The Nineteenth Century Commercial Transition in West Africa: The Case of the Biafra Hinterland Author(s): Chima J.

Korieh Source: Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des tudes Africaines, Vol. 34, No. 3, Special Issue: On Slavery and Islam in African History: A Tribute to Martin Klein (2000), pp. 588-615 Published by: Canadian Association of African Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/486214 Accessed: 12/01/2009 12:53
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The Nineteenth Century Commercial Transition in West Africa: The Case of the BiafraHinterland

ChimaJ.Korieh

Resume
Le 19eme siecle a implique qu'il y avait eu transition commerciale entre le commerce d'esclaves et celui des matieres premieres. Ce point de vue a ete fortement conteste dans 1'histoireeconomique de l'Afrique de l'ouest. Le coeur de ce debat, que cette transition ait plonge dans une crise les societes participantes ou qu'elle ait ete marqueepar la continuite, est tres dispute. S'appuyant sur le cas de l'arriere-pays du Biafra, cet article montre l'importance de l'analyse des regions et des sexes, tout en ne perdant pas de vue les larges modeles regionaux. Tout comme l'institution de l'esclavage variait d'un endroit a un autre, l'impact de la transition commerciale elle aussi presentait de grandes variations. L'article conclut qu'il est besoin d'une perpective plus large et d'une attention aux details sur la localite, le contexte, le sexe et les couches sociales.

Introduction
Historians have devoted a considerable literature to the implications of the commercial transition from slave trade to commodity
trade in nineteenth-century West Africa (Dike 1956; Davidson 1961; Hopkins 1968, 1973; Austen 1970; Klein 1972; Eltis 1987; Lovejoy 1989; Law 1993, 1995; Lynn 1998). Yet the implications of the commercial transition for African societies continue to attract scholarly attention and debate. The heart of this debate - whether This article was first presented at the 1999 conference of the Canadian Association of African Studies (CAAS).I am indebted to Michael Levin, Ugo Nwokeji, Paul Lovejoy, and the editors of the special issue of the Canadian Journal of African Studies, Richard Roberts and Philip Zachernuk,for helpful comments. 588

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the transition led to a crisis for participating societies or was marked by continuity - is very much in dispute. Some of the scholarly works, including A.G. Hopkins' 1968 article "Economic Imperialism in West Africa," which essentially dealt with Yorubaland,explained the era as a period of political and economic crisis. Hopkins characterized the era with the famous "crisis of adaptation"phrase.Other scholars, in contrast, stress that the transition brought change without crisis to West African societies. Both perspectives share an assumption that the effects of the transition affected all parts and facets of West African societies in similar ways. Obviously, however, just as the institution of slavery varied from one locale to another, so, too, did the impact of the commercial transition. Nevertheless, both views have, in opposite ways, raised the need for a more critical analysis of the debateitself. The necessity for regionally focused studies to maintain a sense of broadregional patterns is reflected in the works of Martin Klein. The regional focus of one of Klein's earliest works, "Slavery,the Slave Trade, and Legitimate Commerce in Late Nineteenth Century Africa"(1971), set it apartfrom some of the early analyses of the commercial transition. in linking the expansion of peanut production to the ability of Muslims in the Senegambia region to exploit slave labor, Klein shows how structural change has economic and political implications. Although the Senegambia may have experienced a less dramatic turn of events because the Atlantic slave tradethere was marginal,the continuity of slavery in the post-abolition era suggests the need to revise the crisis thesis. While his 1971 article attributedthe increase in slave use solely to the production of commodities such as palm oil, peanuts, and gum for Europeanmarkets, his later works have recognized other economic developments within Africa that absorbed slaves, including the increasing use of kola, the growth of the Juulatowns, and slave-using states created by the Muslim jihad (1996, 1998). One of Klein's most important contributions is his recognition that different political, economic, and social structures shaped particular forms of responses to the commercial transition. In essence, the commercial transition was influenced by a series of interrelated factors within West African societies that can be understood only though a regional approach.A regional approach shifts attention away from generalizations and towards tracing the socioeconomic dynamics of particularsocieties or groups.

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Another of Klein's important articles, "Social and Economic Factorsin the Muslim Revolutions in the Senegambia"(1972),also questions the homogenous framework of the transition debate. He makes very apparent the way local variables such as the nineteenth-century Muslim revolutions shaped social and economic events. This article raises important questions not only about the economic aspects of the transition, but also about the equally important, but often neglected, social implications. The expansion of peanut production empowered peoples of slave origin as they acquired independent incomes. At the same time, "legitimate" commerce made slave labor desirable. Klein rightly argues that the Muslim revolutions of the nineteenth century in the Senegambia were influenced by the commercial transition since economic independence enabled peasants to resist the old political order.His engagement with this issue contributes significantly to understanding the impacts of the transition from the slave trade to what he prefersto call "commodity" trade in West Africa.1 In addition, his analysis reveals more explicitly than was commonly the case the relationship between the state and the individual in the era of the transition. Although Claude Meillassoux had earlier raised this issue in the context of the Atlantic slave trade, Klein's analysis explicitly reveals the link among politics, religion, and the economy in the Senegambia,as well as the dominant role played by the religious elite and the warriorclass.2 This is an issue he pursued further in "The Impact of the Atlantic Slave Tradeon the Societies of the Western Sudan"(1992). Klein emphasized the political ramifications of the slave trade, which help explain the impact of the trade on local politics, social violence, and state socioeconomic ideology. In the Senegambia region in particular, Klein's work illuminates the ways in which the slave trade strengthened the state and shaped its nature.3 More importantly, his works indicate the gains that could be made by moving beyond generalizations to focus on regional peculiarities for a better understanding of local responses to the commercial transition. Within the transition debate as a whole, a new frameworkhas emerged, one which posits regional and chronological specificity. There is recognition that West African societies varied in their economic, social, and political regimes. It is not that variations are more significant or that the commonality of African experiences

