Dharmakrti on pratyaka Pramavrttika Pratyakapariched, PV 3 : 1-7, 123-133.

English translation: The Heart of Buddhist PhilosophyDinnaga and Dharmakrti: Appendix IV Dharmakrti on Sensation (pratyaka) (Amar Singh, 1984:142-4) Japanese translation available in: : p. 55-68, 202-214 (tosaki_bukkyo_ninshikiron_vol.1: p. 55-68, 202-214)

mna dvividha meyadvaividhyt aktyaaktita | arthakriyy kedir nrtho 'narthdhimokata || (PV 3.1) 1. The means of knowledge is of two kinds, because there are two kinds of objects, as there is or is not a capacity for action towards an object. Hair and such things arc not objects, because there is no reliance on them of the kind that occurs towards objects. sadsadatvc ca viayviayatvata | abdasynyanimittn bhve dh sadasattvata || (PV 3.2) 2. And (also) because of similarity and non-similarity, because of being and not being within the scope of language, and because, when other signs (than the object) are present, intellect occurs with respect to one but not with respect to the other. arthakriysamartha yat tad atra paramrthasat | anyat samvtisat prokta te svasmnyalakae || (PV 3.3) 3. That object with respect to which (purposeful) action is possible is called the ultimate real, whereas the other is the conventionally real. These are respectively the unique particular and the universal. aakta savam iti cet bjder akurdiu | d akti mat s cet samvtystu yath tath || (PV 3.4)

4. If it is argued that nothing has a causal capacity, (we point out that) the causal capacity of seeds, etc. towards sprouts, etc., you may argue that the capacity is regarded to be merely conventional. So be it. ssti sarvatra ced buddher nnvayavyatirekayo | smnyalakae 'da cakurpdibuddhivat || (PV 3.5) 5. If it is argued everything has causal capacity, we reply that there is none in universals, because of the not seeing of the cognition of logical agreement and non-agreement like the cognition of a visible object through the eye.* *Text with Prajnakaragupta reads: It is not seen of the cognition of agreement and non-agreement in the universal characteristic like the cognition of a visible object through the eye. etena samaybhogdyantaragnurodhata | ghaotkepaasmnyasakhydiu dhiyo gat || (PV 3.6) 6. By this (absence of causal capacity in the universal, its effect being mere knowledge) the notions of such things as a pot, upward motion, general characteristic and number are explained due to conformity with such things of the mind as convention, enjoyment, etc. kedayo na smnyam anarthbhiniveata | jeyatvena grhd doo nbhveu prasajyate || (PV 3.7) 7. Hair, etc. are not universal, because there is no desire for them of the kind that occurs towards real objects. In the case of absent things, there is no fault (of their having the features of a universal), because they are grasped as knowables. * PV3: 123-133

pratyaka kalpanpoha pratyakeaiva sidhyati | pratytmavedya sarve vikalpo nmasaraya ||123|| 123. Sensation, which is free of conceptualization (imagining), is established only by means of sensation itself. The conceptualization (imagining) of all (beings), which is cognized individually (subjectively) is dependent on names. sahtya sarvata cint stimitenntartman | sthito 'pi caku rpam kate skaj mati ||124|| 124. One who remains with a tranquil mind, having withdrawn his thought from all (concepts), looks at a visible object with his eye: that thought is born of sensation. punar vikalpayan kicid sd vo kalpaned | iti vetti na prvoktvasthym indriyd gatau ||125|| 125. Then, forming a judgment he knows There was something like my (present) imagining . There is no access of the sense-organ to the situation just stated. ekatra do bhedo hi kvacin nnyatra dyate | na tasmd bhinnam asty anyat smnya buddhyabhedata ||126|| 126. For a particular observed in one place is never seen elsewhere. Therefore, it is not the case that owing to a non-difference in cognitions there exists another, a universal which is separate (from the particular). tasmd vieaviay sarvaivendriyaj mati | na vieeu abdn pravtter asti sambhava ||127|| 127. Therefore, every thought born of sensation has a particular as its object. There is no possibility of the functioning of words

with respect to particulars. ananvayd vie saketasypravttita | viayo ya ca abdn sayojyata sa eva tai ||128|| 128. Particulars have no agreement (with words) because no convention functions: and the object of words may be connected with them (with words, not with particulars), asyedam iti sambandhe yv arthau pratibhsinau | tayor eva hi sambandho na tadendriyagocara ||129|| 129. For when there is a relationship of the form this (expression) is of that (object) , the relationship is between only those two objects, which are imaginings; then it is not within the range of the senses. viadapratibhsasya tadrthasyvibhvant | vijnbhsabhedo hi padrthn vieaka ||130|| 130. Then, because there is no (longer) a discovery (as in sensation) of an object with a clear image, a difference of form in consciousness is what distinguishes objects. cakuo 'rthvabhse 'pi ya paro 'syeti asati | sa eva yojyate abdairna khalv indriyagocara ||131|| 131. Even when an object appears through the eye of which one says: It is other than that only that (conception, imagining) is connected with words, surely not the range (object) of the senses.
avyptendriyasynyavmtrevicrat |

na cnuditasambandha svaya janaprasagata ||132|| 132. Because there is no discovery, that which is not engaged with

the senses merely through the other word and an unexpressed relationship (between word and object) itself is not connected with cognition. manasor* yugapadvtte savikalpavikalpayo | vimho laghuvtterv tayor aikyamvyavasyati ||133|| 133. (If) there were a simultaneous functioning of without-imagining (sensation) and with-imagining (sensation), affecting the mind, (then) there would be bewilderment. Or (If) their functioning were extremely rapid their unity would tend to result (they would appear in the mind to be the same, resulting in the same confusion).