Screwing the Brains

A false history of the Cruel War

"Stupidity is a priceless gift from God, but it should not be abused". Bismarck

From the author

When the trees were tall and I easily fit under the table, it was customary in our country to work. Each morning the street-cars hung by the clusters of the people crawled on the bridge at the intersection of the street of The Red Communards with the street of the 22-nd Party Congress (to this intersection I was brought from the maternity home) toward huge, smoking and honking factories. They honked seriously. Low-tone, steady and endless humming filled up each my evening. Until about five years of age that was what I was thinking, that an evening is when it is getting darker and is honking. Later the testing ground of the aviation engine factory was moved far outside the city, and there was no more honking. But the people continued to work. In my fuzzy childish recollections remains a pompous voice of Levitan who informed about the new cosmic flights and giant dams blocking mighty Siberian rivers. Even a medium capacty middle-school student understood that the people who designed a rocket, computed the trajectory of a cosmic ship, made an aviation engine whose turbine is burning but is not burning up in the stormy blue-white flame, are very intelligent people who studied hard, learnt a lot, who know the things which the others do not even guess about. And any highly qualified lathe operator understood that a model man (it is not the one who is walking on the podium in white pants but craftsman-gold hands who carves from wood an exact copy of the future casting) knows and knows how to do something that he, the lathe-man, does not know. And vice versa. On that THEY caught us. On a natural for any working man respect of the knowledge and expertise of the other working man. On a subconscious (but very firm) perception of the "presumption of the qualification" of each engineer, medical doctor, geologist, musician, corn-producer... A Soviet laborer could not presume and believe that a Soviet "doctor of historical sciences" is absolutely not the same as a doctor of physical sciences who invented a synchro-cyclotron. A concept that behind a lengthy signature "Doctor of the historical sciences, professor, head of the Recent History department" hides a fat burocrat who, first, knows nothing and, second, does not want to know anything about the recent (and any other) history - this concept just does not sink into the head of a normal person. And he does not want to know anything because he wants to sleep peacefully and to live beautifully, and to live not in the factory soot covered street of the Red

Communards but somewhere on the Frunze embankment in Moscow. But it was not that easy to get to live on the Frunze embankment. There, only the "socially affine" people were needed. Only those who, by their solid appearance and quiver inspiring signature validate (derived from the word "constipate"1) the wild delirium imperially prescribed for the dissemination by the Department of the agitation and propaganda of the CC CPSU2. There is no more CC CPSU. And the Department of the agitation and propaganda no longer exists. And the street-name signs changed in many streets. The czar-emperor Nicolas-the-bloody is proclaimed almost a "saint megalomartyr". The knight of the revolution Felix Edmundovich is proclaimed "the bloody executioner". Everything got confused in our common house. I would assume, due to this hassle and confusion nobody thought, at the same day when the iron statue of Dzerzhinsky floated in the air over the heated crowd, to abolish by a single decree all scientific ranks and titles received at the departments of the History of the CPSU, scientific communism and other "recent history". And it is a pity nobody thought about it. Oh, pity... And now the former "cadre", with no even a shade of embarrassment, name themselves a "Doctor of Historic Sciences, Professor, and Head of the Politology Department at the International Academy of marketing, franchising and bablopiling"3. They lecture the students, same as way back, from the thirty years old flyblown synopses. And, at that, sternly wave the hooked digit demanding "to stop rewriting the history". One such "cadre" in all seriousness explained me that Victor Suvorov (with whom I had a pleasure to communicate numerously both in the direct radio-ether and in private conversations) does not exist at all, and behind this pseudonym hides a group of dyed-in-the-wool anti-Sovietchiks, cadre CIA and MI6 employees which was incontrovertibly established by a "veeeery serious organization" (the eyes and the digit go up: "Well, young man, you have to understand yourself what I have in mind..."). Nevertheless the Earth is revolving, and the process, once started, is impossible to stop. To steam peoples' brains with impunity in the Internet and satellite TV times and the book publishing dependent only on the peoples' wallets is getting ever more difficult. I am not worried about the students: most of them do not visit the lectures and faithfully purchase (naturally, for the parents' money) the monitoring, course and diploma tests. The professors socially close to any loafer usually treat such youthful frolics condescendingly. And those few who need diplomas just as an attachment to the knowledge have the opportunity to read serious studies of bona fide historians. I am scared to say that these, they no longer throw out of the universities, no longer corral into the "special psycho ward of MVD", no longer "sew cases" under the Articles 70 and 190.1 of the RSFSR Penal Code, no longer plant narcotics... But what should do us, those who had already grown off the student age and youthful indolence, who has to "spin around" day and night, whose reading time only appears in a subway car or in a train compartment? I do not have the heart to advise
1 2

The author used the word of several meanings including fasten, fortify, constipate; MG CC CPSU is Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; MG 3 Bablo is the Russian slang word for money; piling is piling; apparently bablopiling means money accumulation; MG

them to pull money out of the wallet and purchase one of my fat military-historical books. Really, what working person can plough through these 500600 pages of the fine print, with tables, diagrams and maps of the bygone battles?! That was from these sad dissertations that the idea was born to write a simple and hilarious book which will help the reader to familiarize and part with laughter with the brightest samples of the domestic "brain-having". And along the way to learn something new about our unpredictable history. However, even reading this book from any page diagonally in the subway car do not lose, the esteemed reader, one very important, principal detail: I am putting to ridicule and public shame not the war heroes, not the veterans who return from the war on crutches, not your granddad and not my father but only those freeloaders and greasers who during the long decades converted the dissemination of in-advance false insinuations about the causes and circumstances of our greatest tragedy into a profitable personal industry.

Chapter 1 "INDICATIONS OF THE DEGENERTION"

Over the years a plethora of most diverse examples of "brain-having" accumulated in the memory of my computer. Each one is good and fit in itself, each deserves the public revile. Where to start? Under the rules of didactic we should move "from a simple to a complex". Excellent! We will not invent new rules and will present in the first chapter such hearty stupidities which, even not being something particularly significant in substance, are remarkable in that they show us the very bottom of the "well of ignorance" from which it is advisable to get out as soon as possible. I present the honorable right to open the gallery to one funny interjection which made me hilarious by its limitless diamond transparency and simplicity comparable maybe only with the chemical formula of the diamond. Besides, this is one of the most recent examples known to me. In 2007 the publishing house "Yauza-EKSMO" decided to gather under a single cover the historians of most diverse, I may say diametrically opposite views, who were asked to answer one and the same question: what was the main cause of the Red Army defeat in the summer of 1941? That was how the collection of articles "The Great Patriotic catastrophe" appeared. A well-known historian, the head of the statistics department in the Institute of the Military History at the RF Ministry o defense, a Colonel, Candidate of Historical Sciences M.E.Morozov (if by this time Miroslav Eduardovich has already become a Doctor of Sciences, I apologize and bring my congratulations to him) wrote for this assembly an article "The defeat of the summer of 1941 was natural". The title is a bit heavy to my taste but the main thought is expressed with the military clarity. Frankly, I also believe that in the summer of 41-st the defeat was natural and unavoidable. Of course, this statement is the only coincidence in our views. In 93 pages Colonel Morozov is developing the concept traditional for the Soviet historiography that "the history left us too little time" and the Soviet Union turned out not to be ready for war from the material/technological viewpoint. I, on the other hand, believe that the notorious "history" gave Stalin unacceptably long time, and the 20 year long corruption of the people, ferocious destruction of all moral and ethical norms brought the people and the army to an absolutely unbattleworthy status. Let us return, however, to the article by .E. Morozov. As the article was devoted to the military aviation it discussed, of course, the hopelessly outdated Soviet aircraft which couldnot in any way be compared with the enemy's aircraft. Thus, it is said, verbatim, on page 299: "...the horizontal speed of the "Junkers" Ju-88 was one and a half times higher than that of Ar-2". Yes, of course, not for the speed alone a front bomber is valued, but still the lag in speed by ONE AND HALF TIMES... This is serious. At such technical backwardness the defeat indeed begins to appear natural and unavoidable. Nevertheless, it would be nice to know specific speed numbers. Do not worry,

esteemed reader! I do not intend at all to flail the papers with the reports of the flight tests and "load" you with polemics regarding the reliability of these reports. God forbid! After all, I promised: everything will be simple and transparent. In the page 249 colonel Morozov reports that the maximum speed of the -2 bomber (this aircraft was a deep modification of the most numerous prewar bomber SB) was 480 km/hour. The speed of the 1939 vintage SB Morozov gives in the same page as 450 km/hour. And in the page 298 we can find out that the maximum speed of the "Junkers" Ju-88 bomber was 450 km/hour. That is how the "history" is written in our places. If it is impossible but very desirable then it is possible. If there is a strong desire to rub in to the public a thesis about "technical backwardness" of the Soviet Air force then the number 450 may turn out to be one and a half times greater than a number 480. But that is not all. An important clarification is in order: the speeds are included in the tables which not every reader will be willing to study. But a final conclusion of the overwhelming advantage of the "Junkers" is given in the straight text! What was it? A deplorable misstep or a job of a real master of "brain-having"? I cannot know. This question is to the Colonel. As a second in a row we have a renowned and making the experts' mouths sore but still overwhelming the credulous public "General Agreement of cooperation, mutual help, joint activities between the Main State Security Directorate NKVD USSR and the Main Security Directorate of the German National Socialistic Workers Party (Gestapo) ". I like this text very much. I use it in those very cases about which A.S. Pushkin wrote: "As morose thoughts would visit you, uncork a bottle of Champaign or read again "Marriage of Figaro"4. The life currently is not easy, "morose thoughts" come to mind often and no liver would stand such alcoholic load. As for the immortal comedy by Beaumarchet it just is taking rest next to such pearls: "The parties will conduct the struggle with the degeneration of the mankind for the sake of salubrity of the white race and the creation of the race hygiene eugenic mechanisms. The degeneration kinds and forms subject to sterilization and elimination are defined by the Parties in the additional protocol No 1 which is an inalienable part of this agreement..." Shown in the additional protocol No 1 are "qualification kinds of degenerative indications" against which NKVD and Gestapo decided to fight together, namely: "red-headed, cock-eyed, lame and slant-handed by birth, with speech defects lisping, rhotacism, stutter (inborn), witches and sorcerers, shamans and clairvoyants, hump-backed, dwarfs, persons with large moles and numerous small moles, variegated skin cover, multicoloration of the eyes, etc. ". This fake, unparallel in its stupid squalidness ends so: "The text of the agreement is typed in Russian and German languages in the only copy each of which is of equal validity...". The mysterious Agreement is signed by "the Head of the Main Directorate of the state security of the NKVD USSR, state security commissar 1-st rank L. Beria and Head of the Fourth directorate (Gestapo) of the Main security
4

" , " "; MG

directorate of the National-Socialistic Deutsche Arbeiter Partie brigadenfuehrer DDG. Mller". Given is even the exact minute when the historic event occurred: "Accomplished in Moscow, 11 November, 1938 at 15 hours 40 minutes". This feverish delirium was intensely PR'ed in the media by comrade V. Karpov, former leader of the Union of Writers of the USSR, former Supreme Council deputy and former member of the CC CPSU. Due to such signature a crudely hacked fake which does not deserve even the smallest note became the subject of a broad discussion, constant quotation, etc. However, the text was not authored by Karpov at all. In 1999 it was published by G.S. Nazarov, a figure widely known within the narrow circles of ideological fighters against the domination of Euro-masons (aka "judeo-masons"). The "document" was published in a magazine under a title exceptional for this kind of publications, "Miracles and adventures" (1999, No 10.) Incidentally, I do not exclude a possibility that Nazarov also just copied the text composed by somebody else. At least I came across this "General Agreement" with the reference to some "Memory" No 1/1999. In any case, only the Narzan-exhausted organisms of fighters against "red, guttural and lisping" could give birth to a fake with such a set of blunders: 11 November, 1938 G. Mller could no way have been in Moscow. He was in Berlin, and he was very busy that day. At night of the 9-th to 10-th November, 1938 on personal direction from Hitler was conducted the all-German Jewish pogrom which entered history under the name "Crystal night". 267 synagogues were burnt and destroyed, 815 stores and companies, 20,000 Jews were arrested and thrown into the concentration camps. The spontaneous explosion of the "people's anger" at such scale had to be organized, directed and controlled, 20,000 persons had to be escorted to the camps. This entire huge job lay on the shoulders of the leaders of Germany's penal organs including Mller whose personal participation in the "Crystal night" events is supported by numerous testimonies; and the Main Directorate of the Imperial Security (RSHA) and its component Gestapo were state ("imperial" under the terminology accepted in the Nazi Germany), not party bodies. There was no in existence in November of 1938 such a thing as the "Main Security Directorate of the National-Socialist Workers Party of Germany". NSDAP by that time became a single ruling party, and on the basis of its paramilitary structures were created penal organs of the Fascist state. In order to find this out it is not at all necessary to spend months in the library dust. The abbreviation RSHA known to anyone who watched "the movie about Stirlitz" is formed based on the word "Reichs", i.e. "imperial". The word "Gestapo" is also an abbreviation where the letters "sta" indicate the word "stats", i.e., "state". Total name of this criminal organization: Geheime Staatspolizei, i.e., "secret state police "; All ranks and titles of the "signatories" are chaotically confused. As of the moment of putting together the mythical "Agreement" Mller with the rank of a "SS Standartenfuehrer" headed the 2-nd department of the Main Directorate of the Security police and SD. The Main Directorate of the Imperial Security was created

27 September, 1939, i.e., almost a year after the contrived "visit" by Mller to Moscow. In one more year, 14 December, 1940 Mller was awarded the title "SS Brigadefuehrer" spelled exactly this way and not "BrigadeNfuehrer". The preamble of the "General Agreement" says that Mller is acting based on the power of attorney issued for him by "SS Reichsfuehrer Reinhardt Heidrich". The personal title "SS Reichsfuehrer" had one and only person, H. Himmler. As for R. Heidrich, he was indeed Mller's direct boss, however with a more "modest", general's title "SS Gruppenfhrer" (later, in 1941 "SS OberGruppenfhrer "); and at last such stupidities as "the only copy, each of which is held" and the usage of the clerical term "printed" rather than "put together" do not deserve a detailed discussion. For all that, the cooperation between the NKVD and the penal organs in the fascist Germany is an incontestable fact. It is just that the subject of this cooperation was not the fight against "red-headed, cock-eyed, multicolor-eyed" but issues much more significant for Hitler and Stalin. After the occupation of Poland by the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in September of 1939, the two dictatorial regimes were facing an issue of fighting the Polish resistance. This fight required the interaction between the penal structures. The legal basis for such interaction was the Secret additional protocol to the Treaty of friendship and border signed in Moscow 28 September, 1939. This is the complete text of this Protocol: "Moscow 28 September, 1939 At the execution of the Soviet-German Agreement about the border and friendship the undersigned authorized persons stated their consent with the following: Both parties will not allow on their territories any Polish agitation, which acts on the territory of the other country. They will liquidate the embryos of such agitation on their territories and will inform each other about the expedient measures. Authorized For the German Government J. Ribbentrop For the Government of the USSR V. Molotov". The text of the Protocol is held in the RF Archive of the foreign politics (AVP 5 RF, fund 06, list 1, folder 8, case 77, sheet 4). It is published, in particular, in the 2volume collection of the documents "Year 1941. Documents" (Book 2, pg. 587). Within the framework of the proclaimed "friendship" was also taking place the "repatriation of the German subjects residing on the USSR territory". This strange formula hid two diametrically opposite processes. On the one hand, the Germans arrested in the years of the Great Terror, 1937-1938, on a charge of espionage were
5

AVP () is Archive of the foreign politics.

released from prisons and concentration camps. On the other hand, extradited to Hitler were the German and Austrian anti-Fascists who found in 19331939 asylum in the "country of victorious proletariat". In a word, the NKVD and Gestapo had plenty of common business and concerns but those issues were solved on the operating level, without writing effuse "General Agreements".

Chapter 2 STIRLIZ WOLFOVICH

If the idea of fighting "red-headed and burry" is so far in the farthest corner of subconscious fears and human prejudices grown-over with mildew and cob-webs, then the history of the Great Patriotic war still remains (and will remain for a long time) one of the "hottest", most painful points of the communal conscience. And it cannot be otherwise in a country which brought to the altar of this unparalleled sacrifice millions of human lives. Correspondingly, any bamboozler (or simply a demented graphomaniac) who composed the next "sensational document" is guaranteed his share of the Erostratus glory. The aforementioned Comrade V.Karpov who disclosed to us the mystery of "secret separate negotiations" between Stalin and German leadership which ostensibly occurred in February of 1942 in the Wehrmacht-occupied city of Mtsensk could not restrain himself from getting his share. With pride, at the same time funny and sad in a similar situation, V.Karpov narrated to journalists (an interview in the "Komsomolskaya Pravda" of 17 October, 2002) that he had "the so-called clearance number one conferring the right to work with top secret documents". Further down the road the information by Karpov about the practical application of the "clearance number one" differ. In some interviews he says that he discovered the documents about the "negotiations in Mtsensk" in the former Stalin's private office (sort of, lay under the desk); in some others Stalin's office is also present, but ostensibly there was a "top secret archive" there, with the access to it open only to the possessors of "clearance number one". V.Karpov answered very simply to a columnist from the "Moscow Komsomolets" newspaper .Deych who asked about the location of the documents: "What next! Maybe you also want the keys to the apartment on a saucer with the blue fringe?". Could all these be true? No, they could not. The probability of discovering top secret documents under such circumstances equals to zero. Not one one hundred millionth but exceptionally zero. I will tell you why. More than 50 years elapsed after Stalin's death. But it would be sufficient to have five days in order for even a single unowned document not to remain lying on the floor of Stalin's office (dacha, apartment, and car). Currently a secret document touched by the Master's hand may be found in two and only two possible states: they are destroyed or recorded into ledgers, numbered and accounted for in the corresponding archives. To find under the desk the document of separate negotiations with Germans is impossible in principle. Theoretically, such document could be found in an archive but then the document publisher must pronounce four magic words: "fund, list, case, and sheet". Without these words a historical document does not exist. Maybe only a fake more or less crudely made. But this is not all. A possessor of the "clearance number one" (and also "two" and "three") should understand that the "right to work with top secret documents" absolutely does not mean the right TO PUBLISH the secret documents. This is an

ABC known to anyone who indeed worked with the secret documents. This "ABC" consists of a special closed room, secret pad with stitched-through and numbered pages, guarded safe where this pad is placed every night, courier communications service which - and only which - has the right to move the now secret pad from the point A to the point B and so on. If the document is not yet declassified then any copy of this document, any excerpt from it, even a mere mention of its existence is not subject to the open publication. A violation of this order is a crime. Any possessor of the "clearance" signed the statement that he was warned about the responsibility for a disclosure. And if the document is already declassified it may be published but only with the mandatory indication of the fund, list, case and sheet. That was contrived by the people in order for any willing - and under the law (I wouldn't say that it is so in actuality) any RF citizen has a right to familiarize with any declassified document can come to the archive, specify "the fund, list, case and sheet" of interest and check whether the publishing person correctly copied the document, did not forget anything, did not add from himself "degenerative indications". Having dealt with this "likbez"6, let as deal with the only remaining issue: how good is the fake describing the notorious "negotiations in Mtsensk"? Here are these two "Documents" composed by V.Karpov or by those who decided to play an evil practical joke on the old man (V.Karpov was well over 80 at the time of the publication): "Proposals to the German command. 1. On the 5-th of May, 1942, beginning at 6:00 hours, to stop combat activities along the entire front line. To declare the armistice through 1 August, 1942, to 18:00 hours. 2. Beginning 1 August, 1942 and through December, 1942 the German troops must retreat to the lines indicated on the Scheme No 1. It is proposed to establish the border between Germany and the USSR in length as indicated on the Scheme No 1. 3. After the redeployment of the armies the USSR armed forces are prepared to begin by the end of 1943 the combat operations together with the German armed forces against England and USA. 4. The USSR will be prepared to consider the conditions of declaring peace between our countries and of accusing the international Jewry as represented by England and the USA in war-mongering, and during the subsequent 19431944 is prepared to conduct joint offensive military operations for the purpose of restructuring the world space (Scheme No 2). Note: In the case of refusal to comply with the aforementioned requirements (p.p. 1 and 2), the German forces will be crushed, and the German state will end its existence as such on the political map.

Campaign against illiteracy in the early years of the USSR; MG

To warn the German command of the responsibility. The Supreme Commander of the USSR J. STALIN Moscow; Kremlin 19 February, 1942 No 1/242827February 1942 To: Comrade STALIN REPORT In the course of the negotiations in Mtsensk 2027 February, 1942 with the representative of the German Command and head of the personal staff of the SS Reichsfuehrer, SS Gruppenfhrer Wolf, the German Command did not find it possible to accept our requirements. It was proposed to our Party to leave the border through the end of 1942 along the front line as is by discontinuing the combat activities. The USSR Government must immediately eliminate the Jewry. For this purpose all the Jews would have to be resettled into the high north areas, to be isolated and later completely eliminated. At that, the authorities will guard the external perimeter and implement a strict strict curfew restrictions in the territory of the camp group. The issues of eradication (killing) and utilization of the dead bodies of the Jewish population will be handled by the Jews themselves. The German Command does not exclude a possibility that we may create a unified front against England and the USA. After consultations with Berlin Wolf stated that at the rearrangement of the world, if the USSR leadership accepts the requirements of the German Party, Germany will possibly shift her borders in the east in favor of the USSR. The German Command, as a sign of such changes, will be prepared to change the swastika color on the state banner from black to red. While discussing the positions under the Scheme No 2 the following disagreements occurred: 1. The Latin America. Must belong to Germany. 2. A complex attitude in the understanding of the "Chinese civilization". In the view of the German Command, China must become the occupied territory and a protectorate of the Japanese Empire. 3. The Arab world must be the German protectorate in the north of Africa. Thus, total disagreement in the views and positions must be recognized as a result of the negotiations. The German Command representative Wolf categorically denied a possibility of the destruction of the German armed forces and of the defeat at war. In his view, the war with Russia will linger for a few more years and will end up with a total German victory. The main emphasis is made on their view that, in their opinion, Russia, having exhausted the strength and resources at war will have to return to the armistice negotiations, but under more rigid conditions, after 23 years.

First deputy to the People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR (MERKULOV) Well, what can I say? This is not even a fake. This is rather a practical joke, a stupid joke, a stab. The text authors (I am repeating again my assumption that somebody evil and not intelligent planted this scrawl on Karpov with the wish to ridicule the distinguished but, alas, too old a man) do not even attempt to lend to their contraption moderately plausible appearance. "The German Command, as a sign of such changes, will be prepared to change the swastika color on the state banner from black to red". In the third year of the annihilation of the world the color of heraldic symbols is the last thing that would worry Stalin and "the German Command". But in this particular case the proposal is completely absurd as the color of the Hitler's Germany "state banner" (in-Russian it is called "state flag)" was red. The red swastika on the red flag is a real stab. The SS Gruppenfhrer Wolf appeared in this story for the same reason for which the "General Agreement" between the NKVD and Gestapo was "signed" by BrigadeNfhrer Mller. The authors of the fake openly mock the reader whose knowledge is limited to the numerous viewing of the legendary "movie about Stirliz". If the authors of the fake wanted to be convincing they would have "appointed" as the negotiator those who did not live to the capitulation of Germany: Heidrich, Reichenau, Bock, Model, Klge, hanged Jodl, Canaris or Keitel. From the characters of the movie "Seventeen moments of the spring" Himmler who poisoned himself or Kaltenbrunner executed in 1946 under sentence of a military tribunal would fit all right. But Karl Wolf absolutely does not fit the role of the participant of super-secret negotiations with the Soviet leadership. For a very simple and obvious reason: he lived too long and died 39 years after the end of the war. . Wolf wrote memoirs, dozens of historians and journalists talked with him, and if there were in his tempestuous biography something even slightly remindful of the negotiations with a Stalin's representative, it would have been known not only to the possessor of the "clearance number one" but to any American school pupil. In the "cold war" years the story of how Stalin behind the backs of the allies conducted the separate negotiations with the Fascists, and at that in the same days when the American and English seamen who delivered the military cargo in Murmansk were perishing in the icy waters of the Northern Atlantic, would have become the "propaganda bomb" number one. But Wolf never mentioned to anybody any "negotiations in Mtsensk". And look at the signature "the Supreme Commander of the USSR"! The Soviet Union did not have a "Supreme Commander". And there was no such position among the many Stalin's positions. Stalin was the Supreme Commander of the Red Army. And also Chairman of the GKO7, Chairman of Sovnarkom8, Narkom9 of
7 8

GKO () - the State Committee of the Defense; MG Sovnarkom () - the Council of the People's Commissars; MG 9 Narkom () - People's Commissar (a Cabinet Minister); MG

Defense, Chairman of the General Headquarters of VGK10, General Secretary (sometimes in documents he wrote just "secretary") of the CC VKP(b) 11. The Supreme Commander of the Red Army wrote literately and clearly. He could not whomp up such clumsy phrases as "to establish the border between in length" or "offensive military operations for the purpose of restructuring the world space". This is about the form. The contents are even more insane. In Germany there was a totalitarian regime. The head of this regime was Hitler. Wehrmacht's Command complied with his personal orders. The issues of restructuring the world space, partition of Latin America, "Chinese civilization" and "the Arab world in the north of Africa" could have been discussed either with Hitler or with Generals who made the decision to topple Hitler. Tertium non datur. In a Hitler's Germany there was no place for a legal opposition playing under the constitutional rules. For the negotiations with Hitler (or with his trusted persons) one would have to go not to the destroyed frontal city of Mtsensk but to the capital of any state which had diplomatic relations with Germany and with the USSR (Sophia, Istanbul, Stockholm, etc.). That is exactly how all the deals were done. In a quiet, comfortable environment. In a restaurant with a nice cuisine. To conduct negotiations in a near front line city would be possible only with the conspiring generals. But the fight with the "international Jewry" (the point at which either the fake's compiler or Karpov himself clearly went off the hook) never was the first priority for the Wehrmacht Command. Moreover, most of the top Command clearly understood the danger and fatality for Germany of Hitler's pathological anti-Semitism. Incidentally, Hitler himself in the course of very real negotiations with Molotov in November of 1940 not even once raised this subject, and even more so did not discuss the issue of the "utilization of the dead bodies of the Jewish population" together with the issues of the global restructuring. No less delirious is the specific content of the "proposals". The chronology turns out like this: since May 5 to August 1, 1942 (at that, exactly until 18:00 hours!) lasts "armistice". Excellent. And what will be after "18:00 hours"? "Beginning 1 August, 1942 and through December, 1942 the German troops must retreat to the lines". Is the armistice still holding? If the answer is yes, why then it is only to "18:00 hours on August, 1"? Why is it that the "retreat to the line" takes 5 months? In the end of September, 1939 the separation of the Soviet and German troops in the territory of the crushed Poland happened. The official document was prepared with the indication of the real timing and boundaries. The separation rate 20 km/day. Twenty. At such, normal march rate over 5 months the Germans must have reached the Atlantic Ocean and drown in it... A complete apogee12, however, comes in a "Note":

10 11

VGK () - Supreme Command; MG CC VKP(b) ( ()) - Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist party (of bolsheviks); MG 12 The author is actually using a newly-formed word "apofigee" which apparently is a hybrid of apogee and a Russian word "fig" (an expression of derision or contempt); MG

"In the case of refusal to comply with the aforementioned requirements (p.p. 1 and 2), the German forces will be crushed, and the German state will end its existence as such on the political map. To warn the German command of the responsibility". Absolutely sloppy phrasing ("existence as such on the political map"). Absolutely absurd logic. If you believe you can crush and destroy the enemy - do so; to tear the striped vest13 on the chest and to yell "seven people, hold me!" is sort of not customary in serious negotiations at high level. Such defiant tone (and even with the "warning of responsibility") is absolutely atypical for the real documents of that epoch. That is, for example, in which expressions Germany declared in the morning of 22 June, 1941 the was on the USSR: "In view of further intolerable threat which occurs on the German eastern border as a result of the massive concentration and preparation of all armed forces of the Red Army, the German Government considers itself forced to take immediately military countermeasures". Period. This is the last phrase in the declaration of the German government. No "existence on the political map" was ever discussed. Was it worth it to expend so many letters to refute a clear fake? Certainly not - but this delirium surfaces with a depressing persistence here in one place, there in the other. Very recently, right before the eyes of millions of the TV-viewers of the First Channel, a known Moscow theatrical producer, flailing some yellow newspaper, literally frothing at the lips hurried to inform the public about this "historical sensation". OK, he is a producer the people in this profession apparently cannot be without some little "madness". But why the facilitator, very experienced and erudite V. Pozner did not call emergency room attendants at the first mention of the "negotiations in Mtsensk"? 2122 June, 2007 the "Komsomolskaya Pravda", under the subtitle "The copies of Documents published in the book by V.Karpov "Generalissimo" became the loudest sensation in the historiography of the Great Patriotic War", published the next article about the "negotiations in Mtsensk". For the sake of the truth it needs to be noted that the article content completely contradicted the subtitle, and "the loudest sensation" this time around was recognized as a run-of-the-mill fake. But the question in the article title "Did Stalin proposed the alliance to Hitler?" remained unanswered. By default, the reader should assume that if Karpov's "Documents" turned out to be graphomaniac delirium then there was no Stalin - Hitler alliance. Strictly speaking, this is another specimen of the "brain-having", this time much higher quality, however. The question of whether Stalin proposed the alliance to Hitler is among the rhetorical ones. That is, such questions to which the answers are known exactly and long ago. Looking for the answer, there is no need to climb under the desk in Stalin's office flailing at that "clearance number one". Everything is much simpler. 30 September of 1939 all central newspapers in the USSR published the following text of a statement by the German foreign minister Ribbentrop:

13

Striped vest is the underwear of Russian sailors; MG

"My stay in Moscow was again brief, unfortunately, too brief. Next time I will try to be here longer. Nevertheless we used these two days well. The following was assured: 1. The German-Soviet friendship in now finally established 2. Both parties will never allow the intervention of the third countries into the EastEuropean issues. 3. Both states desire that the piece would be restored and that England and France would stop the totally senseless and futile fight against Germany. 4. If, however, the war-mongers gain the upper hand in these countries, Germany and the USSR will know how to respond ". For those who were born, grew up and aged in New Zeeland I am hurrying to explain that even the information about the milk yield in the "Red Sickle" kolkhoz was subject to a strict multi-stage censorship before appearing in the front page of the "Pravda" newspaper. The text of Ribbentrop's statement where sounded direct threats in the address of the "Anglo-French war-mongers" in the name of "Germany and the USSR" was certainly preliminarily coordinated with the Soviet party. Moreover Comrade Stalin was the only person who could allow such publication. Is it possible to treat the ominous hints by Ribbentrop as the document of alliance between Stalin and Hitler? Certainly, not. The front page of the "Pravda" showed only the very top of the iceberg. The specific discussion of the conditions for creating an aggressive alliance of the four totalitarian states began 1213 November, 1940, during the official visit by Molotov to Berlin and his negotiations with Hitler. Upon Molotov's return to Moscow, 25 November, 1940 the Soviet version of the conditions for the creation of the "axis Rome Berlin Moscow Tokyo" was personally handed by Molotov to the German ambassador Count Schulenburg. Hitler's answer was the silence which ended at dawn of 22 June, 1941. But the document remained! And the very fact of the existence of this document did not let the Kremlin rulers to sleep peacefully after Stalin's Empire as a result of a surprising and ridiculous coincidence turned out to be a participant of the "anti-Hitler coalition of the democratic countries". I am not kidding, that was its title at that time. Right after the war a special organ was created on Stalin's directions differently called in different documents: "the governmental commission on the Nuremberg process", "the commission of managing the Nuremberg process". The commission included such time-tested "workers of justice" as Beria deputies Abakumov, Kobulov and Merkulov. The main Stalin's "legal scholar" Vyshinsky who for perpetuity glorified his name with a lapidary formula: "confession of the accused is the queen of evidence" was entrusted to head the commission. The main commission's objective was under no circumstances to allow the public discussion at Nuremberg of facts of the Soviet-German cooperation in 19391941. The register of issues "unacceptable for the discussion during the trial" officially coordinated with Stalin remains the indelible shame on conscience of the democratic states. What kind

of a "trial" is it if it in advance renounces its duty to find and study ALL relevant facts and documents? Of course, the preternatural alliance between the democracy (may it be quite imperfect) with tyranny (unequaled in the human history) could not last long. In 1948 a package of documents discovered among the archives of the German Ministry for the Foreign Affairs seized by the western allies was published as a collection of documents "Nazi-Soviet Relations" which became truly "the greatest sensation in the war historiography". Over forty years the Soviet historians angrily rebuked this "insolent escapade of the bourgeois falsifiers". Mountains of books were written and hundreds of dissertations were defended. Then, after the command "all clear" was issued, the second copies of the documents were discovered in the Soviet (nowadays Russian) archives. For instance, a typewritten text of the Soviet conditions for the creation of the "alliance of four powers", at that with Molotov's autographic note: "Handed over by me to Schulenburg on 25 November, 1940"; and the signature: V. Molotov, was preserved in the Archive of the President of Russia (AP RF14, f. 3, l. 64, c. 675, p. 108). Here is the text of the original document (quoted from the collection "The year 1941. Documents", Book 1, pg. 417). Certainly, it is not as beautiful as the "General Agreement about the fight against the red-headed" but, if to think carefully about its content and possible consequences much more fearsome: "The USSR agrees to accept in general the draft of the pact of four powers regarding their political cooperation and economical mutual help as presented by Ribbentrop in his conversation with V.. Molotov in Berlin 13 November, 1940 and comprising 4 paragraphs, under the following conditions: 1. If the German forces are right away brought out of Finland (in actuality there was nothing to bring out as the first units of the Wehrmacht were deployed in the Finland territory only in June of 1941 M.S.) which represent the USSR sphere of influence under the Soviet-German agreement of 1939, at that, the USSR is obligated to provide for the peaceful relationships with Finland and for the economical interests of Germany in Finland (export of lumber, nickel). 2. If during the nearest months the USSR security in the Straits is provided by way of concluding the pact of mutual help between the USSR and Bulgaria, which by virtue of its geographic position is within the security sphere of the Black Sea borders of the USSR, and the organization of a military and naval base of the USSR in the area of Bosporus and Dardanelles on the basis of a long-term lease. 3. If the area south of Batumi and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized the center of gravity of the USSR aspirations. 4. If Japan relinquishes her concession rights for the coal and oil in the North Sakhalin on conditions of a fair compensation. In accord with the above the draft of
14

AP RF ( ) - Archive of the President of Russia; MG

the Protocol to the Agreement of the four powers, presented by Ribbentrop, about the division of the spheres of influence must be changed in the spirit of the definition of the center of gravity of the USSR aspiration south of Batumi and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf (the Germans proposed to direct the territorial aspirations of the Soviet Union toward the Indian Ocean but Stalin, through Molotov's mouth, clarified that he is much more interested in the oil than in the Indian tea and elephants with emeralds. M.S.). The Ribbentrop-presented draft of the Protocol-Agreement between Germany, Italy and the USSR and Turkey must have been similarly changed in the spirit of providing for the USSR's military and naval base next to the Bosporus and Dardanelles on the basis of a long-term lease with the guarantee from the three powers of Turkey's independence and territory in the case Turkey agrees to join the four powers. It must be provided in this Protocol that in case Turkey refuses to join the four powers, Germany, Italy and the USSR agree to design and implement the necessary military and diplomatic measures, which must be included in a special agreement". Whereas the political, economic and military cooperation between the Hitler's Germany and Stalin's USSR during the period of 1939 1941 is a reliable fact, the issue of separate negotiations during the Soviet-German war remains the subject of very shaky hypotheses. There is extremely little documental material for the construction of minimally substantiated version of the events. We will try to briefly summarize the available crumbs of the information. First. Neither in the archives of the crushed Third Reich nor in the testimonies of those ringleaders of Hitler's regime who appeared in court or in memoirs of those who managed to survive the "first wave" of vengeance (at the very least, only on sentences of the military tribunals 480 Fascists were executed) there are no data about the really having taken place separate Soviet-German negotiations. This is a serious argument in favor of if even something happened, this "something" did not move further than a preliminary probing of parties' intentions. Second. There is a completely reliable document: "Explanatory note from P.A. Sudoplatov to the Council of Ministers of the USSR of 7-th August, 1953" (held in the Archive of the RF President, f. 3, l. 24, c. 465, pp. 204208). In this case, when mentioning the document's "reliability" I mean exclusively and only the reliability of the existence of the yellowed typewritten pages but in no way the proved reliability of the content. Even the shortest story about who P.A. Sudoplatov was would take half of this chapter. So I'll limit it to a simple definition: Very Senior Chekist. A person with the biography exceeding any adventure novel. Even if Sudoplatov sometimes used the expression "to tell the truth" it is doubtful he understood it the same way as the majority of the usual people. Sudoplatov's "explanatory note" surfaced during the investigation of L. Beria's criminal case. For Sudoplatov, Laurenty Beria was a personal enemy. Of course, eventually Khrushchev, not Beria sent Sudoplatov for

long years to prison... Keeping this in mind let us read several initial paragraphs from the document: "I am reporting the fact known to me. Several days after the falsehearted attack by the Fascist Germany on the USSR, approximately about 2527 June, 1941 I was summoned to the service office of the then People's Commissar for the Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria. Beria told me that there was a resolution of the Soviet government under which it was necessary to find out unofficially on what conditions Germany would agree to end the war against the USSR and to stop the advance of the German-Fascist forces. Beria explained to me that this resolution of the Soviet government had the objective of creating the conditions which would allow the Soviet government to maneuver and gain time for collecting the forces. In this connection Beria ordered me to meet with the Bulgarian ambassador in the USSR Stamenov who, according to NKVD USSR information, had connections with Germans and was well known to them (ellipsis follows further in the published text of the "Note". M.S.). Beria ordered me to pose four questions in my talk with Stamenov. Beria read these questions looking into his notebook, and they boiled down to the following: 1. Why Germany, having broken the nonaggression pact, began the war against the USSR; 2. What would be suitable for Germany, under what conditions would Germany agree to end the war, what would be needed for the end of the war; 3. Would Germany be satisfied by the transfer to Germany such Soviet lands as the Baltics, the Ukraine, Bessarabia, Bukovina, Karelian Isthmus; 4. If no, to which territories would Germany additionally pretend. Beria ordered me to conduct the conversation with Stamenov not on behalf of the Soviet government but to pose these questions in the course of the conversation about the current military and political situation and also to find out Stamenov's view on the substance of the four questions ". Further follows a detailed description of the circumstances of the preparation and conduct of the meeting which took place in the "Aragvi" restaurant in Moscow. After that, Sudoplatov writes: "The tapping of the enciphered Stamenov's correspondence continued for some time. It produced no results. It does not exclude, however, that Stamenov could have sent the information about the meeting through the diplomatic mail or diplomatic communications of the embassies and missions of the countries which by that time had not yet participated in the war. I did not get any additional directions associated with this case or with the use of Stamenov. I do not know whether Beria personally met with Stamenov. I was not tasked with the organization o such meeting..."

