent Judge, a separate and independent civil action for damages 6 allegedly suffered by them from the reckless driving of the aforesaid Francisco Abellana. In such complaint, the other petitioner, Crispin Abellana, as the alleged employer, was included as defendant. Both of them then sought the dismissal of such action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court of Ozamis. It was argued by them that it was not 7 allowable at the stage where the criminal case was already on appeal. Respondent Judge was not persuaded. On April 28, 1967, he issued the following order: "This is a motion to dismiss this case on the ground that in Criminal Case No. OZ-342 which was decided by the City Court and appealed to this Court, the offended parties failed to expressly waive the civil action or reserve their right to institute it separately in said City Court, as required in Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court. From the Records of Criminal Case No. OZ-342, it appears that the City Court convicted the accused. On appeal to this Court, the judgment of the City Court was vacated and a trial de novo will have to be conducted. This Court has not as yet begun trying said criminal case. In the meantime, the offended parties expressly waived in this Court the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal action, and reserve their right to institute a separate action as in fact, they did file. The Court is of the opinion that at this stage, the offended parties may still waive the civil action because the judgment of the City Court is vacated and a trial de novo will have to be had. In view of this waiver and reservation, this Court would be precluded from judging civil damages against the accused and in favor 8 of the offended parties. [Wherefore], the motion to dismiss is hereby denied. ..." There was a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence this petition. The only basis of petitioners for the imputation that in the issuance of the challenged order there was a grave abuse of discretion, is their reading of the cited Rules of Court provision to the effect that upon the institution of a criminal action "the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charge is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party ...reserves his right to institute it 9 10 separately." Such an interpretation, as noted, ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from city courts. It does likewise, as mentioned, give rise to a constitutional question to the extent that it could yield a meaning to a rule of court that may trench on a substantive right. Such an interpretation is to be rejected.Certiorari, to repeat, clearly does not lie.

1. In the language of the petition, this is the legal proposition submitted for the consideration of this Court : "That a separate civil action can be legally filed and allowed by the court only at the institution, or the right to file such separate civil action reserved or waived, at 11 such institution of the criminal action, and never on appeal to the next higher court." It admits of no doubt that an independent civil action was filed by private respondents only at the stage of appeal. Nor was there any reservation to that effect when the criminal case was instituted in the city court of Ozamis. Petitioners would then take comfort from the language of the aforesaid Section 1 of Rule 111 for the unwarranted conclusion that absent such a reservation, an independent civil action is barred. In the first place, such an inference does not per se arise from the wording of the cited rule. It could be looked upon plausibly as a non-sequitur. Moreover, it is vitiated by the grievous fault of ignoring what is so explicitly provided in Section 7 of Rule 123: "An appealed case shall be tried in all respects 12 anew in the Court of First Instance as if it had been originally instituted in that court." Unlike petitioners, respondent Judge was duly 13 mindful of such a norm. This Court has made clear that its observance in appealed criminal cases is mandatory. In a 1962 14 15 decision, People v. Carreon, Justice Barrera, as ponente, could trace such a rule to a 1905 decision, Andres v. Wolfe. Another case 16 cited by him is Crisostomo v. Director of Prisons, where Justice Malcolm emphasized how deeply rooted in Anglo-American legal 17 history is such a rule. In the latest case in point, People v. Jamisola, this Court, through Justice Dizon, reiterated such a doctrine in these words: "The rule in this jurisdiction is that upon appeal by the defendant from a judgment of conviction by the municipal court, the appealed decision is vacated and the appealed case 'shall be tried in all respects anew in the court of first instance as if it had been 18 19 originally instituted in that court.'" So it is in civil cases under Section 9 of Rule 40. Again, there is a host of decisions attesting to its 20 observance. It cannot be said then that there was an error committed by respondent Judge, much less a grave abuse of discretion, which is indispensable if this petition were to prosper. 2. Nor is the above the only ground for rejecting the contention of petitioners. The restrictive interpretation they would place on the applicable rule does not only result in its emasculation but also gives rise to a serious constitutional question. Article 33 of the Civil Code is quite clear: "In cases of ... physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a 21 preponderance of evidence." That is a substantive right, not to be frittered away by a construction that could render it nugatory, if through oversight, the offended parties failed at the initial stage to seek recovery for damages in a civil suit. As referred to earlier, the grant of power to this Court, both in the present Constitution and under the 1935 Charter, does not extend to any diminution, increase 22 or modification of substantive right. It is a well-settled doctrine that a court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt. Unfortunately, petitioners, unlike respondent Judge, appeared to lack awareness of the undesirable consequence of their submission. Thus is discernible another insuperable obstacle to the success of this suit. 3. Nor is this all that needs to be said. It is understandable for any counsel to invoke legal propositions impressed with a certain degree of plausibility if thereby the interest of his client would be served. That is though, merely one aspect of the matter. There is this other consideration. He is not to ignore the basic purpose of a litigation, which is to assure parties justice according to law. He is not to fall prey, as admonished by Justice Frankfurter, to the vice of literalness. The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm, particularly a procedural rule, there is placed an impediment 23 to a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right. The commitment of this Court to such a primordial objective has 24 been manifested time and time again. WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioners. Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur. Antonio, J., concurs on the bases of par. nos. 2 & 3 of opinion.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 104392 February 20, 1996