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should be ignored. To unmask all the complexities of the commercial transition, it is not enough to show that West African societies were affected by the transition, but it is also necessary to ask how different groups and regions responded to the change. The present paper critically reviews the literature on the commercial transition, focusing on the Bight of Biafran hinterland and suggesting ways specific regional analysis can increase understanding of the complexities of the commercial transition.4 The Biafran hinterland was a major supplier of slaves in the Atlantic trade from the 1730s until the end of the nineteenth century. Tradein the region grew steadily, reaching a peak of 22 500 captives annually in the 1780s and expanding further to about 40 800 over the 1836-40 quinquennium (Nwokeji 1998a). The region equally became a major supplier of palm produce following the abolition of the overseas slave trade. From 1855 to 1856, the entire Africanproduction of palm oil was about 40 000-42 000 tons. Out of this figure, 26 000 tons were exported through the Bight of Biafra(Dike 1956, 101).My decision to focus on this specific region is partly methodological: the real complexity of the transition can be more clearly understood within a new framework that reveals how differentgroups,individuals, and communities within a single region were influenced. Regional analyses are important in identifying distinct patterns of change; the case of the BiafraHinterland shows that even within a particular region, variations are to be expected. While this perspective does not negate the wider African context, the mechanisms adopted and responses to abolition are too complex to support the generalizations about the transition. This analysis will begin by briefly outlining the debate in historical perspective in relation to Hopkin's "crisis"thesis. It will then turn to an analysis of the Biafrahinterland, focusing on key issues raised in the existing literature: labor processes, persistence of slavery, and gender transformation. Throughout, the paperwill aim to incorporate regional peculiarities, as well as chronological and historical specificity, within the broadframeworktraditionally set for the transition debate.

Historical Perspectives and New Directions

Two broadfeatures of the early commercial transition debate help to explain the pattern of argument that prevailed from the late 1950s. The first view profferedby propagandistsand advocates of

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the abolition agenda from the late eighteenth century emphasized the revolutionary potential of "legitimate" commerce. Their view emphasized the tendency of the new tradeto liberate Africanslaves and to act as the main site of accumulation in the local economies. Market-orientedoptimists also arguedthat the rise of "legitimate" commerce would create an expandedmarket for Europeanimports. This view was driven by economic rationalism rather than by humanitarianism. Advocates such as Swanzy and Hutton, British merchants on the Gold Coast, argued that unlike the slave trade, "legitimate" commerce was not limited to a narrow elite, but was instead characterized by the large-scale participation of ordinary people. By the mid-nineteenth century, the "liberating"tendency of "legitimate" commerce was expressed within official colonial circles. Benjamin Campbell, British Consul at Lagos from 1853 to 1859, and RichardHutchinson, Consul for the Bight of Biafrafrom 1855 to 1860, painted similar pictures of the liberating potential of "legitimate" trade (Law 1995). The second, pessimistic, view expressedby Europeanobservers suggests that the abolition in many ways generated more inequality and servitude. Richard Burton, British Consul for the Bight of Biafrafrom 1861 to 1864, argued that the end of the overseas slave tradeand the rise of the oil export tradehad strengthened the institutions of domestic slavery and worsened the conditions of the common slaves (Law 1993, 95). The broad views expressed by earlier commentators disguise marked regional differences. Robin Law (1993, 95) has arguedthat early Europeanobserverswere influenced in their understandingof events by preconceived assumptions about the liberating effects of "legitimate" commerce. Similarly, JacobAjayi (1964, 63-128) has pointed out in a different context that Europeanobservers, being concerned mainly with the promotion of trade, tended unreflectingly to project a similar primacy of commercial causation upon African societies. On the basis of limited empirical evidence, the complexities recognized in these reductionist views fail to acknowledge the divergent forms of economic change or the different degrees of responses by regional groups. However, the early debates, though tainted by contending ideological paradigms, formed important reference points on which more meaningful analysis later emerged. From thin beginnings in the nineteenth century, the variety

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and complexity of scholarly works on the commercial transition have expandeddramatically.The debate among Africanist scholars in the 1950s was, however, not a radical departurefrom the nature of the early commentaries. K.O. Dike's (1956, 4) path-breaking work, Tradeand Politics in the Niger Delta, providedsome detailed analysis of the commercial transition and the economic history of West Africa. Dike argued that the abolition of the slave trade, the economic mainstay of the coastal states, precipitated a radical change in the economic sphere leading to majorsocial and political changes. One effect in the nineteenth-century Niger Delta, Dike (1956, 153) argued,was the revolts in Bonny and Old Calabarfrom 1850 to 1875, in which ex-slaves agitated for both political and economic powers. He linked the rise of ex-slaves to positions of leadership in the Delta communities with the rise of trade in palm oil. Dike interpretedthe political divisions in Bonny as reflecting a conflict between the old ruling class of freemen and the rising new class of ex-slaves. Dike's analysis raised two critical issues that have been important to the debate: (1) the political upheaval in the wake of the abolition, and (2) the rise to economic prominence of people of slave origin as a result of their participation in palm oil production. Dike's analysis, however, was not unanimously accepted. Ajayi (1965, 84), for example, argued that the growth of the trade in palm oil during the nineteenth century created no social revolution because the alliance between Europeansand the coastal traderscontinued with the new trade. Ralph Austen (1970, 257-74) also endorsedthe continuity paradigm. Undoubtedly, fundamental changes occurred in the economy of West Africa following the abolition of the slave trade. These changes, however, cannot simply be generalized from, or explained by, the "crisis of adaptation" or "continuity" frameworks. The effects of the commodity trade varied by locality and depended partly on the importance of the slave trade to a particular society. As such, the existing social, political, and economic structures, in addition to resource endowments, informed the patterns of change in the post-abolition years. Thus, the commercial transition was just one part of a big puzzle of events that shaped the history of West Africa in the nineteenth century. Indeed,the processes going on in the post-abolition periodwere much more complex and went beyond economic and political adjustments. While perhapsa few members of the elite dominated

