INDIAS STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES NUCLEAR DETERRENCE By Brigadier Vijai K.

Nair, VSM, There are many scenarios possible for the onset of nuclear war and there remain many justifications for nuclear weapons. Leaders of nuclear weapon states argue that these weapons are only for nuclear deterrence, that is, to prevent war by threatening nuclear retaliation. They don't foresee the potential failure of nuclear deterrence, even though they recognize the cataclysmic consequences of failure. They believe that nuclear weapons bolster a country's prestige and give it greater power in the international system. They proudly display their nuclear weapons and test their missile delivery systems. Those who argue that nuclear deterrence could fail catastrophically are mocked. David Krieger, president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The development and production of nuclear weapons during the course of World War II led to their initiation as a means of modern military warfare by the United States in 1945 against population centres1 to force the Japanese army, which was in any case on its last legs, to lay down its arms without further resistance2. Unfortunately, the nuclear bomb was inducted without the benefit of well thought-out strategic deliberations or analysis of developing political or military doctrines on how, where and under what circumstances, if any, will these be used as a means of warfare. At the time, the United States had a history of less than 200 years wherein an immigrant population used military force as the primary means of achieving political objectives, whether it pertained to the subjugation of indigenous native peoples, the War of Independence to expel the British or the Civil War to amalgamate the ideologically disparate regions into a federation of United States. This proactive acquisitive history is deeply ingrained in the mentality of the American people and the nations political character. Military force was not designed to deterring an enemy but to defeat and occupy territories. Washington realised that while this military philosophy was practical on the North American Continent, it had serious limitations when applied in a global context. In keeping with the domestic interpretation of military applications, Washington created the atomic bomb during World War II and used the new system with remarkable results against Japan. However, before the Americans could realise the political implications of this new destructive force, they were preoccupied with recuperating their military forces, who had participated in the War, concentrating on gaining full political and economic control of Japan, and expanding their toehold in Eastern Asia, which embroiled them in another long-drawn war on the Korean Peninsula. The armistice was induced by the American threat to use nuclear weapons, a threat that deterred these forces from furthering their objective to assimilate the whole Korean Peninsula.3

This experience gave rise to the concept of nuclear deterrence, that nuclear weapons had a political utility to deter an enemy from pursuing a path that was not in the interest of the U.S. Thus, Deterrence theory became the cornerstone of US foreign policy during the Cold War for implementing the strategy of containment. In a nutshell, deterrence theory explores the conditions under which a state A could deter an adversary from taking actions that are contrary to its interests. Most often, deterrence involves the threat to use force although many analysts also allow for a wide range of options, including positive inducements for keeping the status quo.4 Washingtons preoccupations in East Asia gave enough time to its allies and the Soviet Union5 to develop, produce and field nuclear weapons of their own, thus generating indigenous forces that would put a stop to any further expansionist pretensions by any other state. Simultaneously, concerns were aroused with the expansionist policies and methods of the USSR. Consequently, on 4 April 1949, Western countries resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and securitya military alliance that came to be called the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO].6 What eventually emerged from the studies of deterrence is the central concept of credibility. To be effective in influencing the expectations of the opponent, threats and promises, collectively called "commitments," have to be communicated properly and have to be credible. If they are believed, then the opponent will not revise its expectations. Schelling then proposed several ways of how credible commitments can be established. A very famous one is the strategy of constraining one's own options; by deliberately weakening oneself in this way, one can emerge in a stronger bargaining position because a commitment that one is unable to escape from has the ultimate credibility.7 The unilateral capability to employ nuclear deterrence got complicated breakout of states as nuclear weapon states [NWS]. To reduce multilateral both the United States and Russia created coalitions with like-minded states, effectively creating two military blocs, which eased the management of strategy formulation and management. by the threats, thereby nuclear

