AUG

Constitutional Law 1 (Principles and State Policies)

*sources are linked If you want the Principles only of the following cases, I suggest you read this http://www.scribd.com/doc/21492680/Constitutional-Law-1-File-No-3 <--- this site is where I got the salient points of the cases :) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Preamble Republicanism Manifestations 1. Nemo est supra leges

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919 ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.

Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila Mayor together with the police officer, took custody of 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latter's consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Davao City where they were signed as laborers. A writ of habeas corpus was filed against the mayor on behalf of those women. The court granted the writ, but the mayor was not able to bring any of the women before the court on the stipulated date. Issue: Whether or not the act of mayor has a legal basis. Held: The supreme court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating vice was commendable, but there was no law saying that he could force filipino women to change their domicile from manila to nother place. The women, said the court, although in a sense "lepers of society" were still filipino citizens and such they were entitled to the constitutional enjoyed by all other filipino citizens. The right to freedom of domicile was such a fundamental right that its suppression could considered tantamount to slavery. The supreme court upheld the right of filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the Liberty of abode."Ours is a government of laws and not of men." Salient Points:

Nemo est supra leges is a Latin maxim which means "no one is above the law". The law is supreme in a state. All the authorities and diplomats are subservient to law. The law considers every citizen equally. No one can take law into their hands supposing themselves above law. Government of Law and not of Men Significance of the principle- It is basic that laws must be obeyed by all and applied to everyone rich or poor, lowly or powerful - without fear or favor. The observance of the supremacy of the rule of law by officials, individuals, and the people as a whole is what will sustain our democracy and assure the existence of a truly free, orderly and equitable society.

Sources: Full text of case Case digest http://definitions.uslegal.com/n/nemo-est-supra-leges/ "Tectbook on the Phillippine Constitution" (Hector De Leon) pg. 44 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2. Rule of majority 3. Accountability of Public Officials 4. Bill of Rights 5. Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws 6. Separation of Powers Principle of Blending of Powers Principle of Checks and Balances The Steel Seizure case, 343 US 579, 96 L.Ed. 1153 Synopsis of the case

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), also commonly referred to as The Steel Seizure Case, was a United States Supreme Court decision that limited the power of the President of the United States to seize private property in the absence of either specifically enumerated authority under Article Two of the United States Constitution or statutory authority conferred on him by Congress. It was a "stinging rebuff" to President Harry Truman. Justice Hugo Black's majority decision was, however, qualified by the separate concurring opinions of five other members of the Court, making it difficult to determine the details and limits of the President's power to seize private property in emergencies. While a concurrence, Justice Jackson's opinion is used by most legal scholars and Members of Congress to assess Executive power.

Background The United States was in the Korean War in 1950 when troops from North Korea invaded the Republic of Korea. President Harry Truman sent troops to South Korea without asking for a Congressional declaration of war on North Korea albeit with a United Nations resolution.

President Truman chose not to impose price controls, as the federal government had done during World War II. Instead, the administration attempted to avoid inflationary pressures through creation of a Wage Stabilization Board that sought to keep down the inflation of consumer prices and wages while avoiding labor disputes whenever possible. Those efforts failed, however, to avoid a threatened strike of all of the major steel producers by the United Steel Workers of America when the steel industry rejected the board's proposed wage increases unless they were allowed greater price increases than the government was prepared to approve. The Truman administration believed that a strike of any length would cause severe dislocations for defense contractors and for the domestic economy as a whole. Unable to mediate the differences between the union and the industry, Truman decided to seize their production facilities, while he kept the current operating management of the companies in place to run the plants under federal direction. Truman might have, rather than seizing the plants, invoked the national emergency provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act to prevent the union from striking. The administration rejected that option, however, both from a distaste for the Act, which had been passed over Truman's veto five years earlier, and because the administration saw the industry, rather than the union, as the cause of the crisis. The administration also rejected use of the statutory procedure provided under Section 18 of the Selective Service Act of 1948 that might have permitted seizure of the industry's steel plants on the ground that compliance with this procedure was too time-consuming and the outcome of compliance too uncertain. Truman chose not to go to Congress to obtain additional statutory authorization for a seizure of the steel industry for the same reasons. That left invocation of the President's inherent authority to act in response to a national emergency. The Steelworkers favored government seizure of the plants under any available theory to a TaftHartley injunction against it; Arthur Goldberg, General Counsel for the Steelworkers and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, argued that the President had the inherent power to seize the plants, as well as the statutory authority under the Selective Service Act and the Defense Production Act. The steel industry, on the other hand, appears to have been taken by surprise, as it had apparently assumed until shortly before Truman made his April 8, 1952 announcement that he would take the less risky step of seeking a national emergency injunction under the Taft-Hartley Act instead. However, the industry was, as events showed, ready to act once he announced the seizure by a national television and radio broadcast. Prior history The steel companies reacted immediately, sending attorneys to the home of United States District Judge Walter Bastian within a half hour of the end of the President's speech to ask for issuance of a temporary restraining order. Judge Bastian scheduled a hearing for 11:30 the next day to hear arguments on the motion. Because hearings on emergency motions came before a randomly chosen judge, the hearing the next day was before Judge Alexander Holtzoff, a Truman appointee. Judge Holtzoff denied the motion on the ground that the balance of equities favored the government. The case was then assigned to Judge David Andrew Pine, who heard the steel companies' motions for a preliminary injunction. From a tactical perspective, both sides focused on the wrong issues: the government stressed the ultimate constitutional issue of whether the President had the power to seize the mills in its papers, while the steel companies appeared to be shying away from that issue by focusing on the equities and asking the Court merely to enjoin the federal government from entering into a collective bargaining agreement with the Steelworkers. Judge Pine indicated, however, that he was interested in the fundamental issue of Presidential

