S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360

JTF-GTMO-CDR

28 April 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL 33172 SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010001DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information: JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Bensayah Belkacem Current/True Name and Aliases: Abu Shiema, Abu al-Majid, Abdulkarim al-Sabahi, Abdel Karim el-Sabahi, Mezd, Belkacem Ahmed, Abdul Medzid, Mesa, Zerar, Jamal Place of Birth: Warqala, Algeria (AG) Date of Birth: 10 September 1962 Citizenship: Algeria Internment Serial Number (ISN): US4AG-010001DP

1

2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 26 October 2007. b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is a member of an Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) cell involved in an al-Qaida linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BK) 1 Detainee was the Bosnia contact for senior al-Qaida
Analyst Note: The GIA is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) counterterrorism (CT) Priority 3 target. Priority 3 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threat other senior policymakers and IC managers believe must receive attention from the IC that are not already identified as Priorities 1 or 2. These include terrorist/extremist groups involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and the capability to attack CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON: 20330428

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010001DP (S) facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ010016DP (GZ-10016). Detainee is identified as a financier and facilitator who coordinated pre-travel arrangements for extremists en route to Afghanistan (AF). Detainee received advanced training at an al-Qaida associated training camp and an extremist camp in Bosnia. Detainee is linked to al-Qaidas Global Jihad Support Network (GJSN), including those tied to the Millennium Plot and other terrorist support non-governmental organizations (NGO). 2 [ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.] JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies A LOW threat from a detention perspective Of HIGH intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainees assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by next to the footnote.) Added a significant amount of documents to detainees SCI supplement Included an additional report identifying detainee as a high level extremist facilitator Added additional information on communications between detainee and GZ-10016 Included reports identifying detainees training at an advanced training camp in Afghanistan and attending a training camp in Bosnia Included reports indicating detainee fought in Tajikistan and Bosnia Added a report describing detainee as an associate of an Algerian extremist cell in Zenica, BK Added information pertaining to detainees roommate in Zenica Included detainees admissions of being a director of an NGO while in Bosnia

4. (U) Detainees Account of Events:

U.S. persons and interests, but are believed to pose somewhat less threat than Priority 2 groups, or terrorist/extremist groups that have demonstrated intention to attack U.S. persons and interests and are taking action to develop or acquire WMD capability. 2 Analyst Note: The GJSN is a NIPF Priority 1 CT target. Priority 1 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the President, Vice President, DNI, and NSC/HSC Principals and Deputies. This includes terrorist groups, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that pose a clear and immediate danger to US persons or interests. This includes those preparing to employ WMD.

2 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010001DP (S) The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainees own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee completed conventional schooling through the sixth grade. He then attended a religious institute until 1980 when he left before earning a diploma. Detainee then worked as a civil registry clerk at the local municipality, preparing birth and death certificates. From 1982 through 1984, detainee satisfied his compulsory military service in the Algerian Army. Detainee returned to work as a civil registry clerk until 1986, when his father died. Detainee quit his job and moved back in with his mother. Unable to obtain employment, detainee sold a piece of land and set up a small grocery store out of his parents house which he operated for two to three years. In 1989, he became serious about Islam. In June 1990, detainee left Algeria to participate in the hajj (pilgrimage) and traveled to Mecca, Saudi Arabia (SA), via Tunisia (TS) and Jeddah, SA. While in Mecca, detainee frequented various mosques where shaykhs gave religious lessons. Detainee remained in Mecca due to these teachings and stayed at the Noble Sanctuary until early 1995. In April or May 1995, detainee conducted another hajj. Detainee then decided to travel to Bosnia to teach children the basics of practicing Islam. 3 b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In June 1995, detainee, using his Algerian passport, departed Saudi Arabia and traveled to Sanaa, Yemen (YM), where he stayed for two months. 4 Detainee obtained a false Yemeni passport from an unidentified individual. Detainee stated his Algerian passport had expired and he was afraid to go to the Embassy to renew it because he might be accused of being a terrorist. 5 In August of 1995, detainee used his Algerian passport to exit Yemen and his false Yemeni passport to enter Syria (SY). Detainee left his Algerian passport in Damascus, SY with a religious person whom he met at the Amawi Mosque and traveled to Istanbul, Turkey (TU), where he waited for a Croatian (HR) visa. He departed Turkey and traveled to Zenica, via Split, HR and Slovenia (SI). Detainee arrived in Zenica on 11 November 1995 and was directed to the Balkans NGO. 6

