Monistic Force at the End of the Line: Strategic De-Territorialization after Sovereign Capture1

Sayres S. Rudy2

Come, my friends. Tis not too late to seek a newer world. Push off, and sitting well in order smite The sounding furrows, for my purpose holds To sail beyond the sunset, and the baths, Of all the western stars, until I die. ~ Alfred Lord Tennyson3 The task of philosophy is to found a different politics, a politics of conversion which turns its back on the sea The procedure whereby the prisoner is released and offered conversion is preceded by another, by that first metaphoric act which consists in burying the sea, drying it up, stripping it of its reflections and changing their very nature. In response to these assaults we know, however, that the sea will take its revenge. ~ Jacques Rancire4 Well my ships been split to splinters, its sinking fast. Im drownin in the poison, got no future, got no past. But my heart is not weary, its light and its free. Ive got nothin but affection for all those whove sailed with me. ~ Bob Dylan5

Introduction De-territorialization, a ubiquitous tactical weapon, morphs into a hegemonic strategic regime when sovereign entities and their enemies universalize the use of unlimited force, overwhelming the social capture of capitalist, statist, martial, and subaltern excess.6 This regime of strategic deterritorialization eviscerates inter- and intra-state systems of sovereign power that once repressed, stabilized, and sustained the monistic and infinite means-ends of state Realpolitik, market expansion, military exception, legal force, and nomadic resistance.7 The military-market-statist-imperial regime of strategic territorialization that had contained, balanced, or assimilated excessive social energies produces a regime of strategic de-territorialization that overflows dualistic ethical and institutional constraints. This de-territorialized regime out(s)paces the dialectical sublimation of the Westphalian and Weberian regimes of territorialization. The release from sovereign capture of monistic means-ends generates pure violence, total war, free markets, and securitized institutions that exceed all normative integument and diffuse a social ontology of unmediated power beyond the licentious but legible and terminal moralities of war, ethnic cleansing, or apartheid. I wish to clarify these claims before moving on. Under a regime of strategic territorialization empires and states balance or bargain into cohesive formations the excessive modalities of capitalists,

generals, kings, and rebels. But such institutional channeling nurtures the very energies it unstably contains in the limited incorporation of unlimited ambition. The exhaustion of dualistic, dialectical, territorial capture releases the perfected means and unbound ends of monistic value-spheres, yielding the regime of strategic de-territorialization. In the paradigm instance, capitalists initially pay tribute to states whose armies, jurists, and bureaucrats secure private accumulation of wealth, protect property rights, and minimize transaction costs.8 Reciprocal benefits accrue to military, official, and investor classes by mutual ascent abetted by states growing obligations to increasingly capable citizenries. But as each sector uses this universal association to advance is particular purpose, capital develops private means to maximize profits and social leverage. Capital withdraws from the negotiation by internalizing or appropriating the tools of the social contract itself, eventually hiring or becoming its own military force, but now a refined corporate entity emancipated from instrumental or civic bounds.9 A mimetic momentum ensues and other parties to strategic territorialization follow suit to defend and embellish their discrepant sovereign agendas. The logic of territorialization inverts into the logic of de-

territorialization as immanently expansive sectors overflow reciprocal capture, releasing the essential, inner-driven monistic force of capital, military, state, and pirate.10 Territorialization encompasses the spatial delineation of social norms, political practices, and economic circuits. So it entails the political serialization of material, cultural, ideological, or juridical subjectivity, extending beyond geographical territoriality to the physical arrangement of social power. Strategic territorialization situates political subjects as legible, countable, inscribable, conscriptable, or taxable objects in bounded, panoptic, and disciplinary spaces. A productive system of such spaces forms a regime of strategic territorialization, a consociation of sovereign entities established through weaponized spatialization. Territorialization is an instrumental desideratum of sectors in states, and states in the international system. In either sovereign-state regime the inscription of citizenship, designation of duties, codification of law, materialization of class, and representation of governance territorialize time, space, and identity as integral components of their production. The symbiotic trajectories of capital, state, and military illustrate the social mechanisms of the territorialized regime. Capitalist, militarist, and statist apparatuses delayed or compromised their conflicting demands for a shared imperative to create social technologies of literacy, statistics, and mapping. Their collective tactical cooperation to produce social legibility, enumeration, and malleability muted their fractious strategic competition over market, martial, and executive prerogative and resources. Both cooperation and conflict generated a perverse space of unified difference, in which contentious parties secured longterm ends (the infinite means of trade, war, rule) by agreeing to short-term means (the finite ends of sovereign territoriality). Each sector lived a double-life, plotting exceptional strategic release from the shared tactical space illegible gains from the regime of legibility, uncountable profits in a system of

accounting. Thus, strategic territorialization (legibility, hierarchy, concentricity) sustained economic, martial, and state ambitions for strategic de-territorialization (illegibility, horizontality, polycentricity). The dualist regime of strategic territorialization pullulated and finally erupted with the excessive monistic means and ends of repressed constituents just biding their time. Strategic de-territorialization fulfills the dialectical capture-and-release of excessive sectoral agency under military-market-statist strategic territorizalization. Systemic-social cohesiveness in the territorialized regime of Westphalian-Weberian sovereign formations eroded when sub-sectors grew adequately self-sufficient to repudiate the reciprocal constraints they had self-imposed to capitalize on public goods.11 As I noted, systemic instruments to concentrate or distribute wealth, defend property, or cultivate a literate, numerate populace tactically suspended inter-sector rivalries for centuries, inspiring normative or empirical social theorists to emphasize homeostatic totalizations of discrepant social passions and interests. Military-market-state agglomeration only intensified intra-regime strategic contestation over the benefits of cooperation and the paradox of dualistic territorialization: the system concentrated, refined, united, and fragmented the resources of military, statist, and capitalist desires simultaneously. Civil society seized upon modalities of states or merchants to form social movements and sovereign associations; officials and capitalists deployed identical techniques to impose and evade taxation; decentralized rebels appropriated the tactics of centralized sovereigns. Hence capitalists, workers, democrats, imperialists, generals, bureaucrats, partisans, bandits, presidents, and pirates formed a schizoid territorialized regime of exorbitant centrifugal and centripetal social pressures for deterritorialized emancipation. Strategic de-territorialization inverts the dialectical capture and dualistic subjectivization of the sovereign pact, yielding a system of weaponized de-spatialization. The egression of the essential excess of militarism, capitalism, and statism generates a regime of monistic tactics, strategies, identities, and subjectivities. This de-territorialized regime is defined not by the universally excessive tactics of sovereign exception, military torture, or capitalist conspiracy but by their universal dispersal into an encompassing strategic environment. For simplicity I will call the regime of strategic de-territorialization strategic de-territorialization or ambiguity, in contrast to the (regime of) strategic territorialization. Tactical de-territorialization such as illegality characterizes both regimes but are released and generalized rather than captured and localized in strategic ambiguity. In strategic de-territorialization we find a comprehensive inversion of territorial capture, where ambiguity, improvisation, invisibility, illegibility, and innumerability are the core strategic resources and assets of states, militaries, and markets. This regime radically weaponizes the uncertainty and disorientation of subject positions: militarized civilians and civilianized militants; pirate and president; capitalist and bandit; terrorist and general; lawyer and torturer; remunerated and compelled labor.12 These tactical and subjective re-inscriptions cohabit a post-governmental survivalism and vulnerability epitomized by

the disintegrated refinement of total war.13 Strategic ambiguity proliferates ethical sub-discourses of indispensability and expendability14, virtuosity15, piety16, and affectivity17 that frustrate deliberative programs of juridical re-capture18 or a situated immanent infinity.19 This essay presents monistic deterritorialization, the sovereign war machine20, as simulacrum, politics, metaphor, and dialectic. Strategic de-territorialization as simulacrum The success in liberating and democratizing Iraq has been depicted as a triumph of legitimate sovereign power: a war declared by a legible, civilian-run democratic state; conducted by a transparent chain of military command; fought by uniformed soldiers funded by civilian taxes; monitored by elected representatives; and scrutinized by a free press. Thus the US claims the invasion and occupation of Iraq satisfies the hierarchic-official-ethical criteria of Westphalian and Weberian state behavior.21 In contrast to terrorists, the US has affirmed and re-enforced statist order, rationality, and law that attach moral value to physical force. Resistance to this process or discourse was tantamount to opposing the US, democracy, and sovereignty, justifying and requiring any means by occupying forces to defend civilized norms and institutions.22 This political grammar rendered Sunni resistance the last bastion of tribal barbarism when the American Executive23 ordered a surge of troops in 2007 to complete the re-territorialization of the newly civilized Iraq. The surge succeeded, allowing the US to leave behind a constitutional, capitalist, well-policed bureaucratic Arab-Muslim state. American elites celebrated the invasion-occupation-warpacification-institutionalization sequence as the domino effect of sovereignty. Law-and-order democrats, with a necessary but temporary surge of war-and-occupation soldiers, had defeated criminality-and-chaos tyrants to install a stable and liberal multiparty regime.24 The surge aimed to finalize the complex emancipations of liberal sovereignty, freeing the Iraqi land and people from despots and liberators.25 The stages of invasion, occupation, surge, and withdrawal allegedly embody freedom, each instantiating a discrete element of liberation and inaugurating another.26 In liberal democracy-speak, the campaign reiterated, as ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, modernitys stepwise revolutions over feudal monarchy, bureaucratic totalitarianism, indigene anarchy, and social democracy.27 The replacement of Iraqs institutions with bourgeois governance removed a set of distinct fascist forms in a series of proleptic moments of ever-indefinite freedom.28 If the content and timing of full emancipation are forever unsayable or deferred29, its necessary condition is territorial integrity.30 Territorialized speech, governance, and development grounds modern democratic thought and the wars promoted on its terms.31 This concept of democracy, which is undeniably Greek in origin, inherits from its beginnings an association with the land, a conception of the right to belong based on being born in a territory, which corresponds with the boundaries of a state.32 Hence the war on terror and its protean counterinsurgent surges founds sovereign freedom on territorialization. With symbolic and material

force, sovereignty, freedom and US ground troops become one: multi-ethnic, working-class, voluntary movements to reconstitute Iraqs physical, political, and subjective landscape.33 The surge evinced the counterinsurgency (COIN) commitments of American military leaders strategically scarred34 by the genocidal assault on Vietnam. COIN promises to seduce rather than defeat, develop rather than destroy, protect rather than pulverize population-centers contested by insurgents.35 It is a labor- and territory-intensive operation to win the hearts and minds of embattled peoples by building them little Keynesian welfare states to be federated under a centralized market-statist order. The surge was necessary, then, to provide adequate troop-levels to clear and keep enemies out of villages and towns in preparation for state-building investment and infrastructure. This clear-hold-build method would secure the population, peeling back accidental guerrillas from true believers and repolarizing the landscape by luring potential combatants to the US and away from al-Qaida. Responding to scholarship and experience that links collective militancy to violently repressed state subjects, 36 this new strategy37 would supplement aerial attacks, ground assaults, and detached surveillance with human contact, humane policing, and humanitarian social provision.38 In this way COIN and surge39 became unimpeachable metonyms of the central components of modernization: pacification, institutionalization, and welfare. This halcyon projection gained further support by turning occupation into a selflessly risky, pragmatic, industrious, and empathic hearts and minds operation. The campaign to secure the [Iraqi or Afghan] population claims to de-otherize the Other and re-codify the foreigner as non-foreign, satisfying liberal fantasies of mastery without domination or hegemony.40 Emblem of the US counterinsurgency project, the surges are double-coded as instances of sovereign procedures and moral-juridical conduct.41 This coding is prolifically false, revealing the very nature of official verification and falsification. Characteristically, and without public controversy, official language blandly credits the surge with inputs and outcomes it falsifies. First, like its US benefactor Iraq remains an atrociously homicidal, judicially venal, politically paralyzed, financially corrupt, hyper-surveillant, and crony-capitalist entity.42 Second, the surge did not cause but coincided with decreased violence in Iraq after years of exhausting ethnic cleansing, social partitioning, and coercive policing enabled by the US invasion and occupation. Third, and more significant, the surge was not a triumph of infectious sovereign, territorialized power but of its extimate other monistic and improvisational strategic de-territorialization. The myth of the surge extends beyond its abysmal results to its form, content, and meaning. The character of COINs surge has been retrofitted, turned inside out, for military-market-statist apologetics. The surge began as a rationale for keeping the United States in the war, grew urgent with fears for Republican incumbency in the 2006 elections, and became possible after the quasi-coup by General Jack Keane and a small group of individuals, none of them elected or holding appointed offices, who had joined forces with the military dissidents to engineer a change in policy, endangering the chain of

command.43 The surge arose from disparate tactical pressures having less to do with military strategy or national interests than with internecine wrangling over COIN. Adoption of the surge in fact serialized particular desires (retention of incumbency), friable means (intra-military disputes), arbitrary criteria, and contingent modes deliberation over strategic means-ends calculations. The invasion and surge alike used massive troop deployments for occult political purposes (oil, democracy, human rights, filial vengeance, hegemonic demonstration-effect, force projection, Iran, Israel, military-industrialization) and caliginous military ambitions (the means/ends of the war on terror). The US stumbled into the surge and onto its result. Pace the civilian-to-military, ends-to-means, top-down, strategy-derived decisions boasted by sovereign elites, the surge fell into an enemy-to-soldierto-general-to-civilian, means-to-ends, bottom-up, tactic-derived escape hatch made by tribal insurgents. Ultimately the American military and its erstwhile enemies, members of new tribal Sunni Awakening Councils, forged an unplanned, fortuitous and practical alliance. Before the surge several tribal shuyukh had begun organizing to oppose al-Qaidas violent colonization of Anbar province. Marines in the field reported this opportunity to their commanders who informed the Bush administration that Sunni elites might welcome American affiliation.44 Self-interested Sunni resistance to al-Qaidas encroachment and not some enlightened democratic alignment consolidated the Anbar sahwa. The Councils courted the US to encourage and inherit their evacuation, imbibing the occupiers directive: Just get rid of extremists, the Sunnis were told, reduce the violence, and cooperate with the government to stabilize your areas, and were out of here.45 There is no evidence that the surge provided the tactical resolution in Anbar and strong evidence that it neither altered the strategic landscape nor vindicated the COIN program46:
Why the surge failed to achieve its broader political aims is one of two key questions that remain outstanding about that policy choice. The other is what exactly caused the drop in violence. Was it the Sunni Awakening, the turn begun in 2006 by tribal leaders and former insurgents away from al-Qaeda and toward a tactical alliance with the United States? Was it the cease-fire declared by the populist Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army in August 2007? Was it the ebbing of the vicious sectarian fighting that had engulfed Baghdad in 2006 and that some say had played itself out by the start of the surge? Or was it the new counterinsurgency tactics that were adopted by the military and carried out in 2007 and 2008 by the expanded force in Iraq? Its impossible to say for sure which factors were paramount 47

The improvisation, compression, and hallucination of all aspects of the surge typify the dissolution of sovereign territorialization wherever military-market-statism creates imitative resistance. The ambiguity and adhockery of the surge played out similarly in Iraq and the US. At home, [w]ithout consulting his political masters in WashingtonPetraeus began to lower American ambitions in Iraq [I]n April 2008 [he testified before Congress], Were after conditions that would allow our soldiers to disengage. But one of Petraeuss inner circle, adjusting to perpetual war, said of the US occupation: I dont think it does end. We are going to be in this centrally located Arab state for

decades.48 Meanwhile, the unprecedented logorrhea of the US presidential campaign from 2006 to 2008 contained only muted or vaporous discussion of foreign policy in general and COIN or the surge in particular. It was as significant as unremarked that a polity immersed directly in two wars49 could hold an election barely mentioning a policy-direction bound to be precedential for the incoming administration.50 Indeed, the candidates agreed that the surge was a peak performance in the deepening at home and diffusion abroad of the vertical and horizontal self-legislation of US sovereign power.51 This triumphalism gets darkly ironic when we locate the provenance of the alliance between the Awakening Councils and American forces: it was, directly and literally, al-Qaida itself.52 This does not mean that the US and al-Qaida defined each other, trivially true of any encounter. Rather the US and alQaida became each other, mimetic and co-constituted combatants whose purely violent total war is a partnership. Their reciprocal interests, tactics, and characteristics form a disjunctive synthesis of two nihilismson both sides, it is a matter of striking blindly to demonstrate ones capacity[A]t stake are bloody and nihilistic games of power without purpose and without truth.53 This could be called the becoming-enemy of de-territorialized sovereignty that peaks with the war on terror but was immanent in the previous forms of territorialized power. The violence and pacification of Iraq through the resubjectivization/objectification of human life in radically realist pursuit of illegible objectives parallels the strategic de-composition of Colombia, Congo, Haiti, Afghanistan, Palestine, Angola, India, the US, and other sites of military-market-statist prerogative.54 In such spaces of unmediated social excess a political method of monistic means and infinite ends, analogous to ideal-typical capital markets, exhausts the dialectical imbrication of territory, accountability, and subjectivity, negating the institutional coincidence between geography, knowledge, and power.55 The adoption and implementation of the US campaign in Iraq exemplify the isomorphic de-territorialization of prerogative, profit, pain, and impunity for multiple generals, officials, soldiers, contractors, insurgents, scholars, lawyers, and politicians in a kind of psychotic contest whose purpose has been to win, or not lose, given the rules of the moment. The US-al-Qaida alliance is not, in this context, a tactical convergence of opposed kinds. Their convergence reverses dualistic processes of earlier state-formation where capitalist, bureaucratic, military, and political elites negotiated conflicting ends for mutual needs on sovereign territory. The US-al-Qaida alliance shares the means and ends of unfettered entrepreneurial, military, and sovereign aggression, fragmenting the sovereign apparatus into a regime of strategic de-territorialization. Al-Qaida fixed the US quagmire in Iraq by ensuring the American-Sunni alliance, just as the US ushered al-Qaida into Iraq. These surreal oscillations are failures only from the obsolescent binary of means and ends.56 For the US-al-Qaida alliance in Iraq, means and ends are unified and monistic: maximal power as a tacticalstrategic spiral. The global war on terror licenses the logic of infinite expansion stifled by strategic territorialization. The US-al-Qaida strategic regime unleashes those incubated and tethered energies