This is probing of a possible peace agreement. As at that time the Soviet Union legally had not yet been an ally of England and the USA, the term "separate peace" in this case is inappropriate. Based on the available information the deal did not move beyond cautious probing. Third. It is known for certain that in the fall of 1941 Stalin blackmailed the western allies by a possibility of concluding a separate peace with the Germans. W. Churchill in his multivolume "History of the Second World War" includes the text of a letter sent to him by Comrade Stalin 3 September, 1941: "Without these two kinds of help ( it was a matter of landing the English in France and delivering to the USSR 400 aircraft and 500 tanks monthly. M.S.) the Soviet Union will either be defeated or will be wakened to the extent that it will be for a long time incapable o rendering help to its allies by active participation on the front of fighting Hitlerism..." This phrase could not have any other sense than a threat to conclude a separate peace with Hitler. Fourth. It is known for certain that the first meeting of the "Big Three" (Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill) took place only in December of 1943 (in Tehran). So it comes out that for two and a half years (!!!) the "allies" allied without signing any specific agreement about the war objectives, the tasks of the parties and the future structure of Europe. And this is very strange. The correspondence between Stalin and Roosevelt devoted to the preparation of the "Big Three" meeting was published long ago (still at the time of the "stagnation"). No doubts in the publication veracity were expressed either in the USA or the USSR. So, it follows form this correspondence that during the entire 1943 Stalin procrastinated with the meeting as much as he could. Why? Couldn't this, drawn out over two and a half years, actual rejection of the comprehensive agreement with the allies have been the expression of Stalin's desire to "hold the door open" for a case of the separate deal with Hitler? I don't know. And nobody knows, but the questions remain...

Chapter 3 SNOW IN JUNE or ABOUT THE ISSUE OF "FUCKING MOTHER"

Let us now pass from the falsifications made at the most primitive amateurish level to the episode associated with the disinformation manufactured by the secret war professionals. After the 1980-1990's a tornado of words burst out off our historians-political writers. Cluttering and nudging each other the yesterday's laborers of the agitation and propaganda departments rushed to open eyes to the people and divulge the Terrible Military Secret. This "terrible secret" (I dare to suggest, prepared in advance in the counter-propaganda department of the office more serious than a Gorkom CPSU) boiled down in effect to a single thesis to the "dogma of unpreparedness". We were told with a woeful sobbing that the great achievements of Stalin's industrialization, tanks glittering with the shine of steel and armadas of aircraft covering the skies over the Red Square these are all bluff, mirage, hallucination. Something akin to Stakhanov's records and abundant kolkhoz harvests. And in actuality... And in actuality we had and still have nothing. And we had nothing to fight with. The aircraft out of plywood, the tanks "hopelessly outdated", unfinished DOS'es15, one rifle for two soldiers. A book was published (actually quite good, with numerous declassified documents) with the time-typical title: "Hidden truth of the war" ("Russkaya kniga". ., 1992, complier P.N. Knyshevsky). In particular, from a Table included in the book, "Availability of ammunition for mechanized corps in the Red Army as of 15 June, 1941" each interested could learn that "the mechanized corps were in general 10% provided with 152-mm rounds for the tank cannons" (a "projectile" is what flies out of the cannon muzzle; altogether the projectile, detonator, propulsion charge are called in the artillery a "round"), and the mechanized corps in the Western Special military district 0% provided. Zero, dear comrades, a bare zero. What to fight with? With rocks and sticks? What is the use of such mechanized corps if they have nothing to shoot with? Terrible. In order not to become in the future the victims of the "brain-having", learn, the esteemed reader, to ask TWO GOLDEN QUESTIONS: The first one. Little compared to what? The second one. Percentage of what? And everything will pan out. Who did the Red Army as a whole and its mechanized corps intend to fight against? Martians? Ah, with the Germans... So, let us compare the "availability of 152-mm rounds for the tank cannons" with the Germans. It is self-evident that there could not have been any 152-mm rounds in the German tank divisions. The service calibers in the Wehrmacht were 105 mm and 150 mm. So, how many 150-mm rounds for the
15

- ???? MG

tank cannons were in the Wehrmacht as of 15 June, 1941? I am reporting zero integers, cock decimals. My source of information? There is no need in this case. In June of 1941 there was in the Wehrmacht's inventory not even a single tank with the gun of 150 mm caliber or "even" 105-mm. And the tanks Pz-IV armed with 75-mm cannon accounted only for 14% of the total tank inventory. And to the very end of the war Germany did not have batch-produced tanks with 6-inch cannons. I'll tell you even more, in the beginning of the XXI century there are no in the Bundeswehr's inventory tank types (please don't confuse a tank with a self-propelled gun) whose rotating turrets would have a gun with the caliber over 120 mm. By placing into the revolving (i.e., with complex design and creating huge accommodation problems) turret of the KV-2 tank a 152-mm howitzer the Soviet engineers solved the technical problem of exceptional complexity. It is not said about such wonder-tanks: "few". Even two tanks KV-2 is grater that there were tanks with a 6-inch howitzer in all armies of the world combined. But we had not two of them, we had many more. In total, 213 KV-2 tanks were manufactured by the end June of 1941. Now, about percentages and ammunition. What the compilers of the Table if the collection "The hidden truth of the war" had in mind is decisively impossible to understand. They do not provide the Table and the mysterious percentages with any explanations. The availability amount of ALL mechanized corps with 152-mm rounds to the tank guns is even funnier than the renowned "average body temperature for the hospital ". In June of 1941 only eight (out of 29) mechanized corps had in the inventory tanks KB in noticeable (more than 10 units) numbers. The Western Special military district had one mechanized corps (out of six) whose inventory included the KV-2 tanks, total of 22 units. But the main thing is in something else. The KV-2 tank was armed not with a unique but almost standard (the tank version differed from the field artillery gun in slightly shortened barrel) 152 mm "vintage 1938" howitzer -10. The ammunition for this artillery system was manufactured in huge amounts. Specifically: 2,642,000 rounds were available by the start of the war, 925,000 rounds were delivered to the forces in the second half of 1941. The allotment of rounds for one tank KV-2 was 36 (thirty six) rounds. Five allotments for all 213 tanks are "miserable" 38,300 rounds. One and a half percent of the total store of howitzer rounds, caliber 152-mm. There was something to fight with... It remains to assume (I repeat once again that the compilers of the "terrible Table" did not explain: percentages of what they count) that the figure 0% as applied to the Western SMD16 only means the absence of special armor-piercing and marine (this is no typo!) projectiles to the 152-mm tank howitzer. The crux of the matter is that the KV-2 tank was designed as a "tank for the breakthrough of fortified zones". It was suggested to use it in the offensive for the destruction of concrete permanent fire positions and armored turrets. For fighting the armored turrets it was planned to use the "marine armor-piercing grenade" (in the
16

SMD () is Special Military District; MG

man-of-war artillery this projectile had to pierce the armored deck and blow up within the enemy's vessel). In the morning of 22 June, 1941 all these "exotics" became absolutely unnecessary as the forces of the Western district (as well as all others) had to fight on the own territory, i.e., where by definition there were no enemy's concrete permanent firing positions. The main (if not to say the only) task which could be accomplished by the super-heavy tank KV-2 on the defense was fighting enemy's infantry, for which purpose the standard 152-mm high explosive projectile fit very well... Let us, however, return to the issue in the title of this chapter. It was declared the most important element of the suddenly surfaced "unpreparedness" of the Soviet Union to war was the absence of the boss. That is, there was a boss but he was totally unfit for a serious business. The hidden "truth" of the war, it appeared, is in that Comrade Stalin was not just credulous but super-credulous. Naive and foolish. Anyone could cheat him. A girl-pupil from the School for Noble Maidens blushing when she sees nude horses in the street may be taken for an "evil genius" compared with the guileless Comrade Stalin. As it turns out, Stalin was lovingly watching Ribbentrop's signature under the Nonaggression pact instead of ordering to put the forces into the "state of complete readiness"... Do you think, esteemed reader, that I am kidding, sneering, rudely exaggerating? If it were so... In order to enhance the effect, a "foreign expert" was invited. An Israeli professor Gorodetsky (he, by the way, is a born Israeli, not a repatriate from the former USSR) totally justified high trust imparted in him. In his book under an admirable title "A fateful self-deception. Stalin and the attack of Germany" Comrade Gorodetsky (I do not have the heart to call him "mister") proved as clear as day that "...Stalin pure and simple refuses to take seriously the information from the intelligence... Stalin did not allow the military to start implementing the defense plans... Stalin remained deaf to Zhukov's requests to begin implementing the deployment plans... Stalin clearly lost his bearings but desperately did not want to part with his misconception... Stalin apparently drove away any thought of the war, he lost initiative and was practically paralyzed..." Gorodetsky proudly writes in the foreword to his composition: "At the cost of incredible effort I got the access to a huge number of archive sources". Really! Not otherwise that Comrade Gorodetsky got, together with the writer V.Karpov, the cherished "clearance number one". Only with such clearance is it possible to get to the information that in 1941 "the winter in Moscow was unusually long, and even in the second week of June it was snowing". I am not kidding. I am quoting. Look in page 345. The local cadre were just a bit behind the "foreign consultant". One Comrade wrote the following (verbatim): "...Expecting a quick defeat in case of war, and the death personally for himself, Stalin perhaps considered the resistance useless, and for this reason he did not try either to threaten Hitler or prepare to the fight in time... Realizing closeness of the attack Stalin did not deploy the army, did not place it in combat readiness, setting it up under the bombs sleeping in caserns, with tarpaulin-covered aircraft... In the

first days of the war he let loose the reins of leadership and totally avoided the participation in any business..." The most wicked Stalin's "satrap" Laurenty Beria also got his due at the time of exposing "the hidden secret of the war". The following badly smelling "canard" fluttered from one publication to the next: "...I am again insisting on the recall and punishment of our ambassador in Berlin Dekanozov who continues to bombard me with "deza"17 about the attack on the USSR which is ostensibly being prepared... The same was radioed by Major General V.I. Tulikov, the military attach in Berlin. This stupid General maintains that the three Wehrmacht army groups will take offensive on Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev... But I and my people, Joseph Vissarionovich, firmly remember your wise precept: Hitler will not attack us in 1941". This delirium under the name "L.P. Beria memorandum of 21 June, 1941" was launched into the circulation by a known writer and movie script writer .Gorchakov. Writer Gorchakov knew some right words so he embellished his opus by the following phrase: "On the old folder with these reports there are, in discolored violet ink, the numbers of the fund, list and case". Excellent, wonderful unveil, comrade writer, the specific numbers of the "fund, list and case". But of course Gorchakov did not do it. Which is not by accident the so-called "Beria memorandum" is a hundred percent fake. Currently, hundreds of the Soviet intelligence reports addressed to Stalin are published. Some of them are signed by L. Beria. The form of address "Joseph Vissarionovich" is never used in them, the appearance of expressions like "your wise precept", "stupid General Tulikov" and other cheap gutter press epithets is absolutely unthinkable. Nobody is ever making categorical conclusions like "Hitler will not attack us in 1941". The clarification about General Tulikov's position ("military attach in Berlin") was made exclusively and only for the future readers of the fake Stalin had phenomenal memory and certainly knew by heart the names of his representative in Berlin. "L. Beria memorandum" is a very crude, half-assed workedout compilation of typical myths and grapevines from the perestroika-period "hidden truth of the war ". And so what to this day this "canard" is full of vivacity and strength. My search of the Internet immediately spat out 271 documents, which in all seriousness mention the memo with the "wise precept". One such "document" is a large article signed by an Army General Kvashnin (at that time, Chief of the Russian army General Headquarters) and by President of the Academy of Military sciences (!!!), Army General Gareyev... That is onto this, abundantly manured, soil dropped the REAL document. FSB18 RF declassified, with the reference to the Presidential Archive (AP RF, f. 3, l. 50, c. 415, pp. 5052), and published the "Report of the NKGB19 USSR to J.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov No 2279/m" of 17 June, 1941. The "source" within the headquarters of the German aviation informed that "all military measures in Germany for the
17 18

deza - disinformation; MG FSB () is Federal Security Service; MG 19 NKGB () is People's Commissariat for the State Security; MG

preparation of the armed action against the USSR are completed; the strike may be anticipated at any time ". Stalin, in his own hand, inscribed on this document the following resolution (I am reproducing it here with the precise observance of the original orthography): "To Comrade Merkulov. You may send your "source" from the headquarters of Germ. Aviation to fucking mother. This not a "source" but a disinformer. J. St.". Ah, what a scandal happened at once! From one magazine to the next, from one book to the next fluttered this unfortunate resolution as an example of Stalin's blatant stupidity (or pathological naivet). Sure, he, an idiot, is getting reports of the coming attack, and he... How was it with the unforgettable ..Saltykov-Shchedrin? "But Dunka responded with ignorance...". Surprising, but even the fervent Stalinlovers in this situation shyly looked alow and did not come to the defense of their prostrate fetish. I don't like Stalin, and this is the mildest expression to show my feelings. However, I cannot but recognize that in this particular case Comrade Stalin was wrong only about one thing: it is inappropriate for the leader of a state to sink to the use of such hedge-born expressions. But in substance Stalin was absolutely correct: the disinformation was so floutinglytransparent that it was difficult to restrain from harsh words in its evaluation (as well in the evaluation "comrade Merkulov's" incompetence). This is the complete text of the report (which text, apparently, not a single perestroika journalist took pains to read beyond the first phrase): "The source working in the headquarters of the German aviation informs: 1. All military measures in Germany for the preparation of the armed action against the USSR are completed; the strike may be anticipated at any time. 2. In the aviation headquarters circles the TASS20 communiqu of 6 June was received rather ironically. It is emphasized that this communiqu cannot have any significance. 3. The first priority objectives of the German aviation raids are: the power generating station "Svir-3", Moscow factories manufacturing some aircraft parts (electric equipment, ball bearings, tires) and automobile repair shops. 4. Hungary will take active part in the military activities on the side of Germany. Some German aircraft, mostly fighters, are already on the Hungarian airdromes. 5. Important German aviation repair shops are located: in Konigsberg, Gdynia, Graudenz, Breslau, Marienburg. The aviation repair shops Milich in Poland, in Warsaw Ochachi and the especially important, Heiligenkeil".
20

TASS () is Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union; MG

Comrade Stalin had very weighty grounds not to believe that as of 17 June, 1941 "all military measures in Germany for the preparation of the armed action against the USSR are completed". This is a serious subject, it should not be crumpled, we will discuss it in detail in the next chapter. As is known today with certainty, p.4 is a clear disinformation. No German fighters there were in the Hungarian airdromes; moreover, the Germans had to apply substantial effort, including the provocative staging of the bombarding by the Soviet planes of Koshitse and Mukachevo (at the time these cities, under the names Kassa and Munkach, were on the Hungarian territory) in order to draw Hungary into the war. In June of 1941 the Hungarian regent admiral Horti resisted it as strongly as he could. However, the most important content of the disinformation report, in my view, was p. 3. The most important because p. 3 writes about very specific things. And these specifics unavoidably give away the disinformer. Stalin understood well that "automobile repair shops in Moscow" and a power generating station in Karelia ("Svir-3") cannot be the targets of the Luftwaffe's first strike. The state security Narkom Merkulov as well had to have some minimum set of knowledge in the area of theory and praxis in the use of the military aviation which would reveal the absurdity (in this case, the deliberate mendacity) of this statement. So Stalin's indignation was completely justified. The distance between the German bomber aviation airdromes in the occupied Poland and Moscow is over a thousand kilometers (one way). The same distance separated the airdromes in East Prussia from the river Svir. Theoretically, "Junkers" Ju-88 or "Henkel" -111 could perform this long raid but only with the minimum bomb load and, most importantly, without any fighter protection. The cruising (don't confuse with the maximum) speed of these aircraft was about 350 km/hour. In other words, they would have to fly six long hours, without the fighter cover, over the enemy's territory where the anti-aircraft system is not yet suppressed after all, we are talking the first strike! It goes without saying that each Hitler's falcon was obligated to give his life "for the Fuehrer and Faterland", but what for would it be needed to set up such a collective suicide? In actuality the first German aviation raid on Moscow happened only a month after the beginning of the war, during the night into 22 July. By that time the front line ran in the area Yartsevo Yelnya, 300 km to the center of Moscow. Theoretically, it made it possible to provide the fighter cover to the German bombers (if not along the entire rout then at least along the most part of it). However, considering a huge concentration of the Soviet fighter aviation (the Moscow anti-aircraft system included by 22 July 29 fighter regiments with the total of 585 fighter planes about the same number as Germany had on the entire East front), the Luftwaffe Command did not venture to conduct day-time raids. From 22 July through 15 August, 18 night-time raids on Moscow were conducted. The data of the Soviet air observation posts say that in total (i.e., during three weeks) 1,700 sorties were recorded but only about 70 enemy bombers were able to break through to the capital. The objectives of the forthcoming air offensive on Moscow were formulated personally by Hitler on 14 July as follows: "To carry a strike on the center of the

Bolshevik resistance and to prevent organized evacuation of the Russian government apparatus". As we can see, neither "auto-repair shops" nor even "factories manufacturing some aircraft parts" were on the list of the priority targets. And not for nothing in mid-July Hitler and his generals had no intention of breaking and damaging Soviet factories. They believed that they would be able to make the last third of the way from Brest to Moscow at the same rate as the first two thirds. Planned and implemented was the Blitzkrieg, the ruthless and sweeping destruction of the enemy's army and not at all "the war of attrition" (only within the framework of such an attrition war the raids on the factories manufacturing "electric equipment, ball bearings, tires" are possible). The target of a first air-strike could become and had become in actuality not auto-repair shops in the deer rear. There was no need to guess: in front of Stalin's eyes were the practical experience of the German "Blitzkrieg" in France (this experience was known from two sources at once as Moscow continued normal diplomatic relations both with Berlin and Vichy) and the operational plans of the Red Army Airforce Command. And what did they say? That is what: "... Using sequential strikes of the combat aviation on the identified bases, and the combat activity in the air, to destroy the enemy's aviation. To achieve the air domination, and by powerful strikes on the major force groupings, railway nodes, bridges and runs to destroy and delay the concentration and deployment of the enemy's forces..." These standard phrases are included in the cover plans of all without exception western districts. Could the German aviation activity plan be substantially different from this "standard" totally supported by the air war practice on the Western front? It could but only in the direction of even greater concentration of all (or almost all) forces and means for the fulfillment of one single task. This task was the achievement of the air domination, and in particular the strike on the base airdromes of the Soviet fighter aviation as one way to accomplish the main task. The Luftwaffe Command could not be distracted in the first hours and days of the war by anything else neither by senseless bombing of the Moscow auto-services or even by the absolutely necessary activities of the aviation support of the land force and the destruction of bridges, crossings, railway stations in the Red Army operational rear (in the present-day language it is called "isolation of the operations' Theater"). Stalin understood it perfectly. That is exactly why a clumsy attempt to deceive him by a nonsensical information that the first priority objective of the German aviation raids is the power generating station "Svir-3" put out of temper this man usually extremely restrained in his expressions. But the present-day Russian "historians" and journalists do not understand this situation. Why? We came across here a rather remarkable example of how a person who "lied once" has to lie ever farther and ever greater. In decades THEY told us about the "multiple numerical advantage" of the German aviation, about "hopelessly outdated plywood fighter-planes" and about the Soviet fliers with just 6 hours of the training flights along the "rectangular approach pattern" by the start of the war. The innumerable swarm of black ravens on the one side

and yellow-beaked chicks, on the other. Do you think I am exaggerating? No, I am quoting again, this time the memoirs of one Soviet Navy Commander: "...Mighty rays of the searchlights cut the cloudless skies and swung as pendulums probing the firmament on which, growing with each second, spread the monotonous rumble. At last a frightening armada of the low-flying aircraft appeared from the sea side. Their limitless crow-like rows alternatively passed along the Northern bay... Lugubrious silhouettes of yet unknown bombers there flashed in the searchlight rays, there disappeared in the emptiness of the skies..." The only word of truth in this description of the first German aviation raid on Sebastopol is the word "alternatively". Early in the morning of 22 June, 1941 4 (four) German bombers "Henkel" -111 participated in the raid on the main Black Sea fleet naval base. The aircraft approached the target one by one, with long interruptions (1525 minutes) and dropped see-floor magnetic mines on parachutes. Altogether, 8 (eight) mines were dropped, at that rather inaccurately: three mines blew up on-land, two dropped in the shallow water and automatically blew up. The record in the Ledger of combat activities and the testimonies of numerous eyewitnesses say that one bomber was shot down and dropped into the sea. However, the German data indicate that there were no irrecoverable losses in the Sebastopol raid. Against the background of "limitless crow-like rows" a supposition that the Germans could afford in the first day of war such an unjustified "luxury" as air-raids on a power-generating station in Karelia did not appear as absurd as it really is. But Comrade Stalin knew the numbers and combat capabilities of his aviation, and not from journalists. The Luftwaffe Command also had some idea of the real numbers of the adversary. A simple arithmetic inexorably indicated that the situation was practically hopeless for the Germans. There were extremely few forces. Few, compared with enemy's (i.e., the Soviet air force) aviation numbers; few, compared with any theoretical norms; few, compared with the experience of the previous campaigns. In May of 1940 Germans were able to concentrate on the Western front the largest Luftwaffe grouping of the entire World War II. The Wehrmacht's offensive on the 300 km-long front (from Arnhem to Saarbrucken) was supported in the air by the aviation grouping which included 27 fighter and 40 bomber aviation-groups, 9 groups of dive-bombers Ju-87 and 9 groups of the multi-purpose double-engine MeP. Total of 85 groups, 3,641 combat aircraft. The operative density was 12 combat aircraft per one kilometer of the offensive's front. 22 June, 1941 concentrated on the Eastern front were (even including the Luftwaffe detachments deployed in the Northern Norway and in Romania) 22 fighter and 29 bomber aviation groups, 8 groups of the dive-bombers Ju-87 and 4 groups of multipurpose double-engine Me-110. Total of 63 groups with about 2,350 combat aircraft (including those out of order). After the previous multi-month fights in the skies over England, Balkans and the Mediterranean the technical state of the Luftwaffe aviation park was depressing. Average percentage of battle-ready aircraft was 77%. Such

aviation groups as II/JG-77, II1/JG-27,1/StG-2, ll/KG-53, II1/KG-3,1/ZG-26 arrived on the Eastern front with less than half of service inventory of the working aircraft. In June of 1941 the minimum length of the offensive front in the first day of the war was 800 km as the crow flies (from Klaipeda to Sambor). In two weeks the front width almost doubled (1,400 km as the crow flies from Riga to Odessa). Even without accounting for the losses in the first days of the war the average German aviation's operating density declined to 2 aircraft per kilometer of the offensive front (here as well including those out of order). It remains to be added that according to the pre-war concepts of the Soviet military science a front offensive operation required the aircraft density of 2025 per kilometer. On the average, in the number of fighter-fliers (including the airforce of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets) the Soviet aviation had the quadruple advantage over the enemy (a calculation by the number of fighter-planes results in even greater numbers as many fighter regiments in the Soviet airforce had 1.52 times planes than the fliers). On the northern and southern flanks of the huge front (i.e., in the Baltic and the Ukraine) the numerical advantage of the Soviet fighter aviation was simply overwhelming: 7 to 1 in the offensive zone of the German army group "North" and 5 to 1 in the offensive zone of the army group "South". In this situation the Luftwaffe Command had the only chance with some hope of success. The Germans had to rely on such a risky and costly tactics as a massive strike of the base airdromes of the Soviet fighters. I emphasize once again, that was a forced step fraught with huge losses but the Germans simply had no other chances, and they invested all their forces into this first strike. I do not know the exact numbers but it is believed that 22 June the Germans conducted about 2,0002,500 sorties for hitting the airdromes (compare this with 1,700 sorties for bombing Moscow during three weeks!). Having finished with this actually not very significant issue of the "fucking mother" we'll switch to a much more important issue. We will be talking about the sources of the information which the Red Army General Headquarters had on the eve of the war. Beginning in the Khrushchev epoch and up to this day the favorite plot of the falsifiers of the history (I think it is the right time to return to the CPSU/KGB alumni the term they invented21) is stories of how the ubiquitous Soviet intelligence procured by the stone-weight secret documents of the German Command, and stupid (or naive, or scared to death, or "self-deceived" according to Gorodetsky version) Stalin did not want to hear anything. Certainly, this Bacchanalia of lies strengthened in the recent 10 15 years. The impression is that the ideological heirs of "Comrade Merkulov" decided to pay Stalin back post factum for the disrespect to

21

In 1948, the "Pravda" newspaper published, in several issues in a row, a long essay entitled "Falsifiers of the history". It was a classical Stalin's version of the international relations during the pre-war period. The publication was in response to publication in the West of the seized German documents including the information about the Molotov-Ribbentrop negotiations. MG

them and at the same time to raise the "rating" of their office which became somewhat withered in August of 1991. For instance, in 1995 FSB published a collection of documents under a stunning title "Hitler's secrets on Stalin's desk". One of the first "secret" opening the collection was a report of the press-conference of the English foreign minister embossed with all necessary secrecy labels and inscriptions like "Yustas to Alex". With equal success any London newspaper with the materials of this press-conference (and a typewritten page with the translation) could be placed on Stalin's desk... Did the compilers read their book? Most likely they did as it is recognized in the fine print in the Foreword that the pompous title of the collection has nothing to do with its content: "...the information about military preparations [of Germany] did not answer the main question: for what purpose these preparations are conducted, whether or not the Germany rulers made a political decision about the attack, when the aggression should be expected, what will be the strategic and tactical objectives of enemy's military actions..." The right answer begins with the right question. If one understands under "Hitler's secrets" the information that the possessed "Fuehrer" hates communism, is obsessed by the aggressive delirium of "exclusivity of the Arian race" and nurtures plans of expanding German "Lebensraum" at the expense of the lands populated by the Eastern Slavic neighbors, such secrets were published in any Nazi newspaper. If one understands under "military plans" the rumors about the possibility in the near future of the turn of the sharp point of Hitler's aggression to the East, well, in the spring of 1941 all world's papers wrote about it and all world's diplomats whispered bout it. But for the purpose of operative planning of the future combat activities the Red Army Command needed not the rumors but accurate and, which is most important, documentlly-supported answers to the questions: "When? Where? With what forces?" This problem undoubtedly more difficult than gathering the grapevine at diplomatic parties the Soviet intelligence was unable to solve. This disappointing conclusion finds its precise confirmation in the declassified and published in 1992 1998 plans of strategic deployment of the USSR armed forces. Since August, 1940 through March, 1941 every one of the currently known versions of the Great Plan includes among the opening lines the following phrase: "The RA General Headquarters does not have documented data about operative plans of the potential enemies in the West and in the East". In the latest of the Strategic Deployment Plan available versions (dated as "no earlier than 15 May") this sad phrase is absent. Absent, unfortunately, is the opposite as well, i.e., the statement of the availability of "Documented data about the operative plans of the enemy". Moreover, the evaluation of the possible enemy's actions presented in the May version clearly indicates the success of Hitler's special services disinformation measures:

"Most likely the main forces of the German army consisting of 76 infantry, 11 tank, 8 mechanized, 2 cavalry and 5 air, to a total of up to 100 divisions, will be deployed south of Demblin for carrying out a strike in the direction Kovel Rovno Kiev. This strike apparently will be accompanied by a strike in the north from East Prussia to Vilno and Riga and also by brief concentric strikes from the side of Suvalki and Brest on Volkovysk, Baranovichi". A deeply erroneous assumption. The main strike by the "main forces of the German army" (which currently must be known to each pupil of the senior school) was carried out not in the Ukraine but in the center of the East front, along the line Minsk Smolensk. At that, from Suvalki and Brest were carried out not "brief strikes" on Volkovysk, Baranovichi but main strikes by two most powerful Wehrmacht's tank groups (3-rd TGr of Goth and 2-nd TGr of Guderian), and to a much greater depth and in different directions, with the objective of implementing a deep envelopment and encircling the entire Soviet forces grouping in Belorussia. What "Hitler's secrets" were on Stalin's desk is demonstrably indicated by the fact that indeed the 4-th army of the Western front deployed in the Brest Theater (i.e., at the pointed end of Wehrmacht's main strike) turned out to be the only army (!!!) of the first echelon on the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts which did not include the artillery anti-tank brigade. The German Command understood, of course, that it will not be able to conceal the concentration of a 3-million-strong army at the western border of the USSR so it tried to deceive the Soviet intelligence and the top Command of the Red Army regarding the specific plans of the usage of this grouping. One component of a carefully developed, multi-link and multi-level plan of disinformation measures was the organized "information leaks" that the main strikes the Wehrmacht would carry out would be on the extreme northern and extreme southern flanks of the east front, i.e., from East Prussia (or even Finland) and from Romania. An element of the elaborate disinformation was also a flow of very different "dates of the start of the war ", which should at the end of the day disorient the management of the Soviet intelligence. Here is a typical example. Marshal Zhukov (on the eve of the war Chief of the Red Army General Headquarters) writes in his memoirs: "...On the 6 May, 1941 People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral N.G.Kuznetsov directed a memo to J.V. Stalin: "The naval attach in Berlin Captain 1 rank Vorontsov reports: ... that, from the words of one German officer in Hitler's command structure, the Germans are preparing by 14 May the invasion of the USSR through Finland, Baltic and Romania. Simultaneously powerful aviation raids on Moscow, Leningrad and the landing of parachute troops in the border cities are planned..." There is not a single word of truth in this information. We have here a quite standard for the spring of 1941 German "deza" the main strike on the flanks, powerful raids on Moscow, patently wrong date of the invasion. But what is most remarkable even so many years after the war ended Zhukov is either incapable to realize that he had in front of him a German fake or plainly pulls the leg of the uninformed

reader maintaining that "the data provided in the document had exceptional value. However, the conclusions by Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov did not match the facts he himself provided and disinformed J.V. Stalin. "I believe, Kuznetsov's note read, that the information is false (absolutely. M.S.) and intentionally directed through this channel (quite possible. M.S.) in order to check how the USSR would react...". Another part of the disinformation campaign were rumors insistently spread in the diplomatic, journalist and military circles that Hitler intended to present Stalin with some new, much more rigid demands regarding the deliveries of raw materials and food supplies to Germany, up to "leasing out the Ukraine and Baku oil fields". The German force concentration in the East was interpreted as the instrument of psychological pressure. By spreading such rumors the German special services tried to implant in Stalin the idea that the war would begin not with a sudden crushing blow but with a long period of diplomatic strain, presenting an "ultimatum", etc. It is hard to tell how Stalin himself reacted to this disinformation. This is a separate subject far beyond the scope of our book. I personally have an impression that the rumors about the upcoming Soviet-German negotiations were spread equally by the German and the Soviet intelligence. At this time I am just marking an indisputable fact that the "sources" of the Soviet intelligence in Berlin systematically delivered to Moscow rumors of the upcoming "ultimatum". It is the time to name at last these "sources". Discounting numerous journalists, businessmen, lawyers and members of the diplomatic missions accredited in Berlin (such "sources" by definition could only be the rumor carriers, not of the information about specific operative plans of the German Command), there were exactly two sources: the "source in the headquarters of the German aviation", aka "Master sergeant", aka Ober-Lieutenant Harro Schultze-Boysen, an officer in the Luftwaffe headquarters intelligence department; the "source in Germany's ministry of economy", aka "Corsican", aka Arvid Harnack, a referent in Germany's ministry of economy. These people were not "Schtirlitzes" planted in Germany. Born Germans of a rather privileged background (H. Schultze-Boysen was the grand-nephew of admiral Tirpitz, married to a close relative of Prince Eilenburg; a doctor of jurisprudence . Harnack was born in the family of the known scientists, his wife, a philology doctor, German American, was the leader of the community of the American women in Berlin), dedicated anti-Fascists and at the same time the proponents of Communist ideology (in the early 1930's Schultze-Boysen published the anti-Fascist magazine "Enemy" and after Hitler came to power he was behind the bars; Harnack in 1932 was building the "Society for the studies of the Soviet planned economy"). They themselves were insistently looking for contacts with the Soviet special services. Risking their lives every second they collected and transferred to Moscow any crumbs of information they could find. But...

But, as a wonderful French saying runs, "even the most beautiful girl cannot give more than she has". The Ober-Lieutenant Schultze-Boysen could not give Stalin "Hitler's secrets" for a simple reason that the Ober-Lieutenant was not allowed even close to such secrets. It was even more so with respect to the employee of the Ministry of the Economy Harnack. Reading today the reports from the "Master sergeant" and "Corsican" we bitterly note that the courageous anti-Fascists not at all by the fraudulent intent became the "retranslators" of a disinformation skillfully prepared by the German special services. For instance, 28 March the "Master sergeant" reported that "the German Command is conducting the preparation of a pincer-type strike: from Romania on the one side and from the Baltic, and possibly through Finland, on the other". 14 April the "Master sergeant" transmits: "The beginning of the military actions must be preceded by an ultimatum to the Soviet Union with the offer to join the Pact of Three ". 9 May in the report of the "Master sergeant", along with an imprecise information ("in conversations among the headquarters' officers the date 20 May is often mentioned as the date of the start of the war; the others believe that the assault is scheduled for June), again appears a clear disinformation: "Germany will first present the Soviet Union with an ultimatum with the demand of broader export to Germany and relinquishing of the Communist propaganda..." 14 May. "The plans with respect to the Soviet Union are postponed; the German leading echelons take measures to keep their subsequent development secret..." 9 June. "Next week the tension in the Russian question will reach its highest point and the issue of the war will be finally solved. Germany will present the USSR with the demand to submit to the Germans the economic management in the Ukraine and to use the Soviet navy against England..." Only on 11 June in the report of the "Master sergeant" appears the adequate evaluation of the situation: "The issue of assaulting the USSR is solved. Whether any demands will be preliminarily presented to the Sov. Union is not known. A sudden strike should not be discounted". But after that the old disinformation version of the operation design is again repeated ("The German Command will attempt, by way of detour from the north (from East Prussia) and from the south (from Romania), to create pincers, which will be gradually closing with the objective of encircling the Red Army"). Even further (both figuratively and in the direct sense of this word) from the safe with "Hitler's secrets" was the chief of the press-service in the Tokyo's German embassy, a journalist Richard Sorge (aka a Soviet spy Ramsey). Strangely enough but this simple truth is not yet understood by broad masses of Russian historians and political writers. And even in June of 2006 pearls like this were published: "In December of 1940 Hitler made a decision to attack the USSR, and just two weeks thereafter Sorge sent to Moscow copies of the corresponding documents".