IIR 6 034 0198 02, IIR 6 034 0198 02(b), Analyst Note: Detainees claim of living in the Noble Sanctuary for five years is assessed to be a fabrication, as are many of his claims. The Noble Sanctuary is the area of the Kaba where Muslims pray five times daily. It is extremely unlikely that the Saudi Government would allow anyone to remain within the Sanctuary for any period greater than one day due to the need to ensure the Kaba was equally accessible by all. 4 Analyst Note: Detainee reported that he used his Algerian passport because he did not think his accent would support his claim of being Yemeni. Detainee claimed that the officials did not notice that his Algerian passport had expired. 5 Analyst Note: In TD-314/40549-02, senior al-Qaida lieutenant GZ-10016 stated he met detainee in Afghanistan in 1993, the period detainee reported he was in Saudi Arabia. GZ-10016 has historically been more truthful than detainee. 6 IIR 6 034 0198 02(b), IIR 6 034 0198 02(c); Analyst Note: Detainee reported that travel through Yemen, Syria, and Turkey to Bosnia was normal.

3 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010001DP (S) c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee worked for the Balkans NGO until August 1996, distributing food in exchange for room and board. During this time, he obtained his Bosnian citizenship using the name on his false Yemeni passport. 7 Detainee became a clothing trader and made numerous trips to Turkey. The first trip was to Istanbul for three to four months at the end of 1996. Detainee returned to Zenica via Sarajevo in December 1996. In 1997, detainee met and married a Bosnian woman and lived with her parents in Zenica. Detainee did not work during the first two and a half years of marriage and lived off savings and the profits of a month long trip to Istanbul every six months selling clothes. 8 During Ramadan in 1998, detainee rented an apartment in Zenica where he and his wife stayed for approximately eight months, then moved to another apartment. Detainees additional income was derived from money from Arabs going to the United Kingdom (UK) for political asylum, which he received through express mail or Western Union. In late 1997 or early 1998, detainee went to the local police department to change his name back to his real name. He was then able to receive a Bosnian passport in his real name. Detainee traveled to the United Arab Emirates (AE) Red Crescent office in Sarajevo seeking charity assistance for his family. There, Lakhdar Boumediene, ISN US4AG-010005DP (AG-10005), provided detainee with groceries. 9 5. (U) Capture Information: a. (S//NF) In late October 2001, the Bosnian Federal Ministry of Interior Police (FMUP) arrested detainee and several other Algerians (collectively known as the Algerian Six) who were suspected of being involved in a terrorist plot against the US Embassy in Sarajevo. In addition to detainee, Bosnian authorities arrested Sabir Mahfouz Lahmar, ISN US4AG010002DP (AG-10002); Muhammad Nechla, ISN US4AG-010003DP (AG-10003); Mustafa Ait Idir, ISN US4AG-010004DP (AG-10004); AG-10005; and Al-Haj Omar Boudellaa, ISN US4AG-010006 (AG-10006). After being exonerated by a Bosnian police criminal investigation and following the Algerian Governments refusal to take custody, Bosnian authorities transferred the detainees to US custody on 18 January 2002. 10
Analyst Note: Detainee reported the Bosnian Government dissolved the Balkans charity organization at the end of 1996 due to a shootout between an Egyptian and another Arab. Attaining citizenship abroad provides a means of obtaining additional passports, a common practice used by extremists. 8 Analyst Note: Detainee reported he made approximately $2,000 US during each of these bi-yearly trips to Istanbul, TU. Detainee further claimed that he never held a job in Bosnia. 9 IIR 6 034 0198 02(c); Analyst Note: Detainees procurement of multiple passports is representative of extremist procurement of travel documents. Detainee had multiple passports: an Algerian passport (which he claimed to have left in Syria, which verified his nationality and marriage in Bosnia); a false Yemeni passport (which he claimed he burned); a true-name Bosnian passport; and likely a Bosnian passport sharing the name of his false Yemeni passport. Reporting stated detainee had 10 passports showing various nationalities and names in his possession at the time of his arrest, although it is unknown if they were for detainees personal use. 10 IIR 6 933 0021 02, IIR 6 034 0198 02, TD-314/08126-05, TD-314/49994-02, TD-314/39239-01, AMEMBASSY SARJEVO 29-DEC-2006; Analyst Note: In TD-314/39634-01, the date of capture is given as 21 October 2001.
7

