HAZID Wells and Reservoir: Project Title: Page 1 of 12 Document Title

KCP-RDS-SHE-HAZ-1000 Rev.
: 02 Project Title: Document Title: Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project HAZID Wells and Reservoir Page 1 of 12
HAZID Wells and Reservoir

Table of Contents
1. 2. 3. Introduction ......................................................................................................2 HAZID Scope and Methodology ......................................................................2 HAZID Results ..................................................................................................4 3.1. 3.2. 3.3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Introduction.................................................................................................4 Materials .....................................................................................................4 Existing Wells .............................................................................................4
Conclusion........................................................................................................5 HAZID Study Attendees ...................................................................................6 HAZID Guidewords...........................................................................................7 HAZID Study Record. .......................................................................................8 Mandatory References ................................................................................... 12
Kingsnorth CCS De monstration Pro ject The information contained in this document (the Infor ma tion) is provided in good faith. E.ON UK plc, its subcontractors, subsidiaries, affiliates, e mployees, advisers, and the Depart ment of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) make no representation or warranty as to the accuracy, reliability or completeness of the Infor mation and neither E.ON UK plc nor any of its subcontractors, subsidiaries, affiliate s, e mployees, advisers or DECC shall have any liability whatsoever for any direct or indirect loss howsoe ver arising from the use of the Infor mation by any party.
KCP-RDS-SHE-HAZ-1000 Rev.: 02 Project Title: Document Title: Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project HAZID Wells and Reservoir Page 2 of 12
1. Introduction
Hazard identification (HAZID) is a fundamental aspect of risk management. During the initial stages of an engineering project ,HAZID studies are undertaken to ensure that the major risks associated with plant design are identified and addressed at the earliest possible opportunity. Typical HAZID recommendations relate to site layout, process control and improvements and the development of mitigation and emergency response measures. The Kingsnorth carbon capture project presents many new challenges to the power industry in terms of managing risks to man and the environment. Hazardous materials such as carbon dioxide introduce potential new hazards that have not been previously considered by the power industry. E.ON recognises the need to evaluate the new hazards associated with carbon capture. There is also a need to review and challenge the perceived wisdom with respect to risk management to ensure that the potential for harm is always As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP), as required under UK health and safety legislation. The design and construction of the first fully integrated commercial scale power and capture plant provides an ideal opportunity to do this. This document covers the HAZID exercise which was undertaken for the reservoir storage complex and associated equipment. It should also be noted that the HAZID is only one stage of risk assessment for the project. As detailed in Section 9 of the Project Handbook on Health and Safety, the project is adopting the 6stage approach to hazard studies, which covers the full project lifecycle, from initial conception through development and into the operational phase. The HAZID presented here is the first of these steps.
2. HAZID Scope and Methodology

The focus of the HAZID is to identify the major risks to man and the environment. To ensure consistency with E.ON company policy, the extent of the hazards for consideration is based upon the Serious and greater levels of consequence, as identified in E.ON UKs Consolidated Risk Assessment Matrix. These levels are described below.
Safety
Environment
Catastrophic
Major
Major environmental Multiple fatalities, offsite disaster causing long-term impact or irreversible damage and international condemnation Single fatality or serious irreversible disability with Major environmental impact major quality of life resulting in significant fines impact Major long term but reversible injury Reportable incident causing serious but reversible environmental impact
Serious
The structure of each HAZID session was as follows: an explanation of the process/node from the design team brainstorming of potential hazards that could result in significant consequences for man or the environment a final guideword check to ensure that the major issues have been considered identification of initiating events that realise each hazard, along with potential consequences for man and the environment. identification of expected safeguards, along with areas of uncertainty and points for subsequent clarification. The following points need to be taken into account when considering the HAZID: 1. The purpose of the workshops was to identify hazards, not resolve them. 2. The list of causes of hazards is not exhaustive. It was sufficient only to identify that the hazard could occur; 3. Consequences for man and the environment are based on no mitigation (i.e. without safeguards) 4. The list of safeguards for each hazard scenario is not exhaustive and does not constitute an ALARP justification. Safeguards listed provide an indication of what is currently known and planned for at this early stage of conceptual design only. These will be developed and enhanced with detailed design. The HAZID was chaired by MMI Engineering Ltd, and recorded by Baker RDS. It was conducted over rd th two separate sessions on the 3 and 25 August 2010. HAZID nodes were agreed prior to the sessions and included the following: Node 1 - New Wells (CO2 Injection) Node 2 - Existing Wells Exploration Node 3 Existing Wells, Production Node 3 - Storage Complex
Due to similarities, the HAZID record sheets combine nodes 2 and 3.