Nuclear deterrence is a term invented by the West and added to the strategic lexicon in 1945. The destruction of two cities and the capitulation of power in Japan shocked military strategic thinking and existing thought on the subject. It became the tool by which the US and its Western allies could regenerate the flagging imperial domination that had historically fuelled their national power quotient. Military planners in the West used the term nuclear deterrence as the raison dtre to enlarge nuclear arsenals and supporting systems both qualitatively and quantitatively by projecting a wide range of possible targets to deter adversaries. As political and military dimensions shifted to keep pace with their security perspectives, strategic planners continued to evolve their individual definition of nuclear deterrence to provide a rationale for the retention and expansion of existing and projected nuclear inventories. The initial unilateral capability was fast diluted by the acquisition of nuclear weapons and delivery systems by the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China, thus widening the scope of deterrence by hitherto nonexistent vulnerabilities. This brought about fundamental changes in deterrence strategies driven by new nuclear doctrines to cope

with the widening threat. This was not a static phenomenon. And over the years, nuclear deterrent strategies evolved in keeping with qualitative and quantitative increments of the five NWS. The deterrent strategies that were looking at evolved in keeping with the changing nature of nuclear warheads, delivery systems, command, control, communications and intelligence infrastructure and the political nature of these NWS. This evolution brought about new factors and parameters which propelled further evolution. Unilateralism gave way to multilateralism, mutually assured destruction, first- and second-strike forces and concepts, nuclear war fighting, extended deterrence in the form of a nuclear umbrella that made non-nuclear weapon states virtual nuclear weapon states, countervailing strategy, counterforce strategy, arms control regimes, counter proliferation strategy, ballistic missile defences and finally minimum deterrence8. When you go through the paper put up by the Federation of American scientists, the gist of the whole gamut is what Indias been calling its nuclear deterrence they tend to go back to. Of course, the figures that the Federation of American Scientists is suggesting are way, way beyond what the Indian concept is. Each of these factors generated new elements that drove nuclear doctrines and the concept of nuclear deterrence. The latest that is being pushed in the U.S. is minimal deterrence. However, the definition of nuclear deterrence has remained constant and the realisation of possible failure of deterrence was what drove this evolution of tinkering with strategies. The United States interpretation of nuclear deterrence amounts to the prevention of action by fear of consequencesdeterrence is a state of mind. It is brought about by existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.9 However, it is predicated on evolving mind shifts, which are not etched in concrete, whereas capabilities are ground realities. The gap between evolving concepts and the time to create new capabilities is when deterrence will become questionable. In Soviet military writings, the means of restraint was used for the USSRs own deterrent forces while intimidation was used for the potential adversarys deterrent forces. I have interpolated this as a nuclear means to restrain the adversary from acts of nuclear intimidation by nuclear forces. The French definition of nuclear deterrent is the capacity for a country under attack to deter a hostile power by being able to deliver an equally destructive blow to that adversary, thereby dissuading him from doing it. The French deterrent is said to be from a weaker power to a stronger power. A smaller power like France can intervene in a strategic situation where there is a conflict between two large powers, forcing one of the large powers to intervene against the other. This was particularly the case during the Cold War, where it was said that in case the United States abandoned Europe, the French could use their own deterrent to force the US to engage in combat with the Soviets.10 This does not apply to the post-Cold War scenario. However, this possibly is the concept that drives Pakistans nuclear strategy, which will not be touched on in this paper. Having done a fair amount of research on the nuclear doctrine and strategy of Pakistan, one has concluded that it is basically one of coercing a third state to intervene in the South Asian equation on its behalf. Chinas primary objective is the United States. Therefore, the science and military strategy defines deterrence as the military conduct of a state or political group in