4 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010001DP (S)

b. (S) Property Held: Ring Although not held at JTF-GTMO, the following items were reported in detainees possession at the time of his capture: 11 10 passports showing various nationalities and names, three of which were: Algerian passport, number 3510803 Yemeni passport, number 3741913 Bosnian passport, number S/910601550 63 Audio Cassettes and 2 Videotapes Telephone numbers and e-mail addresses were found on detainee or in his apartment by the Bosnian Muslim Government Service

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 20 January 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following: Terrorist operations against US personnel and facilities in Bosnia

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainees Account: While detainee has acknowledged possessing multiple passports, he has omitted key details such as the actual disposition of the passports, their origins, and intended use. As noted, detainee stated he left his Algerian passport in Syria but also claimed he used it to validate his identity for marriage in Bosnia. Detainee is not forthcoming during debriefings and routinely refuses to answer questions. Despite corroborated intelligence reporting, detainee denies his identity, activities, employment, and relationship to extremist members. Detainee stated to the Algerian delegation he has secrets that he cannot tell the Americans. Detainee stated he made an oath to Allah not to speak to interviewers. 12 7. (U) Detainee Threat:

The FMUP is also abbreviated as MUP. IIR 2 216 1331 02 stated detainee was stripped of Bosnian citizenship on 29 November 2001 and pled guilty on 7 December 2001 to having falsified documents, specifically an Algerian passport in the name of Abdulkarim al-Sabahi. The Bosnian investigation was probably limited to the issue of citizenship. 11 TD-314/38324-01, IIR 2 216 1276 02 12 010001 302 04-NOV-2002, 010001 302 29-AUG-2002, 010001 SIR 16-MAR-2006

5 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010001DP (S) a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is an assessed member of the GIA and was arrested, along with other assessed members of a terrorist group, in response to terrorist threats against the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee was the Bosnia-based contact for senior al-Qaida facilitator GZ-10016. Detainee is identified as a financier and facilitator who coordinated pre-travel arrangements for extremists en route to Afghanistan to participate in hostilities against US and Coalition forces. Detainee is a veteran mujahid who received advanced training at an al-Qaida associated training camp and an extremist camp in Bosnia. Detainee is linked to other members of al-Qaidas GJSN, including those tied to the Millennium Plot and to extremist NGOs. (S//NF) Detainee is an assessed member of a GIA cell in Bosnia and an assessed participant in an al-Qaida linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. (S//NF) In September 2001, detainee, Abd al-Qadr al-Mukhtari, aka (Abu Maali), AG-10003, AG-10005, and AG-10006 were included on an Algerian Government list of Algerians residing in Bosnia who were suspected of having terrorist ties to the GIA and al-Qaida. 13 (S//NF) Detainee is included on a Bosnian Government list of 86 ethnic Arabs who made changes to their legal personal identification information. Detainee is listed as changing his name to Abdulkerim al-Sabahi on 12 October 1997. 14 (Analyst Note: Changing his name in the Bosnian Government bureaucracy would possibly enable detainee to obtain another passport in that name, therefore allowing extremist groups to obtain authentic travel documents.) (S/NF) On 8 October 2001, FMUP, in cooperation with US forces in Bosnia, apprehended detainee, a suspected al-Qaida facilitator, after an investigation into threats against the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Bosnian authorities also directed the investigation toward seven other individuals, including detainee, who were suspected of involvement in the threats. This led to their subsequent apprehension.15 (S//NF) Over the next two weeks AG-10002, AG-10003, AG-10004, AG10005, and AG-10006 were arrested for false attestation of information and suspected involvement in the threats against the US Embassy in Sarajevo. 16

13

TD-314/39634-01, TD-314/42368-01; Analyst Note: It is assessed that Abdelmadjid Benaissa is a variant of detainees name and his alias. A variant of Bensayah is Benaissa and a variant of Abdul Medzid is Abdelmadjid. 14 TD-314/32951-04, Paragraph R; Analyst Note: A variant Abdulkerim is Abdul Karim. 15 IIR 6 933 0021 02 16 IIR 6 933 0021 02