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the slave trade, they could not dominate the later trade because it entailed complex social changes that affected economic production. The trade in oil, unlike the trade in slaves, was not capitalintensive. Wealth, therefore, became an attribute of individual enterprise since it could be acquired by all and sundry (Nair 1972, 39). Moreover,the structures of the two enterprises(productionand marketing)were not the same. Access to oil palms and labor were critical factors in the new trade, but these were influenced by the existing social, political, and economic structures. This was certainly the case with many communities in the Bight of Biafra and its hinterland, where the transition to the palm oil economy was attended by remarkable structural changes to meet the labor requiredfor oil production. But these changes also had important social implications. As K.K.Nair (1972)indicates, one social effect of the oil tradewas that it gave rise to two categories of slaves. One group,consisting largely of the "floating" Igbo and Ibibio slave population left over in the various towns following the transition to the oil trade,were sent to the hinterland plantations to collect and transport oil. The other category of slaves consisted of those who stayed on in the towns and were employed by the house heads to prosecute the tradeat the coast. The town slaves were absorbedinto the membership of the houses. The difference between the rates at which these two categories of slaves were assimilated into the social structure provides the essential clue to understandingthe forces operatingin Calabar society in the middle of the nineteenth century. The dissatisfaction engenderedby the social dichotomy accounted for the upheavals of the early 1850s (Nair 1972, 37). The above situation suggests the need to qualify the liberating role of the palm oil trade for former slaves. In general, these earlierstudies of the Delta region show the complexity of the commercial transition, tendencies that seem to emerge more fully in later analyses of the commercial transition. Nair (1972) also identifies other processes going on in Calabar society in the post-abolition era. The abolition of the slave tradeled to changes in the lineage structure and in the role of institutions such as the Ekpe.The Ekpefraternity,whose membership was once drawn exclusively from amongst the nobility (or the free-born members of the houses), underwent revolutionary changes as it began to admit liberated slaves into its ranks. In addition, the expansion of the oil trade stimulated commercial and political

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rivalry between the major towns, namely Duke Town and Creek Town (Nair 1972). In sum, Nair extends Campbell and Hutchinson's argument on the liberating effects of the trade in palm oil and Dike's analysis of the destabilizing effects of the abolition and of the rise of "legitimate" trade. But the importance of these processes lies in the fact that they stimulated crucial economic and social changes with far reaching cross-regional implications. The expansion of the new trade, for example, accounted for the continued supply of slaves to the coastal states from the hinterland. As a result, internal slavery increased during this period and providedsome continuity with the old trade. Historical writing in the last three decades has extended this thematic investigation and broadened its geographical coverage.5 Although most of the scholarship emphasizes either crisis or continuity, collectively these works prove useful in revealing the complexities of the transition era and the importance of regionally focused analyses. Perhapsthe most influential work in this era and one that introduced new dynamism into the transition debate in particular,and into West African economic history in general, was Hopkin's The Economic History of West Africa (1973). Hopkins argued that the commercial transition ushered in a period of
"crisis," as West African economies grappled with the changes

unleashed by the abolition and new forms of demand for African products. In Hopkins' view the crisis resulting from the end of the slave trade, as well as from the adverse economic and political climate it created, led to the imposition of colonial rule in West Africa. Hopkins (1973, 125-26) maintained that the new trade in agricultural commodities marked the beginning of the "modern" economy of West Africa because demand for agriculturalproducts stimulated production by the peasantry.6 Hopkins' powerful and evocative thesis is based on an economic model that stresses the market and external trade as an engine of growth. Hopkins' thesis implies that the economic behavior of African could be explained by market responses as was the case anywhere else. This is a persuasive argument. The more serious question in this context, however, is how his "crisis of adaptation"thesis applies to West Africa as a whole. He is right to say that West African societies witnessed fundamental political and economic changes, but he fails to ask how specific regional structures shaped particular forms of commercial transition. The

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commercial transition introduced new economic mechanisms, as well as reinforcing old ones. As a result, different regions adapted within the frameworkof existing structures but often adoptednew strategies to meet new demands. Hopkins' thesis, generalized for the whole of West Africa, has held up well among scholars whose criticisms have arisen from not empirical research, and even much less to theoretical critiques. One question fundamental to Hopkins' thesis is whether the commercial transition stimulated the emergence of a peasantry in West Africa. In other words, did the commercial transition lead to the emergence of a peasant class or stimulate production by an already existing peasantry? Certainly, the emergence of the peasantry in West Africa could be linked not only to the commercial transition, but also to geographical endowment. Historicizing commodity production in the region would indicate not only that the peasantry emerged at different historical times, but that its emergence in many parts of West Africa cannot be exclusively linked to the abolition of the slave trade. On the other central issue - the one about a "crisis of adaptation" - scholars who work within a framework of continuity continue to arrive at a different conclusion on the implications of the commercial transition. David Eltis (1987, 62-183), for example, has forcefully challenged the transformation thesis, arguing that the Atlantic trade was only marginally significant for the African societies involved in it. As such, the commercial transition would have had a minimal effect on West African societies.7 If the lens focuses on local and regional variations, the heterogeneity of experiences becomes more apparent. As Martin Lynn (1998, 5-12) contends, external trade,whether in slaves or otherwise, was not as important economically as internal trading networks for many parts of West Africa. For many parts of West Africa, it would be difficult to see a systematic break or crisis in the economic and social structures. What is more striking, Lynn (1998, 189) maintains, is the degree of continuity in West Africa's economic patterns. A focus on those involved in the production, trading,and consumption of palm oil on the African side would indicate that the impact of abolition could be exaggeratedfor some parts of West Africa. Overall,the literature indicates a bipolardebatewith very little agreement on the essential implication of the commercial transi-