RUBEN MANIAGO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (First Division) HON. RUBEN C. AYSON, in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Baguio City, and ALFREDO BOADO, respondents. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City pLoakan, Baguio City.roper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority in On January 7, 1990, one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed on March 2, 1990 against petitioner's driver, Herminio Andaya, with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch III, where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7514-R. A month later, on April 19, 1990, a civil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado against petitioner himself. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2050-R, was assigned to Branch IV of the same court. Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver. But the trial court, in its order dated August 30, 1991, denied petitioner's motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal action, in addition to the fact that the petitioner was not the accused in the criminal case. Petitioner took the matter on certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals, maintaining that the civil action could not proceed independently of the criminal case because no reservation of the right to bring it separately had been made in the criminal case. On January 31, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed his petition on the authority of Garcia v. Florido, andAbellana v. Marave, which it held allowed a civil action for damages to be filed independently of the criminal action even though no reservation to file the same has 3 been made. Therefore, it was held, the trial court correctly denied petitioner's motion to suspend the proceedings in the civil case. Hence this petition for review on certiorari. There is no dispute that private respondent, as offended party in the criminal case, did not reserve the right to bring a separate civil action, based on the same accident, either against the driver, Herminio Andaya, or against the latter's employer, herein petitioner Ruben Maniago. The question is whether despite the absence of such reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under the following provisions of the Civil Code: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. .... Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. Art. 2177 states that responsibility for fault or negligence under the above-quoted provisions is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Revised Penal Code. However, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, while reiterating that a civil action under these provisions of the Civil Code may be brought separately from the criminal action, provides that the right to bring it must be reserved. This Rule reads:
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Sec. I. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. .... The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action which has been reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Based on these provisions, petitioner argues that the civil action against him was impliedly instituted in the criminal action previously filed against his employee because private respondent did not reserve his right to bring this action separately. (The records show that while this case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the criminal action was dismissed on July 10, 1992 for failure of the prosecution to file a formal offer of its evidence, with the consequence that the prosecution failed to prosecute its case. Accordingly, it seems to be petitioner's argument that since the civil action to recover damages was impliedly instituted with the criminal action, the dismissal of the criminal case brought with it the dismissal of the civil action.) Private respondent admits that he did not reserve the right to institute the present civil action against Andaya's employer. He contends, however, that the rights provided in Arts. 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code are substantive rights and, as such, their enforcement cannot be conditioned on a reservation to bring the action to enforce them separately. Private respondent cites in support of his position 4 5 6 7 statements made in Abellana v.Marave, Tayag v. Alcantara, Madeja v. Caro, and Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals, to the effect that the requirement to reserve the civil action is substantive in character and, therefore, is beyond the rule making power of this Court under 8 the Constitution. After considering the arguments of the parties, we have reached the conclusion that the right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule III, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. I. A. To begin with, 1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. Such civil actions are not limited to those which arise "from the offense charged," as originally provided in Rule III before the amendment of the Rules of Court in 1988. In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi 9 delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action. Thus Rule III, 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides: Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. B. There are statements in some cases implying that Rule III, 1 and 3 are beyond the rule making power of the Supreme Court under the Constitution. A careful examination of the cases, however, will show that approval of the filing of separate civil action for damages even though no reservation of the right to institute such civil action had been reserved rests on considerations other than that no reservation is needed. In Garcia v. Florido the right of an injured person to bring an action for damages even if he did not make a reservation of his action in the criminal prosecution for physical injuries through reckless imprudence was upheld on the ground that by bringing the civil action the injured parties had "in effect abandoned their right to press for recovery of damages in the criminal case. . . . Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the 11 criminal case has disappeared." The statement that Rule III, 1 of the 1964 Rules is "an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation" is not the ruling of the Court but only an aside, 12 quoted from an observation made in the footnote of a decision in another case.
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Another case cited by private respondent in support of his contention that the civil case need not be reserved in the criminal case 13 is Abellana v. Marave in which the right of persons injured in a vehicular accident to bring a separate action for damages was sustained despite the fact that the right to bring it separately was not reserved. But the basis of the decision in that case was the fact that the filing of the civil case was equivalent to a reservation because it was made after the decision of the City Court convicting the accused had been appealed. Pursuant to Rule 123, 7 of the 1964 Rules, this had the effect of vacating the decision in the criminal case so that technically, the injured parties could still reserve their right to institute a civil action while the criminal case was pending in the Court of First Instance. The statement "the right of a party to sue for damages independently of the criminal action is a substantive right which cannot be frittered away by a construction that could render it nugatory" without raising a "serious constitutional 14 question" was thrown in only as additional support for the ruling of the Court. On the other hand, in Madeja v. Caro the Court held that a civil action for damages could proceed even while the criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence was pending and did not have to await the termination of the criminal case precisely because the widow of the deceased had reserved her right to file a separate civil action for damages. We do not see how this case can lend support to the view of private respondent. In Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals the ruling is that the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case for physical injuries through reckless imprudence on the ground of reasonable doubt is not a bar to the filing of an action for damages even though the filing of the latter action was not reserved. This is because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code which provides that "when an accused is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted." This ruling obviously cannot apply to this case because the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case against the driver is the fact that the prosecution failed to prove its case as a result of its failure to make a formal offer of its evidence. Rule 132, 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that "The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified." To the same effect are the holdings in Tayag, Sr. v. Alcantara, Bonite v. Zosa and Diong Bi Chu v. Court of Appeals. Since Art. 29 of the Civil Code authorizes the bringing of a separate civil action in case of acquittal on reasonable doubt and under the Revised Rules of Criminal procedure such action is not required to be reserved, it is plain that the statement in these cases that to require a reservation to be made would be to sanction an unauthorized amendment of the Civil Code provisions is a mere dictum. As already noted in connection with the case of Garcia v. Florido, that statement was not the ruling of the Court but only an observation borrowed 20 from another case. The short of it is that the rulings in these cases are consistent with the proposition herein made that, on the basis of Rule III, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only (1) when such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code. Indeed the question on whether the criminal action and the action for recovery of the civil liability must be tried in a single proceeding has always been regarded a matter of procedure and, since the rule making power has been conferred by the Constitution on this Court, it is in the keeping of this Court. Thus the subject was provided for by G.O. No. 58, the first Rules of Criminal Procedure under the American rule. Sec. 107 of these Orders provided: The privileges now secured by law to the person claiming to be injured by the commission of an offense to take part in the prosecution of the offense and to recover damages for the injury sustained by reason of the same shall not be held to be abridged by the provisions of this order; but such person may appear and shall be heard either individually or by attorney at all stages of the case, and the court upon conviction of the accused may enter judgment against him for the damages occasioned by his wrongful act. It shall, however, be the duty of the promotor fiscal to direct the prosecution, subject to the right of the person injured to appeal from any decision of the court denying him a legal right. This was superseded by the 1940 Rules of Court, Rule 106 of which provided: Sec. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. - Unless the offended party has waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it after the termination of the criminal case, and subject to the provisions of section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense. This Rule was amended thrice, in 1964, in 1985 and lastly in 1988. Through all the shifts or changes in policy as to the civil action arising from the same act or omission for which a criminal action is brought, one thing is clear: The change has been effected by this 21 22 Court. Whatever contrary impression may have been created by Garcia v.Florido and its progeny must therefore be deemed to have been clarified and settled by the new rules which require reservation of the right to recover the civil liability, otherwise the action will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal action. Contrary to private respondent's contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure. The requirement is merely procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any person criminally
17 18 19 16 15

liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended party the right to bring a separate civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before it may be brought separately. Indeed, the requirement that the right to institute actions under the Civil Code separately must be reserved is not incompatible with the independent character of such actions. There is a difference between allowing the trial of civil actions to proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and requiring that, before they may beinstituted at all, a reservation to bring them separately must be made. Put in another way, it is the conduct of the trial of the civil action - not its institution through the filing of a complaint - which is allowed to proceed independently of the outcome of the criminal case. C. There is a practical reason for requiring that the right to bring an independent civil action under the Civil Code separately must be reserved. It is to avoid the filing of more than one action for the same act or omission against the same party. Any award made against the employer, whether based on his subsidiary civil liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code or his primary liability under Art. 23 2180 of the Civil Code, is ultimately recoverable from the accused. In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the employee, bus driver. Had the driver been convicted and found insolvent, his employer would have been held subsidiarily liable for damages. But if the right to bring a separate civil action (whether arising from the crime or from quasi delict) is reserved, there would be no possibility that the employer would be held liable because in such a case there would be no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused. In such a case the institution of a separate and independent civil action under the Civil Code would not result in the employee being held liable for the same act or omission. The rule requiring 24 reservation in the end serves to implement the prohibition against double recovery for the same act or omission. As held in Barredo 25 v. Garcia, the injured party must choose which of the available causes of action for damages he will bring. If he fails to reserve the filing of a separate civil action he will be deemed to have elected to recover damages from the bus driver on the basis of the crime. In such a case his cause of action against the employer will be limited to the recovery of the latter's subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. II. Nor does it matter that the action is against the employer to enforce his vicarious liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Though not an accused in the criminal case, the employer is very much a party, as long as the right to bring or institute a separate action (whether 26 arising from crime or from quasi delict) is not reserved. The ruling that a decision convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer "not only with regard to its civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot 27 be separated but follows that of his employee" is true not only with respect to the civil liability arising from crime but also with respect to the civil liability under the Civil Code. Since whatever is recoverable against the employer is ultimately recoverable by him from the employee, the policy against double recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the same act or omission whether the 28 action is brought against the employee or against his employer. Thus in Dulay v. Court of Appeals this Court held that an employer may be sued under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code and that the right to bring the action did not have to be reserved because, having been instituted before the criminal case against the employee, the filing of the civil action against the employer constituted an express reservation of the right to institute it separately. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and the complaint against petitioner is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Regalado, Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 145527 May 28, 2002