18 December, 1940 Hitler approved Directive No 21("plan Barbarossa"). The Directive began with these words: "The German armed forces must be ready to crush the Soviet Russia in the course of a short-time campaign even before the war against England is finished". Must be ready. It was written further: "The order of the strategic deployment of the armed forces against the Soviet Union I will issue in the case of need (emphasis added. M.S.) eight months prior to the scheduled beginning of the operations". No specific term of the beginning of the war was established in the "plan Barbarossa". Nine copies of the document were printed, six of them were in Hitler's safe through the end of the war, and the three were issued to the Supreme Commanders of the armed force branches. The secrecy requirements were usual for such kind documents, i.e., exceptionally severe. The last lines of the Directive No 21 said: "I am expecting from Messrs Supreme Commanders verbal (emphasis added. M.S.) reports of their further intentions based on this Directive". Did really "Messrs Supreme Commanders" report to Hitler verbally, eye to eye, but to the German ambassador in Tokyo (who had no even a slightest relationship with the development of operative plans) they were sending written documents? And the main thing what for? For the convenience of Richard Sorge? Not only in December of 1940 but even during the last days and weeks before the start of the war could not Ramsey report to Moscow anything more definite than re-telling of rumors circulating at the embassy: 21 May, 1941: "...The new German representatives who arrived here from Berlin are stating that the war between Germany and the USSR may start at the end of May as they were ordered to come back to Berlin by that time. But they also stated that this year the danger may as well pass..." 1 June, 1941: "... The expectation that the German-Soviet war starts about 15 June is based exceptionally of the information, which lieutenant colonel Scholl brought from Berlin from where he left 6 May for Bangkok. In Bangkok he will take the position of a military attach... Scholl stated that the strongest blow will be carried by the left flank of the German army..." 17 June 1941: "...The German courier told military attach that he is convinced that the war against the USSR will be delayed probably to the end of June. The Military attach does not know whether or not there will be war..." And what there is here for Stalin "not to believe"? The only specific fact here is the information about some German lieutenant colonel departing on 6 of May to Bangkok... The fateful date of the invasion (22 June) was set by Hitler and brought to the notice of the Wehrmacht Supreme Command only 30 April, 1941. Prior to this date no

"source" as a matter of principle could inform Stalin this most important Hitler's secret just because Hitler did not know yet when he would begin the war against the USSR. At that and it is very important to stress 30 April was not at all the "point of no return". We know today that the date 22 of June became the date of actual beginning of the war. In May of 1941 everything could change many times. It is believed that the date of invasion of France was postponed by Hitler on the whole 9 times... On the 23 May the German railways were placed under the regime of "maximum military transit". This is a very important "boundary" in the entire set of strategic deployment measures and, as much as I know, this boundary indeed was not identified by the Soviet intelligence. At last, 10 of June the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht relayed to the army commanders the following decision: "1. It is proposed to consider 22 June as the day "D" of the "Barbarossa" operation. 2. In case of the postponement of this date the corresponding decision will be made no later than 18 June. The data of the direction of the main strike in this case will still remain secret..." Only 18 June (one day over the day of Stalin's four-letter resolution on the next report of the "Master sergeant") the decision of the invasion into the USSR and the exact date of the start of the operation were brought to the knowledge of tactical commander (down to the level of division and regiment commanders). Unfortunately, I do not know of even a single report by the Soviet intelligence, which would record this secret that became known after 18 June by several hundred Wehrmacht officers. At 13:00 on 21 June the German forces deployed at the USSR western border got a code signal "Dortmund". It meant that the offensive would begin as planned, 22 June and "it was allowed to start the open fulfillment of the orders". From that moment on Germany's main military secret was already known to hundreds of thousands but for some reason the Soviet intelligence found this out not from its own spies but from German deserters who in the night of 21 to 22 June on their own initiative, moved by the desire to help "the motherland of the world proletarians", showed up in the positions of the Soviet forces. We certainly know the name of a lance corporal who swam over the Bug River in the Sokal area (Kiev district); there is information about a private who swam over the Bug River in the Volchin area (30 km northwest of Brest). Zhukov in his memoirs mentions a sergeant major who at night of 21 June crossed the border in the area of the Kiev SMD. Interesting information was provided 22 June of 2006 in the interview to the RIA-News agency by the Army General .. Gareyev: "Germans, risking their lives, swam over the Dniester River (emphasis added. M.S.) and informed our Command that the German forces would assume the offensive". What do we want from our intelligence if President of the Academy of military sciences, Academician of the Russian Academy of natural sciences, corresponding member of the RF Academy of sciences, Doctor of military sciences, Doctor of historical sciences, professor, former deputy to the Chief of the Soviet army General headquarters in charge of scientific studies does not know that in June of 1941 the USSR border nowhere touched the river Dniester?

Finally, the Soviet intelligence found out the exact date of the attack only at dawn of 22 June, 1941. Of course, to all the above there is only one but crushing objection: "The time had not come yet when it will be possible to tell EVERYTHING". There is nothing I could object. The intelligence has its own laws and rules, and if even now (these lines are being written early in 2008), after the death of all agents, residents and "sources", after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, after the reunification of Germany and the former Soviet Baltic republics joining NATO it is still not allowed to call by the name all "sources" of the Soviet intelligence within the military-political leadership of Hitler's Germany, it is still not allowed to pull out of a safe and publish the most substantial and reliable intelligence reports well, so be it. But why then the time has already come long ago and still is not ending for unsubstantiated insinuations about "the fateful Stalin's self-deception, he trusted Hitler but did not trust his own intelligence"? Well, and the fate of the main characters of this story was tragic. Around SchultzeBoysen and Harnack formed underground anti-Fascist organization which entered the history under the name "Rote Kapelle". Already after the defeat of the organization Hitler's counterintelligence had to admit that through the efforts of the "Rote Kapelle" a detailed information about the headcount and armament of the Luftwaffe, the aviation manufacturing in Germany, dislocation of various headquarters, manufacturing and reserves of liquid fuel was transferred to Moscow. Probably the greatest achievement of the "Rote Kapelle" was the information about the plans of German offensive on Stalingrad in the summer of 1942. A direct cause of the failure was the scandalous incompetence of the Moscow Center. 10 October, 1941 in one of the radiograms sent from Moscow to Berlin were named in "clear text" the addresses of three safe houses. Of course, the transmission was in cipher but after a few months the group of best German mathematicians broke the ciphers. Schultze-Boysen was arrested 30 August, Harnack 3 September, 1942. After brutal torture they were executed in Berlin 22 December, 1942. In total, more than 80 people were arrested, 49 of them executed, 25 sentenced to hard labor. 7 October, 1969 H. Schultze-Boysen, . Harnack, J. Stobe, . Kukhoff were posthumously awarded orders of the Red Banner.

Chapter 4 "STALIN DROVE AWAY ANY THOUGHT OF WAR"

The Red Army General headquarters did not have documentl data about operative plans of the German Command. This is a fact. But it does not follow from this fact that the Soviet intelligence lay dormant. The spy feats (and not of one but many hundreds of spies) found its specific implementation in a huge amount of quite reliable information. Information about what? About German force concentration at the USSR western border, about weapon, ammunition and fuel transportation, about the locations of headquarters, airdromes, communication nodes, storages and hospitals. From these scrappy fragments of the "mosaic", the analytical services of the Soviet intelligence were able to build a rather detailed picture of the Wehrmacht deployment. And if in the winter and spring of 1941 the reliability of this "picture" still left better to be desired (the data of the German force headcount were significantly overestimated not underestimated as it was fashionable to write in the epoch of documental fairy tales about the "intelligence estimate No 8" but overestimated indeed) then by the beginning of the war the actual and the identified by the Soviet intelligence headcount of the Wehrmacht grouping were almost coincident. They could not be exactly coincident. And not only because even the best intelligence has its limits. The German Command camouflaged its intents by all available methods. For instance, the main invasion strike force, the tank and mechanized divisions, began the redeployment to the USSR border areas only in the last days before the offensive began. For instance, five tank divisions of the 1-st tank group were loaded onto the trains during 6 to 16 June and arrived to the unloading stations in the southern Poland (Lyublin Sandomir Zheshuv) only by 1420 June. The three divisions (13-th, 14-th and 11-th) entered the immediate concentration and deployment areas literally in the last hours before the invasion, the two other divisions (16 tank division and 9 tank division) were at night of 21 June still on the move 100150 km from the border. Correspondingly, the Soviet military intelligence could not identify these divisions just because they were not in the border area a week prior to the war. On the other hand, the continuous overestimation of the German force headcount near the USSR border by a strange twist of fate sort of "compensated" all the enemy tricks. As a result, 31 May, 1941 the Red Army General Headquarters Intelligence directorate estimated the Wehrmacht grouping composition at 94 infantry, 1 cavalry, 14 tank and 13 mechanized divisions (besides, nonexistent nonintegrated cavalry regiments, total of 25, were "discovered"). In actuality, on the 1 June these tank and mechanized divisions were not at the border yet but by the beginning of the war they showed up, and with some "surplus" (actually the enemy deployed 17 tank and 13 mechanized divisions in the four tank groups). It is believed that when Stalin learned it he was supposed to lose sleep and appetite, tear off his bushy mustache and trash about his Kremlin office as an overdriven beast. But Stalin did not do anything of the kind. He peacefully slept during the night into 22 June, 1941.

In our places it is called "the Great Mystery of 22 June". "Why did Stalin to whom the intelligence reported about the concentration of a huge enemy army on the USSR border not...". Further on, after this "not", various words followed. They depended both on the current political vogue and on the degree of incompetency of the writerspeaker. Usually sounded something like: "listen to Zhukov", "allowed putting the forces in the combat readiness", "moved the forces to the border"... And on the maximum incompetency level reached by the Israeli Comrade Gorodetsky Stalin, it appears, "drove away any though about the war". The right answer begins with the correctly phrased question. I was taught that in the Kuybyshev aviation institution (and using the occasion I want again to thank for this my teachers). I so far have not learned to express myself in so aphoristic a way, so I will phrase my thought in a rather long sentence: the unwillingness to ask the right question is often a testimony to the unwillingness (or fear) to hear the right answer. I and you, the esteemed reader, have nothing to be afraid of so we'll try to begin with the main thing, with as precise questions as possible. So, what Stalin did not do? What (or whom) did he not trust? What is it, the "combat readiness"? Where to and which forces needed to be "moved"? and why didn't Stalin have to sleep quietly in the night from 21 into 22 June? Let us start with the last question. It is the easiest because it operates the categories each of us knows (if not from the own experience then from the friends' stories). During the night before the test a D-student feverishly pages through the text books. He loafed and skipped the lectures during the entire semester. That is how - as such a loafer - the Soviet propaganda, strangely enough, tried to portray Stalin, i.e., the top military-political leadership of the USSR. Here we are again encountering an example of how the one who lied once had to lie farther and more. Of course, if to start with the mantra that the Soviet Union was busy in the "peaceful creative labor", that the industries "were not moved to the military rails in advance" (interesting: on which "rails" did these industries roll previously? what was produced by these all day long rattling factories? bikes and sewing machines, gramophones and refrigerators for the communal kitchens?), that Germany put together over six years (1935 through 1941) a huge, armed to the teeth army, that we trust that "the entire Europe worked for Hitler" and that the "second front" was opened only in 1944, then, yes. Then the undisturbed Stalin's calm appears to be something absolutely amazing. But Stalin was no loafer. And already in the second half of the 1930's he "drove away any thought" if it was not associated with this or that aspect of the preparation for the Great War, the war whose result was supposed to be not miserable fragments of the East Poland or the Karelian Isthmus but the entire Europe falling into his hands. For long years he was working late into the night (or rather into the early morning) personally solving thousands of issues associated with the creation, equipment, armament, training of the largest army in the world. And the result of the great labor was weighty, crude, visible22.
22

", , " - a quotation from a poem by Mayakovsky: . , , , ,

61 tank and 31 mechanized divisions were formed in his army. At that, in its structure (one tank and two motor-rifle regiments) the mechanized Red Army division matched a Wehrmacht tank division, and in its operating number of tanks exceeded it. So that actually the Red Army had 92 "tank" (tank in substance, not in name) divisions. Within the area from the western border to Leningrad and Moscow were already deployed (not counting the "raw" divisions of the 17-th and 20-th mechanized corps which were then being formed) 40 tank and 20 mechanized divisions with 12,400 real tanks (discounting many thousands of machine-gun whippets), including over 1,500 advanced, world-best tanks KV and -34 with long-barrel 76-mm cannons, robust anti-shell armor and powerful diesel engines. So who, Stalin or Hitler, was supposed not to sleep and hysterically thrash about the office? Which one of these dictators had to "expect a quick defeat in case of war, and the death personally for himself"? The intelligence reported to Stalin that 94 Wehrmacht's infantry divisions (actually the army groups "North", "Center" and "South", not counting the reserve of the Wehrmacht's Supreme Command, had only 84 infantry divisions) were concentrated at the western border of the USSR. This is important information but Stalin himself at that time had 198 infantry divisions. 13 June, 1941 the First Deputy to the Chief of the RKKA23 General headquarters Lieutenant General N. Vatutin put on Stalin's desk... no, not the next "Hitler's secret" but a memo "About the USSR armed forces deployment in case of a war in the west". It was planned to deploy on the four (Northern, North-Western, Western and SouthWestern) fronts 120 infantry divisions. 35 more infantry divisions were included into five Supreme Command reserve armies which were being deployed in the zone between the western border and the line Bryansk Rzhev. The total of 155 infantry divisions against 94 German. And this particular information ostensibly brought Stalin to such a desperation that he "believed the resistance useless, and that is why he did not attempt to threaten Hitler or prepare to the battle". Here we need to clarify one important moment. The numbers quoted above are too great for the catastrophic defeat of the Red army to be written off due to the "multiple numerical advantage" of the enemy. Probably that was the reason, together with numerous other cheater's tricks, for the appearance and propagation in the hundreds - of publications with an absurd contrivance that the Soviet infantry division was ostensibly one half (or even one third!) of the German infantry division. This is hogwash, there was no such thing in actuality because it could have never been. The point is that ALL armies in the world tried to form the main tactical unit of the land forces (division) so that in its combat potential it would not be inferior to the division of the potential enemy. Everybody tried. It did not pan out with everybody; for instance, a Polish or Finnish division, vintage 1939, was inferior to the "world leaders" in a number of important parameters (first of all, in artillery, trucks and
23

! RKKA () is Workers' and Peasants' Red Army; MG

prime movers). The Red Army division for whose armament from sun dawn to sunset worked the huge country was inferior to nobody. In April of 1941 infantry divisions in the Red Army were converted to a new manning chart. The headcount was lowered by 16% and was now 14.5 thousand men against 16.5 th. in the Wehrmacht's infantry division. Somewhat greater headcount in the German infantry division only meant larger rear and auxiliary troops. In its fire power the infantry division in the Red Army was not a bit inferior to the enemy's division. Under the manning chart of April, 1941 the Red Army infantry division had to have 10.4 th. rifles, 166 mounted and 392 hand machineguns and in a Wehrmacht's infantry divisions, respectively, 11.5 th., 138 and 378. Besides, on the eve of the war the Red Army was being rearmed from the Mosin three-liner rile to a semiautomatic Tokarev's rifle (SVT) which provided noticeable advantage against the enemy in the infantry fire density. It is important that there were no problems with the provision of these numbers: the actually available infantry arms were sufficient to man not 198 but about 460740 infantry divisions. The artillery armament of the infantry division in the Red Army was traditionally powerful. The Table below compares the number of the artillery systems of comparable caliber and the so-called "total salvo weight" of the artillery division in the Polish, French and German infantry division: Country USSR Germany France Poland 75/76 mm 34 20 36 30 100/105 mm 36 15 122 mm 32 150/152 mm 12 18 24 3 Salvo weight 1,395 1,384 1,183 531 No of barrels 78 74 60 48

Another and very common type of the "brain-having" was a concoction that due to the sudden attack the Red Army infantry divisions met the war at 68 th. troops. There probably is no other fact in the history of the beginning of the war which was perverted with such strength and insistency. In actuality, as early as 21 May, 1940 (this is not a typo of the nineteen fortieth) by a decree of the Politburo CC No 16/158 it was resolved to keep in the time of peace the infantry divisions in the western districts as follows: 98 divisions 12,000 count and greater and only 3 division 9,000. In a year, in May June of 1941 in the course of the "large drill" (BUS) were mobilized 802,000 people. "At that, the infantry division headcount in the border districts, with the manning chart of 14,483 troops was brought to: 21 division, 14,000; 72 divisions, 12,000 and 6 infantry divisions, 11,000". This was publicly admitted as early as in 1992 by the authors of a collective publication by the military historians of the General headquarters "The year 1941 lessons and conclusions" (1992); however, up until this day the famous Zhukov's "canard" ("but our divisions, even when 8 thousand strong, were practically half of the German division strength") continues with a vivacious quacking to hover from one publication to the next...

Let us now return to the events in the spring of 1941. Strictly speaking, there is no need now to guess what could and what could not scare (let us put it milder: cause extreme concern) Comrade Stalin. There are declassified and published documents of the USSR top military-political leadership. What do we see in them? Of course, the Soviet intelligence continuously followed the situation on the fronts of the European war. Correspondingly, each known strategic planning document began with the section devoted to the evaluation of the possible composition of the enemy (enemies) force grouping. Plural is more appropriate here as the Soviet leadership chronically included among the USSR enemies in the west, together with Germany, also Finland, Romania, Hungary and Italy (at that, absolutely fantastic ideas were voiced regarding the headcount of the armed forces of the German allies). We will not discuss them and will concentrate on the forecasts of possible headcount of the German forces only. We will quote the data from three documents; 18 September, 1940, "Considerations about the basics of the armed forces strategic deployment in the USSR"; 11 March, 1941, "Fine-tuned plan of the USSR armed forces strategic deployment"; May, 1941, "Considerations regarding the strategic deployment plan of the Soviet Union armed forces for a case of war with Germany and her allies". For the sake of the convenience we'll merge all information into a single Table and add to this Table two very important lines: "Special information" of the General Headquarters' Intelligence directorate of 31 May, 1941 and

actual headcount of the German army groups "North", "Center" and "South". Infantry divisions 145 165 141 94 84 Tank divisions 17 20 19 14 17 Mechanized divisions 8 15 15 13 13 Tanks 10,000 10,000 3,266

September, 1940 March, 1941 May, 1941 Spec. information of May 31, 1941 Actual number as of 22 June

Before moving farther, one small note. I hope you have already noticed these strange proportions: the actual number of Wehrmacht's tank divisions turned out a little under the expectation (17 rather than 1920) but the number of tanks in them turned out three times smaller. This is not a typo. This, unfortunately, is a serious error of the Soviet intelligence which assumed that up to a half thousand tanks may by in one Wehrmacht's tank division... Karl Marx once said: "A single number allows to understand more than entire volume full of rhetoric nonsense". The above Table gives maximum clear answer to a question of the notorious "fatal self-deception" of Stalin who "refused to believe the intelligence reports". Everything was perfectly the other way around. Stalin did believe the intelligence reports. It followed from these reports that the concentration of the German forces at the Soviet Union border was NOT FINISHED. Moreover, the intelligence reports in general forced doubts that Hitler was concentrating forces for the invasion of the USSR. Why? The already twice mentioned "Special information of the General Headquarters' Intelligence directorate" of 31 May, 1941 gave the following estimate of the then current distribution of the Wehrmacht forces: "The general distribution of the German armed sorces is as follows: against England (on all fronts), 122126 divisions; against USSR, 120122 divisions; reserve, 44 48 divisions". Based on these numbers (as we now know, the erroneous ones the Soviet intelligence extremely overestimated the size of Wehrmacht's "anti-England" grouping) a quite logical conclusion was made: "... As for the front against England, the German Command, having already at this time the necessary forces for the further development of the activities in the Near East and against Egypt (29 divisions including Greece with the Island of Crete, Italy and Africa), at the same time rather quickly restored its main grouping in the west, continuing at the same time the transfer to Norway having as a perspective the

implementation of the main operation against the English Isles" (emphasis added. M.S.). Taking into account the fact that this subject during many decades was the epicenter of a purposeful "brain-having", I am repeating the main conclusion once again. Slowly and clearly. Early in June of 1941 Stalin did not consider the German attack in the nearest days a possibility. And that was not because he trusted Ribbentrop's signature, not because he "lapsed into torpor and drove away any thought about a war". Stalin's opinion was based on irreproachably logical conclusions based on the information provided to him by the intelligence. There were FEW German forces at the western border of the USSR. Few compared with the expected numbers of the enemy grouping. Few compared with the total numbers of the German armed forces (in the estimate of these "total numbers" the Soviet intelligence made a big blunder by overstating it exactly by the factor of one and a half). Few compared with the Red Army numbers. Stalin could not believe that with such SMALL FORCS Hitler will risk attacking the mighty Soviet Union. Stalin could not believe that Hitler evaluates the "indestructible and legendary"24 Red Army lower than the army of a 40-million France (for the invasion of which the German Command allotted 136 divisions, i.e., 87% of 156 available). There was no in Stalin's thinking even a shadow of "fateful self-deception". Stalin was proud of his logics and in this case was judging absolutely logically. There are simple and unshakable axioms in the military profession. "A trick is a good thing, cunning, savvy, etc. But it is not possible to live with tricks. You deceived once came from the rear, you deceived the second time, and it won't work the third time. The army cannot live with tricks only; it has to be a real army". I did not invent it. This is a quotation from Stalin's speech at the April (1940) Meeting of the top Red Army commanders. For an offensive on a huge front from the Black to the Baltic Sea and to a huge depth, at least 1,000 km from Brest to Moscow it is necessary to have the numerical advantage, advantage in the fire power, in tanks and aviation. But the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe did not have the "standard", by the military science, three-fold advantage. They did not have even minimal numerical advantage. Moreover, the attackers (the Germans) were numerically many times smaller than the defenders. And most unfavorable or the Germans was the ratio in the major offensive tools, tanks and aviation. That is not the way to attack, this is contrary to any common sense, and Stalin did not have reasons to take his Berlin competitor for a total idiot. A sound logic, the experience of the two preceding war years said that the purpose of Hitler's summer campaign will be the defeat of England, and the concentration of significant German land forces in the East had the objective to cover German strategic rear from possible Stalin's "surprises".
24

The words "indestructible and legendary" (" ") are from a pre-war song by a composer Alexandrov; MG

And if the Soviet intelligence placed on Stalin's desk "plan Barbarossa" he would write on this report the words which I just don't have enough courage to pronounce. Here is the first phrase of this "plan", read in carefully and try to think about these words: "The German armed forces must be ready to crush the Soviet Russia in the course of a short-time campaign even before the war against England is finished". And further: "The final objective of the operation is the creation of a blocking barrier against the Asian Russia along the general line Volga Arkhangelsk". To what "mother" should Stalin have sent the authors of such report? To crush the Soviet Russia "in the course of a short-time campaign"? Hitler was not able to crush even France in the course of a short-time campaign. The "Armistice agreement" (stubbornly called "capitulation" in our literature) signed 24 June, 1940 in Compiegne left to France all perks of a sovereign state (the government, territory, diplomatic corps, army, aviation and navy), left to France all her colossal overseas possessions. And this (note it!) with the distance from the German border to Paris of only 200 km. And from the western border of the USSR to "the general line Volga Arkhangelsk" 2,000 km. How much time is needed to simply walk (and the Wehrmacht included mostly infantry and horse drawn artillery) these two thousand kilometers? Even a "triumphal march" for such a distance (with brief interruptions for the ceremonies of handing bread-salt and flowers by the exhilarant population) would take three to four months. And what if there is need to fight along the way? And what is good about the idea to tangle into a war with the Soviet giant "even before the war against England is finished"? Where is logic here, the tiniest traces of the common sense? Hitler has already tried to fight England. 86 aviation groups, 3,067 aircraft (i.e., the grouping larger than the one concentrated by 22 June at the Soviet border) began on 13 August, 1940 a grandiose air battle which entered the history under the name "Battle of Britain". The Royal Airforce Command could set against the German air armada 49 fighter wings with the total of 704 aircraft. With such initial numerical ratio the Germans lost. Already by mid-September, 1940 huge losses forced the German Command to abandon massive day-time sorties. The landing on the British Isles had to be postponed for "indefinite period". By the end of 1940 the total ratio of the aircraft losses was 1 to 2 in favor of England. And after such experience Hitler decided with the SMALLER force to crush "once-over lightly" the Soviet airforce exceeding the English one 6 times in the number of fighters? Well, it is about the same as, being beaten in a match with a second class boxer, to fight a heavy-weight world champion... Stalin was thinking absolutely logically and was wrong in everything. But, as Lenin himself once said, on a different occasion and about a different person (Leon Trotsky), "he hardly could be blamed for it personally". It was difficult not to err. Stalin was unable to divine, believe that his huge, with the best arms in the world armies were just an armed crowd of the future deserters and prisoners of war. He did not think that thousands of tanks and aircraft, tens of thousands of guns, millions of rifles will be abandoned at the road shoulders by the fleeing panicked crowds of the former Red Army men. But let us not judge Comrade Stalin too sternly for this error. After all you, the esteemed reader, even today, even after the fact, even after everything was declassified and published in the recent years, after what was said by

a few witnesses of the events who survived to the epoch of the liberty of speech and press, you, the esteemed reader, do not want to believe and accept this real FACT. Is it worth it to be surprised that Stalin was unable to make such an overwhelming forecast? To be fair it needs to be noted that it took Stalin just seven days to understand the main cause of the unheard-of collapse. Maybe he understood rapidly and correctly the sense of what was going on because his "universities" were not the department of scientific communism at a Soviet college but the underground work for a subversive organization which had already destroyed the Russian army once during the First World War. Comrade Stalin knew specifically how the empires collapse and multimillion armies disappear. Yes, the truth revealed at that moment turned out to be immeasurably heavy even for this "man of steel". In the night of 28 into 29 June Stalin left for the dacha where he spent two days (29 and 30 June) in the state of a total frustration, not answering telephone calls and meeting with nobody. But before these two terrible days Stalin worked hard. And right here we are switching to the next question: "What did Stalin do and what didn't he do in June of 1941?" In a bright and emotional form, with the overkill unavoidable in such case this question was answered by Victor Suvorov in his world bestsellers "The Ice-breaker", "The day M" and "The Last Republic". Very dryly and pedantically the picture of the Red Army strategic deployment for the invasion of Europe was described by a candidate (now a doctor) of history (there are no rules without exceptions, and it is a special pleasure for me to draw your attention to such rare doctors) M.I. Meltyukhov in his monograph "The missed chance of Stalin". Interesting and substantial works on this subject were published by P. Bobylev, V. Danilov, J. Gofman, V. Nevezhin... And I as well some time ago described these events in the 510 pages in the book "23 June the "Day-". Whoever is interested can read all these publications. I do not want to retell in a hasty sputter my own book. I will only mention one interesting document which I had the pleasure to hold in my hands. 4 June, 1941 at the meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b) a decision was made "to approve the creation within the Red Army of one infantry division manned by the personnel of the Polish nationality and knowing the Polish language". Deadline 1 July, 1941 (RGASPI25, f. 17, l. 162, c. 35, s. 13). What was it all about? Why would Stalin need by 1 July, 1941 a Polish-speaking division? Was it that the Russian land became so impoverished in bogatyrs26 that the Poles were urgently required for the protection of the indestructible USSR borders? A similar case occurred 11 November, 1939. Then, 20 days before the planned beginning of the "liberation" of Finland, a decision was made to form the 106-th infantry division whose personnel were drafted exclusively from the Finnish or Karelian-speaking people... It is funny that it turned out to be necessary to argue and to prove the obvious (i.e., visible by a naked eye - if this eye is looking at the deployment and dislocation map
25

RGASPI () is - (Russian State Archive of the Social-Political History)

26

A close transltion is "athlete" but this would not convey the epic character of the word, hero of folk Russian legends, defender of Russia from its enemies; MG

of the Soviet forces) offensive thrust of the strategic Red Army deployment only after the publication of Suvorov's "Ice-breaker". Prior to that the Soviet historians were calmly stating that "the design of the strategic deployment and building of the operative force grouping to a greater extent reflected the offensive goals... the location of positions and forces was affected by the offensive nature of the planned strategic actions... the force transfer was planned in view of completing the concentration in the areas scheduled in the operative plans from 1 June through 10 July..." Only for this single phrase the authors of the monograph "The year 1941 lessons and conclusions" (the words quoted above are from this book) should have been right then, in 1992, awarded the medal "For courage". Briefly and clearly they answered a sacramental question about the causes of the notorious "unpreparedness". The Red Army Command operated under its own OFFENSIVE plans, implemented its own deployment schedule (when it was put together the German invasion was not contemplated). Yes, by the morning of 22 June, 1941 the construction of operative groupings was not completed. But the strategic deployment actually began, it was proceeding at the increasing tempo and sweep. Its completion was not tied with 22 June. It was tied with a different date. With one of the days in July, 1941 which is impossible to accurately establish at this time with the source base available to the historians. For those in whom the words "strategic redeployment" cause involuntary yawning I am ready to retell even simpler the brief content of this chapter. At six p.m. on December, 31 of any year in any family a blatant "unpreparedness" occurs. The steaks are jumping and hissing on the skillet, the smoke from the burnt cake is billowing from the baking oven, the lady of the house in a crumpled gown is feverishly stirring the Russian salad in a bowl. Does it mean that nobody in the house is preparing to celebrate the New Year? Nothing of the kind. It is the other way around: they are very actively preparing. But are NOT ready yet. By the midnight, by the planned in advance moment of champagne opening everything will be under control: the salad will be redeployed from the bowl into a crystal salad bowl, the steaks and garnish will join in one location and the best girl-friend of the lady of the house in a party dress with two bold low neck cuts will be amiably flirting with her husband. Everything will go exactly according to the plan. Unless the uninvited guests break in at seven o'clock.

Chapter 5 THE GLOBAL TERMINATION

I think you have read "Chonkin". If you have not, I strongly recommend. There is such a funny scene there: The NKVD Captain Comrade Milyaga27 under a strange convergence of circumstances was taken prisoner by Red Army men. By reason of concussion (he was hit on the head by a rifle butt) Milyaga did not understand right away where he got, so he began, in broken German, giving testimony that he was a member of the Russian Gestapo and much to shoot - to kill Communisten und Komsomoltsen (the latter statement was bare truth). The noble rage boiled as a wave28, and Soviet soldiers decided to put the kibosh on the abominable Fascist houseling. When it at last dawned on Milyaga that the powers have not yet changed in the village he began changing his testimony, began explaining that he was not a shivering critter but a member of the organization which had the right... and everything would end up well but Captain Milyaga foolishly yelled: "Long live Comrade Hitler!" These words were the last ones in the life of a glorious checkist... What is this supposed to mean? That is what. In August of 1991 great events occurred in our country. Many believed then that the power changed. For this or some other reason the "Military-historical Journal" (and this is, for your information, the official print-media organ of the Ministry of defense and not some migr sheet by the "literary Vlasovites") published very early in 1992 those same, numerously mentioned "Considerations about the basics of the armed forces strategic deployment in the USSR in a case of the war with Germany and her allies" of May, 1941. The bewildered public read in particular such thoughts: "...I believe it is necessary in no way to allow the action initiative of the German Command, [it is necessary] to forestall the enemy in the deployment and to attack the German army at the moment when it is at the stage of the deployment and did not have time to organize the front and interaction of the force branches. To set as the first strategic objective of the Red Army force actions the defeat of the main German army forces which are being deployed south of Demblin and coming by the 30-th day of the operation on the front Ostrolenka, Narva River, Lovich, Lodz, Kreizburg, Oppeln, Olomuz (Polish and Czech cities at a distance 300350 km west of the USSR border. M.C). To have as the subsequent strategic objective: through the offensive from the Katowice area in the northern or northwestern direction to defeat the large forces of the Center and Northern flank of the German front and to seize the territory of former Poland and East Prussia..." Absolutely sound thoughts why in the world to allow "the action initiative" to the enemy? What else for were 61 tank and 31 mechanized divisions created if not for the conduct of large offensive operations? But for a person who spent several months in the state of weightlessness the Earth gravity which is normal for all living becomes an unbearable torture, and pale, losing consciousness astronauts are brought on hands from the landing module... So it was for the Soviet/Russian readers brought
27 28

A nice guy in-Russian; MG "... , " is the line from a 1941 song "Holy war" by Alexandrov and Lebedev-Kumach; MG

up since kindergarten on the fairy tales about the "kind grandfather Ilyich" and "immutably peaceful foreign policies of the Soviet Union": the normal truth that wolves do not eat cabbages turned out to be a heavy nervous shock. And while the public was terrified, surprised, delighted the time was running and eventually had run to the point where it became clear to anybody that the power did not change (and where would it, dear, go from us, and we from it?) and it is again the time to yell: "Long live Comrade Stalin!" Apropos, I absolutely do not understand why it was not possible to yell: "Long live Comrade Stalin!" flailing the May (1941) "Considerations"? I do not understand. What is wrong in that, as it turns out, Comrade Stalin intended to hit by an ax on the "Comrade Hitler's" nape of the head? What is so shameful about it? Our generals from the Institute of the Military History should have carried Victor Suvorov in their arms for his imaging their mustachioed idol as a predatory beast (which Stalin actually was) and not as a lost and scared school miss... But something did not merge with something somewhere and the word of command "about face" had not sounded. And that meant that everybody responsible for the publication of the documents defiling immutably peaceful policies of the USSR must be made responsible "for the bazaar". And they began to respond. First of all the veterans of the Soviet propaganda "science" explained everyone who was still capable of listening to them that May "Considerations" were just a draft, sort of a "chess etude" put together (on 15 sheets, with four attachments and seven maps) by General Vasilevsky out of boredom, on his time free of his main job as a deputy head of the Operative department in the Red Army General Headquarters. A bold hypothesis, for sure, but totally incompatible with the view on the Document's purpose of its compilers who write in the last lines: "... I ask: 1. To approve the presented USSR's armed forces strategic deployment plan and plan of the envisaged combat activities for a case of war against Germany. 2. Timely to permit the sequential conduct of the clandestine mobilization and clandestine concentration, first of all, of all armies of the Supreme Command reserve and the aviation..." That is, in the view of the military (specifically, exactly four persons were associated with the document: Vasilevsky the text is written in his handwriting, first deputy to the Chief of the General Headquarters Vatutin supposedly the corrections are added to the text in his handwriting, Chief of the General Headquarters Zhukov and the Narkom of the defense Timoshenko), they presented to Stalin for his approval "a plan of the proposed combat activities" and not at all a student's abstract. After that the "attack from the rear" began. The document's original indeed does not carry any resolution by Stalin. You would agree that this opens some "window of opportunity" for getting rid of so inconvenient "Considerations". A grand piano was immediately found in the bushes. That is, a known Soviet military historian

N.A.Svetlishin all of a sudden remembered that as early as in 1965 Zhukov told him about the May "Considerations" and about Stalin's reaction. 27 years Svetlishin was silent as a fish, never published these Zhukov's recollections, did not enter them into his secret pad, did not turn it, in due order, into the secret fund of ZAMO29... But remembered at the moment of need. It turns out that Zhukov (as narrated by Comrade Svetlishin) handed the top secret, special importance document (with a mark in the right-hand upper corner: "Only personally. The only copy") not to whom this document was personally addressed but to Stalin's secrety Poskrebyshev. Handed and left. I am explaining for those who did not understand this is the tribunal. As a minimum. And as maximum execution by shooting. A cadre military person could not hand the special importance document to an unauthorized person. Only a Soviet military historian could hit upon such an idea. At that time in the Red Army operated the Instruction on the order of composing and keeping special importance documents approved by the Narkom Timoshenko. This is a booklet of 15 pages. In particular, such documents must be written personally by hand "on a hard base where no imprint from the pen would remain", all drafts and blotter paper must be destroyed (documented by a protocol); the document must be kept in a sealed safe located within a room with the sealed door and steel bars in the windows. The instruction directly prohibited handing of the special importance documents even to the seniors in the rank and position but only in the hands of the one to whom the document was addressed. But this is not yet the finale of the comedy. Svetlishin (in the name of the dead Zhukov) narrates how next day Poskrebyshev, in the name and on the instruction from the Master scolded the Chief of the General Headquarters, at that Zhukov heard both this reprimand and the order "in the future not to write such "memos for the prosecutor" right in Stalin's office (possibly in the presence of the third persons). The funniest thing in this entire story is that Svetlishin did not even think about the existence of the declassified and published as early as in 1990 "Ledger of visitors" in Stalin's office. This ledger indicates that Zhukov and Timoshenko had no problem of handing the document to Stalin personally. Based on the "Ledger of visitors" it is even possible to suggest (not affirm but quite justifiably suggest) when it happened. May 10, 12 and 14 Timoshenko and Zhukov were in Stalin's office, and the meetings lasted 1.52 hours. In these meetings the military could have received the directions based on which they were working on the "plan of envisaged combat activities". The May "Considerations" information is from the intel report of 15 May, that is exactly why they are dated "not earlier than 15 May". On 19 May Stalin and Molotov (at that time the deputy to Stalin in the position of Chairman of the Sovnarkom and actually the "person No two" in the country) received Timoshenko and Zhukov. 15 minutes later Vatutin, the other developer of the plan, entered the office. The meeting lasted an hour and a half, all foursome left Stalin's office at the same time.

