Hegels Philosophy of Right, Part II Emma Quillen and James Bayne Hegel's conception of "morality" can only be illuminated

in the wider context of his system. Rather than a simply- stated maxim, such as Kant's universal imperative, we find a subtle and often frustrating line of intuition-driven reasoning. The conclusions of his reasoning themselves form a great circle; they themselves can serve as the axioms by which the initially chosen starting axioms are derived as conclusions. Throughout the course of this paper, we shall examine how Hegel manages to construct from the notions of freedom and self the concept of morality, which emerges as a necessary consequence. In addition, we shall examine the discrete aspects that comprise Hegelian morality. In doing so, it shall prove helpful to say a few words about the importance of understanding terminology in its intended context. It is to this matter that we first turn our attention. Perhaps, one of the greatest challenges that we face when reading Hegel is becoming unfamiliar with familiar terminology. Concepts such as "right", "ethical, and "free" are found throughout his writings. Yet, they are not as familiar as they might at first seem. Emotional "baggage" is unavoidable when dealing with these terms; yet, Hegel uses them in an almost neutral sense with an often very precise meaning. It must be remembered that "right" is understood as "the existence of the absolute concept or of self-conscious freedom that is something sacrosanct" and that ethics and morality are in no way synonymous in this context (30). The notion of "self" is the starting point for much of Hegel's philosophy and a step in deriving morality. We might say that it is the concept of "myself" which gives rise to the notion of "self" in general, for it necessitates that there should be the concept of "other-self." The argument here seems to be what might loosely be called a "psychological" one. If there were only "my pen," then the "my" would be redundant with just "pen." No such term as "my pen" would ever be created. Thus in having the concept of "my pen," we admit other "pens." In having the concept of "self," we admit that there must be other "self's" such that the term "myself" needs to be distinguished from "to have identity." This is more than an interesting argument about how language and the mind works. It is a metaphysical requirement that an "x" depends upon its opposite for its ontological status. As Hegel puts it: A person by distinguishing himself from himself relates himself to another person, and it is only as owners that these two persons really exist for each other (40). In conjunction with this line of thinking is Hegel's philosophy of freedom. It is clear that he accepts two main categories: the negative and the positive (5, 6). In the exercise of these, however, he sees a third and more fundamental form of freedom. By acting, we affirm our freedom. In this objectification, we will find freedom itself. Unlike the other freedoms, this freedom can never be stripped from us-- regardless of external circumstance. To see that this is so, we need only note that negative freedom can only reject categories insofar as they apply to the I. Once all categories have been rejected, this leaves only the I. Thus, we see that the

result of carrying the negative freedom to its fullest extent can only lead to one point determined in principle to be I. In a similar vein, the positive freedom can only affirm from a set of desires. These desires are not chosen by the self-- but are rather presented by the system as a whole. Thus, positive freedom is completely contingent upon other factors outside of the subject. According to Hegel, however, Free will which wills the free will (27) is contingent upon nothing but itself. From this, we see that freedom known to exist from the start implicitly entails the existence of freedom which must be recognized regardless of external circumstance. Hegel defines this as the first and most fundamental right (36). Some interesting conclusions follow this if we grant that freedom is an integral aspect of self. In brief, Hegel insists that in understanding ourselves as such, we must logically also admit the selfhood of others. With that admission, the freedom of others and, therefore, the rights of other selfs must be admitted. An interesting question arises at this point. If to be a "self" ultimately dictates via logic that we must recognize the rights of others, does that also imply that as "selves," we can never encroach upon the rights of others? Can we, in effect, lapse in and out of selfhood? If so, then Hegels philosophy reminds us of Platos dictum that to know the Good is to do the good. The solution is not obvious to us, but it does seem that we could recognize others as having rights and yet not respect them. Indeed, this is the position that Hegel takes in saying (with regards to contracts): This performance is dependent again on the particular will which qua particular may act in contravention of right in itself (81). As a result of Hegels belief in the rational necessity of "right, this right must take precedence over the individuals will. As long as the individuals will is at odds with respect of the right, then the will cannot be said to be moral. What may seem somewhat odd is that for Hegel, morality is an additional type of freedom. It is to this moral freedom to which we may now turn our attention. Hegel formally introduces the concept of morality by providing a general sense of what he believes is its gravity in individuals lives. The sphere of morality, unlike that of abstract right, exists as finite; in it, subjectivity and objectivity are separate. Subjectivity for self and selfs inner purpose is merely internal will until it is put to use with the use of acquired external objectivity. Hegel mentions that morality exists within self when selfs will has a positive character in relation to others. In other words, morality refers to the concept that a will exists for an individual to the point that the individuals actions agree with both the individuals subjectivity and external subjectivity, or the will of others. As long as the individuals will is at odds with respect of the right, then the will cannot be said to be moral. Indeed, to be moral for Hegel is precisely to have the will in one accord with the respect of the right. In fact, the claim being made is stronger than that. To be moral is to BE the right made manifest in the world (106). So, the objectivity of an aim, or the realization of specific will, exists both externally and immediately, meaning that the objective (external) and the subjective (immediate) are distinct entities. Yet, the ultimate goal of morality is to develop a resolution by which the aims of self and not self are met, i.e. a platform where subjective and objective wills coexist. In order for this resolution to occur, self must externalize its subjective, moral will. Hegel refers to this