immanent in the mobilization of military, capitalist, and statist potential. The mechanics of this strategic ambiguity render and justify an improvised regime too compressed, complex, indefinite, and fissiparous for the territorial niceties of public deliberation, political cogency, or ethical accountability. Strategic de-territorialization as power This regime of strategic de-territorialization is not indicated by the presence of torture, massacres, ethnic cleansing, or states of exception, all atrocities of empire and state-making.57 Rather, strategic deterritorialization emerges when those practices lose their dualistic nature in a generalized rationality of monistic violence or exploitation. Atrocities like torture or massacre can have a dualistic or monistic valence, determined by their systemic-political effects, notably their relationship to territorialized power. Martial, biopolitical, and structural violence at home and abroad were tactical de-territorializations of empire-state strategic territorialization. The resulting regime of territory-based power, the State within the State-System, was the inadvertent consequence of diverse aggressive interests converging to build and stabilize centralized rule. In the isotropic logics of state- and empire-building violence, aggression, and conquest were the means and state-formation the end. The result was a bifurcated regime that stabilized the disparate, contentious, mutually dependent imperatives of warriors, capitalists, workers, and statesmen on a legible territorial plane. This regime of sovereign territorialization therefore conjoined, represented, and advanced the discrete, hostile desires of these disputatious parties in a proprietry, institutional nexus. Strategic territorialization was dualistic because its homogeneous ends (social cooperation) depended on heterogeneous means (social conflict). How the conflicted architecture of sovereignty is resolved defines ethical reflection on ideology, discourse, interpellation, performativity, identity, communication, plurality, and subjectivity. Such theories register the imperial-statist conversion of opposed constituents into pacified or docile territorialized citizen-subjects. This conversion entailed all manner of tactical de/reterritorialization: deracination, expulsion, and standardization of resistant peoples by violent means now associated with failed, not rising sovereignty. Westphalian-Weberian strategic territorialization integrated the core and the periphery of empirestate in parallel fashion. In the core a series of bargains, negotiations, and compromises among leading members of state and civil society suppressed conflicts of interest for reciprocal tactical gains, which only sustained, heightened, and equipped their antagonistic aims. As Marx said, far from abolishing these differences, [the State] only exists so far as they are presupposed; it is conscious of being a political state and it manifests its universality only in opposition to these elements.58 Sovereign territorialization in this way cultivated in the long-term, by balancing in the short-term, de-territorializing imperatives endemic to its military, market, and state constituents. These excessive structural investments the sub-sovereignties of general, capitalist, patron, and president instrumentally impeded themselves until the universal

territorial sovereign had sharpened their distinct non-territorial weapons and become a superfluous fetter. In the periphery this gradual supplanting of territorial by non-territorial strategies has been, if more brutal or volatile, similar across statist and imperial settings. Indeed, the core denotes political elites and the periphery targeted subalterns in either case. Core-elite state compromise and periphery-subaltern colonial conflict were two expression of one substantive regime of repressive territorialization. Empires and states deployed a two-tiered, concentric process: strategic-territorial capture of military-market-statist excess allowed subsequent captures of bandit, pirate, terrorist, trafficker, colonized, and rebel. But each phase used tactical means to map fluid, nomadic, isolated, or autonomous people by de-mapping and then re-mapping, that is, re-inscribing or re-territorializing them. This re-writing achieves what we might call terraqueous power, control by means of sea and land: hegemony by liquefaction and territorialization, as a metaphor for the creation and capture of social excess. Pontecorvos Battle of Algiers portrays this process. The Algerians re-territorialized as a mini-state; the French liquefied the Algerians into nomadic, improvisational flows of resistance; the Algerians re-territorialized in quasi-acephalous cells; the French charted or de-coded the tactical ambiguity (scenes with Massu and his chalkboard), and broke it. But note the dialectical structuring of a legible territory out of a series of tactical de- and re-inscriptions. The empire or state forms as a double-sited excess-of-excess at the elite core and in the subaltern periphery. Strategic territorialization, the object and subject of multiple social desires, is as excessive or expansionist in its essence as its constitutive-inside merchants, militants, and managers and its constitutive-outside mercenaries, mujahideen, and martyrs. I will sketch these parallel cases of terraqueous power in which tactical liquefaction produces and finally overflows the regime of strategic territoriality. Scott describes high modernist states that re-territorialize existing ecological and social systems in massive social engineering projects that re-inscribe national citizens, regulate market agents, discipline workers, and standardize the physical landscape.59 State-designed modernization simplified and reduced complex, intricate, organic biospheres into centralized and isomorphic institutions. Cadastral mapping, land-surveys, territorial grids, striated specialization, and spatial division of labor highlight the power of legibility in state-building territoriality.60 To create or appropriate land, labor, and capital the state must first render them visible, numerable, calculable, in recurring time and space.61 The state must first read a place in order to reconstruct, re-spatialize, and re-populate it:
The immanent unity of the earth as the immobile motor gives way to the transcendent unity of an altogether different nature the unity of the State; the full body is no longer that of the earth, it is the full body of the Despot, the Unengendered, which now takes charge of the fertility of the soil as well as the rain from the sky and the general appropriation of the productive forces. Hence the savage, primitive socius was indeed the only territorial machine in the strict sense of the term.62

But the reverse also holds. The state must re-territorialize a place to read it, must read space to write it and write space to read it. The exemplar is the individualization, standardization, and centralization of

communal, usufruct lands, registered as legible property for extraction of resources from citizen-subjects. Efficient land-taxation or rent-collection required mastering (reading) and destroying (erasing) socially embedded, flexible cultivation; constructing (re-writing) commercial forms of (drought-susceptible) monoculture;63 and expanding a capitalist system of accumulation, production, and distribution (reading and writing erasure). Thus modern empire-states arose via the terraqueous power of sovereign de/reinscription, that is, a dialectical spiral of liquefaction-territorialization-liquefaction The state remakes people as it remakes territory, by re-inscribing and re-energizing them.64 This legibilization process renovates material and ideal mechanisms of power.65 Market-statist modernity renders people visible, audible, legible, palpable, and countable by affixing them to new spatio-temporal materializations of productive accountability: private property, wage labor, commodity streams. 66 The sovereign supplements measurable material production with modes of subjective transparency67: identity papers, citizen obligations68, panoptic accessibility69, architectural70 and proprietary71 re-inscription, and so on. The population is not, Foucault remarks,
a collection of juridical subjects in an individual or collective relationship with a sovereign will. It is a set of elements in which we can note constants and regularities even in accidents, in which can identify the universal of desire regularly producing the benefit of all, and [for] which we can identify a number of modifiable variables on which it dependsWe have a population whose nature is such that the sovereign must deploy reflected procedures of government within this nature, with the help of it, and in regard to it. In other words [we do not have] a collection of subjects of right differentiated by their status, localization, goods, responsibilities, and offices [but] a set of elements that, on one side, are immersed within the general regime of living beings and that, on another side, offer a surface on which authoritarian but reflected and calculated transformations can get a holdThe population is therefore everything that extends from biological rootedness through the species up to the surface that gives one a hold provided by the public. From the species to the public; we have here a whole field of new realities[,] the pertinent elements for mechanisms of power [and] space within [and regarding] which one must act. 72

This formalization of the world-as-conquered-space provides sovereign leverage over sub-state groups, but statist consolidation does not imply dictatorship or even domination over society.73 Elite and ordinary citizen-subjects may benefit from enforcement of contracts, protection of property rights, and repression of class conflict. Market-statists deploy the coercive military/policy apparatus against dissidents or class opponents but rivals may also court them.74 Similarly, vernacular legibilities integrate but also diffuse the bourgeois, bureaucratic, and military pillars in and beyond the nation-state.75 Finally, captation by the image may supplement sovereign ideologies and immunize ruling elites76 or dismantle them and communize political disagreement.77 Indeed, Scott himself veered into [this] inquiry from an attempt to trace and explain why expanding states so regularly struggle with mobile populations they find roaming their territories nomads, Romany, hunter-gatherers, swidden agriculturalists, transhumant herders, and others.78 For the sovereign as for the theorist, torturer, and manager the crucial question is: what is the remainder of the re-territorialized subject?79 What form of power can continually contain people re-

subjectivized as agential, willful, capable, literate, strategic, inventive, individualistic, ethical, or indeed rhizomatic, nomadic, and deracinated. How can the territorial sovereign routinize excessive excess to capture the excessive subject workers, citizens, readers, and speakers with abundant energies and capabilities requisite for the market-statist project? Sovereign market-statist territorialization of the material and meaningful content of subjectivity creates, deploys, but also releases energies, wills, desires, and fantasies that must be repeatedly captured, harnessed, i.e., re-re-territorialized. The paradoxical sovereign excess defining militarist-market-statist apparatuses emerges: the weaponization of legible, numerable, accountable, productive, and committed soldiers, citizens, workers, officials, tax-payers, and ideologues entails a re-subjectivization that forever generates potent monads-turned-nomads ready to appropriate the sovereigns own weapons. In the classic example of this re-territorialization circuit, the cadastral maps of privatized holdings that allowed states to tax communal land and entrepreneurs to commercialize agriculture provided resources to small owners to resist arbitrary seizures of property. The generalized ability to read maps does not indicate the capture or resistance of peasants under market-statism; rather, the costs or gains from topographical literacy for poor farmers depend on the specific distributions of legibility as one contributor to social power more broadly. Indeed, even if weaker actors avoid short-term capitalist or sovereign capture by grabbing state tools such as literacy or property rights, they are still captured by the tools that ground the totality of the militarymarket-state formation. This is the crux of the classic empirical and normative accounts of sovereignty in the Westphalian era depicting social systems rather than class domination capturing, channeling, or reclaiming the excesses of revolutionary subjectivities and multiple desires.80 To summarize where I am, the sovereign, characterized by market-statist territorialization, resubjectivized agents who for some time were systemically captured even as they seized the states own means of coercion, negotiation, or production. In this period, political philosophers like Hobbes, Hegel, Weber, and Foucault held that the special feature of this sovereign form was its achievement of cohesive, uniform social practices, institutions, and norms over earlier forms of social coercion or division. As such the power of the modern sovereign or state derives not merely or principally from its coercive prerogative but from its location in a territorialized whole stabilized by an integrated, organizing rationality (call it Leviathan, Spirit, Rationalization, or Governmentality). The elements of the rational system, its tools and weapons, are the parts of the whole and are co-extensive, mutually captured, even co-defined. Legibility and literacy enabled legal, contractual, and bureaucratic procedures; countability and numeracy afforded statistics, elections, finance; property and labor rights provided surplus labor, wealth-creation, and income redistribution. Social actors were co-constituted and co-conditioned: capitalist and worker, analyst and patient, President and general, conscript and denizen, urbanite and farmer, candidate and voter, taxcollector and -payer, even police officer and criminal reconcile in shared interests or productive

passions.81 The existence of each social position required the co-existence of its counterparts; all relied on the regime as their condition of possibility. Such economies of tools and persons recurred at the level of social aggregation where systemic-dialectic capture formed the mediated sovereign power of the state.82 Literacy is the exemplary tool first monopolized (as tactical legibility) by state power but soon appropriated by civil society to constrain that power. Power-centers states, firms, armies whose innovations modernize their human inputs to production eventually afford those humans new powers of self-determination that must be captured.83 It is perilous to manumit serfs, concentrate them as workers in factories, train them to read, write, use machines, labor in organized groups, and accept poverty wages without secondary enforcement mechanisms to impose order. The state-capital nexus typically developed repressive, educational, and disciplinary techniques, bolstered by subaltern ideology.84 Numeracy became similarly a bio-political resource for leverage against indeterminacyfirst perceived in connection with deviancy: suicide, vagrancy, madness, prostitution, disease.85 Activists instrumentalized numeracy for social mobilization often co-opted by electoral hierarchies, and so on. This systemic dialectic captures via reciprocal mechanisms of containment, stabilization, and opportunism. The premise is that systems generate technologies that, in turn, reinforce those systems. Framing the circularity, Mann says we have
two contrary tendencies: militaristic centralization followed by fragmenting federalism. Combining them we get a dialectic. If compulsory cooperation is successful, it increases both the infrastructural and the despotic power of the state. But it also increases social infrastructural resources in general. The logistical constraints mean that the new infrastructures cannot be kept within the body politic of the state. Its agents continually disappear into civil society, bearing the states resources with themThe booty of conquest, land grants to military lieutenants, the fruits of office, taxes, literacy, coinage, all go through a two-phase cycle, being first the property of the state then private (in the sense of hidden) propertyIn the long run, despite attempts at absolutism, states failed to acquire despotic powers through [ever increasing infrastructural power] because it also enhanced the infrastructural capacity of civil society groups, especially of capitalist property-holders.86

The dialectical obstacle to absolutism was its continually generating and surrendering the very weapons it designed to impede effective opposition. In this social physics, the states unique and autonomous feature is its dispositive rule-making capacities and nothing else: the state is merely and essentially an arena, a place, and yet this is the very source of its autonomy.87 Mann portrays social power as a dialectical state-civil rivalry in a centralized space, a fixed territory, where infrastructural power deepens and extends with aggravated social polarity. Tilly describes a similar dialectical process that severely constrains state prerogative:
War making, extraction, and capital accumulation interacted to shape European state making. Power holders did not undertake those three momentous activities with the intention of creating national statesTo make more effective war [states] attempted to locate more capitalIn the long run, the quest inevitably involved them in establishing regular access to capitalists who could supply and arrange credit and in imposing one form of regular taxation or another on the people and activities within their spheres of controlstate makers developed a durable interest in promoting the accumulation of capital, sometimes in the guise of direct return to their own enterprises88

Again the mutual needs, resources, and dynamics of state and capital form coherent, legible, stable states on perspicuous territories. That is, opposed rationalities of state, capital, and military have an inherent, systemic, and dialectical tendency to reconcile by braiding their disparate logics.89 The encounter of statist and capitalist objectives produced integration not fragmentation, production not destruction, and intensified the subjectification and objectification of the bourgeois-juridical citizen.90 Here secondary modes of capturing excess energies, desires, or capacities are unnecessary: internal dialectics of marketstatism obviate coercion and indoctrination and contain re-subjectivization. Mann and Tilly restrict their models to European tatism. Mann does not pretend to know the parameters of capitalist rationality or authoritarianism imposed by multi-national corporations and international banking institutions.91 In his conclusion, Tilly, at the aperture of strategic ambiguity and sovereign involution, darkly warns:
[S]tates that have come into being recently through decolonization orreallocations of territory by dominant states have acquired their military organization from outside, without the same internal forging of mutual constraints between rulers and ruled[T]he old national states of Europe almost never experienced the great disproportion between military organization and all other forms of organization that seems the fate of client states throughout the contemporary worldIn our own time, the analogy between war making and state making, on the one hand, and organized crime, on the other, is becoming tragically apt. 92

The anxiety indexed here concerns a projected lack, a loss of countervailing sovereign and social forces, imputing to dialectical capture a general good. From studies of European statism Mann and Tilly worry that contemporary despotic states may monopolize or eliminate the social resources by which civil society once compelled sovereign compromise. They dread the political emancipation from the bourgeoisie whereas Arendt recoiled at the political emancipation of the bourgeoisie and unleashing of an ethos of wholly de-territorialized expansion for expansions sake.93 These twinned fears reflect deep images of harmonious state and society94 under military-capitalist-sovereign consortium, a dialectical closure where valuable desires capture the minatory, depraved excesses of the other, perhaps as an organized multitude chasing down global Empire at the limits of the earth to demand a new commonwealth.95 If inter-elite balance captured social conflict at the core of strategic territoriality, elite-subaltern conquest captured it, if more tenuously, on the imperial frontier.96 A similar dialectic governed urbane coalitions in ruling cities and merciless wars in the hinterland. If reciprocity and institutional quarantine territorialized sovereign power at the center, terrible brutality did so at the margins. Social capture at the core and periphery alike exercised tactical ambiguity, a multifarious and ubiquitous aspect of politics that does not as such define strategic regimes. I am making two related claims here. First, tactical ambiguity covers a wide range of political means, from inter-elite negotiation to elite-subaltern aggression. Second, tactical ambiguity, as central or peripheral repression, combined in empire-state strategic territorialization. In a moment I will address a third claim, that while sovereign-state territoriality deployed multiple tactics,

tactical ambiguity also defined multiple strategies. This suggests that the current preoccupation with neocolonial states of exception eclipse the politics of de-territorialization. Imperial states savagely attacked dehumanized others in the border areas, ghettos, hills, and high seas, to compel cultural, economic, or institutional integration. This ruthless violence served the same strategic regime of tactically sublimated difference as elite military-capitalist-statist haggling in various riverine palaces. Under the Westphalian-Weberian state-system, sovereign power radiated out through concentric circles of conquest, pacifying and territorializing unruly borders in an ever-widening expanse of legible, numerable, and patterned social units. The core re-constructed the periphery, taming the frontier with molar tactics from military rationalization via cellular automata97 to human terrain mapping.98 But statist territorialization exploited imitative and improvised tactics, conceived as a dialectical process of positing then negating de-territorialized tactics at the edges. Juridical, integrated, legible sovereign states were built by adopting and abandoning illegal, disintegrated, and illegible tactics and strategies; as such, sovereign power deployed illegible mercenaries to render illegible insurgents legible, expanding legibility as a sovereign resource. The quintessential example is the rivalry between mercantilism and piracy; states adopted piratical tactics in order to subdue pirates and territorialize the sea as a field of human energy, activity, and organization.99 Sovereign power constituted itself, then, not by exerting one kind of power (statist) against another (anti-statist), or territorial versus anti-territorial force. State apparatuses arose not when soldiers defeated terrorists, or regular armies conquered irregular partisans in polar modes of warfare. Regular armies imitated irregular insurgent operations100 or hired irregular paramilitaries, adopting anti-sovereign tactics to defeat pirates, bandits, rebels, partisans, insurgents, and outlaws.101 The states exploitation of uncertainty responded to its enemies de-territorialization of sea-lanes, urban terrain, rural landscape, and open skies. As one British veteran-scholar wrote over a century ago:
In every class of warfare uncertainty must exist as to the movements, intentions, and whereabouts of the enemy. Unless there is some special reason for acting to the contrary, a commander always endeavors to keep his antagonist in doubt upon these pointsThe more irregular and the less organized the forces of the enemy are, the more independent do they become of strategical [sic.] rules[A]nother peculiarity which is very generally found in the antagonists with whom the organized forces in small wars have to copeis the extreme rapidity with which the enemy conducts his movements and operations. This mobilityis attributable tomarching power, freedom of impedimenta, knowledge of the theatre of war, and so forth. But one important consequence of this mobility on the part of the enemy undoubtedly is to increase the perplexity and uncertainty in which the regular army is plunged. 102