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tion. However, the sense of the argument is that the transition affected different societies in different ways and even affected communities within particular societies differentially. Paul Lovejoy and D. Richardson (1995, 32-56) show that the decline in the number and price of enslaved Africans leaving West Africa may indicate the onset of a major crisis for the economies dependent upon revenues from the trade, but they call for emphasis on chronology and regional specificity. Moreover, economic, social, and political upheavals do not exhaust the many manifestations of the transformation from slavery to "legitimate" commerce, while an exclusive stress on these factors distorts the wider realities. Other processes, endogamous in origin and cultural in character, also influenced African responses in this era. An illuminating framework for analysis would ask how the different factors interacted with each other and were influenced by the internal dynamics of African societies. Relevant studies on the Bight of Biafraand its hinterland permit us to uncover some of the complexities of the
commercial transition.

The Commercial Transition and the Biafra Hinterland

G.I. Jones' TradingStates of the Oil Rivers (1963), devoted to the Delta states, extends the argument that the transition had a destabilizing effect upon West African political structures from the coastal states to the palm oil-producing societies in the Biafra hinterland. The Aro, the largest trade diaspora in the hinterland, were unable to monopolize the palm oil tradein the same way they had monopolized the slave trade. Unlike the slave trade, the production and marketing of palm oil were readily open to local competition since the oil could be produced by anyone who had access to the trees (Jones 1963, 73). In a later monograph, From Slaves to Palm Oil (1989), Jones extends and elaborates his earlier analysis of the Biafranhinterland. He suggests that the commercial transition affected the coastal and the hinterland societies very differently.The former were able to find in the export of palm oil a very convenient replacement and to establish the new trade before the slave trade came to an end. Difficulties of overland transportation, Jones contends, prevented those communities at any distance from navigable waterways from participating in the export of palm oil triggeringa severe and prolonged depression in those areas. The oil had to be handled in bulk before it became profitable. The only

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means of transporting oil in such quantity was by water, and the Aro tradingorganization was a land-basedone (Jones 1989, 42-43). Jones' argument is in line with the crisis of adaptation view expressedby Hopkins and others. The Aro faced difficulties retaining their control of the Biaframarket (Ohadike 1998, 198; Afigbo 1971).D. Northrup'sTradeWithout Rulers (1978, 207) supportsthe view of a crisis in the Aro economy because they were unable to control the new trade in oil. But did the transition mean a total collapse of the Aro trading system? I do not think so. Up until the BritishAro expedition in 1902, the Aro still faredwell in their trading activities, enjoying a large measure of economic stability. The decline of Aro hegemony was gradual (Afigbo 1981, 239-82; Jones 1989, 43). Throughout the nineteenth century, the Aro retained their hold on the Cross River trading system. They alone had the organization that covered the whole area and still controlled what remained of the trade in slaves (Jones 1989, 43). The internal slave tradewas not easily suppressed,and tradingin slaves continued in the lower Niger and Cross River tradingareas, "forthere were local people wanting to sell slaves and others wanting to buy them."8 The Aro and their hinterland agents benefited from this continuity. While the Aro had specialized in the slave trade, they also had traded a vast arrayof other items, so that the end of the overseas slave trade did not mean an end to Aro hegemony. Moreover, the Aro were not entirely shut out of the new palm-oil trade. On the contrary,they became quite active in the new trade in some places by using old trading contacts, organizational skills, and capital, especially along the Cross River area (Northrup 1978). Despite intense external and internal pressures, these sophisticated traders were able to develop a majortradein palm oil while simultaneously expandingtheir trade in slaves. Thus, when the slave trade finally ended, the Biafrahinterland and its coastal middlemen sufferedfar less economic dislocation than did the other trading states along the west coast of Africa (Northrup 1978, 195). Similarly, Lovejoy (1983, 176) observed that large-scale slaveholders, including the Aro, the Efik of Calabar,Igbo of Aboh, and the Ijaw of the Niger Delta, continued to concentrate on commerce by reinvesting in agriculturalproduction for export. As a result, when slave exports declined to insignificance in the 1830s and palm-oil exports were alreadysubstantial, there was no serious economic recession. But there were other variables, of a physical and ecological

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nature, which influenced local responses. For the Aro, like many others in northern Igboland, geography largely influenced the patterns of adaptation.Although the Biafrahinterland was a major supplier of palm oil, most of the northern part of the territory lay outside the oil palm zone. Furthermore,producersand transporters of palm oil could draw on many different and flexible labor systems, while that for the slave trade depended on a high degreeof organization and coordination (Ukwu 1967). Therefore, the structure of the new commodity tradewas not always determined by the end of transatlantic slave trade alone. The rise of the palm oil trade in the region was, in fact, just one of the several processes taking place in the region. Although the analysis in the hinterland focussed on the Aro (Afigbo 1971, 1974, 1981; Dike and Ekejiuba 1990; Jones 1989; Nwokeji 1998bc), there were other key players (such as the Efik traders,the Umon, the Akunakuna, the Ezza, the Ejagham,Mbaise, Obowo and Nkwere) in the hinterland for whom the new trade representednew opportunities. Generalized assumptions even for the Biafra hinterland are, therefore, problematic, as studies in the Ngwa region show. In A History of the Ngwa People, John Oriji (1991) maintains that, until the late nineteenth century, when the British began to penetrate the hinterland to enforce the policy of free trade, the trade in palm produce was conducted along the same routes as the ones along which slaves were tradedin the eighteenth century. Thus, Okonko members (a secret all male cult) associated with the Aro were able to adaptto the demands of legitimate commerce since they continued to collect tolls from long distance tradersby maintaining and policing the routes. Oriji believes that Okonko members benefited from selling slaves obtained from the Aro to privileged members of their community. He argues, however, that unlike the slave trade that was monopolized by warriors, kidnappers,and a professional groupof traders,the introduction of "legitimate" commerce linked small-scale farmers,as well as large-scaleproducers,to the international economic system. Oriji (1982, 1991) contests Northrup's argument that "small scale" producers and traders played a more active role in the new palm oil trade. He insists that Okonko members remained dominant in the palm oil trade and became majorproducersof oil for export, employing the labor of their wives and slaves. Underlining the importance of preexisting social and economic

