Managing For Socio-Economic Objectives in Catch Share Systems: Identifying Issues, Learning From Experiences, and Exploring Options For New England

Proceedings from
Managing for Socio-economic Objectives in Catch Share Systems: Identifying Issues, Learning from Experiences, and Exploring Options for New England
December 2-3, 2009 Wylie Inn Conference Center Beverly, MA
Compiled and edited by: Laura Taylor Singer Meredith Mendelson Ingrid Irigoyen With contributions from: Kurt Cochrane, Ralph Brown, Theresa Peterson, Mark Lundsten, Merrick Burden, Mike Downs, Ed Backus, Tony Charles, and Michael Pentony
Co-Hosted by: Gulf of Maine Research Institute Meridian Institute
Proceedings: Catch Share Workshop
TABLE OF CONTENT
BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................................3 Mike Pentony, A Brief Overview of the Legal Framework for Fisheries Management: Recent Changes to the Magnuson-Stevens Act ......................................................................4 KEY ISSUES OF CONCERN IDENTIFIED BY WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS ..............7 Catch Share Design Elements ...............................................................................................7 Catch Share Administration Elements.................................................................................8 CATCH SHARES: PERSPECTIVES FROM FISHERMEN ...............................................10 Kurt Cochrane, Pacific Whiting and Gulf of Alaska Rockfish Pilot Program .......................10 Ralph Brown, Pacific Shoreside Groundfish Trawl Program ...............................................10 Theresa Peterson, Alaska Halibut and Sablefish ITQ program, Salmon, Herring, Cod and Tanner Crab Fisheries; Alaska Marine Conservation Council Kodiak Outreach Coordinator ..............................................................................................................................................11 Mark Lundsten, Alaska Halibut and Sablefish ITQ Program...............................................11 CASE STUDIES: CATCH SHARE APPROACHES IN PRACTICE..................................18 Merrick Burden, Pacific Groundfish Trawl Rationalization ................................................18 Mike Downs, Social Impacts of Bering Sea Crab Rationalization Program ..........................20 Ed Backus, Effects on Communities of Catch Shares IFQs: Its All in the Design.................24 Tony Charles, Canadas Atlantic Offshore Groundfish Fishery............................................27 KEY ISSUES DISCUSSED IN BREAKOUT GROUPS .......................................................33 Spillover and Interactions with Other Fisheries ............................................................33 Capitalization and Access 34 Defining Socio-economic Goals and Objectives for New England.................................35 SUMMARY COMMENTS .....................................................................................................35 SELECTED REFERENCES ..................................................................................................37 PANELIST BIOGRAPHIES ..................................................................................................39
BACKGROUND This year the New England Fishery Management Council has taken concrete steps toward catch shares with the transition to sectors in the groundfish fishery and discussions about transitioning additional fisheries are underway. In addition, NOAA Administrator Dr. Jane Lubchenco and other agency leaders have expressed support for the consideration of catch share management for all of the nations fisheries. These steps indicate momentum among decision makers for shifting toward this approach.
I think the challenge is to design them in a way that is specific to the place they are used. There are very legitimate concerns that a lot of fishermen have about catch shares, which boil down to what the initial allocation is and what the rules of trading are... Dr. Jane Lubchenco, NOAA
Meanwhile, questions about the impact catch share programs will have on New Englands fishing communities and economies remain, particularly among members of the fishing community. Existing catch share programs in other regions offer ideas for ways New England might design and implement catch share programs that meet the needs of both our fishing communities and the stocks on which they depend.
What is a Catch Share? "Catch Share" is a generic term used to describe a fishery management program that exclusively allocates a specific portion of the total fishery catch to individuals, cooperatives, communities, or other entities including sectors. The term encompasses more specific programs defined in federal legislation such as Limited Access Privilege Programs and Individual Fishing Quotas. Catch Share Programs Include: Individual Fishing Quota Limited Access Privilege Fishing Community Dedicated Access Privilege Fishery Cooperative Individual Transferable Quota Limited Access System Regional Fishery Association Sector Allocation
Sources: NOAA Fisheries Service/Northeast Regional Office and NMFS Office of Policy
In response to the current need for increased dialogue and learning about catch shares, the Gulf of Maine Research Institute and Meridian Institute hosted a two-day workshop on socioeconomic considerations related to the shift toward catch shares management of New England fisheries. The workshop was held in Beverly, Massachusetts and brought together New England fishermen, scientists, managers, and non-governmental organizations that are working to design the socio-economic elements of catch shares with their counterparts from the North Pacific, Pacific, and Gulf of Mexico regions, as well as Atlantic Canada and British Columbia. This mix of participants provided an opportunity to: identify and discuss socio-economic considerations stakeholders believe should be addressed in the design of catch shares systems; learn about the objectives, design mechanisms, achievements and challenges of existing catch shares programs; Proceedings: Catch Share Workshop 3
and identify potential design elements for catch shares in New England that warrant further discussion by stakeholders and decision makers. Mike Pentony, Sustainable Fisheries Division, Northeast Regional Office, NOAA Fisheries A Brief Overview of the Legal Framework for Fisheries Management: Recent Changes to the Magnuson-Stevens Act In order to set the context for the workshop, Mike Pentony from the Northeast Regional Office of the National Marine Fisheries Service provided an overview of the recent changes to the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) and new initiatives at the national level to encourage the use of catch shares as a management tool for fisheries. The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act was enacted in 1976 and created a national program for the conservation and management of fishery resources of the U.S. to prevent overfishing, rebuild overfished stocks, insure conservation, facilitate long-term protection of essential fish habitat, and realize the full potential of the Nations fishery resources. The MSA established the Regional Fishery Management Councils as stewards of fishery resources with responsibility to develop fishery management plans (FMP) through a public process and involve stakeholders directly in decision-making. The MSA also requires Councils to establish scientific and statistical committees for scientific advice. The National Marine Fisheries Service, on behalf of the Secretary of Commerce, reviews the Council FMP and implements regulations consistent with approved Council FMPs. To be approved, the Councils fishery management plan must be consistent with the 10 National Standards. Some of the key standards include: Prevent overfishing; achieve optimum yield (Standard 1) Based on best available science (Standard 2) Dont discriminate among residents of different states (Standard 4) Importance of fishing communities; minimize economic impacts (Standard 8)
Fishery management plans must also comply with 15 required provisions that include providing measures to prevent overfishing and rebuild overfished stocks as well as identifying, describing, and minimizing impacts to essential fish habitat. Mechanisms for establishing annual catch limits and accountability measures must also be included. Finally, all fishery management plans must comply with other applicable federal laws (e.g. National Environmental Policy Act, Endangered Species Act, etc.). The Councils are required to create a Scientific and Statistical Committee (SSC) that must provide its Council with recommendations for acceptable biological catch (ABC), preventing overfishing, maximum sustainable yield (MSY), and achieving rebuilding targets for each fishery the Council manages. Members of SSCs are appointed by the Council, and may be Federal employees, state employees, academicians, or independent experts, with strong scientific or technical credentials and experience.
The 2007 reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Act requires each FMP to establish a mechanism for specifying annual catch limits. . . such that overfishing does not occur. . . including measures to ensure accountability. Annual catch limits (ACLs) may not exceed fishing level recommendations of [the Councils] SSC. In 2010, the ACL provision will be in effect for stocks subject to overfishing and in 2011 the provision will apply to all others (with exceptions for annual life cycles and international agreements). Once notified that a stock is overfished or approaching an overfished condition, a Council has 2 years to prepare and implement management measures to immediately end overfishing and rebuild affected stocks in as short a time as possible but Not exceed 10 years, unless biological or environmental circumstances, or management under an international agreement dictates otherwise. To address the new provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Act regarding ACLs, accountability measures (AM), SSC reviews and other items, NMFS promulgated revised guidelines on National Standard 1. Published on January 16, 2009, the final rule defines the relevant terms and explains the relationship between terms in Magnuson-Stevens Act (i.e., ABC, ACL, AM) and other relevant reference points such as overfishing limit (OFL), annual catch target (ACT), and control rules. Annual catch limits are overarching catch limits that account for scientific uncertainty to ensure that overfishing does not occur. They cannot exceed the acceptable biological catch. Accountability measures are management measures to prevent ACLs from being exceeded and may be proactive or reactive. Proactive AMs account for management uncertainty, and include setting an annual catch target (ACT) below the ACL. Alternatively, reactive AMs address catch levels that approach or exceed either a target or limit, and include in-season actions (i.e., reducing a possession limit or closing a fishery) and repayment of overages in future fishing years. The 2007 reauthorization of Magnuson-Stevens Act also provides that a Council may submit, and the Secretary may approve, for a fishery that is managed under a limited access system, a
Source: NOAA Fisheries Service, Northeast Regional Office Proceedings: Catch Share Workshop 5
limited access privilege program (LAPP) to harvest fish if the program meets the requirements of [the Act]. An LAPP is a federal permit, issued as part of a limited access system under section 303A of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, to harvest a quantity of fish representing a portion of the total allowable catch that may be received or held for exclusive use by a person. It can include an individual fishing quota (IFQ) but does not include community development quotas (CDQ). The MSA provides that individuals, fishing communities, and regional fishery associations may be eligible for and participate in a LAPP and establishes criteria for the development and allocation of LAPPs. These criteria include fair and equitable initial allocations with consideration of relevant factors. Measures to assist and facilitate participation and prevent excessive shares must also be included. Limited access privilege programs are also subject to cost recovery by the federal government to offset the cost of administration. Unique to New England, the MSA restricts the establishment of an IFQ program such that the Council may only submit an IFQ plan to NMFS if it passes a referendum by 2/3 of those voting in the referendum. Voter eligibility is proposed by the Council and must include permit holders and crewmembers that derive a significant percentage of their total income from the [subject] fishery. If the referendum passes, NMFS notifies Council, who may then submit the proposed IFQ program. A "Catch Share" is a generic term used to describe a fishery management program that exclusively allocates a specific portion of the total fishery catch to individuals, cooperatives, communities, or other entities including sectors. The term encompasses more specific programs defined in legislation such as Limited Access Privilege Programs and Individual Fishing Quotas.