displaying force or showing the determination to use force, to compel the enemy to submit to ones volition and to refrain from taking hostile actions or escalating the hostility. Strategic deterrence also is a major means of retaining objective of military strategy. It does not necessarily restrict this to a nuclear exchange. By its nature, deterrence seeks to change the pattern of the opponents psychology. In each case, nuclear deterrence is predicated on affecting the psychological state of mind of the leadership of the adversary. Indian leadership has stated that it will build and maintain credible minimum deterrent against nuclear attack on Indian territory. No philosophy has been enunciated. ANALYSIS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE Nuclear deterrence is essentially derived by demonstrating a capability to retaliate with exponential force to bring about unacceptable destruction and communicating the intent and political will to use such force in the event a nuclear strike is initiated against a country and in some cases its allies. The threat underlying nuclear deterrence is that aggressive acts will be answered by nuclear weapons retaliation. If that threat lacks credibility, then deterrence is uncertain and susceptible to failure at a critical juncture. Credibility cannot be quantified as minimum and maximum. Its either credible or it is not. The plinth on which nuclear deterrence rests is essentially a complex set of psychological interactions between the leadership of two adversarial states and is not set in concrete.11 This involves two-way communications between leaders, human perceptions and assessments and projects human behaviour to influence decision making. The objective is to affect the human mind so as to make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to use nuclear force under a given set of circumstances. WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS OF BASING STRATEGY ON PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPECTATIONS? To start with, it is essential to avoid viewing others thoughts and behaviour pattern in ones own mirror image.12 It is critical for the psychological analysis of a leadership of possibly a different cultural background, a country with different means, to be accurately done. To add to the complexity of the psychological construct, we need to accurately identify the decision makers that are being targeted and the individual and collective psychology of those decision makers. Assurance of successful deterrence requires a reasonably accurate prediction. And this does concern India, because who has to take the final decision in Pakistan matters. Whom are you deterring? Therefore, a states value of what it needs to create to deter that leadership is what counts. Finally, it would be foolhardy to live in the belief that the adversarial leadership will always act rationally.13 That could lead to catastrophic miscalculations, and it should be expected that decision making on the brink of nuclear war would be in a highly stressed, emotionally charged environment, not conducive to coolheaded, rational thinking. This makes nuclear deterrence an imperfect strategy. At best, it is backed up by certain essential elements and, therefore, to reduce the risk of deterrence failure, it is essential to support the strategy, where necessary, by psychological force multipliers. While some of these elements must necessarily be tinged in ambiguity, most of them must be explicit and communicated to the targeted leadership forcefully. There are a

number of elements that go into strengthening the psychological construct that would give credence to nuclear deterrence. These are: Articulation: A credible nuclear doctrine that communicates to a nuclear adversary the national policy to defend the nation against all forms of nuclear threat. This articulation of doctrine by India formally leaves a lot of loopholes, which could subsequently be misunderstood by an opposing force. A nuclear strategy: It spells out the objective, defines required weapons capability and deploys and manages all structures and systems to ensure that the nuclear deterrent is credible and backed up by a robust fail proof C4I system. A demonstrated capability: To deliver and assure nuclear response on specific high value targets of the adversary that would wreak unacceptable levels of damage in the mind of the leader you are targeting. It would far outweigh the gains of having initiated a nuclear strike. The hardware itself that demonstrates capability comprises a set of robust workable nuclear warheads with appropriate yields to cause the desired destruction of designated targets; delivery systems that have adequate range to deliver nuclear warhead to the selected targets; built-in redundancy to ensure the survival of sufficient forces to deliver and assure retaliatory strike; and supporting systems to ensure security during flight, hit probability, terminal ballistics and so on. In this paper, I have made an attempt to define the concept of nuclear deterrence, examine its elements and interpolate the hypothesis in the context of Indias national security imperatives and analyse the efficacy of this concept. INDIAS STRATEGIC FORCES On 27 May 1998, in a suo motu statement, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee stated in Parliament that India is now a nuclear weapon state. This is a reality that cannot be denied . . . We do not intend to use these weapons for aggression or for mounting threats against any country; these are weapons of self-defence, to ensure that India is not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion.14 Thereafter, Prime Minister Vajpayee while addressing the United Nations General Assembly on 24 September 1998, stated, Mindful of its deteriorating security environment which has obliged us to stand apart from the CTBT in 1998 India undertook a limited series of five underground tests, conducted on 11 and 13 May 1998. These tests were essential for ensuring a credible nuclear deterrent for Indias national security in the foreseeable future.15 This speech by the Prime Minister is what really set the ball rolling on the public debate on Indias embryonic nuclear deterrent capability and concepts. It is questionable whether the notion of credible deterrence had been grasped within the Indian context at the time. But it was not until a year later that any public mention was made on this subject. On 17 August 1999, the National Security Advisory Board [NSAB], a quasigovernmental body of strategists and intellectuals that works under the aegis of the National Security Advisor [NSA], released a draft nuclear doctrine16 for the consideration of the Cabinet Committee on Security [CCS]. However, it took three more years before the Indian government actually formally announced its nuclear doctrine. Having met to review the progress in operationalising Indias nuclear doctrine, the CCS, in a press release on 4 January 2003, formally made public the