29

ZAMO () is Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense; MG

May 24 in Stalin's office was held a multi-hours meeting with the participation, besides Stalin, of Molotov, Timoshenko, Zhukov, Vatutin, and head of the Red Army's Main airforce directorate Zhigarev, force commanders of five western military districts, members of the Military councils (i.e., commissars) and airforce commanders of the five districts. There was no other so representative a meeting of the top Red Army command officers in Stalin's office either several months prior to 24 May or after that day and up to the beginning of the war. With very high plausibility it may be assumed that in this clearly unordinary meeting the Commanders of the western districts (future fronts) were informed about the war plan approved by Stalin. Another indirect but, in my view, very convincing confirmation of the fact that in the meeting of 24 May, 1941 the plan of future war and not of a defensive war at that was finally detailed and brought to the notice of executors, is the absolute curtain of secrecy enshrouding the secret of this meeting. In the Soviet epoch not a single reference of even the very fact of its conduct even the more so of the stenograph of the discussion appeared in the so-called scientific and not in the memoir literature. And to this day there is nothing documentl about either the agenda or the decisions made. Which is very strange considering huge amounts of the "antiSuvorov" literature published in the last 10 years. You may find anything here: "the myth of the ice-breaker", "the ice-breaker of lies", "sharpie of the history ", "antiSuvorov", "how Suvorov invented history", "lies of Victor Suvorov"... Some greaser who called himself by a pseudonym "V. Surovoye" published a lampoon under the title "Ice-breaker-2". It would appear to be much simpler just to publish the materials of the 24 May, 1941 meeting, and everybody will finally be convinced in the peaceloving policies of Stalin... The last doubts in that the May "Considerations" are one of many documents in the practical development of a Europe invasion plan and not a theoretical exercise disappeared after in the first half of the 1990's other similar documents were published. As of this moment at the disposal of historians there are four versions of the general Red Army strategic deployment plan (August, September, October of 1940 and March of 1941) and materials or the operative plans of two most important fronts ("Memorandum on the resolution of the Military Council of the SouthWestern front about the deployment plan for 1940", December 1940, and the "Directive of the USSR's Narkom of the defense and of the Chief of the Red Army General Headquarters to the commander, Western SMD, for the development of the operative deployment plan for the district forces", April, 1941). The materials of January (1941) operative-strategic games conducted by the RKKA top command generals also should be attributed to the documents, which actually divulge the operative plans of the Soviet Command. We are led to such conclusion not just by a simple down-to-earth logic but also by an article by Marshal .. Vasilevsky published only in 1992. He directly indicates that "in January, 1941 when the approach of the war was felt quite clearly, the basic points of the operative plan were tested in the strategic military game with the participation of the armed forces' top command generals". So, what do we see? All currently known operative plans actually represent one and the same document only slightly modified from one version to the next. All versions

of the Grand Plan coincide not only in substance but clearly also textually. All without exception plans represent a plan of the large-scale offensive operation conducted outside the borders of the USSR. The combat activities on the own territory were not reviewed even as one scenario in the headquarters game. All placenames of the assumed military Theater include the names of Polish, Rumanian, Slovakian and East Prussian cities and rivers. Such were the plans. Let us now look at the facts. As soon as one puts on a geographic map the disposition of the western districts' forces, which was created in the process of the clandestine operative deployment, the "offensive nature of the planned strategic actions" becomes absolutely obvious. Due to the prudently drawn, in September, 1939 (and signed by Stalin personally in two places), "line separating the state interests of the USSR and Germany on the territory of the former Polish state", the new border had two deep (150 170 km) protrusions sticking their "points" westward. The Bialystok protrusion in the Western Belorussia and The Lvov protrusion in the Western Ukraine. The two protrusions are unavoidably accompanied by four "depressions". From north to south these "depressions" at the base of the protrusions were positioned in the areas of cities Grodno, Brest, Vladimir-Volynsky, and Chernovtsy. If the Red Army intended to hold the defenses, the minimum cover forces should have been left in the "protrusion points", with the rest of the defensive groupings placed next to the base, in the "depressions". Such disposition certainly allows to avoid the encirclement of own forces within the protrusions, to shorten the total length of the defensive front (the triangle base length is always shorter than the total of the two other sides) and to create maximum operative density in the most probable directions of the enemy attack, i.e., in the "depressions". In June of 1941 everything was done exactly in the opposite way. The Red Army's main strike force was mechanized (tank) corps. The extreme hurry and the difference in time of their formation start resulted in their very nonuniform equipping with the combat hardware. Most corps had no "new type" tanks (-34, KV), some mechanized corps had only 100 200 (in the Red Army it was said about a couple hundred tanks: "only") of the BT-2/BT-5 tanks of vintage 1932 1934 with almost exhausted motor mileage allowance. Clearly outstanding against this background were "five bogatyrs", five mechanized corps equipped with 700 to 1,000 tanks including over 100 advanced tanks -34 and KV, hundreds of caterpillars (tow tractors), several thousand automobiles and motorbikes. These were (north to south) 3-rd mechanized corps, 6-th mechanized corps, 15-th mechanized corps, 4-th mechanized corps and 8-th mechanized corps. Even among these, the best of the best, stand out 6-th and 4-th mechanized corps. They had, respectively, 452 and 414 advanced tanks more than the rest Red Army's mechanized corps together! Where were these "bogatyrs"? The 4-th mechanized corps was being deployed in the Lvov area at the point of the Lvov protuberance. Next to it, somewhat to the south, the 8-th mechanized corps was dislocated, and east of Lvov was the 15-th mechanized corps. Without even making a single shot the strike group of three mechanized corps was hanging over the flank and rear of the German forces

squeezed in the Vistula and Bug interfluve. Two days prior to the war beginning all three divisions of the 4-th mechanized corps started to move west, to the very border. In the morning of 22 June the 8-th mechanized corps also moved to the border river San. Perhaps most indicative was the place selection for the dislocation of the 6th mechanized corps, which was hidden among the primeval woods and bottomless swamps near Bialystok. The corps could only move in one direction from Bialystok under its own power on the highway to Warsaw, to which just 80 km remained to the border (after the war Stalin was forced to return the Bialystok voivodship [province] to Poland). The dislocation of the 3-rd mechanized corps was at least as remarkable. This corps was a component of the 11-th army deployed in the southern Lithuania, at the contact of the North-Western and Western fronts. The border line in the contact area looked like long and narrow "tong", which jutted out from the Polish city of Suvalki into the Soviet territory in the Grodno area. The very configuration of the border near Grodno caused great forebodings (4 tank and 3 mechanized Wehrmacht divisions being deployed within this "dime-size area" should have caused even greater forebodings). Nevertheless, the 3-rd mechanized corps turned out much to the north of Grodno, even north of Kaunas separated from the "Suvalki foothold" by the full-flowing Neman River. It was a strange solution for repelling the possible enemy strike from Suvalki to Grodno but a very understandable and rational one for the offensive on Tilzit and farther up to the Baltic coast of the East Prussia. The nonintegrated heavy artillery regiments were deployed in a similar way (the main forces in the "protuberance point" facing the enemy, and much weaker ones near the bases). Only two nonintegrated artillery regiments (152-nd and 444-th) were in the 3-rd army covering the Grodno direction, and in the 10-th army (the point of the Bialystok protuberance) -seven (130-th, 156-th, 262-nd, 315-th, 311-th, 124-th and 375-th). Maybe you, my esteemed reader, think that after the declassification of such documents and facts THEY sprinkled ashes on their heads, humbly admitted their multi-year insolent "brain-having" and retired in a monastery? Sure... In 1996 still the same "Military-Historical Journal" published in five issues a series of articles under the common title "The end of a global lie". The funniest thing was that one of the two authors was that very Yu.A. Gorkoye who early in 1992 published the May "Considerations". The Jesuit logic of the publication-ordering customers is clear: "we did not pull your tong, you've put chestnuts in the fire it is now up to you to take the racket". Only this rigid setting of the objective can explain me the decisive shamelessness displayed by the authors of "The end ..." who tried to offload onto the public a goat under the name and at the price of a cow. However, considering that the broad public is even less familiar with the military-strategic planning issues than with the cattle husbandry, the "global lie" made some hoopla. You bet! The through and through (almost) defensive plans were presented, and almost all combat activities are planned on the own territory, and the place-names are ours...

I won't intrigue you for long, especially in the empty place. The main content of the "End of the global lie" was the publication of five (according to the quantity of the western military districts) documents. These documents were the Mobilization, concentration and deployment plans of the districts. Using the fact that far from all readers (although, entre nous, the VIZh readers could be expected to have at least some competence) understand the meaning of specific military terminology, the authors of the "global lie" tried to present the plan of the cover operation, i.e., of a very small, time- and objective-limited operation as a happily found by them "war plan", which turned out to be strictly defensive. That is, strictly speaking, the entire end. Purely technically, the con trick was built on a continuous substitution of notions: the cover, mobilization, concentration and deployment plan was turned into a "border cover plan" (which is already a crude imprecision), then into the "plan of the border defense", then simply into the "plan of defense". Quod erat demonstrandum.

Strictly speaking, even a reader far removed from military matters could have independently come to an unelaborated thought: if the entire operative plan boils down only to the cover of the mobilization and deployment, why then this very costly deployment is conducted? Could it be that only for a purpose of generating extra problems with its cover? But, remembering that the Homo Soveticus was assiduously broken off the habit of thinking and the Homo Russicus was taught by the advertizing not to think but "to control the dream", it makes sense to delve mode specifically in the content of the term "mobilization, concentration and deployment cover operation". Translated into a normal humane language "mobilization, concentration and deployment cover" means the following: the units and groupings intended for the participation in a war need to be replenished with personnel (reservists who at the time of peace are engaged in a creative labor and are waiting for their hour), auxiliary machinery (the Red Army mobilization scheme proposed the removal from the national economy of hundreds of thousands of cars/trucks and tens of thousands of tractors), ammunition, fuel, food supplies and medications from the mobilization stores. the mobilized units (personnel, machinery, ammunition and all the rest) must be transferred to the deployment locations set in the plan; for some units it may be a foot-march for 50 km, and for some others a railway transport for 5,000 km. the forces which had arrived to the theater of the future military actions need to be placed in a certain way: a tank regiment, hidden in the dense forest; a heavy artillery regiment, brought to the fire position; an anti-tank battalion, camouflaged next to the highway intersection; the commandos, brought to the airdromes of loading; the infantry, placed into the fox-holes and tranches dug in advance, etc. Only after all these (mobilization, concentration, and deployment) are done the most senior boss can pick up the most senior phone and speak hoarsely: "Begin!" But on

the very stage of concentration and deployment the forces are awfully defenseless. In its substance the concentration process both in form and content is similar to the move from one apartment to the other. A couple of weeks after the move the life will settle down again and, hopefully, will become better than it was in the old place. But this will happen later. During the short moment of the move proper even a simple thing like finding a thread, needle and a button of the needed size becomes an irresolvable problem. The same situation occurs during the redeployment of the forces. A tank division (370 tanks, 11,000 troops) unfolded into the battle order is a terrible force. The same division loaded into the railway cars covered for camouflage with the plywood becomes helpless as a baby. Even worse, it turns into a convenient target for the enemy. Therefore, to make sure that a brief period of gathering the reservists, force transportation and operative deployment does not become their last period it is necessary to conduct a whole number of special measures, which is called in the military language "the cover operation of the mobilization and deployment". This operation is by definition defensive and short-lasting. The cover object is not the country, not the border, not the "peaceful labor of the Soviet people" but the process a rather short-lasting process of the mobilization, concentration and deployment. The units and groupings tasked with the covering are required to hold for a few days the enemy offensive, not to allow a breakthrough of large mechanized enemy units into the operative depth, to cover from the air the areas of force unloading, railway stations and station-to-station blocks. That is all. No less but also no more. During the cover stage it is acceptable to retreat from the border poles. This is not the main thing. The army, mobilized and unfolded into the combat orders will return all the poles in their place in a few days. The most effective and at the same time the cheapest way to solve the cover task is selection of an enemy so weak that it won't take a risk of carrying out the first salvo thereby breaking the planned procedure of your force deployment. This is possible. This is exactly how it happened in the wars the USSR waged in 1939 1940. Neither Poland whose army crumbled in September of 1939 under Wehrmacht's blows, nor 3.5-million Finland ever attempted to hamper the Red Army force deployment at their borders. Initially this scenario was planned to be used by the Kremlin rulers in the war against Germany. The cover plan development began not in September of 1939 after the emergence of the common contact line between the German and Soviet forces, and not late in the fall of 1940 when the work on the plans of the Red Army strategic deployment for the invasion of Europe abut only in May, 1941 was going at full steam. This is not a typo in May of 1941. It is funny, but the Russian "historians" stick out this circumstance today with especial zeal. Apparently, they do not understand that the absence of the cover plans - with the presence of the invasion plans with the depth of the offensive 300 km at the stage of the implementation of the "first strategic objective" demonstrates not a special peace-loving but only a limitless arrogance of the country's top militarypolitical leadership. If to suggest any sense at all in such planning, it was, most likely, hope that it would be possible to begin the war against Germany under the most "lightweight option", namely: the main forces of the Wehrmacht leave for the Near East or (which would be more reliable and better) land on the British Isles. Under such development scenario, 2030 German infantry divisions will either not

risk to hamper the Red Army strategic deployment or will be easily smashed at the first attempt to cross the border. The other, much more troublesome expectation arose only in the spring of 1941. For instance, in the April (1941) Directive for the development of the operative deployment plans for the Western SMD armies appears the phrase about a "possibility of the enemy carrying the offensive prior to the end of our concentration". The development of full-fledged cover plans began only in May of 1941 (before that the actions of the deployment cover were briefly mentioned in the total list of tasks included in the operative plans). Probably it was exactly in May of 1941 that the understanding began to dawn on Stalin that Hitler's invasion of the British Isles may be postponed until the uncertain future, and the Red Army would have to deal with the main, most battle-worthy Wehrmacht's and Luftwaffe's units. The attitude toward the complexity and significance of the cover operation changed correspondingly. During the period of 5 through 14 of May, 1941 the corresponding directives from the Narkom of defense were sent to the districts, and by 619 of June the cover plans from the five western districts were brought from the districts' headquarters for the approval of the Red Army General Headquarters. It is remarkable that, along with the standard phrase "using dogged defenses of the fortifications along the international border, to cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of the district's forces", all cover plans envisioned carrying out the aviation strike on the contiguous territory: "... By sequential strikes of the combat aviation on the established bases and by combat activity in the air to destroy the enemy's aviation... By powerful systematic strikes on the main force grouping, railway nodes and bridges to disrupt and delay the enemy force concentration and deployment..." Is there a need to prove that "to delay the enemy force concentration and deployment" is possible only in the case of carrying out the first, and not at all the response strike? Is there a need in a special explanation that it is possible to carry out in the first hours of the war the strike on the established basing airdromes of the enemy aviation only if the locations of these airdromes and the trajectories of approach were reconnoitered in advance? And such diligent preparatory work was indeed conducted. For instance, the "bombardment calculation of the aircraft detail for a strike on the enemy airdromes" in the attachments to the cover plan of the Western SMD took three pages of text. Moreover, the cover plans of the Kiev and Leningrad districts assumed even the possibility of a land force invasion on the enemy territory already at the stage of performing the cover tasks: "Under favorable conditions all defending and reserve armies and districts to be prepared on the direction of the Supreme Command to carry out sweeping strikes for the defeat of the enemy groupings, transfer of the combat activities onto the enemy territory and the seizure of favorable areas". The peace-loving discovered by the authors of the "global lie" was very much toothy...

Chapter 6 "THE SURPRISE WORKS OVERWHELMINGLY..."

So, by mid-June, 1941 the cover plans did exist. Each of them began with the standard phrase: "The cover plan is enacted upon receipt of the deciphered telegram of the following content signed by the People's Commissar of defense, member of the Main military council and Chief of the Red Army General headquarters: "Begin implementing the cover plan 1941". The army, corps and division commanders had no right without a sanction from the top command not only to enact but even to familiarize with the content of the "red package". "The folders and packages with documents about the cover are unsealed on the written or telegraph order: in the armies, of the Military council of the district, in the groupings, of the Military council of the army". Thus, the Red Army capability for the organized rebuff (simply shooting from cannon toward the enemy does not require any plans) of the German preemptive strike depended to a substantial extent on the receipt by the district headquarters of a telegram with five short words: "Begin implementing the cover plan". But these words had not sounded up to the very morning of 22 June, 1941. This a first thing Stalin has not done (although in this case the word should not be capitalized and should be taken in quotation marks because the collective "Stalin" was a group of six persons: Stalin, Molotov, Timoshenko, Zhukov, Beria, Malenkov the latter, as a CC secretary, was a member of the Main military council). Immediately after the enactment of the cover plan the open mobilization should start (the concealed mobilization in the form of so-called "large training drill" was already in full swing, 802,000 people were mobilized within its framework in May-June). Formally-legally the Decree from the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council declaring the mobilization was supposed to be signed by the "all-Union grandfather" Kalinin, but understandably such problems were not decided without a direct guidance from Stalin. This also was not done and the general mobilization in the USSR was declared only from 23 June which is the absolutely amazing but obvious and incontestable fact. All countries participants of the world war began the mobilization a month, a week, a few days PRIOR to the start of combat activities. And only the country which was preparing to the Big War with all furious tenacity of a totalitarian regime managed to be late with the start of the mobilization by the whole day! But why? Why did Stalin not give the order to enact the cover plans? Why was he late declaring the general mobilization? Don't these questions contradict the earlier conclusion ("early in June of 1941 Stalin did not consider the German attack in the nearest days a possibility")? Not at all. First, because many days passed and many important events occurred between the beginning of June and 22 of June, including the start of the German tank and mechanized divisions arrival to the starting offensive areas at the western border of the USSR, and 21 June the Germans were already openly removing the barbed wire obstacles at the border. Second, and most important "store is no sore". Possibly, the flow of alarming reports coming to Moscow through the intelligence and

diplomatic channels was insufficient for certain conclusions of Hitler's intents. But why not to secure himself? What would be hindered by the timely, and even by a premature enactment of the cover plan? Under the cover plans, the forces in the border districts occupied defense areas positioned tens, in rare cases hundreds of kilometers from the positions of the permanent billets. As a rule, the approach march was planned on foot, sometimes by truck and only for very few detachments and groupings by rail. The needed expenses of coal and gasoline, stewed meat and food concentrates within the total scale of the Soviet Union's military costs are simply negligible. Well, what if the troops will have to spend several days and even weeks not in a relatively comfortable military settlement but in the fox-holes in a flat field? Well, this reason is even funnier. The burdens of the military service are directly included in the army book, besides, any military service man, a private to a general, will agree that it is better to be alive in a summer rain-filled fox-hole that to lie torn into shreds among the ruins of a military settlement destroyed by the first enemy bomb attack. The issue of what was hampered by the timely inaction of the cover plan was (and will ever be) absolutely insoluble within the framework of false inventions of the Soviet historical "science" about a naive and gullible Comrade Stalin, about the peaceful creative labor of the Soviet people, about multiple numerical advantage of the Wehrmacht and about Richard Sorge whose reports were not believed. But in light of the knowledge of real intentions, real plans and real actions of the USSR military-political leadership everything becomes absolutely clear. The cover operation is nothing else but the beginning of war. This is a jinnee that is impossible to stick back into the bottle. And not only because the Soviet cover plans of the summer of 1941 assumed carrying massive air strikes on the adjoining territory. The very complex of measures associated with the cover operation (and even more so, with the open mobilization covered by this operation) is so large and noticeable that it is on principle impossible to hide it from the enemy intelligence. It would be no big deal if Stalin were planning a defensive war. May the enemy see and know: the Soviet borders are under lock and key! "May remember the enemy hiding in ambush / That we are watching". A wonderful song. It is just that the next line ("We do not want even an inch of a foreign land") was by the summer of 1941 categorically outdated. Exactly the absence of the order to enact the cover plan, in combination with the incontestable fact of the greatest strategic force regrouping, is another confirmation of a conclusion that hundreds of troop-carrying trains were moving westward in June of 1941 not at all for the defense of the "indestructible borders". Stalin planned and was ready to start a totally different, not at all defensive war. This circumstance doggedly denied by the official Soviet (now Russian) historiography totally changes the entire situation. The in-advance enactment of the cover plan would have prevented the main thing would have prevented carrying of a SUDDEN crushing blow on the German forces. "The surprise works overwhelmingly" reads paragraph 16 of the RKKA field book. In conclusion of his report at the December (1940) Meeting of the top commanders the Chief of the Red Army General Headquarters Zhukov repeated this word as a mantra:

"... That party will secure victory which is more skillful in the management and creation of the surprise conditions in using these forces and means. Surprise of the modern operation is one of the decisive factors of victory. Ascribing the exceptional significance to the surprise, all camouflage and enemy deception techniques should be broadly incorporated in the Red Army. The camouflage and deception must run through the training and upbringing of the troops, commanders and headquarters. The Red Army must demonstrate high class in the operative and tactical suddenness in future battles..." Stalin was preparing his "Blitzkrieg" so long, so insistently, so assiduously, he invested so much effort (fruitful until this day) into the "camouflage and deception" that he very much did not want to break a brilliant plan of the operation, which should have begun with a crushing blow on the enemy. He indeed "drove away any thought" - no, not of the war (he already was not thinking about anything else) but of the Germans maybe capable at the last moment of forestalling him in the army deployment. The same thought may be stated shorter and simpler: Stalin was afraid to scare Hitler off. This strive "not to scare off" resulted in the strategic deployment being conducted "with the preservation of railway operating regime as in time of peace". For this valuable admission the authors of the monograph "The year 1941 lessons and conclusions" should have been awarded the second medal "For courage". For multimillion armies in the first half of the XX-th century the railways, trains and steam engines became a very important "type of armament", which in many respects predetermined the outcome of major battles in the two world wars. Actually, both Germany and the USSR had the plans of railway transportation transfer to the regime of "maximum military transportation". The substance of the term and of the procedure is clear enough: all trains, freight and passengers are at standstill and waiting while the echelons with troops, military hardware and ammunition have run through in the needed direction. Besides, the mobilization coal stores are dereserved, the armed protection of the railway stations and stages between the stations is increased, etc. The military transportation regime was introduced in the European part of the USSR (12 September, 1939) even at the Red Army strategic deployment stage before the war with Poland, half-destroyed by Wehrmacht's invasion. However nothing of the kind was done in 1941 up to 22 June! Camouflage and deception reached such extent that 21 June of 1941 the head of the Political propaganda Directorate in the Baltic district Comrade Ryabchiy ordered the "political propaganda departments of corps and divisions not to provide written directives to the units; to set the political work tasks by the word of mouth through their representatives..." Certainly, the Soviet secrecy norms were always different from those common to all mankind but not to the extent where it was not allowed to put on paper even "the political propaganda tasks"! It remains to assume that by 21 June, 1941 these "tasks" way outreached the statements on all posters about the readiness "to answer by a triple blow to the aggressor's strike" and "to firmly protect the peaceful labor of the Soviet people"...

"Force movement was planned so as to complete the concentration in the areas identified in the operative plans between 1 June and 10 July, 1941". Nobody knows the exact date of the planned beginning of the Red Army offensive. Moreover, it is quite possible that Stalin himself did not know this date in the evening of 21 June. But in any case the offensive could not start before the force concentration and deployment were completed, i.e., not before 510 July. To enact the cover plan 15 20 June meant to throw out the window all efforts and gimmickry to provide for maximum secrecy of the deployment, meant to make a gift to the enemy of two-three weeks for preparations to repel the strike. This is plenty, two-three weeks by the Soviet norms a full-fledged defense corridor could be set up by a multi-service army (with involvement of the local population and animal-drawn transport) in 10 15 days. Yes, Stalin had an option to move the start time of the operation closer, to move it from mid-July to end June, and to enact the cover plan on 2223 June (I believe that exactly this decision was made; this hypothesis is elaborated in the book "June 23 day "). But even this decision would mean that the offensive would have to be begun only with part of forces, breaking in the process carefully developed transportation, and people and transport mobilization schedules. Also bad, also fraught with failure and heavy losses. Before starting to shake head grievingly ("how could Stalin have egg all over his face... why didn't he listen to the intelligence reports...") one should look at the situation through the eyes of participants of the meeting in Stalin's office. Incidentally, there were many meetings. The "Ledger of visitors" shows that Zhukov and Timoshenko were seven times in Stalin's office: 3, 6, 7, 9, 11, 18 and 21 of June. On 9 June the military spent in Stalin's office the total of 6.5 hours. On 18 June "the collective Stalin", almost complete (Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Timoshenko, Zhukov), conferred four hours. We precisely know now that the German attacked 22 June. But Stalin knew precisely only his plans and those were the plans of a large-scale offensive operation which was supposed to begin no earlier than in the second decade of July. The flow of ever more alarming reports from the intelligence and from the western military district commanders forced a feverish selection of the "least of two evils": either to deprive own forces of the opportunity to meet in an organized way a possible pre-emptive enemy strike; or enact the cover plan before the scheduled time thereby certainly deprive own forces of the opportunity to carry a surprising strike on the enemy. The task was exceptionally difficult. The forfeited surprise would not be possible to return. At the same time the tactical loss or a failure in the first day of the defensive combat did not appear as something catastrophic. You, esteemed reader, firmly "know" that the fortified areas on the old border were disarmed (or even blown up), and "there was no time to build something" on the new border. But the collective "Stalin" knew perfectly well both the status of the corridor of fortified areas (one

such corridor was called "Stalin line" and the other one, "Molotov line") and topographic map of the western areas of his country. War is unfolding not on a smooth chess-board but on the real landscape with its ravines, bumps, lakes, mountains and swamps. And if there are no "offensive" or "defensive" tanks and airplanes, the landscape, on the contrary, can help either the defending or offending party. It was not I who invented it, and the terms "tankinaccessible landscape", "tank-dangerous direction" long ago firmly gained footing in the military literature. These concepts were particularly significative for a Wehrmacht vintage 1941 in which motorized infantry regiments of the tank and mechanized divisions were rolling not on the caterpillar APC's (as shown in the Soviet "movies about the war") but on usual, "civilian" trucks, captured buses and in bread vans; besides, the German tanks with their narrow caterpillars stuck after a good rain in the landscape called in Russia "dirt road". If we turn to a map we will see that the German army group "North" right after crossing the border "abutted" the fool-flowing river, Neman, at that in its lower (i.e., the widest) course. Farther on, having crossed numerous small rivers and rivulets the German divisions came, about 250 km from the border, to the shores of a mighty navigable river West Dvina (Daugava), and again in its lower course. Another 150 200 km on the way to Leningrad the German forces had to cross the river Velikaya, north of which the road on Leningrad was dead blocked by the system of the Chudskoye and Pskovskoye lakes. And that was the best of the nature-supplied trajectories. The forces of the army groups "Center" and "South" encountered much more serious obstacles. The landscape in the offensive corridor of the army group "Center" (southern Lithuania and western Belorussia) is absolutely "anti-tank". From the north the "Bialystok protuberance" is protected by the band of impassable swamps in the flood plain of the Bebzha River, in the south the border was drawn along the shore of the navigable river Western Bug in its lower course. A few roads in the age long forests and ruinous swamps of the western Belorussia are the semblance of mountain gorges the stuck (or damaged) head automobile in the column is impossible to pass, to get around. East of Minsk the offensive corridor of the army group "Center" from north to south crosses two full-flowing rivers, with which at the times past met Napoleon to his ruin: Berezina and Dnieper. We can judge today what it meant to carry out the offensive in such landscape from the chronology of the most brilliant (both in its design and implementation) strategic offensive operation of the Red Army operation "Bagration". The offensive began 23 June, 1944 approximately from the line of the Dnieper River. On the 3 July Minsk was liberated, 13 days thereafter, Grodno, and in 25 more days, Bialystok and Brest. The city of Lomzha (at the very point of the former Bialystok protuberance) was taken only 13 September. It remains to be added that the Red Army began the operation "Bagration" with the triple advantage in the number of divisions, and quadruple, in the number of tanks with the total air domination. In June of 1941 the army group "South" could begin the invasion of the Ukraine only through a relatively narrow (150200 km) corridor between the cities of Kovel and

Lvov. From the north this corridor is bounded by a completely impassable area of the Woodlands swamps (they say there were villages there which did not see a single German soldier for the entire war), from the south, by the Carpathian Mountains. That was exactly through this corridor that all the tank and mechanized divisions of the group "South" armies were advancing. On the way they had to cross the Western Bug, then, one after another over almost equal distances of 5060 km, southern tributaries of the Pripyat (Turya, Stokhod, Styr, Goryn, and Sluch). These small rivers have broad reliably swamped shores. The Soviet military experts describe them as "water obstacles of operative-tactical significance". South of the Carpathians, in Moldavia and in the South Ukrainian steppes the landscape appears to be much more favorable for the advancing forces there are no forests and swamps there. At the same time, three navigable rivers, Prut, Dniester and Southern Bug, in their lower course, are flowing parallel to the border. And at last a mighty Dnieper unavoidably stood in the way of the German and Romanian forces. Crossing it in its lower course is an operation comparable in its complexity and risk with an amphibious assault landing. In effect, only east of Dnieper that German mechanized units reached at last the landscape accommodative for a broad operative maneuver. But the distance between the border and Dnieper is over 400 km. The obstacles created by mother-nature were complemented and multiply strengthened by the man-made obstacles. At a distance of 200300 km from the border (behind the "old" border of 1939) were positioned in a continuous band from the Bay of Finland to the Black Sea the fortified areas of the "Stalin's line": the Kingisepp; the Pskov; the Ostrov; the Sebezh; the Polotsk; the Minsk; the Slutsk; the Mozyr; the Korosten; the Novograd-Volynsk; the Shepetov; the Kiev; the Izyaslav;

 the Staro-Konstantinov; the Ostropol; te Letichev; the Kamenets-Podolsk; the Mogilev-Yampolsk; the Rybnitsk; the Tiraspol. The number of the permanent fire positions within a single fortified area was different, between 206 and 455, which provided the density of two to three permanent fire positions per 1 km of the front. Some fortified areas were constructed ashore of the full-flowing rivers (West Dvina, Southern Bug, and Dniester). That created an additional obstacle for the advancing enemy. In the numbers and composition of the armaments, in the quality of the reinforced concrete, in the special equipment any of these permanent fire positions was at least as good as the most mass objects of the notorious "Mannerheim line". Contrary to the legend widely replicated over many decades, before the war nobody blew up or dumped with the dirt the permanent fire positions of the "Stalin line". Some permanent fire positions are still intact. It was practically impossible to transfer the armaments from the "Stalin line" to the "Molotov line": whereas the permanent fire positions at the "old" border were nine tenth machine-gun equipped, about half of the permanent fire positions at the new border must have been armed with the advanced semiautomatic artillery systems with the outstanding periscopic optic, and this optic was in short supply. In the summer of 1940 along the new western border of the Soviet Union began the construction of 15 fortified areas of the "Molotov line" (the Telshyay, Shaulyay, Kaunas, Alitus, Grodno, Osovets, Zambrov, Brest, Kovel, Vladimir-Volynsk, Rava-Russky, Strumilov, Peremyshl, Upper-Prut and Lower Prut). The grandiose program planned the erection of 5,807 permanent fire positions (there were "only" 3,279 in the "Stalin line"). By 22 June, 1941 this "project of the century" was still very far from the completion. G.. Zhukov in his notorious "Recollections and Reflections" maintains that by the "beginning of the war it was possible to build about 2,500 reinforced concrete facilities", but there he possibly made a mistake, and at that in the direction opposite to the desired: most of the current sources indicate much lower numbers. For instance, 332 to 505 permanent fire positions were built in the West Belorussian fortified areas, and about 375 in the Western Ukraine. A much greater number of the permanent fire positions were at the stage of construction.

For instance, in the Brest FA30 128 permanent fire positions were completed and 380 more should have been finished by the builders by 1 August, 1941. Thus, in the days and hours when the last pre-war meetings were going on in Stalin's office their participants knew that on the average per one kilometer of front in the Brest fortified area three concrete boxes with the walls capable of withstanding the direct hit by a shell of the heavy field howitzer were already available. One was completely built and two more similar boxes were partially constructed. But this is on the average. In actuality, the Brest FA was positioned in one of the world-largest swampy landscapes. The fire positions in such landscape were constructed not in a "chain" but as separate defense nodes blocking the few available road corridors. For instance, near the village of Semyatychee, near the Sedlets-Belovezh road were 20 permanent fire positions occupied by the 17-th machine-gun-artillery battalion. Stalin had phenomenal memory but the most absentminded Red Army commander could not forget by June of 1941 how the Red Army broke the "Mannerheim line". This subject constantly appeared in the orders from the Narkom of the Defense Timoshenko and in the meetings of the top commanders. It was announced to everybody that the Red Army performed a miracle unequaled in the military history. The "miracle" chronology was as follows: 710 days were spent to overcome 30 40 km of the "forefield" and approach the line of the main fortifications, then two weeks of fruitless and bloody attempts to break through. After that, the entire January and the beginning of February of 1940 were devoted to a serious preparation for the storm. 11 February began the offensive, which ended early in March by the final breakthrough of three bands in the Finnish fortified area and by the Red Army's approach to Vyborg. Every comparison is lame. Of course, physical and climatic conditions for the conduct of an offensive operation in February of 1940 were terrible. On the other hand, against 166 permanent fire positions of the "Mannerheim line" in February were concentrated (beside the 350,000 infantry troops) 767 152-mm cannons and howitzers, 96 203-mm howitzers and 28 super heavy 280-mm mortars throwing 286kg shells. The number of tanks on the Karelian Isthmus was over 3 thousand. Even if we subtract 492 light whippets -37/38 it still comes to the average of more than 10 tanks per permanent machine-gun fire position of the "Mannerheim line". The Soviet aviation in the course of 19,500 sorties dropped on the permanent fire positions of the "Mannerheim line" the total of 10.5 kilotons of bombs; the artillery rained down on the Finnish fortifications up to 230,000 shells daily. These numbers, these facts and fortified area breakthrough tempo stood in front of the eyes of the collective "Stalin". The most primitive logic and the "Felix" adding machine indicated that the Germans with their meager forces will not be able to put together even one fifth of those concentration in manpower and fire power, which in February of 1940 was created on the Karelian Isthmus; that meant that a multi-month "bloody meat-grinder" was waiting for them on the way from the border to the Dnieper. With this estimate of the situation the issue of whether the five-word order
30

FA is fortified area; MG

("Begin implementing the cover plan") comes to the western districts a day earlier or two days later could not have had the earthshattering significance which the Soviet historians-propagandists later attributed to it. Stalin was not expecting a catastrophe, and within the framework of the military science which counts kilotons of bombs, kilometers of the front and millimeters of the armor there were no reasons to anticipate one.

Chapter 7

THE MAIN MANEUVERS

Stalin was wrong. The catastrophe, unprecedented in its scope and consequences military catastrophe occurred. The task assigned to the Wehrmacht under the plan "Barbarossa" ("the main forces of the Russian land armies in the Western Russia must be destroyed in bold operations by way of deep, rapid move forward of the tank wedges...") was actually accomplished already by mid-July, 1941. The Baltic and Western military district forces (more than 70 divisions) were crushed, thrown back 350450 km east of the border, dispersed in the forests or taken prisoner. A little later the same thing happened with the new 60 divisions added to the North-Western and Western fronts during a period of 22 June through mid-July. The enemy occupied Lithuania, Latvia, almost entire Belorussia, Western Ukraine and Moldavia. The Germans crossed the river Neman over three unexploded bridges near Alitus and Merkine, the full-flowing Western Dvina was crossed in the morning of 26 June over two unexploded bridges near Daugavpils (300 km west of the border). On the 4 July the Germans practically without any combat seized Ostrov by taking two unexploded bridges over the river Velikaya. On the 9 July Pskov was taken. The Germans practically did not notice the fortifications of the Pskov, Ostrov and Sebezh fortified areas. At the same rate, practically not paying attention to the gray concrete boxes of the permanent fire positions, the Germans crossed the line of the Brest and Grodno FA's. Only on the Northern flank of the Minsk fortified area fierce fights occurred, and the enemy advance was delayed by 23 days. 28 June, exactly one week after the beginning of the war Minsk was taken (350 km west of Brest or Bialystok). The same day, 28 June, the German forward group of the 3-rd tank division (two tank platoons and one company of the mechanized infantry) crossed river Berezina in the Bobruysk area. The same day, 28 June 1941, the military commandant of Borisov wrote in his report: "...Directly at the Berezina River there are no large enemy units. On the major thoroughfares are operating individual tank groups with the escort in the form of separate patrols (often whippets) in the amount of a section to a platoon (i.e., 10 to 50 troops. M.S). <... > The garrison at my disposal for the defense of the Berezina line and Borisov has nailed-together combat unit in the amount of the tank school (up to 1,400 count). The other personnel a gathering of scaremonger "rabble" from thr rear demoralized by the aforementioned situation, with significant percent of infiltrating agents of the German intelligence and counterintelligence (spies, saboteurs, etc.). All these make the Borisov garrison not battle-capable. The absence of the 3-rd section and of the tribunal, before I personally organize them, significantly weakens the battleworthiness of these garrison units, unbattleworthy even without it. Besides (emphasis added. M.S.), there are no tanks and anti-tank guns..."