Current Catch Share Programs under the Mid-Atlantic & New England Fishery Management Councils: Surf clam/Ocean Quahog FMP IFQ Program (MA) Golden Tilefish FMP IFQ Program (MA) General Category Scallop IFQ Program (NE, pending) Georges Bank Cod Hook Gear Sector (NE) Georges Bank Cod Fixed Gear Sector (NE) Other Groundfish Sectors (NE, proposed)
Source: NOAA Fisheries Service
In June, the NOAA Administrator created a Catch Share Task Force to assist NOAA and the regional fishery management councils as they consider and implement catch share management programs. The Task Force has 15 members: 7 council members and 8 NOAA staff. There are five objectives of the Task Force: 1. Develop NOAA policy on catch shares; ensure consideration. 2. Support for Councils; empower local fishermen. 3. Achieve best possible environmental & economic performance. 4. Consider organizational changes to NOAA. Proceedings: Catch Share Workshop 6
5. Advice on how to allocate resources; create milestones.

Designing and Implementing Catch Shares: Elements of Design Identify the management goals Define the resource Define the privilege Identify eligible participants Determine transferability rules Assign the privilege Administer the program Elements for Implementation Establish clear goals Set the limit Ensure effective monitoring & enforcement Have a transparent trading platform Create a cost-effective system
Source: Fisheries Leadership Forum, New England Catch Shares Workshop, www.fisheriesforum.org
KEY ISSUES OF CONCERN IDENTIFIED BY WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS There are many opportunities and challenges to designing and implementing catch share systems in New England. Socio-economic issues need to be considered in the development of any catch share program. The workshop was an opportunity to bring voice to those socio-economic concerns and for participants to ask questions of those who had implemented catch share programs. There were several questions raised during the workshop captured below. Catch Share Design Elements Determining Quota Ownership Caps: How can fishery managers balance the benefits of a market-driven system with desired social goals and distributional outcomes? Allowing for Transferability of Quota: What types of transferability restrictions and/or protections have been used (i.e. transparency, price caps, other mechanisms)? How do you allow quota holders to transfer between groups (i.e. sectors or coops)? How do you provide for the ability to transfer quota so the fleet make-up can change in the future (i.e. allow for those who are currently displaced due to past management actions)? Providing Opportunities for New Entrants: Who is allowed entrance, how and when? How do you build opportunity for fishermen to get into the fishery while also limiting access? What tools are available, especially for financing, to provide access in the future? Protecting Community Access: How do you let communities who have lost access get back in the fishery? What mechanisms exist to protect access by various communities? Proceedings: Catch Share Workshop 7
What implications will changing community access have on other fishery-related infrastructure?
Managing the Transition to Catch Shares: What transition mechanisms can be used to reduce disruption during the shift from one system to the next? How have buybacks or other safety nets been used? Establishing Socio-economic Goals and Objectives: At what level of decision-making (i.e. Council, sectors, etc.) and at what point in the process should socio-economic goals and objectives be defined? Have socio-economic goals and objectives been comprehensively defined in areas where catch shares have been implemented, and to what effect? Can you decouple permits from quota with different restrictions to achieve different goals? What is the influence of socio-economic objectives on each other? Does one approach limit or benefit another? Providing Conservation Incentives: How can catch shares create positive ecological incentives (i.e., reduce habitat impacts)? How have other regions struck a balance between capacity of fleet, capacity of resources and fishermens behavior? Incorporating Recreational and Commercial Charter Sectors: How do recreational fishermen and party-charter sectors participate in catch shares? Catch Share Administration Elements Monitoring New Types of Socio-economic Data: What indicators of change to ports/individuals/businesses/etc. should be monitored? What is a useful measure of that indicator? How can this data be collected and processed efficiently? How can socio-economic impacts be monitored over time given the range of variables involved? Anticipating Program Administration: What are the initial costs of setting up catch share programs (with no certainty on what will happen to the value of the New England product)? What systems need to be in place to administer catch accounting and trading and who is responsible for the administration? Considering Modifications Post Implementation: How have other regions made modifications to existing programs? Does the implementation of a catch share system cement a point in time and then change or evolve from that base point? How do you keep a fishery fluid and provide flexibility for adaptations to the system? o Market mechanisms o Non-market mechanisms Proceedings: Catch Share Workshop 8
Integrating Quota Programs: What is the nature of interaction among catch-share and non- catch share fisheries? When catch shares were implemented in other areas did that lead to a shift in all other fisheries to catch shares? Is there a spillover effect in other fisheries? How can you prevent spillover, or direct it to fisheries that can accommodate it? Addressing Other Concerns: How do fishermen with a low initial quota allocation maintain a viable fishing business? Does initial sacrifice by fishermen with low quota allocations translate to reward down the road? How can territorial use rights to fish (TURFS) be used to address socio-economic objectives?
CATCH SHARES: PERSPECTIVES FROM FISHERMEN Kurt Cochrane, Pacific Whiting and Gulf of Alaska Rockfish Pilot Program Kurt started fishing at age nine and has done all types of fishing except long lining. He was eliminated from Bering Sea and California fisheries as a result of their management systems so he now fishes out of Oregon, Washington, and the Gulf of Alaska. He currently runs two boats. Kurt remarked that he generally does not favor ITQs, IFQs, and cooperatives because he thrives on the race for fish. He grew up with the belief that the harder you work the more money you make. However, he noted that the fact remains that there are too many people and not enough fish and things are changing. When the Kodiak rockfish program was implemented, Kurt was very nervous about losing the competition. In retrospect, Kurt believed that the rockfish cooperative has been a good thing because it has changed the way rockfish are managed and fished. In addition, Kurt discussed the gear technology that has also been able to be developed. Rockfish had a large bycatch of halibut (176 mt) prior to implementation of the pilot program. With the use of gear technology, the bycatch is down to 50mt and the remainder of bycatch allocation is used in the sole fishery. Kurt remarked that halibut is a zero retention fishery and being able to fish cleaner enables fishermen to transfer the bycatch to another fishery. Kurt observed that as fisheries are rationalized and the fish are divided among fishermen, it is important to remember that the greater the number of baseline years that are used, the less fish available for everyone else. He noted that perspectives change when looking back two or three years and taking a snapshot to see who in the fishery who would be made whole - captains, crews, and towns. In Alaska, he commented, the rockfish rationalization program was mandated by Congress, yet Congress never took the snapshot. (For additional information see: http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/catchshare/docs/goa_rockfish.pdf) Ralph Brown, Pacific Shoreside Groundfish Trawl Program Ralph grew up in the fish business beginning at age eight. He has fished in the salmon, tuna, and crab fisheries. His first boat was 32 feet and he fished it until he decided to lease it to someone else in order to lease a larger boat for himself. Later, he ran his fathers boat. Ralph has spent time shrimp fishing, but commented that he prefers trawling. Ralph remarked that fishermen partnered with management right from the start on the West Coast because they saw rationalization as an opportunity to manage sustainably. He attended every Pacific Fisheries Management Council meeting from 1984-2005 and ultimately hired a skipper for his boat in 1986 so he could devote his own time to looking after his business interests. He participated in many fishery management processes including the Oregon Ocean Plan, the Pacific Council Limited Entry Program, and the Pacific 10
Fisheries managers tend to plan without looking at the data available or how expensive it is to get the data. New programs are often designed and then managers realize there is not enough money to implement the program.
Council Strategic Management Plan. Ralphs observation from all of those management programs is that Councils tend to plan without looking at the data available or how expensive it is to get the data. He noted that fisheries managers design new programs but then realize there is not enough money to implement the program. However, since the management plan is already developed, all kinds of good stuff is used to make the management plan work. He asserts that in the west coast fisheries the assumptions of the stock assessment groups are more critical then the data that goes into the assessments. Ralph is cynical about the management direction being taken, but supportive of IFQ. (For additional information see: http://www.pcouncil.org/groundfish/gffmp/gfa20.html) Theresa Peterson, Alaska Halibut and Sablefish ITQ program, Salmon, Herring, Cod and Tanner Crab Fisheries; Alaska Marine Conservation Council Kodiak Outreach Coordinator Theresa moved to Alaska in 1982 and worked on a shrimp trawler, becoming involved in halibut and sablefish long lining throughout the years. She started to see potential in the Bering Sea fisheries and realized she needed to be on a bigger boat. Once on a bigger fishing vessel, Theresa was able to combine her crew shares (payment) and buy a boat with which to start fishing around Kodiak. She was able to fish initially by buying limited access permits, which required the owner to be on board (and therefore limited the price of permit) and by working as crew on a halibut and sablefish boat. Theresa watched the dramatic decline of the halibut and sablefish fishery. She observed that there were never any limits put in place and therefore it was a derby fishery that got to the point where some type of management measures needed to be put in place.
Although an IFQ can be a good system for many reasons, the originally designed system needs to remain flexible in order to allow for fixes after implementation. For example, it is important to ensure the opportunity to move into the fishery. These mechanisms should be worked in all catch share systems.