power; even so, the steel companies' attorneys continued to steer the discussion back to the equities and the President's statutory power under the Taft-Hartley Act. After the attorney for one of the smaller producers, Armco Steel Corporation, finally challenged the government's right to seize its property without Congressional authorization, Judge Pine then asked the attorney for the government to respond. The assistant Attorney General may have done more harm to the government's case than the steel companies had. Asked by Judge Pine for the source of the President's authority, he offered "Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Article II of the Constitution and whatever inherent, implied or residual powers may flow therefrom". When the Court asked if the government took the position that "when the sovereign people adopted the Constitution, . . . it limited the powers of the Congress and limited the powers of the judiciary, but it did not limit the powers of the Executive", he assured Judge Pine that this was the case. He was, however, unable to name any cases that had held that the President had this power. His presentation committed the Truman administration to an absolutist version of Presidential power that went beyond the administration's own position. Truman's supporters in Congress first distanced themselves from the argument, then spread the message that Truman disavowed it as well. Finally, Truman issued a statement responding to a constituent's letter in which he acknowledged in very general terms the limitations that the Constitution imposed on his power to respond in a national emergency. Two days later, Judge Pine issued an injunction barring the government from continuing to hold the steel plants it had seized. The Steelworkers began their strike within minutes of the announcement of the injunction. The government promptly appealed. It first, however, formally requested that Judge Pine stay his order, and permit the government to resume control of the plants, ending the strike by the Steelworkers. He declined to do so. The government then applied for a stay in the D.C. Circuit. The Court, sitting en banc, granted the government's request for a stay by a five to four vote on April 30, then denied a motion for reconsideration by the steel companies that sought to amend the stay order to bar the government from increasing wages by the same margin the following day. The stay granted by the Court of Appeals was conditioned, however, on the government's filing of a petition for certiorari by May 2, 1952 and only lasted until the Supreme Court acted on that petition. The government filed its petition for certiorari on May 2, only to discover that the steel companies had already filed one of their own. The government renewed its request for a stay. In the meantime, the White House convened a meeting between the Steelworkers and the major steel companies on May 3. Those talks made rapid progress and might have produced an agreement, if the announcement that the Supreme Court had granted certiorari and issued a stay allowing the government to maintain possession of the steel millsbut coupled with an order barring any increase in wages during the pendency of the appealhad not removed any incentive the steel companies had to reach agreement on a new contract with the union. Proceedings before the Court The Court set the matter for oral argument on May 12, 1952, less than ten days later. The government's brief opened with an attack on Judge Pine's application of equitable principles to the facts before him, but devoted much of its 175 pages to the historical records of governmental seizure of private property during wartime, from the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 through Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation and seizure of telegraph and railroad lines to the government's seizure of industrial properties in the First and Second World Wars. The steel industry's brief focused instead on the lack of statutory authority for this seizure,

emphasizing Congress' decision when enacting the Taft-Hartley Act to give the President the power to seek an injunction against strikes that might affect the national economy instead. It denied that the President had any power to seize private property without express legislative authorization, noting that Truman himself had asked for such legislative authority when the United Mine Workers of America went out on strike in 1950. The Court set aside five hours for oral argument by the parties, while allowing the Steelworkers and the railroad unions to speak as amicus curiae. Before an overflow crowd, John W. Davis argued for the steel companies that the President had no powers to make laws or, more particularly, to seize property without Congressional authorization. He explained away his own actions when he had defended the government's seizure of property while he had been Solicitor General in the Wilson administration and urged the justices to look beyond the transitory labor dispute before them to the constitutional principles at stake, closing with Thomas Jefferson's words, slightly misquoted, "In questions of power let no more be said of confidence in man but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution". Justice Frankfurter was the only Justice to interrupt Davis with a question, and only one, during his argument. Truman's Solicitor General Philip B. Perlman had a rockier argument, as the Justices pressed him with questions on many of the points he made. Justice Jackson took pains to distinguish the facts concerning the seizure of the North American Aviation Company in 1941 which he had overseen as Attorney General at the time. Justice Douglas commented that if Perlman were correct as to the scope of the President's powers, then there was no need for Congress. When Perlman attempted to close on a rousing note, reminding the Justices that this was wartime, Justices Jackson and Frankfurter immediately contradicted him, noting that Congress had not declared war. Goldberg, speaking for the Steelworkers, addressed whether the Taft-Hartley Act would have allowed for injunctive relief in these circumstances. The attorneys for the railroad brotherhoods, who were parties to a similar action coming up for review, addressed the President's inherent powers. Davis then gave his rebuttal, using only a few minutes of the hour he had reserved. Even despite the Court's evident lack of sympathy for the broad claims of inherent power made by the government, Truman and many other observers expected the Court to uphold his authority to act in the absence of express statutory authorization. Many commentators predicted that the Court would avoid the constitutional question, while others stressed the background that all of the Justices had in the New Deal and Fair Deal, when the powers of the Presidency had expanded greatly, and the past support of Justices such as Black, Reed, Frankfurter, and Douglas for the expansive application of the President's war powers. As it turns out, most of those predictions were wrong. While Justice Burton harbored fears at one point that he might be the only Justice to vote against the government's position, he was encouraged by his private conversations with other Justices. In the end, the Court voted by six to three to affirm the District Court's injunction barring the President from seizing the steel plants. Majority opinion Justice Black wrote for the majority, although the number of divergent concurring opinions made it clear that he did not necessarily speak for it. Black took, as he often did, an absolutist view, holding that the President had no power to act except in those cases expressly or implicitly authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress. The Korean War effort increased the demand for steel. Disputes arose between steel industry management and labor that culminated in an announcement of a strike by the union. President Truman authorized Secretary of Commerce Sawyer to take possession of the steel industry and keep the mills operating. The Attorney General also took the position that "when the sovereign people adopted the Constitution, it limited the powers of the Congress and limited the powers of the judiciary, but it did not limit the powers of the Executive." Goldberg, speaking for the Steelworkers, addressed whether the Taft-Hartley Act would have allowed for