governments position regarding the nuclear doctrine and operational arrangements governing Indias nuclear assets.17 Basically, this document outlined the larger matrix of Indias nuclear doctrine. But of importance were the issues that referred to the doctrine itself, the matter of building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent, a posture of no-first use, limiting the use of nuclear weapons to retaliation against nuclear attacks on Indian Territory or on Indian forces. The nuclear doctrine is silent on what part the strategic forces would have to play in the event of an overwhelming conventional attack on India. Would its deterrence come into play or not? This is conspicuous by its omission from the entire deterrence literature that is available in and out of the government at the moment. Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage; nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the National Command Authority [NCA]; nonuse of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and of course retaining the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of a biological or chemical attack, in other words Indias nuclear deterrence is meant to deter any form of WMD. This statement on its own is extremely vague and fails to communicate the governments definition of what it perceives as nuclear deterrence as viewed within the larger matrix of Indias national security interests. At the same time, it obfuscates the definition by a quantitative fix to the word credibility. Therefore, at the start, I attempted to define nuclear deterrence and now shall enlarge on that to fit the Indian nuclear strategic being into the global nuclear strategic dynamic. A few explanatory remarks on the Indian deterrent here would be in order. In 1998, vagueness was perforce a necessary stratagem, when India, a non-party to the nonproliferation treaty (NPT), demonstrated its nuclear capabilities by detonating a series of explosions. However, it refrained from carrying out full-scale tests to mitigate the expected economic consequences and sanctions that could have negated its economic growth. Therefore, New Delhi was constrained to following a policy of winning the campaign but not pressing the war to its logical conclusion by carrying out a full-scale test, which Im led to believe, was possible but denied for this reason. INDIAS NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY The accepted belief amongst our adversaries today is that India has a proven capability to deliver a 1015 KT nuclear warhead by aircraft or by missiles over a radius, from the Prithvi Class 350 and Agni 1,700 to Agni II 2,500 kilometres from the point of deployment to target using the proven and inducted (as declared by the government of India) Agni II missile. A number of factors dictate that intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs)thats what weve got at this point of timebe deployed in secure hiding places in the deep interiors of the Indian hinterland. It would be safe to conclude that delivery would be assured to targets lying in radius of only 2,000 kilometres or less, beyond Indias territorial limits. However, India has successfully tested the Agni III missile (under 4,000 kilometres),18 and the government has cleared it for production and induction into military units already raised for this purpose. However, with the limited production rate and necessary training and infrastructure, it may be a few years before a homogeneous force capability is fielded. Once the forces are operational, Indias

political leadership and strategic force commander can plan on threatening targets approximately 3,200 kilometres beyond its territorial limits. The government has indicated that a 5,000-kilometre Agni V missile is under development, and media reports indicate that the first prototype may be tested in 2011.19 However, proving tests, flights tests, series production and induction are a matter of the future, largely dependent on the political will to authorise validation of a capability to demonstrate the much-touted Indian credible nuclear deterrent. And if we look at the political vacillation that has characterised past authorisation of various missile flights, there is a question mark about the political will, which is possibly being held hostage to other political issues. Currently, no adversary whose high-value targets lie beyond 2,000 kilometres is threatened by Indias nuclear forces, no matter what the Indian public may believe from declarations made through the media. This is only an exercise in self-deception that would prove fatal if the government of India is confronted with the need to hold targets hostage to a nuclear retaliatory strike beyond 2,000 kilometres. And other than Pakistan, all the other recognised nuclear weapon states fall into the category of not being deterable as their high-value assets do not lie within the range India has demonstrated to which it can confidently deliver nuclear weapons. Warhead yield is the other questionable issue. While some high-value targets that fall under the purview of New Delhis assumed target list to support a strategy of minimum credible deterrence may be punished adequately by striking with a 12 or 15 KT warhead, that does not necessarily stand good for all targets included in the larger deterrence envelope that India has to look at. Inflicting desired destruction levels on most targets will depend on the structural makeup, size and nature of the targets and will in all probability require a warhead yield to the order of 150200 KT.20 Indian strategic forces have a limited range and a limited proven warhead. The atomic energy commissions claim of having tested a fusion device of 47 KT yield in May 1998 series of tests has been disputed. The questions raised have not been answered satisfactorily by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).21 Furthermore, even if we were to accept the claims that the AEC had successfully detonated a 47-KT fusion device, it does not mean that it has mastered the technology to interpolate or project these calculations on to the development of a 150250 KT thermonuclear warhead. India has yet to demonstrate that it has mastered the technology to successfully detonate a thermonuclear device that would give a yield of 150250 KT. At this point, it would be pertinent to draw attention back to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, where most signatories predicated their acceptance of the indefinite extension on the undertaking that the NWS would cease testing, for which commitment had been made in Geneva before the conference started. But it was restricted by the fact that France and China had to test these devices in spite of the fact that they had carried out numerous tests before, not three like we really did. So for the Indian scientific community to come to the final conclusion we can do it! Im afraid doesnt gel with the kind of discussions Ive had with people in Lawrence Livermore22 or in Taiwan. All the major NWS have conducted over 1,000 in some cases, down to 50, nuclear tests validating warheads proving their capabilities by actual detonation. This in itself brings into question Indias ability to field a credible nuclear deterrent. At best, it is an illusion that fails the first test of psychological elements of credibility. There is a