Theresa stated that an IFQ is a good system for many reasons, but that it needs to maintain flexibility to fix the system originally designed. She commented that it is important to ensure the opportunity to move into the fishery and these mechanisms need to be worked on in all catch share systems. Another part of the program that Theresa believes needs work is addressing crew access issues. In the original design of the halibut and sablefish IFQ, she noted, the crewmembers were left out of the allocation equation even though it was their labor on deck that generated the history during the qualifying years. She commented that the IFQ left some crew out of the fishery entirely. Before implementing additional catch share systems, these issues need solutions to maintain viable working waterfronts. To date, they have not. (For additional information see: http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/catchshare/docs/ak_halibut_sablefish.pdf; http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/catchshare/docs/crabrat_program.pdf; http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/catchshare/docs/alaska_cdq.pdf) Mark Lundsten, Alaska Halibut and Sablefish ITQ Program
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Mark started off in the halibut longline (schooner) fishery as a deckhand. The halibut longline fishery is the oldest groundfish fishery in the North Pacific. The fishery was self-limiting for decades primarily because of the difficulty of the work. He always worked on deck, even after he became a vessel owner. He started to see the fishery declining in opportunity, primarily as technological changes such as LORAN and circle hooks made it easier to catch fish. Mark observed that the professional nature of the fishery also declined and as that happened he became more engaged in the management process. Mark commented that individual fishing quotas were considered and rejected for a variety of reasons (entry, bycatch, etc.) for years until the quota system seemed to be the only option for the halibut fishery. After six years of development, the Council submitted a proposal that became the Alaska halibut and sablefish IFQ program. He reflected that the design and implementation of the IFQ program resulted in very contentious debates and disagreements. Mark observed that a large number of fishermen who initially didnt support the program eventually loved it, as the system was more economically efficient and successful for the fishery and the fishermen. While Mark commented that he has always maintained that there were flaws in the program, his evaluation is that the program is the best that could have been done given the circumstances. Mark stated that he benefited greatly from the Alaska halibut and sablefish IFQ program after implementation. He was engaged with his crew and set up a collateral system where they could buy quota. Because of vessel cap regulations, his crewmembers were not allowed to use the quota on his boat, but they could fish on another vessel and use the quota he was helping them purchase. In 2002, after 27 years of fishing, Mark decided to try a second career and left the fishery. His crewmembers at the time have either retired or gone on to other boats. In examination of the program, Mark commented that he would not recommend changing it substantially. Mark described how seabird bycatch was addressed under the IFQ program. He remarked that seabird bycatch became a serious issue in the longline fishery immediately after the Design and implementation implementation of the IFQ program. He remarked that of an IFQ program can be highly contentious and seabird bycatch was a serious issue in the longline fishery often results in major prior to implementing the IFQ program. However, under the disagreements. However, if IFQ, the fleet designed a system that reduced the bycatch to the system is more zero. Mark believes this could not have been done with the economically efficient and race for fish approach that was previously in place. He successful for the fishery noted that the IFQ let fishermen take the time to figure out and the fishermen, some of the best way to address the seabird bycatch issue since they the biggest opponents may were no longer competing with each other to catch fish in a eventually endorse fixed-time opening of a few days or a few weeks. Mark the new approach. asserted that the IFQ saved the fishery as the fishermen would never have solved the seabird bycatch problem under the previous management structure, and the consequences would have been severe. (For additional information see: http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/catchshare/docs/ak_halibut_sablefish.pdf) Discussion Proceedings: Catch Share Workshop 12
Establishing Socio-economic Goals and Objectives: Comment: Ralph, you discussed the importance of establishing goals and who establishes them. What are your thoughts about this? Response: For nine years on the Pacific Fisheries Management Council, Ralph felt the entire period was spent trying to keep fisheries alone on the West Coast. The change in definition of severely overfished in MSA changed the stock status on many stocks so he believes this is one reason why the Council spent so much time trying to keep fisheries alive. Ralph observed that much of what the Council was doing was based on a change of the regulations and what they were managing for and he couldnt give advice on how to address that issue. Ralph believes management has become more complicated because fishermen thought they were the only ones with a stake in the resource. However, he noted that public perspectives of ownership are changing and subsequently this impacts how others react to management options. Ralph commented that the public needs to define those goals and the uses allowed, then provide time for fishermen to react and get used to a new system. His opinion is that currently expectations are changing too often. Allowing for Transferability of Quota Owner Operator Provisions: Comment: Ecotrust held a meeting on Market Design for Limited Access Privilege Programs in 2007, which produced an excellent report (available at http://www.inforain.org/reports/WSP4_Fisheries_Market_Design.html). At that meeting, Mark made two interesting statements about how to design quota programs: 1) any ITQ fishery should be owner operated and the owner should sell when no longer fishing and 2) transferability ought to be strongly controlled. Mark, do you still agree with these statements? Response: Yes, Mark still agrees with these statements. He observed that any fishery always inherits the legacy of the previous management regime and fishermen still inherit them when moving to a catch share system. In Alaska, input controls are still in place. Mark stated that the overriding fishery management system in Alaska is the legacy of limits. He asserted that when Alaska became a state, one of the reasons was to eliminate outside ownership of salmon traps. Local citizens were unable to make a living, so they prohibited outside owners after statehood was established. The Alaska Halibut Commission started with quotas in the 1920s and that system has been in existence since that time. When the quota is caught, the fishery is closed. Mark observed that when the IFQ system was being discussed in Alaska, it was within a community that is used to limits and sustainable approaches (i.e. Salmon Commission and Halibut Commission). In the salmon fishery, there is an owner-operator provision and fishermen are limited to one area. For the halibut and black cod fishery, one early proposal was for owner operators only. But enough of the vessel owners hired skippers so it wasnt implemented. However, Marked noted that the pollock fishery is a very different situation because you cant catch pollock with small boats. In Marks Proceedings: Catch Share Workshop 13
opinion, community approaches are not inherently good. He feels the best approach is to honor those who have a hand in the fishery and, in the current IFQ system in Alaska, one way to do this is to eliminate grandfather rights, which allow grandfathered first generation IFQ-holders essentially to remove themselves from the fishery but to lease quota. In this way they use IFQs primarily as a financial instrument, like a stock or a bond, or a rental property, and not as a personal stake in the fishery, its communities, and its future. Comment: Are there any downsides to transferability? Response: Kurt stated that ownership caps are important or large entities will eventually own all of the quota. He noted that a cooperative allows each fisherman to bring in his amount of quota. Some cooperatives manage the quota on volume and may even give it to two vessels while others manage at the individual level. The cooperative can stop any one entity from fishing and then the rest of the members can fish these fish while the quota owner stays ashore. Kurt reminded participants that the Alaska rockfish cooperative program is a pilot program. He noted that fishermen cant buy and sell quota, but they can trade or stack quota. Response: Tony asserted that the question of transferability is key. He observed that there are spin-offs that come to communities and these are lost when quota is sent out of a system. Response: Ralph commented that unfortunately there are conflicting goals. He believes that a region cant go through big management changes without affecting communities. Response: Mark suggested that transferability in season may be a good thing, but that leads directly to the leasing problem and needs to be seriously considered. He stated that sometimes you just need to face what you can get out of a new system when a fishery faces collapse. He also recommended that a built in buy-back system intrinsic to IFQs the fishermen themselves buy back the excess or unnecessary effort is one reason to consider IFQs. It is NOT a mandatory buy-back system but rather one that is completely determined by the fishermen, their plans and the market. Mark outlined the advantages to ownership of quota. He believes that if you have ownership you have an automatic adjustment on what level of effort the fishery needs and the market will take care of making adjustments. He noted that British Columbia has experienced problems because of having non-owner operators. In his judgment, it is not that any of these things will produce inherently good or bad outcomes, they are just tools. They can go bad, or they can work well. He has observed how people often mix up a conservation problem with an allocation problem. He commented that fishermen should only live on the interest and dividends of a fish stock, and not on the principal, or they risk depleting it. If that happens, all the other management tools become pretty irrelevant. In Marks opinion, IFQs are not a conservation measure; they require conservation but they are not conservation. He emphasized that an IFQ fishery can be overfished and it is not a panacea but a tool.
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Protecting Community Access: Comment: We are talking about diversity of size, geography, and fleet capacity but there still could be mechanisms to unify those themes. Are there mechanisms that can help protect community access? Response: Theresa agreed with Mark about the need for the owner to be onboard. She noted that in the sablefish fishery, a large percentage of the fishery is skippered while the owner isnt present on the boat. She shared that she is now seeing fishermen undercutting each other. Theresa observed that leasing has grown more and more since there are no controls on lease rates. Comment: How are owner-on-board provisions monitored? Response: Theresa reported that there is a card system managed out of Juneau that is based on landing events. Comment: It is unclear why we are having such a lengthy discussion about the need for owneroperator provisions, because New England has many owners who do not operate their vessels. Is owner-operator a historical fishing practice in your regions or is this a change? Response: Theresa responded that the halibut and sablefish fishery was largely owner operator prior to implementation of the quota system. She noted that when the fishery went to catch shares, the structure began to change and within a couple of years many fishermen were leaving Kodiak and hiring skippers to fish their quota, taking revenue away from the community. In addition, she reported that people are holding onto the quota, which raises the value of the quota and makes it inaccessible to some. In her opinion, the system may not need to be 100% owner operator, but some level of owner-operator vessels should be considered. She remarked that every design will be different in the fisheries. Response: Mark replied that conservation is vital, the most important fisheries management priority, and that without something like an owner/operator provision, that conservation priority could be jeopardized. IFQs are a means to connect a person to the fishery with a long-term stake in that resource. If IFQs become highly profitable, and available to non-fishing owners (dentists retirement plans, or some such thing), then IFQs can become strictly an investment instrument, like a stock or a bond. In that case, owners who are far away, and mostly ignorant of fisheries issues could compromise the knowledge of and the commitment to fisheries conservation. He feels that those that have their hands on the resource have a better idea than others. His belief is that the owner-operator provision helps preserve communities. Mark asserts that if the fishery has a tradition of owner-operator then it is important to be included in the new system. Response: Kurt stated that not all fishermen are in favor of owner-operator provisions. He remarked that people knew that effort would shift immediately away from historical communities when the rockfish pilot program was implemented. In reality, quota Proceedings: Catch Share Workshop 15
shifted up to Seward. He noted that eventually quota started to come back to Kodiak but the shift did happen. He also mentioned how the rockfish pilot program struggled to find ways to address new entrants. His observation is that trawling isnt an entrylevel fishery. Although trawling allows for new entrants, given the vessel sizes used to prosecute this fishery, it is not entry-level fishing. He acknowledged that some fishermen do sell out to big corporations, which may be what people should consider restricting. His recommendation was that fishermen should be selling to the crew if they dont want to see the mom and pop aspect of the fishery disappear and perhaps this is something to protect. Providing Opportunities for New Entrants: Comment: Ralph pointed out that allowing new entrants into the fishery is not simply a matter of reducing the price of quota. For example, the minimum cost to enter the Pacific groundfish fishery is around $400-500K and that is not going to be made as a crewmember. He stated that the other concern to consider is how to get fishermen the experience they need to survive in the fishery. In the Pacific, groundfish may be in areas where rockfish are also located. Ralph remarked that new entrants will need to know where not to go in order to avoid bycatch issues or they may shut out and not survive in a the fishery. He contends that experience may be a bigger barrier to new entrance then cost. Of note is that accountability measures call for every boat to have an observer and every trip to be counted against the annual catch limit. Ralph argued that discarding will not work if the Pacific groundfish program is implemented as planned and he believes this will be an eye-opener for many fishermen. Considering Modifications Post Implementation: Comment: Do you have time-area closures, permanent closures, or other closures in the Pacific groundfish fishery? Response: Ralph responded that rockfish live at 50-150 fathoms and, therefore, everything up to 200 fathoms is closed to fishing. In addition, he noted that there are essential fish habitat closures. Ralphs thinks the rational for closures is actually diminished when the ITQ system is implemented but he suspects the Council will probably not eliminate the closure because everyone will recall a different reason why the Council closed the areas in the first placed. Response: Kurt noted that there are areas in Alaska where trawling is prohibited but the rest is open to fishing. He predicted that West Coast canary rockfish closures will probably remain but they may be reduced in size. However, he noted that the issue for fishermen is still a low quota. Kurt remarked that the beauty of sectors is that trading is allowed at the end of the season to balance out the quota (e.g. bycatch community pooling). He noted that this may be the way fishermen can propose eliminating those closed areas.