AUGUSTUS CAEZAR R. GAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANTONIO C. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Br. 61, Baguio City, ALBERT G. TOLENTINO, in his capacity as RTC Sheriff of Baguio City, and FRANCHESKA JOY C. PONDEVIDA, assisted by BERNADETTE C. PONDEVIDA, respondents. BELLOSILLO, J.: Quite apprehensive that she would not be able to send to school her three (3)-year old daughter Francheska Joy S. Pondevida, 1 Bernadette S. Pondevida wrote petitioner Augustus Caezar R. Gan demanding support for their "love child." Petitioner, in his reply, denied paternity of the child. An exasperated Bernadette thereafter instituted in behalf of her daughter a complaint against petitioner for 2 support with prayer for support pendente lite. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. He argued that since Francheska's 3 certificate of birth indicated her father as "UNKNOWN," there was no legal or factual basis for the claim of support. His motion, 4 however, was denied by the trial court. Despite denial of his motion, petitioner failed to file his answer within the reglementary period. Thus, on 19 January 2000 private respondent moved that petitioner be declared in default, which motion was granted. In itsOrder declaring petitioner in default the trial court noted that petitioner's Motion to Admit Answer was filed more than ninety (90) days after the expiration of the reglementary period, and only after private respondent moved that petitioner be declared in default. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, the court received the evidence of private respondent ex parte. After finding that the claim of filiation and support was adequately proved, the trial court rendered its Decision on 12 May 2000 ordering petitioner to recognize private respondent Francheska Joy S. Pondevida as his illegitimate child and support her with P20,000.00 every month to be paid on or before the 15th of each month starting 15 April 2000. Likewise petitioner was ordered to pay Francheska Joy S. Pondevida the accumulated arrears ofP20,000.00 per month from the day she was born, P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and P25,000.00 for expenses of litigation, plus P20,000.00 on or before the 15th of every month from 15 May 2000 as alimony pendente liteshould he 5 desire to pursue further remedies against private respondent. Forthwith, private respondent moved for execution of the judgment of support, which the trial court granted by issuing a writ of 6 execution, citing as reason therefor private respondent's immediate need for schooling. Pursuant to the writ, the sheriff levied upon a motor vehicle, a Honda City, with Plate No. UMT 884, registered in the name of "A.B. Leasing & Fin. Corp., Leased to: G & G Trading," 7 and found within the premises of petitioner's warehouse in Caloocan City. Meanwhile, petitioner appealed the Judgment to the Court of Appeals.
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On 9 June 2000 petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court for ordering the immediate execution of the judgment. Petitioner averred that the writ of execution was issued despite the absence of a good reason for immediate enforcement. Petitioner insisted that as the judgment sought to be executed did not yet attain finality there should be an exceptional reason to warrant its execution. He further alleged that the writ proceeded from an order of default and a judgment rendered by the trial court in complete disregard of his "highly meritorious defense." Finally, petitioner impugned the validity of the writ as he argued that it was issued without notice to him. Petitioner stressed the fact that he received copy of the 9 motion for immediate execution two (2) weeks after its scheduled hearing. On 31 August 2000 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ratiocination that under Sec. 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure judgments for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. Thus, it did not help petitioner any to argue that there were no good reasons to support its immediate execution. The second challenge hurled against the validity of the writ concerning the lack of notice and hearing was likewise dismissed with the appeals court favoring substantial justice over technicalities. Lastly, petitioner's justification for belatedly filing his answer, i.e., miscommunication with his lawyer, was disregarded since it fell short 10 of the statutory requirements of "fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence." His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner came to us impugning the dismissal of his petition for certiorari. Petitioner argues that under the rules a judgment for support which is subject of an appeal cannot be executed absent any good reason for its immediate execution. Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the writ asserting that it was issued in violation of his right to notice and hearing. Petitioner also seeks the setting aside of the default order and the judgment rendered thereafter for the reason that should he

be allowed to prove his defense of adultery, the claim of support would be most likely denied. Petitioner claims that in an action by a child against his putative father, adultery of the child's mother would be a valid defense to show that the child is a fruit of adulterous relations for, in such case, it would not be the child of the defendant and therefore not entitled to support. Parenthetically, how could he be allowed to prove the defense of adultery when it was not even hinted that he was married to the mother of Francheska Joy. Petitioner consents to submit to Dioxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing to resolve the issue of paternity, which test he claims has a 12 reputation for accuracy. A careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case fails to persuade this Court to brand the issuance of the writ of execution by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals with the vice of grave abuse of discretion. There is no evidence indeed to justify the setting aside of the writ on the ground that it was issued beyond the legitimate bounds of judicial discretion. Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment and that advance executions will only be allowed if there are urgent reasons therefor. The aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate execution of all judgments for support and makes no distinction between those which are the subject of an appeal and those which are not. To consider then petitioner's argument that there should be good reasons for the advance execution of a judgment would violate the clear and explicit language of the rule mandating immediate execution. Petitioner is reminded that to the plain words of a legal provision we should make no further explanation.Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget. Indeed, the interpretation which petitioner attempts to foist upon us would only lead to absurdity, its acceptance negating the plain meaning of the provision subject of the petition. Petitioner would also have us annul the writ of execution on the ground that he was not notified of its issuance. We are unable to accept such a plea for enough has been done by petitioner to delay the execution of the writ. As the records show, in partial fulfillment of the writ of execution petitioner surrendered a sedan which apparently was not his as it was later ordered released to a third party who laid 13 claim over the levied vehicle. Also, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave to Deposit in Court Support Pendente Litepromising to deposit the amount due as support every 15th of the month, but to date has not deposited any amount in 14 complete disavowal of his undertaking. He was not even deterred from appealing before us and needlessly taking up our time and energy by posing legal questions that can be characterized, at best, as flimsy and trivial. We are thus not prepared to abrogate the writ of execution issued in favor of private respondent for substantial justice would be better served if petitioner be precluded from interposing another barrier to the immediate execution of the support judgment. We are not intimating that in every case the right to notice of hearing can be disregarded. That is not so. It appears in this case that there has been too much temporizing in the execution of the writ which must not be allowed to thwart the constitutional mandate for speedy disposition of cases. As has been said, a technicality should be an aid to justice and not its great hindrance and chief 15 enemy. Truly, if the writ of execution would be voided on this ground alone, then procedural rules which were primarily drafted to protect parties in the realm of constitutional guarantees would acquire a new sanctity at the expense of equity and justice. Lastly, we note that no useful purpose would be served if we dwell on petitioner's arguments concerning the validity of the judgment by default and his insistence that he be subjected, together with private respondent Bernadette C. Pondevida to DNA testing to settle the issue of paternity. The futility of his arguments is very apparent. It is not for us at this instance to review or revise the Decision rendered by the trial court for to do so would pre-empt the decision which may be rendered by the Court of Appeals in the main case for support. In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time 16 continues to slip away. An excerpt from the early case ofDe Leon v. Soriano is relevant, thus: The money and property adjudged for support and education should and must be given presently and without delay because if it had to wait the final judgment, the children may in the meantime have suffered because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in school because of lack of funds. One cannot delay the payment of such funds for support and education for the reason that if paid long afterwards, however much the accumulated amount, its payment cannot cure the evil and repair the damage caused. The children with such belated payment for support and education cannot act as gluttons and eat voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to make up for the years of hunger and starvation. Neither may they enrol in several classes and schools and take up numerous subjects all at once to make up for the years they missed in school, due to non-payment of the funds when needed. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the Decision sought to be reviewed, the instant petition is DENIED. The 31 August 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the Petition for Certiorari instituted by petitioner Augustus Caezar C. Gan and upholding the validity of the 2 June 2000 Writ of Execution issued by the Regional Trial Court Br. 61, Baguio City, in Civil Case No. 4234-R, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Mendoza, Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Corona, JJ., concur.