credibility gap, which can only be bridged by actually testing a thermonuclear weapon in the range of 150250 KT. Yet another factor that comes into play in management of nuclear deterrence is survivability. Having successfully demonstrated a limited-yield robust nuclear device and integrated it with a viable though limited-delivery capability, the next imperative to give credibility to Indias deterrence strategy lies in the survivability of this force structure through an inimical first strike. The nuclear establishment has taken numerous steps to enhance survivability of the strategic forces, including basing weapons on mobile launchers, enhanced concealment, deployment and concealment strategies, underground command and control nodes, strategic and tactical deception and so on. Equally important is that the primary means of survivability of nuclear forces lies in subsurface maritime deployment. The advanced technology vessel (ATV) has been under development for many decades. Recent reports indicate that the development of subsurface launch missiles is also in the nascent stages.23 Neither the undetectable submarine platform nor the submarine-launched ballistic missile is anywhere near being proven, let alone being deployed. Even if limited technical sea trials are being carried out on the ATV,24 it will be some years before the platform will be handed to the navy in the form of an SSBM25 for user trials, training of personnel and induction into service. At best, one can expect the SSBN force to start entering service sometime between 2013 and 2015. Thereafter, commander strategic forces assurance levels of survivability will increase exponentially, giving the required credibility to Indias nuclear capabilities. ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE Once the political leadership draws up a tentative list of targets and the type of punishment to be meted to achieve the necessary deterrence value, military planners at strategic command would be required to carry out a target analysis that would dictate the type of warhead to inflict necessary destruction, the point/points of impact, the delivery systems best suited for the task and the problems of penetrating hostile air space that may require special technological fixes and probability of impact. Thereafter, this list of analysed targets gets back to the political leadership, which carries out a political, technological, and economic assessment of the requirement and directs the AEC and allied agencies to develop, produce and validate hardware and make adequate financial appropriations. It is, thereafter, that the process of development can take place, which must comply with parameters the military has given in its analysis. It is from that list that the political leadership will select what would be the targets. The military only does the analysis of the list provided to it. In so far as India is concerned, the military analysis must have been carried out either pegged to proven capabilities of the hardware or on theoretical projections of hitherto unproven capabilities. In the latter case, India is looking at a wish list that has no credibility vis--vis deterrence imperatives. The first phase of Indias process of developing a nuclear deterrenta robust workable nuclear warhead and survival of delivery vectorswas completed by 1998. The second phase of integrating both these systems into a national nuclear doctrine in the prevailing political, military and technological milieu to formulate a comprehensive nuclear strategy was developed subsequently. One can assume that with the incorporation of the military and the creation of a strategic command, the steps mentioned above are well underway.