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Determining Quota Ownership Caps: Comment: Are ownership caps good or bad? How do you do it effectively if you do it at all? Response: Kurt responded that ownership caps are good because they keep the fishery and traditions alive. His observed that when corporations control access no one else can come into the fishery. He contends that if a fishery keeps to a mom and pop organization then new people can come into the fishery. However, he acknowledged that there are always maneuvers by fishermen in any fishery management program to get around the limits of the system. Response: Ralph agreed that ownership caps are good and stated that if the fishery management system encourages consolidation of catch in a few geographical areas and limits landing ports; there will be greater adverse community impacts. He noted that the issue is the tradeoff between efficiency and the number of people participating in the fishery. And Ralph observed that everyone has an opinion on where that tradeoff should be established. He believes that having more people involved rather than less people protects more communities. Response: Theresa remarked that it is important to maintain some controls on opportunity and diversity to help slow down consolidation. For example, in the halibut and sablefish IFQ, fishermen can only own two blocks in a certain area, which helped slowed down consolidation. There are also vessel classes to avoid having varying vessels sizes competing against each other. For example, D class quota is for vessels up to 32 feet and is least valuable. Response: Mark noted that owner-operator provisions preserve fishing traditions and keep communities stronger. Although a larger level of quota goes on to market measures, he thinks large corporations would purchase the entire quota if they could.
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CASE STUDIES: CATCH SHARE APPROACHES IN PRACTICE Merrick Burden, Environmental Defense Fund (mburden@edf.org) Pacific Groundfish Trawl Rationalization Overview The Pacific Coast Groundfish Fishery (PCGF) is a multi-species fishery constrained by weak stock management conditions with many healthy stocks left unharvested. In 2003, the Pacific Fisheries Management Council (PFMC) initiated development of a new fisheries management program that covered the traditional multi-species trawl fishery and the three sectors pursing Pacific whiting. The PFMC elected to adopt an IFQ program for the shoreside whiting fishery and the traditional multi-species trawl fishery, while adopting harvest cooperatives for the two at-sea whiting fisheries. The plan also imposes individual accountability through 100% at sea monitoring and dockside monitoring. The PFMC is currently working on the final recommendations for the trawl rationalization and IFQ amendments for groundfish with an anticipated implementation date of January 2011. Selected Expected Outcomes 1. More Selective Fishing and Increased Revenues: Experimental fisheries operating like an IFQ have shown that individual accountability will cause fishermen to more selectively target healthy species while avoiding weak stocks, ultimately increasing revenue to the fishery. 2. Fleet Consolidation with Greater Earnings: An IFQ program will result in fleet consolidation with fewer captain and crew jobs, but greater earnings for those left in the fishery. The market tends to move quota and fishing activity to the highest return. However, this return does not always align with social issues (i.e. community effects and effects on second generation harvesters). 3. Community Impacts: Differential community effects are possible as the market moves quota to the highest return. Due to individual accountability, fishermen or quota will move to avoid regionally distinct weak stocks. This may result in loss of fishing activity in adjacent communities. The objectives of those holding quota may or may not include some broader social objectives. 4. Increase Cost of Entry: There is predicted high cost of entry for second-generation fishermen as quota prices escalate.
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Components of Catch Share Mechanisms The Council adopted (or has currently under development) the following mechanisms to address socio-economic issues of concern: Accumulation Limits: Limits on quota control and the amount of quota that can be assigned, or used, by a vessel. This preserves relatively diverse ownership and can provide a limit on fleet consolidation. Adaptive Management Program Quota Set-Aside: A portion of the quota (10% for Pacific groundfish) is set aside in a trust by NMFS and allows for temporary distribution of quota to communities or second generation harvesters, free of charge or at no cost. This provides communities or new entrants the ability to generate revenue and gradually increase quota ownership and fishery access through the revenue generated by the Adaptive Management Quota. Community Fishing Associations (CFA): A CFA board may be created that takes on a set of objectives that are representative of the community, not just a single quota holder. The CFA may be required to be comprised of certain types of members from the community. Adaptive Management Program quota could be allocated temporarily to these associations to get them started. CFAs could exceed accumulation caps, if their operating agreement includes certain social objectives. Quota Ownership Eligibility Requirements: The PFMC considered quota ownership eligibility requirements such as owner on board provisions, limiting ownership to those with a tie to the industry, etc. However, it was difficult to specify these eligibility requirements, so none have yet to be implemented. Summary The Pacific Coast Groundfish Fishery rationalization plan has not been implemented so the impacts of this catch share system are unknown. However, on the Pacific Coast, a marketcentric catch share would be expected to result in several unintended social consequences. The PCGF rationalization plan calls for several measures to counter these potential impacts, which constrain or counter the markets influence in order to: Help protect disadvantaged communities or processors; Assist second generation fishermen; Help retain a relatively diverse quota ownership and may limit some fleet consolidation; and Allow for community empowerment. These measures still retain the individual accountability provisions of the plan, which is the core element to the program. (For additional information see: http://www.pcouncil.org/groundfish/gffmp/gfa20.html)
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Mike Downs, AECOM (mike.downs@aecom.com) Social Impacts of Bering Sea Crab Rationalization Program Overview Prior to rationalization, the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) crab fishery management program set a biologically determined quota for all participants with a common starting date and a common end date when the quota was caught. This created a derby or Olympic-style fishery leading to a race for fish. This system resulted in a tragedy of the commons which was economically precarious for participants. The season was compressed resulting in a derby fishery that stranded capital and created serious safety issues (e.g. Deadliest Catch reality television program). There were also product handling and market issues. The North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC) developed the BSAI Rationalization Program over a six-year period. The desired outcomes for the program were: Economically rationalize the fishery; Slow down and spread out the fishery to foster increased economic returns; Economically stabilize participation; and Improve safety. Components of Catch Share Mechanisms The NPFMC adopted a complex program designed to balance the interests of several groups who depend on crab fisheries - vessel owners, processors, captains, crew, and communities. The program is based on a limited access system with several different types of shares that are allocated. The key elements of the program include: Individual Fish Quota: Shares are allocated to catcher vessels and based on the Pacific experience with Alaska halibut and sablefish IFQ. Each year these shares yield an exclusive harvest privilege to the quota holders. The quota holders can choose to harvest these annual privileges individually, or as part of a fishery cooperative. Processor Quota/Individual Processor Quota (PQ/IPQ): Congress provided specific authority to NMFS to allocate processing quota shares. Each year a portion of the annual harvest privilege issued to catcher vessel owners must be delivered to processors with matching shares. An arbitration system administered by an independent third party ensures that equitable price and delivery terms are maintained between harvesters and processors. Community Development Quota (CDQ): Community interests were addressed by including CDQ allocations and regional landing and processing requirements, as well as an opportunity for communities to exercise a right to purchase processor shares prior to their sale for use outside of a community.
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Fishing Cooperatives: The creation of cooperatives is based on BSAI Pollock Cooperatives that were established under the American Fisheries Act in 1998. Quota holders can harvest their annual allocation individually or as part of a cooperative. Vessel Buyback: A vessel buyback program was implemented in parallel with the other catch share mechanisms to reduce capacity in the fleet. The NPFMC has adopted modifications to the program over time that include changes to the operation of the arbitration system, expanding the ability for processors to consolidate operations in remote facilities to address operational efficiencies, and modifying the allocations of crew quota shares. Specific Community Protection Measures There were several components of the crab rationalization program to address community impacts. In this case, there were inefficiencies engineered into the system to achieve social and policy goals. These included regionalization (landing requirements) that were designed to retain processing within a region. Mechanisms were also established to limit the movement of processing quota. Communities were granted the right of first refusal to purchase the quota before it was sold outside the community. In addition, catcher vessel owner (CVO) A and B shares, as well as captain and crew shares, were allocated to address community issues. Characterizing Socio-economic Changes A review of the BSAI crab rationalization program was conducted to objectively measure the effects on vessel owners, captains, crew, processors, and communities. Due to confidentiality restrictions that require four or more entities to be aggregated in order to disclose the data (and only one community met this requirement) the review focused on qualitative measures. Both preand post-implementation characterizations were conducted via fieldwork. Factors reviewed included an assessment of the locally present sectors, the level and nature of engagement in the fishery, the relative local dependency on the fishery, and the relative local diversification opportunities. There were eight communities included in the review. Each community started with a different set of characteristics and each was impacted differently. These community impacts were driven by community specific fishery attributes and the larger community socio-economic structure. 1. Unalaska/Dutch Harbor: The harbor was a major processing and support center for crab. As a result of rationalization, the percent of processing experienced an increase, but there was a change in nature of support services. Catch shares were also divested to Atka and away from the community. 2. Akutan: Both processing and community developed quotas were part of the Akutan crab fishery. The fishing crews in Akutan experienced negative impacts from the crab rationalization program. 3. King Cove: There were multiple sectors and a smaller scale crab fishery in King Cove. The new rationalization program resulted in crew issues for non-CDQ crew. There were Proceedings: Catch Share Workshop 21
4.