Plunged [into] perplexity and uncertainty by the mobility and rapidity of irregular enemies, the general tried to keep his antagonist in doubt, conquering the outlaw by copying him. In turn, besieged pirates, bandits, and rebels imitated the sovereign, forming mini-states with codified legal regulations, distributive mechanisms, and legislative procedures on wooden worlds103 at sea and floating islands on land.104 In their contagion of mimicry sovereign and outlaw deployed tactical ambiguity, spontaneity, and

flexibility that nonetheless produced territoriality as a hegemonic sovereign resource.105 This dialectical mimesis of mutual becoming, borrowing, and bestowing proliferated tactical ambiguity but embedded it in the progression of strategic regularity. Sovereign tactical de-territorialization and nomadic tactical territorialization spiraled toward Westphalian-Weberian strategic territorialization: the governing of land, people, and things in a regime of discipline, regulation, bio-power and tenuously captured social excess.106 This mimetic dialectic has now reversed course, as the tactical ambiguity has erupted and overflowed balance at the core and conquest at the periphery. As honest bankers, businessmen, generals, presidents, scholars, tax-payers, and terrorists now admit, we are all outlaws now. This is why we must distinguish regimes of (de-)territorialization from the fluid means of all state systems. Arbitrary, cruel, and unaccountable tactics define military-, market-, and state-building projects but with differing regimelevel effects. The multiplication and replication of de-territorialized tactics between sovereign and enemy forces that once underwrote has now undermined the regime of strategic territorialization. Before elucidating the de-territorialized strategic system, I should defend the distinction between tactics and regimes of ambiguity against distracting tendencies in current work on neo-colonial politics. The coincidence of means across imperial, hegemonic, and failed states is a hot topic for scholars keen on the imperial designs of superpower politics. The agenda is to present a cahiers de dolances cataloguing torture, assassination, rendition, indefinite detention, and assassination, and other signifiers of the state of exception associated with genocide, ethnic cleansing, low-intensity war-criminality, and state-terrorism. The finding is that the major powers, especially the US, have invaded, occupied, incarcerated, killed, and tortured people with impunity in the contemporary war on terror, making them as immoral and vicious as their imperialist forebears. Look, we hear, the Belgians did it in the Congo, the French in Algeria, the British in Kenya, and now the Americans murder, bomb, and torture at will in Afghanistan! The hope may be to impede the war on terror that most people passively or actively support by linking it to tainted colonial atrocities. If so, reports of affective, aesthetic, or absolute offense seem a wise move. 107 And by examining tactical patterns anti-imperial research can disavow recondite or crude reductions of sovereignty to internment108 or violence109 per se. But the emphasis on torture, massacres, and the state of exception prioritizes continuous tactics over discontinuous regimes, thus producing an imprecise, narrow, and potentially reactionary impressionistic politics of sovereign loss. Recall that tactical de-territorialization can territorialize or de-territorialize the strategic regime or sovereign system. American military-market-statists subjected the indigenous peoples to monumental violence and suffering in order to create a centralized, standardized, cohesive polity whose institutions no longer use those means. Wars and terrorism marked borders of a territorializing regime whose hierarchy, legibility, bio-power, and jurisdiction were radiating out from the center.110 Similarly, French torture and killing of Algerians in the 1950s differs from US torture and killing of Islamists in the 2000s because the

Algerian revolution occupied a dualistic regime of strategic territorialization in which sovereignty was still defined, ruled, and defended by the land-nation-rights axis. Win or lose, Frances appalling carceral regime of torture, massacre, and disappearance would be buried, if only to resurface in post-colonial Algerias perpetual war on terror.111 This trajectory situates continuous means of tactical ambiguity in discrete territorial regimes and shows how tactical ambiguity can then suffuse the strategic milieu.112 The modern state and its chaotic colonial borders have always been sites of tactical ambiguity, negotiation, pragmatism, and exceptional brutality.113 But ubiquitous tactical cruelty and hegemonic prerogative still construct distinct strategic regimes. Analytical focus on tactical excess will find colonialterror formations everywhere: zones in which war and disorder, internal and external figures of the political, stand side by side or alternate with each other outside legal and institutional rules.114 The search for colonial continuity, however progressive, thus dangerously ignores the context of the text, the protean regimes that emerge from tactical de-territorialization. Atrocious tactics like torture do not have but gain meaning in their relationships to strategic systems. 115 It matters not mainly what the tactics are but what they create, where they go whether torture leads toward or away from sovereign power or strategic territorialization. Tactical improvisation pervades the internal and external frontiers of every polity whose prisons, camps, ghettoes, and borders are less Law and Order and more A Touch of Evil.116 But the question is whether tactical de-territorialization, the use of any means, is generating or attenuating a regime of strategic territorialization, a generalized system of monistic force. Emphasizing the regularity of coercive or racist tactics across (neo-)colonial settings obscures the various surrounding strategic conditions that may determine the endurance of those tactics. Reducing political analysis to colonial tactical ambiguity occludes tactical ambiguitys colonization of strategic territoriality.117 Studies of neo-colonial tactics ignore such critical strategic changes. Comparing US strategic bombing in Vietnam to UAV (drone) attacks in Pakistan opens a portal into the contemporary regime.118 War has nearly vanished from power, or as Badiou puts it:
Now the concept of war only designates the use of violence, disposed in variable dissymmetries. The only invariable trait is dissymmetry: only the weak are targeted and as soon as the shadow of power can be seen (North Koreas atomic bomb, the Russia of brutal extortions in Chechnya, the heavy hand of the Chinese in Tibet), war war which might risk actually becoming a war, and not the peace of the police, or peace/war (la pguerre aprs laprs-guerre) is not on the agenda.119

In Foucaults terms less sovereign killing yields more bio-political letting die.120 Post-sovereign and -governmental121 power renders colonial tactics, a statist supplement, an activist fetish that brackets the politics of life itself and its illegible, innumerable victims. Finally, the strategic regime matters because sovereign excess varies by circumstance. We need not presume every durably invested social group spends its time plotting against its constitutive outside. There is no reason to suppose that the new dog-

lovers-collective will attack the cat-lovers-club.122 Rather, sovereign excess varies by internal and external factors. Even if military, capitalist, state, or dog-lovers organizations are inherently aggressive their conditional vulnerability or safety will decide their actions. I digress over this because I have presupposed that capitalist, militarist, and statist interests are maximalist or excessive by nature, that is, infinitely acquisitive by their internal or systemic logics.123 If we relax this premise to admit variation in sovereign excess then the transformation from tactical to strategic de-territorialization may expand the ambit of tactical ambiguity beyond torture and indefinite detention with the ever more extensive erosion of ethical or deliberative space. I now turn to the regime of strategic de-territorialization that has succeeded territorial capture. State apparatuses and territorial strategies that captured and nurtured the excessive energies of capital, military, state, and outlaw under Westphalian-Weberian sovereignty have collapsed into their opposite, the regime of strategic de-territorialization. Strategic ambiguity resulted when technical parity weakened sovereign leverage to co-opt or coerce elites and subalterns, although an explanatory account here must be an abstract technological-functionalism. In the core and periphery of strategic territorialization a similar organizational exhaustion occurred in the mechanisms of dualistic capture and instrumental repression. Inter-elite compromise was bound to erode as financial, institutional, and geopolitical specialization and autonomy unleashed rhizomatic energies and immanent desires of de-stratified sub-sectors. As military, market, and state equilibrium under sovereign assemblage124 fragmented, so did anti-colonial material and ideological resources overflow imperial structures. In sum, the sovereign territorialization that once stratified core elites and pacified peripheral rogues released the monistic, excessive energies it nurtured in both. I have suggested that the regime of sovereign spatiality incubated, amplified, and equipped social aggression at all corners of the military-market-state-rebel ensemble. The rise of de-territorialized power inhered in territorialized power as its immanent other-within and therefore lacks an obvious starting point. Tactical ambiguity antedated and, in retrospect, pre-figured strategic ambiguity, so the substantive issue is not the specific timing but the anfractuous, cumulative emergence of systemic de-territorialization.125 Still, Arendts passages on expansion for expansions sake126 as the triumphant bourgeois ethos of imperial Europe are seminal in the empirical delineation and normative critique of uncaptured excess, monistic subjectivity, and unfettered Realpolitik.127 Arendt derives totalitarian and imperial regimes from the detachment of capitalism from political rationality. This capitalism-imperialism-totalitarianism nexus re-situates systematic racist de-humanization128 in the degradation of commodified human subjectivity. How, Arendt says, a competition between fully armed business concerns empires could end in anything but victory for one and death for the other is difficult to understand. Linking capital, empire, and the tyrannical state of exception she illuminates the rise and character of strategic ambiguity. Arendt connects social excess at the core to that at the periphery; the politically emancipated colonizer captures

the politically emaciated colonized. Returning to the analogy of concentric circles, we find at the inner and outermost rings a deepening homology of military-market-statist absolutism from Paris, London, and Washington to the far reaches of Algeria, India, and Haiti. The concentric territorialization of elites and rebels reached the end of the line when tactical ambiguity radiated back from the frontier to the city, deterritorializing sovereign power. The dialectical and territorial capture of elite and rogue monists of capitalist, terrorist, militarist, and statist militants alike has inverted into the counter-dialectical and antiterritorial eruption of aggressive excess. 9/11/2001 did change everything by finalizing, not initiating, the erosion of boundaries and deterritorialization of politics129 long nourished in the core and periphery of sovereign territoriality. The regime of strategic-de-territorialization is a structural-subjective system best approached in capitalist terms for historical, theoretical, and expository reasons. Capitalism is both master metaphor and literal motor of strategic ambiguity, but with caveats. Even radicals who indict capitalism for evil utility maximizing or instrumental reason have internalized its rhetoric of liberal peace, general equilibrium, or liberal communism.130 Strategic ambiguity must be understood without such compensatory images. Capitalism effectively represents monistic expansion because it is analogous to social morality, martial aggression, or sovereign exception. In sum, I adopt the market metaphor for strategic ambiguity precisely to equate capital to military, state, and terror. It is this isomorphism, as I have been arguing, that indexes strategic de-territorialization, not apologistic reductions of globalization to capitalism. A second caveat is more analytical. Like capitalism, strategic ambiguity comprises structural and subjective elements that are co-constituted but analytically distinct. Capitalism as structure and capitalist as subject entail, but are not reducible to, each other just like military and soldier or state and citizen. Capitalism, like any system, is a structural-subjective whole at any specific moment but structures and subjects are shaped by external systems that affect that whole. Capitalist and worker, general and soldier, and official and citizen inhabit capitalist, military, and state systems; but they also inhabit a larger regime, either sovereign-territorial or strategic-ambiguous. The larger regime encompasses and orders these multiple systems and inhabitants through dualistic capture or monistic release; in the latter, citizen, soldier, and worker, or official, general, and capitalist are intra-systemically fragmented as never before as their systems have homogenized. It is this miscegenation, dislocation, improvisation, and alienation that the capitalist metaphor accesses but that strategic de-territorialization disperses across and between its structures and subjects. In Anti-dipus Deleuze and Guattari describe the smooth space of monistic de-territorialization: Capitalism is the only social machine that is constructed on the basis of decoded flows, substituting for intrinsic codes an axiomatic of abstract quantities in the form of money. Capitalism therefore liberates the flow of desire, but under the social conditions that define its limit and the possibilityIf capitalism is the universal truth, it is so in the sense that makes capitalism the negative of all social formations. It is the thing, the unnamable, the generalized

decoding of flows that reveal a contrario the secrets of all these formations, coding the flows, and even overcoding them, rather than letting anything escape coding. Primitive societies are not outside history; rather, it is capitalism that is at the end of history, it is capitalism that results from a long history of contingencies and accidents, and that brings on this end. It cannot be said that the previous formations did not foresee this Thing that only came from without by rising from within, and that at all costs had to be prevented from rising.131 Capital here is a hurricane, flood, or conflagration devouring mere humanity. For all its scintillation, this conception hews to conventional enlightenment anxieties that social machines or systems will overwhelm human value, quality, or distinction. Capitalisms Kingdom of Means colonizes the Lifeworld, replaces substantive with procedural rationality, promotes private calculation over public deliberation, etc.; but its unique mechanisms are its social saturation, seamless surround, and incessant re-de-over-codings all its solids melting into air. Capitalism diffuses a monistic decisionism with no outside where means and ends collapse into undifferentiated modes of justification and explanation; citizens and workers dissolve into substitutable objects and subjects; and statesmen, generals, and families alike internalize the cash nexus. In the structure of capital the thing itself is the remedy against the threat it poses, a power left to itself [that] can achieve nothing but more power [and] turns into a destructive principle that will not stop until there is nothing left to violate.132 Capitalism is system of pure strategic de-territorialization, in other words that interpellates and mobilizes agents, techniques, and networks in fluid tactical ambiguity. It is not a value-sphere of optional opportunism and competition but a compulsory, disciplinary regime of time-space compressed and just-in-time subjectivity. As in US-al-Qaida militarism, the allotropic and absolutizing bourgeois regime emancipates and captures the social horizon, trapping its activated objects as free subjects. This political economy of vulnerability, paranoia, and hyper-activity thus re-captures social excess but now in monistic spaces and performances of immediacy, automaticity, and compliance. Hence two seemingly opposed versions of realist monism conjoin: the camp and the market. The former seems an enclosed and vertical striation of collective brutality, the latter an open and horizontal release of atomized desires. The hoary leftist clich that factories are like concentration camps is beside my point, which is to locate differential sites of comparable subject-object intensification across exemplary regimes. Capital-workers are interpellated and mobilized as subject-objects in monistic and de-territorialized space, unlike prison-workers; both are captured by rigorously punitive regimes. Strategic de-territorialization and sovereign territorialization produce, through distinct mechanisms, subjects of arbitrary rule.133 A simpler argument is that capitalism is not merely the clearest model for strategic ambiguity, but directly defines post-sovereign power. The commodity-form permeates social existence, reducing labor to bare life134 in the abstract temporality 135 and de-territorialization136 of post-Fordist capital and even commercializing citizenship.137 Thus Nitzan and Bichler describe capitals figurative identity as power:

capital does not relate to power. It is, itself, a mode of powerThe legal-organizational entity of the corporation and the network of institutions and organs that make up government are part and parcel of the same encompassing mode of power. We call this mode of power the state of capital, and it is the ongoing transformation of this state of capital that constitutes the accumulation of capital[Against the artificially separated spheres of economics, politics, sports, and so on, t]he fractured human beings, the infinite threads that tie them to one another, the different spheres between which they move all those converge into one totalizing logic: the logic of capital.138

There is, they add, a single process of capital accumulation/state formation, a process of restructuring by which capital is accumulated as power. To study the accumulation of capital is to study the formation and transformation of organized power under capitalism. 139 In this last passage organized power under capitalism inverts the Marxian schema wherein the material mode of production is under its necessary social relations. Capitalism is now, they mean, the social organization of power itself, replacing the dualistic, conflicted, and revolutionary market-in-politics with a monistic, reconciled, and evolutionary market-as-politics. Capital in its ascent invades and re-inscribes the juridical order, the ideational site of sovereign power. Many studies140 confirm this trend, but Comaroff and Comaroff convey it in a way that encapsulates a regime of strategic de-territorialization:
With market fundamentalism has come a gradual erasure of received lines between the informal and the illegal, regulation and irregularity, order and organized lawlessnessVastly lucrative returns also inhere in actively sustaining zones of ambiguity between the presence and absence of law: returns made from controlling uncertainty, terror, even life itself; from privatizing public contracts and resources; from discretionary policing and laundering of various kinds. From amassing value, that is, by exploiting the new aporias of jurisdiction opened up under neoliberal conditions. 141