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relations, Oriji contends that the introduction of legitimate commerce did not alter the earlier method of administration of palm trees in Ngwa region, which was interwoven with the land tenure system. Within each compound, every adult male was allowed to harvest the few palm trees that were located near his house, but the palm trees that grew in the communal land were administeredby lineage and village heads. Thus, authority holders had more palm trees than other members of the lineage because they had usufructuaryrights over the comparatively largeancestral land attached to their office (Oriji 1991, 64-67).9 Therefore, the capacity of the "ordinary"man and his wife to produce was relatively low because of limited access to oil palms, heavy labor requirements, marketing difficulties attendant on the distance involved, and inability to transportin bulk. In contrast, lineage and village heads were the major producers of these commodities in Ngwaland in the nineteenth century because they had many wives and domestic slaves.'0 Forthe Ngwa region in particular,Susan Martin has challenged Oriji's view. Martin (1995, 175) argues that Oriji underestimates the difficulties faced by Okonko members once the Atlantic slave trade finally ended, especially during the long period of coastal warfare and external trade depression after 1870. Through close analysis of the chronology and structure of economic relations in the Ngwa region during the era, Martin explains that the fates of women producers, Ofo (lineage heads) holders, and Okonko members were influenced as much by internal tradingfluctuations and local warfareas by the transition. As the case of the Ngwa region demonstrates, scholars are unable to agree on the impact of the abolition, even within the same region. In other words, in any given region, a number of other factors were at work. The extent to which the transition could affect economic and social life is not in dispute. However, its impact on groups, individuals, and households varied over time. In the severe depressions that began in 1885, Ofo holders and smaller households within their compounds appear to have fared better than the Okonko members, a fact prompting changes in the character of the Okonko society itself (Martin 1995, 178). Martin maintains that there is no evidence supporting large-scale demand for slaves among the Ngwa to counteract the ebbing of demand for the Atlantic slave trade after 1830, although it is not known to what

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extent the gap was filled by a rise in demand for slaves from other buyers, in particularthe Niger Delta canoe houses and Cross River yam farmers. Martin suggests that Ofo holders were using their ideological link with the land to steal a march on their upstart slave-dealing rivals. However, Okonko members who were also Ofo holders had the best of both worlds (Martin 1995, 185-86). The case of the Ngwa might well not be typical of the Biafran hinterland. The Mbaise, who have very close social and cultural affinities with the Ngwa, operateda radically differentsystem. The position of lineage head did not translate into economic domination. Like that of many Igbosocieties, the social system more often than not conferred equality of opportunity on its members. This equality limited the ability of lineage heads to control or dominate communal property,including oil palms." Furthermore,polygyny was widespread throughout Igboland. This institution was not a preserve of lineage heads or any other group. Since polygyny provided the measure of the capacity of the household to increase its labor,and thus its production, the number of polygynous households would be relatively high. Since there are no data that indicate the ratio of household heads' gross production in relation to total output, one can only speculate that lineage and village heads produced more than others. It is probable,however, that access to sufficient palm trees was a more important determinant of what a household produced than were any limitations imposed by one's position in the lineage. In contrast to Lovejoy's (1983, 176) analysis, which suggests that slave-basedproduction systems were expandingright up to the moment of their destruction by colonial rule, Martin (1988, 160-83, 276) argues that household producers in the Ngwa-Igbo region proved better able both to sustain expansion and to weather the storm of the late nineteenth century slump than slave-based producerswere. Focusing essentially on social relations within the household, especially on the extent and limits of domestic slavery and the role of women in palm oil production in the transition era, Martin maintains that relationships within the household were changing in ways that fit uneasily with Hopkins' model of modernity. The above analyses indicate that other, localized processes were shaping West African societies in the transition era. The commercial transition, therefore, must be analyzed in terms that

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incorporate both specific local complexities and general patterns, not merely as "crisis" or continuity. Although sensitivity to theoretical conceptualizations can help understand empirical peculiarities, what is needed is recognition of the complex nature of African societies. In this way, detailed analysis of laborrelations (including the persistence of slavery)and transformationin sexual divisions of labor can explain some of the local variations during this period of transition.