On the 10 11 July, the Dnieper was crossed within a 200-kilometer corridor from Orsha to Rogachev. 16 July, Wehrmacht's 29-th mechanized infantry division occupied Smolensk (700 km east of the border). Two thirds of the distance from Brest to Moscow were spanned less than in a month. By 69 July (these days are traditionally treated by the Soviet historiography as the temporary border of the so-called "near-border battle") the forces of the NorthWestern, Western and South-Western fronts lost 11,700 tanks, 19,000 guns and mortars, over 1 million units of the infantry arms. The accounted personnel losses of these three fronts were 749,000 people. The Wehrmacht on the Eastern front lost by 6 July 64,000 people. Therefore, the ratio of the personnel losses by the advancing (and very successfully, 3050 km daily) Wehrmacht and by the defending Red Army was approximately 1 to 12. By the end of July the number of prisoners of war accounted for by the German Command was 814,000. The irrecoverable loss of the Wehrmacht tank divisions by end-July, 1941 was 503 tanks. Added to this number should be the loss of 21 "assault cannons". We may add also loss of 92 whippets PzI. Even in this case the ratio of irrecoverable tank losses by the parties is 1 to 19. This is a "miracle" not fitting any canons of the military science. The sound logic and the entire practice of war and armed conflicts say that the losses of the advancing party must be greater than those of the defending party. The ratio 1 to 12 possible perhaps only in a case of white colonizers, who arrived to Africa with guns and rifles, attack the aborigines defending with spears and hoes... In the years of the mature stagnation such a sad joke appeared. A dude in the middle of the Red Square in Moscow was throwing around blank sheets of paper. Of course, he was taken by the hands and brought to a police station. What are you doing? Throwing around the leaflets. What leaflets? There is nothing written in them! Well, is there anybody around who does not understand something? Those who saw the monstrous collapse in the summer of 1941 through their own eyes do not need long explanations of its real causes. They understand everything without explanations. As if on the orders (and may be really on the orders), the unspoken "conspiracy of silence" formed. Under the rules of this conspiracy even the secret reports and memos should not mention that main thing which without any reports was known to commanders and subordinates on all rungs of the military ladder. Here, for instance, is an interesting document (ZAMO, f. 221, l. 5554, c. 4, pp. 3439). On the 9 July, 1941 Major General Tikhonov is writing in the name of a Supreme Command representative Colonel General Gorodovikov a report entitled "Conclusions based on the observations of the operations in the Riga-Pskov and Ostrov-Pskov theaters". Judging by the title, General Tikhonov was sent into the forces with the assignment to impartially figure out the causes of the defeat and to

report his conclusions to the top Command. How does he begin his "Conclusions"? With the following, mildly speaking, strange phrase: "Not delving into the root causes (emphasis added. M.S.) of the North-Western front troops retreat, it is necessary to acknowledge the presence in the forces of the following drawbacks as of this day..." Incidentally, even having refused to discuss the "root causes", General Tikhonov stated that: "... The officers and soldiers are unstable on the defensive... I observed many cases when the retreat began without the order from a commander, without any push from the infantry and under the pressure only from tanks or artillery fire or mortar fire... The artillery is displaying instability, prematurely retreats from the fire positions, and does not use the entire might of its fire... The anti-tank canons are also unstable on the defensive, prematurely abandon their positions, and as a result the enemy tanks command the battlefield... The infantry is the weakest link of the force. The offensive spirit is low... Part of the command chain, especially in the link up to a battalion commander, does not manifest proper courage in the engagement, there are cases of abandoning the battle field by soldiers and even detachments without the command from the senior. Moreover, even in the link of the top command some display confusion and depression... The rears, beginning with the regiment rear, are poorly managed, roam and are the source of the panicky rumors and flow..." Rather remarkable conclusions were made by a military historian, colonel L.N.Lopukhovsky. His article "In the first days of the war" was published in a collection "Great Patriotic catastrophe-3" (M., Yauza, 2008). The paper deals with the history of the defeat of the 120th howitzer RGK31 regiment (4th army, Western front). Author's interest in the history of this particular unit is understandable the regiment was commanded by his father, Colonel N.I. Lopukhovsky (killed in early October, 1941 in the "Vyzma pocket"). Working in ZAMO with the survived documents of the Western front L.N.Lopukhovsky found the following: "...Only rarely is it possible to encounter a detailed report of the reasons why the arms and military hardware were abandoned on the enemy captured territory. The impression is that part of such reports is simply withdrawn from the corresponding cases and transferred to the special keeping (the researchers are led to this thought by numerous occurrences of changed page numbering in the cases in the direction of their decrease)... It is strange that the report of the 120-th howitzer regiment commander does not say anything about the reasons of abandoning 12 howitzers B-4 at the dislocation points. "Abandoned" and that is it..." In order for you to better understand how "strange" it is I'll have to quote several numbers. The 203-mm howitzer B-4 on a caterpillar gun-carriage is a steel monster of 19 tons (in the travel mode) capable of hurtling a 100-kg shell to a distance of 18 km. The factory price of the B-4 howitzer in 1939 was set (depending on the list of
31

RGK () is the Reserve of the Supreme Command; MG

equipment) at 510585 thousand rubles. This is the price of a light tank. Or 90 -1 cars ("emka"). Such powerful and expensive artillery systems are not supposed to be abandoned "for no particular reason"... Strictly speaking, if wanted very much, it was possible to find out the "reasons of abandonment" of almost every tank, every heavy howitzer, every airplane abandoned on the airdrome. The arms are not distributed "for no particular reason". Specific persons were responsible for the safety of each unit of arms. Even a simple Mosin rifle had its individual number and was distributed to the soldier under his signature. After the war, at the price of big blood, ended not in Moscow but in Berlin Stalin could set up a grand "flight analysis". It was possible to take tens of thousands of captured Wehrmacht documents and with due diligence compare each report of the "enemy losses" with the losses accounted for in the documents of the enemy. It was possible to more specifically find out what really stood behind the report of the "numerously exceeding enemy forces", of the notorious "German paratroop drops", of the German tanks which appeared in their thousands in most inappropriate places... Many things could be checked but Comrade Stalin showed a great wisdom in this matter. Stalin did not get into the checking and clarifications. What for? To find the "root cause" of the military catastrophe in 1941? Stalin understood these "root causes" in the first days of the war. Or to punish the guilty? The main culprits were himself and the criminal gang of his accomplices. As for the "fall guys", they have already been exemplarily punished. On 16 August, 1941 was issued a renowned decree No 270 "On the cases of cowardice and turning-in to the captivity and measures to cut short such actions". For a greater persuasion Stalin ordered his henchmen Budenny, Voroshilov, Zhukov, Molotov, Timoshenko and Shaposhnikov to sign this document with hardly an analogue in the military history of civilized countries. The operant part of Order No 270 read: "I am ordering: Commanders and political workers who during the engagement tear away their insignia and desert to the rear or give themselves up to the enemy captivity to be considered malicious deserters whose families are subject to arrest as the families of those broking the oath and betraying their Motherland. Obligate all higher commanders and commissars to shoot such deserters from the command personnel on the spot... Obligate each military service man, regardless of his position, to demand from the higher commander, if the unit is encircled, to fight to the last to breakthrough to the own forces, and if such higher commander or part of the Red Army men, instead of organizing a rebuff of the enemy, prefer to surrender destroy them by any means, both on land or from the air, and deprive the families of those surrendered Red Army men of the state allowance and assistance..." For understanding Comrade Stalin's frame of mind is very important the fact that in the Order No 270 he did not see it proper even to mention such lofty motifs as "defense of the achievements of October", "salvation of the humankind of the Fascist

barbarism", did not remember either Dmitry Donskoy or Alexander Nevsky. Simply and without beating about the bush the Red Army military servicemen were reminded that their families are hostages of their behavior at the front line. The modern reader perhaps will have difficulty understanding the specific meaning of the phrase "deprive of the state allowance and assistance" but those who heard Order No 270 standing in formation already knew that at the sky-high prices of the "kolkhoz market" an average worker's salary could buy about 4 kilo of bread or two pieces of soap. Either one. Stalin's order did not remain an empty phrase. In total, during the war years under the sentences of military tribunals were shot 158,000 people (the report of the Rehabilitation Commission quoted the "accurate" number, 157,593 but I doubt that so accurate an accounting was possible in the bloody whirl of the war). Ten divisions without exception were shot by their own. So, Comrade Stalin did not forget to punish the "fall guys". Hardly there is the need to remind a commonly known fact that the Soviet Union refused to cooperate with the International Red Cross, which made it impossible to help the Red Army men in the German captivity with food and medications. And after the Great Victory Stalin did not waste the resources to feed, clothe and put shoes on, to provide normal living conditions and a cheap Volkswagens to those who survived the world slaughterhouse of the victors. He behaved much more intelligently. He displayed a great generosity and made single, but really royal-size present for all: Stalin presented his subjects with a FAIRY TALE. The fairy tale of a young beautiful country where it was so free and happy to breathe among the endless forests, fields and rivers. But one sunny morning the damned Fascist horde perfidiously and suddenly attacked the peaceful country. The noble rage of the peaceful people boiled as a wave, and came crushing down on the aggressors. The defenders of a wonderful country did not have tanks, aircraft, and even simple rifles were in short supply but there was heroism unparalleled in history and the unprecedented unity of the party and the people. And ran in fear the black hordes, and the entire world met in admiration the winning army with flowers and captured accordions. The adult people were listening to this magic fairy tale and were forgetting everything they have seen through their own eyes, and when the blood-thirsty and mean storyteller died (or was timely poisoned by his Politburo Comrades), millions of bewitched adult children wept and writhed in hysterics. And then, in a quiet environment, on the abundant nomenklatura chow, mountains of books were composed about that "the source of high moral qualities of the Soviet warriors were: the strength and great advantages of the Socialistic social and political regime, friendship between the peoples of the USSR, Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, unchallenged leadership of the Communist party over all aspects of the country's life". I hope you understand: I am not clowning about, I am quoting. I'll also quote what was published in the end of 2007 by S.Gedroyts in a Leningrad magazine "Zvezda32":

32

Zvezda is star in-Russian; MG

"...For longer than half a century thousands upon thousands of special people in the special institutions, academies, directorates, publishing houses produced and reproduced special Military Lies. The documents some destroyed, some forged, some classified, and the main thing, the brains were treated so that it would be impossible to stir them. In a Mausoleum constructed of cyclopic boulders of lies, the Great Patriotic [war] lay deader than Lenin..." It is obvious that it won't be possible to review all the grifter tricks in one chapter; I won't be able to name even one hundredth of the names because the following tricks were used by practically all Soviet "historians", and their name is legion. Not daring to formulate a complete and exhausting classification of the "special military lies" techniques, I will begin this brief review with the following four examples: "maneuver along the front"; "maneuver in depth"; "mind games" (substitution of "argument about the possibilities" for a discussion of the facts); usage of the tear gas and noise grenades. Military actions unfold in time and space. This unsophisticated phylosophy opens for a skilful person really boundless possibility for falsifications. I will now demonstrably show you how, using the maneuver along the front and maneuver in depth, it is possible to present a credulous reader with ANY numerical force ratios of the antagonistic parties. We'll start with the simplest, purely theoretical example. Some division went on the defensive. According to the prewar Field Book (PU33-39, p. 375) "the infantry division can successfully defend a corridor 812 km wide along the front, the infantry regiment an area 35 km along the front, the battalion, area of 1,52 km along the front". Let us assume that the defending division is dislocated in the landscape exactly as required by the Book. The enemy has a task to break the defense by the force of one division. There is actually a complete numerical equality of the parties' forces (division against division). However, the division acting on the offensive will not attack stretching in a "chain" over 10 km. For this, the commander of the division acting on the offensive does not have to be the greatest military genius of all times, he just has to sink in the Book firmly enough. And what does the Book say? "A division may attack, on the average, on the front of up to 3 km. The division strike group is formed including at least two infantry regiments. It is reinforced by the tanks assigned to the division and is supported by the bulk of the division and assigned artillery" (PU-39, p. 260). Even if the attackers do not have any assigned tanks and artillery, the strike of two regiments supported by the fire "of the bulk of the division artillery" will be on the defense area occupied (in the best case for the defenders) by just one regiment. Thus,
33

PU (), or "Polevoy Ustav" if the Field Book; MG

the attackers have a double numerical advantage it the troops and a huge advantage in the artillery. What does it mean "huge"? Let us count. The defending regiment (here and thereafter we take the troop list of the Red Army infantry division as of April, 1941) has just 6 76.2-mm canons. But the attackers, beside the 12 cannons of two infantry regiments, also have "the bulk of the division artillery, i.e., 32 122-mm howitzers and 12 152-mm howitzers (16 76,2-mm division cannons I would in place of the attacking division commander leave in reserve, for the case of rebuffing a possible counterstrike). The attackers have the nine-fold advantage in the number of guns; in the "total salvo weight" (there is such parameter in the military), the 32-fold advantage is created. And mark it: this is at the initially equal forces of the parties! Now we'll transfer from the tactical level (regiment, division) to the operative (army, front). This time, we'll use a quite specific example. Most of the Red Army forces was deploying in the South-Western Theater (in the corridor from Pripyat to the Black Sea). As a result, despite the general numerical advantage of the Soviet party, in the North-Western Theater (from the Baltic to the Woodlands swamps) during the first days of the war formed approximate equality (74 Wehrmacht divisions of the army groups "North" and "Center", 71 Red Army divisions of the Baltic and Western military districts). The German Command, naturally, did not line up their forces in a long equal chain but resolutely amassed their forces and means on the directions of the main strike. In particular, from the northwest onto the Bialystok protuberance was advancing Wehrmacht's 9-th army consisting of three (8, 20, 42-nd) infantry corps. Three divisions of the 42-nd corps stretched in a "long thread" along the border on the 110 km-long front and had the objective to distract the attention and neutralize part of the Red Army forces. But the main strike at the very base of the Bialystok protuberance was carried out by five divisions of the 8-th and 20-th corps. Actually, in the defense corridor of a single (56-th) Red Army infantry division was carried a concentrated blow by four German divisions. Multiple numeric advantage is on hand. Still, this is far from the limit of the concentration. North of the Wehrmacht's 9-th army a strike was carried out at the merger point of the Western and North-Western fronts by Wehrmacht's 3-rd tank group. At the stage of breakthrough through the border fortifications two infantry corps (5-th and 6-t) were operatively subordinated to the 3-rd TG (tank group). In the first day of the war only in the first offensive echelon three tank (20-th, 7-th, 12-th, total of 714 tanks), two infantry and one mechanized divisions of Wehrmacht advanced against the 128-th Red Army infantry division. An overwhelming advantage, and this is with the general equality of the forces in the Theater. And this is not the end of the "maneuver along the front". The 3-rd TG in the first days of war advanced within a 40 50 km-wide corridor. It does not at all mean that the tanks were moving east stretched in a chain from Vilnius to Voronovo. Nothing of the kind each of the group's four tank divisions had its own "attack corridor" but even within such corridor the tank and mechanized infantry shock groups advanced within relatively narrow breakthrough areas. According to the prewar concepts of the Soviet military experts, a large tank unit in the battlefield should be positioned in three echelons with intervals between the

tanks of 2030 meters. With such disposition a German tank division (about 200 tanks) carried out a strike on the front 2 km-wide. This (see above) is the defense corridor of an infantry battalion. A tank division against an infantry battalion! A tenfold numerical advantage and the absolute firing power advantage. According to the organization list, the infantry battalion has only two anti-tank guns how can they fend off a strike of two hundred tanks? That is where it is, the "multiple numerical advantage" of the enemy, which, as Marshal Zhukov writes, "in the very first day of the war carried out crushing cutting blows". Of course, you know all this without me. From your own, fortunately almost bloodless experience. A midget mosquito, less than a gram in weight, breaks in the crushing cutting blow through a thick human skin. A pressure is created on a microscopic area of the mosquito sting point, which nothing living can withstand. Does it mean that in a combat between a man and a mosquito the man is doomed? No. The man has in store two ways to protect himself against the mosquito attack. A first one is to create in advance the prepared fortification corridor (a sturdy tarpaulin jacket, protection anti-mosquito net, a repellent ointment). A second one is a crushing counterstrike on the enemy flank and front, i.e., to swat the mosquito with a light move of the hand. The defending army has also a third option: counter the concentration of the advancing forces in the narrow breakthrough area with the adequate force concentration (the man, however unless he is an Indian yogi cannot by the effort of will to make his skin so dense as not to be penetrable for the mosquito sting). Miracles do not happen. With the initial equality of the parties' forces it is impossible to create the "multiple numerical advantage" in one area without denuding all others! The breakthrough of the 3-rd tank group from Suvalki on Vilnius and farther on Minsk was possible not at all because the German found a "magic wand" which turned a fly into an elephant. It is just that the Red Army mighty 6-th mechanized corps could not (strictly speaking, did not even try) to punch a thin "thread" of the Wehrmacht's 42-nd infantry corps battle order and carry out strikes on the flank and rear of the 3-rd tank group. Duplicating the arithmetic exercises demonstrated above we come up with the thought that the 6-th mechanized corps (1,100 tanks, over 28,000 troops) must have discharged its "crushing cutting blow" onto a single Wehrmacht's infantry regiment and just "smear it out on the wall". As a mosquito.... The tenet of the force concentration in the corridor of the main strike was, is and will be the bedrock foundation of the military art. But this is a dangerous, "double-edged" technique. And it is not coincidental that there is in the Russian language this expression: "the military art". An enormous skill, i.e., experience, knowledge, speed and flexibility in the decision making, in order to have concentrated the efforts in one area of the front not to get a crushing blow on the other one. Were it not so, the attackers would have always attacked. Without much pain and on the enemy's land. Returning from the bloody military science to a relatively safe military-historical propaganda, we'll note that in the Soviet times the "maneuver along the front" was implemented as if in "two echelons". At the first one, in thick books claiming at least some scientific ethics, the phrases about the "multiple numerical advantage of the

Wehrmacht" were still accompanied by a prudish reservation: "in the breakthrough area", "in the corridor of the main strike". Not everyone noticed these reservations but the wise professors covered this way their... no, no, I mean, reputation. At the level of lectures in the "propaganda room" all these unnecessary clarifications distracting from the essence were thrown off, and the laborers were told flat, in plain Russian about "four- to five-fold advantage of the enemy". We'll observe here that these numbers were taken from the wall, or rather from the Raykom methodological guidance (which was copied from the Gorkom one, and so on up to the Agitation and propaganda department of the CC.) That is exactly where a decision was made what should have been Wehrmacht's "numerical advantage". I believe that the honest estimate of the correlation of forces in those very narrow areas (actually road corridors) where the German tank columns were advancing would give the number on the order 10 15 to 1. The "maneuver along the front" technique is good in all respects but one: it is designed for a person completely illiterate in the military matters. Which of course totally matched the basic principle of the Communist propaganda: "a fool will not notice, a smart one will be silent, and we'll jail the bold one". And nevertheless even in the good old times the "maneuver along the front" was supplemented by a much more respectable "maneuver in depth" (in this case, saying "the depth" I mean both space and time). The substance of the technique "maneuver in depth" is in the deliberate disregarding the difference between the eyewink and a long time interval, between the snapshot and filming a long process. Simply put, the Red Army forces and armaments were always stated as of the morning of 22 June, 1941, and at that within the geographic boundaries of the arbitrarily set "first echelon". And on the enemy side is summedup everything that showed up there within a week, month, year after the combat activities began. This trick opens a huge field for the "brain-having". If it is a matter of a "snapshot" on the 22 June, 1941 then three Wehrmacht's army groups ("North", "Center" and South") should be included among the enemy force grouping, and among the Red Army grouping, the forces of four western districts (the Baltic, Western, Kiev, Odessa). If it is a matter of the "border battle" (22 June 9 July) then the Romanian army is added to the enemy side (it began, together with the Germans, the offensive in Moldavia on the 2 July), and to the Red Army side, some large units of the Leningrad military district redeployed into the Ostrov Pskov area and some large units of the Second strategic echelon which actually participated in the combat activities in the end June early July, 1941. If we are talking summer of 1941, the Finnish army (which began the offensive 10 July), scarce at that time groupings of the Hungarian and Slovakian armies, some infantry divisions from the reserve of the Wehrmacht's Supreme Command appear on the enemy side. On the Soviet side, the entire Leningrad district, the entire Second strategic echelon, numerous new formations are added to the battle. And so forth... Even this brief review shows that the honest numeric esimate of the Red Army and enemy forces requires some knowledge and intellectual effort. And the main thing is that such estimate will unavoidably result in different conclusions from those listed in the Raykom methodological guidance. That is why a decision was made "not to

try to be clever". That is how the numbers which, I hope, are known by rote to all veterans of the propaganda room lectures, appeared. Namely: to the numbers of the three Wehrmacht army groups (84 infantry, 17 tank and 13 mechanized, total of 114 divisions) are added: 9 rear protection divisions (actually the police formations manned by the service personnel of senior ages); 4 divisions of the army "Norway" (entered the combat activities early in July); 24 infantry, 2 tank, 1 mechanized divisions from the Supreme Command reserve (they appeared on the Eastern front in these quantities only by the beginning of the battle of Moscow); 36 Finnish, Romanian, Hungarian and Slovakian divisions (which truly "could not be compared in any way " with the Wehrmacht's divisions in their armament and the level of combat training and, except 16 Finnish divisions, fit only for the robberies in the occupied territory). That is for you the sought-for "190 German divisions", which in the pages of the Soviet history textbooks "at the sunrise of 22 June" invaded the USSR. And ignored at that is the fact that the Soviet force grouping also rose numerically, and much larger and quicker than the groupings of the Wehrmacht and its allies. As of 22 June the forces of the four border districts included at least 149 "designed" divisions (7 cavalry divisions and 12 airborne brigades are counted as 7 "designed divisions"). This number does not include 10 anti-tank artillery brigades and at least 16 divisions of the Second strategic echelon, which by 22 June have already been deployed in the western districts, does not include also NKVD detachments whose headcount (154,000 personnel) corresponded to then "designed divisions". Thus, even by the start (very unsuccessful, unplanned, premature) of the combat activities the Red Army had slight numerical advantage over the enemy in the total number of divisions (at that, the advantage in the aviation, in the number of tanks and tank divisions was multiple). Early in July large units of the Leningrad district entered the combat: 15 infantry, 4 tank and 2 mechanized divisions. By 510 July the redislocation into the Theater of the Secondary strategic echelon forces (16-th, 19-th, 20- th, 21-st, 22-nd, 24-th and 28-th armies) was mostly completed. In mid-July, even despite the losses during the first weeks, the army field forces already included about 235 divisions. By the end of July were formed 29-th, 30-th, 31-st, 32-nd, 33-rd, 43-rd, 49-th armies. In total in the course of a two-months-long Smolensk battle 104 divisions and 33 brigades were brought into action. By 1 December, 1941 the Supreme Command sent into the western strategic Theater altogether 150 divisions and 44 infantry brigades, and into the Leningrad and Kiev Theaters, 140 more divisions and 50 more infantry brigades. But besides the infantry groupings, the cavalry, tank, artillery groupings were also being formed...

The reason why the Red Army could accrue its numbers at such tempo is simple to the utmost. The units and groupings which the Wehrmacht could concentrate near the border of the Soviet Union was maximum which could have been reached by the 80-million-strong Germany34 two years after the start of the general mobilization. There was nothing that could have been added to this "maximum". On the other hand, the divisions deployed by the Red Army in the western districts by 22 June, 1941 represented the minimum which the 200-million-strong Soviet Union could form and transport to the west in the conditions of a clandestine, secret mobilization within the framework of the incomplete force redislocation. 23 June, 1941 the open mobilization began, and by 1 July 5.3 million were drafted into the armed forces (which was the doubling of the military headcount compared with the status as of 22 June). Amazingly, the Soviet historiography contrived "not to notice" that. Although one would think, how was it possible to forget such a thing? Millions of families saw their loved ones to the front, women's wail raised over tens of thousands of villages, "Rise, the huge country..."35 rattled from all loudspeakers, the newspapers were peppered with photographs of the lines to the military commissariats... But up to the final collapse of the Soviet Union all books and textbooks included only the number 2.9 million, the western districts' force headcount as of 22 June, 1941. Where did the 5.3 million of the mobilized go? Not really for a summer walk? But the mobilization, of course, did not end 1 July, 1941. It was just beginning. The total number of the mobilized under the Decree of the USSR Supreme Council Presidium of 22 June, 1941 was 10 (ten) million people. And they were not at all "excessive". As the authors of the monograph "The year 1941 lessons and conclusions" write, "already in August the remainder of all mobilized ages was totally exhausted". Then, under the GKO decree of No 459 of 11 August, 1941 4 more million were drafted. And about 2 million more (at least this is the number always quoted by the Soviet propaganda) were drafted into the so-called people's volunteer divisions. Having such a huge "manpower resource", the Soviet Command was able to form hundreds of new divisions and continuously replenish the remainders of hundreds of crushed divisions, in a word, to compensate continuously for the missing management quality of a huge numerical advantage in troops. Such method of waging war has a very specific name, but you know it without my help... There is no telling that the "maneuvers along the front and in depth" are totally devoted to the past. No. They are present even today in the hundreds of publications. The new "brain-having" techniques did not displace but rather complement, strengthen and deepen the old sharper's tricks. In particular, the "mind game" is as good and effective as previously. Once during a live transmission of "The Echo of Moscow" a furious listener asked me a crushing (in his view) question: "You are narrating here all these fairy tales of how the Red Army had many times the number of tanks than the Wehrmacht. But are you aware that Germany produced twice as much pig iron and steel as the
German population in 1939 was 70 million (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties); MG 35 See footnote 29; MG
34

USSR?" I replied immediately. Honestly, as it was: "I do not know. And I do not want to know". The issue of how much pig iron and steel Germany was producing was one of the most important issues looked into by the Soviet military intelligence on the eve of the war. Why? Because the information about of the amount of steel enabled some, not totally unsubstantiated guesses of how many tanks were and how many could be produced in the future by the German industry. These guesses allowed making the next, most important guess: how many, and what types of tanks may be in the Wehrmacht's tank divisions being deployed at the borders of the USSR. In spring of 1941, in the absence of documental data about the composition and armament of the enemy army the information on the pig iron yield was worth its weight in gold. But what for, today, to pull the peoples' leg by chit-chatting of how many tanks could have been manufactured from the available pig iron when it is known for certain how many and what kind (by the type and modification) tanks actually were in each of the 17 Wehrmacht's tank divisions? The question of why in the beginning of the war (please underline the words "in the beginning" with a bold line) from such large amount of steel Germany manufactured so small number of tanks (the average monthly tank production in Germany in 1941 was 305, in 1944 1,530) is, of course, interesting. Ten (or a hundred) logical explanations of this paradox may be contrived. But all this "mind game" has nothing to do with the search for reasons of the Red Army defeat in the first weeks of the war. But it is oh, so good for the "brain-having" as it allows transferring the discussion right away to disputing the irrelevant subjects. The well known refrain: "the entire Europe was working for Hitler" is also good for such an occasion. What is "the entire Europe"? Can it be considered "the entire" without England, Spain, Italy (Hitler got nothing from Mussolini except big and small troubles), Sweden, Switzerland (the latter two countries gave nothing to Germany but were selling, and these procurements had to be paid for in money)? What material resources should have been expended for the conversion of factories producing the Dutch cheese for manufacturing tanks? What was limiting in reality the tank manufacturing for the Wehrmacht: the shortage of production capacity or the shortage of raw material for manufacturing the steel alloys (as is known, the tanks are not made of the pig iron)? Lots of questions, lots of room for demonstrating own erudition... And the identification of the facts of the real correlation of forces on the Eastern front as of 22 June, 1941 is drowned for good in the flows of the phrase-mongering. In the times past this trick (the substitution of a discussion of specific facts by a talk about always unclear and disputable "possibilities") was not commonly used as the falsifiers had enough of other, much cruder and efficient techniques. But nowadays this sharper's trick is one of the most common. The loud and sassy "anti-Resunists" especially love it. (Victor Suvorov's blasphemers for some reason believe it a special pizzazz to call him Resun; I guess within the sense of humor available to them this quite typical Ukrainian name sounds terribly funny).

V. Suvorov suggested that Stalin was preparing the invasion of Europe, which invasion should have started in July of 1941. The elementary logic is in that it is only possible to overturn Suvorov's version by way of proposing another, coherent and internally noncontradictory interpretation of the declassified operative plans and Stalin's real actions. Alas, the mental capacities of the "anti-Resunists" are insufficient even for understanding their problem, not even speaking of its solution. That is why they muffle any discussion of the "Suvorov theme" by this outcry: "How could Stalin plan the invasion of Europe if (the second left-hand supporting roller in the KV tank overheated; or the Flybeshitted36 regional military commissariat did not prepare the site for the receipt of the mobilized automobiles; or the production plan for armored protection of the permanent firing positions was only 83.725% fulfilled; or the statistical average of the pliers and screwdrivers supply for the steam engine repair shops in the USSR was below the German one by 27.345%; or the Third Russo-Turkish war convincingly proved a low level of operative training of the Russian army officers underline the unwanted)..." and that was it. In a few minutes everybody forgot what they were trying to discuss because a bitter argument, with a flow of ad hominem insults is going on: why Stolypin's reform did not work... Even absolutely faery dissertations happen nowadays: "... The lovers of calculating the combat might of armies by the number of tanks forget for some reason that the German industrial potential by 1941 was several times greater that the industrial potential of the Soviet Union. That is why it is quite obvious (to whom? M.S.) that if the Germans built insufficient number of tanks, it means that the corresponding industrial capacities were occupied by manufacturing the other military production, which the Reich's armed forces leadership considered more important. For instance, APS's, cars and trucks, motor bicycles, anti-tank guns, sub-machineguns or field radio stations. We should not doubt that the German armed forces presented a maximum balanced mechanism..." What a charm! "We should not doubt". Why is that? Because it is "absolutely obvious". This passage is lacking a mere trifle (and it is lacking because of the leisure!), a small table with specific numbers. Those very numbers which in my and Karl Marx views, "are worth of the whole volumes filled with the rethorical nonsence". But Mr. Goncharov (the auhtor of the above pearl) does not have time to count "APS's, cars and trucks, motor bicycles and anti-tank guns", which were introduced by 22 June, 1941 in the Red Army and Wehrmacht. Plenty of other matters ("born in Sverdlovsk. Did not graduate from two universities Sverdlovsk state medical and Urals state pedagogical. An activist in the movement of the Fantastics amteurs club, of role games..."). Lately V.L.Goncharov is actively playing a role game "I am a historian". No, he did not give the world a single book but with a strange connivance of publishing houses (or are they also playing a role game?) he is writing voluminous forewords-afterwords to somebody elses' books and also polemic articles.

36

Mukhosransky (), literally Fly-beshitted; MG

The freshest (of those known to me as of this date) article by V.L.Goncharov is entitled simply and stylishly: "History or propaganda?" I am reading with the repressed melancholy and cannot get enough of it... Who inspired the touching nonsense in her...37 Sorry, I got distracted. The glorious Goncharov name brought it up... Well, anyway, in the first four pages Mr. Goncharov is talking at length and at pain of good and evil: "...Abnormal situation when a historian strives to expose and stigmatize the past of his motherland (so in the text, the word "Motherland" is not capitalized. M.S.) not even attempting to figure out the causes of these or those events... It needs to be admitted that the historians are grouped not by the political views but by the scientific work ethics... Incompetency is not a justification for a person who is positioning himself as a specialist (sic in the original. M.S.) in this or that domain... It is necessary to clearly distinguish between the historical science and political journalism..." After this plenty long-drawn preamble Mr. Goncharov begins figuring out "the causes of the events". With the stated "scientific work ethics" he decided to proof that the airplanes in the Soviet airforce are hopelessly outdated "caskets". To be frank, it is not a new talking point. Substantial assortment of fraudulent tricks is already accumulated. Is it possible to say a fresh word there? Oh, yes, and what a word! "It is rather difficult "to eyeball" the comparative specifications and "out-datedness" of various aircraft (you bet, especially if instead of the engineering knowledge there are two unsuccessful attempts to study at a med. and ped.)... In any case, there is no need to prove (why? because "it needs to be admitted"?), that the Soviet industries were patently weaker that the German one both in terms of the technological implementation and in the level of the work force qualification. But we see a paradox: the USSR spent for the manufacturing of one aircraft 24 times less human labor than Germany. It is quite obvious that it is simply useless to compare one to one Soviet and German aircraft: they have absolutely different technical and technological level. Miracles do not happen. That is why the real value of a Soviet aircraft also was at least half (in actuality one third to one quarter) of the German of the same vintage year..." Strong words. Nobody before Goncharov hit upon this idea. And there is no surprise here at all a minimally educated person should understand that the technical progress moves toward the contraction in the production cost of the live human labor and the expansion in the fraction of the embodied past labor. Channels are dug nowadays not by the hands of thousands of slaves but by the bucket of a monstrous dragline in which (both in the bucket and in the dragline) is compressed the labor of several generations of workers and engineers. And the manufacturing of a digital
37

" ... or more completely: " , , ? . ..." - from Pushkin's poem Eugene Onegin; MG

-3 player took orders of the magnitude less live labor than the assembly of an electron tube based magnetophone "Dnieper". From which a conclusion does not at all follow that the sound quality of the modern -3 player is one hundred times inferior to that of the trunk box-like "Dnieper". It is rather the other way around. It means that the very "technique" of evaluating the military hardware performance by the amount of the live labor invested into its manufacturing is absurd to the hilt. The very method of determining labor expenses by dividing the total number of workers in the aviation industry by the total number of the annually produced airplanes does not stand to any critique. The airplanes are too different. There was a four-engine bomber TB-7 (weight, 19,986 kg), there was a two-engine bomber Ju-88 (weight, 7,724 kg), and there was a single-engine fighter Yak-3 (weight, 2,123 kg). It is quite obvious (paying back Mr. Goncharov with his beloved turn of speech) that the amount of live labor expended for the manufacturing of these aircraft will differ very substantially regardless of where and on what technological base a 2-ton or 20ton aircraft was manufactured. Moreover, it is doubtful that as applied to the Soviet Union the roster of workers, technicians and engineers on the facilities of the Narkomat of the aviation industry coincided with the actual number of people who manufactured the airplanes. That is the assumption derived from a careful study of the documents. Let us take the "Labor balance in the USSR as of 1 April, 1945" (of course, secret) put together in the Central Statistical Directorate (RGAE38, f. 1562, l. 329, c. 1523, pg. 99). What do we see? 36.7 million of able bodied population are listed in the cities (and this number includes "working teenagers of 12 15 years"). Including 19.3 million of the "[bluecollar] workers, [white-collar] workers and cooperative craftsmen". What are they doing, where are they working, these 19 million of blue-collar and white-collar workers? We are opening a monograph by N. Simonov "Military-industrial complex of the USSR in 1920 1950." (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996). In the pages 157167, with specific references to the documents in the RF economic archive, are indicated the following numbers of blue-collar and white-collar workers in the military manufacturing in 1944: Narkomat of the aviation industry, 733 thous. people; Narkomat of the ammunitions, 398 thous. people; Narkomat the armaments, 316 thous. people; Narkomat of the tank industry, 244 thous. people; Narkomat of the mortar armament,160 thous. people; Narkomat the shipbuilding, 136 thous. people. Total: 1,987 thous. people.