Normal drilling risks were considered to be separate from this HAZID which focussed on the introduction of CO2 to the wells design process. Hazards associated with the drilling operations will be subject to further risk assessment, including Task Risk Assessments, at a later date when a drilling contractor has been selected. During the HAZID process a number of safeguards were recommended, and actions were noted for consideration during the detailed design phase of the project. These actions were not assigned to individuals during the HAZID meeting and it is recommended that a list of actions is compiled and they are assigned to the Subject Area Manager (SAM) for each area within the project. The responsible engineer will then ensure that the recommendations are considered during the detailed design phase of the project. Output from the HAZID form the basis for the conceptual design stage Design Risk Assessments [M1] which are documented in the Risk Assessment and Risk Mitigation report .
3. HAZID Results
3.1. Introduction
The study records developed during the workshop were reviewed on-screen by the study team, enabling minimal post-workshop review and amendment. The principal risks identified were in the areas of material selection and risks associated with the original wells which were drilled in the late 1960s. 3.2. Materials
Due to the corrosive properties of CO2 and the potential for carbonic acid attack on cements, material selection is a key issue. The compatibity issues with elastomers and CO2 have also been recognised, along with the potential for the existence of extremely low temperatures in the operating envelope. 3.3. Existing Wells
The existing wells were not designed for a CO2 environment, and hence were not constructed with materials resistant to attack by CO2 or carbonic acid. The existing production wells, drilled from three platforms, have not yet been fully abandoned, and so access for plugging remediation is generally possible. There are a few exceptions for which further engineering is required. The existing exploration wells, drilled on the seabed, are assumed to be fully abandoned using standard methods for hydrocarbon wells, although there is no available record for these operations. As such, they will have been cut off below the seabed,. Re-entry for plugging of these wells may not be feasible. The monitoring programme for the CO2 reservoir will need to take the issue of incomplete plugging into account.
4. Conclusion
The HAZID workshop successfully achieved the aim of reviewing potential major incidents associated with the wells and reservoir. Various reports produced by Baker RDS have successfully addressed these potentials, and/or identified further work which will be required at later stages in the design process. Output from the HAZID has been included in the Design Risk Register for the project, to ensure that these items will be covered at later stages. All these items will be addressed during further hazard and risk assessment workshops during the course of the project.
5. HAZID Study Participants

The HAZID participants included technical professionals from Baker RDS and Genesis Oil and Gas who were directly involved in the project. Technical representatives from E.ON, and the Project Risk Manager from ARUP also took part. The sessions were chaired by MMI Engineering Ltd.
6. HAZID Guidewords
Initial brainstorming was used to establish hazards associated with the wells and storage complex due to the novel application. Following this initial development of hazards, the guidewords in the table below were applied. Substances Environmental Emissions
Toxic Eco-toxic Flammable Explosive (inc. missiles) Corrosive Asphyxiant Temperature Pressure Electrical Human Factors Moving Parts (kinetic energy) Ignition sources Lifting Facilities C&I Working environment
Air Water Soil Noise Odour Environmental receptors Population Flooding Ambient temperature Wind Snow Rain Ice Earthquake/Seismic activity Lightning Subsidence Erosion Escape points Muster points Safe rooms (toxic refuge) Emergency procedures Isolation
Process/Equipment Hazards
Natural Hazards
General Hazards
Falling Objects Transport and traffic Structural failure Obstacles Fire Loss of containment Venting Health Startup/Shutdown/Trip Isolation and access
Emergency Response
O&M
7. HAZID Study Record.