injunctive relief in these circumstances. The attorneys for the railroad brotherhoods addressed the President's inherent powers. The Government's position is that the order was made on findings of the President that his action was necessary to avert a national catastrophe, which would inevitably result from a stoppage of steel production. Concurring opinions William O. Douglas Douglas took a similarly absolutist approach to the President's assertion of inherent power to cope with a national emergency. Felix Frankfurter Frankfurter avoided the sweeping condemnation of the administration's claims that Black and Douglas had offered. While he would not rule out the possibility that the President might acquire the power to take certain actions by a long course of conduct unobjected to by Congress, he found the statutory history persuasive evidence that Congress had not acquiesced, much less authorized seizure of private property in the absence of a formal declaration of war. Robert Jackson Jackson's opinion took a similarly flexible approach to the issue, eschewing any fixed boundaries between Congress' and the President's power. Jackson divided Presidential authority vis a vis Congress into three categories, ranked in descending order of legitimacy: (1) those cases in which the President was acting with express or implied authority from Congress, (2) cases in which Congress had thus far been silent, and (3) cases in which the President was defying congressional orders. He classified this case as falling within the third category. Harold Hitz Burton Burton likewise held that Congress, not the President, possessed the power to act in emergencies because it had exclusive power to pass legislation. He relied on the language and legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act to find that Congress had not authorized seizure of plants involved in a labor dispute without express legislative authorization. He hedged, however, on whether the President might, in more extreme circumstances, have authority to act. Tom Campbell Clark Justice Clark, who had been Truman's Attorney General for four years before Truman appointed him to the Court, rejected Black's and Douglas' absolutist approach, holding that the President did have some inherent power to act in the case of grave and imperative national emergencies. Clark refused, however, to define the boundaries of that power; in his view the fact that Congress had provided in the Taft-Hartley Act, the Selective Service Act or the Defense Production Act for procedures that the executive could have used, ended the discussion by barring the President from relying on any inherent powers he might otherwise have to choose a solution other than the ones that Congress had allowed. Dissenting opinion Chief Justice Vinson dissented; Justices Reed and Minton joined him. His opinion dealt at some length with the history of presidential seizures; in the oral presentation of his opinion he went out of his way to make a sarcastic reference to the contrary positions that Jackson and Clark had taken when they were the Attorneys General for Roosevelt and Truman, respectively. Rejecting the view that Congress had limited the executive's authority to seize property in this case by providing for different procedures in the legislation it had enacted, Vinson's opinion nonetheless appeared to recognize Congress' primacy in enacting legislation, justifying the seizure in this case as necessary to preserve the status quo so that Congress could act in the future, but mocking arguments based

on the Constitution's provision allowing the President to recommend legislation, rather than to make it himself, as "the messenger-boy concept of the Office". Effects of the decision Within minutes of the Court's ruling, Truman ordered Commerce Secretary Charles Sawyer to return the steel mills to their owners. Sawyer did so immediately. The Steelworkers went out on strike again shortly thereafter. The strike lasted for more than fifty days until the President threatened to use the somewhat cumbersome procedures under the Selective Service Act to seize the mills. Truman was stunned by the decision, which he continued to attack years later in his Memoirs. Justice Black was concerned enough that Truman would take the decision personally that he invited Truman and his fellow Justices to a party at his home. Truman, still smarting from the defeat, was mollified somewhat by Black's hospitality; as he told Black, "Hugo, I don't much care for your law, but, by golly, this bourbon is good". The multiplicity of opinions made it difficult to determine just what the Court had decided as to whether and when the President had authority to act without Congressional authorization. In large part this was the result of the fact that the administration had made a weak casethe evidence of an actual emergency was tenuous, given the substantial stockpiles of steel products in many sectors of the economy at the timeeven weaker by overstating its position and offering incoherent arguments in the early phases of the litigation that turned public opinion against it, while framing the public debate in the most simplistic terms. The decision nonetheless has had a broad impact. It represented a check on the most extreme claims of executive power at the time. It also represented the Court's assertion of its own role in intervening in political questions, as the Court later did in Baker v. Carr and Powell v. McCormack. The Court also applied the Frankfurter-Jackson approach to analyzing Congress' legislative authorization of Presidential action in invalidating efforts by the Nixon administration to plant wiretaps without prior judicial approval, while citing it more generally in support of its decision to permit litigation against the President to proceed in Clinton v. Jones. The high court also relied on Youngstown in Medelln v. Texas, 06-984 (2008). In that case, President Bush had pressured the state of Texas to review the murder conviction of a Mexican citizen who had tortured and raped two teenage girls in 1993, arguing that a 2004 decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) required law enforcement authorities to tell the accused of his right under the Vienna Convention to notify Mexican diplomats of his detention. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that ICJ rulings were not enforceable in the United States, and Bush's actions were unconstitutional. Quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube, Chief Justice John Roberts concluded, "The president's authority to act, as with the exercise of any governmental power, 'must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.'"[2] But the Court drew back from some of the implications of its decision, refusing to rely on Youngstown as authority to review the failed challenges brought against the War in Vietnam and deferring to the Executive's authority over foreign policy in cases such as Zemel v. Rusk. The Court cited Youngstown in the 2006 decision Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. Additional read: http://books.google.com.ph/books?id=kl79WaRCnoC&pg=PA317&lpg=PA317&dq=The+Steel+Seizure+case,+343+US+579,+96+L.Ed.+1153& source=bl&ots=rw9MfWVMJG&sig=tdgQj_DJffsT8MD1C1XmFRunPPg&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Z4gaUJfC62ziQeC1IDADA&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=The%20Steel%20Seizure%20case%2C%20343%2 0US%20579%2C%2096%20L.Ed.%201153&f=false Salient Points:

Principle of Blending of Powers Instance when powers are not confined exclusively within onedepartment but are assigned to or shared by shared by severaldepartments. Principle of Checks and Balances Allows one department to resist encroachments upon itsprerogatives or to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the otherdepartments.