38

RGAE () is the Russian State Archive for the Economy; MG

Goncharov operates with a somewhat different number (640 thous. people working on the aviation industry facilities in January, 1944). But the problem is not at all in this unavoidable scatter of the statistical data. A strange, I would even say mysterious question is: what were the remaining 17 million of blue-collar and whitecollar workers doing? Is it true that in a country which put to the lathe "working teenagers of 12 15 years", only 2 million people, i.e., 10.3% of the cities' bluecollar and white-collar workers, were working in the military production? Yes, of course, there were also metallurgy, transport, coal and mining industries, petrochemicals, some people were sewing military uniforms and baking bread. As N.Simonov writes, in the "military" Narkomats were working about 25% of all industrial workers. But in this case 100% is 10 million. What were the remaining 9.3 million of blue-collar and white-collar workers doing? I have no answer to these questions. But I have a firm view that we are dealing here with the "false numbers". Possibly, the answer to the enigma is in that huge numbers of the people actually busy in the military manufacturing were placed outside the roster of workers, technicians and engineers working for the respective Narkomats. For the obvious reason: the cadre worker of the aviation industry Narkomat must have been issued the exemption from the active duty and a higher food ration. In 1944 it was an unacceptable luxury... I repeat again: I do not have the accurate answer. Only a clear understanding that it may be possible to evaluate a "real combat value of the Soviet aircraft" on so shaky a statistical base and upon totally absurd methodological approaches only for a purpose of the propaganda hotly condemned by Mr. Goncharov. It has nothing to do with the historical science. Another example, quite anecdotal, of substitution the logomachy about the "potential possibilities" instead of the discussion of the facts is discovered in the aforementioned collection of articles "Great Patriotic catastrophe-3". Mister B.Kavalerchik placed in the collection a huge (148 pages) article entitled: "Which tanks were better in 1941?" Despite the fact that the article title, one would think, did not leave the author the other way but to formulate the most important (in his view) performance parameters of the tanks and then to compare the Wehrmacht tanks and Red Army tanks with respect to these parameters, Mr. Kavalerchik used another way. For some reason he begins his palaver about the tanks with the ritual damnations to headdress of the hated Resun: "...On the wave of justified criticism of the official Soviet view point surfaced also a scum in the form of V.Suvorov's (Resun) version; he proposed his theory which fast gained popularity with the uninformed part of the public. He maintained that the Soviet tanks both in numbers and quality significantly exceeded the German ones... The theory by Suvorov (Resun) was numerously and convincingly torn to pieces so we will not be wasting in this paper time for the polemics with him". How charming! "We will not be wasting time for the polemics" but to kick for no particular reason this is always OK. And it would be difficult to argue against the "Suvorov's assertion" of a significant numerical advantage of the Soviet tank forces taking into account that in the pg. 304 Kavalerchik himself reveals to the reader that "for the conduct of the operation "Barbarossa" Germans concentrated 3,502 tanks", and in pg. 351 writes: "In the five western military districts there were 12,898 tanks".

Maybe I also belong to the "uninformed part of the public" but it appears to me that the number 12,898 is greater than the number 3,502. At that, "significantly" greater not by a few percent but almost by the factor of four. After that Mr. Kavalerchik took it upon himself cutting to pieces the qualitative parameters of the Soviet tanks. He describes in the following tone the history of the "thirty four" the tank, which defined the major trends in the world tank-building for several decades forward: "...In August of 1937 KBKhPZ39 was assigned a government's task to design a new tank model. At the time this task was beyond the capacities of the buro. That was a relatively small designing organization working in the backwater place, far from the leading centers of the Soviet tank-building..." At this point the book dropped out of my weakened hands. What is he talking about? What kind of a "backwater"? Was there really any other KhPZ40? I feverishly turned the page and read further: "...It was not possible to make most of their designs enter the serial production as KhPZ experienced the acute shortage of qualified specialists... The constant problem of a shortage in the competent and experienced engineering cadre... The cause of errors was mostly in the banal shortage of the knowledge and practical experience... The RKKA's Auto-armor-tank directorate did not cherish many illusions regarding the actual capabilities of the Kharkov factory buro... They simply did not have enough time for the search and development of conceptually new designs. Besides, insufficient knowledge and experience of Kharkovites made this deal too risky..." Yes, everything is in place. Yes, it is the same Kharkov KhPZ. I do not believe in the existance of the "uninformed public" wich do not know this joke but still I will tell it again with pleasure. And please don't treat it as "inflaming the hatred". " Hayim, where indeed did you make such a chic suit? In Paris. Umph, in Paris... Is it far from Berdichev? Well, maybe about two thousand versts41... Just think of it, such a back country but how well they tailored it! I hurry to inform Mr. Kavalerchik that relative to the Kharkov locomotive building factory (KhPZ), aka Factory in the name of the Comintern, aka factory No 183 all other points of the globe were "backwater". Constructed in 1895 and conferred in the
39 40

KBKhPZ () is the design buro of the Kharkov locomotive building factory; MG KhPZ () is Kharkov locomotive building factory; MG 41 A versta is an old Russian measure of length, a little over 1 km; MG

Soviet time such a sonorous, such a promising name ("in the name of the Comintern"), the factory converted Kharkov in the "tank Paris". Starting in 1932, factory No 183 manufactured series BT tanks, which at the time exceeded any light tank world over in speed and armament. By the moment WWII began the factory No 183 produced twice as much BT tanks as the entire tank industry of Germany. The tank turret with the 45-mm cannon developed by the KhPZ designers was being set up not only on BT's but also on the most numerous series of the light tank -26. As early as in 1916 KhPZ mastered the manufacturing of high-power (1,320 hp.) diesel engines for submarines. This experience (and the subsequent experience in manufacturing multi-fuel caterpillar engines) enabled the KhTZ42 designers to make a grandiose technical breakthrough, the creation of a high RPM and light tank diesel V-2 (nominal capacity 400 hp, maximum 500 hp). No country in the world at that time had something like it (the most powerful German tank engine "Maybach" HL120 TRM had nominal capacity 265 hp. and maximum 300 hp.). The uprated engine V-2k developed for the heavy tank KV had maximum capacity 600 hp. which allowed the 48-ton giant to move on a highway at a speed just slightly below that of the German light tanks (35 km/hour). Later, the tank engine manufacturing was detached from the KhPZ into a separate factory No 75 (also in Kharkov). The V-2 appearance resulted in a technical breakthrough for the entire Soviet tankbuilding. Based on these engines light tanks BT-7 and -50, middle -34, heavy V were developed. By the end of the 1930s in the KHPZ was designed and started in the serial production the "Voroshilovets", an artillery caterpillar prime mover with absolutely phenomenal technical parameters. Its highway speed without a trailer was 42 km/hour, range 390 km, and with the full load, 20 km/hour and 240 km. The V-2 diesel capacity and efficiency enabled the "Voroshilovets" in one light day and with one fuel fill-up to move a heavy howitzer from one flank of the army defense range to the other. Two "Voroshilovets" managed even to handle a monstrous 305-mm howitzer Br-18 (weight, 45.7 tons). As the evacuation tow-tractor the "Voroshilovets" could tow the five-turret tank -35. But Mr. Kavalerchik is implacable: "A small design organization working in a backwater... the assignment to design a new tank model was beyond its capabilities". And it does not matter that a result was the world-best, for the 1940's standards, middle tank. The main thing is the writer's view on the "real capacities of the Kharkov factory buro". Please don't argue, patient. If the doctor said: "To the morgue", so be it. We will begin familiarizing with the use of the "noise grenade" technique also with the example from the voluminous paper by Mr. Kavalerchik. As we already understand, author's task was to "expose the myth" about the qualitative advantage of the advanced Soviet tanks (i.e., -34 and KV). Absolutely incontestable advantage
42

Kharkov Tank Factory; MG

of these tanks was the diesel engines. It is strange that we have to argue about it in the beginning of the XXI century, when the diesel became a norm for heavy transportation and military hardware. I personally pushed a burning paper torch into a bucket with the diesel fuel. In a construction gang, many years before the emergence of the "Suvorov theory". I won't recommend even my worst enemy to repeat this "experiment" with a bucket of gasoline. And not only with a torch. It is better not to approach a bucket of gasoline with a burning cigarette. But if there is a desire to prove that white is black, then the following can be written: "...An explosion of a "kamor" (i.e., with the explosive charge. - M.S.) shell in a fuel tank filled one quarter or less causes most catastrophic consequences. In the process forms an aerosol mixture of small fuel droplets which adds to the fuel vapors already present in the fuel tank. The precondition of the detonation is high temperature and pressure created by the high-explosive action of the "kamor" shell, with the pressure increasing in a jump-like manner to a huge value... As a result of the fuel tank detonation the closest armor sheet was totally torn off the frame along the welding suture and thrown to the side... The fuel tank with the diesel fuel after the detonation vanished without a trace; it just broke into the dust... This is completely comparable with a process taking place in the explosion of the modern round of the volume blast called sometimes a "vacuum bomb". As is known, the speed of its detonation reaches 1,5001,800 m/s and the pressure, 1520 atmospheres. This is exactly the monstrous force that tore even the strong sutures of the -34 frame..." Are you frightened? I would think so! A "monstrous force", the fuel tank "broken into dust", the armor sheet "totally torn off the frame "... This is the vaunted -34, which does not burn in the flame! As it turns out it falls into pieces all right. Despite all its diesel. Can one believe it? But how can one not believe an expert who knows such abstruse words ("detonation speed", "round of the volume blast", "aerosol mixture", "kamor round"...). This is really not a simple but effective trick which I call the "noise grenade". To crush by the "erudition", to overwhelm by a flow of unfamiliar technical terms, to push on the emotions... and the client is cooked. He (the client) will either miss or not fully understand to the end the meaning of a phrase which follows the paragraph quoted above, namely: "It is necessary to add here that the high-explosive action of the 37-, 47- and 50-mm German armor-piercing shells was too weak to generate the fuel tank detonation in the "thirty four". Then what are we talking about? What is this bogeyman story about the fuel tanks torn into dust doing in the paper entitled "Which tanks were better in 1941?"? In 1941, the Wehrmacht was armed with 37-mm anti-tank guns, 37- and 50-mm tank guns, 47-mm Czech anti-tank guns assembled on the light tank chassis; the modern 50-mm anti-tank guns began arriving into the infantry divisions. The latter two systems under especially favorable conditions (short distance, the impact on the lower part of the frame flank) could break through the T-34 armor but, Mr. Kavalerchik himself explained, even in a case of the breakthrough THESE shells could not cause the detonation of a fuel tank. Why then this entire story about the "catastrophic consequences of a kamor shell blow up in the fuel tank"? And why does not the article entitled "Which tanks were better in 1941?" include a clear and

unequivocal statement of the fact that the fuel tanks of any German tank were protected at best by a 30-mm flank armor, which any Soviet tank, cannon armoured automobile, any Soviet anti-tank (or a division 76-mm) cannon broke through at a distance of the aimed fire, and the jet of incandescent fragments of the shell and armor assured the ignition of the gasoline splashing in the fuel tank? For all that I am ready to agree that the "noise grenade" prepared by Kavalerchik is acting effectively and I would say even beautifully. The same trick performed by the acknowledged leader of the domestic "anti-Resunists" .V.Isayev looks terribly boring: "The first combat group of the 14-th tank division (the Kampfgruppe Stempel) consisted of the 108-th mechanized infantry regiment (without the 2-nd battalion), headquarters of the 4-th artillery regiment of the 14-th tank division with the 3-rd battalion of the 4-t artillery regiment (without the 1-st battery), 1-st battery of the 4th artillery regiment, 1-st battery of the 607-th mechanized battalion (the assigned corps detachment, 210-mm mortars), 1-st battery of the 60-th artillery regiment (the assigned corps detachment, 100-mm cannons), 1-st company of the 4-th anti-tank battalion of the 14-th tank division, 36-t tank regiment (without the 1-st reinforced company) with 2-nd company of the 13-th mechanized sapper battalion, detachments of the mechanized communications battalion, 2-nd platoon of the 4-th sapper company. The second combat group (Kampfgruppe Falkenstein) comprised the 103rd mechanized infantry regiment, the 1-st reinforced company of the 36-th tank regiment, the 2-nd battalion of the 4-th artillery regiment, 4-th anti-tank battalion without one company and two platoons, 1-st platoon of the 4-th sapper company. The third combat group (Kampfgruppe Damerau) was composed of..." Is everything clear? No? Then read it again, two or three times. Try to copy it in writing, this facilitates the memorization. And don't grizzle, just be grateful to me that I pitied you and quoted only half (!!!) of the "grenade"... Mr. Isayev needed this little masterpiece of the pretentious clap-trap ("From Dubno to Rostov", Moscow, ACT, 2004, pg. 158) in order that, after having hypnotized the reader by this entire flicking of platoon, battery and battalion numbers, to impose on his the image of the "immeasurable enemy force" advancing as a black thunder storm cloud onto the Soviet forces. The list is indeed impressive. There are no miracles, however. The Wehrmacht's 14-th tank division on its way from the near-border Vladimir-Volynsky to Lutsk encountered (it would be more correctly to say should have encountered) four Red Army divisions (19-th tank division, 135-th infantry division, 215-th and 131-st mechanized divisions) and the 1-st anti-tank brigade. And this is not counting the 87th infantry division and 41st tank division, and also three defense nodes of the Vladimir-Volynsky FA deployed directly at the border (about them Isayev disparagingly let slip: "40 loosely deployed permanent fire positions"). 26 June to the German-occupied Lutsk came two more Red Army infantry divisions (200-th infantry division and 193-th infantry division). And if the complete list of all detachments of one German division takes 2 text pages, then the similar, detailed to the level of the platoon and company, list applied

to the eight Soviet divisions should take 16 pages. Of course, Mr. Isayev prudently does include it... Tear gas (aka the "Yaroslavna wail") was and remains one of the most important, base trick in the falsification of the history of the war beginning. What is its strength in? In the truth. The substance of this approach is in speaking up truth and only the truth about the pitfalls (shortages, unfinished work, difficulties, problems) encountered by the Red Army in the summer of 1941. Only the Red Army. Nothing about the same (and may be even more serious) problems occurred with the enemy. That is it. Works trouble-free. "... The landscape. In the corps advance corridor are 5 serious water obstacles: rivers Radostavka, Ostruvka, Zhenka, Lovushka and Sokoluvka. All rivers are with the swampy shores and are difficultly-accessible lines for the tank actions. The entire landscape within the offensive corridor is woody-swampy; the command highs are on the side of the enemy. The conclusion: the landscape does not facilitate the offensive..." How could one disagree with such a conclusion? Having read this, not everyone would surmise to ask: "And in what landscape did enemy advance at a tempo of 30 50 km per day?" How could Wehrmacht's divisions of the 1-st Tank group which acted in the Ukraine get over these mighty, not shown on a single geographic map, forest rivulets (Radostavka, Ostruvka, Zhenka, Lovushka and Sokoluvka), and also the Western Bug, Styr, Goryn, Sluch and at last the full-water Dnieper? Where from the "command highs" appeared in the swampy forest and how come did they turn out in the enemy hands albeit the enemy appeared in this forest just a few days (or even hours) before the events described in the quoted report of the 15-th mechanized corps commander? There was not and there is not a single book where the Soviet historians, with a woeful sniffle, would not report to the reader about the lack of the military experience, shortage of the command and technical cadre, terrible hurry in the formation of tank divisions and mechanized corps in the Red Army. You will get a mandatory statement that 76.453% mechanized unit commanders were in their positions for less than a year, and some tank division commanders (how terrible!) commanded cavalry units before that. By default it is assumed the Germans had it all spiffed up. And of course, any book says about "the two-year experience of the modern war accumulated by the Wehrmacht". The hypnotic effect of this endless repetition of the "two-year experience" mantra is so great that even now many readers cannot count using their fingers: four weeks of the war in Poland + five weeks of the war on the Western front + two weeks in the Balkans (at that, all these are with a large margin; if to take in actually, it is 3+4+1). Is it really two years? There were problems in the Soviet Union of manning the army by the personnel (first of all, the command personnel). Who would argue? In the summer of 1939 the Red Army included 100 infantry and 18 cavalry divisions, 36 tank brigades. Two years later, on the eve of the war, 198 infantry, 13 cavalry, 61 tank and 31

mechanized divisions have already been formed. Total of 303 divisions. More than doubling the number of the units (and significant increase in the level of their motorization!) caused serious problems with manning. To solve them, the compulsory universal draft was introduced in the Soviet Union. Due to this the country gradually accumulated multimillion contingents of the reservists who served three years. Yes, all these are not easy and not cheap but not even close to the Wehrmacht problems. Germany, demilitarized under the Versailles Treaty conditions, entered the year 1935 with 10 infantry divisions. In the field drills the tanks were indicated by cardboard dummies. In the summer of 1939 the Wehrmacht already had 51 divisions (including 5 tank and 4 mechanized), by the spring of 1940 the Wehrmacht formed 156 divisions, by June1 of 1941, 208. A dazzling headcount increase forced to put "under arms" totally unschooled draftees. The Germans would be happy to form their tank and mechanized divisions on the basis of the cadre cavalry divisions (the operative tenets in the combat application of the movable groupings were quite similar). But the old Reichswehr had not even a trace of such number of the cavalry units and officers. Wehrmacht's tank divisions were formed on the base of the infantry groupings, and it was possible to man their command with no more than 50% of cadre officers. Of course, for the Wehrmacht 50% was a high index taking into account that the infantry divisions formed in the second half of the 1940's and later had no more that 35% cadre officers. Germany began the war with 5 tank divisions, by the spring of 1940 their number grew to 10, by the end of 1940 10 more tank divisions were formed. How many "years" did the commanders commanded these divisions? What kind of the "combat experience" could have the tank divisions formed after the completion of the campaign at the Western front? Out of the 17 tank divisions deployed in June of 1941at the USSR border only three divisions (1-st tank division, 3-rd tank division, 4-th tank division) had some semblance of a "two-year war experience" (i.e., the participation in the Polish and French campaigns). Seven tank divisions (12-th tank division, 13-th tank division, 16-th tank division, 17-th tank division, 18-th tank division, 19-th tank division, 20-th tank division) did not even have the experience of the two-week long war in the Balkans, and 22 June became for them the first day of their combat actions as a tank grouping. Why is this that against such background the combat experience acquired by the Soviet tankers at Khalkhin-Gol and in Finland (i.e., in the war with the enemy which showed the fanatical tenacity in the engagements) should be treated as a tiny trifle? I would call the "percentage method" the most malignant (and most common) modification of the "tear gas". Not a single publication by the historians from the Gareyev-Isayev scientific school gets by without using it. It is a particularly significant "brain-having" technique so we devote the entire next chapter to it.

Chapter 8

THE PERCENT-MANIA

The jist of the percentage method of "brain-having" is best illustrated by a demonstrative example from a domain well familiar to any Soviet person: "the housing problem". Let us assume that some citizen V. Pupkin with his family of three resides in a comfortable 4-room apartment with the area of 80 m2 (807 ft2). How can the living conditions of Comrade Pupkin be interpreted? The answer is simple and understandable. We have to compare. With what? With how the others are living. The comparison result is obvious: Vasily Pupkin is well settled, his numerous compatriots are still living in the "Khrushchebas" with a kitchen of 6 m2 per five people. And now let us imagine that we have a task to prove that Pupkin is suffering because of absolutely unbearable living conditions. Can we do it? Easily. To do this it is necessary to make Vasily a present of additional real estate. Namely: a house in a village (70 m2) with wood-burning heating stove, with "facilities" in the yard, a big barn next to the house (50 m2), hayloft (60 m2), pigsty (40 m2) and a cellar for the potatoes (30 m2). One would think Comrade Pupkin did not get poorer and his life did not turn into nightmare because IN ADDITION to a wonderful city apartment he got the barn, hayloft, pigsty and a cellar. But it only appears this way. Until a deafening howling sound: "Only 24% of the premises belonging to the Pupkins match the current sanitary standards, 55% of the premises do not have heating or lighting... How is it possible to live in such inhuman conditions?" That is exactly how our military history is written. Four tank groups were formed in the Wehrmacht for the attack on the Soviet Union. The weakest, 4th tank group (army group "North") was armed with 602 tanks. The largest, 2nd tank group (army group "Center") had 994 tanks. Total number of tanks in the four tank groups as of 22 June, 1941 was 3,266 (if to call whippets Pz-I and Pz-Il "tanks"), i.e., on average 817 tanks per group. The Red Army included six mechanized corps equipped with 800 and more tanks each (1st mechanized corps, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th mechanized corps). This list should be complemented by two quite battle-worthy mechanized corps: the 3rd (672 tanks including 128 KV and -34) and 15th mechanized corps (749 tanks including 136 KV and -34). Total is eight powerful mechanized units almost totally manned and supplied with the artillery, tanks exceeding enemy in the technical parameters, supplied even prior to the open mobilization by two to four thousand automobiles and two to three hundred tow tractors each. Did the Red Army become weaker when IN ADDITION to these eight "armored battering rams" it could bring into action in the first days of war 12 more mechanized corps at various degrees of battle readiness and manning? Did the incompletely manned 13th mechanized corps (282 light tanks, 18,000 troops) hampered in any way combat activities of the most powerful 6th mechanized corps? Who did they intend to fight, percents or the enemy? Of course, these are foolish questions. I may say, idiotic questions. But why don't you, dear comrades throw away into the garbage basket the next salvo of scribbles which in the thousandth time derive "the average body temperature for the hospital", i.e., adding together and dividing the armament of all 30 corps (including those barely started to form in the Central Asian and Orel districts), begin their blood-

curdling wailing: "the Red Army mechanized corps were supplied by the trucks only ...%, movable repair shops, ...%, tanker trucks, ...%, automobile tires, ..." Why are you sadly shaking your heads reading that "the new type tanks were only 7.8% of the total tank park"? Just 7.8 percent. Terrible, flagrant unpreparedness to a war. The traditional Soviet historiography maintained that with such percentages the USSR could not be ready for the war before the summer of 1942, and until that time it was necessary to procrastinate, to procrastinate and to procrastinate... But this is an outdated view. Two comrades (A. Anatolyev and S. Nikolayev) published in two issues of the "Independent military review" a huge article entitled "A natural defeat". After having listed all possible percentages they came to a dumbfounding conclusion: the Red Army could have become really battle-worthy only by the end of the 1940's". Could have become. In the mid-1940's, or to be more precise, in May of 1945, Berlin has obviously taken by some un-battleworthy army. But the authors are implacable, or rather the implacable math indisputably proves that only "by the end of the 1940's" the army could have been 100% armed with the "new types of tanks". And the magazine pretending to be considered as a solid publication did not find an editor who could have explained to the Comrades that the new types of tanks (as well as of cellular phones, ladies' shoes, best surgeons and fresh jokes) never and nowhere can constitute 100% of the entire depot, and only the defeated army can "complete the re-armament". There is the specific, exact date of the "complete rearmament", 8 May, 1945. This was the day when the rearmament of the Wehrmacht was finally and irreversibly completed. The Red Army, to our luck, was unable to reach such summit. As of 9 May, 1945 the "new type tanks" (-34 and KV), which were so assiduously multiplied and divided by Anatolyev with Nikolayev, were hopelessly outdated and were everywhere removed from the combat units. The main "workhorse" of the Red Army tank force became -34-85 with new armament (super mighty 85-mm cannon), new three-man turret and new fire control devices. But this tank also did not have the right to be called "advanced" because in January, 1945 a serial production began of the tank -44, conceptually new in design. Contrary to the expectations tank -44 turned out to be a flop, and in April, 1945 were manufactured two experimental prototypes of the new tank, which was in a year made operational with the name -54. By the 9th of May were manufactured no more than two hundred -44's (about 0.8% of the total tank park), the prototype -54 was only beginning its test runs, so in May of 1945 was observed a total "unpreparedness to the war"... The "percentage method" is working nicely also in a situation when the notorious "preparedness" is counted in percents of some arbitrary selected parameter which does not say too much about anything. An example. All Soviet pamphlets43, with a woeful sobbing, informed a credulous reader that on the eve of the war "only 8% of the Soviet fighter aircraft had cannon armament". This is working. On the intuitive level everybody "understands" that cannon are whoopee, not something like a trashy miserable machine-gun... To complete the picture it would be nice to quote the "cannonness" percentage for the aircraft of the other countries - enemies of Hitler's

43

The author is using the word "" which in this case has a derogatory tinge; MG

Germany, but that was traditionally passed over in silence by the Soviet historians. We'll fix this deplorable omission. A first serious, strategic in scale Hitler's defeat was the collapse in the fall of 1940 of his plans of invading the British Isles. Germany suffered this defeat not on the ground, not in the water but in the air, in the course of the multi-months "battle of Britain". The Royal Airforce fighters held the air supremacy over La Manche and incurred huge losses on the German aviation. Do you know how many English fighters had at that time cannon armament? 80 percent? 18? 8? A correct answer is: zero digits, cock decimals. England's fliers won the air battle in the skies over London with "Hurricanes" and "Spitfires". Both fighters were armed exclusively and only with machine guns. Let us go further. In the latest months of the World War II American-made long-range fighters covered the armadas of allies' bombers. What percentage of these aircraft had the notorious "cannon armament"? I do not know the exact number, and there is no sense looking for it. The absolute majority of the fighter squadrons by 1944-45 were rearmed with "Mustangs" and "Thunderbolts". And both were armed only with the machine guns. Not a single cannon aboard. And the American fighters with the cannon armament ("Lightning", "Kittyhawk") by that time moved into the rank of outdated and were either absent in the skies over Western Europe or very modest numbers of them were used as light attack aircraft ("Kittyhawk") or spy planes ("Lightning"). The shortest explanation of this strange, from the first sight, transition from the "outdated cannon" to the "advanced machine gun" fighters took 13 pages of text in my book "On peacefully sleeping airdromes". In this super-brief rendition it only remains to be said that the cannons vary, and multi-ton guns which children climb in a recreation and entertainment park were not installed on World War II era aircraft. The difference in the destructive effect of a 20-mm shell and a 13-mm bullet is of course real but it is not as significant as it may seem from the first sight. Besides, designing of the aircraft and everything attached and screwed-on to it is rigidly limited by the restrictions on the weight and dimensions. Thus, the issue is phrased something like this: what is better: to arm the fighter with two cannons with the shell store for 10 seconds of firing or with six machine guns with bullet store worth 50 seconds of firing? The answer to this question is very complex or rather there is no singular answer in principle. In any case there are no grounds to treat as "hopelessly outdated" the 1941-vintage fighter only because it did not have cannon armament. 22 July, 1941, exactly one month since the beginning of the war, began (and ended at midnight) the sederunt of the USSR Supreme Court's Military board. The Western front Commander D.Pavlov, front's headquarters chief V.E.Klimovskikh, the front's communications chief ..Grigoryev, the Western front 4th army commander ..Korobkov spent in the dock the last hours of their lives. Among the numerous questions asked from the former head of the Red Army Main automobile-tank directorate, hero of the defense of Madrid, Hero of the Soviet Union Army General Pavlov was also this one: "...You testified at the preliminary investigation that: "In order to deceive the party and Government, I know exactly that the General Headquarters overstated the ordering plan for the war time for the tanks, automobiles and tractors by about the

factor of 10. The General Headquarters justified this overstatement by the available capacities whereas the actual capacities which the industry could provide were much lower. With this plan Meretskov intended for the war time to confuse all estimates for tank, tractor and automobile procurement to the army <...>. Do you confirm this testimony?" Before reading the response it is important to note one important circumstance: the response was given not in a torture chamber but in the court session where Pavlov denied some testimonies which the "interrogators" beat out of him. Defendant Pavlov: Mostly, yes. There was such a plan. It contained such nonsense (emphasis added M.S.). Based on that I came to a conclusion that the order plan for the war time was put together for a purpose to deceive the party and government..." Army General ..Meretskov (chief of the Red Army General Headquarters from August, 1940 through January, 1941) certainly had the most direct connection with the development of the Mobilization plan of 1941 (MP-41) but still, the document was signed not by him but by Timoshenko and Zhukov. Pavlov was shot. Meretskov was arrested in the end of June, 1941 but was miraculously released in August into a tentative "freedom". The "Pavlov's case" materials were declassified and published only in 1992. But that time nobody from the aforementioned was with us. Timoshenko did not write memoirs. Meretskov's memoirs do not say a word about MP-41. G.K.Zhukov turned out to be more talkative: "...Remembering how and what we, the military, demanded from the industry in the last months of peace I see that sometimes we did not fully considered the real economic possibilities of the country. Although from our so-to-speak institutional point of view we were right ". I am not sure that the present-day reader will be able to understand without a translator what exactly Comrade Zhukov said. The words "institutional", "institutional approach to the matter" were common euphemisms (words-substitutes) of the Soviet "newspeach". The word combination "institutional approach" replaced the other, much less harmonious expression: "cover one's ass". Inputting into the mobilization plan exorbitant, unsubstantiated and consciously undoable requests to the material-technical supplies of the army the military agency leaders were preparing for themselves a "legitimate excuse" in the case of a future defeat. It is doubtful they were also thinking about the convenience for the future Soviet historians but nevertheless it was a wonderful gift. Because the percents, those very percents which cover as fly traces the opuses of the Soviet historians, are computed relative to the numbers in the mobilization plan MP-41. That very plan which the Supreme Court Military board tried to present as "wreckage" but the defendant Army General was prepared only to admit that the plan contained "nonsense". We will now try to figure out the numbers and percents in the MP-41 from a few specific examples.

The tow-tractors. One example of the Red Army "flagrant unpreparedness" for war most favored by the falsifiers are (and still remain) the artillery tow-tractors. Or rather their scarcity. The scarcity is always expressed as percentage of nobody knows what, maybe of the mobplan, maybe of the organization register. In any case, the percentages are always modest: 30, 40, 50%. That is exactly why, associate professors and PhD's explain, everything went so askew. It was impossible to bring the guns onto the fire positions or even to haul them into the rear in the retreat. That is why the loss of artillery guns in the first weeks of the war was astounding. We will not be arguing. We just will take a calculator and simply count the number of tow-tractors and the number of tow objects. By the beginning of June, 1941 the Red Army had among the artillery systems of the most numerous, division link (122-mm and 152-mm howitzers, 107-mm cannons) 12,800 units (the "three-inchers"44 and mortars were transported in the trucks or by horse, so in this case we will not consider them). Added to this list may be 7,200 heavy 76-mm and 85-mm flak cannons (although most of these artillery systems were in the anti-aircraft system of large stationary facilities, and there was no need to haul them in the field). Thus, maximum number of the tow objects was exactly 20,000 units. As of 15 June, 1941 (here and thereafter the numbers are taken from the report of the head, RKKA's Main automobile and tank directorate) 33,700 tractors (not counting the specialized artillery tow-tractors S-2, "Comintern", "Voroshilovets" intended for towing the heavy guns of the corps artillery regiments and RGK artillery regiments) were already in the forces. It would appear that there were no causes for a catastrophe: there were one and a half times more tow-tractors then guns. However, the number in the MP-41 is 55,200. That is why it is possible to say without a twinge of conscience that the guns were abandoned due to the allround shortage of mechanical towing vehicles". For the sake of truth the "historians" should be reminded that in the course of the open mobilization already by the 1 July, 1941 additional 31,500 tractors were transferred from the economy to the Red Army, so in this category the mob plan was fulfilled. "That is not how the count is done", any specialist may say, and he will be absolutely correct. The artillery units were the major but not the only "consumer" of tractors and tow-tractors. Caterpillar tow-tractors were needed for the evacuation of damaged tanks from the battlefield, for the mobile repair shops and nonintegrated sapperbridge battalions... So we will count it differently, the right way, i.e., based on the nominal norms of the level of equipment and planned number of personnel in the force units. According to the organization chart of April, 1941 the anti-tank battalion of a regular infantry division was supposed to have 21 armored caterpillar tow-tractor "Komsomolets" per 18 anti-tank cannons (we'll note in parentheses that the Wehrmacht's infantry did not even dream of such a luxury). So, for the total level of equipment under the nominal requirements of all infantry divisions (and all mechanized divisions which according to the nominal level of equipment were supposed to have 27 "Komsomolets") were needed 4,596 tow-tractors of this type.
44

76-mm cannons; MG

As of 15 June, 1941 the Red Army already had 6,672 "Komsomolets". Not bad at all. But MP-41 has the number 7,802. The flagrant "unpreparedness" indeed. Every one of the 179 infantry (excluding the mountain-infantry) divisions nominally had to have 78 tow-tractors (excluding the "Komsomolets"). At that the nominal numbers were exceptionally generous. For instance, a howitzer regiment in a regular not to confuse with the mechanized infantry division for 36 howitzers, according to the list of equipment, has 72 tractors. The total for the entire infantry 13,962 tractors. The complete equipment level for all 30 mechanized corps (which, incidentally, was not required under the mobplan by June, 1941) was to be 9,330 tractors and specialized tow-tractors (excluding the "Komsomolets"). Another firstpriority receiver of the mechanical towing equipment the RGK anti-tank artillery brigades. By 1 July, 1941 it was planned to deploy 10 such brigades, each one with 120 powerful (76-, 85- and 107-mm) cannons for whose transportation the nominal level was 165 tow-tractors. Correspondingly, for all anti-tank artillery brigades 1,650 more units of mechanical towing were needed. The artillery regiments of the corps and the RGK artillery regiments had different equipment levels and organization. Assuming (with a certain overshot) the average equipment level of 36 guns and taking into account the double reserve unthinkable in any army of the world we come up with about 12,100 tow-tractors needed for providing for the complete equipment level in all (94 corps and 74 regiments of the RGK) nonintegrated artillery regiments. Altogether, all combat units and groupings of the entire Red Army (including the Urals, Siberian and central Asian military districts removed by thousands of kilometers from the western border) needed, under the "super-generous" roster normative, about 37,000 tow-tractors. Actually the forces had by 15 June, 1941 36,300 tractors and tow-tractors (plus 6,700 "Komsomolets"). The MP-41 compilers demanded 83,045. And we were force-fed within over half a century with the percentages of this absolutely unbridled "requirement" by the Soviet and later postSoviet historians. But the Wehrmacht in their writings was always "ready for war". Hundred percent. Without opening a single reference book you can boldly maintain: 22 June, 1941 the German tank divisions were fully equipped with heavy and medium tanks with antishell armor. And with the armored automobiles armed with the adequate 45-mm tank gun the Wehrmacht was provided in exact, absolute compliance with the organization chart and mobilization plan. And with the division cannons breaking through the front armor of the heaviest enemy's tanks. And with multiple launch rocket systems... Zero available, zero in the plan, equipping percentage 100. This is exactly the glorious German orderliness and scrupulousness. The Red Army tank divisions in the beginning of the war had over 1,500 KV and -34 tanks. Thanks to wisely composed MP-41 this may be with a clean conscience described as "miserable 9% of the organization chart". The division howitzers in the Wehrmacht are pulled by six horses. Our historians call it "fully mobilized army for which were working the industries of the entire Europe". Well, it did not get into Halder's and Jodl's heads to put together the mobilization plan "in a smart way", to include in the organization chart of their forces nonexistent

hardware, to demand from Hitler 4 tow-tractors per gun... That is exactly why the Soviet historians do not call them other than "beaten Hitler's Generals". Another favorite of the historical "brain-having" is radio-communications. There were no communications in the Red Army. Same as there was no sex in the USSR. Everybody knows it. Strictly speaking, the "dogma of the absent communications" is outside the framework of the "percentage method" as the falsifiers in most cases do not bother with specific numbers. What for? The reader knows without any numbers that at the sunrise of 22 June, 1941 the German saboteurs cut all telephone wires, and radio stations were not even dreamt of in the Red Army. And only a few most serious books include the information that the "forces of the Western SMD were provided by the regiment radio stations, 41%, by the battalion stations, 58%, by the company stations, 70%...". Indeed, how is it possible to fight under such conditions? In the early 1940's, the provision of the COMPANY RADIOSTATIONS - just 70%. It is... about the same as the cellar without a Jacuzzi or the hayloft without a dishwasher! There really were large problems with the communications in the Red Army. During the first hours, days and weeks of the war any information exchange between the headquarters of all levels was almost completely paralyzed. This is a fact. This fact has a simple, understandable explanation which is totally unacceptable for the Soviet (as well as for the present-day imperial) historical mythology, namely: subjects of the information network were missing or did not want to communicate. Simply speaking, a division commander who abandoned his forces and fled into the rear areas could not and did not want to report about the course of his "combat operations" to the Army Commander who fled a day earlier and 100 km farther. Even the satellite phones would not change anything in this situation. Exactly as the cellular phone does not help the parents to find their rapidly grown-up teenager who went to a birthday party and does not want to return home on time. It is a case when "the battery gone dead" or he pushed "a wrong button"... Of course, this simple truth did no suit the Soviet "historians" so, with the dexterity which a seasoned card-sharper would envy substituted, they substituted the real fact of missing communications between the commanding echelons with the wittingly false fabrication of the "absence" in the Red Army of TECHNICAL MEANS of communications. For a stronger effect they also imposed on the light-minded superficial public the idea of the missing radio-communications ostensibly being the only technical means of communications. Surprisingly, the public swallowed even this hook without bait. For some reason nobody remembered that Napoleon, Suvorov and Kutuzov commanded huge armies not only without radio-communications but even without a simple wire connected telephone. For some reason everybody forgot that a signal camp-fire, a signal rocket, motor-bike, automobile, light airplane can be excellent communications means... Under the field book the infantry division defense corridor is 10-12 km (it is much narrower on the offensive). If we assume for the simplicity's sake that the division headquarters are located in the center of the battle order then the courier can reach either flank running in half an hour. On foot. With the motor-bike during this time, even on a very rugged landscape, he can make 3040 km, i.e., to get to the corps

headquarters. In the overwhelming majority of cases the division commander's orders and reports are issued at a much slower tempo than two times an hour, so there is no need here for a great speed of transmitting the information. Who would be running and what means can be used for driving? According to the organization chart of April, 1941 the nonintegrated infantry communications battalion had: 278 people; 6 saddle-horses; 3 motor-bikes; 3 armored automobiles; 1 car and 11 trucks. This is according to the organization chart. And what was in reality? We will not be counting horses but as of 15 June, 1941 the Red Army had 16,918 motor-bikes. As we see there were no particular problems with supplying each communications battalion in each of 179 infantry divisions with three motor-bikes. And with armored automobiles everything was in order. Only light armored automobiles BA-20, very good for a ride with a top important document under the enemy fire, were 1,899 before the war. On the average, six per each of the Red Army's 303 infantry, mechanized and tank divisions. Under the organization chart a mechanized corps included the corps squadron of U-2 and R-5 airplanes, the total of 15 (fifteen). The uniquely simple, reliable and cheap "puddle jumper" U-2 (Po-2), as is known, could take off and land on any forest glade and with all its low speed was still moving in space two-three times faster than the motor-bike. Of course, in a number of cases the information must be transferred under the "real time regime", without even a minute of delay. For instance, the communications between the firing position of the artillery battery, the observation and command posts in the artillery regiment must be continuous no curriers with packages are appropriate. For this reason the telephone with wires became the main communications medium in the XX-th century armies. Both wires and telephones were abundant in the Red Army. Specifically: 343,241 km of the telephone and 28,147 km of the telegraph cable. It was enough to circle the Earth on the equator 9 times. There were also 252,376 telephone apparatuses. On the average, more than 800 pieces per one division. A simple and cheap wire, beside all the other things, provides for incomparably better secrecy and noise protection than a radio-channel. The wire communications are very difficult (and with the technical means of the 1940's, practically impossible) to suppress with noise. And in order to eavesdrop on negotiations or use the wire communications for planting false information it would be necessary to send beyond the front line an intelligence-sabotage group, which is difficult, expensive and risky. After all, for this purpose (to monitor the status of wire communications channels, rapidly eliminate the breaks, install reserve lines therewith providing for continuous telephone communications) 278 communications personnel are serving in a division (i.e., on the front no greater than 10 15 km).