HAZARD SCENARIO N1 CAUSES CONSEQUENCES POTENTIAL IMPACT TO PEOPLE ON AND OFFSITE POTENTIAL IMPACT TO THE ENVIRONMENT RECOMMENDED SAFEGUARDS ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
New Wells (CO2 Injection) Loss of Wellhead & Xmas Tree Leakage Containment of CO2 Outside Storage Complex
Release of CO2 to Sea, Atmosphere, potential migration
DHSV Failure (Does not close when required) Cement Degradation Tubing Materials Corrosion Casing Materials Corrosion Elastomer failure (CO2 exposure)
As above As above As above As above As above
Loss of buoyancy Impact on Support Vessel Crews Asphyxiation/Toxic Impact Exposure to High Pressure Fluid/Gas Exposure to Very Low Temperatures Impact from Debris Impact on Aircraft As above As above As above As above As above
Toxic Impact on Marine Life ETS Contravention
Wellhead design for integrity
RDS
As above As above As above As above As above
Design Integrity of DHSV Materials Selection Materials Selection Materials Selection Materials Selection
RDS RDS RDS RDS RDS (NB there are identified issues with elastomers in CO2 service) RDS RDS RDS RDS RDS E.ON (FW), GENESIS E.ON (FW), GENESIS RDS Review Potential, Compatibility/Concentrations Identify Potential, Development of Consequences
Tubing Mechanical Failure Casing Mechanical Failure Cement Mechanical Damage Hydraulic Control Line Leak Seismic Activity Hydrate Formation in Wellbore Hydrate Formation at sandface Operational Error Unplanned Introduction of Chemicals
As above As above As above As above As above As above As above As above As above
Liquid CO2 Slugs in Pipeline Arriving at Wellhead Interference in Complex from external Hydrocarbon production/storage activities
As above
As above
As above
Materials Selection IS Installation Procedures Materials Selection and Routing of Control Lines Reservoir Selection Criteria Integrity of CCS Plant Dehydration Plant, Methanol Injection Topsides Integrity of CCS Plant Dehydration Plant, Methanol Injection Topsides Reduce Operator Input Where Practicable System Design to Prevent Inadvertent Chemical Addition (only route is Methanol Injection Offshore?) System Designed to Allow for Liquid (Dense Phase) CO2.
Kingsnorth CCS De monstration Pro ject The information contained in this document (the Infor ma tion) is provided in good faith. E.ON UK plc, its subcontractors, subsidiaries, affiliates, e mployees, advisers, and the Depart ment of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) make no representation or warranty as to the accu racy, reliability or co mpleteness of the Infor mation and neither E.ON UK plc nor any of its subcontractors, subsidiaries, affiliate s, employees, advisers or DECC shall have any liability whatsoever for any direct or indirect loss howsoe ver arising from the use of the Infor mation by any party.
HAZARD SCENARIO
CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
POTENTIAL IMPACT TO PEOPLE ON AND OFFSITE
POTENTIAL IMPACT TO THE ENVIRONMENT
RECOMMENDED SAFEGUARDS
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
N2
Existing Wells (from Exploration and Production) Loss of containment to outside of Storage Complex Cement degradation Release of CO2 to sea, potential migration to other formations Loss of buoyancy Toxic impact on marine life Establish location, review condition, re-entry and plugging (if required/possible). NB:, this requires failure of multiple barriers
Impact on support vessels
ETS contravention
Monitoring.
Need to consider impact of low temperatures.
Casing materials corrosion
As above
As above
As above
As above
As above
Seismic activity
As above
As above
As above
As above
As above
Migration between formations unable to be isolated by abandonment methods
As above
As above
As above
As above
KCP-RDS-SHE-HAZ-1000 Rev.: 02 Project Title: Document Title:

HAZARD SCENARIO N3
Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project HAZID Wells and Reservoir
CAUSES CONSEQUENCES POTENTIAL IMPACT TO PEOPLE ON AND OFFSITE
Page 10 of 12
POTENTIAL IMPACT TO THE ENVIRONMENT
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
Storage Complex Loss of containment to outside of Storage Complex Leak of formation water with dissolved CO2 outside the storage complex. Release of free CO2 to sea/atmosphere, potential migration to other formations And possibly third party fields Loss of buoyancy Impact on marine life Robust Monitoring program of storage site and complex (including seabed)
Impact on support vessels Destabilise seabed impacts installation/platform
ETS contravention
Robust storage site selection process
Destabilise seabed causes slippage Contamination of fresh water bearing aquifers Potential for displacement of heavy metals at sea bed
Fit for purpose interpretation and modelling or storage site and complex Develop corrective measures plan
Leak of CO2 across bounding faults and subsequent leak to surface Exceeding natural reservoir pressure resulting in seal failure along faults and/or in overburden
As above
As above
As above
As above
As above
As above
As above
Development plan stipulates that CO2 storage does not exceed hydrostatic pressure locally i e. in near well bore region Monitoring pressure in well and near well bore
In addition to all of the above Seismic activity/natural resulting in reactivation of faults generating leak paths As above As above As above Links with BGS or authority monitoring seismic activity in the area (frequency/trends)
In addition to above Interference in Complex from external CO2 storage licences which causes unexpected pressure differentials not accounted for at time of design Interference in Complex from external Hydrocarbon production/storage activities As above As above As above All of above Subsequent Operators need to account for Eon Operations in the area DECC to include in licensing regulations As above As above As above All of above Eon Operations to account for other Operators in the area DECC to include in licensing regulations
KCP-RDS-SHE-HAZ-1000 Rev.: 02 Project Title: Document Title:

HAZARD SCENARIO
Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project HAZID Wells and Reservoir
CAUSES CONSEQUENCES POTENTIAL IMPACT TO PEOPLE ON AND OFFSITE As above
Page 11 of 12
Leak of CO2 along the bounding fault planes
As above
POTENTIAL IMPACT TO THE ENVIRONMENT As above
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
Robust Monitoring program of storage site and complex (including seabed) Robust storage site selection process Fit for purpose interpretation and modelling or storage site and complex Develop corrective measures plan
Interference with 3rd party operations
Leakage into adjacent formation due to spill of CO2 outside storage site Pressure changes due to Injection of CO2 into the storage site
As above
As above
As above
Storage site selections
Potential for negative impact to 3rd party hydrocarbon production and/or storage (gas or CO2)
NO HSE impact incorporate in Risk Register
8. Mandatory References
[M1] Baker RDS, Risk Assessment and Mitigation Options, KCP-RDS-CRE-REP-1009

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KCP-RDS-SHE-HAZ-1000 Rev.

HAZID Wells and Reservoir

2. HAZID Scope and Methodology

Due to similarities, the HAZID record sheets combine nodes 2 and 3.

5. HAZID Study Participants

7. HAZID Study Record.

Release of CO2 to Sea, Atmosphere, potential migration

As above As above As above As above As above

Toxic Impact on Marine Life ETS Contravention

Wellhead design for integrity

As above As above As above As above As above

As above As above As above As above As above As above As above As above As above

As above As above As above As above As above As above As above As above As above

As above As above As above As above As above As above As above As above As above

POTENTIAL IMPACT TO PEOPLE ON AND OFFSITE

POTENTIAL IMPACT TO THE ENVIRONMENT

Impact on support vessels

Need to consider impact of low temperatures.

Casing materials corrosion

Migration between formations unable to be isolated by abandonment methods

KCP-RDS-SHE-HAZ-1000 Rev.: 02 Project Title: Document Title:

POTENTIAL IMPACT TO THE ENVIRONMENT

Impact on support vessels Destabilise seabed impacts installation/platform

Robust storage site selection process

KCP-RDS-SHE-HAZ-1000 Rev.: 02 Project Title: Document Title:

Leak of CO2 along the bounding fault planes

POTENTIAL IMPACT TO THE ENVIRONMENT As above

Interference with 3rd party operations

Storage site selections

NO HSE impact incorporate in Risk Register

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