Sources: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Youngstown_Sheet_%26_Tube_Co._v._Sawyer#Background http://www.scribd.com/doc/21492680/Constitutional-Law-1-File-No-3 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Bowsher v. Synar, 478 US 714 Facts Under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, allowable deficit levels were calculated with an eye to eliminating the federal deficit. If the budget exceeded the allowable deficit, across-the-board cuts were required. Directors of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) were required to report to the Comptroller General regarding their recommendations for how much must be cut. The Comptroller General then evaluated these reports, made his own conclusion, and made a recommendation to the President, who was then required to issue an order effecting the reductions required by the Comptroller General unless Congress made the required cuts in other ways within a specified amount of time. The Comptroller General is nominated by the President from a list of three people recommended by the presiding officers of the House and Senate. He is removable only by impeachment or a joint resolution of Congress, which requires majority votes in both houses and is subject to a Presidential veto. Congress can give a number of reasons for this removal, including "inefficiency," "neglect of duty," or "malfeasance." Holding The Congress cannot control how its laws are executed. Since it doesn't possess this power, it can't delegate it to its agents. The Comptroller General is an agent of Congress because it can remove him by a process other than impeachment. The Comptroller General exercises executive power and therefore, the Act is unconstitutional. Reasoning (A) Definition of "executive power." The Comptroller General's function under the Act is the "very essence" of execution of the laws since (1) it entails interpreting the Act to determine precisely what kind of budgetary calculations are required and (2) the Comptroller General commands the President to carry out, without variation, his directive regarding the budget resolutions. Once Congress passes legislation, it can only influence its execution by passing new laws or through impeachment. (B) Impeachment. The Constitution only provides Congress the power to remove executive officers by impeachment. Also, the Constitutional Convention explicitly rejected language that would have permitted impeachment for "maladministration," with Madison arguing that "so vague a term will be

equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate." Thus, Congress can only remove a member of the executive branch through impeachment. White's Dissent Justice White's dissent argued that the act should have been upheld. Determining the level of spending by the federal government is a legislative function, not an executive one, he argued. Even if the power were executive, White did not see anything wrong with delegating that power to an agent as long as Congress can only influence him by a means that is subject to the Presentment and Bicameralism Clause requirements, which the act satisfied, since the Comptroller General can only be 'influenced' by Congress through a joint resolution. Additional Read: http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/478/714/ Synopsis of Rule of Law. Because [the legislative branch in the form of] Congress retained removal authority, he may not be entrusted with executive powers. Sources: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bowsher_v._Synar http://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/administrative-law/administrative-law-keyed-to-strauss/agenciesand-the-structural-constitution/bowsher-v-synar/ -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Senate v. Ermita (E.O.464), G.R. No. 169777 -Requisites of Judicial Review -Legislative Inquiry vs. Executive Privilege -Executive Privilege, defined -Kinds of Executive Privilege -Executive Privilege as applied to an official -Constitutionality of EO 464 FACTS: This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam. The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation. Senate refused the request. On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated that all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance.

Hence, these petitions. ISSUES: Whether or not EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress Whether or not EO 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern Whether or not respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented EO 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation RULING: ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised as the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Salient Points: LEGAL STANDING Standing of the Senate That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public decision-making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation is not disputed. EO 464, however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information that is crucial to law-making. Verily, the Senate, including its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail the constitutionality of EO 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.

Standing of an ordinary citizen It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders and other regulations must be direct and personal. In Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. Requisites for transcendental importance: Establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. ACTUAL CASE/CONTROVERSY The Court finds respondents assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of an actual case or controversy insofar as EO 464 is concerned. For EO 464 does not require either a deliberative withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the President in order to bar officials

from appearing before Congress. As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials invited to the hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for any further event before considering the present case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain from passing on the constitutionality of EO 464. The power of inquiry The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21, Art. VI. But as early as 1950 (the 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision) in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate. xxx That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry...is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation. xxx the power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is grounded on the necessity of the information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof. The power of inquiry is subject to judicial review xxx the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Courts certiorari powers under Sec. 1, Art. VIII. For one...the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result...is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its investigations, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation. Sec. 21, Art. VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or Houses duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Sec. 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. Exemption to power of inquiry Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions falls under the rubric of executive privilege. Executive privilege, defined Schwartz defines executive privilege as the power of the Government to withhold information from

the public, the courts, and the Congress. Similarly, Rozell defines it as the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public. Kinds of executive privilege One variety of the privilege...is the state secrets privilege...on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informers privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.

The principle of executive privilege Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. xxx When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary. Constitutionality of Sec. 1, EO 464 Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Sec. 22 of Art. VI and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Sec. 22, Art. VI xxx The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Sec. 22, Art. VI, the appearance of

department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. Validity of Sec. 2 and 3, EO 464 En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of EO 464 virtually states that executive privilege actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege...is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories of persons. The claim of executive privilege must be accompanied by specific allegation of basis thereof Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested. A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted xxx Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected xxx Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. A useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege against selfincrimination xxx The claim of privilege under Sec. 3, EO 464 in relation to Sec. 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes EO 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress. In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of EO 464 must be invalidated. EO 464 unlawfully delegated authority to the heads of offices in Sec. 2(b) to determine certain information as privileged Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the Presidents authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.

Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exception nature of the privilege. Executive privilege...is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain informations (sic) must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is By order of the President, which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. How executive privilege should be applied in the case of an official xxx when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, afer the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance. Right to Information There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen. Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information. To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive assistance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other governmental officials through various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression xxx The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of EO 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of inquiry. Implementation of EO 464 prior to its publication

While EO 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do not directly apply to people in genera, Tanada v. Tuvera states: The term laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of the law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in courts of justice. Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the challenged order must be covered by the publication requirement. As explained above, EO 464 has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic may question before this Court. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented.