Such a capitalized regime of strategic ambiguity operates between chaos142 and totalized order, rather as a generally predictable pattern sub-system discretionary power. What exists in these zones of ambiguity between the presence and absence of law is not random or stochastic but strategically anarchic: a regime of generalized tactical ambiguity controlled by various elites and incumbents seeking familiar results with new prerogatives and latitude.143 The key departure from sovereign strategic territorialization, then, is the invention of a regime that inverts the key weapons of state-building. Strategic ambiguity is a structure of invisibility, illegibility, innumerability, and inaudibility a system, in the Comaroffs unsurpassed words, of controlling uncertainty, terror, even life itself. In contrast to striated state apparatuses that codify the inside and outside of law, strategic de-territorialization is a regime of decoded flows in the interstices of the legal-illegal, legible-illegible, and so on. In short, strategic ambiguity constitutes an environment that guarantees spaces of pure force and will against juridical, legal, ethical, or moral constraint. The terrorist leads us to the structured subject of strategic de-territorialization, in terms similar to capitalist discourse. The nomad with a bomb, the pirate on land, personifies tactical de-territorialization. Terrorist campaigns usually target coercive states, exploiting the tactical or social resources of sovereign power (openness, ignorance, media, etc.). The sovereign, recoiling in horror and fired by indignation,

goes dark, off-grid, adopting piratical tactics of invisibility, secrecy, evasion, and unaccountability. To defeat terrorists the state disavows territorialized tactics, like so many American grade-schoolers mocking the British red coats. But more broadly, after 11 Sept 2001 the US burst into ethical, institutional, and military adhockery: declaring a state of emergency; attacking and occupying Afghanistan and Iraq with savage violence, securitization mantras, dogmatic marketism, and battlefield welfarism; and fighting a war on terror that made terrorism only more likely. This litany demonstrates the creation of a regime of unmediated prerogative and monistic force. To defeat terror, the full spectral experience of vulnerability, the state did not accept tit-for-tat retaliation or eleventh-hour anticipation, but expanded its jurisdiction, surveillance, force-projection, and response-time across all time and space. The anti-terrorism discourse presented a compressed spatial-temporal order, akin to post-modern capitalism144, that precluded legal, political, or reflective obstacles to sovereign force. Here we may turn to a rarely noted comment Arendt made on time-space compression. Totalitarianism, she said, destroys the one essential prerequisite of all freedom which is simply the capacity of motion which cannot exist without spaceIn the iron band of terror, which destroys the plurality of men and makes out of many the One who unfailingly will act as though he himself were part of the course of history or nature, a devise has been found not only to liberate the historical and natural forces, but to accelerate them to a speed they ever would reach if left to themselves.145 The regime of crushed motion, speed, and space by which the war on terror totalizes and fragments sea, air, and land generates cognates of its ambiguous, weaponized identities, ethics, sociology, and activity in the citizens, soldiers, aid workers, development specialists, social scientists, bureaucrats, police, officials, and contractors. First, strategic ambiguity deracinates and confuses civilian, military, police, security personnel, and paramilitaries, blurring the quintessential categories of territorial recognition. Notoriously we have not only civilianization of the military/militarization of civilians, but debilitating militarization of once insulated endeavors like development.146 Ethically, the subject of multiple de-territorialized wars on terror is silenced, compliant, subdued, and forever afraid of (unwittingly aiding) the enemy. The social or psychic subject of strategic ambiguity is vulnerable, anxious, narcissistic, fragmented, performative, and takes to unconscious or communal flight. The inevitable other of this submissive, docile ethical-social subject is the self-authenticating or -inventing extremist or militant. Finally, the regime repays diligence, efficiency, sobriety, responsibility, rapidity, and analytical narrowness in contributing to national security. Hardly just the Protestant work ethic, these elements form the psychotic composite profile of the subjectobject intensified by a regime of untraceable tactics, illegible strategies, and unimaginable power. As structural and subjective de-territorialization totalize monistic force and enforce arbitrary rule, we are brought back to the conception of total war. The amplification of tactical ambiguity into a comprehensive regime of monistic prerogative, just-in-time morality, and kill-or-die subjectivity threatens

the core of the enlightenments account of itself. We have heard many times that humanity is at war with itself that its spirit, reason, or passion is self-destructive. Foucault proclaimed, for instance, that
wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. 147

It was a seminal development in human history when societies could be structured and inculcated so that two entire peoples could go to war integrally, comprehensively, and absolutely. In Gallis stirring words:
With the entrance of armed masses into politics, the modern state died and totalitarianism was born. Totalitarianism is a political order that hosts disorder within itself; it is a new order that configures itself as a post-human objectivity in which friend and enemy lose their own subjective characteristics and become stereotypes (such as the no-longer human, the Titan, and, ultimately, the less-than-human)Rather than try to make sense of totalitarianism with reference to outmoded conceptual frameworks, let us instead recognize that both internally and externally totalitarianism practices a new type of war: the total war. The integral war, which is also morally discriminatory, involves the state, society, army and party, economy, politics, ideology in short, all the forms of human existence, a vast arsenal employed against the biological substance of the enemy.Schmitt refused to see that the new conflict between twentieth-century political totalities was not the functional equivalent of traditional conflict between modern State forms. The main difference is that the latter still involved mutual recognition and hence potential order, whereas the former consisted in mutual nihilistic dehumanization, and consequently in the transformation of war into the destruction of the social and biological substance of the enemy. 148

In contrast to dualistic conflicts between sovereigns with purposeful or rational motives and resolutions, in which Modern state formsstill involved mutual recognition and hence potential order, total war entailed nihilistic dehumanization, the desire to destroy another people as a biological substance. In comparison to the total wars of the 20th-century, consider Weizmans account of occupation:
In the occupied Palestinian Territories, the organization of geographical space cannot simply be understood as the preserve of the Israeli government executive power alone, but rather one diffused among a multiplicity of often non-state actors. The spatial organization of the Occupied Territories is a reflection not only of an ordered process of planning and implementation, but, and increasingly so, of structured chaos, in which the often deliberate selective absence of government intervention promotes an unregulated process of violent dispossession. The actors operating within this frontier young settlers, the Israeli militarycapitalist corporations, human rights and political activists, armed resistance, humanitarian and legal experts, government ministries, foreign governments, supportive communities overseas, state planners, the media, the Israeli High Court of Justice with the differences and contradictions of their aims, all play their part in the diffused and anarchic, albeit collective authorship of its spaces. Because elastic geographies respond to a multiple and diffused rather than a single source of power, their architecture cannot be understood as the material embodiment of a unified political will or as the product of a single ideology. Rather, the organization of the Occupied Territories should be seen as a kind of political plastic, or as a map of the relation between all forces that shape it. 149

The occupation of the Palestinian territories should be called de-totalized total war, and typifies the broad release of military-capitalist-statist-piratical excess in strategic ambiguity.150 Israeli society participates in the occupation as a fragmented, contentious, polycentric whole. The collective authorship of its spaces

comprises all leading monistic sectors of the country, effectively at war with the whole of Palestine, itself internally divided but one people arguably collectivized in military, economic, and social conflict against Zionist nationalism. But total war is de-totalized because sub-sovereign entities in Israel and Palestine are fighting discrete, occasional, and internally antagonistic conflicts. Weizman encourages us to imagine the political plastic and structured chaos of occupation, to radically re-orient our political vision to grasp the conquest of the OPT through de-territorialized territorialization. De-totalized total war occurs where non-governmental states, civil societies, militaries, businesses, mercenaries, bandits, or activists from multiple (national) locations might align in any number of ways, spaces, and ventures, including mortal struggle. The perfect synechdoche of strategic ambiguity, then, is an enclave economic project in which a firm from one country, investors from another, some host-country bureaucrats, and private contractors from a fourth country land somewhere, start a business and a community and perhaps have a small war with locals, all without juridical authority, humanitarian intervention, or sovereign power. This re-vision of politics, bringing strategic ambiguity into view, requires us to imagine our own reality, to re-inscribe the power that inscribes us. In the de-totalized total war, we are part of the bio-political division of humanity into what can be metaphorically called insured and non-insured life and, as such,of a global civil war at the level of species-existence itself.151 I wish to revise the relationship between the Pashtu militant in Helmand and the American in Las Vegas who drops his kids at school, cruises to work in his SUV humming to Coldplay, conducts drone attacks killing dozens of people in Afghanistan, and drives home to barbecue with his family. How do we conceive the violence between the suburban American bomber and the rural Afghan sniper aiming at his friend? In the de-totalized total war of strategic deterritorialization, I see them, like the insured and non-insured, fighting one-on-one, by all means. De-Territorialization as metaphor In his novella, The Royal Game, Stefan Zweig gives an apposite description of chess:
But is it not an offensively narrow construction to call chess a game? Is it not a science, too, a technique, an art, that sways among these categories as Mohamets coffin does between heaven and earth, at once a union of all contradictory concepts: primeval yet ever new; mechanical in operation yet effective only through the imagination; bounded in geometric space though boundless in its combinations; everdeveloping yet sterile; thought that leads to nothing; mathematics that produces no result; art without works; architecture without substance; and nevertheless, as proved by evidence, more lasting in its being and presence than all books and achievements; the only game that belongs to all peoples and all ages and of which none knows the divinity that bestowed it on the world to slay boredom, to sharpen the senses, to exhilarate the spirit. One searches for its beginning and for its end. 152

Zweig departs from the familiar use of chess as a signifier of rule-enabled action.153 He reverses liberal or psychoanalytic senses of law as constituting play or creativity here diversion and natality constitute law. Chess-as-law dis-identifies with chess-as-game, the paradox of its in/finite territoriality. Games transcend the order they inhabit, as power [is] irreducible to law.154 Zweigs chess, lacking beginning or end,

exceeds time, place, culture, situation, articulation, even itself. What, indeed, would solving it mean?155 Its unbound multiplicity adjoins the rise of universality out of the particular lifeworldwhen a properly universal dimension explodes from within a particular context and becomes for-itself, and is directly experienced as universal.156 Chess reflects the desire for the infinite, uncaptured, unfolding universal articulatedthrough challenges to its existing formulation.157 In Zweigs tale the chess master starts as a parochial landed peasant and becomes the world champion, whom we encounter on a boat at sea. Chess embodies the layered paradox of sovereign freedom. Only bound by law or tied to a mast do we ascend from behavior to action, animal to human, receptivity to originality. We are freed from mere license by the primordial act of decision, the beginning of all beginnings.158 This decision, as traumatic or revelatory event, concentrates energy on the persistent infinity of existence rather than dissipating it in totalizing repetition.159 The infinite160 universal is situated in-and-against finite-particular law, institutions, or procedures in the becoming-subject of the always-virtual player of the rules of chess. So one paradox of sovereign freedom is that the subjectivity Law allows may be pressed against laws but not against Law per se.161 It would hardly advance the mental faculties or imaginative capacities I hope to develop by playing chess were I to change the rules or dash the pieces to the floor. By adhering to the rules I may exceed myself, by reforming them I only repeat myself.162 This posits a sort of Pascalian point of human multiplicity between ontological particularity and institutional universality, the great dead-ends of normative or empirical political analysis. All we may conclude is that order is a neutral basis for the potential flourishing, valuable human life, symbolized poignantly by the ruled game(s) of chess. Zweigs Hegelian chess frames its celebrated Deleuzian-Guattarian counter-point: Chess is a game of State, or of the courtChess pieces are coded; they have an internal nature and intrinsic properties from which their movements, situations, and confrontations derive. They have qualities; a knight remains a knight, a pawn a pawn, a bishop a bishop. Each is like a subject of the statement endowed with a relative power, and these relative powers combine in a subject of enunciation, that is, the chess player or the games form of interiority. Go pieces, in contrast, are pellets, disks, simple arithmetic units, and have only anonymous, collective, or thirdperson function: It makes a move. It could be a man, a woman, a louse, an elephant. Go pieces are elements of a nonsubjectified machine assemblage with no intrinsic properties, only situational onesWithin their milieu of interiority, chess pieces entertain biunivocal relations with one another, and with the adversarys pieces: their functioning is structural. On the other hand, a Go piece has only a milieu of exteriority, or extrinsic relations with nebulas or constellations, according to which it fulfills functions of insertion or situation, such as bordering, encircling, or shattering. All by itself, a Go piece can destroy an entire constellation synchronically; a chess player cannot (or can do so diachronically only). Chess is indeed a war, but an institutionalized, regulated, coded war, with a front, a rear, battles. But what is proper to Go is war without battle lines, with neither confrontation nor retreat, without battles even: pure strategy, whereas chess is semiologyFinally, the space is not at all the same: in chess, it is a question of arranging a closed space for oneself, thus of going from one point to another, of

occupying the maximum number of squares with the minimum number of pieces. In Go, it is a question of arraying oneself in an open space, of holding space, of maintaining the possibility of springing up at any moment: the movement is not from one point to another, but becomes perpetual, without aim or destination, without departure or arrival. The smooth space of Go, as against the striated space of chess. The nomos of Go against the State of chess, nomos against polis. The difference is that chess codes and decodes space, whereas Go proceeds altogether differently, territorializing and deterritorializing it (make the outside a territory in space; consolidate that territory by the construction of a second, adjacent territory; deterritorialize the enemy by shattering his territory from within; deterritorialize oneself by renouncing, by going elsewhere). Another justice, another movement, another space-time.163 Against Hegelian Chess, Deleuzian Chess precludes multiplicity, infinity, and difference. Here chess represents strategic territorialization (state apparatus), Go strategic de-territorialization (war machine). The claim is that chess/State codifies territorial laws procedures in and through which they dominate-bydefining even resistance to the codes. But Go/war-machine resists by overflowing this territoriality. 164 Hence, chess-as-sovereign does not facilitate but suffocates excessive human desires, energies, wills, and potencies. However vacillating over the ontological or dialectical mechanics of multiplicity/difference, Deleuze sees dis-identification as the essence of existence. Reflecting on Borgess thought-experiment Deleuze says that even if exact replication were possible, two copies and their situation must differ.165 Together, one that will always have existed alone and another that will never have form a pure repetition of the former text and the present text in one another.166 The chess/State fails to capture differential energies, desires, dreams, technologies, and so on:
But the war machines form of exteriority is such that it exists only in its own metamorphoses; it exists in an industrial innovation as well as in a technological invention, in a commercial circuit as well as in a religious creation, in all flows and currents that only secondarily allow themselves to be appropriated by the State. It is in terms not of independence, but of coexistence and competition in a perpetual field of interaction, that we must conceive of exteriority and interiority, war machines of metamorphosis and State apparatuses of identity, bands, and kingdoms. 167

This field of interaction between State and war machine, I am arguing, collapses into pure repetition and mimetic excess the diffusion of monistic realism and tactical ambiguity throughout sovereign order. It is a chess game where players and pieces adopt the tactics of Go, where player can claim victory by suddenly seizing a handful of anothers pieces. If my pawn suddenly jumps over my opponents pieces and I yell, King me! I am no longer playing chess. So what is politics when states, permanently adopting all the tactics of pirates, terrorists, natives, outcasts, and criminals, become the war machine? Strategic ambiguity means continuously fragmented prerogatives for improvised re-spatialization, biopolitical re-inscription, collective punishment, lawfare, biometrical surveillance, destruction of civil infrastructure, massacres, assassinations, torture, and disappearances. It is monistic realism that totalizes instantaneity, immediacy, invisibility, and extra-legality in word and deed, subject and object, tactic and strategy, and rule and play. The de-territorialized regime the appropriation of pure improvisational

power by multiple sovereigns is not, in short, a chess game. There are no preset rules: in principle, there is no distinction between legal and illegal moves and no basis on which the best move can be decided. There are no identifiable pieces. And the chessboard [168] is not self-contained.169 But neither is it a theoretical abstraction, as Americas campaign attests in Afghanistan. There the United States has extended age-old coercive and COIN tactics170 to the psychotic space of pure improvisation. To deny alQaida safe haven, the occupation has encouraged Islamist tactical liquefaction, vaporized the conflict, militarized Muslim civilians, and made the battle both permanent and unwinnable.171 The US backs an Afghan government of illegitimate, corrupt warlords, some implicated in war crimes or crimes against humanity. Many Parliament members are gangsters who stoleat gunpoint or bought their seats with US dollars which they had in abundance because leaders of the Northern Alliance were paid with cash by the CIA for their support of the US war.172 As Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke explained, the US would not allow al-Qaida move back into Afghanistan, set up a larger presence, recruit more people, and pursue its objective against the United States more aggressively. 173 Journalists know not to nag officials on the GWOTs ethical, juridical, or practical rationality but [a]sked to define victoryHolbrooke could only say, Well know it when we see it.174 As to limits placed on the means to this indefinite end, he pronounced, In no way, shape, or form are the presidents options constrained.175 The errand-boy UN representative sought to expand US means-ends de-territorialization. Additional international troops are required, he remonstrated. This cannot be a US-only enterprise.176 Recent battles in Helmand exemplify strategic ambiguity. In February 2010 the American-led coalition mounted [a] large military operation in the Taliban stronghold of Marja to do something they have never done before: bring in an Afghan government and police force behind them.177 Obama has added to COINs clear-hold-build program the transfer of rule from US to Afghan officials and police178, to physically and conceptually extend Afghan governance to these areas.179 In a poignantly mixed metaphor, General McChrystal boasted, Weve got a government in a box, ready to roll in.180 During the operation, the occupying force had no idea whether Marja was a district or a population center; how many people lived there, were civilians, or would become refugees; who might effectively govern; or how to reconstruct a poppy-dependent and Taliban-dictated economy. Within a week, twenty civilians had been killed, including twelve in a shelled house181, as the Taliban scattered to regroup and shortly return like so many pirates chased to deeper waters.182 To mark victory, the coalition appointed Haji Abdul Zahir, a tourist who had never set foot in Marja until two weeks ago, as district governor.183 When Taliban ingenuity, civilian casualties, and cynicism around Marja dimmed the hype, McChrystal blithely added, We have shot an amazing number of people but, to my knowledge, none has ever proven to be a threat.184 In iek-speak the US COIN/surge in Afghanistan is a war without war, legitimized without legitimacy by the divisive nationalists of the international community, waged for a non-

sovereign sovereign by bomber-free bombers, mission-free missionaries, and ground troops lost at sea.185 In a battle that end when it ends, fought as it is fought for this-not-that warlord, these soldiers do not require strategic importance or national interest to give the place value.186 As for soldier for state: it is the fight alone that gives the place value in the great game. And, just so, the policy sage disdains equally traditional statesmen [who] see international relations as a chess game and post-realists [who] see it as more like the complicated, multidirectional Japanese board game of Go. Obama, rest assured, knows you have to play both boards at the same time. 187 Thus speaks de-territorialized power, in the visionless images of an infinite tactical unfolding, of deciding the game at will. De-Territorialization as dialectic Hobbes and Deleuze are the theoretical protagonists of sovereign territorial capture and nomadic de-territorialized flight. But between these poles, in a sense, it is Hegelian Sittlichkeit and Foucauldian assujetissement that compellingly evaluate the spiritual or ethical subjectivity of strategic ambiguity. The modes of becoming Hegel and Foucault depict in response to military, capitalist, statist, and popular excess188 envisage an affective-evaluative subjectivity beyond juridical recapture and nihilist difference. Hegels writing on alienation and reconciliation founds an imperishable socialization of practical reason.189 He approaches as a historical question being at home [bei sich or zu Hause] in the world. Estrangement, in which the social world is not a home, registers the split between consciousness and objective social arrangements.190 Here the primitive state of unconscious social coherence yields subjectivity, a new exercise of conscience and critical reflection on ones social roles and institutions that produces alienation and the need for reconciliation. This split between consciousness (subject) and world (object) manifests in the perception of that bureaucracy, oligarchy, or war (the monistic elements of strategic ambiguity) as Other to who we are or wish to be. The bifurcation of subjective consciousness and objective world inaugurates the separation of is from ought and reality from expectation. 191 Hence philosophy (and religion) arise out of a certain kind of strongly negative affective human experience, an encounter with the world as radically defective, disappointing, or unsatisfactory, painful, absurd, or revolting.192 This disrupted cohesion of subject/object or thought/world means that one term gets away from the other; in the regnant frame of modern criticism, instrumental activity supersedes value-rational action. Anomic and reflective subjects must then reconcile with the Real.193 Alienation is a manifold affective response to the world and its mediation. Subjective experience involutes (1) my relationships to an external, objective world into (2) my sense of that relationship, of my subjective experience, itself. For instance, I experience anew cruelty and my experience of cruelty; I experience myself as an experience of self. More, I become conscious as subject and object of my own becoming.194 If I am alienated because I am denied my affective desires in liberal-legal-bureaucratic

society, then I feel subjective discomfiture with the immediate, de-familiarized, objective world and the mediation of that subjective discomfort and its world. Alienation here manifests Spirits incomplete selfactualization in the world at any moment as Freedoms positing an aspect of itself in human affairs or consciousness.195 Hegel abandons romantic idealizations of the moral-economic community besieged by the foreign symbols and inscrutable noises of encroaching modernity. The advance of rational forms does not oppose but complements and elevates cultural valuation by fusing the freedoms of familial Bildung and market calculation. The modern tension is not between pre-conscious being and conscious becoming or between ascription and reason. Rather, the rupture is the post-primitive antinomy of new material and ideal conditions. I do not encounter modern reason or instrumentalism as a cultural primitive (that is anachronistic) but as a subject whose new consciousness experiences as alienation any material condition offensive to Spirit. In each historical instantiation or positing of Spirit alienation expresses, then, a new consciousness of the world and of consciousness per se. It reflects the dualism of Spirit as it comes
to know itselfThe sole endeavor of spirit is to know what it is in and for itself, and to reveal itself to itself in its true form. It seeks to create a spiritual world in accordance with its own concept, to fulfill and realize its own true nature, and to produce religion and the state in such a way that it will conform to its own concept and be truly itself or become its own Idea. Geist, Hegel contends, attains self-knowledge by developing successively more adequate interpretations of itself, that is, a series of increasingly more coherent interpretations accounting for an increasingly wide range of activities. 196