The Labor Question and Persistence of Slavery

If a focus on the macro-economy of the transition proves incapable in itself of distinguishing specific patterns of change from the general, the focus must shift to important processes such as labor and gender. The expansion of agricultural products was a major factor of change. Laborwas needed to grow crops, to produce palm oil and kernels, to carryloads, to paddlecanoes, and to work as trading assistants. Such demand was satisfied whenever possible by enslavement. The labor question focuses on two key issues; the first issue is whether the transition resulted in a "crisis" of labor; the second one is the link between the demand for labor and the persistence of slavery after abolition. In other words, was the persistence of slavery an attempt to maintain the old economic orderor was it promptedby the labordemands of the new economic order?What does the persistence of slavery mean for Hopkins's crisis of adaptation?There are no easy answers, but an analysis of the Biafrahinterland suggests an intertwining of many factors. For some analysts, the abolition created a labor crisis. D.C. Ohadike (1998, 189-95), for example, argues that the abolition created a crisis of labor and of production for large slave-holding entrepreneursnot just in Igboland,but also in areas such as Benin, the Niger Delta states, western Igboland, Arochukwu and the Sokoto Caliphate. He suggests that slave labor was very important throughout these areas. In many parts of the Biafra hinterland, however, slave labor was not the dominant mode of production. Slaves continued to be tradedfor economic reasons until the beginning of the twentieth century, when colonial armed forces implemented the abolition agenda. The export of slaves from the hinterland was in response to demands along the coast. Oil production in the hinterland, however, did not lead to a labor crisis. Martin (1988, 33-34) argues that the Ngwa region was densely

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populated with few demands on labor besides food production. As the only commercial activity, palm production did not impose majorstrains on local labor supplies so as to provoke the invention of new production methods (Martin 1988, 33-34). Martin's argument implies that a pool of under-utilized household labor facilitated production and minimized demands for slave labor. While labormay not have constituted a critical problem for the hinterland producers, the under-utilized labor argument is problematic. Precolonial economic activities obviously involved much more than food production. Tradingand manufacturing were extremely important economic activities that involved considerable time (Ohadike 1998, 189-207). Evidence suggests that the development of oil production increased pressure on existing labor to meet new demands.12Clearly, the decline of the external slave export did not mean the end of slavery and slave tradingin the region, a fact indicating that historians must scrutinize more closely labor utilization and the persistence of slavery. The above observation does not diminish the importance of slave labor in other parts of the Biafranhinterland. The Igbo of the Biafranhinterland were a notable exception, as Suzanne Miers and Martin Klein (1998, 5) observe. Igboslave owners were tenacious in their efforts to retain control over their slaves (Ohadike 1998; Brown 1996, 51-80; Isichei 1976, 94-95). Internal slavery, for certain, offset some of the consequences of the abolition of the overseas slave trade, as well as providedlabor for the production of oil, especially in the Delta states. A significant change, therefore, was the increase in internal slavery for production of palm oil. On the political scene, the persistence of slavery and the slave trade served as a justification of the British Aro expedition and colonial pacification of the Biafra hinterland in 1902. It must be emphasized, however, that the trade in palm produce developed independently of the tradein slaves in many parts of the Biafranhinterland and was not a replacement for the earlier trade, for the region was already producing palm oil before abolition. Indeed, we should actually talk of many transitions and transformations. Nevertheless, the expansion of oil production following the abolition of the overseas slave tradeinfluenced existing genderrelations in significant ways.

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The Commercial Transition and Gender Relations

Hopkins (1973, 126) called attention to changing gender relations that may have resulted from the use of female labor in commodity production in West Africa, but the issue disappearedin his analysis.13 Studies of the gender ratios of the slave trade, often limited to broadoverviews of Atlantic trends, have contributed significantly to the understanding of gender transformations and how they impacted African societies after abolition (Law 1995; Lovejoy and Richardson 1995; Eltis and Engerman 1992; Inikori 1992). The growth of "legitimate" trade had significant implications for two important aspects of West African social organization:the institution of slavery and the position of women (Law 1995, 16). Law (1995, 195) proposes that most of the slaves exported were men, although the ratio of men to women appears to have been lower among the slaves exported from Dahomey and Yorubalandthan from elsewhere in West Africa. Law (1991, 66-67, 272) agrees with Claire Robertson and Martin Klein (1983) that many of the slaves within West Africa were probablywomen retained to farm and to serve as concubines for the rich and powerful.14 Female slaves were retained because they tended to fetch much higher prices than males in the interior markets, an indication that the laborof women slaves probablyunderpinnedmuch agricultural production in West Africa. The existence of premium prices for female slaves within West Africa suggests that the Atlantic slave tradehad to compete to some degreewith an internal, and probably expanding,market for slaves by the early nineteenth century, if not earlier (Lovejoy and Richardson 1995, 32-56). The preference for females in the internal markets of West Africa correspondedto the increased export of males at this time and perhapsreflects their use in internal productive activities. Gender-basedanalysis raises two important questions in our context. First, if different African regions supplied captives with widely differing sex compositions (Nwokeji 1998a), how did this affect the labor process? Second, if many females were retained within African societies, how did this affect gender relations of production, especially in the post-abolition period?On the theoretical level, African conceptions of gender probably determined the structure of the overseas slave trade,which was, in turn, shaped by economic, ideological, and political forces. According to G. Ugo

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Nwokeji (1998a), if the Euro-American demand for masculine captives was not wholly successful in other regions, it all but broke down in the Bight of Biafra.He suggests that difference in the character of African warfare and the role of women in the indigenous economy and institutions could shape the gender structure of the slave trade.This fact could account for the relatively largernumber of females supplied from the Bight of Biafra and West-Central Africa as a whole (Nwokeji 1998a). Our main concern, however, is the gendered implication of the commercial transition within the Biafra hinterland itself. How did traditional gender ideologies change in the wake of the commercial transition?And how can the case of the Biafra hinterland help in understanding some of the complex economic and social processes occurringas a result of the
commercial transition?