Sources: http://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2008/11/senate-vs-ermita.html Full text of case -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------7. Non-delegation of powers

Phil. Interisland Shipping Ass'n. v. CA, GR 100481, Jan. 22, 1997

FACTS On February 3, 1986, shortly before the presidential elections, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, responding to the clamor of harbor pilots for an increase in pilotage rates, issued Executive Order No. 1088, PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES FOR PILOTAGE SERVICES RENDERED TO FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PORTS. The executive order increased substantially the rates of the existing pilotage fees previously fixed by the PPA. However, the PPA refused to enforce the executive order on the ground that it had been drawn hastily and without prior consultation: that its enforcement would create disorder in the ports as the operators and owners of the maritime vessels had expressed opposition to its implementation; and that the increase in pilotage, as mandated by it, was exorbitant and detrimental to port operations. 4 The UHPAP then announced its intention to implement E.O. No. 1088 effective November 16, 1986. This in turn drew a warning from the PPA that disciplinary sanctions would be applied to those who would charge rates under E.O. No. 1088. The PPA instead issued Memorandum Circular No. 43-86, fixing pilotage fees at rates lower than those provided in E.O. No. 1088. Consequently, the UHPAP filed on January 7, 1987 a complaint for injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, against the then Minister of Transportation and Communications, Hernando Perez, and PPA General Manager, Primitivo S. Soils, Jr. It sought a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the immediate implementation of E.O. No. 1088, as well as a temporary restraining order to stop PPA officials from imposing disciplinary sanctions against UHPAP members charging rates in accordance with E.O. No. 1088.

The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 87-38913, was raffled to Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila which issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the PPA from threatening the UHPAP, its officers and its members with suspension and other disciplinary action for collecting pilotage fees pursuant to E.O. No. 1088. On March 16, 1987, the Chamber of Maritime Industries of the Philippines, William Lines, Inc., Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. and Delsen Transport Lines, Inc., after obtaining leave, filed a joint answer in intervention. On February 26, 1988, while the case was pending, the PPA issued Administrative Order No. 02-88, entitled IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES ON OPEN PILOTAGE SERVICE. The PPA announced in its order that it was leaving to the contracting parties, i.e., the shipping lines and the pilots, the fixing of mutually acceptable rates for pilotage services, thus abandoning the rates fixed by it (PPA) under Memorandum Circular No. 43-86, as well as those provided in E.O. No. 1088. Issues

I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CHALLENGED DECISION OF RTC-MANILA, BRANCH 41, WHICH RULED THAT: (A) CIVIL CASE NO. 87-38913 HAS NOT BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC WITH THE ISSUANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 02-88; AND (B) HEREIN PETITIONERS ARE BOUND TO COMPLY WITH E.O. NO. 1088; II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING CA G.R. SP. NO. 19570 FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION? III. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE NAPOLEON FLOJO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONS FOR CONTEMPT FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AS A RESULT OF THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 05-92?

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the several petitions in these cases are DISMISSED. Salient Points:

The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. When heissued E.O. No. 1088, President Marcos was authorized underAmendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution to exercise legislativepower, just as he was under the original 1973 Constitution, whenhe issued P.D. NO. 857 which created the PPA, endowing it with thepower to regulate pilotage service in Philippine ports. Although thepower to fix rates for pilotage had been delegated to the PPA, itbecame necessary to rationalize the rates of charges fixed by itthrough the imposition of uniform rates. That is what the Presidentdid in promulgating E.O. No. 1088. As the President could delegatethe ratemaking power to the PPA, so could he exercise it in specificinstances without thereby withdrawing the power

vested by P.D.No. 857, Section 20(a) in the PPA "to impose, fix, prescribe,increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees... for the servicesrendered by the Authority or by any private organization within aPort District (Philippine Interisland Shipping Ass'n vs. CA, GR 100481, Jan. 22,1997) General Rule: Potestas delegate non potest delegare Premised on the ethical principle that delegated power constitutes notonly a right but also a duty to be performed by the delegate throughthe instrumentality of his own judgment and not through theintervening mind of another Sources: Full text of case http://www.scribd.com/doc/21492680/Constitutional-Law-1-File-No-3 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Permissible Delegation a. Tariff Powers to the President b. Emergency Powers to the President

First Emergency Powers cases, 84 Phil. 368

Antonio Araneta vs Judge Rafael Dinglasan

FACTS: Araneta is being charged under violation of EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Dinglasan is the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671. 3 other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit. L-3054 is filed by Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from 49-50] pursuant to EO 225. L-3056 is filed by Barredo is attacking EO 226 w/c is appropriating funds to hold the national elections. CA 671 is otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act. All the petitioners aver that CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect hence all EOs passed pursuant to it had likewise ceased. ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased. HELD: CA 671 became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate. Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly. Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation

must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal. Second Emergency Powers cases, 92 Phil. 603

ARTICLE VII DELEGATION OF POWERS Eulogio Rodriguez, SR., ETC., ET AL., petitioners v. Vicente Gella , ETC., ET AL., respondents (92 PHIL. 603 [Feb. 2, 1953]) Ponente: Paras, C.J Facts:Petitioners herein seek to invalidate E.O. Nos. 545 and 546issued on November 10, 1952, the first appropriating the sumof P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and thesecond setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, drought,earthquakes and other calamities. E.O.s were issued by virtueof C.A. No. 671 The Emergency Powers Act. Issue:WON E.O.s Nos. 545 and 546 are valid? Held: NO. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides thatin times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, x x x to prescribe/promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy. The said powers are limited in the prescribed period. It cannot be exercised at any time as the President may want to be.

Salient points: Permissible Delegation The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 which provides for a system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who areconvicted of crime is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) Thatsaid Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2)that it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (3)that it denies the equal protection of the laws. As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning powerexclusively in the Chief Executive. But, probation and pardon arenot coterminous; nor are they the same. In probation, theprobationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is notfinally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entirepunishment which the law inflicts. The Court held that theProbation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of theExecutive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving theirprobationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if theProbation Law had never been enacted. The President may yetpardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of thecourt to order his rearrest and imprisonment. The power to make laws or the legislative power is vested in abicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicamiralNational Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1,

Constitutionof the Philippines. The Philippine Legislature or the NationalAssembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities bydelegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attemptto abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestasdelegata non delegare potest no delegated powers can be further delegated. The rule, however,which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute andinflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned byimmemorial practice permits the central legislative body todelegate legislative powers to local authorities. In testing whether astatute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, itis usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its termsand provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so thatnothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegateof the legislature (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil 56)

(A) Tariff Powers to the President (Sec.28 (2), Art. VI;(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fixwithin specified limits, and subject to such limitations andrestrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and exportquotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

(B) Emergency Powers to the President(Section 23 (2), Art VI)(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limitedperiod and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe,to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out adeclared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn byresolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease uponthe next adjournment thereof. Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of itseffectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in itsnature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved,and its relation to the Constitution. Article VI of the Constitutionprovides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for alimited period." "Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted;bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive induration, extent or scope." The words "limited period" as used inthe Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictivein duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to bean emergency." The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act wouldnot be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new anddifferent law were necessary to terminate the delegation, theperiod for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, wouldbe unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which wasintended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanentlaw,"; for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it would,the repeal might not meet the approval of the President, and theCongress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, thiswould create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate itspowers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall themexcept by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier forCongress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is notright and is not, and ought not to be, the law.