That said, the future belonged to radio-communications, and the Red Army began creating this "future" on an overwhelming scale. Under the organization chart, a regular infantry division (not a tank or mechanized rushing into the operative depth but a regular infantry, which must advance in the best case at a tempo of 10 km/day) had 153 radio-stations. One hundred and fifty three. In other words, even "miserable, pitiful" 10% of the full strength means in the absolute values 15 radio-stations per a division! Radio-stations are different. Some are on an armored train, some others in an automobile and others yet, in a horse-load or in a backpack. In April, 1941 a Red Army infantry division (for which the notorious "all Europe" had not yet begun working) was proposed to be equipped as follows. Three powerful automobilechassis-mounted radio-stations in the nonintegrated communications battalions they provide communications for the division's commander and headquarters. Three automobile radio-stations in the nonintegrated intelligence battalion, four in the artillery (howitzer) regiment and division's artillery headquarters. Altogether ten reasonably powerful radio-stations; on the eve of the war the 5- stations were mostly used. This radio-station had radius of 25 km for the telephone communications and 50 km, for the telegraph communications, thus liberally covering battle orders of the division and its neighbors. As of 1 January, 1941 the USSR's armed forces had 5,909 radio-stations 5- on average 20 per a division. Beside the powerful automobile-mounted radio-stations there were portable transmitters (RB, RBK, RBS, RBM) with capacity of 1 3 w and radius of 1015 km. As of 1 January, 1941 there were 35,617 such radio-stations. More than 100 radio-stations per one division. Under the organization chart, the howitzer regiment of an infantry division had to have 37 radio-stations per 36 howitzers. One portable radio-station per gun is clearly the "extremism" because the howitzers do not shoot one at a time. The minimum "molecule" of the artillery units and detachments was the battery (usually four guns). That was exactly the battery commander who received from the command and observation positions the information for conducting fire. A howitzer regiment included nine batteries, so that even the "miserable" 24% of the organization chart number mean in effect the radiocommunications availability for the artillery regiment commander with each battery commander. The infantry regiment had to have 18 radio-stations including 15 in the battalions. Complaints that the "Western SMD forces were only 58% provided with the battalion radio-stations" mean that each battalion (and this is 778 people and about 2 km of the defense corridor) actually had 8 portable radio-stations! The mechanized division according to the organization chart got 115 portable radio-stations (this number of course does not include the tank radio-stations), i.e., even fewer in total than the infantry division. But it got a much greater number of powerful truckmounted 5- radio-stations 36 units per a division! Of course, having planned (and provided to a significant extent) a completely phenomenal, for early 1940's, radio installation level at the division level the Red Army Command have not forgotten the operative link groupings (corps, army). To provide for the communications in this management echelon were developed the 11-

, RSB, RAF radio-stations. An RSB radio-station was installed on the truck chassis, had the radiation capacity of up to 50 w and provided for the telephone communications at 300 km, i.e., actually in the activity corridor of an army or even front. The RAF's were a much more powerful (400500 w) set of equipment transported by two ZIS-5 trucks. As of 1 January, 1941 the USSR armed forces have already have 1,613 units of RSB and RAF, i.e. on average 18 units per each (infantry or mechanized) corps. The memo on the mobilization plan MP-41 for some reason does not include the data about the predecessor of the RAF, a powerful (500 w) radio-station 11- although they were quite numerous in the forces. For instance, the Kiev SMD had as of 10 May, 1941 6 RAF's, 97 RSB's and 126 11 - radiostations. The RAT complex could be considered real technological miracle in 1941. Hugely powerful (1.2 kW), it provided for the telephone communications at a distance 600 km, and telegraph, up to 2,000 km. The transmitter could operate in 381 fixed communication frequencies with the automatic frequency tuning. The entire RAT equipment was transported on three ZIS-5 trucks; it was serviced by 17 people. There were 40 such complexes as of 1 January, 1941. In particular, the Kiev SMD had before the war 5 RAT complexes. This, of course, is very-very little. Why? Because under the mobilization plan MP-41 the Red Army was supposed to have 117 (one hundred and seventeen) RAT complexes. It is interesting, on how many fronts and on what continents did the MP-41 developers intend using them? The Red Army actually reached Berlin without ever having more than fifty RAT at one time... In total, without portable battalion and company link radio-stations, without tank radio-stations, Red Army had 7,566 radio-stations of all types. And that was as of 1 January, 1941. The life, however, did not stop on the first of January; the factories continued their "peaceful creative labor". The production plan for 1941 included the manufacturing of 33 radio-stations RAT, 940 RSB and RAF, 1,000 5-. I do not think anybody is capable of memorizing these numbers. But I would strongly advise to develop a useful habit o throwing into the garbage any article/book which begins the story of 22 June, 1941 with the wailing about "German saboteurs who cut all wires".

Chapter 9 THE MYSTERY! OF A SECRET!! SCENARIO!!!

Let us, however, go back to a "simple and hilarious" story about the brightest specimens of the newest historical "brain-having" as promised in the foreword. Not everything is as complex in this ruinous business as it may appear to the reader who climbed over the pile-up of the numbers in the preceding chapters. Some cookers are writing simply and with ease about the Great Mystery of June, 1941. For instance, a book was published in 2005 entitled: "Stalin. Secret "Scenario" of the beginning of the war" (Moscow, Olma-Press). To tell the truth, the book authors, retired spouses Ya.Verkhovsky and V.Tyrmos, said in one interview that they wanted a different title: "Amateurs against historians". Who would argue such sincerity and boldness in the self-evaluation stands to the authors' credit. The fact that the freedom of the press tenet suggests as a natural side effect, alas, a situation where the amateursgraphomaniacs are allowed to pull the public's leg is regretful but unavoidable. But this definitely weak book was included (again, if we want to believe the authors' statements) on some "list of the recommended reading" regularly sent by the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation to the governors and other state burocrats in high positions. This is very strange and interesting. This single circumstance made the "Secret scenario" into a mandatory item of our program. First of all, let us listen to how the authors themselves phrase in the page 224 the contents and the substance of the "secret scenario of the beginning of the war" they deciphered. I will quote a rather large fragment with the accurate observance of the style and orthography of the original: "...And today (they are talking about 20 March, 1941 M.S.) Stalin had already made his decision. The war with Germany, when it begins, will not begin under the scenario imposed by Hitler but under his own, Stalin's, "Scenario"... This "Scenario" will take into account that the last week, 11 March, 1941, a great historic event happened the United States of America entered the fight against Hitler! Last week the American Congress passed "the Lend-Lease Bill" under which the states subjected to Hitler's aggression may be able to receive military and economic assistance. Russia as well will have a chance to get this assistance but only in the case if it is not the attacking party but was subject of the attack itself. Russia has a chance to get the lend-lease if it becomes a VICTIM OF HITLER'S AGGRESSION! Only in a case it wages a just, liberating war against the aggressor! From that day on the much more cunning and subtle Stalin's BLUFF will be contrasted to Hitler's DISINFORMATION, the bluff intended to mislead the entire world, both enemies and friends, and the possessed Fuehrer, and the wisest Winston Churchill, and the smartest Franklin Roosevelt... From that day on and to the very "sudden attack" Stalin will pretend that he "does not believe" any intelligence reports... From that day on the resolutions will show up on the intelligence reports "Into the list of doubtful and disinformation information". Or even worse: "You may send your source to fucking mother".

Real passion was moving the hand of the retired spouses. The entire text is peppered with exclamation marks, sometimes three after a single word. The book has numerous chapters with the titles like: "3 hours 15 minutes remain to the "sudden attack"... "2 hours 45 minutes remain to the "sudden attack"... "15 minutes remain to the "sudden attack"... "5 minutes..." I know what you wish to say: "A delirium, certainly, but as a possible hypothesis, why not?..." No, my friends, this is no hypothesis. Not every balderdash has the right to be called a hypothesis. Indications of the qualitative difference between a bald scientific hypothesis and graphomanmiacal nonsense are the key element in the theory and practice of the fight against the "brain-having". That is why I need to dwell on this issue in some more detail. At seven in the morning on 30 June, 1908 an enormous explosion occurred over the desolate, wild taiga in the Podkamennaya Tunguska River area. About 80 million trees were uprooted within the circle with radius of 4050 km. This is the fact. Comets and meteors fly in the outer space. At least this is the view of most scientists (the minority believes that there is nothing in the world except illusions born from our consciousness). A suggestion that the forest was uprooted by a meteor or a comet blown up in Earth's atmosphere is a scientific hypothesis. The taiga area is very swampy in the catastrophe area. The swamps exude the combustible "swamp gas". A suggestion that the "Tunguska catastrophe" was caused by the explosion of a huge gas-air mix cloud ignited by the fragments of the meteorite entering the atmosphere is a scientific hypothesis. And so on... A suggestion that the mammoths are grazing in the Izmaylovo Park in Moscow as they are attracted there by the abundance of huge delicious cactuses is no scientific hypothesis. Why? Because there are no live mammoths in Moscow, there are no thickets of wild-growing cactuses in the Izmaylovo Park and no graminivorous animal can bite, chew and swallow a prickly cactus45. The people coming up with such a "hypothesis" must either provide a super-weighty proof of their rectitude (for instance, witness- and expert-supported video recording of the mammoths gorging on the cactuses against the background of Moscow streets) or be ready to meet with an attentive psychiatrist. There should be tertium non datur in a civilized society. Now we return to the "secret scenario" by Verkhovsky and Tyrmos. The lend-lease Law (Bill46) was officially called "An Act to promote the defense of the United States". It does not say anything about the "aggression", "victims of the aggression", "Hitler's aggression", etc. The Law gave the President of the United States the right to make unilateral without the approval by the Congress decisions of the transfer of armaments, ammunition and other military technology to the countries whose support is important for the defense of the USA. For the defense of the USA. No quixotic charitable goals, no quixotic "concern about widows and orphans" were included into the Law. The very wording "lend-lease" relates to a very specific financial side of the issue: the armament was transferred on conditions of
45

This is not accurate. Iguanas in the Galapagos do eat prickly cactuses. But of course it does not change the general statement; MG 46 A Bill is a proposed law. After it is adopted it becomes the Law, not Bill; MG

"lend-lease", which simply speaking meant: "Use it; if something remains after the war you well return it..." For many years before and after the adoption of the "lend-lease Law" the USA conducted active foreign policy, in particular, supplied American-made armaments to the belligerent parties. For instance, even before the adoption of the "lend-lease Law" the USA supplied combat aircraft to the air forces of China, France, England, Finland conducting active combat activities (the latter, incidentally, was at that time recognized by the League of Nations as the victim of aggression but Stalin's, not Hitler's). If we take France and England, the notorious "first round" was done by them: 4 September, 1939 the English aviation carried out a bomb strike on the German naval base in Wilgelmshaven; 9 September, 1939 9 divisions of the French army crossed the French-German border and began the offensive on Saarbrucken. Obviously, in making the decision of the political and military support to England and France in their war against Hitler's Germany the US President and Congress followed not a legal chicanery on the subject of "who shot first" but the evaluation of real objectives of the war and of real political interests of America. By-the-way, there was nothing particularly "earthshattering" in the adoption of the "lend-lease Law". The only thing the law did was untie the hands of President Roosevelt who could now make decisions without looking back to "isolationists" whose positions in the Congress were quite strong. The adoption of this law manifested a serious strengthening of Roosevelt's personal authority against the legislative branch. The law did not cause any radical changes in the USA foreign policies, and even more so did not become "the greatest historical event in the fight against Hitler". As for England and her Prime Minister W.Churchill, the American laws were in no way applicable to them. The readiness (or unpreparedness) of the American President to help the Soviet Union in the war against Hitler was not at all based (both legally and practically) on the bombastic outcries about a "just and liberating war against aggressor". In order to become a receiver of the lend-lease supplies Stalin had to become not a "VICTIM OF HITLER'S AGGRESSION" (unfortunately the capital letters do not convert a puny foolishness into a sensational "hypothesis") but an ally to America whose battleworthiness is important for the defense of the USA. Whether somebody may like it or not, the USA and Great Britain were in the middle of the XX century great democratic powers. The foreign policies of the legitimately elected authorities in these countries were based in ideals and interests. 4 July, 1941 in his radio address to the nation President Roosevelt said: "...It is, indeed, a fallacy, based on no logic at all, for any American to suggest that the rule of force can defeat human freedom in all the other parts of the world and permit it to survive in the United States alone. But it has been that childlike fantasy itself that misdirected faith which has led nation after nation to go about their peaceful tasks, relying on the thought, and even the promise, that they and their lives and their government would be allowed to live when the juggernaut of force came their way... And so it is that when we repeat the great pledge to our country and to

our flag, it must be our deep conviction that we pledge as well our work, our will and, if it be necessary, our very lives." I assume, moreover, I am quite certain that rank-and-file Americans in their conversations in the street or in the work place did not speak in such "grandiloquence". But unless these words were harmonious with the thoughts and feelings of most Americans Roosevelt would not have been elected four times President of the USA and 295 thousand Americans would not have given their lives on the fronts of World War II. With respect to the ideals of freedom and democracy both Hitler and Stalin were equally hated by the peoples and governments of England and the USA. For a long time already nobody cherished any illusions of the "new world" which was ostensibly being built behind GULAG's barbed wire. May it be not to the full extent but the information about ferocious repressions, about the horrors of dekulakization and famine genocide (golodomor), about mass executions and tortures crept beyond the "iron curtain" and caused in the West anger and indignation. As for the specific acts of Stalin's aggression (invasion of Poland in September of 1939, the attack on Finland in December of 1939, the annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the summer of 1940), they not only caused a wave of indignation in the society but also quite real actions by the England and USA governments. In particular, after the bombardment of residential neighborhoods in the Finnish cities President Roosevelt extended the requirements of the "moral embargo" (a voluntarycompulsory prohibition of supplies of the aviation technology to the aggressor countries) on the USSR; not without the participation by England and USA the Soviet Union was shamefully expelled from the League of Nations; not only refugees from the countries occupied by Stalin but also their "governments in exile" found asylum in London and Washington, etc. After what happened in 19391940, after the partition of the crushed Poland, which was demonstrably and insolently formalized by the "Treaty of friendship" between the two dictators, Stalin did not have any chance to come before "the wisest W.Churchill and smartest F.Roosevelt" as an innocent victim of the aggression. No "games" with the first shot at the border (which was officially called "the boundary of the mutual state interests of Germany and USSR in the territory of the former Polish state") could deceive not only "the wisest and smartest" but any normal person. "The plague on both your houses" was all any US citizen or a subject of His Majesty King could say with regards to the scuffle for the carve-up of the predatory loot between Stalin and Hitler regardless in what form this scuffle began. Churchill was not a man from the street so in the evening of 22 June, 1941 he found it necessary to say in his radio address: "...The Nazi regime is indistinguishable from the worst features of Communism. It is devoid of all theme and principle except appetite and racial domination. It excels in all forms of human wickedness, in the efficiency of its cruelty and ferocious

aggression. No-one has been a more consistent opponent of Communism than I have for the last twenty-five years. I will unsay no words that Ive spoken about it..."47 At this point the ideals ended and interests began. With the interests everything was even simpler, clearer and more unambiguous. Not even trying to compete in the precision and brightness of expressions with the Nobel Prize winner for literature W.Churchill, I'll quote several more phrases from his speech: "But now I have to declare the decision of His Majesty's Government - and I feel sure it is a decision in which the great Dominions will, in due course, concur - for we must speak out now at once, without a day's delay. I have to make the declaration, but can you doubt what our policy will be? We have but one aim and one single, irrevocable purpose. We are resolved to destroy Hitler and every vestige of the Nazi regime. From this nothing will turn us - nothing. We will never parley, we will never negotiate with Hitler or any of his gang. We shall fight him by land, we shall fight him by sea, we shall fight him in the air, until with God's help we have rid the earth of his shadow and liberated its peoples from his yoke. Any man or state who fights on against Nazidom will have our aid. Any man or state who marches with Hitler is our foe... It follows, therefore, that we shall give whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian people... He wishes to destroy the Russian power because he hopes that if he succeeds in this, he will be able to bring back the main strength of his army and air force from the East and hurl it upon this Island, which he knows he must conquer or suffer the penalty of his crimes. His invasion of Russia is no more than a prelude to an attempted invasion of the British Isles... The Russian danger is therefore our danger, and the danger of the United States, just as the cause of any Russian fighting for his hearth and home is the cause of free men and free peoples in every quarter of the globe... Yes, there are plentiful emotions here but a cold calculation resulted in the same conclusions. In the spring of 1941 England balanced at the edge of a precipice. Since August, 1940 through May, 1941 German bombers destroyed 84,000 buildings in London alone. The last (although that was known to nobody at the time) massive air attack of the English capital took place on 10 May, 1941. Churchill so describes it in his memoirs: "More than two thousand fires flared in the city, and we could not put them out because the bombers destroyed about 150 water-mains. Five docks and over 70 important objects were damaged, most of them factories. All major railway terminals except for one were put out of commission for several weeks, and the trunk lines were completely open for traffic only in the beginning of June. More than 3 thousand people were killed and wounded..." The most terrible raids in Manchester occurred 23 and 24 December, 1940. In two days (or rather in two nights) 2,500 people were killed and 100 thousand were left without a roof over their heads. In the night on 14 November, 1940, 449 Luftwaffe
47

This and the following excerpt from Churchill's speeches are originals, not translations from Russian; MG

bombers erased the city of Coventry from the face of the earth. Huge damage was incurred in Birmingham, Liverpool, Sheffield, Bristol, Southampton... Altogether, close to one million buildings were destroyed in the country. Total casualties were 43 thousand killed and 51 thousand badly wounded. But the main threat to the very existence of England was not in the air, it lurked under water. England is an island. For nine centuries this circumstance was a valuable gift from the destiny as it protected the people of the Isles against the invading hordes of foreign intruders. In the XXth century this industrial country, the "workshop of the world" could not provide her factories with raw materials, her people with foods and her transport with fuel without continuous supply of huge amounts of cargo by sea ways. The German submarines sank British transport ships, and nobody could be certain at that time for how long would England's building yards be able to compete with the destruction activities of the German submariners. "England lost this war. With the desperation of a drowner it is grasping every straw which can in her eyes be the anchor of salvation... After the destruction of France in general after the liquidation of all their West-European positions the British war mongers cast all their glances to where they tried to start the war: to the Soviet Union". These are the lines from a letter which Hitler 21 June 1941 sent to his main sidekick Mussolini. This letter (contrary to the quoted speeches by Roosevelt and Churchill) was not in the least intended for the propaganda purposes, Hitler indeed hoped that he would be able to put a final squeeze on England soon". Was there any doubt in these conditions of what "the decision of His Majesty's Government" will be? Could have this decision depended on who shot the first round in the first day of the Soviet-German war? Did Churchill have any other option? Could he have done whatever was available to him in order for this war, salutary for England, once begun would last as long as possible to weaken both dictatorships even further? Could have the rigid and ferocious political logic based on fundamental life interests of the British Empire changed because of such nonsense as newspaper blabber about the "attacking party", "liberation war" and all these? And could have a great cynic Stalin not understood this simplest arithmetic? The America's situation as it was separated from the European tyrants by huge oceanic expanses did not cause great alarm from the first sight. Roosevelt could analyze the situation deliberately and in measured way, without "grasping every straw. But practically he also did not have any other options except for those that have been implemented in reality. The right answer begins with a right question. The right question in this situation is: "What was a greater threat to America, the Soviet Union occupied by Germany or Germany occupied by the Soviet Union?" To me, the answer is quite obvious. We have already seen the "Germany occupied by the Soviet Union". It was called German Democratic Republic, she was a threat only for herself and eventually, being unable to sustain this threat, she surrendered to the tender mercies of the winning West. We will note in parentheses that a rather high level of Stalin's military economy reached by 1941 was based on mass purchases (thievery) of the western technology and licenses during the 1930th. In the absence of this suicidal myopia of

the western leaders the Red Army would have come to the threshold of the world war as the "Red Khmers", with rifles and hoes. Luckily for the humankind, nobody had to see the Soviet Union occupied by Hitler. One would shudder even to think of what might have happened in the case of merging the colossal raw materials, industrial and human resources of the USSR (and if somebody forgot, it was not only Russia but also the Ukraine, TransCaucasus, Central Asia, Kazakhstan) with the organizational, managerial and science-technology resources of the Hitler's Germany. Even without all these additional resources, even at the state of war with the Soviet Union, Great Britain and USA, even suffocating of the raw materials shortage and under the hailstorm of the allied aviation bombs, Germany in the end of 1944 had: medium-range ballistic rockets on mass production; jet fighters and turbo-jet engines on mass production; anti-ship guided missiles on mass production; on-board aviation radars on mass production; at different stages of the experimental development were surface-to-air missiles, heat-seeking caps, two-stage ballistic rocket capable of reaching New York, several prototypes of medium- and long-range jet bombers, and at last a serious scientific and industrial potential ("heavy water", high-speed centrifuges) allowing for the start of creating the nuclear weapon. It is worth noticing that developing and starting to mass-produce the technical wonders which were many years ahead of the time, the Germans did not forget about the continuous upgrading of the mass armament systems. A first serial "Messerschmitt" Me-109 was produced in 1937 with the Jumo-210D engine (take-off capacity 680 hp). The K-series "Messer" in the fall of 1944 had the "Daimler-Benz" DB-605AS engine with the methane-hydrogen injection device and the capacity of 2,030 hp. In 7 years (1937 through 1944) the engine capacity of the most common Luftwaffe fighter exactly tripled! And what was going on in our places? All Yakovlev fighters, from the first experimental I-26 to the most advanced Yak-3, fought through the war with the engine -105. Only in 1944 the -105 PF-2 capacity was "dragged" to 1,240 hp (compared to the starting capacity 1,050 hp). And this turned to be the limit of the Soviet engine-building achievements. With the same -105 engine fought the entire war the most mass-produced Soviet bomber P-2. All attempts to "get into shape" -106 and -107 ended up in failure... This is an obvious and uncontestable fact that the efficiency of the criminal and fanatical Hitler regime was much higher than the efficiency of the criminal and fanatical Stalin regime. Had Hitler's hopes for a quick destruction of the Red Army materialized, than such a whopping monster would have emerged over the huge

expanses from the Atlantic to Kamchatka, which could gobble America up without even gagging. The wisest Roosevelt could not but see this threat so he was helping Stalin to the last day of his life. Let us return, however, to our mammoths and cactuses. VerkhovskyTyrmos version is against any logic but could it be they were able to find some direct incontestable proof of their correctness? After all, some fundamental positions of the quantum mechanics (such as "wave-particle dualism", "uncertainly principle") are totally incompatible with a simple everyday logic, which still does not prevent the lasers from operating. Let us ask the next correct question: "What could be a direct and incontroversial proof that Stalin, secretly from everybody, secretly from the top Red Army command, without leaving a single written document nurtured some secret plans?" Do you feel, the esteemed reader, what a great power is contained in a right question? It immediately is directing us to the right answer: a spiritualistic sance. The only way to find out what and about what he was thinking in June of 1941 is to evocate the spirit of the dead Joseph Dzhugashvili. Did the authors of the "secret scenario" conduct a spiritualistic sance? I hope not. With what then did they fill up 600 pages of their book? "I don't like living at the Douglas widow", used to say a young vagabond Heck Finn to his friend Tom Sawyer. "Everything in her house is cooked separately, and besides one is forced to eat with a knife and fork. No taste, no pleasure. The scraps in a garbage bin are so much better when you stir them properly and they become saturated with a juice..." (I am quoting from memory and in advance apologizing to the spirit of Mark Twain for possible discrepancies). Although one of the "secret scenario's" two authors is a woman, the book was cooked not under the "Douglas widow rules" but the Heck Finn's receipt. The narration and substantiation of the authors' version takes no more than one percent of the text; no - and I emphasize it no direct evidence, documents, etc., in support of this version is included. The book is replete (I dare to assume, with the assistance of the computer mouse) by the intelligence reports, memoir fragments, quotations from documents, lengthy reflections, and all these have not even the slightest cause and effect association with the point the authors sort of intended to prove. I stress it again: there could not have been any association because conspirology (i.e., explaining grandiose historical events by a conspiracy theory which nobody but its author-trail blazer knows anything about) versions are not provable by definition. But maybe the book is useful if only in that it accumulated under one cover numerous documental materials not well known to the mass reader? That was what I was thinking during the first half hour. But then, terrified, I dropped the plump contraption on the floor. The text of course does not include any references to the sources. It appears the authors do not have a clear understanding of the difference between the materials of "journalistic investigations", V.Karpov's style, and a document with the precise archive address. I am OK in that I read many times all real documents placed for some reason in the "secret scenario", I recognize them and exactly because of this I notice if unvarnished gaga appears among the documents.

And what this very "mass reader" is supposed to do? For him the reading of Verkhovsky Tyrmos graphomaniacal opus is the same as walking on the thin ice: the snow is sparkling under the sun, and it is hard to understand where there is strong support under the snow and where is air-hole slightly drawn over with a thin ice film. The saddest thing, however is that with all attempts of the sensationalism, the book recreates with depressing completeness so painfully familiar myths of the Soviet historiography: the intelligence reported accurately, Hitler's secrets immediately flied on Stalin's desk, Stalin himself did not even think of any aggression, the Soviet Union entered the war not in September of 39th but in June of 41st, the war in the west at that time maybe already ended or maybe did not even begin, Stalin "was afraid to give a pretext" and only here at last some novelty appears. The classical Soviet version said that "Stalin was afraid to give Hitler a pretext for an invasion". Under the version of the authors' "secret scenario", Stalin was afraid to give Roosevelt a pretext not to provide lend-lease to Stalin. And was it worth because of that... At that moment the telephone rang. Whatever you wish - you may believe or not, you may treat it as a cheap literary trick but at that moment, late at night of a Monday, 28 January, 2008 the telephone rang on my desk. I cannot tell you I like very much the calls close to midnight but I picked the phone. "Turn immediately on "the Echo of Moscow, yelled the handset, some pretzel there is baking suuuuuch things..." I remembered that on Mondays the "Echo" had the program "The Price of Victory" (I also was on that program a few times in the past), and I pushed the button on my magnitola48... And froze in place - with the extended hand and hair standing on end... "the pretzel was baking, and baking he was... "How" he was doing it was no less expressive than "what" he was baking: disconnected, confused speech, incomprehension of the questions and absence of any logic in the replies... In about ten minutes I was tired. I have already understood the gist of the next "sensational discovery" and it was the time to come back to Chapter 9 when all of a sudden from the speakers sounded a phrase about a "Documentry" already filmed (!!!) on the script of the "discoverer". That I did not understand. To publish a book is simple. For the money a printing office would print anything. Having spent miserable two to three thousand bucks you may start presenting to your friends and former classmates a book with your name on the hard cover. A film is a totally different story... No, I am not about the "documentary nature", no problem here: our viewer is not spoiled, he may be shown -80 which is called Pz-I. The problem is money; the film production takes it greater by three order of the magnitude. "Who gave it to him?" I was thinking; I turned the radio off and went on the Internet. And when I found out who was financing the spread of this delirium I understood that the time came to write next chapter.

48

Magnitola is a residential device combining radio-receiver and magnitofon. It appears from the text that the author's also had a TV; MG

Chapter 10 BRIEFS, LONG JOHNS and FACC49

It turns out that what I assumed to be a senile delirium was, in the words of the President, College of the military experts (???), PhD in the political sciences Major General A.Vladimirov, "different not only in its absolutely new and unusual work hypothesis but also in the amount of almost exhaustive information and diligent documentation of the work...". It turns out that "this bright and unusual hypothesis provided an opportunity to win the competition for the creation of the movie "The mystery of 22 June" conducted by the Federal agency for the cinematography and culture within the subject "Beginning of the Great Patriotic war in the light of new historical studies". That is "the bright and unusual hypothesis" was already recognized by FACC (one would assume, of course, as a result of an open public competition where the word "kick-back" was used only as a technical term in the designing of the artillery systems) as the most outstanding achievement of "new historical studies". So outstanding that the money from the federal budget has to be spent right away for its popularization. And here is the view of the book publisher, Director General, "Vremya" publishing house mister B.N.Pasternak: "... This, in my view, is a sensational book. Alexander Osokin is a dilettante historian but sometimes such breakthroughs come from dilettantes which are very valuable. He was puzzled for many years and continued working on the mystery of the first day of the war trying to find answers to his questions... and he, in my view, dug deep and created this new version of the beginning of the war, answered plenty o questions. I have already spoken with several historians (eh, wouldn't it be nice to find out their names! M.S.), they spread their hands and say: "The deuce knows, maybe he is right indeed." "You mean he is basing [his hypothesis; MG] on some documents, which he dug out?" naive corresponded is naively asking. "Yes, of course, answers Mister Pasternak without turning a hair. Half of the book is such a beautiful, I would say, photo-investigation. He takes all photographs of those years and assiduously studies them: who are those people, who are on the right, who are on the left. There is a whole pad of photographs. I believe this is a sensation... " Now, what questions, what "mysteries of the first day of war" was it possible to solve scrutinizing: "who are on the right, who are on the left". The answer is in the abstract to the book: "The mystery of the first day of the Great Patriotic war has not been solved to this day. Why did Stalin so blindly trusted Hitler and ignored the flow of warnings of the approaching beginning of the war. (How do you like this question, the esteemed
49

FACC (Russian ) is Federal Agency for Culture and Cinematography; MG

reader?) Why did the Soviet border units not have shells and fuel? Why did the country learn about the war only after eight hours of continuous bombing? Why were the soldiers in several Red Army detachments dispensed briefs instead of the regulation long johns? There are numerous versions but not a single one until now gave intelligible answer to hundreds of such questions. Alexander Osokin put forward one more version, improbable from the first sight, turning on their heads all previous ideas. But this improbability is illusory. If one reads the documents carefully, estimates wittiness of the hypothesis and diligence of the analysis, the version acquires the nature of epiphany which is impossible to ignore either today or in the future". Epiphany which is impossible to forget (at least to me) is relayed in the book by .Osokin "The great mystery of the Great Patriotic" (Moscow, "Vremya", 2007). "Osokin Alexander Nikolayevich, born in 1939, graduated from the Ryazan radio-technical institution, is working in the radio-industry. A corresponding member of the RF Academy of the electrotechnical sciences (what this is I have no idea; I know the "International Academy of the Informatization" it is the former "Moscow city inquiry office"; electrotechnical sciences it is probably a secret knowledge of why the stores do not carry either washing machines or irons, fans or wall outlets manufactured in Russia), Director, Information strategy Department (sure, that is not a cleaning sub-department!) of the "Phazotron-NIIR" corporation. Author of numerous magazine and newspaper publications on the history of the Russian aviation and aviation radars". The sensational version boils down to this: the Red Army (including, note it, the forces of the Kiev and Odessa districts) was concentrated at the western border of the USSR in order for, in compliance with the most secret agreement between Hitler and Stalin, alight the railway cars and go to the shores of La Manche. What for? Simply, Watson, for the invasion of England. As a reciprocal courtesy Stalin allowed the German forces to transit through the Soviet Union territory to Iran and farther to the Near East... What for would those go here, and these - there? "There was a clear understanding in Germany that the Anglo-Saxons are brothers, and it would be easier for the Germans if the Slavs, rather than they, fought the Anglo-Saxons." Here, of course, a first mistie showed up: in Iran the Germans would be fighting either AngloSaxons or the Persians who are exactly the most genuine, primordial Arians... The causes of a catastrophic Red Army defeat in the summer of 1941 .Osokin explains so: because of the cunning intrigues by Churchill, the plan of the Soviet-German military cooperation collapsed; Germans leaped (already in the USSR territory) out of the trains with submachine-guns and with "the sleeves rolled-up" (the latter circumstance Mr. Osokin especially noted in his presentation with the "Echo"); the Red Army turned out without ammunition because under the secret Stalin Hitler collusion it was ordered to go to La Manche without the bullets and shells;

 the fortified area at the old (this is not a typo at the old) border were disarmed under the same secret agreement (how they hindered the ride to La Manche .Osokin does not explain). The most interesting is "the rigorous documental substantiation of the work", which in the total absence of references to the sources a General, PhD and VicePresident of the military experts managed to discover. Mr. Osokin warns honestly that there are no and cannot be any documents as the secret swap between Hitler and Stalin was kept secret from everybody (even Beria did not know anything about it). Correspondingly, not only any available documents do not include any mention of the "mutual ping-pong transit" plans but they are "intentionally doctored" in order to camouflage the very presence of such plans. No traces of the bloody plan can be found and can be present in any of earlier published memoirs of the Soviet and German Generals as they knew nothing... The long and the short of it is that we have here a chemically pure sample of a conspiracy theory, at that the conspiracy theory brought to a clearly clinical level. In the society of the sane people such texts may be only held in a very restricted clinical record. It is no laughing matter, the official statistical data say that 3.8 million people in Russia are suffering with mental disorders requiring continuous observation in the psychoneurological health centers; 14 million people need regular psychiatric help (it is 10% of the population). The WHO estimate is that this number should be doubled. In the recent ten years, the number of citizens recognized as invalids with mental diseases increased by 50%. And what would you think - is it easy to live in the "epoch of changes"? It is just that a miserable sick person who in the "stagnation epoch" had to restrict himself with a letter to the trade union committee and district executive committee with the request "to put behind the bars a neighbor who every night irradiates me with radiation" now got incomparably broader opportunities to implement his information strategies... So I was thinking plodding along in the snow banks (it was impossible to drive because of the unusual snow fall) to the doors of the book-store. But after I took the Osokin's book (incidentally, printed on the gorgeous snow-white paper) in my hands and ran my eyes over several pages my view sweepingly changed. No, this "dilettante historian" is not a simpleton at all! If the book of fiery retirees Verkhovsky Tyrmos all peppered with exclamation marks and two foot size capital letters, the fiery delirium of the "Great mystery" is carefully roped-in with the protection constructions of "possibly", "could not be excluded", "probably", "there is some information", "it may be assumed", "a number of writers believe"... That is, whereas Verkhovsky Tyrmos (and a legion of the similar enthusiasts) hurry to share their "discovery" with the public, the discovery which they piously believe is genuine, the falsifier Osokin is clearly implementing the "information strategies" of the psychological warfare. The main rule in this dirty business is known for a long time: "Don't lie!" It is categorically forbidden to lie. The bumpkin should deceive HIMSELF.