6 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010001DP (S) (S//NF) The two other individuals arrested were identified as Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) member Khaled al-Arbed and Atif Munassur, aka (Abu Nasar), a suspected facilitator for the GSPC. 17 (S//NF) The Bosnian Federation Supreme Court stated this group attempted to attack the facility and the employees of the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Bosnian Government documents identified the arrested individuals as an organized terrorist group, whose activities constituted an act of international terrorism. The group was suspected of conducting surveillance of the Embassy and its personnel, and coordinating with senior UBL lieutenant GZ-10016. 18 (Analyst Note: According to 2004 open source reporting, Bosnian prosecutors and police formally exonerated the six Algerians of any criminal charges. No terrorism charges were levied against them in the Bosnian court.) 19 (S//NF) Detainee possessed the phone number of a Bosnian locksmith employed at the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Further investigation by Embassy authorities revealed the individual was AG-10002s father-in-law. The employee was detained and subsequently failed a polygraph test given by US authorities. 20 (Analyst Note: This individual could have provided physical access to the Embassy for the purpose of the attack.) (S//NF) Despite claims they were not associated with each other, communications between the members of the group known as the Algerian Six demonstrated a close association between them. All six individuals are Algerian nationals who came to Bosnia during the 1992-95 war. They are linked to the Algerian terrorist organization GIA. 21 (S//NF) AG-10002s mobile phone number and his landline number are listed among detainees contacts. 22 (S//NF) AG-10002 remarked he met detainee once or twice during AG10002s employment with the Saudi High Commission for Relief (SHCR) in Zenica. AG-10002 further remarked detainee was a poor, uneducated individual who could barely afford to feed his family. 23 (S//NF) A report listing phone numbers of detainees contacts included AG10005s phone number. 24 His cell phone number was identified as
TD-314/11070-05, IIR 6 933 0021 02, 010001 Mantis ealin26398 21-Nov-2001 TD-314/02606-02, BIH Court Doc BB-014 30-OCT-2001, DCS-G2 Special Assessment-Algerian Six 18-FEB2004 19 Washington Post Foreign Service 21 August 2006 20 IIR 7 130 1022 02, Paragraph 1A, 010001 Profile 23-AUG-2002 21 AMEMBASSY-SARAJEVO-29-DEC-2006 22 010001 SFOR POCKET LITTER 01-OCT-2001, IIR 6 933 0021 02; Analyst Note: AG-10002s phone number is reported as 033-535-026 23 TD-314/09118-02 24 010001 SFOR POCKET LITTER 01-OCT-2001
18 17

7 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010001DP (S) 0038766157269 in the report. (Analyst Note: AG-10005 reported during an interview his home telephone number was 543234 and his cell phone number was 66157269.) 25 (S//NF) AG-10005 admitted knowing, providing aid to, and obtaining a lawyer for detainee. AG-10005 claimed he hired a lawyer without knowing the charges against detainee. 26 (S//NF) Detainee identified AG-10005 as Ahmed from the United Arab Emirates Red Crescent office in Sarajevo.27 (S//NF) AG-10003 stated AG-10005 assisted detainee and AG-10002 with their respective charity work. 28 (S//NF) Detainees pocket litter included AG-10006s phone number. AG10006s cell phone number was provided as 00387-66160112 and his home phone number was 00387-33522085. 29 (Analyst Note: During an interview, AG-10006 confirmed his cell number as 66160112 and his home number 33522085. 30 AG10006 was an al-Qaida instructor and an assessed GIA member. 31 ) (U) Other reporting provided additional links between the Algerian Six in Bosnia. (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) AG-10004 claimed he was good friends with AG-10005 and they worked together one or two days per week. 32 AG-10004 further remarked he and AG-10005 taught Karate to orphans sponsored by the Red Crescent. They also played soccer on Saturdays with other Arabs who worked with other NGOs and embassies. AG-10004 further reported AG-10005 and AG-10003 were friends. 33 (S//NF) AG-10003 stated he first met AG-10004 in Croatia and AG10004 assisted him with the paperwork for his Bosnian citizenship. AG10003 stated he came to know AG-10004 quite well when AG-10004 transferred to Sarajevo in 1997. 34

