Atty. Isidro to Madam Rosa: Good Afternoon Madam!

Based on your letter-inquiry regarding the series of incidents which transpired resulting in the untimely death of Michelle Tala, I have came to the following preliminary assessment of the case. There is no absolute assurance that our possible defenses will be favored by the court since the Supreme Court itself based on the membership and its stand on the main cause of the Talas grounded on agency appears to be unsettled. In other words, while we cannot predict the outcome of our case and victory is not one of my assurances, we can set up the following defenses that could exculpate the hospitals liability or assuming that it will not be excused at all, at the least, it may be mitigated. This is a serious case and requires an extensive research. Before I proceed to discuss the intricacies of the case, please read and sign the retainer contract. X x x x Based on our initial research, as mentioned earlier, victory is not one of my assurances but we can plead strong defenses. They are the following: 1. The first offensive that the Talas will deploy is that Dr. Lapuz is an employee or at least an agent of the hospital. But to our findings the Talas did not select Medical City Hospital (PSI) to provide medical care because of any apparent authority of Dr. Lapuz as its agent since the latter was chosen primarily and specifically based on his qualifications and being friend and neighbor. 2. Assuming that our first line of defense will defeat the first claim, I expect that the Talas will this time attempt to maneuver the circumstances to hold you liable under the doctrine of corporate liability. But again the hospital cannot be liable under doctrine of corporate negligence since the proximate cause of Mrs. Talas injury was the negligence of Dr. Lapuz, which is an element of the principle of corporate negligence Clearly, not being an agent or employee of the hospital, it is not liable for Dr. Lapuzs acts during the operation. Considering further that Dr. Lapuz was personally engaged as a doctor by Mrs. Tala, it is incumbent upon Dr. Lapuz, as "Captain of the Ship", and as the Talas doctor to advise her on what to do with her situation vis-a-vis the two missing gauzes. In addition to noting the missing gauzes, regular check-ups were made and no signs of complications were exhibited during her stay at the hospital, which could have alerted petitioner PSI's hospital to render and provide post-operation services to and tread on Dr. Lapuz s role as the doctor of Mrs. Tala. The absence of negligence of the hospital from the patient's admission up to her discharge is borne by the finding of facts in this case. Likewise evident therefrom is the absence of any complaint from Mrs. Tala after her discharge from the hospital which had she brought to the hospital's attention, could have alerted petitioner PSI to act accordingly and bring the matter to Dr. Lapuz s attention. But this was not the case. Ms. Tala complained ONLY to Drs. Lapuz and Lobo, not the hospital. How then could the hospital possibly do something to fix the negligence committed by Dr. Lapuz when it was not informed about it at all. 3. The hospital really fulfilled its corporate duty on the ground that Dr. Lapuz assumed the personal responsibility of informing Michelle about the two missing gauzes. Dr. Ricardo Jocson, who was part of the group of doctors that attended to Natividad, testified that toward the end of the surgery, their group talked about the missing gauzes but Dr. Lapuz assured them that he would personally notify the patient about it. Thus, there was no reason for it to act on the report on the two missing gauzes because Michelle Tala showed no signs of complications. She did not even inform the hospital about her discomfort. Atty. Isidro to Dr. Lobo: As in your case, Dr. Lobo, it appears that your participation is merely as an anesthesiologist such that the Captain of the ship during the conduct of the whole operation was Dr. Lapuz. Thus, you have nothing to be afraid of, since there is a very thin possibility that you will be held liable for the injury cause. Atty. Isidro to Dr. Lapuz:

As much as I sympathize with the inadvertent error you may have committed, I must honestly tell you that if well fight this case to the end, you might lose more than enough. In other words, we need miracle to defend your cause. The defenses are not in your side, Doc. But please, you do not have to despair because well do everything within my firms power to make an affordable compromise with the Talas. But should they not accept our offer, well defend you to the very last, maybe not winning the case but saving you from a lot of damages.

Atty. Sicat: I join the whole family in this mournful event of our lives in the loss of Michelle. I am deeply troubled about her loss considering you and Michelle are my dearest friends. We cannot let this pass we cannot let them go scot-free. We have to teach everyone responsible the lesson that in handling lives: extraordinary diligence must not only be exercised by the attending physicians but also by the hospitals that they represent. Based on the initial risk analysis of our case, it appears that we have a very strong case. The hospital and the doctors can only hope for miracles. First, the hospital is liable under the principle of ostensible agency for the negligence of Dr. Lapuz and, pro hac vice, under the principle of corporate negligence for its failure to perform its duties as a hospital. Second, while in theory a hospital as a juridical entity cannot practice medicine, in reality it utilizes doctors, surgeons and medical practitioners in the conduct of its business of facilitating medical and surgical treatment. Third, while it is true that Dr. Lapuz is not an employee of the hospital because of the apparent lack of control, however, there is ample evidence that the hospital held out to the patient, Michelle, that the Doctor (Lapuz) was its agent. This can be shown by the following factors, first, the hospitals manifestation to the patient which led the latter to conclude that the doctor was the hospitals agent; and second, the patients reliance upon the conduct of the hospital and the doctor, consistent with ordinary care and prudence. Judge: Wherefore, based on the foregoing premises, this Court rules in favor of the plaintiff finding that the hospital is solidarily liable with Dr. Lapuz; that the complaint against Dr. Lobo is dismissed. The hospital is ordered pro hac vice to pay Michelle (substituted her heirs) and Emman Tala the total amount of P15M, subject to 12% p.a. interest from the finality of this decision to full satisfaction.