5. 6.
7. 8.
also changes in the fleet with regard to both support and revenues. Finally, there was local divestiture of shares within the community. Sand Point: Although not a center for processing the crab fishery, the Sand Point community had historic engagement with the fishery. After implementation of the program, there was a loss of crew positions for community members. Adak: Adak is a developing community in Alaska. The rationalization program resulted in a processing reversal and direct allocation of crab harvesting quota. St. Paul: This community is part of the North Region and a processing center for crab. Under the new program, St. Paul experienced direct benefits due to regionalization success. St. George: Also part of the North Region, St. George is not a processing center. However, the community benefited indirectly from regionalization success. Kodiak: This is a multi-sector community with a large harvest sector. Kodiak experienced a direct decline in its fleet, but Catcher Vessel Owner (CVO) percentage increased. There was also a negative impact on crew due to lost employment and there was disruption in the support system.
The BSAI crab rationalization program resulted in a decrease in the number of fishing vessels across both fisheries. In the Bristol Bay red king crab fishery, the average annual fleet from 1998 through 2004/2005 was 249 vessels. That number was reduced to an average annual fleet of 85 vessels for the 2005/2006 - 2006/2007 fishing seasons. Similar results were experienced in the Bering Sea snow crab fishery. The average annual fleet from 1998 through 2004/2005 was Proceedings: Catch Share Workshop 22
recorded as 206 vessels. However, this number dropped by 64% to an average annual fleet: of 74 vessels 2005/2006 - 2006/2007. Although the revenue stream from landings taxes remained relatively unchanged, there were specific harbor revenue losses experienced due mainly to crab pot transfer and storage. In general, the communities experienced less pronounced peaks and valleys in community services and services improved for transients and residents. The foundation of the local support services was an inefficient system. After the crab rationalization, there were changes in the busy and slow periods that lead to changes in seasonal employment. This was in response to consolidation and diversification. Summary The BSAI crab rationalization program resulted in changes in the fundamental nature of the fishery. From the crew perspective, there are far fewer crew openings available. However, for those crew that remain in the fishery, there is a greater economic return but longer fishing season. Although there are fishing jobs left, they are sometimes incompatible with other opportunities pursued during non-fishing seasons, which makes it difficult to make an annual livable wage. Prior to rationalization, some community members would go out on crab boats, and then return to the community and work construction, small-scale fishing, subsistence, etc. Their preferred lifestyle was to participate in various jobs throughout the year. By changing to a fishery that spreads out the season for a longer time (even if more profitable), it often conflicts with other jobs. There are fewer fishermen left in the fishery and the job is different, creating changes in lifestyles. There is a perception among crew that crab fishing now provides less of a return per unit of time away from home. Some members of the fishing community have a philosophical opposition to privatization of a natural resource. (i.e. commodity nature of individual quotas and the creation of wealth). Regardless, there is an understanding of crew progression from the deck to the wheelhouse, which was not apparent before the system went into place. Processor quota ownership was also established which recognized the investment of processors in the community and awarded quota without harvest. Finally, the program allows for entry-level opportunities that were not available previously. (For additional information see: http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/catchshare/docs/crabrat_program.pdf)
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Ed Backus, North Pacific Fisheries Trust/Ecotrust (ebackus@ecotrust.org) Effects on Communities of Catch Shares IFQs: Its All in the Design
A subsidiary of Ecotrust, the North Pacific Fisheries Trust provides financing to individuals, community organizations, quota entities, and businesses that share and meet strong community equity, ecosystem conservation, and economic development goals. The trust helps community members acquire and manage fishery assets including licenses, permits, quotas, and distribution rights. Potential Costs for Entrance into an ITQ Fishery Entrance into a fishery can be expensive. By way of example, a 26 years old fisherman with 15 years of experience who wants to be an owner/captain in St. Petersburg, Alaska has some significant costs. St. Petersburg is one of the most successful fishing communities in southeast Alaska. The cost for a seine boat, gear and permit for salmon is roughly $500k, and salmon is not a quota fishery. Halibut quota in Alaska costs approximately $24-29/lb. The dock price for fish fluctuates, but what drives the price for quota?
The price/earning ratio for quota is inflated. There is a significant disparity between the price of quota and the potential earnings - roughly 4 or 5 to 1. For the halibut IFQ, there is an inverse relationship with the prime interest rate between the quota and ratio of ex-vessel price to IFQ market value. It is hard for new entrants to get into the fishery because there are different perceptions of what quota costs are. Proceedings: Catch Share Workshop 24
There are at least two design elements for ITQ fisheries that can greatly impact the price/earnings ratio. Effects of Leasing Leasing by retired, initial issue owners of quota shares generates a large amount of cash. Approximately 45-55% of initial recipients of quota shares leased their quota. This is an initial design feature that will sunset with this first generation of owners (second generation owners may not lease). This additional influx of cash allowed these initial quota owners to buy even more quota, and very few were capped in holdings. This indicates that more consolidation may happen under this scenario. These buyers are willing to pay higher prices, as the cost basis of total quota share holdings is very low. The leasing of quota shuts down periodic trading. Effects of Gifting Gifting of quota shares cuts the cost basis of acquiring new quota shares substantially, creating a major competitive advantage for further accumulation of quota shares by the recipient. On the other hand, gifting usually comes with an implied revenue commitment of at least 50-70% to the giver of the quota shares. Thus the price/earnings ratio is at least 25% better for the recipient of a gift. Although the new quota could be allocated through an auction system rather than giving the new quota for free, allowing retirees to lease quota is affecting non-participating fishermen the most. The ability to access more unblocked quota and free up funding is a more important driver than initial issuance of quota at zero cost. Example Debt Load for New Entrants into an ITQ Fishery The significant debt load for the next generation of entrants into an ITQ fishery severely restricts or prohibits completely the number of new entrants. For example, to purchase 25,000 pounds of halibut quota shares at $24/lb. would cost $600,000. If a new entrant could acquire a loan from the National Marine Fisheries Service at 30% down, the cash upfront required would be $180,000. The remaining debt would be $420,000. At 8% interest for 30 years, payments would total $1.12M including principal and interest (interest of $700k, which is 166% of the principal.) Designing Community Trusts to Address Socio-economic Issues Community trusts are authorized under the Magnuson-Stevens Act as Regional Fishing Associations (RSA), Fishing Communities, or Community Fishing Associations (CFA). Precedent has been established in Alaska through the use of Community Development Quota (CDQ) and Community Quota Entity (CQE) programs. The Community Trust functions like a land trust by holding assets in the public interest. The aim of the Trust is to keep quota in communities for residents to maintain vibrant fishing communities. For example, one community trust uses a point system based on community incentives to loan funds to new entrants. The Trust leases quota at low rates, with an overhead rate of 8-12%. A portion of the community quota can also be held as a risk pool or insurance against possible by-catch overages. It is important to cap the potential quota that could be allocated to any single community trust. Proceedings: Catch Share Workshop 25
Allocating 10% quota to communities can provide geographic incentives, but it doesnt have to be 10%. For example, a system could be designed to grandfather 70% of the remainder and 20% to an auction, but the issues around these decisions are political. Revenues should be returned to pay for monitoring, etc. Auctions can be performance based by including considerations such as crew wages, socio-economic benchmarks, etc. As a result of performance, fishermen would get back a percentage of this quota (e.g. 10%) and would only have to buy 5% back at auction. Currently, there is more demand for community holding quota by potential lessees, which is mitigated with a point system that is very transparent and cyclical. Its a very equitable system based on performance, versus a first come first serve or a lottery system. This community defined their goal as helping new entrants so the system is designed to lower the score and limit the ability to lease quota as individuals acquire quota ownership. Summary: Catch Share Design Solutions 1. Allocate to Communities Upfront: It is important to allocate quota to communities upfront. The CDQs in Alaska were allocated quota during the initial allocation and they are currently thriving multi-million dollar economic development community engines. On the other hand, the CQEs have to buy quota and they are having a difficult time making a profit due to the high debt load. 2. No Leasing by Retirees (Initial Quota Holders): The designers of Alaska halibut IFQ have acknowledged that allowing leasing of quota by retirees has inflated the price of quota and has a negative impact. 3. Grandfather a Portion of the Catch History (Active Vessels) 4. Allocate a Portion of the Quota for a Fixed Term (15 years): This would allow quota to be brought back into the market and made available to new entrants. However, community-based quota should be allowed to hold perpetual ownerships. 5. Require Performance-based Indicator Review: If quota is for a fixed term cycle, a performance review should be included in the design with specific indicators that ensure social, economic, and ecological accountability of the quota holders. This fosters both good business and community stewardship. (For additional information see: http://www.ecotrust.org/npft/)
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Tony Charles, St. Marys University, Halifax, Nova Scotia (tonycharles@smu.ca) Canadas Atlantic Offshore Groundfish Fishery Background Canada has used Total Allowable Catch (TAC) as a fisheries management measure in the groundfish fishery for over 30 years. The TAC is allocated for specific fleet components, but is not further subdivided. In the early 1990s, not long after the cod collapse in Atlantic Canada, the ITQ fishery was being formed for one portion of the fishery fleet, but the small boat fleet adopted a community-based approach. The offshore groundfish sector is comprised of corporate quotas and the new management system has led to significant waste of fish at sea. The mobilegear groundfish sector was allocated ITQs that were meant to be held by individual fishers. However, approximately six companies now hold the quota, which has had negative impacts elsewhere in the fishery and on the coastal economy. Of the fishermen who didnt want the initial proposed ITQ approach, roughly 80% wanted to go to a community quota. The fixed-gear sector implemented community quotas (i.e. fishing rights held by the fishermen of each community or placed based catch shares.) Mechanisms to Address Community Needs: Canadas Community Quotas Under the community quota approach, the communities are defined as stretches of coastline (~100 miles) and are not necessarily distinct communities, but connected to counties. The system is based on subdividing groundfish TACs geographically to communities (not individuals) in the Scotia-Fundy region. Fishermen and their communities create and enforce management plans and allocate access through Community Management Boards (CMB) that are geographically based and in keeping with the local preferences. The CMBs are fairly cohesive groups with significant decision-making authority. For example, the Fundy Fixed Gear Council in Nova Scotia makes all the decisions about how to use their portion of the TAC what days to fish, how to fish, and the allocation amongst hand line, longline, and gillnet. Hand liners were heavily impacted by the quota system and are almost extinct because they were dependent on local resources whereas vessels with ITQs could roam where fish are located. Community Management Boards have functioned well in Canada for 12-14 years. Some well established multispecies CMBs have a hired staff member to manage quota and manage the accounts for groups of fishermen. Each CMB also has an established Infractions Committee to oversee enforcement. Government officials and patrol boats are responsible for catching fishermen who break the rules but the fishermen themselves set the penalties (except in the case of criminal laws and regulations). Penalties usually include loss of fishing time that ranges from days to a season and possible expulsion from the Board. Fishermen who are expelled go to Group X, which is the government-managed group and is the least attractive fishing group. Expelled fishermen still interact with other fishermen in their communities and this can cause tension so there is social pressure not to break the rules. The Infractions Committees are double blind so the members are not identify and only the staff person keeps track of whose case is being reviewed and who is evaluating the case. Canadian fishermen are proud of the CMBs and meet regularly in various settings. The CMB system is seen as building social capital and started as a people-driven process, not a market-driven quota allocation.