IIR 6 034 0205 02 IIR 6 034 0205 02(b) 27 IIR 6 034 0198 02(c), paragraph 23 28 IIR 6 034 0205 02, IIR 4 201 2433 06 29 TD-314/38324-01, IIR 6 034 0201 02; Analyst Note: The IIR lists a phone number AG-10006 provided as his own. The TD provides a list of detainees contacts and notes the same phone number with the name Khallad. The phone number is 066-160-112. 30 IIR 6 034 0201 02 31 TD-314/41818-01, 010006 SIR 01-DEC-2005, IIR 6 034 0205 02, TD-314/42368-01, TD-314/43043-07 32 IIR 6 034 0727 02 33 IIR 4 201 2107 06 34 IIR 6 034 0208 02, 010003 FM40 24-MAR-2002
26

25

8 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010001DP (S) (S//NF) An FMUP investigation found AG-10003s and AG-10005s phone numbers in items confiscated during AG-10004s arrest. 35 (S//NF) AG-10006s mobile phone number memory contained the phone numbers of AG-10003, AG-10004, and AG-10005. 36 (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) AG-10004 remarked that he met AG10006 in June or July 1996. AG-10006 was working for the Human Appeal Charitable Organization. AG-10004 claimed his wife and AG-10006s wife were friends. Detainee also admitted he helped AG-10006 download programs on his computer. 37 (S//NF) Detainee had direct contact with senior al-Qaida facilitator GZ-10016 in Afghanistan and Bosnia. GZ-10016 attempted to have detainee procure passports for him while detainee was in Bosnia. 38 (S//NF) Detainee called GZ-10016 at least once on his mobile phone, and had spoken in a way that indicated he was about to take part in a terrorist attack. The most likely targets were Eagle Base, the main US base in Bosnia, housing 3,000 personnel, and the US Embassy, which later closed temporarily in recognition of the threat. 39 (S//NF) GZ-10016 photo-identified detainee as Abu Majd, an Algerian national who fought in Bosnia in the mid-to-late 1990s. GZ-10016 did not recognize the name Bensayah Belkacem. 40 In a separate debriefing, GZ-10016 again photo-identified detainee as Abu al-Majid and also identified detainee by the alias Zerar.41 (S//NF) GZ-10016 stated detainee was from Bosnia and first met him in Afghanistan in 1993 or 1994. Detainee had been captured and spent some time in a Communist prison in Kabul, AF. Sometime in 1994, detainee was released and visited GZ-10016 at his guesthouse in Peshawar, Pakistan (PK). Detainee told GZ10016 he was en route to Bosnia to fight in the jihad 42 . (S//NF) When detainee returned to Afghanistan in 1997, GZ-10016 saw detainee again. GZ-10016 said detainee stayed in Afghanistan until 2000, when detainee returned to Bosnia. GZ-10016 attempted to use detainee during this time as a contact to procure passports. GZ-10016 said his last contact with detainee was shortly after

TD-314/39904-01, Paragraph 2 FFFF and Paragraph 3C; Analyst Note: AG-10005s phone number is 090-157269, and AG-10003s phone number is 090-165-595 (see TD-314/41367-01). 36 TD-314/41367-01 37 IIR 4 201 2107 06 38 TD-314/43586-01 39 Janes Sentinel Security Assessment Balkans 1-APR-2005 (See below regarding GZ-10016s comments pertaining to this phone call.) 40 TD-314/18247-05 41 TD-314/57979-05; Analyst Note: A variant of Abu Majd is Abu al-Majid. Detainee has not been identified in any other reporting as Zerar. 42 TD-314/57979-05