In a majorcontribution analyzing the gender dimensions of the commercial transition, Martin (1995)arguesthat the key to a man's success in commercial palm production lay in control of women's labor. Women, Martin maintains, did most of the work in palm processing as in yam cultivation, but their male household heads were able to claim ownership of the product. Martin (1995, 182) maintains that by the end of the nineteenth century, the division of labor acquired an ideological significance strongly favoring men. With specific reference to palm oil processing, Martin contends that, given the sexual division of labor and property rights, the opportunity clearly existed for Ngwa households and lineage heads to acquire wealth. This they did by organizing yam and palm oil export production to serve the nineteenth-century provisioning and palm oil export trades. Little pressure, Martin argues, was put on their male laborresources by the palm oil industry, in particular, since palms were harvested throughout the year and men's contribution to processing, though vigorous, was brief, while women's work in palm oil extraction was both laborious and time consuming (1985, 183). There is no doubt that the commercial transition affected gender relations, but the extent to which it increased women and children's tasks has not been fully investigated. What is clear, however, is that the commercial transition and the labor required for palm oil production may explain the persistence of internal slavery and the increased demand for women from the hinterland by the coastal communities. In the domestic arena,such social and

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ideological forces could also explain why the Delta states absorbed large numbers of Igbo female slaves. Among the Ijaw,for example, the accepted form of marriageprevented a husband from founding a family, as his wife's children belonged to her kin's group. The acquisition of an Igbo slave wife was an ideal solution to this practice (Jones1989, 44). This probablywas a factor in the continuity of internal slavery up to the early years of the twentieth century. Far from being driven by economic factors alone, internal slavery became an important way of solving a social dilemma. Less well understood, but nevertheless relevant to the gender question, is the ideological dimension of the division of labor. As serious as this process may be in understanding some of the labor questions and the persistence of slavery, many scholarly works in the sphere of gender have been predicated upon the existence of a well-defined and unchanging gender division of labor and resource allocation regime. The reality in the Biafranhinterland is that division of labor in the Bight of Biafradid not correspondto fixed rules (Nwokeji 1998a). There are no fast and hard rules about how the household carriedout its work. The extant literature does not support the proposition that women became disadvantagedfollowing the commercialization of palm oil. Women remained important in both production and marketing during the era. In the palm oil industry in particular, women were entitled to some of the palm oil and entirely controlled the palm kernels, which also became important in the export market. Burdo (1965), for example, described Onitsha women in 1880, who traversed the country to collect palm oil and ivory. G.T. Basden (1966) reported that women tradersdominated tradein palm produce and imported goods in the Onitsha areafrom the turn of the century until the depression in 1929. R. Henderson (1971, 215-53) also indicated that women controlled the market and tradewith Europeanfirms until the early periods of the twentieth century. Up to 1900, women in the riverine Igbo areas controlled the markets, constituted the local and long distance traders,and were in a position to amass more wealth than men and to participatefully in economic decision making. N.E. Mba's(1982, 32-47) account shows that women in Oguta, Onitsha, Opobo, and Azumini areas became middlewomen dealing in palm produce. Early twentieth century evidence indicates also that women had considerable control in the palm oil trade. A District Officer in

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Okigwe reported in 1917 that women chiefly carried out small quantity tradingin palm oil and kernels in the market.15 Admittedly, gender roles changed as a result of fundamental economic and political change. It is clear, however, that there was a dramatic response by both men and women to cash incentives offeredby the new export in palm produce (Ukaegbu 1974; Martin 1984, 1988, 1995).In the Ngwa region, men entered into oil production by harvesting the fruits and pounding large quantities in hollowed-out tree stumps (Martin 1984, 419). In the Niger Delta, men dominated production by treading fermented fruits in large canoes at the waterside and washing out the oil (Martin 1984, 419). But in many parts of the Biafrahinterland, women continued to participate actively in the production and marketing of palm produce (Mba 1982, 30). Nevertheless, the lack of a clear interpretation of the relationship between commercialization and changes in gender relation stems from a static conceptualization of Igbo gender relations. To expect that the pre-commercialization gender status would remain is an abstraction from basic economic rationalism. Obviously, commercial production increased women's labor inputs, but such a narrow assessment ignores the coincident increases in men's and children's labor inputs as well. For a better understanding of the dynamics of the commercial transition, we need to reconceptualize gender as a framework for historical analysis.16 The centrality of such a framework should examine who in the household is responsible for productive tasks, who controls important resources, who has knowledge about particular tasks and production processes, and who benefits from production operations and production outputs. We should not think of gender in isolation, but rather in relation to the social context in which it is operative.This means going beyond fixed dichotomies which fail to account forpower relations, are insensitive to historical change, and treat female marginality peripherally.Gender ideology is deeply rooted in the social structures of any society, but it is often affected by changes in the political economy. As household economies became more dependent upon commercial production as sources of income to meet cash needs, production processes changed to meet these needs. Such economic and social transformations changed the nature of work, responsibility for labor supply, and the tasks allocated to men and women. For West African societies in the nineteenth century, the

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internal dynamics of change were influenced by external factors created by a world economic system dependent on African resources - both enslaved people and commodities - to meet their own economic needs. In the BiafraHinterland in particular, responses varied and gender ideology was dynamic enough to facilitate effective participation by women. Thus, the Biafranhinterland again points to some of the complexities of the commercial transition and the difficulty of a simplistic analysis of the implications of the transition on gender.

Conclusion
Fromthe perspective of this analysis, understandingthe complexities of the commercial transition requires a framework that incorporates regional patterns and processes of change. Although this review concentrates on the Bight of Biafrahinterland, it is evident that the implications of the commercial transition variedwidely, as did individual and group responses. I have shown that regional specificity and chronological context indicate that the impact was not uniform throughout West Africa. Some societies underwent a crisis; others did not. Moreover,the impact of the commercial transition on particular societies depended on the nature of each society's relationship to the Atlantic system, as well as on environmental factors. The transition clearly created problems for the major players in the slave trade such as the Aro. It did not, however, constitute a crisis that the Aro and their hinterlandneighbors could not overcome. The new trade diminished Aro influence throughout Igboland,but they continued to dominate the distributive trade and manipulate many regions in the hinterland with the Ibini Upkabi oracle until the beginning of the twentieth century. The Aro, therefore, did not suffer a total collapse of their economy until the British colonial invasion in 1902. I have also shown that the end of the Atlantic slave trade did not mean the end of slavery. The uses to which slaves were put and their links to wider social, political, and economic systems constituted critical variables in the persistence of slavery. Unlike the slave trade, the production of commodities such as palm oil requiredlarge labor inputs and new production processes to meet the new demands. Such needs were met partly by internal slavery, but households also drew on their own labor and redefined gender tasks.