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Place-Based Catch Shares and Local Management Canadas community-based quota system is a form of place-based management whereby fishing rights are defined on a geographical basis, at a local scale. Fishery access is handled through community mechanisms and management is done as locally as possible, with fishermen and communities having significant involvement and responsibility. These types of management systems have the potential to: improve the use of local fishermen knowledge; improve the acceptance of management rules; and produce stewardship and positive effects on conservation and sustainability. Place-based catch shares can perform better than other approaches due to their capability to fit with a coastal communitys value system. They are designed to provide benefits to communities and fishermen with a better distribution of benefits and costs among fishery participants. There are also lower indirect economic impacts on ecological sustainability (e.g. less incentive to discard and high-grade relative to ITQs). Comparing New England Sectors and Canadas Community Quotas Both sectors and community quotas are set as shares of the annual TAC to groups of fishermen. By design, both have the potential to improve the buy-in to fishery regulations and to bring people together in fishery management. Although community quotas are based where fishermen live and sectors can be formed without an attachment to place, sectors could be place-based and this would promote local stewardship. Community quotas have regulations to prevent loss of Proceedings: Catch Share Workshop 28
fishery access in communities. Sectors, without such restrictions, may lead to concentration of control due to transfer of access. (For additional information see: http:// husky1.smu.ca/-charles) Discussion Protecting Community Access: Comment: Mike talked about crew not getting quota, which resulted in more consolidation. It appears as though there is a trade-off: community issuance ends up taking quota off the top from existing jobs to help new entrants. Response: Ed responded that, on paper, approximately 50-70% of boat revenues are off the top (back to the boat/owner) then the crews work for revenues vs. shares. Therefore, he asserts current crewmembers would be beneficiaries of such trade offs. Comment: There is concern in New England about the concept of allocating to Community Fishing Associations (CFA) off the top when there isnt enough fish available for current participants in fishery. Response: Ed replied by suggesting that you look at the geographic structure of where vessels are (i.e. day boat fleets) and target a CFA around addressing that issue. For example, 10% is not inaccessible to these people just make it available to this specific sector in the design. Mike clarified that in Alaska 10% wasnt the original comfort level, it was 7.5%. However, as the program became successful, the percentage allocated to communities increased. Ed acknowledged that fundamentally, the allocation does disadvantage some people, but it increases the value of the fishery to offset or provide some measure of economic benefit to a group of folks that wouldnt benefit or are disadvantaged. He contends that this is not taking it away from people who would have had it, so philosophically its not a zero sum, its a value gain. Response: Mark admitted that everyone in Alaska was not made whole by adopting an IFQ approach. He stated that the majority did not get what they wanted and thousands of people turned into a couple hundred boats because of the qualifying years. However, he contends that it was the best way to make something rational. Fishermen couldnt harvest the fish and hit the target under or over. He recalled that when CDQ portions of IFQs were allocated, some of it was 50%, which is a substantial amount of fish. Individuals were suddenly getting half of their quota. Mark told how the fishermen negotiated with the Council and ended up getting compensated for each area in the Gulf of Alaska. Therefore, instead of 50% cut to individuals, everyone took a 3% cut. Ed argued that the fact is that all of these programs result in consolidation. However, the idea of a community structure is that a migratory asset gets damped down. Merrick suggested one thing to consider is that a community allocation doesnt have to happen in the start of the fishery and perhaps it is good to let fishermen acclimate and become profitable, then consider it.
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Response: Tony countered that one model is a market-based approach, but the Canadian CMB is not market based. He reported that here are no leasing issues, so its led to stability of quota, organizations, and communities. His observation is that consolidation is not an issue with these CMBs, only with the IFQ component of the fishery. In fact, he feels it has provided the security to get back to traditional practices. He emphasized that with a catch share system, there are other options. Response: In the Pacific groundfish trawl fishery, 10% is not automatically given to CDQs. The 10% was not solely proposed for CDQs, but instead was a conservation hold back or buffer for unintended consequences. Ralph noted that the original proposal was to establish a 10% reserve for new entry programs. A consultant from Canada wrote a straw proposal that recommended different uses. As the program has evolved, more people saw value in having a cushion to deal with unexpected outcomes. Merrick stated that Council originally had several objectives for this reserve: community, environmental, new entrant, etc. However, the Council didnt decide how to implement these objectives. The Council and participants decide how the 10% is allocated in the future and it is fluid. Ralph observed that ultimately, there are going to be unintended consequences under the ITQ system and the 10% reserve was implemented to mitigate for these consequences. Response: Kurt clarified that the CDQ programs are Native American corporations and therefore not necessarily tied to a specific geographical community. He noted that these types of programs do not exist in the Gulf but Native groups can buy quota and lease it out and felt it may not be accurate to use the CDQs as an example of how to save a community. In Kurts area, there are community colleges, but none of them have courses in fishing trades and vessel owners pay for the cost of training their crew. He believes if educations existed in communities vessel owners costs would be lower and new entrants would come and benefit communities. Response: Theresa commented that in the halibut and sablefish ITQ program, adjustments made by the Council have benefited people who already hold quota (blocks). For example, the vessel class restrictions (A - D) established to keep quota for the smaller vessels have been relaxed. However, in February 2010 there are proposals that will make significant changes to the program including a provision that anyone buying quota would have to fish with the owner on board. She noted that these proposals are in recognition of the negative impacts of the program and an attempt to address these impacts. Monitoring New Types of Socio-economic Data: Comment: Apparently, NMFS is not getting accurate price data from fishermen (i.e. zero or blank data values). What are your data sources for the price/earning ratio, and are they an underestimate?
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Response: Ed replied that the data are from two sources, price data is different than cost of whats financing quota transactions. Working with NOAAs database , there is one set of price data (dock and quota), which is verified (e.g. price data for one brokerage firm). His observation is that the database keeps good track of what type of financing, private bank, gift, etc. And he noted that he is always interested in dock price and asset price. Response: Concern was expressed about data quality if New England implements a similar program to Alaska. It was noted that even for days-at-sea leasing, there are still a lot of zero values. Data on leasing are even harder to manage and monitor due to the complexity of dynamics surrounding relationships with lessees and leasers. Managing the Transition to Catch Shares: Comment: Was the trawl or groundfish buyout in 2002/2003 an explicit part of rationalization or not? If so, do you know what you were targeting? Response: Merrick stated that the groundfish fishing industry was struggling and vessels couldnt afford to hire crew, so one option was to start with a buyout to get the fishery to be more profitable. He was not sure if this program was directly linked to rationalization. Providing Opportunities for New Entrants: Comment: Theresa stressed that the crab rationalization is a clear example that design matters. She noted that the Councils Advisory Panel knew consolidation would occur because there were no controls in the design. There was two-thirds consolidation in the first year in Kodiak. In her opinion, an abundance of wealth existed in the fishery and the crew could have been considered explicitly in the design of the program. For example, one owner had four boats with quota worth $22 million and 25 crew. In the crab fishery, fishermen have a contract with percent of share, a 1099 tax form, etc. Theresa suggested that vessel owners could have submitted this data when they received quota, but she contends that crew were threatened if they were against the IFQ process. Have there been any discussions about trying to track and account for, or allocate to crew who have put a significant amount of work into the fishery? Response: Mike responded that the Alaska Fisheries Science Center staff put a lot of effort into identifying crewmembers and the results of this effort have been good so far. There is need for follow up on data and how to capture it. He noted that Alaska is currently looking at a swipe card for crew to identify who was on board. Comment: Has the idea of returning a percentage of quota to a pool every year (after a certain amount of time passes) been seriously considered in the Pacific groundfish ITQ? Response: Merrick replied that one of the alternatives was to start out with an initial quota gifted for 15 years, and have it roll back to the public or be auctioned off after the term expires. He noted that the PFMC didnt like this alternative because the quota starts to
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waste away after time; by year 13 and 14 quota is decreasing. Alternatively, the BSAI crab rationalization program has a modified approach. If the TAC exceeds threshold, there is a motion on the Council to gift it back to the fishery. Ed remarked that it is a challenging environment in the Pacific groundfish fishery because stocks are so depressed, but questioned what happens when stocks rebound. He asked whether the Council should rationalize in the opposite direction to existing participants or provide it to new entrants if stocks rebound. Response: Tony reported that in eastern Canada theres no system that limits accumulation and no issues with new entrants. However, he urged that it is important to design the program and address the issue at the start if this issue is a concern because his observation is that its hard to go back and change how things were done afterwards (e.g. New Zealand quota fisheries). Considering Modifications Post Implementation: Comment: How do you go about approaching modifications after a program has been implemented? Response: Mark responded that the NPFMC established blocked and unblocked quota for the halibut and sablefish ITQ and there have been changes over time. His observation was that ninety-five percent of the battle was allocation and after that it was a significant educational experience. He thinks the problem with the rationalization program for Pacific groundfish trawlers and longliners and for Alaska crab fishermen was that everyone knew how valuable quota shares would be and people lobbied to get as much quota as possible. Whereas Atlantic groundfish doesnt know the worth of quota shares and the allocation is done. He asked about the cooperation of the fleet and whether fishermen going to be able to trust each other. His opinion is that lawsuits abound with NGOs and NOAA is a target for litigation. However, he noted that groundfish sectors might improve this situation in New England, if the program is working and stocks start to rebound.