externalization as action. For the duration of this part of his Philosophy of Right, Hegel attempts to clearly convey the discrete aspects upon which the gauges of actions morality are contingent. The assertion that to be "moral" is to be the "right" seems to arise, in part, out of Hegels strong distaste for accepting abstract explanations divorced from the particulars of history. In his introduction to The Philosophy of History, he validates the philosophical precedence of this scrutiny. He cites Platos Socrates encounter with the thinking of Anaxagoras (a natural philosopher) in which Socrates states how disappointed [he] was when [he] so eagerly took up the writings of Anaxagoras himself, and found that he brought in to his explanation merely external causes such as Air, the Ether, Water and the like---instead of Reason (PH, pg15). That is, Socrates felt that broad truisms fail to capture adequately what is most important about the world process. To understand this, we consider the following question: "Why did the airplane crash?" and then the response Because of gravity. This is true to be sure, but it is so poor an answer for what it elucidates that we are inclined to deem it false. This relates directly to the notion of freedom. It is not adequate to have some abstract notion of freedom in mind. For Hegel, freedom is a descriptive fact of history. Freedom is the concrete process that we are currently embodying. Morality is frequently considered a necessary, yet undesirable restriction on our freedoms. For Hegel, however, morality does not limit our otherwise infinitely free self, but in contrast allows us to access an even greater freedom. We now unpack this curious idea. So long as our will is contrasted with the universal will (as some wills must, in light of the dialectic), there will be crime. The rights bearers (and these must exist as well) will seek to bring about justice. On all sides, there is myriad opposition to the disrespecting of rights. The moral individual does not situate his will over and against the respect of external rights, but rather recognizes that the conglomerate external will is his own. As a simple analogy, we consider a child whose will is opposed to that of his parent. This child will find opposition in abundance. In contrast, for the child whose will is the same as that of his parents, opposition disappears without the slightest encroachment. To be certain that we have not misunderstood Hegel, we find in the text the following passage: The second sphere, morality, therefore, throughout portrays the real aspect of the concept of freedom, and the movement of this sphere is as follows: the will, which initially is only for itself and is immediately identical only in itself with the universal will or the will that is in itself, is superseded and raised above its difference from the universal will, above this situation in which it sinks deeper and deeper into itself, and so is posited as identical for itself with the will that is in itself(106). Now Hegel introduces the concept of "self-determination" explicitly. This term reminds us of the implications of saying that we are more than freedom divorced from actualization. In willing, we act with intent. In doing so, we immediately have a sense of ownership over the intended results of our actions. Thus we feel as if our arms belong to us because they are so intimately connected with our will. From the will out into the universe, a wave of intentionality

propagates. In possessing the right of ownership, we also have self-determination; in selfdetermination, the right to ownership. As Hegel puts it, The content of the subjective or moral will contains a determination of its own, i.e. even when it has acquired the form of objectivity, it must still continue to enshrine my subjectivity, and the deed is to count only if on its inward side it has been determined by me, if it was my purpose, my intention. Beyond what lay in my subjective will I recognize nothing in its expression as mine (110). The issue arises as to whether moral freedom is contingent upon external factors or if it is absolute (as we saw in the case of the first right). To answer this question, Hegel presents a neat little argument as follows: Since the human being wishes to be judged in accordance with his own self-determination, he is free in this relation to himself whatever the external situation may impose upon him. No one can break in upon this inner conviction of humanity, no violence can be done to it, and the moral will, therefore, is inaccessible (106). The thought seems to be that in wishing to be judged in light of our self-determination, we set ourselves up as both judge and judged of our capacity in this regard. The world may burn, but this courtroom remains an asylum for free moral will for so long as we shall live. What inspires an individual to act in a way that outwardly affects the reality in which the individual exists? The right of intention, says Hegel, is the worth of the action and the reason [an individual] think[s] good to do it (114). Achieving satisfaction is so highly valued that it alone drives individuals to act (within a realm that offers satisfaction even when unexpected effects are accounted for). The subjective aim of selfs intentions, insofar as the aim does not negatively affect self or any other individual, refers to what Hegel calls welfare. Hegel deduces from his definition the notion that any intention that secures the welfare of an individual and those of others will never justify a wrongful action. To act in a manner that compromises universal welfare is to abandon what Hegel decrees are ones duties. These duties- namely, to do right and to promote welfare on both individual and universal levels- must be commonly respected if we are to ensure that the widespread preservation of individual freedoms does not sputter to a halt. What recognizable form does the fulfillment of our duties, or the unification of abstract freedom (right) and particular will (welfare), take? Hegel titles this cohesive entity good. Further, he explains that through conscience, good exists as concrete and subjective within every individual. More specifically, conscience is the deepest inward solitude with oneself where everything external and every restriction has disappeared (136). Absolute selfconsciousness, which exists in each individual as a unique conscience, holds the subjective right to know whether an act falls under the category of good or evil (ibid). To do good is to act with purpose and intentions that promote universal welfare and the existence of rights, while taking responsibility for the entirety of the actions outcomes. Guiding each individual as it attempts to act in this manner is its subjective will in relation to its acquired objectivity, or what Hegel calls morality. When individuals act in a moral manner, they innately maintain their own dignity and that of others through honoring contracts of property exchange

and acknowledging the existence of those who in turn recognize them. In short, morality promotes individuals with respect to their individuality; it promotes individual freedom. Personal Questions: (1) In his dialectic, is Hegel confusing problems of the mind with those of metaphysics? (2) The goal of morality is to create a resolution in which selfs aims become one with notselfs aims. Can it be said that the original subjective aim of an individual is inherently immoral, regardless of its implications, until it reaches an state of resolution with external aims? (3) Do we agree that morality is a type of freedom?