More anomalous than the exercise of legislative function by theExecutive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of itsauthority is the fact that there would be two legislative bodiesoperating over the same field, legislating concurrently andsimultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if theemergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspendedwhile Congress was in session and be revived after eachadjournment, the anomaly would not be limited. Congress

by atwo-third vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by thePresident during congressional recess, and the President in turncould treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress,laws enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic apprehension; intwo instances it materialized. In entire good faith, and inspired onlyby the best interests of the country as they saw them, a formerPresident promulgated an executive order regulating house rentalsafter he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, andthe present Chief Executive issued an executive order on exportcontrol after Congress had refused to approve the measure.What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in thesame paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer.He said he issued the call for a special session of the NationalAssembly "when it became evident that we were completelyhelpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." It is our considered opinion, and weso hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued withoutauthority of law. In so far as it is insinuated that the Chief Executive has the exclusive authority to say that war not ended,and may act on the strength of his opinion and findings inc ontravention of the law as the courts have construed it, no legalprinciple can be found to support the proposition. There is nopretense that the President has independent or inherent power toissue such executive orders as those under review. First EmergencyPowers Cases, 84 Phil 368 After the convening of Congress new legislation had to be approved if the continuation of the emergency powers, or some of them, wasdesired. In the light of the conditions surrounding the approval of the Emergency Power Act, we are of the opinion that the "state of total emergency as a result of war" envisaged in the preamblereferred to the impending invasion and occupation of thePhilippines by the enemy and the consequent total disorganizationof the Government, principally the impossibility for the NationalAssembly to act. The state of affairs was one which called for immediate action and with which the National Assembly wouldwould not be able to cope. The war itself and its attendant chaosand calamities could not have necessitated the delegation had theNational Assembly been in a position to operate. As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutionalprovision, it has to be assumed that the National Assemblyintended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended thatthe Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is necessaryto a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to the President,the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may neverbe repealed by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so,the President may wield his veto. This eventuality has in fact takenplace when the President disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealingall Emergency Powers Acts. The situation will make the Congressand the President or either as the principal authority to determinethe indefinite duration of the delegation of legislative powers, ? inpalpable repugnance to the constitutional provision that any grantthereunder must be for a limited period, necessarily to be fixed inthe law itself and not dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic will of either the Congress or the President.Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President anddid not thereby become a regular statute, it may at least beconsidered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formallydeclaring the termination of the emergency powers. To contendthat the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to produce effect,would lead to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, "whileCongress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it mightnot be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words,it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to takethem back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be thelaw."Insofar as the Congress had shown its readiness or ability to act ona given matter, the emergency powers delegated to the Presidenthad been pro tanto withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546must be declared as having no legal anchorage. We can take judicial notice of the fact that the Congress has since liberation repeatedly been approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and many others purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task theCongress must be deemed to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself and to

withdraw the same from thePresident. Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the 2nd Emergency Powers Cases, 92 Phil 603 President should be allowed to exercise emergency powers for thesake of speed and expediency in the interest and for the welfare of the people, because we have the Constitution, designed toestablish a government under a regime of justice, liberty anddemocracy. In line with such primordial objective, our Governmentis democratic in form and based on the system of separation of powers. Unless and until changed or amended, we shall have toabide by the letter and spirit of the Constitution and be prepared toaccept the consequences resulting from or inherent indisagreements between, inaction or even refusal of the legislativeand executive departments. Much as it is imperative in some casesto have prompt official action, deadlocks in and slowness of democratic processes must be preferred to concentration of powersin any one man or group of men for obvious reasons. The framersof the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful inallowing delegation of legislative powers to the President for alimited period "in times of war or other national emergency." Theyhad thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the dutyof coping with any national emergency by a more efficientprocedure; but it alone must decide because emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hopeand survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotismof all officials and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution

Sources: First Emergency power cases, 84 Phil 368 Second Emergency power cases, 92 phil 603 Salient points -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------c. Delegation to the People d. Delegation to Local Government Units e. Delegation to the Administrative Bodies Power of Subordinate Legislation

Principle of Subdelegation of Powers Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency

G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995 MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, and JOEL D. MUYCO, Director of Mines and Geosciences Bureau, respondents.

Facts : Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development,

and utilization of mineral resources. The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitutionshall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines. and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court. Issue : Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid? Ruling : Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus: Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect. Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State. Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Salient points: Delegation to the People (Sec. 32,Art. VI; Sec. 10, Art X; Sec. 2, Art.XVII; RA 6735);Section 32.

The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enactlaws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registrationof a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislativedistrict must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may becreated, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundarysubstantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of thisConstitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

Delegation to Local Government Units (Art. X; RA 7160);

ARTICLE X The Administrator Section 480. Qualifications, Terms, Powers and Duties. (a) No person shall be appointed administrator unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, a resident of the local government unit concerned, of good moral character, a holder of a college degree preferably in public administration, law, or any other related course from a recognized college or university, and a first grade civil service eligible or its equivalent. He must have acquired experience in management and administration work for at least five (5) years in the case of the provincial or city administrator, and three (3) years in the case of the municipal administrator. The term of administrator is coterminous with that of his appointing authority. The appointment of an administrator shall be mandatory for the provincial and city governments, and optional for the municipal government. (b) The administrator shall take charge of the office of the administrator and shall: (1) Develop plans and strategies and upon approval thereof by the governor or mayor, as the case may be, implement the same particularly those which have to do with the management and administration-related programs and projects which the governor or mayor is empowered to implement and which the sanggunian is empowered to provide for under this Code; (2) In addition to the foregoing duties and functions, the administrator shall: (i) Assist in the coordination of the work of all the officials of the local government unit, under the supervision, direction, and control of the governor or mayor, and for this purpose, he may convene the chiefs of offices and other officials of the local government unit;

(ii) Establish and maintain a sound personnel program for the local government unit designed to promote career development and uphold the merit principle in the local government service; (iii) Conduct a continuing organizational development of the local government unit with the end in view of the instituting effective administrative reforms; (3) Be in the frontline of the delivery of administrative support services, particularly those related to the situations during and in the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters and calamities; (4) Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the governor and mayor, as the case may be, on all other matters relative to the management and administration of the local government unit; and (5) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or by ordinance.