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KEY ISSUES DISCUSSED IN BREAKOUT GROUPS The workshop participants identified four key issues of concern in New England and discussed these issues in breakout groups. Possible solutions for the Council to contemplate as fisheries are adopting a catch share approach were also considered. Spillover and Interactions with Other Fisheries The observation was made that catch share programs need to consider the unintended cumulative impacts of management measures and their interactions with each other. Participants noted that there have been some clear socio-economic spillover issues in Alaska that have also had biological implications. For example, when the pollock fishery was rationalized, boats in the system were able to adjust seasons to fish at optimal time, and other fisheries occur at the same time. The non-rationalized boats couldnt access pollock at the same time in the harvest sector (i.e. pollock fishing would be timed to occur close to the cod fishery to gain a competitive advantage). In the processor sector, when the socio-economic analysis was done, losses observed. The lesson is that implementing an ITQ in one major fishery ripples through other fisheries that are coincident in time and/or geography. Other participants commented that there is a likelihood of a domino effect to expand catch shares into other fisheries in the region once they are implemented in one fishery because there are clearly ecological overlaps among fisheries and therefore interactions among fisheries management measures. However, if management plans differ for coincident fisheries, this creates a loss of efficiency for fisheries not in catch shares as historic behaviors and accordant management measures may no longer be relevant. Some participants felt that bycatch issues may be addressed through an integrated approach to catch shares.
If there is not a common currency, similar fisheries need to be compatible with each other. This is an interactive process that takes a great deal of time.
One example given by a participant was in the Gulf of Alaska. Fishermen are allowed three permits a year to sign into or out of a fishery and must produce a paper trail with the National Marine Fisheries Service. It was suggested that fishermen are getting more selective in their fishing practices because of the rationalized system. Fishermen sign in with NMFS to record their intent to catch a certain species but they may change their behavior based on what the true conditions are on the water. It was noted by workshop participants that the key is identifying what a fisherman is targeting. For example, if a fisherman is targeting groundfish he is allocated a higher trip limit than under a bycatch limit. Other socio-economic impacts of catch shares on non-catch share fisheries were discussed by participants. For example, some crewmembers will need to transition to other fisheries which created additional pressures on these fisheries and organizers, the shift in coastal economy, and other social issues. Possible Design Solutions: Integrated Programming: Integrated quota programs allow more fluidity among gears. 33
Two notable examples are the New Zealand ITQ fishery and the Alaska halibut and sablefish fishery with the groundfish fishery. Create Sideboards: Create sideboards to prevent shift into other fisheries. Consider Historical Incidental Allocation: Allocate historical incidental catch for bycatch fisheries. Integrate Other Fisheries into Sectors: Allow landing of catch by other directed fisheries into sectors. Implement Intent to Catch Declaration: Consider an amendment to restructure the callin/call out system in New England to focus on intent of fishery.
Capitalization and Access It was clear to workshop participants that catch share programs can create shifts among communities and consolidation of capital. As an example, those fishermen heavily invested in the halibut and sablefish fishery maintained access to the fishery. Participants agreed that finding the capital to gain entrance into fisheries is difficult. However, catch share systems might stabilize the value of the fishery over time and make it easier to find financing. One observation was that banks are still lending money in the Pacific because it still makes business sense. It was suggested that when it doesnt make business sense anymore than you are limiting new entry into the fishery. One participant noted, however, that when permit values drop and quota is not coupled with permits, there may still be reason to limit permit or quota ownership to achieve different goals. Possible Design Solutions: Moratorium on Permit Transfers: Place a temporary hold on trading as business/understanding settles. The Pacific Council placed a moratorium on permit transfers, but still allows temporary transfer for overages. However, there are questions about this approach as this may not support price discovery. De-couple Permit from Quota: In New Zealand, everyone can get a license, but you need to lease or buy quota to land fish. One way to reduce the up-front costs in New England is to de-couple the permit from the quota shares so each could be valued accordingly. Establish Ownership Cap: If you keep fisheries at the mom and pop level the skippers start on back deck and then buy in over time until they own their own quota. That is a natural progression of how new entrants gain access to the fishery. An ownership cap becomes incredibly important. Set-aside Quota for New Entrants in the Future: As the TAC goes up, set aside a percentage of the quota for new entrants into the fishery to access. 34
Defining Socio-economic Goals and Objectives for New England

Catch shares should let fishermen catch their quota and let them figure out how using their local knowledge.
Workshop participants suggested that socio-economic goals and objectives might be in conflict with each other and need to be prioritized into short-term and long-term goals. It was noted that there have been at least two visioning processes in New England (Gloucester Fishermens Wives health care and Northwest Atlantic Marine Alliance fleet visioning), but the list has not been prioritized and it hasnt been transferred to NMFS. Additionally, Amendment 16 for groundfish does have some goals about a small boat fleet, but there are no measures to implement them.
Possible Designs Solutions: Establish an Outreach Process: The Council should establish an outreach process aside from the formal public comment period. (There was also concern raised about the SSC determining ABC with no public input at all.) Establish Specific Goals for Catch Share Systems: The Council goals have been established, but there should also be more specific goals for catch share fisheries, which are measurable so you can track progress. Evaluate Use of Advisory Panels: Modify the Council process so Advisory Panels have more say in setting goals and objectives. The Council should be using the Advisory Panels more to develop socio-economic goals and objects based on Terms of Reference. Restate Goals and Objectives: The Council should list goals and objectives and reiterate them before any major vote. Collection of Socio-economic Data: NMFS is trying to find fairly straight-forward indicators, like change in profitability, etc. to monitor impacts and progress toward goals and objectives; socio-economic data collection is challenging and it is difficult to determine how the information would inform management. It is difficult to collect information on profits and sale of quota and/or permits.
SUMMARY COMMENTS The focus of this workshop was on socio-economic impacts of catch shares as a fisheries management tool in New England. It is important to understand the goals and objectives of any catch share program and collect the data to inform management options. It is very difficult to do this after the fact. There are different levels of socio-economic issues federal, regional, local, etc. and which level is chosen will influence the goals and objectives. In Alaska, there was a comprehensive community profile conducted pre- and post-implementation of the IFQ system. In New England, the sector program for the groundfish fishery is already well underway and the prediction is that there will be rapid consolidation and localized concentration when fish arrive. However, sectors are different than other catch share approaches and provide an opportunity to establish a different model. New England fishermen should take time to examine options for how Proceedings: Catch Share Workshop 35
sectors might govern themselves, as well as to explore new management approaches and incentives. Sector participants should be encouraged to manage their operations to meet their own goals. Management measures should be established early on to provide some access to rebuilt stocks based on small quota of current fish. New England fishermen need to consider their fishing businesses as a financial asset and figure out a way to maintain the capital asset until groundfish is viable for fishing again rather than selling out completely now. This requires a shift from a mentality of despair to a few people who see the opportunity in the future. If a big portion of asset value is tied to the health of the stock, then there is a substantial incentive to get stocks rebuilt as quickly as possible.
New England fishermen should take time to look at other options for guiding how sectors might manage themselves and explore new approaches and incentives to work together.
Every fishery management council creates winners and losers and community impacts existed before ITQs or catch shares were established. Thousands of fishing jobs have been lost in the Pacific trawl fishery prior to the implementation of an ITQ program. Therefore, it is important to look at the trends in the fishery over time. The historical performance of the old input control style of fishery management has not been good and catch shares may provide a new approach to explore.