35

9 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010001DP (S) 11 September 2001 by telephone. During this phone conversation GZ-10016 told detainee he would be able to find work in Afghanistan similar to his work in Bosnia. 43 (S//NF) Analyst Note: GZ-10016s comments conflict with detainees claims and place detainee in Afghanistan on multiple occasions. It is also assessed that the phone call detainee made to GZ-10016 is the same as mentioned previously regarding detainee and an imminent terrorist attack. It is assessed that detainee was requesting safe-haven assistance from GZ-10016 and continued employment in terrorist operations in Afghanistan. (S//NF) Detainee was identified as the primary al-Qaida facilitator in Bosnia. Detainee possessed numerous phone numbers linking him to UBLs operational network in Afghanistan and the global Sunni extremist network, including GZ10016s phone number which was found in his pocket litter.44 (S//NF) Detainee denied associations with GZ-10016 and to using the alias Abu Majd. Despite his denials, detainees wife also identified detainee as Abu Majd. 45 (S//NF) Detainee was identified as a financier and facilitator arranging travel to Afghanistan for the Algerian Six with the intentions to participate in jihad against US and Coalition forces. (S//NF) Detainees name was one of 25 names on a Bosnian Government list of Algerians suspected of involvement with terrorist organizations abroad, or involved with humanitarian organizations suspected of providing logistical support to terrorist groups. 46 (S//NF) Detainee is identified as an extremist facilitator linked to cells in North Africa (Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria) and extremists operating in Turkey, Germany (DE), France, Italy and England. 47 (Additional information available in SCI supplement) (S//NF) Open source reporting refers to bank accounts held by members of the Algerian Six. The document specifically mentions detainee as the key man in alQaida in the Balkans, and he had 3.5 million Bosnian Marks 48 in a bank in Bosnia deposited by the SHCR. Detainee denied ever having a bank account in Bosnia. 49

TD-314/57979-05; Analyst Note: In 010001 302 19-NOV-2002, detainee denied ever traveling to Pakistan. TD-314/14059-02, TD-314/40549-02, IIR 6 933 0021 02, DCS-G2 Special Assessment- Algerian Six 18-FEB2004, IIR 7 130 1022 02, Paragraph 1 45 IIR 6 034 0199 02, 010001 302 06-DEC-2002 46 TD-314/07726-02, Paragraph X 47 002223 INTREP 03-APR-2002 48 Figure currently equivalent to approximately $2.8 million US 49 EUP20030303000281, 010001 SIR 09-APR-2004; Analyst Note: The SHCR is a NIPF Priority 4 Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 4 TSEs are defined as having the available resources and being in a position to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 4 terrorist groups.
44

43

10 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010001DP (S) (S//NF) A source reported detainee led a group of naturalized former Bosnian mujahid of Algerian descent in Bosnia. Detainee was identified as an al-Qaida member with no viable means of financial support but was somehow able to support himself and several other former mujahideen families in the Zenica and Sarajevo areas of Bosnia. Some financial support was provided by Shaykh Nasar al-Said, the former director of the SHCR, as well as from Rashid al-Sudairi, a former mujahid with connections in Afghanistan. 50 Possibly corroborating this statement, GZ-10016 stated detainee worked for the mujahideen in Bosnia, providing them with daily supplies.51 (S//NF) Detainee encouraged his Algerian associates, GTMO detainees AGs 10002-10006; Khaled al-Arbed (See information available in SCI supplement) and Atif Munassur, aka (Abu Nasar), a native Algerian and a former Bosnian and Afghan mujahid to participate in jihad in Afghanistan against US and Coalition forces. 52 Detainee applied for an Iranian visa on 1 October 2001 in Sarajevo intending to travel to Afghanistan through Iran and then assist the other Algerians jihadist elements in Afghanistan in anticipation of the US campaign following the 11 September 2001 attacks. Detainee received financial support for this travel from Shaykh Nasar al-Said, the former director of the SHCR. 53 (S//NF) Detainee is a veteran mujahid who received advanced training at an al-Qaida associated training camp and an extremist camp in Bosnia. (Additional information available in SCI supplement) (S//NF) GZ-10016 indicated he first met detainee in approximately 1993, when al-Majd came to Afghanistan from the war in Tajikistan. Former al-Qaida operations director in Southeast Asia and Bagram escapee, Mahmud Ahmad Muhammad alRashid, ISN US9KU-001206DP (KU-1206, deceased) corroborated GZ-10016s account by stating he believed detainee had traveled to Tajikistan based on conversations he had with detainee. 54 (S//NF) Multiple reports identify detainee as having received training and serving in the Bosnian jihad in the early to mid 1990s. 55 (S//NF) Detainee is reported being an associate of a group of former Bosnian mujahideen from Algeria which established an extremist cell wanted by the Algerian Government as of 2002. 56 (S//NF) KU-1206 reported he saw detainee (al-Majd) at the Derunta Training Camp for approximately one week. Additionally, after detainees training at Duranta,