Delegation to the Administrative Bodies1.1.1Power of Subordinate Legislation

The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules andregulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limitedonly to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislativeenactment. The questioned administrative orders are reasonablydirected to the accomplishment of the purposes of the law underwhich they were issued and were intended to secure theparamount interest of the public, their economic growth andwelfare. The validity and constitutionality of Administrative OrderNos. 57 and 82 are sustained, and their force and effect upheld (Miners Assn vs. Factoran, GR 98332, Jan. 16, 1995) . Principle of Sub-delegation of Powers1.1.3 delegatus non potest delegare, one to whom power is delegated cannot himself further delegate that power. Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency or Alter Ego Principle Acts of the Secretaries of Executive departments whenperformed and promulgated in the regular course of business orunless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive arepresumptively the acts of the Chief Executive (Villena v. Secy of Interior, 67 Phil 451).

Sources: Full text of case Case digest RA 7160 (Art. X) Salient points -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Tests for valid delegation a. Completeness Test b. Sufficient Standard Test

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

Facts: Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order No 626-A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The government argued that Executive Order No. 626-A was issued in the exercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for farm work or breeding. Issue: Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process. Held: The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not reasonably necessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see how prohibiting the transfer of carabaos from one province to another can prevent their indiscriminate killing. Retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the transfer of carabeef, after the slaughter of the carabaos, will not prevent the slaughter either.

G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982 GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners, vs. MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice, Respondents. FACTS In 1981, BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129). HELD: The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of

security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. --Legislative standard need not be expressed --Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943

Facts Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, American public opinion initially stood by the large population of Japanese-Americans living on the West Coast, and believed that their loyalty to the United States was unquestionable.[1] Six weeks later, though, public opinion turned against Japanese Americans living in on the West Coast, as the press and other Americans became nervous about the potential for fifth column activity. Though the administration (including the President Franklin D. Roosevelt and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover) dismissed all rumors of Japanese-American espionage on behalf of the Japanese War effort, pressure mounted upon the Administration as the tide of public opinion turned against Japanese-Americans. On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an Executive Order 9066 which permitted the Lieutenant General DeWitt (as head of the military for most of the Western United States) to confine and exclude certain persons from "military areas," regardless of their ancestry or country of citizenship. Over the course of several weeks, LTG DeWitt imposed several public proclamations, which first imposed a curfew upon resident aliens of Japanese descent and upon Japanese-Americans. Then, later orders confined Japanese and Japanese-Americans to Military Area No. 1, where Hirabayashi lived. Then, on May 3, 1942, DeWitt issued an order requiring Japanese and Japanese-Americans to report to offices, where they would be taken to relocation centers. (At the time, the terms "relocation centers," "internment camps," and "concentration camps" were used interchangeably.) The defendant, Gordon Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, was a University of Washington student, who was accused of violating the curfew order, a misdemeanor based upon Executive Order 9066 and a subsequent Congressional statute designation the violation of military orders in Military Area Nos. 1

and 2 a misdemeanor. The Justice Department knew that someone would challenge all of the three substantive elements of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's orders affecting Japanese-Americans: curfew, exclusion, and internment. The FDR administration, and particularly the Department of Justice and Francis Biddle sought out test cases it could use to establish favorable precedent and prepare itself for a case that could challenge the entire internment policy. Hirabayashi was convicted of violating a curfew and relocation order, and his appeal of this conviction reached the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court heard both the Hirabayashi case and Yasui v. United States during the 1942-1943 term, and released the opinions as companion cases on June 21, 1943. The Court upheld the curfew order in both the Hirabayashi and Yasui cases, and the defendants were sent to internment camps. Later developments This case has been largely overshadowed by Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which the U.S. Supreme Court decided the following term. But, though the Korematsu case challenging the exclusion and internment portions of Executive Order 9066 overshadowed the Hirabayashi case challenging the curfew portion of the order, the Court's opinion in Korematsu cited its Hirabayashi opinion, upholding the curfew order. In 1986 and 1987, Hirabayashi's convictions on both charges were overturned by the U.S. District Court in Seattle and the Federal Appeals Court, because evidence arose that the Solicitor General's office had argued Japanese American attempts to aid the enemy in its 1943-44 Supreme Court presentations despite having researched and debunked all the rumored incidents. In 2011, the Acting Solicitor General officially confessed error in that regard. In May 2012, President Obama awarded Gordon Hirabayashi posthumously the Presidential Medal of Freedom, America's highest civilian honor.

Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253 Facts In 1990, President Aquino issued E. O. No. 439 wherein she picked certain provinces and cities, some of which did not participate in the inclusion to the ARMM, to the reorganized to new regions (e.g. Misamis Occidental, whichdid not participate in the ARMM plebiscite, was transferred from Region X to Region XI). Aquino issued said E. O.pursuant ant R. A. 6734, which says: That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in suitable plebiscites shall beincluded in the ARMM. The provinces and cities which plebiscite no vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shallremain in the existing administrative regions. Provided however, that the President may, by administrative determination,merge existing regions. James Chiongbian, a Sultan Kudarat congressman, filed a certiorari prohibition to protest the E.O., claiming that President Aquino had no power to reorganize administrative regions because said provision in R. A. 6734 1) also states that provinces, cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remainthe existing administrative regions 2) the Constitution does not expressly provide the President the power to mergeadministrative regions; in fact Art. 10, Sec. 10 of the Constitution (see II of your outline) prohibits this and 3) even grantingthat the President is allowed to merge administrative regions, there is law setting standard on how it is to be done. Held

Chiongbian is wrong. Reasons: 1)The sentence shall remain in the existing administrative regions, is further qualify by the phrase, Providedhowever that the President may, by administration determination merge the existing regions. 2)Past legislation, particularly R. A. 5345 issued in 1968, authorized the President the help of a Commission onReorganization, to reorganize the different example departments including administrative regions. This showsthat traditional power to reorganize administrative regions has always been lodged in the President 3) The standard is found in R. A. 5345 which states to promote simplicity, economic efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with no goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve service transaction of the public business.