Theres yet another factor. We have to look at deterrence in the light of its statespecific nature. Having fielded nuclear armed strategic forces, supporting structures, systems and vested control with the prime minister with secure command and control structures gives Delhi the potential to implement its nuclear deterrence strategy, provided the shortfalls are resolved. That is a prerequisite if the government is serious about converting its notional nuclear deterrence into a credible deterrent that would meaningfully deter any other NWS from using its nuclear capabilities to arm twist New Delhi into complying with their volition. The last issue I feel that needs to be noted is that nuclear deterrence cannot be viewed as a blanket strategy that covers all players. To deliver nuclear weapons to designated targets and guarantee their destruction in keeping with the demands of a nuclear doctrine and application of strategy for each will vary, thereby requiring a number of contingency plans. The factors influencing the psychological responses of the leaders amongst different states would vary in a vast array of circumstances. A deterrence strategy that may be effective against one may not be expedient to deter another. To put it simply, what is it India must do to deter the leadership of Pakistan to desist from using a nuclear weapon? If we get that answer, will it fit the bill for deterring the leadership in Beijing or deterring the United States from triggering its counterproliferation strategy to support its ally, in this case Pakistan? They have certain interests of their own. The simple answer to that is a big NO. The same answer cannot be applied in each case. The geostrategic potency, the nature of governance and the comprehensive national power quotient differ so widely that one single formula will not work for all. The critical question that the Indian government has to get an answer to in respect of each entity that has to be deterred from using its nuclear weapons capability against India is, what threat of impairment would influence the decision-making process of X state from using its nuclear weapon potential to resolve a conflict with India? By analysing prevailing bilateral and multilateral conflict relations, we arrive at a value A. Carrying out a similar exercise to safeguard India from W, Y and Z states, we would arrive at varying values that could be translated to B, C and D, whatever it is. In other words, there are at least four different values for Indias nuclear deterrence strategy. Each may require different capabilities in terms of warhead, yields, delivery ranges, number and types of targets and so on. Nuclear deterrence cannot be credible till all permutations and combinations are factored into the larger national deterrence matrix and strategic plans for each are in place. CONCLUSION In conclusion, I have enumerated the problems in defining, creating and managing a credible nuclear deterrence strategy and the shortfalls that need to be made good before New Delhi can confidently conclude that it has a minimum nuclear deterrent to safeguard its national interests. India is yet to psychologically convince other nuclear weapon states that it wields a credible nuclear deterrence. Furthermore, deterrence cannot be guaranteed as it is based on psychological convictions, which are susceptible to the quality and stability of leadership and the dynamic changes in prevailing circumstance at the time it is required to be effective. The concept of nuclear deterrence is fragile and susceptible to failure.

Until we get all these issues resolved, its a matter of flailing in the dark and depending on a hit-and-miss mission. The only safe strategy really is a total abolition of nuclear weapons. This is something that the Indian government has consistently advocated for the last 60 years to date, including after its nuclear tests and the declaration of having a nuclear deterrent. The most important manifestation of this strategic goal lies in the Action Plan for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free and Non-violent World Order submitted by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to the Third Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly at New York on 19 June 1988.26 Until such time as the world negotiates and implements a Nuclear Weapons Convention for total and verifiable disarmament, nuclear deterrence strategies will continue to evolve, they will continue to have loopholes and at some stage will fail, resulting in Armageddon, the battle between the forces of good and evil that is predicted to mark the end of the world.

Endnotes:
1. 2. Official Bombing Order, 25 July 1945. DECLASSIFIED. E.O. 1652, Secs 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND 730039 By ERC NARS, Date 6-4-74. Wikipedia. Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_bombings_of_Hiroshima_and_Nagasaki> (accessed 10 July 2010). Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman and Robert L. Gallucci. Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis. Brookings Institution Press. p. 2. Branislav L. Slantchevs review of Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility. By Robert Powell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Wikipedia. Soviet atomic bomb project. The Soviet project to develop an atomic bomb began during World War II in the Soviet Union. The USSR tested its first nuclear weapon in 1949. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_atomic_bomb_project> (accessed 10 July 2010). NATO Handbook. <http://152.152.96.1/docu/handbook/2001/hb0101.htm>. Op cit, n. 4, p. viii, 230. Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris and Ivan Oelrich. From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons. Federation of American Scientists & the Natural Resources Defense Council. Occasional Paper No. 7. April 2009. p. 21. And William Perry, former secretary of defense: I strongly support deep reductions in our nuclear arsenal . . . we are committed to a nuclear posture based on the minimum number of nuclear weapons to meet our security needs. Dictionary of Military Terms. Department of Defence. Deterrence. <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/index.html> (accessed 10 July 2010).

3.
4. 5.

6. 7. 8.

9.