The source of painful alienation or spiritual discomfort here only appears to reside in primordial mental attachments. Indeed, the form resembles atavistic retrenchment but the content is reversed; resistance to unfulfilled freedom comes not from the past but from the future. Hegel says a state is well constituted and internally strong if the private interest of the citizens is united with the universal goal of the state, so that each finds its fulfillment in the other.197 This states universal goal transcends dialectical capture, however, and achieves the finite infinity of Spirit.198 Hardly a territorial enclosure, Hegels state is a rational totality constituted by an irrational excess or surplus whose limit is the positive condition of [our] very activity.199 For Hegel the affective-rational subject is not captured and reconciled but released and multiplied in the temporal-spatial state. Foucaults concept governmentality, sensibly misconstrued as a political territorialization, must similarly be re-envisioned as a site of multiple, excessive, and infinite subjective ambiguity. Like Hegels reconciled state, Foucaults biopolitics of the population200 situates the intensified antinomies of subject and object, tactics and strategies, apparatus and flow. Foucaults discursive, disciplinary, regulatory, biopolitical, and sovereign forms of power intrinsically register a multiplicity beyond sovereign-state images in Hobbes or Hegel, but like them are accessible only by distinguishing mechanisms from territorialities. Given the relative accessibility and celebrity of governmental bio-power in Foucaults writing, I presume a brief review will suffice to introduce a twofold argument: that bio-political constellations or discourses

are momentary, tactical territorializations of de-territorialized flows of power; and that governmentality further displaces strategic-tactical or subject-object de-territorialization from sovereign capture in Hobbes and suture in Hegel to the immanent bio- and thanato-political plane of monistic improvisation. I wish to posit a Hobbes-Hegel-Foucault-Deleuze series, a trajectory in the emergence of strategic ambiguity where captured excess migrates from Hobbess dualistic opposition to Hegels monistic fusion to Foucaults and Deleuzes perversion of territorialization as itinerant de-territorializations of de-territorialization. Hence multiplicity and excess thrived under Hobbess Leviathan, through Hegels constitutional monarchy, and now as Foucaults governmentality or Deleuzes assemblage. The excess energies of military, capitalist, state, and piratical desires embody this logic, an arc from extrinsic to intrinsic emancipation; that is, from alienated capture under the State to actualized release in discourses. The pervasive and invasive mapping, reading, and counting of disciplined subjects are the signs of unmediated tactical prerogative. Foucault argues that the entry of life into history201 entails a new art of government that takes the physiology of individuals and the population as its object. To monitor, train, nurture, and protect its citizens-subjects governmental power imposed anatamo-political disciplines on persons and bio-political regulations on the people. Foucaults distinctions and qualifications overwhelm, but we can emphasize several key points already. Governmentality, as it seizes hygienic and eugenic properties of life itself as its political scope, totalizes the body-politic as a species and individualizes bodies-politic as efficient workers, useful citizens, and so on. In terms of this essay, we may characterize governmentality as a dual (re-)territorialization of disaggregated individual subjects into one agglomerated population. To this end bio-power (anatomo-, thanato-, bio-politics) mobilizes multivalent techniques, heuristics, practices, and tactics at diverse sites, from national to local to personal to molecular. Governmentality re-defines the territories and subjectivities of life with a bio-political gaze that gauges productive and repressive power. Military-capitalist-statist capture/excess requires variously disciplined, docile, or efficient bodies; but law, psychiatry, sexuality, and criminology also need regulated and confessional subjects. Governmental biopower deploys diffuse, de-centered, polymorphous discourses (linguistic-institutional regimes) to secure such bodies and subjects. As society unifies the polity becomes a conglomeration of hospitals, barracks, schools, prisons, factories, and courts, a spectrum of monistic discourses forming discrete subjects instrumentalized for social perpetuation, efficacy, and safety. Within the governmental scheme, finally, the state has no systemic primacy or unique features. Foucault contrasts sovereignty and bio-power but their excessive and monistic mechanisms and governmentalitys dominant position or definitive character emerge all the same. Foucault denies that
sovereigntys old right to take life or let live was replaced, but it came to be complemented by a new right which does not erase the old right but which does penetrate it, permeate it. This is the right, or rather precisely the opposite right. It is the power to make live or let die. The right of sovereignty was the 202 right to take life or let live. And then this new right is established: the right to make live and let die.

Foucault further differentiates bio-power from disciplinary power, although the former does dovetail into it, integrate it, modify it to some extent, and, above all, use it by sort of infiltrating it, embedding itself in existing disciplinary technologies. Such passages clarify that disciplinary and sovereign power are, in a sense, being taken over (permeated, infiltrated, penetrated) by governmentality, if only partially. It makes sense that power over life or species would absorb, saturate, or colonize narrower powers to kill or train individuals. Nonetheless governmental bio-power is widely seen as an appendage or support system for other modalities. Especially, bio-power is thought to deepen, complement, or extent sovereign power by connecting state activities to the micro-physics of disciplinary power. Foucault solidified this interpretation himself, summating the formation of a political governmentalityin which the conduct of a set of individuals became involvedin the exercise of sovereign power..., an art of governing that finds the principles of rationality and the specific domain of its application in the state.203 Reasonably enough, sovereign power is said to be governmentalized when bio-political tactics buttress or refine the state, or
procedures of governmentalityare invoked to extend and fortify forms of sovereignty that are equally irreducible to lawThe suspension of the rule of law allows for the convergence of governmentality and sovereignty; sovereignty is exercised in the act of suspension, but also in the self-allocation of legal prerogative; governmentality denotes an operation of administrat[ive] power that is extra-legal, even as it can and does return to law as a field of tactical operations. 204

Echoing Butler, Agamben sees the state of exceptionnot onlyas a technique of government rather than an exceptional measure, but it also lets its own nature as the constitutive paradigm of the juridical order come to light.205 Reid replaces miscegenation with oscillation in the balance between deterritorializing and reterritorializing forces, or between flows, agencies, and practices of biopolitical form and those actions by which the nation-state reinstates its sovereignty.206 Faulting Agamben and Hardt and Negri for read[ing] biopower back into the sovereign, Medevoi confines bio-power to governmentality, which regulates the population and enacts a [capitalist] political economy, a maximization of the relationship [among] wealth, territory, and population with a minimization of force exerted.207 Yet an undecidable suspension between the rubrics of regulation and war perpetuates our simultaneous state of war and peace, with the war on terroras the territorially unbounded, politically malleable military strategy thatthe pacification of populations in the name of world market integrationactually demands.208 Alternatively, Hoffman claims that Foucault abandoned Nietzsches hypothesis that power consists of warlike struggles between forces for the politics of conduct based on governmental power.209 These discrepant views recognize the infinite capacity of governmental power as it supplements or even succeeds sovereign power, but they all see bio-power as territorialization.210 One crucial difficulty is that Foucaults recursive style, his serial framings of what something was through concentric negations of what it was not211 has led to reification and juxtaposition of the

posited and negated categories he deploys, such as sovereignty and governmentality. To essentialize his concepts as identities-in-relation violates his procedure, eliding the excess internal to his method. Foucaults technique is an instance of its theory, of an historical nominalism cast against teleological, universal, or stable analytical categories.212 He wrote not objective histories of the present, but rather histories of the objectification of the present.213 That is, in his cases as in his concepts the mechanisms are multiple, overlapping, provisional, and experimental, occasionally territorializing a method or tactic to get a footing before advancing. We tend to identify modes of power and put them in definitive order, not least because Foucault did. Pace hostility to totalization, Foucault said, Panoptism [was] utilized first of all on a local level, in schools, barracks, and hospitalsAnd, at a certain moment in time, these methods began to become generalized.214 Still, in the mechanisms of governmentality we excavate the monistic and improvisational force that allows bio-power to invade and reconstitute state, military, and capitalist tactics, breaking its capture and freeing its excess. Governmental bio-power does not modify or advance sovereign, regulatory, or disciplinary territories but re-inscribes them just as tactical de-territorialization universalized to form the de-territorialized regime. Bio-power turns sovereignty into strategic ambiguity. Governmentality should connote de-territorialized motifs such as the heteronomous freedom of sensuous experience cultivated in techniques of the self,215 not the spatialized welfare-state. Foucault is neither theorist nor adherent of territorialized government (or conduct). As Lemke says, governmental discourses entail two operations: representation or generation of rationalized discursive fields; and intervention or the intellectual processing of the reality which political technologies can then tackle, comprising agencies, procedures, institutions, legal forms, etc., that are intended to enable us to govern the objects and subjects of political rationality.216 Note that in producing these discourses, organizations and rationalizations, bio-power is wholly self-propelled, uncaptured, and monistic. Governmentality thus retains the bellicose predicates of Foucaults earlier writings on knowledge/power, for instance:
Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination. The nature of these rules allows violence to be inflicted on violence and resurgence of new forces that are sufficiently strong to dominate those in power. Rules are empty in themselves, violent and unfinalized; they are impersonal and can be bent to any purpose. The successes of history belong to those who are capable of seizing these rules, to replace those who had used them, to disguise themselves so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect them against those who had initially imposed them; controlling this complex mechanism, they will make it function so as to overcome the rulers through their own rules. 217

The monistic instrumentalism and strategic ambiguity, radically stated here, anticipate the turn to biopower and conduct. But this war premise has two coeval facets, generative and systemic. First, the representations and interventions reflect a closed circuit of non-deliberation that generates and re-enforces contingent systems of rationality.218 Second, the divisive logic of bio-political results betrays its intrinsic

instrumentality and hostility. Thus, as Esposito states the biopolitical state replaces community (mutual obligations, social reciprocity, and collective identity) with immunity (state-dispensed security).219 This is the genocidal immanence of bio-powers care for the health of the population, that it creates conditions of possibility for the designation of cancerous social anti-bodies. But it is letting-die, in the minute interstices of social life wherein modern power operates,220 that systematizes the unmediated hostility of generalized tactical de-territorialization. As Rose remarks in an essay on the pastoral eugenecism of risk profiling in advanced liberal bio-power, The idea of society as a single, if heterogeneous, domain with a national culture, population, and destiny co-extensive with a national territory and the power of a national political government has entered a crisis.221 This marks not the end but perfection of bio-power, however, when we realize that governmentality does not want government, it wants to govern. With biopolitical supplementation, medical commodification commands every citizenbecome an active partner in the [will to health], accepting their responsibility for securing their own well-being.222 Foucaults bio-politics re-invigorates his earliest intuitions about unfettered, monistic power, a purely tactical field in which, as Dumm writes, security must become as mobile as the forces that oppose it.223 Indeed, it obverts Foucaults sense of monistic realism in discursive and subjective formations to portray bio-political governmentality as a tendency to political order or capture of immanent social force. In the so-called Governmentality lecture, he declaimed, [W]hat enabled sovereignty to achieve its aim of obedience to the laws was the law itself; law and sovereign were absolutely united. [O]n the contrary, [government] is not a matter of imposing a law on men but of the disposition of things, that is to say, of employing tactics rather than laws, oremploying laws as tactics; arranging things so that this or that end may be achieved through a certain number of means.224 His sardonic rhetoric of this or that end and a certain number of means perfectly evince the conflation of means and ends, laws and tactics. As such,
The art of government was opposed to the theory and practice of sovereignty; it invoked not law or the imposition of rules, but rather the right disposition of things. This meantthat the ends of government were multiple andthat these ends were to be found in the objects of government themselvesThus, the end of government is to be sought in the perfection, the maximization, or the intensification of the processes it directs225

A better elaboration of Arendts expansion for expansions sake is hard to find. As with the released excess of capital, the means-ends composite multiplies, perfects, maximizes, and intensifies as a reason unto itself. This is why governmentalized sovereignty inverts the dialectical capture and territorialized regime it connotes into the realization of immanent sovereign aggression. It is not that the state loses its proprietary referent through bio-political re-articulation but territorial pertinence is exposed as a tactical asset amid the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which [it] operate[s] and which constitute [its] own organizationthrough ceaseless struggles and confrontations.226 In Foucaults microphysics of power is a dispersion of miniaturized mechanisms that are also singularities of an

abstract diagram coextensive with the entire social field, or as quanta deducted from a nonspecific nature the nonspecific flow being defined by a multiplicity of individuals to be controlled.227 There is in Foucault a consistent sense of systemic de-territorialization. Reviewing Deleuze in 1970, he writes:
There is no center but always decenterings, the series, from one to another, with the limp of a presence and an absence, of an excess, of a deficiency. Abandon the circle, a faulty principle of return; abandon our tendency to organize everything into a sphereand you will dream of a a general history of philosophy, a Platonic phantasmatology, and not an architecture of systems. 228

Halfway into his alleged journey from Nietzsche through governmentality to care of the self, he writes:
[T]his micro-physics presupposes that the power exercised on the body is conceived not as a property, but as a strategy, that its effects of domination are attributed not to appropriation but to dispositions, maneuvers, tactics, techniques, functionings, that one should decipher in it a network of relations, constantly in tension, in activity, rather than a privilege that one might possess; that one should take as its model a perpetual battle rather than a contract regulating a transaction or the conquest of a territory. 229

Foucault held fast to the underlying, evolving, and multiple tactical-cum-strategic mechanisms of force as they posited and negated territorial sovereignties like any other sharpened and disposable tools. The state becomes the pirate, the president the terrorist, the suburban commuter the bomber in these circulations of force. In the parabolic trajectory from Hobbes to Deleuze, to and from sovereign power as the crucible of strategic ambiguity, we have arrived where the exception is that which decides on the sovereign. De-territorialization as passage In his summum genus on dialectics, Jameson darkly announces: when Sartrean existentialism:
abandons the death anxiety as some ultimate motive (substituting for it freedom as such) we descend into a true relativity of life-passions or authentic commitments and originary choices from which a Kantian ethics of respect for freedom cannot rescue the ethical thinker. Here the burning questionremains the distinction between humanism and fascism, between a human and an inhuman ethics. 230

These sere dilemmas of universality and relativity, humanism and fascism, and human and inhuman may seem quaint or dated, but Jamesons fatigue is justified. Monistic Realpolitik and fundamentalism can hardly please any ethical intellectual, must less the great secular dialectician. But perhaps strategic deterritorialization and religio-nationalist militancy are surfaces to be interpreted, dialectically, as conveying immanent truths. What if strategic ambiguity and militant difference reflect valuable subjective desires exaggerated by dehumanizing social conditions into monistic means and ends borne by the cunning of (un)reason? Does not each extreme provide some aspect of the way out? What if identity absorbed the elements of pure violence (multiplicity, experiment, and de-territorialization) and violence absorbed the elements of identity (order, legibility, and accountability)? Does this inversion not address the we by recognizing in strategic ambiguity the social desire for practical reason and in fundamentalism the desire for social belonging? Resuscitated ethical reflection and affection may permit us to share a politics of

vulnerability that abjures antiquated juridical, moral, or national231 re-capture for a vigorous return, after all, to land. Beyond the cosmopolitans palliative cities of refuge232, Badiou envisions the creation of independent spaces for a subtractive activism.233 Harvey, too, counsels a kind of re-territorialization: Contemporary discontents with the traditional theory of the state, in fields including international relations, anthropology, history, and cosmopolitan and Marxist theory, derive from the realization that the earlier, damaging fictions concerning state, sovereignty, and private property need to be transformed if a saner and more secure global political order is to be constructedThis means integrating the concept of territory into the dialectics of absolute, relative, and relational modes of approach to space and time.234 In and through the cunning hegemony of monistic means and ends we may find resources for such a practical-ethical revaluation.