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The commercial transition informed significant changes in genderrelations. Rigid categorizations of gender fail to unmask the structural factors that are critical to assessing social and economic change. The structuralchanges in the sexual division of laborin the transition era resulted from the interaction of internal and external factors. Overall, it is likely that the history of the commercial transition will continue to attract scholarly interest. What, then, lies ahead? There are several key areas where research can broaden current knowledge. Comparative research of different regions holds particular promise of uncovering similarities and peculiarities. Studies of gender and class in the transition period are also needed. Furthermore,to assess the implications of the commercial transition, macro-level analysis should take into consideration developments and transformations at the micro-level. We need to explore how the household as a socioeconomic unit adapted to externally determined market processes and monetarized relations of distribution. Still to be fully explored as well is how the export trade promoted individual concepts of property rights, affected collectivism, determined economic production processes, and transformedgenderrelations and structures. How did the commercial transition and increased commercialization of agriculture affect social dynamics and family forms? We need to examine how such groups as Ekpe and Okonko changed their characterand functions and their links with political and social developments following European imperialism.17 The commercial transition is best understood within the context of an indigenous economy able to adapt to changes stimulated by the abolition of the slave trade but not entirely influenced by it. What is requiredis a broaderperspective with more refined attention to details of locality, context, gender,and social strata.

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Notes
1 Klein consistently argues that the term "legitimate trade/commerce"is a misnomer because there was nothing illegal about the slave trade until the nineteenth century. 2 Meillassoux (1971, 55) argues that the tension between the state and privateenterprisein precolonial Africa took a particularform as a result of the slave trade. Also, see Law's analysis of this relationship for Dahomey (1996) 3 Klein'sessay relates the impact of the Atlantic slave tradein the Western Sudan on the structure of the state. See also Klein's most recent work, Slavery and Colonial Rule in French West Africa (1998), for the complex interaction among West African slave holders, the French colonialists, slaves themselves, and post abolition problematics. 4 The littoral defining the Bight of Biafraruns from the Niger Delta (exclusive of the Rio Nun) in modern Nigeria to Cape Lopez in modern Gabon inclusive. The Igbo and Ibibio inhabit the Biafrahinterland in the Nigeria section. They constitute about sixty-nine and ten per cent respectively of the population of the area known today as Southeastern Nigeria. See Nigeria, Department of Statistics (1953). 5 For a review of the historiography,see Austen (1970);Davidson (1961); Eltis and Walvin (1981); Hopkins (1968); Klein (1972); Law (1991, 1993, 1995);Lovejoy(1983).Fora recent treatment, see Lynn(1998);and a special issue of Slavery and Abolition 19, no. 2 (1998). 6 For Hopkins' main arguments, see especially pages 124-66. See also RichardRoberts'sreview of Law (1995) in Slavery and Abolition 18, no.1 (1997). 7 Fora counterargumentsee Lovejoy(1989). 8 In the Bight of Biafra,the demand for slaves came from communities in the underpopulatedareas of the Cross-Riverhinterlands who were colonizing new territories and were short of manpower. The principal purchasersof slaves for colonizing purposes duringthe nineteenth century were the Efik of Old Calabar,who settled them with the poorermembers of their houses (lineage) in the Duke Town and Creek Town hinterland. Others were bought by the Yako and other middle Cross-Rivergroups and by the Aro themselves, who established similar "plantations" on vacant land on the eastern side of the Cross River,later known as the Ugwuakoma clan (Jones1989, 44). Demands for slave also came from the Ijawdelta men, who increasingly marriedIgboslave women. 9 Interview with E. Ihediwa, Owerrinta,July 1998. 10Lovejoy(1983, 176)arguesthat those who could supplement the laborof their wives and children could increase output only if they had access to slaves and pawns. 1 Foran analysis of Igbocorporateattitude, see Uchendu (1965);Ottenberg

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(1971, xii); LeVine(1966). 12 Extract from an interview by the author with Linus Anabalam and ChristopherAnabalamon the impact of commercial oil production on the food economy of Southeastern Nigeria, Umuchieze Ihiteafoukwu, Imo State, Nigeria, 22 December 1998. 13 Hopkins merely recommended the gender division of labor question for furtherresearch.See Note 5. 14 See also Klein (1996)who believes that women were also valued because they were easier to control, easier to integrate into the society, and useful as rewardfor men. See also Eltis and Engerman (1992); Manning (1990); Meillassoux (1993);Inikori (1992). 15 NAE (Nigeria National Archives Enugu), RIVPROF8/5/661, File No. OW 630/17, "TradePrices at Up Country Markets 1917," D.O. Okigwe to Resident Owerri Province, Port Harcourt. 16 Often, the important and indispensable contributions of children are taken for granted in discussing division of labor and conceptualization of work and household production. 17Forinstance, Lovejoy and Richardsonhave illuminated our knowledge of the importanceof tradingnetworks and institutional andpolitical structures, which facilitated the expansion of trade across cultural frontiers. Such developments at the coast obviously affected the societies of the interior through such institutions as the Ekpe, adaptedas Okonko in the interiorto facilitate trade. See Lovejoy(1997).

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