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SELECTED REFERENCES Draft NOAA Catch Share Policy. Department of Commerce. NOAA. 2009. Available at: http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/catchshare/docs/draft_noaa_cs_policy.pdf Fisheries Management: Core Principles and a Strategic Approach Would Enhance Stakeholder Participation in Developing Quota-Based Programs. Government Accountability Office. GAO-06-289. February 2006. Individual Fishing Quotas: Economic Effects on Processors and Methods Available to Protect Communities. Government Accountability Office. GAO-04-487T. February 2004. Catch Shares Design Manual: A Guide for Fishermen and Managers. 2009. Environmental Defense Fund. Available at: http://www.edf.org/documents/10400_catch_shares_design_manual_09.09.09.pdf Ecotrust Harvard workshop; http://www.inforain.org/reports/WSP4_Fisheries_Market_Design.html). Briefing: A Cautionary Tale About ITQs in BC Fisheries. Ecotrust Canada. 2009. Vancouver, Issue 8. Available at: http://www.ecotrust.ca/fisheries/cautionarytale The elephant in the room: The hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas. Evelyn Pinkerton and Danielle N. Edwards Marine Policy, 2009, vol. 33, issue 4, pages 707-713. Saving Fisheries with Free Markets. Donald R Leal. The Milken Institute Review, First Quarter, 2006, pages 56-66. A Fishery Managers GuidebookManagement Measures and Their Application. FAO Technical Document 424. 2002. Available at: http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/Y3427E/Y3427E00.HTM Use of Property Rights in Fisheries Management. FAO Technical Document 404/1, 2000. Available at http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/3281/en Publications by Anthony Charles: A. Charles, Sustainable Fishery Systems, Blackwell Science, Oxford (2001). A. Charles, Use Rights and Responsible Fisheries: Limiting Access and Harvesting through Rights-based Management In: A Fishery Managers Guidebook. Management Measures and their Application. (K. Cochrane, ed.) FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 424, FAO, Rome Italy, 231p. (2002). A. Charles, Rights-Based Fishery Management: A Focus on Use Rights. in: Who Gets the Fish? Proceedings of the New England Workshop on Rights-Based Fisheries Management Approaches. M.E. Petruny-Parker et al. (eds). Rhode Island Sea Grant, Narragansett, R.I. USA, 28pp (2004).
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J. Graham with A. Charles and A. Bull. Community Fisheries Management Handbook. Published by the Gorsebrook Research Institute, Saint Mary's University, Halifax, Canada [available at www.coastalcura.ca] (2006). J. Kearney, F. Berkes, A. Charles, E. Pinkerton, M. Wiber. The Role of Participatory Governance and Community-Based Management in Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management in Canada. Coastal Management 35:79-104 (2007). P. Copes & A. Charles. Socio- economics of Individual Transferable Quotas and Community-Based Fishery Management. Agricultural & Resource Economics Review 33:171-181 (2004).
Addressing Community Concerns in the Development of Individual Fishing Quota Program Alternatives for the Pacific Groundfish Trawl Sector: A Survey of Community Stakeholders. Environmental Defense Fund, 2004. One Last Chance: The Economic Case for a New Approach to Fisheries Management in New England. The Pew Environment Group, Pew Charitable Trusts. Available at: http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Protecting_ocean_life/Johnst on_Sutinen_2009.pdf A New England Dilemma: Thinking Sectors Through. Seth Macinko and William Whitmore. 2009. Prepared for the Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries. Available at: http://www.peopleandplace.net/on_the_wire/2009/9/17/macinko_and_whitmore_fisheries_sector s Draft NOAA Catch Share Policy. Department of Commerce. NOAA. 2009. Available at: http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/catchshare/docs/draft_noaa_cs_policy.pdf Design Matters: Making Catch Shares Work. The Pew Environment Group, Pew Charitable Trusts. 2009. Available at: http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Protecting_ocean_life/Catch Share.pdf?n=5322
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PANELIST BIOGRAPHIES Edward (Ed) Backus Vice President Fisheries at Ecotrust, lives in Newport, Oregon. He oversees the Marine, Copper (Alaska) and Skeena River (British Columbia) watershed and State of the Salmon programs. He is founder and chair of the North Pacific Fisheries Trust, a $6 million community fisheries quota revolving loan fund, and an Ecotrust subsidiary. Ecotrusts marine activities focus on the analysis of the social and economic effects of fisheries management, developing capital strategies for communities to accumulate equity in the tradable assets of fishing, while providing intensive analysis of the status of fisheries resources and conservation options. He has worked on community economic development teams with Shorebank Enterprise Cascadia, an Ecotrust founded organization. Edward has a background in conservation planning and information systems, tropical forest conservation, seabird ecology, and commercial fishing. He is past chair and a member of the board at the Prince William Sound Science Center (AK), chair of the board of the Alaska Sustainable Fisheries Trust, and a conservation committee member of the Sea Change Investment Fund. He was born and raised in a marine science family in Woods Hole, Massachusetts and fished commercially out of Nantucket in the early 1980s. Ralph Brown began fishing in at age 8. After attending college and working in the private sector for a while, Ralph rejoined his familys fishing business in 1978, eventually becoming an owner/operator and processor of two 75 foot commercial vessels. Ralph has participated in the Groundfish Alternative Management (GAM) Committee studying world-wide fishery management systems and exploring alternative management for west coast fisheries. He spent time as the Commissioner, Oregon Trawl Commission, served on Governors Task Force on Marine Resources and was appointed on the first Oregon Ocean Policy Advisory Council. Ralph represented Oregon fishing interests on the Pacific Fishery Management Council from 19962005, and was instrumental in developing the PFMC Strategic Plan for Groundfish 1997-2000. He spearheaded the coast wide groundfish limited entry program and was a strong advocate for gear selectivity changes to avoid bycatch (such as mesh-size restrictions, the trawl small footrope requirement and the new cutback trawl technology). Merrick Burden is an economist with Environmental Defense Fund. Prior to his move to EDF in November 2009, Merrick was a Groundfish Staff Officer with the Pacific Fishery Management Council. For the past two years, Merrick has been the lead analyst for several aspects of the groundfish trawl fishery rationalization program recently adopted by the Pacific Council. He also has had lead responsibility for the Pacific Councils consideration of in season management adjustments for all commercial and sport fishery sectors of the west coast groundfish fishery. Prior to coming to the Pacific Council, Merrick worked as a Fishing Industry Economist for the National Marine Fisheries Service in Seattle, Washington and as a private sector economist in Anchorage, Alaska. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics from Linfield College and a Master of Science degree in Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics from Oregon State University.
Dr. Anthony (Tony) Charles is a professor at Saint Marys University (Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada) with a joint appointment in Management Science and Environmental Studies. Dr. Charles is a Pew Fellow in Proceedings: Catch Share Workshop 39
Marine Conservation, and specializes in interdisciplinary analysis of fisheries, aquaculture and coastal issues. Particular areas of emphasis include integrated ocean and coastal management, the ecosystem approach to fisheries, marine protected areas, community-based management, indicator frameworks, and the development of management measures for sustainability and resilience. Dr. Charles is currently Principal Investigator in the Coastal CURA project exploring community involvement in coastal management across the Canadian Maritimes. He is the author of a wide range of publications, President of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET), a past President of the Resource Modeling Association, the founding Director, past Chairperson, and current Board Member of Canadas Ocean Management Research Network, and a member of the editorial board of the American Fisheries Society journal Marine and Coastal Fisheries. Tony also serves as an advisor to fisheries organizations in Atlantic Canada, and internationally he works on fishery, aquaculture and coastal management projects in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as on FAO and OECD research studies. Kurt Cochrane began fishing at age 9, and started running boats when he was 18. He bought his first boat at age 22, and has fished ever since. Currently, he owns and operates 2 vessels, the Marathon (91' ft) and the New Life (83') from Newport, Oregon. He has trawled from California to the Bering Sea, spending much of his time off of Oregon in the whiting and groundfish fishery, and groundfishing off of Kodiak, Alaska. Mike Downs has more than 27 years experience as a senior social scientist and project manager on complex environmental projects throughout the U.S., including Alaska, Hawaii, and territories in the Pacific and Caribbean. With AECOM, he is responsible for overseeing preparation of environmental documents in compliance with NEPA and CEQA, as well as a range of social science technical studies. Mike has recruited and managed research teams, conducted field research and data analysis, and authored numerous technical papers related to socio-economics, social impact assessment, community impact assessment, environmental justice, subsistence, and traditional use. Mike has managed socio-economic research projects for a range of federal clients, including the National Marine Fisheries Service and its affiliated North Pacific, Pacific, and Caribbean Fishery Management Councils, and his commercial fisheries work has included not only analysis under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, but also the Endangered Species Act and the Marine Mammal Protection Act. Mark Lundsten has been fishing for almost 30 years. In the 1970s, Mark worked as a welder at a boatyard that specialized in maintaining and repairing fishing boats, many of them classic halibut schooners. He also found a chance to crew on one of those boats, which he did for six years while still working in the off season in the shipyard. In 1984, he bought the Masonic, a 70-foot halibut schooner built in 1930. Mark also became very involved in the management issues of the
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halibut/black cod fisheries, particularly in the formation of the IFQ (individual fishermans quota) program and in the design and implementation of seabird by catch regulations. But when he reached the age of 50, he began to feel that he wanted to do something else in his life and that he shouldn't wait to do it. In 2002, he sold the Masonic and bought the Gravina (then the Ranger 9), with plans to return to Alaska at a more leisurely pace, to explore the beaches and bays and to catch salmon with a rod and reel. Theresa Peterson grew up in San Diego and was attending the University of California at San Diego when she decided to go work in a cannery in Alaska for the summer. She ended up finding a job on a commercial fishing vessel and has been involved in the fishing industry ever since. Over the last 27 years, Theresa has participated in a myriad of fisheries ranging from South East Alaska to the Bering Sea. During this period she harvested fish using longlines, pots, trawls, and nets. In 1988, Theresa and husband purchased their own vessel and moved to Kodiak Island. They continue to live on the island with their 3 children and participate in Tanner crab, herring, salmon, pacific cod and halibut fisheries. Theresa spends summers setnetting at the South end of the island in Deadmans Bay and winters working for Alaska Marine Conservation Council, a communitybased group made up largely of fishermen, subsistence harvesters and other coastal Alaskans who rely on the ocean for their way of life. She serves on the Advisory Panel for the North Pacific Fishery Management Council and is an advocate for marine conservation to protect the long term health of Alaskas oceans and sustaining the working waterfront of our coastal communities.
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Managing For Socio-Economic Objectives in Catch Share Systems: Identifying Issues, Learning From Experiences, and Exploring Options For New England

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