1 2

Published in the Special Issue, Territories of Thought, theory@buffalo, #14 (2010). This essay contains revised sections of the following papers: Freedom and Difference: Islamism as a Dilemma for Human Rights, Global Discontent? Dilemmas of Change, 21st World Congress of Political Science, International Political Science Association, Annual Meeting, Santiago, Chile (12-16 July 2009); Marxist Realism at the Dawn and Dusk of Sovereign Power, New Marxian Times, 7th International Conference, Rethinking Marxism, University of Massachusetts, Amherst (5-8 Nov 2009); Islamism, Humanitarianism, and the Politics of Desire, Columbia University Seminar on Human Rights, Columbia University (20 Nov 2008); Strategic Ambiguity and the Politics of Difference, Five College Faculty Seminar on Marxist/Postcolonial Discourse, University of Massachusetts, Amherst (20 Feb 2009). I am grateful to respondents at those events, including Zehra Arat, Seyla Benhabib, Joan Cocks, Frank Holmquist, Omar Dahi, Vishnupad, and especially Mark Kesselman, my discussant and critic in Chile. Finally, the arguments here grew out of conversations with Anderson Mackenzie, Adam Sitze, and Josh Barkan. 3 Alfred Lord Tennyson, Ulysses, Poems by Alfred Tennyson (Moxon 1842). 4 Jacques Rancire, On the Shores of Politics, L. Heron, tr. (Verso 2007 [1992]), p. 2. 5 Bob Dylan, Mississippi, Love and Theft (Columbia 2001), released on September 11. 6 Subaltern excess refers to struggles to enhance dissidents agency under given social orders or political regimes. Militant cadres or evental figures who resist coercive sovereignty by transgressing negation of negation become the constitutive outside of hegemonic ethical discourse. Radicals like Lenin, Paul, LOuverture, Qutb, or Tagore thus remain unassimilated, silenced, or condemned but abstracted from their causes {cf. Georg Lukcs, Lenin: A Study of the Unity of His Thought, N. Jacobs, tr. (Verso 2009 [1924]), pp. 60ff.; Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, R. Brassier, tr. (2003 [1997]), pp. 42ff.; CLR James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint LOuverture and the San Domingo Revolution (Vintage 1989 [1963], pp. 145ff.; Roxanne Euben, Killing (For) Politics: Jihad, Martyrdom, and Political Action, Political Theory, 30:1 (Feb 2002), pp. 11ff.; Ashis Nandy, The Illegitimacy of Nationalism: Rabindranath Tagore and the Politics of Self (Oxford 1994), pp. 4ff.}. 7 Sovereign power often connotes finite state apparatuses gradually supplemented by infinite governmental bio-power {Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, A. Sheridan, tr. (Vintage 1979 [1975]), pp. 93ff.; Governmentality, G. Burchell, et al., eds., R. Braidotti with C. Gordon, trs., The Foucault Effect (Chicago 1991 [1978], pp. 95ff.}. But sovereignty itself indexes both a legible, striated, and finite political form and an illegible, diffuse, and infinite political content. Thus John Austin could define the sovereign as the state and the sovereign One or Number [as] superior to the subject or citizen: the master, of the slave or servant: the father, of the child. In short, whoever can oblige another to comply with his wishes, is the superior of that other, so far as the ability reaches {John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, W. Rumble, ed. (Cambridge 1995 [1832]), pp. 30, 190, fn. 1}. Sovereignty marks the indefinite boundary between

all finite means and infinite ends and thus includes any social form optimizing instrumental capture (legibility, numerability, or governmentality) to maximize immanent excess (incalculable gain, profit, or expansion). I will return to this critical point. 8 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, eds. (Oxford 1974). 9 Militarized capitalism or capitalized militarism is apotheosized in instances of mercenary-monistic ad-venture-capitalism [cf., Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the Worlds Most Powerful Mercenary Army (Nation 2007) and Rolf Uesseler, Servants of War: Private Military Corporations and the Profit of Conflict, J. Chase, tr. (Soft Skull 2008)]. Recent academic studies show systemic constraints on the privatization of war [cf. Angelina Fisher and Simon Chesterman, From Mercenaries to Markets: Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies (Oxford 2007) and Private Security, Public Order: The Outsourcing of Public Services and its Limits (Oxford 2009)]. But this tactical capture would be a predicted component of strategic ambiguity. 10 The pirate is the quintessential enemy of all humanity, the paradoxical constitutive-outside of normative universalism [Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations (Zone 2009)]. The nomadic rebel, anarchist, bandit, hijacker, terrorist, or partisan is the piratical supplements of sovereignty, passing through three modular moments: state hires pirate; state attacks pirate; state becomes pirate. Piracy targets interests within the territorial regime that enables the articulation of interests; it is weaponized anarchism or, in Lacanian terms, generalized perversion yet defined by law. The regime of deterritorialization emerges when the sovereign adopts piratical modalities (illegibility, invisibility, horizontality, antispatialization) permanently and systemically rather than temporarily and peripherally; thus, when tactical ambiguity instantiates the broader strategic regime rather than its exceptional intermediary, creating a psychotic space no longer operative through or around law. 11 The transition to strategic de-territorialization is analogous to that from privately appropriating to dismantling a public-goods system [cf. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard 1965)]. Olson grounds systemic irrationality in the sub-systemic rationality of social excess. Classical political economy unified individual and collective exertion in images of monistic rational development disaffected by the rise of the commodity over moral economy [cf. Robert Brenner, The Social Basis of Economic Development, J. Roemer, ed., Analytical Marxism (Cambridge 1986) and James OConnor, Accmulation Crisis (Basil Blackwell 1984), pp. 16ff., passim]. 12 AbdouMaliq Simone, Pirate Towns: Reworking Social and Symbolic Infrastructures in Johannesburg and Douala, Urban Studies, 43:2 (Feb 2006), pp. 357ff. The regime can be seen as a universalized urban improvisation, as in Simones statement: Throughout urban Africa, power increasingly derives from a capacity to transgress spatial and conceptual boundaries, erasing clear distinctions between public and private, territorial borders, exclusion and inclusionRegimes increasingly recognize that they need no longer substantially invest in the definitional aspects of rule i.e., to deliberate clearly defined jurisdictions, zones, policies, and sectors. This allows unregulated practices of accumulation to unravel once-relied-upon centers of social gravity and then intervening only to depict certain actors and spaces as threats demanding that the state take extraordinary and emergency actions (Simone, Pirate Towns, ibid., pp. 357-358). 13 The phenomenon of disintegration parallels Catherine Boone, Africas New Territorial Politics: Regionalism and the Open Economy in Cte dIvoire, African Studies Review, 50:1 (Apr 2007), pp. 61ff. Boone identifies a set of distinctive territorial effects mapped over economic liberalization, citizenship struggles, regional disputes, diffuse power, and state atrophy. 14 Achille Mbembe, Aesthetics of Superfluity, Public Culture, 16:3 (2004), p. 374; cf. John and Jean Comaroff, Ethnicity, Inc. (Chicago 2009), ch. 4; Larry Diamond, The Rule of Law Versus the Big Man, Journal of Democracy, 19:2 (Apr 2008), pp. 145ff.; but primarily, Jean-Franois Bayart, LEtat en Afrique: La Politique du ventre (Librairie Arthme Fayard 1989). 15 Talal Asad shows how Michael Walzers emergency ethics replaces moral cogency with justifications of civilized massmurder as virtuous, guilt-ridden, conscientious acts of humanitarian necessity [On Suicide Bombing (Columbia 2007), pp. 17-22]. 16 Saba Mahmood, Ethical Formation and Politics of Individual Autonomy in Contemporary Egypt, Social Research, 70:3 (Fall 2003); Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton 2004); Gopal Balakrishnan, The Politics of Piety, Antagonistics: Capitalism and Power in an Age of War (Verso 2009 [2001]), pp. 245ff. 17 Simon Critchley, Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance (Verso 2007) and John Protevi, Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic (Minnesota 2009). 18 Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory (Columbia 1986), pp. 279ff.; and Another Cosmopolitanism (Oxford 2006); cf. Raymond Geuss, History and Illusion in Politics (Cambridge 2001); Bonnie Honig, Emergency Politics: Paradox, Law, Democracy (Princeton 2009). 19 Alain Badiou, Saint Paul, ibid., p. 11, passim; Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, P. Hallward, tr. (Verso 2001 [1998]), pp. 40ff., passim. 20 Gilles Deleuze and Flix Guattari distinguish State and war machine as the topos of de/territorialization {A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, vol. 2, B. Massumi, tr. (Minnesota 1987 [1980]), pp. 360-362, 355}. I address this further below. 21 The brief contretemps over whether American aggression was preemptive or preventive exemplifies the arbitrary conceptual designations entailed by the ambiguous circuit of legal and military sanction: laws must legalize a war to defend law. 22 On the intensification of violence by liberal-humanism, cf. Asad, On Suicide Bombing, ibid., pp. 15ff.; Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land: Israels Architecture of Occupation (Verso 2007), pp. 249ff.; Derek Gregory, The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq (Blackwell 2004), pp. 17ff., passim. 23 I adopt conventional political concepts to highlight the partisan moralities of the wars on terror. Conceptual consistency would commend naming American and Islamist combatants as extremists, militants, etc. If the war on terror is the militant adjunct of racialized global dominion or exploitation, then such a potent binary serves a cognitive or discursive apartheid. As such it must remain part of the described object, stressed but not corrected in an account of its total content.

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On human rights imperialism, cf. Richard Seymour, The Liberal Defense of Murder (Verso 2008) and Wendy Brown, The Most We Can Hope For?: Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism, South Atlantic Quarterly, 103:2/3 (Sum 2004), p. 460. 25 On the contrast between official justifications and actual practices of the invasion/occupation of Iraq, cf. Gregory, The Colonial Present, ibid., pp. 180ff; Lloyd Gardner, The Long Road to Baghdad: A History of US Foreign Policy From the 1970s to the Present (New Press 2008); Philippe Sands, Lawless World: America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules from FDRs Atlantic Charter to George W. Bushs Illegal War (Viking 2005), pp. 174ff. 26 Note that actual and virtual freedoms are conflated. Being-free (I am free) requires becoming-free (I act freely). Freedom is, tensely, condition and possibility. If I am free my free actions occur within, not toward, the condition of freedom. With respect to freedom I have no reason to act once I am free. Once free, I may create, express, or perfect myself but not freedom; I cannot freely strive for freedom. Thus freedom becomes an ontological condition that captures action as already-free. So the statement In a free state I act freely invokes two senses of freedom: (1) a permanent environment of absent limits or negations allowing (2) a malleable field of natality or affirmations. Hence (1) is prior to (2), (2) parasitic on (1): affirmation-in-becoming depends on negation-in-being as its free condition of possibility. This paradoxical subordination of freedoms novelty to fixity justifies this world, our world, [as it] standardizes and commercializes the stakes of such freedom. It submits them to monetary uniformity and with such success that [it] no longer has to revolt to be free since it guarantees us freedom {Alain Badiou, Philosophy and Desire, O. Feltham and J. Clemens, eds., trs., Infinite Thought (Continuum 2009 [1999]), p. 30}. 27 The US explicitly articulated these symbolic (de)formations: invasion overthrew Saddam as sectarian feudal lord; occupation restructured totalitarian machines; surge defeated autochthonous pirates; and withdrawal removed the American nanny state. 28 This is the weaponized ambiguity of freedom itself freedom as freedom-to-be-free aligns the infinite temporal and spatial horizons of liberal-subjective and statist-sovereign excess under the war on terror. 29 Slavoj iek, 20 Years of Collapse, NYT (11 Nov 2009), at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/09/opinion/09zizek.html; Post-Wall, London Review, 31:22 (19 Nov 2009); cf. Jodi Dean, Democracy and other Neoliberal Fantasies (Duke 2009). 30 Cf. Stuart Elden, Terror and Territory: The Spatial Extent of Sovereignty (Minnesota 2009), pp. 176ff. If the nation is a site of forgetting and historical error, as Renan held, then nation-state territorialization facilitates freedom-as-amnesia [quoted in Kwame A. Appiah, Experiments in Ethics (Harvard 2008), p. 6]. Appiahs discussion of ethics, lacking any sustained treatment of its proprietary or territorial politics, helps this amnesia to frame the normative abstractions of the wars on terror. 31 Political philosophers debate whether territory enables and endures progress, for instance whether open borders benefit private-market or public-ethical reason. The war on terror retains this silence of market-statist liberal sovereignty over the ethical balance between political territorialization and military-capitalist-statist excess. 32 Giovanna Borradori, Forward: Pure Faith in Peace, Mustapha Chrif, Islam and the West: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, T. Fagen, tr. (Chicago 2008), p. xix]. Weber situated the monopoly of the legitimate use of forcein a given territory. Note that territory is one of the characteristics of the state tied to legitimacy {Politics as a Vocation, H. Gerth and C. Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Oxford 1946 [1919], p. 78, my ital.}. Weber formalizes the co-extension of territory and freedom derived from Kant [cf. Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, ibid., pp. 23, passim]. 33 As the US military is a volunteer class-within-a-class, its soldiers choice becomes an ethical overcoming of particularity, a rupture in the traditional division [partage] of thought to some andproduction to others [Jacques Rancire, The Philosopher and His Poor, A. Parker, ed., tr. [Duke 2004 (1983), p. 219]. American force-projection is converted into a social movement in which the appearance of egalibert is precisely not a mere appearance but evinces an effectivity of its own, which allows it to set in motion the process of the re-articulation of actual socioeconomic relations by way of their progressive politicization [Slavoj iek, Tolerance as an Ideological Category, Critical Inquiry, 34:4 (Sum 2008), p. 669]. 34 As with the apocalyptic bombings of civilians in Tokyo, Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, the US has turned its atrocities in Vietnam into tactical and strategic refinements for an expanded borderless hegemony. Hardly the outcome of impulsive racism, this rationalization of indiscriminate killing bears a meticulously constructed juridical lineage that crosses strategic fixity and ambiguity [cf. Sven Lindqvist, A History of Bombing, L. Rugg, tr. (New Press 2001)]. Compare territorial-liberating bombing to de-territorial-indefinite bombing in WWII and South Asia [Cf. Sherwood Ross, How the United States Reversed Its Policy on Bombing Civilians, Humanist, 65:4 (Jul-Aug 2005); Kenneth Anderson, Predators Over Pakistan, Weekly Standard, 15:24 (8 Mar 2010)]. 35 On COIN, cf. David Petraeus, et al., The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago 2007). Adopted by the neo-con Bush administration, COIN remains official policy but has since further de-territorialized. The administration promises to remove territorial sites (tortured prisoners at GITMO) and expand ethereal combat (UMV strikes, assassinations). 36 Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991 (Cambridge 2001), p. 23; for the current period, cf. Mohammed Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (Lynne Rienner 2004). 37 COINs long history is defined by dilemmas of counter-insurgent territorial capture [cf. articles by Stephen Biddle, Stathis Kalyvas, and Wendy Brown, The New US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual as Political Science and Political Practice, Review Symposium, Perspectives on Politics, 6:2 (Jun 2008); Nick Masellis, Human Terrain: A Strategic Imperative on the 21st-Century Battlefield, Small Wars Journal (2009), at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docstemp/250-marsellis.pdf; and Nasser Hussain, Counterinsurgencys Comeback: Can a colonialist strategy be reinvented? Boston Review, 35:1 (Jan/Feb 2010)]. 38 Significantly, COIN fatally supplements coercion rather than replacing it with securitization, development, or reparations. 39 COIN extends or complements the bio-political coercion of the 1990s [Julian Reed, The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: a critique of the return of imperialism thesis in international relations, Third World Quarterly, 26:2 (2005), p. 245-246].