11

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio City THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 142943 April 3, 2002

Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA QUISUMBING, petitioners, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), respondent. PANGANIBAN, J.: Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric service on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 1, 2000 Decision and the April 10, 2000 2 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 49022. The decretal portion of the said Decision reads as follows: "WHEREFORE, the challenged decision in Civil Case No. Q-95-23219 is hereby SET ASIDE and the complaint against defendant-appellant MERALCO is hereby DISMISSED. Plaintiffs-appellees are herebyORDERED to pay defendant-appellant 3 MERALCO the differential billing of P193,332.00 representing the value of used but unregistered electrical consumption." The assailed Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The Facts The facts of the case are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise: "Defendant-appellant Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a private corporation, authorized by law to charge all persons, including the government, for the consumption of electric power at rates duly authorized and approved by the Board of Energy (now the Energy Regulatory Board). "Plaintiffs-appellees Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of a house and lot located at No. 94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City, which they bought on April 7, 1994 from Ms. Carmina Serapio Santos. They alleged to be business entrepreneurs engaged in the export of furnitures under the business name 'Loran Industries' and recipient of the 1993 Agora Award and 1994 Golden Shell Award. Mrs. Quisumbing is a member of the Innerwheel Club while Mr. Quisumbing is a member of the Rotary Club, Chairman of Cebu Chamber of Commerce, and Director of Chamber of Furniture. "On March 3, 1995 at around 9:00 a.m., defendant-appellant's inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine-on-the-spot inspection of all single phase meters at Greenmeadows Avenue. House no. 94 of Block 8, Lot 19 Greenmeadows Avenue owned by plaintiffs-appellees was inspected after observing a standard operating procedure of asking permission from plaintiffs-appellees, through their secretary which was granted. The secretary witnessed the inspection. After the inspection, defendant-appellant's inspectors discovered that the terminal seal of the meter was missing; the meter cover seal was deformed; the meter dials of the meter was mis-aligned and there were scratches on the meter base plate. Defendant-appellant's inspectors relayed the matter to plaintiffs-appellees' secretary, who in turn relayed the same to plaintiff-appellee, Lorna Quisumbing, who was outraged of the result of the inspection and denied liability as to the tampering of the meter. Plaintiffs-appellees were advised by defendant-appellant's inspectors that they had to detach the meter and bring it to their laboratory for verification/confirmation of their findings. In the event the meter turned out to be tampered, defendantappellant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of plaintiffs-appellees. The laboratory testing conducted on the meter has the following findings to wit: '1. Terminal seal was missing. '2. Lead cover seals ('90 ERB 1-Meralco 21) were tampered by forcibly pulling out from the sealing wire.
1

'3. The 1000th, 100th and 10th dial pointers of the register were found out of alignment and with circular scratches at the face of the register which indicates that the meter had been opened to manipulate the said dial pointers and set manually to the desired reading. In addition to this, the meter terminal blades were found full of scratches.' "After an hour, defendant-appellant's head inspector, E. Orlina returned to the residence of plaintiffs-appellees and informed them that the meter had been tampered and unless they pay the amount ofP178,875.01 representing the differential billing, their electric supply would be disconnected. Orlina informed plaintiffs-appellees that they were just following their standard operating procedure. Plaintiffs-appellees were further advised that questions relative to the results of the inspection as well as the disconnection of her electrical services for Violation of Contract (VOC) may be settled with Mr. M. Manuson of the Special Accounts, Legal Service Department. However, on the same day at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon defendant-appellant's officer through a two-way radio instructed its service inspector headed by Mr. Orlino to reconnect plaintiffs-appellees' electric service which the latter faithfully complied. "On March 6, 1995, plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, despite the immediate reconnection, to order defendant-appellant to furnish electricity to the plaintiffsappellees alleging that defendant-appellant acted with wanton, capricious, malicious and malevolent manner in disconnecting their power supply which was done without due process, and without due regard for their rights, feelings, peace of mind, social and business reputation. "In its Answer, defendant-appellant admitted disconnecting the electric service at the plaintiffs-appellees' house but denied liability citing the 'Terms and Conditions of Service,' and Republic Act No. 7832 otherwise known a 'Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994.' "After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment, ruling in favor of plaintiffs-appellees." (Citations omitted) Ruling of the Trial Court The trial court held that Meralco (herein respondent) should have given the Quisumbing spouses (herein petitioners) ample opportunity to dispute the alleged meter tampering. It held that respondent had acted summarily and without procedural due process in immediately disconnecting the electric service of petitioners. Respondent's action, ruled the RTC, constituted a quasi delict. Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's ruling and dismissed the Complaint. It held that respondent's representatives had acted in good faith when they disconnected petitioners' electric service. Citing testimonial and documentary evidence, it ruled that the disconnection was made only after observing due process. Further, it noted that petitioners had not been able to prove their claim for damages. The appellate court likewise upheld respondent's counterclaim for the billing differential in the amount 5 of P193,332 representing the value of petitioners' used but unregistered electrical consumption, which had been established without being controverted. Hence, this Petition.
6 4