50 51

TD-314/35452-01 TD-314/57979-05 52 TD-314/35452-01, IIR 6 933 0021 02; Analyst Note: The GSPC is an NIPF Priority 1 CT target. 53 TD-314/35452-01, IIR 6 933 0021 02, TD-314/14059-02 54 TD-314/45985-02, 001206 FM40 18-APR-2005 55 TD-314/45985-02, 001206 FM40 18-APR-2005, TD-314/30111-02 56 TD-314/20986-02

11 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010001DP (S) detainee told KU-1206 about his training and how compounds and explosives were created at the Duranta Training Camp. 57 (S//NF) KU-1206 also reported that detainee attended an unidentified militant training camp in Zenica during 1993. 58 (S//NF) Detainee is linked to other members of al-Qaidas GJSN, including those tied to the Millennium Plot and to extremist NGOs. (S//NF) Detainees pocket litter contained the same phone number provided by Hocine Benaoui to Fatah Kamel in order to contact Said Atmani. Kamel is suspected, along with Ahmed Ressam, of involvement in the Millennium Plot, a planned bombing attack against the Los Angeles Airport (LAX). Atmani was convicted in French courts as a terrorist facilitator and deported to Morocco by the Bosnian Government. 59 (S//NF) Detainee met Ahmad Marwan in 1998 at the al-Ansar Mosque in Bosnia. Detainee called Marwan to request assistance in locating a place to stay when he traveled to Turkey, allegedly to buy and sell clothing. Marwan is an ethnic Turk with ties to mujahideen efforts in Turkey and is affiliated with several known terrorists. 60 (S//NF) Detainee received money from members of al-Qaidas GJSN. As recently as two weeks prior to his arrest, detainee received a wire transfer in the amount of $750 US from Benallaoa Nabil in Frankfurt, DE. Detainee stated Abu Ali in London, UK arranged the transfer. 61 (S//NF) Algerian national Benallaoa Nabil is a lieutenant of Ibrahim Buisir trained in Kosovo. Ibrahim Buisir, aka (Ibrahim Abd al-Salam Muhammad Busayr), is an Ireland (IE) based terrorist facilitator and holds a leadership position in the al-Qaida European cell. 62 (S//NF) The phone number 441214495950 associated with the name Dozana and Dojano, was found in detainees effects by the Bosnian Government service. The same phone number was listed for Abud Janana al-Jazari in the telephone diary of al-Qaida facilitator Ahmed Hassan Jamil Suleyman, ISN US9JO000662DP (JO-662, transferred). 63 (Analyst Note: Dozanas phone number has a United Kingdom country code and it is possible he is associated with Abu Ali. There is no other known connection between detainee and JO-662.) (S//NF) Detainees roommate at 184 Gorazdanska, Zenica was an Egyptian named al-Sheriff Hassan Mahmoud Saad, aka (Sakhr) who was arrested

58

57

001206 FM40 18-APR-2005, TD-314/30111-02 001206 FM40 18-APR-2005 59 EUCOM Atmani 14 Feb 2006, TD-314/32974-05, TD-314/38324-01, Paragraph 4A 60 TD-314/14059-02, IIR 6 034 0199 02, 010001 302 29-AUG-2002 61 IIR 6 034 0199 02; Analyst Note: A variant of Benallaoa Nabil is Nabil Benalloua. 62 TD-314/30473-04, TD-314/18847-04 63 TD-314/38324-01, Analyst Note: Variants of Dozana may include Dojano, Janana, and Dujana.