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Claiming to replace domination-hegemony with cooperation-consent, COIN lets US rulers disavow the construction of the colonial subject in [a] discourse [of] difference {Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (Routledge 2007 [1994]), p. 96}. The US repudiates the discursive and political practices of racial and cultural hierarchization (96) with a synchronized set of socialscientific practices and ethical views that re-Orientalize Islam as virtually universalistic but actually aggressive welcome but punishable [cf. Sayres Rudy, Pros and Cons: Americanism against Islamism in the War on Terror, Muslim World, 97:1 (Jan 2007)]. Given its acceptance that subalterns are neither vanquished by domination nor deceived by hegemony [cf. Ranajit Guha, Domination without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India (Harvard 1998); James Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (Yale 1992)], COIN lays the American military claim to postcolonial radicalism. 41 Cf. Darryl Li, A Universal Enemy?: Foreign Fighters and Legal Regimes of Exclusion and Exemption under the Global War on Terror, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 42:2 (Win 2010). 42 The surges success was a complex fantasy. It won the war that was neither a war nor won; defended our ally of Shia elites tied to Iran; pacified Iraq which remains violently lawless; and allowed US withdrawal which will never happen. Foreign policy relevance requires acceptance of such official hallucinations. That suffering can be imposed for ends and means readily fabricated, uncorroborated, unpunished, and forgotten is an advance of de-territorialized over sovereign power. 43 Andrew Bacevich, The Long War, Review of Thomas Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 (Penguin 2009), London Review, 31:6 (26 Mar 2009), p. 21. Those with statutory responsibility for providing military advice to the president were sidelined, he says. If Keanes maneuver proves a precedent, the chain of command will cease to exist. 44 Ricks, The Gamble, ibid., pp. 63-69. 45 David Kilkullen, The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford 2009), pp. 173-174; Kilkullen quotes Major General John Allen. 46 Militant nationalists continue to distort this process; Kenneth Pollack and Michael OHanlon, for instance, recently wrote, [A]fter 2007American-brokered cease-fires and political shifts convinced Sunnis that they would have a fair opportunity to elect their own leaders [Iraqs Ban on Democracy, NYT (18 Jan 2009), p. A19]. 47 Michael Massing, Is It a Great Victory? Review of Ricks, ibid., New York Review, LVI:7 (30 Apr 2009), p. 41. 48 Bacevich, The Long War, ibid., pp. 20-21. 49 It is a feature of strategic de-territorialization that we cannot determine how many wars the US is directly involved in. 50 The US whose money, military, and morality are implicated in the deaths, refugee migrations, and destitution of hundreds of thousands of people (in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan) held a democratic campaign and election without any sustained, rigorous discussion of its foreign policy. This is not a function of strategic de-territorialization, a concept beyond political prerogative, license, or irresponsibility. Responsive regimes and engaged citizens elsewhere are as committed to the war on terror as many hegemonic elites are aloof. Yet strategic ambiguity tends to discourage debate and democracy in the long-term. Weaponized uncertainty fosters time-space compressed climates, reducing citizens to pious spectators, fearful adherents, or vengeful partisans [cf. Terry Aladjem, The Culture of Vengeance and the Fate of American Justice (Cambridge 2008)]. 51 Academic studies seem equally nostalgic, invoking conventional degree-measures of US direct/indirect rule, more/less empire, etc., while ignoring innovations in the regime [cf. Daniel Nexon and Thomas Wright, Whats at Stake in the American Empire Debate, American Political Science Review, 101:2 (May 2007), pp. 266ff., passim]. 52 Note that the Kennanites attacked NSC-68 (Paul Nitze, et al. 1950) for allowing its enemies to define US foreign policy. 53 Alain Badiou, Philosophy and the War Against Terrorism, S. Corcoran, O. Feltham, and J. Clemens, trs., Infinite Thought: Truth and the Return to Philosophy (Continuum 2009 [2001]), pp. 119ff. 54 E.g., cf. Michael Taussig, Law in a Lawless Land: Diary of a Limpieza in Colombia (Chicago 2003); Thomas Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and Reality (Zed 2007); Peter Hallward, Damning the Flood: Haiti, Aristide, and the Politics of Containment (Verso 2007); John Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America, and International Terrorism (Pluto 2002); Richard Labvire, Dollars for Terror: The United States and Islam, M. DeMers, tr. (Algora 2000); Neve Gordon, Israels Occupation (California 2008); Weizman, Hollow Land, ibid.; Gregory, Colonial Present, ibid.; James Ferguson, Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order (Duke 2007); Partha Chatterjee, Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World (Columbia 2004); Mark Dow, American Gulag: Inside US Immigration Prisons (California 2004). 55 Edward Said, Orientalism (Vintage 1979), p. 215. The Occident/Orient polarity was corporeal, ideological, and territorial, a co-extension under colonial rule after becoming mediated or even anachronistic under European governmentality. 56 Classically, Webers Kantian assertion of the double life of communal citoyen and private bourgeois {cf. Carole Pateman, Sublimation and Reification, The Disorder of Women (Stanford 1989 [1975]), pp. 91ff.}. 57 Sven Lindqvist, Exterminate All The Brutes: One Mans Odyssey into the Heart of Darkness and the Origins of European Genocide, J. Tate, tr. (New Press 1996 [1992]). 58 Karl Marx, On The Jewish Question, R. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader (Norton 1978), p. 33. 59 James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (Yale 1999). 60 For technical treatments of spatiality and territoriality, cf. David Harvey, Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom (Columbia 2009), cf. 7; and Philippe Signoret and Alexandre Moine, A Concept of the Territory Implemented in and by Observation, Paper for Tools and Methods of Territorial Intelligence, International Conference of Territorial Intelligence, Besanon, France (16-17 Oct 2008), at http://www.territorial-intelligence.eu/index.php/eng/Publications/International-

conferences/Besan%C3%A7on-2008/Proceedings-of-Besan%C3%A7on-2008/A-concept-of-the-territory-implemented-in-andby-observation.-Philippe-Signoret-and-Alexandre-Moine. 61 Similarly, cf. Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (California 2002), ch. 3. 62 Gilles Deleuze and Flix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, R. Hurley, et al. trs. (Minnesota 1983 [1972]), p. 146. 63 Cf. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Beacon 2001 [1944]); Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nio Famines and the Making of the Third World (Verso 2002). 64 Cf. Ian Hacking, Making Up People, Historical Ontology (Harvard 2002). 65 Ira Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities: Race, Politics, and Migration in the United States, 1900-30, and Britain, 1948-68 (Chicago 1976), pp. 176ff. 66 Cf. Michael Perelman, The Invention of Capitalism: Classical Political Economy and the Secret History of Primitive Accumulation (Duke 2000). 67 Material and discursive subjectivizations are complementary, not competitive, pace Wendy Grace, Faux Amis: Foucault and Deleuze on Sexuality and Desire, Critical Inquiry, 36:1 (Aut 2009), pp. 63ff., passim. 68 Cf. Sudhir Hazareesingh, From Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire and the Emergence of Modern French Democracy (Princeton 1998); cf. Malcolm Bull, Ultimate Choice, London Review, 28:2 (9 Feb 2006), pp. 115ff., passim; 69 Note that ordinary Egyptian women helped frustrate [Napoleons] advance down the Nile by simply fleeing from the towns along the way, taking with them as much in the way of provisions as they could [Juan Cole, Napoleons Egypt: Invading the Middle East (Palgrave 2007), p. 46]. By the 19th-century tactical invisibility no longer hindered French territorialization in the homogenizing core-periphery. French Algeria, dominated by compartmentalization (Fanon), mirrored French France [Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford 1976), pp. 490-491]. 70 For instance, under French urban territorialization of North Africa, the gulf between architecture and ordinary building grew wider, while the historic fabric of cities was commercialized into a tourist commodity, an expression of quaint charm. Most important, the effort to replace certain groups actual involvement in political life with a purely visual expression of their cultural autonomy demonstrates one of the ways in which historicist design, in many different settings, can be used for political power [Gwendolyn Wright, Tradition in the Service of Modernity: Architecture and Urbanism in French Colonial Policy, 1900-1930, Journal of Modern History, 59:2 (Jun 1987), p. 294]. 71 Sara Maza, The Myth of the French Bourgeoisie: An Essay on the Social Imaginary, 1750-1850 (Harvard 2003), pp. 84ff. 72 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collge de France, 1977-1978, M. Senellart, ed., G. Burchell, tr. (2007 [25 Jan 1978]), pp. 74-75. 73 Statism is not natural, automatic, or uniformly successful [cf. Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Capital Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton 1988)]; but both success and failure standardize state apparatuses. 74 Regimes of inclusive capture and exclusive repression of popular classes in centralizing state apparatuses are contrasted and explained in David Waldner, State Building and Late Development (Cornell 1999). 75 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (Verso 1991 [1983]), pp. 76-77. [I]n world historical terms bourgeoisies were the first classes to achieve solidarities on an essentially imagined basis. 76 Rosalind Morris, Images of Untranslatability in the US War on Terror, Interventions, 6:3 (Nov 2004), p. 413. 77 Jacques Rancire, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, J. Rose, tr. (Minnesota 1999 [1995]); Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (Verso 2005); Ariella Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography (Zone 2008). 78 Charles Tilly, Survey Article: Power Top Down and Bottom Up, Journal of Political Philosophy, 7:3 (1999), p. 332. Tilly remarks on Scotts account of the particularity, contingency, and interdependence of routine life that provide both the incentives and the obstacles to imposition of master plans (p. 331). But for Scott and Tilly, bottom-up and top-down become forms of mutual capture between state and nonstate agents precisely the reciprocal capture broken by sovereign-nomadic excess. 79 Sovereignty, political philosophy, torture, and management are similarly preoccupied with retaining but channeling dualistic subjects toward useful or ethical activities. Evolving or modern institutions, ethics, biopower, and capitalism demand stable improvisation, narrow reflection, pained communication, and obedient innovation (respectively), each an unsettling admixture of systemic de/re-territorialization or excess/capture. In this respect, the trend toward singling out torture or the state of exception as special sites of pure power approaches an apology for normal liberal democracy [Marnia Lazreg, Torture and the Twilight of Empire: From Algiers to Bagdad (Princeton 2008), p. 7, passim]. 80 The anxiety over monistic modernization only intensifies with Frankfurt, Althusserian, and post-structuralist denials of dualist ideological, hermeneutic, or phenomenological social forms. The position that instrumental (capitalist-bureaucratic) rationality saturates and eradicates alternative modes of valuation is continuous, then, with later theories of identitarian subjectivization. 81 Cf. Gil Anidjar, Terror Right, New Centennial Review, 4:3 (Win 2004), pp. 38ff.; Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, L. Meintjes, tr., Public Culture, 15:1 (2003), p. 13. 82 The functional-analytical compatibility of capitalist, democratic, bureaucratic, military, and popular spheres is fundamentally contested, of course; cf. Raymond Geuss, Liberalism and its Discontents, Political Theory, 30:3 (Jun 2002). 83 The idea that productive sites generate weapons then used against it, that machines themselves produce their anti-machines, is indeterminate as to how destructive those weapons will be. Scotts renowned studies of weapons of the weak and hidden transcripts describes social systems that create opportunities for internal resistance that eventually stabilize those systems.

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Belief in political or religious emancipation signals a demand for human emancipation and so provides interim stability {Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, R. Tucker, ed., Marx-Engels Reader (Norton 1978 [1843]), pp. 32-36]; cf. iek, Tolerance, ibid., pp. 665-669; and First as Tragedy, Then as Farce (Verso 2009), pp. 99ff.} 85 Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge 1990), p. 3. There is a seeming paradox: the more the indeterminism, the more the control sought at the nexus of the avalanche of numbersand the invention of normalcy (pp. 2, 5). 86 Michael Mann, The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results, J. Hall, ed., States in History (Blackwell 1986 [Archives europennes de sociologie, v. 25 (1984)], pp. 129-130, 133. 87 Mann, Autonomous Power, ibid., p. 112. Mann observes that successful democratic politicians are largely controlled by outside civil society groups (either by their financiers or by the electorate) as well as by law. But they do not brazenly expropriate or kill their enemies or dare to overturn legal traditions enshrining constitutional rule, private property or individual freedoms. On the rare occasions this happens we refer to it as a coup or a revolution, an overturning of norms (p. 114). 88 Charles Tilly, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, T. Skocpol, et al., eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge 1985), p. 172. 89 The model is Hegelian: State reconciles the agonistic desires of Market (Civil Society) with the affective desires of Home (Family). The mechanism retains a tension: some supra-market ethical substance is alleged to unify the very antagonistic drives intensified by modernizing capitalism {cf. Herbert Marcuse, A Study on Authority, J. De Bres, tr. (Verso 2008 [1936]), Part III}. 90 De/re-territorialization prefigures the postmodernend of the subject-object dualism {Frederic Jameson, The Antinomies of Postmodernity, The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern, 1983-1998 (Verso 2009 [1989]), pp. 52ff.}. 91 Mann, Autonomous Power, ibid., p. 131. 92 Tilly, War Making, ibid., p. 186; e.g., cf. William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Lynne Rienner 1998). 93 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (HBJ 1979 [1951]), p. 126, cf. pp. 124ff. 94 Even skeptics mystify the eternal battle between politics and economics, a vicious warfare fought throughout history [Loretta Napoleoni, Rogue Economics: Capitalisms New Reality (Seven Stories 2008), p. 5]. 95 I am playfully referring to the monumental trilogy by Michael Hardt and Antonion Negri that hovers over any analysis of deterritorialization [Empire (Harvard 2000); Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (Penguin 2004); Commonwealth (Harvard 2009)]. Their concepts, analyses, and refinements are powerful, notably their interdigitation of capitalist, bio-political, and sovereign drives behind the brutal global state of war and permanent and generalstate of exception (2004, pp. 5, 7). It would take a separate study to grasp how this condition operates under a new global form of sovereignty with a single logic of rule and paradigmatic form of biopower whose objectis social life in its entirety and a project of political organization formed through articulations on the plane of immanence without hegemony (2000, pp. xii, xv; 2009, pp. 169ff.). 96 Charles Maier, Being There: place, territory, and identity, S. Benhabib, et al., eds., Identities, Affiliations, and Allegiances (Cambridge 2007), p. 79. 97 John Martin, The objective and subjective rationalization of war, Theory and Society, 34:3 (Jun 2005), p. 253. 98 Michael Bravo, Ethnographic Navigation and the Geographical Gift, D. Livingstone and D. Withers, eds., Geography and Enlightenment (Chicago 1999); cf. Christian Caryl, Human Terrain Teams, Foreign Policy (8 Sep 2009), at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/08/reality_check_human_terrain_teams/ 99 Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt (Verso 2000), p. 244. 100 States used sovereign power when possible in the periphery, as in late Ottoman conscription of non-insurgent Libyan soldiers [Selim Deringel, They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 45:2 (Apr 2003), p. 319]. 101 Carl Schmitt identifies four criteria of partisan combat: irregularity, increased mobility, intensity of political commitment, and the telluride character {The Theory of the Partisan: A Commentary/Remark on the Concept of the Political, A. C. Goodson, tr. (Michigan State 2004 [1962]), p. 14}. These are the tactics of strategic ambiguity, de-territorializing telluride resources. 102 Colonel C. E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (Bison/Nebraska 1996 [1896]), pp. 51-52. 103 Isaac Land, Sinful Propensities: Piracy, Sodomy, and Empire in the Rhetoric of Naval Reform, 1770-1870, S. Pierce and A Rao, eds., Discipline and the Other Body: Correction, Corporeality, Colonialism (Duke 2006), pp. 92ff. 104 Cf. Colin Woodard, The Republic of Pirates: Being the True and Surprising Story of the Caribbean Pirates and the Man Who Brought Them Down (Harcourt 2007), p. 3; Peter Leeson, An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization, Journal of Political Economy, 115:6 (2007). 105 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (California 2005), p. 165, passim 106 Michel Foucault, Governmentality, G. Burchell, et al., eds., R. Braidotti with C. Gordon, trs., The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago 1991 [1978]), pp. 94-95. 107 Slavoj iek holds that torture, like rape, violates our objective spirit which abhors an empty space that is sustained by the law and yet not regulated by the rule of law and that distinguishes between legal and illegal criminals. He then endorses the core of strategic ambiguity that necessitates and justifies designations of homines sacri: there may be a singular situation in which we might resort to torture, where in the brutal urgency of the moment, I should simply do it [but] I should not elevate this desperate choice into a universal principle [Knight of the Living Dead, NYT (24 Mar 2007), at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/24/opinion/24zizek.html]. 108 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, D. Heller-Roazen, tr. (Stanford 1998 [1995]), p. 83; What is a Camp? Means without End: Notes on Politics, V. Binetti and C. Casarino, trs. (Minnesota 2000 [1994]), pp. 43-44. 109 Basically: the state (1) is founded on a violent original sin or (2) perpetuates non-violent violence such as normalization.

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Reviel Netz, Barbed Wire: An Ecology of Modernity (Wesleyan 2004), pp. 8ff., ch. 2. Cf. Sayres Rudy, Barring the Algerian Subject: Carcerality and Resistance under Market-Statism, L. Khalili and J. Schwedler, eds., Political Prisons and Policing in the Middle East and North Africa (Columbia 2010). 112 Cf. James Ron, Frontiers and Ghettos: State Violence in Serbia and Israel (California 2003). 113 Cf. Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900 (Cambridge 2002) and A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires (Cambridge 2009). 114 Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, ibid., pp. 23, 25. 115 For a related statement against having rights, cf. Raymond Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton 2008), pp. 66-67. 116 A more recent, equally poignant filmic interiorization of the war on terror is the HBO series The Wire. 117 Similarly, we must situate weaponization of territory itself in territorial regimes. Thus black sites in the war on terror and maritime subterfuge of privateers liquefy sovereign territorialization but under dissolving versus evolving state forms [cf. Trevor Paglen, Blank Spots on the Map: The Dark Geography of the Pentagons Secret World (Dutton 2009); Jody Greene, Hostis Humani Generis, Critical Inquiry, 34:4 (Sum 2008)]. 118 Cf. H. Bruce Franklin, Burning Illusions: The Napalm Campaign, Vietnam and Other American Fantasies (Massachusetts 2000); Jane Mayer, The Predator War, New Yorker (26 Oct 2009). 119 Alain Badiou, Fragment of a Public Diary on the American War against Iraq, K. Ross, tr., Contemporary French and Francophone Studies, 8:3 (Sum 2004), p. 226. 120 State killing is still horrific and traumatizing but punctuates more subtle modes of political domination and subjectivization. 121 Ferguson, Global Shadows, ibid., p. 39. 122 We may separate aggressive from non-utilitarian sovereign excess, with Bataille (Mbembe, Necropolitics, ibid., pp. 15ff.). 123 Marxist analysis rejects palliative capitalist sites and logics on the grounds that the systemic pressures homogenize firms and markets ineluctably [cf. Claus Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State (MIT 1984), ch. 4]. 124 John Protevi, Political Affect, ibid., p. 102. The author stresses that Deleuze and Guattari differentiate stratum and assemblage, the latter an abstract machine or functional whole that preserves the heterogeneity of its component parts and enables further rhizomatic connections. From this insight we can see that different regimes of (de-)territorialization confer distinct political patterning[s] of somatic systems[s], varying the intensity in experiences of political vulnerability (p. 102). 125 Again, the historical repetition of sovereign excess (illegality, atrocity, exception) thus does not refute this transformation. 126 Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (HBJ 1979 [1948]), pp. 126ff., passim. 127 Cf. Ira Katznelson, Desolation and Enlightenment: Political Knowledge after Total War, Totalitarianism, and the Holocaust (Columbia 2003). 128 Mahmood Mamdani, Making Sense of Political Violence in Postcolonial Africa, Identity, Culture, and Politics, 3:2 (Dec 2002), pp. 3ff. 129 Roxanne Euben, Killing (For) Politics, op cit., p. 11. The post-9/11 era extends American moral militarism and hegemonic ambiguity in Afghanistan (1979-), Iraq (1991-), Sudan (1998) and Serbia (1999) [cf. Ian Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror (Penn 2006), ch. 4; Michael Mandel, How America Gets Away With Murder: Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage, and Crimes Against Humanity (Pluto 2004)]. 130 Dean, Democracy and other Neoliberal Fantasies, ibid., chs. 1, 2; Slavoj iek, Violence (Picador 2008), pp. 15-24. 131 Gilles Deleuze and Flix Guattari, Anti-dipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, R. Hurley, et al., trs. (Minnesota 1983 [1972]), pp. 139-140, 153. I thank Anderson Mackenzie for selecting and discussing passages from Deleuzes work with me. 132 Respectively, iek, Violence, ibid., p. 21; Arendt, Origins, ibid., p. 137. 133 iek is one of few writers aptly keen on the likeness of arbitrary rule across these spaces [e.g., Tolerance, ibid., p. 676]. 134 Joshua Barkan, Use Beyond Value: Giorgio Agamben and a Critique of Capitalism, Rethinking Marxism, 21:2 (Apr 2009). 135 Antonio Negri, The Porcelain Workshop: For a New Grammar of Politics, N. Wedell, tr. (Semiotext[e] 2008), pp. 29-45. 136 Jane Collins, deterritorialization and workplace culture, American Ethnologist, 29:1 (2002). 137 Eva Cherniavski, Neocitizenship and Critique, Social Text, 27:2 (Sum 2009). 138 Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, Capital as Power: A Study of Order and Creorder (Routledge 2009), pp. 3, 8-9. 139 Nitzan and Bichler, Capital as Power, ibid., p. 10. 140 Cf. fn. 53 for a partial but representative list. Also see Achille Mbembes seminal, On the Postcolony (California 2001). 141 Jean and John Comaroff, Law and Disorder in the Postcolony, Comaroffs, eds., Law and Disorder in the Postcolony (Chicago 2006), p. 5. 142 But cf. Prem Shankar Jha, The Twilight of the Nation State: Globalization, Chaos, and War (Pluto 2006), pp. 328ff. 143 Paul Smith, Millennial Dreams: Contemporary Culture and Capital in the North (Verso 1997), pp. 14ff., passim. 144 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Blackwell 1990). 145 Hannah Arendt, Origins, ibid., p. 466, my ital. 146 On these overlaps, cf. Antonio Tujan, Audrey Gaughran, and Howard Mollett, Development and the global war on terror, Race & Class, 46:1 (Jul-Sept 2004); on the effects, cf. Kirk Bowman, Militarization, Democracy, and Development: The Perils of Praetorianism in Latin America (Penn State 2008). 147 Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, vol. 1, R. Hurley, tr. (Vintage 1990 [1976]), p. 137. Vital is a bio-political pun. 148 Carlo Galli, On War and on the Enemy, A. Minervini and A. Sitze trs., New Centennial Review, 9:2 (2009), pp. 210-212. 149 Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land, ibid., p. 5.