The Issues In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration: "4.1 Whether a prima facie presumption of tampering of electrical meter enumerated under Sec. 4 (a) iv of RA 7832 (AntiElectricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994) may be had despite the absence of an ERB representative or an officer of the law? "4.2 Whether the enumeration of instances to establish a prima facie presumption of tampering of electrical meter enumerated under Sec. 4 (a) iv of RA 7832 (Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994) is exclusive? "4.3 What constitutes notice prior to disconnection of electricity service? Corollarily, whether the definition of notice under Meralco v. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 243) applies to the case at bar? "4.4 Whether a prima facie presumption may contradict logic? "4.5 Whether documentary proof is pre-requisite for award of damages?"
8 7

In sum, this Petition raises three (3) main issues which this Court will address: (1) whether respondent observed the requisites of law when it disconnected the electrical supply of petitioners, (2) whether such disconnection entitled petitioners to damages, and (3) whether petitioners are liable for the billing differential computed by respondent. The Court's Ruling The Petition is partly meritorious. First Issue: Compliance with Requisites of Law Petitioners contend that the immediate disconnection of electrical service was not validly effected because of respondent's noncompliance with the relevant provisions of RA 7832, the "Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994." They insist that the immediate disconnection of electrical supply may only be validly effected only when there is prima facie evidence of its illegal use. To constitute prima facie evidence, the discovery of the illegal use must be "personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)." Respondent, on the other hand, points out that the issue raised by petitioners is a question of fact which this Court cannot pass upon. It argues further that this issue, which was not raised in the court below, can no longer be taken up for the first time on appeal. Assuming arguendo that the issue was raised below, it also contends that petitioners were not able to specifically prove the absence of an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the ERB when the discovery was made.1wphi1.nt Prima facie Evidence of Illegal Use of Electricity We agree with petitioners. Section 4 of RA 7832 states: (a) The presence of any of the following circumstances shall constitute prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, as defined in this Act, by the person benefitted thereby, and shall be the basis for: (1) the immediate disconnection by the electric utility to such person after due notice, x x x xxx xxx xxx

(viii) x x x Provided, however, That the discovery of any of the foregoing circumstances, in order to constitute prima facie evidence, must be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the 9 Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)." (Italics supplied) Under the above provision, the prima facie presumption that will authorize immediate disconnection will arise only upon the satisfaction of certain requisites. One of these requisites is the personal witnessing and attestation by an officer of the law or by an authorized ERB representative when the discovery was made. As a rule, this Court reviews only questions of law, not of facts. However, it may pass upon the evidence when the factual findings of 10 the trial court are different from those of the Court of Appeals, as in this case. A careful review of the evidence on record negates the appellate court's holding that "the actions of defendant-appellant's service 11 inspectors were all in accord with the requirement of the law." Respondent's own witnesses provided the evidence on who were actually present when the inspection was made. Emmanuel C. Orlino, the head of the Meralco team, testified: "Q A When you were conducting this inspection, and you discovered these findings you testified earlier, who was present? The secretary, sir."
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"ATTY. REYES - Who else were the members of your team that conducted this inspection at Greenmeadows Avenue on that day, March 3, 1995? A Q A The composition of the team, sir? Yes. Including me, we are about four (4) inspectors, sir.

Q A Q A

You were four (4)? Yes, sir. Who is the head of this team? I was the head of the team, sir."
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Further, Catalino A. Macaraig, the area head of the Orlino team, stated that only Meralco personnel had been present during the inspection: "Q A Q A Q A By the way you were not there at Green Meadows on that day, right? Yes, sir. Only Mr. Orlino and who else were there? Two or three of his men. All members of the inspection team? Yes, sir."
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These testimonies clearly show that at the time the alleged meter tampering was discovered, only the Meralco inspection team and petitioners' secretary were present. Plainly, there was no officer of the law or ERB representative at that time. Because of the absence of government representatives, the prima facie authority to disconnect, granted to Meralco by RA 7832, cannot apply. Neither can respondent find solace in the fact that petitioners' secretary was present at the time the inspection was made. The law clearly states that for the prima facie evidence to apply, the discovery "must be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the 15 law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)." Had the law intended the presence of the owner or his/her representative to suffice, then it should have said so. Embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that courts may not construe a 16 statute that is free from doubt. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts 17 have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed. In fact, during the Senate deliberations on RA 7832, Senator John H. Osmea, its author, stressed the need for the presence of government officers during inspections of electric meters. He said: "Mr. President, if a utility like MERALCO finds certain circumstances or situations which are listed in Section 2 of this bill to be prima facie evidence, I think they should be prudent enough to bring in competent authority, either the police or the NBI, to verify or substantiate their finding. If they were to summarily proceed to disconnect on the basis of their findings and later on there would be a court case and the customer or the user would deny the existence of what is listed in Section 2, then they 18 could be in a lot of trouble." (Italics supplied) Neither can we accept respondent's argument that when the alleged tampered meter was brought to Meralco's laboratory for testing, there was already an ERB representative present. The law says that before immediate disconnection may be allowed, the discovery of the illegal use of electricity must have been personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by an authorized ERB representative. In this case, the disconnection was effected immediately after the discovery of the alleged meter tampering, which was witnessed only by Meralco's employees. That the ERB representative was allegedly present when the meter was examined in the Meralco laboratory will not cure the defect. It is undisputed that after members of the Meralco team conducted their inspection and found alleged meter tampering, they immediately disconnected petitioners' electrical supply. Again, this verity is culled from the testimony of Meralco's Orlina: "A When she went inside then she came out together with Mrs. Lourdes Quis[u]mbing at that time. We did tell our findings regarding the meter and the consequence with it. And she was very angry with me. Q When you say consequence of your findings, what exactly did you tell Mrs. Quisumbing?

A We told her that the service will be temporarily disconnected and that we are referring to our Legal Department so could 19 know the violation, sir."

"A Q A Q

Yes, sir. At that time, I referred her to Mr. Macaraig, sir. What is the fist name of this supervisor? Mr. Catalino Macara[i]g, sir. Then after talking to Mr. Catalino Macara[i]g, this is over the telephone, what happened?