10. Olivier Debouzy. French Nuclear Deterrence Doctrine: An Aggiornamento Source: European Institute. <http://www.europeanaffairs.org_issue/2006_spring_summer/2006_spring_summer_09.php4>. 11. Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein. Psychology and Deterrence. Johns Hopkins University Press. 1986. 12. Bradley A. Thayer. Thinking about Nuclear Deterrence Theory: Why Evolutionary Psychology Undermines Its Rational Actor Assumptions. Comparative Strategy, vol. 26, no. 4. July 2007. pp. 311323. 13. Op cit, n. 11. 14. Suo Motu Statement by Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Parliament on 27th May, 1998. <http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/05/980527-india-pm.htm> (accessed 10 July 2010). 15. Prime Minister Vajpayee, while addressing the United Nations General Assembly on 14 September 1998. <http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/sep/24pm.htm> (accessed 10 July 2010). 16. Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine Embassy of India. Washington. <http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html> (accessed 10 July 2010). 17. The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews operationalisation of Indias Nuclear Doctrine. (i) Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent; (ii) A posture of No First Use: nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian

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territory or on Indian forces anywhere; (iii) Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) met today to review the progress in operationalising of Indias nuclear doctrine. The Committee decided that the following information, regarding the nuclear doctrine and operational arrangements governing Indias nuclear assets, should be shared with the public. 2. Indias nuclear doctrine can be summarized as follows: (iv) Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority. (v) Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states; (vi) However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons; (vii) A continuance of strict controls on export of nuclear- and missile-related materials and technologies, participation in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations and continued observance of the moratorium on nuclear tests. (viii) Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weaponfree world, through global, verifiable and nondiscriminatory nuclear disarmament. 3. The Nuclear Command Authority comprises a political council and an executive council. The political council is chaired by the prime minister. It is the sole body which can authorise the use of nuclear weapons. 4. The executive council is chaired by the national security advisor. It provides inputs for decision making by the Nuclear Command Authority and executes the directives given to it by the political council. 5. The CCS reviewed the existing command and control structures, the state of readiness, the targeting strategy for a retaliatory attack, and operating procedures for various stages of alert and launch. The Committee expressed satisfaction with the overall preparedness. The CCS approved the appointment of a commander-in-chief, Strategic Forces Command, to manage and administer all strategic forces. 6. The CCS also reviewed and approved the arrangements for alternate chains of command for retaliatory nuclear strikes in all eventualities. 18. Hindustan Times. N-capable Agni-III missile test-fired. 7 February 2010. <http://www.hindustantimes.com/N-capable-Agni-III-missile-test-fired/Article1-506250.aspx> (accessed 10 July 2010). 19. Dr. Monika Chansoria. Indias Missile Programme: Augmenting Firepower. MOD, October 2009. <http://www.drdo.gov.in/dpi/2009/oct09.pdf> (accessed 10 July 2010). 20. Brigadier Vijai K. Nair. Nuclear India. New Delhi: Lancers International, 1992. 21. Pranay Sharma and Ajaz Ashraf. The Myth Bomber. Outlook, 5 October 2009. pp 3040. 22. Robert Barker. Report on Discussions Held at the Forum for Strategic & Security Studies. 15 November 1996. He was of the view that testing was absolutely necessary where strategy was predicated on an assured nuclear ascendancy over the adversary. In his experience of designing and developing nuclear weapons, he found that computed mathematical models varied from tested results. Tests based on mathematical calculations did not work. The system, thereafter, was to remodel the weapon based on multiplication of the existing mathematical model by an intuitional figure and doing the test again. Often, it has taken three to five repeats of the process before the test was successful. This final mathematical model is then used for production. Therefore, three to five nuclear tests were a minimum must to assure the scientist of the validation of the design. Thereafter, if a system with a differing configuration had to be produced, this mathematical model would have to be put through the same guesstimate and the product proven by testing. Past experience has shown that when drawing on computer data to design a weapon system, there have been numerous failures. Codes and tests are not necessarily the same. 23. Op cit, no. 19. Delhi has also taken steps towards achieving submarine-launched ballistic missile capability, with the first test of the K-15 (Sagarika) taking place in February 2008 from a submerged barge with a range of 750 km. 24. Op cit, no. 19. Sagarika missile is being integrated with Indias nuclear-powered Arihant-class submarine, which began sea trials in July 2009. 25. Wikipedea. The SS denotes a "submersible ship," the B denotes a "ballistic missile" and the N denotes "nuclear powered." <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ballistic_missile_submarine> (accessed 10 July 2010). 26. Mani Shankar Aiyar. Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free and Non-violent World Order. <http://www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/pubs/AIYAR_RajivGandhi.pdf> (accessed 10 July 2010).

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