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Thomas Nagel, What Does It All Mean? A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy (Oxford 1987), p. 80; cf. H. M. Malm, Killing, Letting Die, and Simple Conflicts, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18:3 (Sum 1989). 151 Mark Duffield, Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment, and Post-Interventionary Society, Journal of Refugee Studies, 21:2 (2008), p. 149. 152 Stefan Zweig, The Royal Game, R. W. Huebsch, tr. (Viking 1944), pp. 17-18. 153 John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (Free 1995), pp. 27-28. 154 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (Verso 2004), p. 94. 155 It is not the infinite number of legal positions (10 to the 40th) or possible games (10 to the 120th) that show this self-excess but the idea of solving chess [Garry Kasparov, The Chess Master and the Computer, Review of Diego Rasskin-Gutman, Chess Metaphors: Artificial Intelligence and the Human Mind, D. Klosky, tr. (MIT 2009), New York Review, 57:2 (11 Feb 2010). 156 Slavoj iek, on Badious notion of singular-universal [Violence, op cit., p. 152]; cf. iek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Center of Political Ontology (Verso 2000), ch. 3; Raymond Geuss, Review of Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, P. Hallward, tr. (Verso 2001), European Journal of Philosophy, 9:3 (Dec 2001); Alain Badiou, Logics of Worlds: Being and Event, II A. Toscano, tr. (Continuum 2009 [2006]), pp. 306ff. 157 Judith Butler, Universality in Culture, Martha Nussbaum, et al., For Love of Country (Beacon 2002), p. 48. 158 Slavoj iek, The Indivisible Remainder: On Schelling and Related Matters (Verso 1996), pp. 13ff. 159 Badiou, Saint Paul, ibid., p. 10. Appropriately, capitalism is Badious model of a universal bereft of singularity and infinity. 160 We must differentiate excess from infinity, via Badious discussion of the structured situation. Greatly simplified, Badiou identifies the political sphere as a contest between (1) state apparatuses and (2) truthful subjects of a universal event. The state seeks to retain its power of excessive representation while evental subjects become militants of infinite presentation {cf. Alain Badiou, Politics as a Truth Procedure, Theoretical Writings, R. Brassier/A. Toscano, trs. (Continuum 2008 [1998], pp. 155ff.; cf. Peter Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth (Minnesota 2003), pp. 93-103}. Here the states excess is not the inherent expansion of sovereignty outward (it may include this) but its juridical coding that inherently represses the infinite singularity of the universal event. In this conception, sovereign excess means a finite codification or social representation of subjects straining for genuine infinity as subjective universality (pp. 156-158). Again, the states false universality captures infinite multiplicity with tactical ambiguity: It reveals its excess of power, its repressive dimension. But it also reveals a measure for this usually invisible excess. For it is essential to the normal functioning of the State that its power remain measureless, errant, unassignable. The political event puts an end to all this by assigning a visible measure to the excessive power of the State (p. 158). 161 Cf. Nasser Hussain, Hyperlegality, New Criminal Law Review, 10:4 (Fall 2007). 162 I am locating multiplicity even under action-constraining rules. Wittgensteins claim that action is neither interpretation nor application of (always ambiguous, indeterminate) rules only folds infinite play into the very non-territorialized structure of rules. Cf. Chantal Mouffe, Wittgenstein, Political Theory, and Democracy, The Democratic Paradox (Verso 2009 [1996]), pp. 70ff.; Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Harvard 1982), pp. 81ff., passim. 163 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, ibid., pp. 352-353. 164 The armed forces are war machine and striated state apparatus. This explains the mistrust States have toward their military institutions, they say (p. 355). I presume this means that the actual military as state apparatus is immanently a war machine that can always break from and attack the State using all necessary means. 165 Or, simply, If two things really were equal in every respect (including their history and spatiotemporal position), they would be indistinguishable, and thus byLeibnizs principle of identity of indiscernibles, they would, then, not be two different, but equal things; rather, they would be the very same thing (Raymond Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics, ibid., p. 77). 166 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, P. Patton, tr. Columbia 1994 [1968]), p. xxii. 167 Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, ibid., pp. 360-361. 168 So it is non-chess yet played on a chessboard a desired re-territorialization: a cosmopolitan order in which multilateral institutions and continental alliances would become the chief political actors in the universal community (p. xiv). 169 Gionvanna Borradori, Introduction: Terrorism and the Legacy of the Enlightenment, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jrgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (Chicago 2003), p. 2. 170 Empire-state territorialization of peripheral people and land varies mainly in the mixture of COIN and coercive tactics. In the US case, cf. Alfred McCoy, Policing Americas Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State (Wisconsin 2009), ch. 4; and Douglas Valentine, The Phoenix Program (Avon 1990), pp. 254ff. For parallels with England and Portugal, cf. Wunyabari Maloba, Mau Mau and Kenya: An Analysis of a Peasant Revolt (Indiana 1998), ch. 4; and Gerald Bender, The Limits of Counter-Insurgency, Comparative Politics, 4:3 (Apr 1972). 171 Significantly in landlocked Afghanistan, a liquefied political space, the conflict is defined by poppy cultivation and landmines. 172 Malalai Joya, A Woman Among Warlords: The Extraordinary Story of an Afghan Who Dared to Raise Her Voice (Scribner 2009), p. 124; cf. Kimberly Marten, Warlordism in Comparative Perspective, International Security, 31:3 (Win 2006/2007). 173 Quoted in John Mueller, The Save Haven Myth, The Nation (21 Oct 2009), at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20091109/mueller 174 Quoted in Maleeha Lodhi and Anatol Lieven, How the West Can Exit the Afghan Quagmire, Financial Times (5 Oct 2009), at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b063983a-b1e6-11de-a271-00144feab49a.html. 175 Quoted in Thom Shanker, NATO Ministers Endorse Wider Afghan Affort, NYT (23 Oct 2009), at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/24/world/europe/24nato.html?th&emc=th

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UN Special Representative Kai Eide, quoted in Thom Shanker, NATO Ministers Endorse Wider Afghan Effort, NYT (23 Oct 2009), at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/24/world/europe/24nato.html?th&emc=th 177 Dexter Filkins, Afghan Offensive is New War Model, NYT (13 Feb 2010), at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/13/ world/asia/13kabul.html?th&emc=th. Note the re-territorializing language: The US didnt attack an Afghan village but the coalitionmounted an operation on a Taliban stronghold. Such writing is not false. 178 David Sanger, A Test for the Meaning of Victory in Afghanistan, NYT (13 Feb 2010), at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/14/weekinreview/14sanger.html?th&emc=th. 179 Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Department of Defense Report to Congress (April 2010), p. 129. Peremptory praise for COIN-surge tactics in the Marja campaign (pp. 128ff.) appears in the predictably dire DoD report on government weakness; Taliban mobility, evasion, and expansion; and of an 87% increase in violence since Feb 2009 [Alissa Rubin, US Report on Afghan War Reports Few Gains in Six Months, New York Times (29 Apr 2010), at (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/30/world/asia/30afghan.html]. 180 Filkins, Afghan Offensive, op cit. 181 Aziz Ahmad Tassal and Mohammad Elyas Dayee, New Civilian Death Claims in Helmand Sweep, Afghan Recovery Report of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (20 Feb 2010), at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MYAI82V8JB?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc=afg. 182 By May 2010, the Taliban and US were at a standoff in Marja, farmers leaving in drove and up to twenty families leaving every day [Carlotta Gall, Taliban Hold Sway in Area Taken by US, Farmers Say, NYT (16 May 2010), at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/17/world/asia/17marja.html?hp. 183 Joshua Foust, The Next Battles for Marja, NYT (2 Mar 2010), at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/03/opinion/03foust.html?th&emc=th]. 184 Quoted in Richard Oppel, Tighter Rules Fail to Stem Deaths of Innocent Afghans at Checkpoints, NYT (26 Mar 2010), at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/27/world/asia/27afghan.html. NATO Commander Sergeant Major Michael Hall reported cases of victims loved ones joining the insurgency: There are stories after stories about how these people are turned into insurgents. 185 Soldiers, abruptly uprooted and shunted about like their Islamist enemies, become ultrarapid forms of free-floating control that [have] replaced the old disciplines operating in the time frame of a closed system [Gilles Deleuze, Postscript on the Societies of Control, October, v. 59 (Win 1992), p. 4]. 186 Sebastian Junger, Farewell to Korengal, Op-Ed, New York Times (21 Apr 2010), p. A25. 187 Anthony Lake, quoted by Nicholas Lemann [Worlds Apart: Obama, McCain, and the Future of Foreign Policy, New Yorker (13 Oct 2008), p. 115], who adds: In the Obama camp, all dichotomies are false dichotomies, which the candidate transcends. 188 Beyond France, Foucault exalted social agitation in Brazil, Poland, and Iran; Hegel, more reserved, may have internalized the Saint Domingue (Haiti) revolution [cf. Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History (Pittsburgh 2009); but cf. Anders Stephanson, The Philosophers Island, New Left Review, 2nd Series: 61 (Jan/Feb 2010). 189 Critchley, Infinitely Demanding, ibid., pp. 35, passim; cf. Gillian Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology (2009 [1981]), pp. 209ff. 190 Cf. Michael Hardimon, The Project of Reconciliation: Hegels Social Philosophy, Philosophy and Social Affairs, 21:2 (Spr 1992), pp. 168-170. 191 Raymond Geuss, Art and Theodicy, Morality, Culture, and History (Cambridge 1999), p. 80. 192 Geuss, Art and Theodicy, ibid., p. 79. 193 Especially in more complex human societies humans will easily fail to find their social world comprehensible, a failing that art, religion, and philosophy compensate by sating our absolute need to feel at home in the world. The persistence of radical otherness (evil, al-Qaida) generates theodicies that show or make visible or represent (darstellen) to us that our world is good, rational, comprehensible, etc. [Geuss, Art and Theodicy, ibid., pp. 81-82]. But it must actually be the case that the world we live in (including our social and political world) is basically rational, comprehensible in principle, and commensurate to us in the sense that it is amenable to allowing us to realize our deepest human interests and aspirations (p. 81). 194 Cf. Slavoj iek, The Plague of Fantasies (Verso 1997), pp. 196-197. 195 Michael Hardimon, Hegels Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation (Cambridge 1994), pp. 43ff. 196 Hardimon, Hegels Social Philosophy, ibid., p. 45. 197 G.W.F. Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, L. Rauch, tr. (1988 [1840]), p. 27. 198 On the contrast of Hobbesian scientism and Hegelian Spirit, cf. Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes, G. Schwab and E. Hilfstein, trs. (Chicago 2008 [1938]), pp. 84-85, 100, passim. 199 Slavoj iek, Lacan in Slovenia, P. Osborne, ed., A Critical Sense (Routledge 1996), pp. 25-26. 200 Foucault, History of Sexuality, ibid., p. 139. 201 Foucault, History of Sexuality, ibid., p. 141. 202 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collge de France, 1975-1976, M. Bertani and A; Fontana, eds., D. Macey, tr. (Picador 2003 [17 Mar 1976]), p. 241-242; cf. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collge de France, 1978-1979, M. Senellart, ed., G. Burchell, tr. (Palgrave 2008 [17 Jan 1979]), pp. 30ff. 203 Michel Foucault, Course Summary, Security, Territory, Population, ibid., pp. 364-365, my ital. 204 Judith Butler, Indefinite Detention, Precarious Life, ibid., p. 55; cf. 94ff.; cf. Dean, Democracy, ibid., pp. 128ff. 205 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, K. Attell, tr. (Chicago 2005 [2003]), pp. 6-7.

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Reid, The Biopolitics of the War on Terror, ibid., pp. 244-245. Reid clarifies: It is only through a consequent process of reterritorialization that forces of deterritorialization are rendered biopoliticalThe biopolitical is never a nave representation of a deterritorializing movement but is defined primarily by the imprint of a reterritorializing maneuver (p. 248). 207 Leerom Medovoi, Global Society Must Be Defended: Biopolitics without Boundaries, Special Issue, The Ends of War, P. Deer, ed., Social Text, 91, 25:2 (Sum 2007), p. 57. The portable tactics that produced docile bodies had begun as a military project, the author says, but then reduces discrete regimes to those tactics: the race warhas been continually reframed and redeployed in a series of major historical permutations: colonial war, the Cold War, globalization, the war on terror (p. 58). 208 Medovoi, Global Society, ibid., 54-55. 209 Marcelo Hoffman, Foucaults politics and bellicosity as a matrix for power relations, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 33:6 (2007), p. 764. 210 Cf. Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire (Princeton 2006), p. 83. 211 Ann Stoler, Race and Education of Desire: Foucaults History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things (Duke 1995), p. ix. 212 John Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy (Columbia 1985), pp. 61ff., passim. 213 Vronique Voruz, The Politics of The Culture of Control: undoing genealogy, Review of David Garlands study (Oxford 2001), Economy and Society, 34:1 (Feb 2005), p. 156. 214 Michel Foucault, Questions of Geography, C. Gordon, ed., Gordon, et al., trs., Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 (Pantheon 1980 [1976]), p. 71. Pressed to specify geographys political salience, Foucault remarks: Tactics and strategies deployed through implantations, distributions, demarcations, control of territories and organizations of domainscould well make up a sort of geopolitics (p. 77). 215 Jane Bennett, How Is it, Then, That We Still Remain Barbarians?: Foucault, Schiller, and the Aestheticization of Ethics, Political Theory, 24:2 (Nov 1996), pp. 654-656. 216 Thomas Lemke, The birth of bio-politics: Michel Foucaults lecture at the Collge de France on neo-liberal governmentality, Economy and Society, 30:2 (May 2001), p. 191. 217 Michel Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, P. Rabinow, ed., D. Bouchard and S. Simon, trs., The Foucault Reader (Pantheon 1984 [1971]), pp. 85-86. 218 Adi Ophir, The Order of Evils: Toward and Ontology of Morals, R. Mazali and H. Carel, trs. (Zone 2005), p. 603ff. 219 Roberto Esposito, Bos: Biopolitics and Philosophy, T. Campbell, tr. (Minnesota 2008 [2004]). 220 Vivienne Jabri, Michel Foucaults Analytics of War: The Social, the International, and the Racial, International Political Sociology, 1:1 (Feb 2007), p. 70. 221 Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself, Theory, Culture, & Society, 18:6 (2001), pp. 5-8. 222 Rose, Politics of Life Itself, ibid., p. 6 223 Thomas Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom (Sage 1996), p. 133. 224 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, ibid. [1 Feb 1978], p. 99. This is an emended translation of Governmentality, The Foucault Effect, ibid. The re-translation changes disposer from dispose (p. 95) to arrange: one will arrange things to achievespecific finalities. The monistic blending of ends (finalities) and means (arrangements) is clarified. It also renders apparatuses (1991, p. 87), as mechanisms of security (2007, p. 88), restoring Foucaults general principlethat every form is a compound of relations between forces {Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, S. Hand, tr. (Minnesota 1988 [1986], p. 124}. 225 Bruce Curtis, Foucault on Governmentality and Population: The Impossible Discovery, Canadian Journal of Sociology, 27:4 (Fall 2002), p. 522. 226 Foucault, History of Sexuality, ibid., p. 92. 227 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, ibid., pp. 536-537, fn. 16. 228 Michel Foucault, Theatrum Philosophicum, Review of Gilles Deleuze, Logic of Sense and Difference and Repetition, D. Brouchard and S. Simon, trs., Critique, #282 (1970), at http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault5.htm. 229 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, A. Sheridan, tr. (Vintage 1979 [1975]), p. 26. 230 Frederic Jameson, Valences of the Dialectic (Verso 2009), p. 605. 231 The word homeland arose in US discourse the very year (1998) that strategic de-territoralization was consolidated [Jennifer Bajorek, The Office of Homeland Security, or, Hlderlins Terrorism, Critical Inquiry, 31 (Sept 2005), p. 877]. 232 Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, M. Dooley, tr. (Routledge 2001 [1997]). 233 Alain Badiou with F. Del Lucchese and J. Smith, We Need a Popular Discipline: Contemporary Politics and the Crisis of the Negative, Critical Inquiry, 34:3 (Sum 2008), p. 653. 234 Harvey, Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom, ibid., p. 174.