A The supervisor advised her that the service will be temporarily disconnected and she has to go to our Legal Department where she could settle the VOC, sir. Q A You are talking of 'VOC,' what is this all about Mr. Orlino? 'VOC' is violation of contract, sir."
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As to respondent's argument that the presence of an authorized ERB representative had not been raised below, it is clear, however, that the issue of due process was brought up by petitioners as a valid issue in the CA. The presence of government agents who may authorize immediate disconnections go into the essence of due process. Indeed, we cannot allow respondent to act virtually as prosecutor and judge in imposing the penalty of disconnection due to alleged meter tampering. That would not sit well in a democratic country. After all, Meralco is a monopoly that derives its power from the government. Clothing it with unilateral authority to disconnect would be equivalent to giving it a license to tyrannize its hapless customers. Besides, even if not specifically raised, this Court has already ruled that "[w]here the issues already raised also rest on other issues not specifically presented, as long as the latter issues bear relevance and close relation to the former and as long as they arise from 21 matters on record, the Court has the authority to include them in its discussion of the controversy as well as to pass upon them." Contractual Right to Disconnect Electrical Service Neither may respondent rely on its alleged contractual right to disconnect electrical service based on Exhibits "10" and "11," Decisions of the Board of Energy (now the Energy Regulatory Board). The relevant portion of these documents concerns discontinuance of service. It provides:
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or on

"The Company reserves the right to discontinue service in case the Customer is in arrears in the payment of bills or for failure to pay the adjusted bills in those cases where the meter stopped or failed to register the correct amount of energy consumed, or for failure to comply with any of these terms and conditions, or in case of or to prevent fraud upon the Company. Before disconnection is made in case of or to prevent fraud, the Company may adjust the bill of said Customer accordingly and if the adjusted bill is not paid, the Company may disconnect the same. In case of disconnection, the provisions of Revised Order No. 1 of the former Public Service Commission (now the Board of Energy) shall be observed. Any such suspension of service shall 24 not terminate the contract between the Company and the Customer." Petitioners' situation can fall under disconnection only "in case of or to prevent fraud upon the Company." However, this too has requisites before a disconnection may be made. An adjusted bill shall be prepared, and only upon failure to pay it may the company discontinue service. This is also true in regard to the provisions of Revised Order No. 1 of the former Public Service Commission, which requires a 48-hour written notice before a disconnection may be justified. In the instant case, these requisites were obviously not complied with. Second Issue Damages Having ruled that the immediate disconnection effected by Meralco lacks legal, factual or contractual basis, we will now pass upon on the right of petitioners to recover damages for the improper disconnection. Petitioners are asking for the reinstatement of the RTC Decision, which awarded them actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. All these were overturned by the CA. As to actual damages, we agree with the CA that competent proof is necessary before our award may be made. The appellate court ruled as follows: "Considering further, it is a settled rule that in order for damages to be recovered, the best evidence obtainable by the injured party must be presented. Actual and compensatory damages cannot be presumed but must be duly proved and proved with reasonable degree and certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guess work as to the fact and amount of

damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have been suffered and on evidence of actual amount thereof. If 25 the proof is flimsy and unsubstantial, no damages will be awarded." Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the injured party in the position where it was before it was injured. They 27 pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. Except as provided by law or by 28 stipulation, a party is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as it has duly proven. Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the amount of loss be capable of proof; it must also be actually proven 29 with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable. Petitioners' claim for actual damages was premised only upon Lorna Quisumbing's bare testimony as follows: "A Q Actually that da[y] I was really scheduled to go to that furniture exhibit. That furniture exhibit is only once a year. What is this furniture exhibit?
26

A The SITEM, that is a government agency that takes care of exporters and exclusive marketing of our products around the world. We always have that once a year and that's the time when all our buyers are here for us to show what we had that was exhibited to go around. So, my husband had to [fly] from Cebu to Manila just for this occasion. So we have an appointment with our people and our buyers with SITEM and also that evening we will have to treat them [to] dinner. Q A Q A Q Whereat? At our residence, we were supposed to have a dinner at our residence. What happened to this occasion? So when they disconnected our electric power we had to get in touch with them and change the venue. Which venue did you transfer your dinner for your buyers?

A We brought them in a restaurant in Makati at Season's Restaurant. But it was very embar[r]assing for us because we faxed them ahead of time before they came to Manila. Q Now as a result of this change of your schedule because of the disconnection of the electric power on that day, Friday, what damage did you suffer? A Q A I cancelled the catering service and that is so much of a h[a]ssle it was so embarras[s]ing for us. Can you tell us how much amount? Approximately P50,000.00."
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No other evidence has been proffered to substantiate her bare statements. She has not shown how she arrived at the amount of P50,000; it is, at best, speculative. Her self-serving testimonial evidence, if it may be called such, is insufficient to support alleged actual damages. While respondent does not rebut this testimony on the expenses incurred by the spouses in moving the dinner out of their residence due to the disconnection, no receipts covering such expenditures have been adduced in evidence. Neither is the testimony corroborated. To reiterate, actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved with a reasonable degree of 31 certainty. It is dependent upon competent proof of damages that petitioners have suffered and of the actual amount thereof. The award must be based on the evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote, 32 speculative and unsubstantial proof. Consequently, we uphold the CA ruling denying the grant of actual damages. Having said that, we agree with the trial court, however, that petitioners are entitled to moral damages, albeit in a reduced amount. The RTC opined as follows: "This Court agrees with the defendant regarding [its] right by law and equity to protect itself from any fraud. However, such right should not be exercised arbitrarily but with great caution and with due regard to the rights of the consumers. Meralco having a virtual monopoly of the supply of electric power should refrain from taking drastic actions against the consumers without observing due process. Even assuming that the subject meter has had history of meter tampering, defendant cannot