Salient points: Tests for valid delegation Completeness Test Law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions sothat there is nothing for the delegate to do except to enforce it. Sufficient Standard Test Maps out the boundaries of the delegates authority by defining thelegislative policy and indicating the circumstances under which it isto be pursued. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearingwhich may not be dispensed with because they are intended as asafeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifyingcommentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of thiscountry is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of ourfealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. Thisis not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every casefor, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions in viewof the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need toprotect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. Theprotection of the general welfare is the particular function of thepolice power which both restraints and is restrained by dueprocess. The police power is simply defined as the power inherentin the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. By reason of its function, it extends to all thegreat public needs and is described as the most pervasive, theleast limitable and the most demanding of the three inherentpowers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain (Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659)

Legislative standard neednot be expressed Did the President's executive orders and the power delegated tothe military authorities discriminate against Americans andresident aliens of Japanese descent in violation of the FifthAmendment which restrains discriminatory legislation by Congressas amounts to denial of due process? The Court found thePresident's orders and the implementation of the curfew to beconstitutional. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the unanimous Court,took into account the great importance of military installations andweapons production that occurred on the West Coast and the"solidarity" that individuals of Japanese descent felt with theirmotherland. He reasoned that restrictions on Japanese actionsserved an important national interest. The Court ducked the thornyrelocation issue and focused solely on the curfew, which the Courtviewed as a necessary "protective measure." Stone argued thatracial discrimination was justified since "in time of war residentshaving ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greatersource of danger than those of a different ancestry

(Hirabayashi vs US,320 US 81) The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrativeregions have been by the President pursuant to authority grantedto him by law. The choice of the President as delegate is logicalbecause the division of the country into regions is intended tofacilitate not only the administration of local governments but alsothe direction of executive departments which the law requiresshould have regional offices. The regions themselves are notterritorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalitiesand barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces foradministrative purposes." There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislativepower in conferring on the President the power to mergeadministrative regions. The question is whether Congress hasprovided a sufficient standard by which the President is to beguided in the exercise of the power granted and whether in anyevent the grant of power to him is included in the subjectexpressed in the title of the law. On the question of standard. Alegislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply begathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation.With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions,the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy andefficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economicdevelopment and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business." Indeed, as the original eleven administrative regions were established in accordance with this policy, it is logicalto suppose that in authorizing the President to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" in view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces nowconstituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative regions (Chionbian vs. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253)

Sources: Case digest (Ynit vs. IAC) Full text of case

Case digest (de llana vs. Alba) Full text of case Hirabashi vs. US 320 US 81 Chiongbian vs. Orbos 245 SCRA 253 Salient points -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------8. State Immunity (supra) 9. Election through popular will Act of State Incorporation Clause Conflict between municipal law and international law

G.R. No. L-7995

May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents.

Facts: Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as An Act to Regulate the Retail Business was passed. The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner in this case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China was violated according to him. Issue: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. Held: According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided that police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state. --Civilian Supremacy ---

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents. Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review (2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces. The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

--Government to serve and protect the people People to defend the State Separation of Church and State Independent Foreign Policy Nuclear Free Philippines Just and dynamic social order --Salient Points:

Section 6 (Art. 2 of 1987 Phil. Con). The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable. The principle simply means that the Church is not to interfere in purely political matters or temporal aspects of man's life and the State, in purely matters of religion and morals, which are exclusive concerns of the other.

This is not as simple as it appears for the exact dividing line between the respective domains or jurisdictions of the Church and the State has always been the subject matter of much disagreements. Section 7(Art. 2 of 1987 Phil. Con). The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination. The Constitution mandates the State to pursue an independent foreign policy, aware of the unwelcome consequences of a policy characterized by excessive dependence on another country. (a) and independent foreign policy simply means one that is not subordinate or subject to nor dependent upon support of another government. An independent nation rejects foreign dictation and decides for itself what the national interest is and how it is to be promoted and protected. (b) an independent foreign policy, however, it is not one that completely rejects advice or assistance from without. Neither does it mean abandoning traditional allies or being isolated from the international community. Section 8(Art. 2 of 1987 Phil. Con). The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory. The aim of this provision is to forbid the making, storing, manufacture or testing in our country of nuclear weapons, devices or parts thereof as well as the use of our territory as dumping site for radioactive wastes and the transit within our territory of ships or planes with nuclear weapons.

Section 9(Art. 2 of 1987 Phil. Con). The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all. The promotion of just and dynamic social order is accomplished through policies that provide adequate services (in the field of health, education, housing, etc.) promote full employment (see Art. XII Sec. 1; Art. XIII sec. 3 par. 1), and a rising standard of living and an improved quality of life.

Sources: Case digest (Ichiong vs. Hernandez) Full text of case Case digest (IBP vs. Zamora) "Texbook on the Philippine Constitution" (Hector De Leon) pgs. 78, 82, 84, 85 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Social Justice Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726

Facts: Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature, the Director of Public Works promulgated rules and regulations pertaining to the closure of Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a year in prohibition against respondent-public officers. Among others, the petitioners aver that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon constitutional precept on the promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all people.

Issue: Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social justice. Held: Yes. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Salient points: Section 10 (Art. 2 of 1987 Phil Con). The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. SOCIAL JUSTICE according to Dr. Jose P. laurel (in Calalang vs. Williams) "Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic force by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex." Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

Sources: Case digest and Salient points