12 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010001DP (S) approximately three months prior to detainees arrest. Sakhr was also suspected of being a member of the GJSN operating in Bosnia. 64 (S//NF) Detainees Bosnian phone number was found on Libyan extremist and document forger Ibrahim Muhammad Mustafa, aka (Mustafa al-Ibrahim), aka (Abu Hafs), when Mustafa was detained in Ireland. 65 (S//NF) Documents recovered from UBLs residence in Kandahar, AF and from raids of suspected al-Qaida facilities in Northern Afghanistan listed detainees phone number. 66 (S//NF) Detainee has been identified as a former director of the al-Furqan Association, and linked to several other NGOs in Bosnia including the SHCR through Shaykh Nasar al-Said. SHCR provided funding to other Islamic NGOs in Bosnia, including al-Furqan, al-Haramayn, and the Active Islamic of Youth Organizations (AIO). 67 (S//NF) Reporting indicates detainee was once employed by the al-Haramayn Charitable NGO. 68 Corroborating these reports, detainee admitted being the director of an unspecified NGO in Bosnia. 69 (S//NF) The Bosnian-based NGO Pomoc provided detainees wife and the wives of the other Algerian Six members a monthly stipend throughout 2004. 70 (Analyst Note: Pomoc also provided a stipend to the wife of convicted terrorist Said Atmani, who was associated with convicted Millennium Plot conspirator Ahmed Ressam. 71 The Pomoc NGO is suspected of having ties to the Active Islamic Youth Organization (AIO).) 72 c. (S//NF) Detainees Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a LOW threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been compliant and rarely hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 21 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 10 March 2008, when he failed to follow guard instructions on returning an electric razor when his time was up. He has one Report of Disciplinary Infraction for assault occurring on 17 November 2003, when he threw water on the guards. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass
EUP2001092200089 TD-314/04678-03; Analyst Note: Detainees phone number is listed in paragraph C as 38732420737. 66 TD-314/52648-03, IIR 7 739 3117 03 67 AT Force Protection 06-FEB-2002; Analyst Note: Al-Furqan is a NIPF Priority 4 TSE. 68 IIR 7 131 0030 02; Analyst Note: Al-Haramain is NIPF Priority 2 TSE. Priority 2 TSEs have demonstrated sustained and active financial support for terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 2 terrorist groups. 69 010001 SIR 29-JUN-2005 70 TD-314/50199-05, Paragraph O 71 TD-314/50199-05 72 IIR 7 114 0256 04; Analyst Note: AIO is an NIPF Priority 1 TSE. Priority 1 TSEs are identified as providing witting operational support to Priority 1 terrorist groups.
65

64

13 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010001DP (S) disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, unauthorized communications, assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of seven Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and one so far in 2008. 8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of HIGH intelligence value. Detainees most recent interrogation session occurred on 7 March 2008. b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee was identified as working with GZ-10016 and linked to the procurement and use of forged documents. Detainee spent ten years traveling around Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and West Asian regions. Detainee reportedly lived in Saudi Arabia for five years. He is affiliated with various NGOs and is assessed as an extremist with militant experience in Bosnia and in Afghanistan. Detainees phone directory ties him to al-Qaida operatives in Europe and the Middle East. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee is assessed as an extremist with militant experience dating back to the early 1990s. Detainee can provide information on terrorists with whom he affiliated during that time, such as GZ-10016, as well as new associations and provide details of the evolution of militant recruitment and facilitation. Detainee can detail the al-Qaida network regarding forgery and finance support in Bosnia and can provide information on terrorist links in Europe. Detainee can detail the surveillance of and preparations for attacks against the US Embassy in Bosnia, as well as identify participants who may still be at large. d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: Al-Qaida terrorist operations and methodology Foiled US Embassy attack in Sarajevo Al-Qaida and international network leadership and facilitators GZ-10016 (Worldwide) Ibrahim Buisir (Ireland/Europe) Ibrahim Muhammad Mustafa (Ireland) Nabil Benalloua (Germany) Abu Ali (United Kingdom) GIA in Bosnia Al-Qaida activity in Bosnia Terrorist and foreign fighters operatives, recruiters, financiers, and facilitators False, stolen, and forged travel documentation 14 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330428

s E c R E T //NOFORN / I 20330428 JTF-GTMO-CDR Detention UnderDoD Control(CD) for for SUBJECT:Recommendation Continued (S) ISN Detainee, US4AG-010001DP Guantanamo
o Terrorists and foreign fighters targets,activities, training, motivation, movement, and networks logistics,leadership, o Plot againstUS Embassyin Sarajevo "Algerian Six" o GIA - operations in and personnel Bosnia,including the members o Ties to terrorism o NGOs and links to extremism- including personnel, facilities,financing,links on 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemy combatantstatuswas reassessed 1 October2004, and an enemy combatant. he remains

7aw-4)A
MARK H. BUZBY RearAdmiral,US Navy Commanding

can Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence Warning Terminology.

15 S E C R E T / / NOFORN I I 20330428