simply assume that the present occupants are the ones responsible for such tampering. Neither does it serve as a license to deprive the plaintiffs of their right to due process. Defendant should have given the plaintiffs simple opportunity to dispute the electric charges brought about by the alleged meter-tampering, which were not included in the bill rendered them. Procedural due process requires reasonable notice to pay the bill and reasonable notice to discontinue supply. Absent due process the defendant may be held liable for damages. While this Court is aware of the practice of unscrupulous individuals of stealing electric curre[n]t which causes thousands if not millions of pesos in lost revenue to electric companies, this does not give the 33 defendant the right to trample upon the rights of the consumers by denying them due process." Article 2219 of the Civil Code lists the instances when moral damages may be recovered. One such case 35 individuals, including the right against deprivation of property without due process of law, are violated.
34

is when the rights of

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral 36 shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, such damages may be recovered if they 37 are the proximate results of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. Case law establishes the following requisites for the award of moral damages: (1) there is an injury -- whether physical, mental or psychological -- clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there is a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on 38 any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. To reiterate, respondent had no legal right to immediately disconnect petitioners' electrical supply without observing the requisites of law which, in turn, are akin to due process. Had respondent been more circumspect and prudent, petitioners could have been given the opportunity to controvert the initial finding of alleged meter tampering. Said the RTC: "More seriously, the action of the defendant in maliciously disconnecting the electric service constitutes a breach of public policy. For public utilities, broad as their powers are, have a clear duty to see to it that they do not violate nor transgress the rights of the consumers. Any act on their part that militates against the ordinary norms of justice and fair play is considered an 39 infraction that gives rise to an action for damages. Such is the case at bar." Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled in Meralco v. CA delinquent customer. The Court said:
40

that respondent is required to give notice of disconnection to an alleged

"x x x One can not deny the vital role which a public utility such as MERALCO, having a monopoly of the supply of electrical power in Metro Manila and some nearby municipalities, plays in the life of people living in such areas. Electricity has become a necessity to most people in these areas, justifying the exercise by the State of its regulatory power over the business of supplying electrical service to the public, in which petitioner MERALCO is engaged. Thus, the state may regulate, as it has done through Section 97 of the Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission, the conditions under which and the manner by which a public utility such as MERALCO may effect a disconnection of service to a delinquent customer. Among others, a prior written notice to the customer is required before disconnection of the service. Failure to give such prior notice 41 amounts to a tort." Observance of the rights of our people is sacred in our society. We cannot allow such rights to be trifled with or trivialized. Although the Court sympathizes with respondent's efforts to stamp out the illegal use of electricity, such action must be done only with strict observance of the rights of our people. As has been we succinctly said: "there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for the 42 right reason." However, the amount of moral damages, which is left largely to the sound discretion of the courts, should be granted in reasonable 43 amounts, considering the attendant facts and circumstances. Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are designed 44 to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a plaintiff 45 at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to obtain a means, a diversion or an amusement that will serve to alleviate 46 the moral suffering the injured party has undergone by reason of the defendant's culpable action. They must be proportionate to the 47 suffering inflicted. It is clear from the records that respondent was able to restore the electrical supply of petitioners on the same day. Verily, the inconvenience and anxiety they suffered as a result of the disconnection was thereafter corrected. Thus, we reduce the RTC's grant of moral damages to the more equitable amount of P100,000. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good in addition to moral, 48 temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. It is not given to enrich one party and impoverish another, but to serve as a 49 deterrent against or as a negative incentive to socially deleterious actions. In this case, to serve an example -- that before a disconnection of electrical supply can be effected by a public utility like Meralco, the requisites of law must be faithfully complied with -we award the amount ofP50,000 to petitioners.

Finally, with the award of exemplary damages, the award of attorney's fees is likewise granted. It is readily apparent that petitioners 51 needed the services of a lawyer to argue their cause, even to the extent of elevating the matter to this Court; thus, an award of P50,000 is considered sufficient. Final Issue: Billing Differential Finally, this Court holds that despite the basis for the award of damages -- the lack of due process in immediately disconnecting petitioners' electrical supply -- respondent's counterclaim for the billing differential is still proper. We agree with the CA that respondent should be given what it rightfully deserves. The evidence it presented, both documentary and testimonial, sufficiently proved the amount of the differential. Not only did respondent show how the meter examination had been conducted by its experts, but it also established the amount of P193,332.96 that petitioners owed respondent. The procedure through which this amount was arrived at was testified to by Meralco's Senior Billing Computer Enrique Katipunan. His testimony was corroborated by documentary evidence showing the account's billing history and the corresponding computations. Neither do we doubt the documents of inspections and examinations presented by respondent to prove that, indeed there had been meter tampering that resulted in unrecorded and unpaid electrical consumption. The mere presentation by petitioners of a Contract to Sell with Assumption of Mortgage does not necessarily mean that they are no longer liable for the billing differential. There was no sufficient evidence to show that they had not been actually residing in the house 53 before the date of the said document. Lorna Quisumbing herself admitted that they did not have any contract for electrical service in their own name. Hence, petitioners effectively assumed the bills of the former occupants of the premises. Finally, the CA was correct in ruling that the convincing documentary and testimonial evidence presented by respondent, was not controverted by petitioners.1wphi1.nt WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed CA Decision is MODIFIED as follows: petitioners are ORDERED to pay respondent the billing differential of P193,332.96; while respondent is ordered to pay petitioners P100,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages, and P50,000 as attorney's fees. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Melo, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur. Vitug, J., abroad on official business.
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