G.R. No. 93252 August 5, 1991 RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents. G.R. No. 93746 August 5,1991 MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner, vs. HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the Department of Local Government and SALVADOR CABALUNA JR., respondents. G.R. No. 95245 August 5,1991 RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Local Government, respondents.

Topic: Local Autonomy- Not Self-executing provisions Facts: 1. A series of administrative complaints, ten in number, were filed before the Department of Local Government against Mayor Rodolfo T. Ganzon by various city officials sometime in 1988 on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, etc. 2. Finding probable grounds, the Secretary Santos of the Department of Local Government Luis T. Santos issued successive suspensions. 3. Ganzon then instituted an action for prohibition against the secretary in the RTC of Iloilo City where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. 4. Ganzon also instituted actions for prohibition before the Court of Appeals but were both dismissed. 5. Thus, this petition for review with the argument that the respondent Secretary is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials as the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President to exercise said power. Issue: 1. W/N the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials. Held: 1. Yes a. SUMMARY OF RATIO: i. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. In administration law supervision means

overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires. ii. The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension. b. It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase as may be provided by law to strip the President of the power of control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission. i. Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

ii. It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution: 1. Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

c. The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language?It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments'

autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline. d. Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal corporations euphemistically to "small republics." Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest-is to wean local government units from overdependence on the central government. e. It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, a local tax law, income distribution legislation, and a national representation law, and measures designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President i. Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.

f. The deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to

stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of local legislation. The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition. g. The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority h. "Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter." "Supervision"

on the other hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. As we held, however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering". The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at least three cases, Lacson v. Roque, Hebron v. Reyes, and Mondano v. Silvosa, and possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General. In Lacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no control powers but only supervision "as may be provided by law," a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the President "may not . . . suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board." However,neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Monda no categorically banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. i. The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President, Commissioner Blas Ople would not. j. The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect. k. As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." The Constitution as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance selfgovernment. l. As we observed in one case, decentralization means devolution of national administration but not power to the local levels. Thus: i. Now, autonomy is either decentralization of

administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. ii. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency
2. Other issues: on Suspension of 60days a. Held: it was NOT proper b. Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty. c. Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held, a longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.