You remember of course as the market in the early 1990's was splashed with an avalanche of home electronics with the lettering Panasonic, Sony, JWC... and when the customer who shed not a small money for a "soap-box" of unknown origin ran back, all in tears and snot, and asked the seller to return his money he was met with a stern reprimand: "Why the noise? Who lied to you? Did we lie to you? We did not sell a Panasonic to you, that were you, idiot, who decided that he bought a Panasonic from us... This is exactly how .Osokin's book is constructed: "...It is quite possible that Hess did not fly anywhere but was abducted by the English intelligence in order to split Stalin and Hitler and disrupt the joint landing operation... A possibility should not be excluded that Hess came to England with a proposal of the joint combat activities against the USSR and, possibly, trying to convince the English he told them about the agreement by the USSR to conduct, together with Germany, the landing in England. The information flicked recently that one of the nine copies of the "Barbarossa" was held in Hess' safe; it cannot be excluded that he had the total plan of the Third Reich's military actions... It is quite possible that, having understood the danger of such development for England Churchill duped the Germans, signed this treaty and sent it to Hitler..." What is he saying? Here is the exact translation of this paragraph into Russian: "Dick knows, maybe there was, maybe there was not, possibly, could have been". In no court could Churchill's inheritors sue Mr. Osokin for the slander. But in combination with excellent paper, hard cover, solid size and weight, with the foreword from an expert in political sciences this graphomaniacal opus may acquire in the eyes of an impressionable reader "the nature of epiphany". And we have 3.8 million of excessively impressionable people (the book run was 3 thousand copies, not enough for everybody; they will have to sign up in a line from the morning...). Strategically, A.Osokin's book is worked out correctly: a totally unsubstantiated "hypothesis" is sold at the price of "epiphany", the required amount of foul hints about English and Churchill "that is at fault that everything turned this way" are nailed into the reader's subconscious. For January of 2008 a very timely book! But... " There is someone I know. I do not know in what subject He was a conisseur; though he speaks sternly But devil carries him away to judge about the society: He should try to judge about boots"50. Everything would be OK if Mr. Osokin did not even try to discuss specific things with numbers, dates, names. That is where horror of horrors begins.
50

A piece of a brief Pushkin's poem, "The Cobbler"; MG . , , :

Both in the book and in the interview on the radio (even two times there, in 40 minutes) .Osokin maintains that "in Churchill's book about the Second World war, for which he became a Nobel Prize winner in literature, the word "Hess" is never mentioned". Who has he to be to lie so? In Churchill's "Second World war" the name of Hitler's deputy for the Nazi party, Reichs-Minister "without portfolio" Hess is not only present but is even included in the title of the entire chapter! The description of Hess' flight to England (strictly speaking, Scotland) takes seven pages (Part 3, pg. 28 35), the ill-fated name "Hess" is mentioned there 29 times! How many times the name "Hess" is mentioned in the entire multi-volume book - I don't know. I'll let the Director of the Information strategy Department himself count it. For some reason Osokin undertook it to discuss the correlation of forces between Germany and the USSR in tanks. What connection it may have with the "bright and unusual hypothesis" about "mutual ping-pong transit" of the forces unclear. But as a result Osokin had to deal with numbers, not with wild fantasies. And what happened with it? "The Germans had 990 medium tanks (over 20 t) and the Red Army had 1,373, including 892 advanced -34 and 481 -40". -40 is not a medium and even not a light tank, it is light floating whippet of 5.5 tons (only about 160 of them were manufactured by the beginning of the war). Maybe a typo? -50, -60, -70 are similar in writing. The last two are light tanks; their manufacturing began just several months after the beginning of the war. Tank -50 passed into service in April, 1941, several dozens were manufactured by the beginning of the war, by the end of 1941, just 50 of them. But this is also not a medium but a light tank, the combat mass of 13.8 ton. What means "481 medium tanks -40" guess if you can. .Osokin likes floating tanks. In his view they are very good for a landing operation over La Manche. The author of the "sensational epiphany" does not know yet that the light intelligence whippets -37 / -38 were "floating" only in that they could on the march, not wasting time looking for a ford or a bridge, cross a forest rivulet. And not any at that but only the one with low-angle shores (a caterpillar amphibia has a great difficulty in getting from the water onto the shore as the traction between the caterpillars and the river bottom is weakened by the Archimedes "buoyancy force" but the screw prop thrust is infufficient for climbing the shore). La Manche, albeit the English call it the "channel", is a sea strait 35150 km wide. Crossing La Manche is a marine landing operation, it is not the crossing of a river, may it be the widest in the world. It is only in the "documentary" made on the motifs of .Osokin's delirium that a terrible scene is possible of the flotilla of tiny "steel turtles" floating and sinking among the raging sea waves... Besides, what would they be doing on the England's shore? A light (3.3 t) machine was armed with the machinegun, and its thin armor could be broken through, both flanks, from any antitank gun. But Osokin is not afraid of bold hypotheses so he is writing:

"...In any case, Hitler did not have enough landing craft, no floating tanks, very few airborne forces. All these Stalin had in huge amounts: cargo ships, floating tanks: from 1931 through 1939, 7,309 whippets and floating tanks -27, -37 and -38 were manufactured in the USSR. By the beginning of the Patriotic war the Red Army had operational 5,836 such machines (exactly: if to floating -37/38 are added 2,376 whippets -27, which never in their lives were floating). That is why, most likely, exactly after the signing at the Berlin negotiations of November, 1940 of a secret agreement about the USSR participation in the landing on the British Isles tank and mechanized groupings with floating tanks began coming into the border areas of the USSR..." And it is modest. .Osokin neglected to mention the most numerous units "with floating tanks", the infantry divisions. The floating tank in the Red Army was the standard equipment in the intelligence battalions of infantry and mechanized divisions (one company of floating tanks, total of 17 machines, per division). Thus, practically any Red Army division could be included among the "groupings with floating tanks"! Extending Osokin's logic, the intention most likely was to sail in the floating tanks into Japan. Because exactly on the Far-Eastern front (that is true, it was called "front" at the time of peace) the groupings of floating tanks were unusually numerous. For instance, 34th and 69th infantry divisions of the Far-Eastern front had 44 tanks -37 each, and the 37th division, 38 tanks -37... But let us not be too stringent. Mister Osokin has the right not to be a tank expert; after all, he is the "author of numerous magazine and newspaper publications on the history of the Russian aviation". Was there the support for the "bright and unusual hypothesis" in the skies? Of course. That is exactly what .Osokin is writing: "...Several facts supporting our guess: our advanced fighters MiG-3 had ceiling of 7 km. However, not German but English bombers were flying at this altitude". In an article of 21 June, 2007 in the newspaper "Vremya novostey51" and announcing the publication of the book (the newspaper and the publishing office are components of the same Publishing house), .Osokin elaborated on the subject. So to speak, raised "MiG's" ceiling: "...Another notable fact: in 19401941 mass production of the advanced fighter MiG-3 unfolded in the USSR on the order from Stalin; the fighter was intended for most effective combat at the altitude of 7 9 kilometers. However, at that time not German but English bombers were flying at that altitude. By the beginning of the war 1,400 MiG-3 were produced and only 400 and 300 respectively of YaK-1 and LaGG-3 whose specialization was the destruction of German bombers, only 400 and 300, respectively". Horrible. One type of the fighters for English bombers and a different one, for German bombers. As in the best houses of Philadelphia: tweezers for lobster, a spatula for caviar, special fork for the oisters, three-prong fork for fish...52 and the main thing: where is the cause and effect connection? Let us assume that YaK-1 and LaGG-3 are better for "the destruction of German bombers" than MiG-3. Let us believe it for a second. And what? In the second half of 1941, did MiG production
51 52

"Time for the news"; MG A reference to the social/humosristical novel "Twelve Chairs" by Ilf and Petrov. MG

stopped after Germany became the enemy and England, an ally? Nothing of the kind. Manufactured: 2,211 of MiG-3, 2,141 of LaGG-3, 877 of YaK-1. The plan for the first quarter of 1942: 1,570 LaGG-3, 1,200 MiG-3, 785 YaK-1. As we see, huge numbers of the "anti-English MiG-3" are still being manufactured, and the best of this "trinity" and eventually the most numerous Soviet Yakovlev fighter is firmly in the third place. The key is very simple. The aircraft production was defined by the capacity of the manufacturing plants but the order distribution between the factories was determined by a fierce competition between the "firms" and by their nomenklatura sponsors. The main "prize" in this struggle was the largest and oldest in Russia Moscow aircraft factory No1 (now called "Progress", in Samara; it was and still is manufacturing all rockets-carriers for the space ships). The brother of the Politburo member Comrade Mikoyan got this factory. And huge production capacity of this factory No 1 unmatched by any other factory made MiG-3 into the most mass-produced fighter of the Soviet Airforce on the eve of the war. After long ordeal with the furniture factories (this is almost no joke) the Lavochkin fighter was given to the second in capacity Gorky aircraft factory No 21. The result was a huge increase in the number of the produced aircraft; early in 1942 this exceptionally unsuccessful fighter (it was called on the front "Lacquered Guaranteed Coffin"53) became the production leader. But young deputy to the Narkom of the aviation industry Yakovlev, although well received by the Master himself, initially got only the new-born Saratov aircraft factory No 292... In terrible for the country December of 1941 Stalin sent to Kuybyshev his renowned telegram: "...The IL-2 aircraft are needed now to the Red Army as air, as bread... I ask you not to put the Government out of patience; I demand to produce more IL's. This is my last warning". A few lines written in the mad fever of the battle for Moscow drew the line under the MiG-3 program. Three huge factories: the Moscow No 1, the Voronezh No 18 and the Moscow aircraft-motor factory No 24 (evacuated to Kuybyshev) turned into a huge production complex for manufacturing IL-2. And the MiG-3 production at the factory No 1 was instantaneously folded down and not resumed anywhere else because the motor factory No 24 also folded down the production of high-altitude engines AM-35/37 and was producing during the entire war -38 for the divebombers (total number of "ILs" manufactured during the war was 35,668, which is the absolute world record in the production of one type of combat aircraft). Everything I told you above could have been read 20 to 30 years ago in any magazine like "Young model-maker-designer" (if only without the mention of the "court intrigues"). It was not worth it to invent special anti-England and antiGerman" fighters. But as an old reader of the aforementioned magazine I would like to emphasize the brightest detail of the aviation discovery (and also of the professional knowledge) of Mr. Osokin.
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(L) (G) (G); MG

7,000; 9,000; 8,000; 7,700; 5,500; 5,200; 8,200 meters. These are "static ceilings" elevations (maximum elevations of the continuous horizontal flight) of the most mass-produced medium-range and long-range bombers in the beginning of World War II (high-velocity and short-range bombers in this case are of no interest to us as even not every long-range bomber could reach from England to the nearest point of the USSR). Striking in this list (H-111, DB-f, Ju-88, Italian SM-79, French LeO45) are two "small numbers" 5,500 and 5,200 meters. This is the ceiling of two English bombers: the main (and the only by the beginning of the war) twin-engine "Wellington" and a first in the series of the English four-engine bombers "Stirling". Yes, that is what happened: the ENGLISH bombers were the most low-altitude among all their contemporaries! Incidentally, this fact has a very rational explanation but I do not intend to lead you now in the technical thicket. I am interested in something else. 9,500: 11,000; 10,000; 9,900; 10,000; 10,120; 10,350; 10,500 meters. These are "static ceiling" elevations of the most mass-produced fighters in the beginning of World War II (LaGG-3, MiG-3, YaK-1, I-16, French MS-406, English "Hurricane" and "Spitfire", German -109). MiG-3 was indeed the most high-altitude (plus speediest) fighter of its time. But the "ceiling" of any fighter was sufficient to intercept any enemy bomber. Any fighter. The problem was not with the technical parameters but with the application tactics (continuous fighter vigil in the air is extremely expensive, the discovery of a high-altitude target is almost impossible without radar, the takeoff on alarm results in that the fighter does not have time to gain the altitude needed for the interception). So, no careful study of the MiG-3 and YaK-1 ceiling can discover at this ceiling any anti-English trend, and especially in view that only from his own ceiling [from his own wall] Mr. Osokin could get the plan of the joint Stalin-Hitler invasion of England (and particularly the one scheduled precisely for June of 1941). Some of his mega-conclusions Mr. Osokin makes based on such tremendous megastupidities that I just don't know whether I should laugh or cry. "I discovered in Halder's diary, this is the chief of land force in the General Headquarters, so under the 3 July entry he is writing such thing: at the top "12th day of the war with Russia", and at the bottom it is written "therefore in the 14 th day of the Eastern campaign...". I raise my eyes, I look again: "12th day" and "in the 14th day of the Eastern campaign". Do you understand? The Eastern campaign and the war with Russia according to Halder are different things. So what happened during these two days? This is it, these two days the trains were running both ways..." Let us not weep. Let us lower our eyes to the book "Military diary" of F.Halder and read (unless you memorized by heart this fragment quoted hundreds of times): "... In general it may be stated now that the task of crushing the main forces of the Russian land army in front of Western Dvina and Dnieper is accomplished. I consider as correct the statement of one of the captured corps commander that east of Western Dvina and Dnieper we may encounter resistance only from individual

groups, which, taking their size in the account, won't be able to seriously hinder the German force offensive. Because of this it would not be an exaggeration to state that the campaign against Russia was won in 14 days (emphasis added. M.S). Of course, it is not finished yet. Huge size of the territory and dogged resistance of the enemy using all means will be shackling our forces for many more weeks..." Where is "in the 14th day of the Eastern campaign" here? Which "trains running both ways"? On the 3rd of July Halder was in a good mood (it got drastically worse just in a couple of weeks); he certainly did not set any precise dates of the war ("campaign") end but recorded in his diary his personal estimate of the situation: "The main thing is already behind us, the main enemy forces are crushed although the end-beating will take forces and time". It is just stupidity to search in this context the secret sense of mentioning "14 days" in the 12th day of the war. With the same success Halder could have expressed the same thought by saying that the war was won in 10 days, two weeks, 20 days... I categorically refuse to discuss the mega-idea that the substitution of the briefs for long johns is a necessary component in the preparation of the landing operation across La Manche. I consider insulting and obscene even the smallest hint that it is allowable to rush into Poland and Slovakia in long johns only. Such hints are incompatible with multi-century traditions of the friendship between the Slavic peoples, with Russian folk tales (Ivan-the czarevich did not woo in long johns even the frog), with Pushkin's creative heritage ("There is no girl in the world more beautiful than a Polish maid. Joyful as a kitten next to the stove. And as a rose she is rouge, as a sour cream she is white. The eyes are gleaming as two candles...")54. Seriously, Hitler was missing three things for the invasion (i.e., the marine landing operation through La Manche): air superiority, dominance at sea albeit locally (in the landing area), amphibious ferriage. And that was all. It may be worth to fine-tune some quantitative parameters. 6 June, 1944, in the first day of the allied forces landing in Normandy, La Manche was crossed in 4,126 landing barges, 864 transport ships. The landing flotilla was protected by 1,200 combat ships. The allied aviation made 6 June 14,000 sorties. Two floating ports were tugged to the seized foot-holds and a trunk gasoline pipeline was laid on La Manche's floor. These are exactly the "trifles" which Hitler was missng for the defeat of Britain. He had everything else. German land army had the overwhelming advantage over England in the number of divisions, in the number of tanks and in the level of combat training. If 156 Wehrmacht divisions (and a few dozen thousand railway cars of ammunition in addition!) could have magically transported to the British Isles, the Brits would have to perish they could not win. But Germans were unable to solve even the task number one, the task of gaining the air supremacy over La Manche. They were even farther away from the capacity to solve two other problems. Neither one nor one hundred Red Army divisions on the
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. . , , . ,

French coast of La Manche could by one iota narrow the distance between Hitler and his desired goal. He could even have piled up there, for the company, his dear friend Mussolini with his army of Croatian, Slovakian, Hungarian Fascists... This entire horde could bark over La Manche in frenzy as a chain dog which strains at the leash, splatters the lather but cannot tear the chain. That is exactly why the very central idea of A.Osokin's "Great mystery" (Hitler did not need the Soviet infantry in Normandy, he did not have means for his own infantry to cross the channel) is a mega-stupidity. Some information appeared that it was possible that Mr. Osokin himself (in view of some authors) felt that only vague guesswork is insufficient to prove the veracity of his "epiphany". Maybe that is the reason that a DOCUMENT appears in pg. 414 of his book. In Osokin's view this "Document" is "a first powerful Documental confirmation of the correctness" of his version. You would agree that it sounds proudly55. The chapter itself is entitled: "The "Generalissimo" confirms correctness of the new hypothesis". Have you already understood everything? No? I am giving you my first and last prompt: "In 2002 Moscow publishing house "Veche" issued a book by V.Karpov "Generalissimo" where he included a number of I.V.Stalin's documents never published earlier..." Yes, yes, yes. Here they are coming, "the negotiations in Mtsensk", those same negotiations where the Germans agreed to change "swastika color from black to red". The bread and the "Rama" are created for one another. Birds of a feather flock together. Two mega-historians, V.Karpov and .Osokin, could not but meet... In conclusion it only remains for me to fulfill a pleasant obligation and congratulate FACC with the successful completion of the competition on the subject "Beginning of the Great Patriotic war in the light of new historical studies", to congratulate the "Phazotron-NIIR" corporation with that its Department of information strategies is in the reliable hands. And to you, dear viewers, I wish a pleasant viewing of the "Documentry". Be seated comfortably. Free popcorn only for the members of General Vladimirov's College of military experts.

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A hint on the phrase from Maxim Gorky's liece "At the bottom": "Human! It sounds... proudly!"; MG

Chapter 11

TANK DESTROYERS

Don't forget to take your kid to the park. Here, in Samara it is called "Children's' park in the name of Gagarin". As it is supposed to be with the children's' park it is decorated by a tank, armored personnel carrier and three cannons. Look, how many kids (and their parents) gathered around the tank and how many, around the cannon. The attention of the writers, readers, journalists, screen-writers, historians is distributed to the same ratio (and for the same reason). Tank looks nicer. Even forever frozen on a pedestal it is shocking the imagination with its overwhelming might. And if to start the 500 horse powers diesel and "pedal to the metal"... Second World War is often called the "tank war". This is a metaphor which should not be taken too seriously. The ruthless "God of the war" was (and remained to the end of 1940's) the artillery. It is just the typhoon of the artillery fire that put out of commission half of all killed and wounded, it is with the artillery fire on enemy's machinegun positions and not with the cussing and flailing the pistol a trained commander raised his soldiers into the attack. It is exactly the artillery and mortars hidden on the covered fire positions rapidly and ruthlessly eliminated the enemy raised for the attack. But who is interested to read and write about mortars today? A tube is a tube. In describing an operation (the strength and losses of the parties) any popular book uses two-three numbers: number of divisions, troops, tanks. May be a thick monograph will list a number and caliber of the involved artillery systems but even there the main number, the amount of the used ammunition, will be passed by in silence. But it is exactly these "boring" tons, rounds, echelons of shells delivered by the beginning of the offensive give a specific answer to a question what was the price of victory in this operation: soldiers' blood or iron, trotyl and powder... Tankers please don't take offense. By the end of World War II tank forces radically changed their technical state and could probably pretend to have had the role quite comparable in its significance with the artillery. But it should not be forgotten that the tank of 1945 even in the appearance was unlike the tank of 1939. Not even mentioning the very main changes, i.e., those invisible to the eye! The tank at the war end has the armor impregnable to small and medium caliber artillery, with the 75 88 mm cannon demolishing the enemy's infantr with weighty fragmentation-high explosive shells, with wide caterpillars, with a powerful engine whose capacity was greater than of some sea ships. In the fall of 1939 totally different tanks entered the World War bulletproof armor which could be broken through with any gadget named "anti-tank gun" (for instance, the French 25-mm "Marianna" which weighed just 310 kg), narrow caterpillars which would be stuck in a grain field wet after the rain, the engine rarely more capacious that 100 hp, and at last the armament almost useless to fight the infantry hidden in the simplest field fortifications. "They were low-maneuverability and easily vulnerable to the artillery fire, they used gasoline and hence were easily flammable, and had insufficiently strong armor". This is Marshal G.K.Zhukov writing in his renowned "Recollections and Reflections". In this case his words should be trusted without reservations: the Marshal saw tanks not in a children's park. Moreover, it was Zhukov who organized and brilliantly implemented the operation of demolishing the Japanese forces at

Khalkhin-Gol. The decisive role was then played by the Red Army tank brigades. There is no brighter example of a successful use of tank groupings in the military history on the boundary of 193040's. Sure, the German tank divisions in Poland and France dispersed incomparably larger enemy crowds but the point is that our tankers at Khalkhin-Gol dealt with the totally different enemy: he could not be "dispersed", he must have been destroyed. Zhukov knew the price of victory at Khalkhin-Gol so it is advisable to trust his stern evaluation of the technical parameters of the light Soviet tank. With only one but very important clarification: the German ones were even worse. Yes, Germany had centuries-long traditions of the conscientious labor, a huge army of qualified workers, brilliant engineering school... That is why Germany after all caught up and, frankly, overtook the Soviet Union in many areas of the military technology including the tank-building. But it is always difficult to catch up and it is never possible to do it instantaneously. In the time when the German Reichswehr conducted field drills with cardboard dummies of the tanks (under the Versailles treaty the German army personnel was limited by ten divisions without the medium and large caliber artillery, without tanks and aviation), the Red Army already had 3,460 real tanks. And if we supplement the real (i.e., with the cannon or flame thrower armament) tank armament with light machine-gun whippets, then the Soviet tank park would be 7,574 machines. That is how few they were 1 January, 1934. Three years later, by 1 January, 1937, the "peaceful creative labor of the Soviet people" increased the number of tanks and whippets in the Red Army to 17,280 units. The production of first German training-combat tanks began only after Hitler came to power and Germany canceled (first actually and in March, 1935 formally) the execution of the Versailles treaty restrictions. A light whippet Pz-1 was designed and put into service. The armament was two machine guns of a regular rifle caliber, 60 hp engine, anti-bullet armor 6 15 mm-thick, weight 5.4 tons. "Of course, nobody believed", writes in his memoirs the main ideologue and creator of the German tank forces Guderian, "that we will have to enter the combat with these small training tanks..." Here Guderian was wrong. A first encounter of the enemies occurred in the civil war fields in Spain. Germany provided Franco with the Pz-1 whippets; the Fascist Italy sent the best she had: 3.5ton tank "Fiat-Ansaldo" CV-3 armed with a machine gun on a ring mount in the immovable (!) turret. The Soviet Union delivered to the republicans 10-ton tanks 26 and 13-ton VT-5, both types armed with 45-mm cannon. The armor-piercing shell of the Soviet tank cannon broke through the enemy whippet armor at a distance 1 km (could do it from a greater distance but it was practically impossible to hit the tank at such distance). The future head of the RKKA Main auto-tank Directorate, future Army General and Commander of the Western front D.Pavlov (who was among the first Soviet tankers in 1936 in Madrid) so phrased his evaluation of the Spain combat: "The experience of the war in Spain taught the Germans and showed them what tanks were needed as the light German tank could not stand the comparison with the republican (i.e., Soviet. M.S.) cannon tanks and were ruthlessly shot..."

The war in Spain indeed "taught the Germans" and they began feverishly accelerating the manufacturing of new models, full-fledged combat tanks: Pz-III armed with a 37-mm cannon and Pz-IV with a short-barreled (the Germans called it the "cigarette stub") 75-mm cannon. However, rapidity does not work well. "In view of the fact, Guderian writes, that the production of the base types of tanks extended over a longer time than we assumed, General Lutz made a decision to build one more, intermediate-type tank armed with a 20-mm automatic cannon and one machine gun". The 20-mm "cannon" in its ballistic parameters was somewhat inferior compared with the parameters of the Soviet anti-tank 14.5-mm Degtyarev rifle. So the most fitting name for the new German "tank" Pz-II would be the "selfpropelled anti-tank rifle with machinegun". A little shell weighing 120-145 grams and with 4 to 20 grams of an explosive was negligibly small for the main tank objectives, i.e., the destruction of enemy's fire power, fortification and troops. Before the war cannons of such caliber were installed only on the fighter-planes, not in the armored technology... By the start of the war with Poland (which turned into the European, then world war) 1,445 Pz-I and 1,223 Pz-II, 98 Pz-III and 211 Pz-IV came into service in the Wehrmacht. The occupation of Czechoslovakia added to the German tank divisions 280 captured light Czech tanks Pz-35(t)/Pz-38(t) armed with a 37-mm cannon. If we call a spade a spade, Germany entered the war having in-service 378 light and 211 medium (Pz-IV) tanks. Rounding up: six hundred. As of 1 January, 1939 (9 months before the start of the World war) the Red Army had 11,765 light tanks armed with a 45-mm cannon or fire-thrower (-26, VT-5, VT7) and about 560 tanks armed with a 76-mm cannon (VT-7, multi-turret -28 and -35). Rounding up: 12 thousand. 20 times greater than the Germans. Having analyzed this information the Soviet historians came to a singularly possible (for them) conclusion: "... The Soviet government's position may be compared with the position of a person who is overwhelmed higher and higher with a sea tide: there the water reached his knees; there it reached his belt, chest, then the neck... Another moment and the water will be over his head if he does not make a fast, resolute jump, which will carry him onto the rocks which the tide cannot reach..." The water (or some other liquid) "got over the head" of the Soviet historianspropagandists, and they short of half a century harped on about how Stalin with Molotov shuddered of terror at the thought that these six hundred German tanks, having rung through the entire Poland (which at the time was twice the width of the current one!), will rush through the autumn impassability, straight through the Belorussian swamps, onto Smolensk and Moscow. And only a desperate desire to "jump" from this implacable danger forced them to sign the Treaty with the bloody Ribbentrop... Now we will return from a delirium to the reality. The quoted numbers show the lagging distance which the German tank industry had to cover in order to catch up with the USSR. They were able to do something over the two years. The composition of the Wehrmacht's tank park radically changed: the machinegun

whippets were replaced by full-fledged medium and light tanks. The Pz-III armament was strengthened by replacing the 37-mm cannon with the 50-mm (i.e., the newest German "trinity" caught up in the armament and even slightly overtook the "hopelessly outdated" under the version of the Soviet historians Soviet 26 and VT). As a result of all efforts the following numbers were in service in 17 tank divisions deployed in June of 1941at the USSR border: 439 tanks Pz-IV with 75-mm cannon; 707 tanks Pz-III with 50-mm cannon; 1,039 tanks with 37-mm cannon (Czech and Pz-III of the earlier vintages). Total: 2,185 tanks. Only half of these numbers (439 + 707) could have been with very large reservations called the "tanks with anti-shell armor" (the frontal slab was strengthened to 5060 mm and could stand a hit by the 45-mm shell from the Soviet tank and anti-tank cannon but the turret, very high flanks and back even in these very best German tanks had only anti-bullet armor). To complete the picture it is necessary also to include about 250 "storm guns" (chassis from the Pz-III with the short-barreled 75-mm "cigarette stub" installed in the short immovable armored tower) and 8 battalions of "tank eliminators" (the Czech 47-mm anti-tank cannon on the chassis of Pz-I whippet), which adds 216 combat machines to the German tank armaments. Altogether, not even 3,000 tanks and SP guns. 1,081 more "tanks" of the invasion army were light whippets Pz-I or Pz-II. Is it much, three thousand tanks (half of them light, with the anti-bullet armor and low-caliber 37-mm cannon) on the front from the Baltic to the Black Sea? Awfully much, without a minute of delay for thinking, replied the Soviet historians in chorus. Indeed, the "multiple numerical enemy advantage in tanks and aviation" was always pushed as the main explanation of all failures. "The steel avalanche of tanks with the spider swastika on the flanks... The German tank wedges broke through the Soviet force defenses... the breakthrough of the enemy's large tank grouping made it unavoidable... The German tank divisions closed the ring of encirclement around... pulling forward fresh tank units the enemy attacked..." that is exactly how our history of 1941 was written. That is how was filmed the "Documentry movie about the war" where the 50-ton Soviet tanks of the 1960's "made-up" with the plywood and cardboard to look as the German "Tiger" of 1944, frighteningly rotated the turrets with a gun barrel half a telegraph pole in size... The German tank groupings, at all times very "fresh", showed up in the most unexpected places. Even where they have never been. For instance, the forces of the Southern front retreated behind the Prut, Dniester, Southern Bug and Dnieper chased by the German (and what is very strangely the Romanian!) infantry. Huge expanses of the Southern Ukraine with the unique industrial-raw materials region (Krivoy Rog, Zaporozhye, Dnieperopetrovsk, the NIkopol manganese mines, largest in Europe) were occupied by the Germans without any tanks. Then, also without a single tank battalion, the German infantry broke through the Perekop fortifications and seized the Crimea. That is how it was in actuality, but the "avalanche of the German tanks" continued to spill over the memoire literature, and sometimes even

literature pretending to belong to the "historical". It seemed sometimes that the Soviet historians decided to outdo the very Sovinformburo which reported 4 October, 1941 that "over more than three months of the war the Germans lost more than 21,000 tanks... Such are the facts". The mousetrap which the Soviet historical "science" with such assiduity drove itself in, loudly slammed at the time boundary of 198090's. After the half a century-long praise of the indestructible power of tanks and their decisive role in the battles of 1941 the data on the composition and armament of the Red Army tank force on the eve of the war were declassified and published. 61 tank and 31 mechanized divisions. (A mechanized division in the Red Army in its structure one tank and two motorized infantry regiments and organization chart's tank numbers was at least as strong as a Wehrmacht's tank division). So, actually the Red Army had 92 "tank" divisions. 23,268 tanks (including 3,607 floating machinegun whippets 37/-38/-40). If we want to be maximum stringent by excluding all machinegun tanks and outdated VT-2 we have 17,806 real tanks. The armored automobile BA-10 was quite comparable with a light tank in its armament and armor (a triaxial crosscountry automobile with anti-bullet armor and standard light tank's turret with the 45-mm cannon). Of these undeservedly forgotten armored automobiles were 3,361 units. 40 tank and 20 mechanized division armed with 12,379 tanks were deployed right in the western districts and entered the combat activities in the first two weeks of the war. About two thousand more whippets (mostly floating machinegun type, -37/38/-40) were in the service in the Red Army intelligence battalions of the infantry and cavalry divisions. "We are lazy and uninquisitive"56, said about his compatriots the greatest Russian poet. But even the laziest person, when hitting upon such numbers and facts, unavoidably had a question: "How was it possible?" If 17 German tank divisions with three thousand tanks were all-destructive insuperable force, why then 60 Red Army tank groupings with twelve thousand tanks did not leave any noticeable trace on the battle maps in the summer of 1941? Why the only visible "trace" was the mountains of armored hardware blocking all roads in Lithuania, Belorussia and Western Ukraine? Why did not the Soviet "tank wedges" broke through anything, encircled, closed and destroyed? Early in September of 1941 the Germans without a pause, practically without serious engagements crossed the full-water Dnieper in the Kremenchug area and built 1.5kilometer-long pontoon bridges used by three tank divisions of the 1st tank group to cross onto the East shore. Three tank divisions of the 2nd tank group crossed the rivers Desna and Seim on the pontoon bridges and unexploded new bridge at Makoshino (up to this day the books are published where this shame is explained so: "the bridge was seized by the large group of German paratroopers"). In the evening of 14 September, in the Lokhvitsa area (170 km east of Kiev) the front detachments of the 1st and 2nd tank groups closed the encirclement ring around the giant "Kiev pocket". A huge Soviet grouping (21st, 5th, 37th, 26th, part of the 38th army, altogether
56

From "Travel to Arzrum" by A.S.Pushkin, 1836 (" "); MG

more than 40 divisions) was destroyed within one week. Wehrmacht's Supreme Command then reported the capture of 665 thousand troops, 3,718 guns and 884 tanks. The Soviet sources admit that about 400 thousand troops were taken prisoner. There was plenty written about the catastrophe at Kiev in the Soviet and post-Soviet times. Everybody in unison quoted the last phrase from the operative summary sent to Moscow during the night of 13 into 14 September by the Chief of the SouthWestern front headquarters: "A beginning of the catastrophe understandable to you is a matter of a couple of days". Hot discussions were going (and are still continuing) on the issue of who was at fault that the "understandable catastrophe" was not prevented. Stalin who for political considerations did not allow abandoning Kiev to the last minute? Chief of the General Headquarters Shaposhnikov who did not evaluate in time and adequately unavoidable consequences of German tank divisions breakthrough into the deep rear areas of the South-Western front? The SW front Commander Kirponos who was afraid to take responsibility and by his own authority to remove the front forces from the pending "pocket"? Everybody who discussed this issue were breaking their heads at when (12 September? 14 September? and maybe even 10 September?) everything should have been abandoned for the run eastward. Unfortunately I personally have not come across a single text where were summarized in a column the battle-ready tanks, with which the German tank divisions "closed the ring of the encirclement". We will correct this annoying lapse. In the first decade of September (i.e., about a week before the tank wedges met at Lokhvitsa) three tank divisions of the 1st tank group (9th, 1st, 16th tank divisions) included 185 working tanks. Three tank divisions of the 2nd tank group (3rd, 4th, 17th tank divisions) had 140 working tanks. Especially impressive is the composition of the tank park in the "unchangeably fresh" 3rd tank division where, after the preceding multi-month engagements on the way from Brest to Mogilev and from Mogilev to Desna, remained 5 Pz-IV, 6 Pz-III and 30 Pz-II. Altogether 41 working tanks (this is if we count Pz-II with its 20-mm "cannon" for a tank). The appearance of such a "steel avalanche" in the rear of the South-Western front's half-a-million grouping is considered in our places to be the cause of a catastrophe "understandable to anybody". But a question would be appropriate: who encircled who? What are six good deal battered divisions with 325 tanks on the 250 km-long encirclement front (the actual straight-linear front from Kremenchug to Konotop was even longer), a "steel wedge" or a thin thread? And if six tank divisions with less than a third of initial tanks (and, one would guess, not too many people) were capable of encircling four multi-service armies, why then 20 Soviet mechanized corps (60 tank and mechanized divisions) did not encircle and did not destroy even one German infantry division during the entire summer and fall of 1941? It was impossible to simply ignore these and similar questions, so the Soviet historians and their modern followers began conducting multi-year exhausting and ruthless fight with the Soviet tanks. Not on the battlefield, of course, but in the pages of their garbage writings. Below we will review some most outstanding specimens of "brain-having" associated with this fight.

First off, the number of tanks in the Red Army was "shrunk" by more than the factor of ten! How? Very simple. Incredibly simple. All tanks were subdivided into "new type tanks" (-34 and KV) and "hopelessly outdated" (this category encompassed ALL others, without a single exception). The falsifiers' subsequent job was structured in the traditional (see Chapter 7) "two echelons". In the first one, it was said in thick and solid books: "By the beginning of the war the Red Army had 1.5 thous. new type tanks and significant number of hopelessly outdated light tanks". In the "second echelon", at the level of the "propaganda room" lectures and newspaper articles, the clarification about "significant number of hopelessly outdated" was thrown away as unnecessary (why do they need to be counted, the hopeless?), and only one and a half thousand tanks remained in the Red Army. In view of such trick the professional "thimblers"57 are nervously smoking in the corner... One certainly cannot but agree that the combat potential of a 48-ton heavy tank KV and, for instance, of a 10-ton light -26 is very different. And not coincidentally all normal historians in any reference table always identify the new tanks (-34 and KV) on a separate line. In principle, legitimate is such a view of the war history where everything inferior to the Soviet "new type tanks" is taken away from the review and considered as if nonexistent in the description of events in 1941. Why not? I would be the first one to agree that a combat machine without the anti-shell armor and at least "normal" three-inch (76.2-mm) cannon cannot be called a "tank". Most diverse classification systems are possible and appropriate but only under one quite obvious condition. The requirements and approaches must be EQUAL in the evaluation of all antagonistic parties. Correspondingly, the Soviet historians should have written directly and honestly that the Red Army had fifteen hundred tanks and the German army did not have tanks. Not a single one. There are the numbers of the "tank" regiments, divisions and groups but there are no tanks. And this conclusion would have been totally adequate with the classification system invented by the Soviet "historians" because in the summer of 1941 the Wehrmacht did not have a single tank with the performance parameters comparable with -34 and even less so, with the monstrous KV. In a maximum-compressed rendition the conceptual, qualitative advantages of the new Soviet tanks over any German tanks boiled down to the following: a long-barreled 76-mm KV and -34 cannon could break through the front (and even more so the flank and tail) armor of any German tanks at the maximum pinpoint shooting distance of 600800 m; tank cannons of any German tanks could not break through the KV tank armor; the best German 50-mm tank cannon KwK-38 could defeat -34 only shooting on the lank from short (100300 meters) distances;

57

"Thimbler" - a noisy and cheap propagandist? MG

 only the tank Pz-IV (439 units, 15% of the total tank park) had the armament equivalent with the new Soviet tanks for fighting against enemy's infantry (75-mm cannon); even the best modifications of the Pz-III tank were armed with a 50-mm cannon whose fragmentation shell weighed one third of that for 76-mm cannons of the Soviet tanks (1,96 kg against 6,3 kg); even the heaviest modifications of the German tanks (Pz-III, series and J, PzIV, series and F) did not have full-fledged anti-shell armor: the Soviet division 76.2-mm cannons (F-22 and USB) broke through the front armor on these tanks from a distance of 600800 meters, and the anti-tank 45-mm cannon broke through the turret armor and flank armor; the most common Wehrmacht's 37-mm anti-tank cannon could not break through the -34 and KV armor even from a distance of 100 meters; the advanced 50-mm anti-tank cannon (began to be delivered into Wehrmacht's infantry by two units per infantry regiment!) could not break through the KV armor and could break through -34's flank armor or shooting from the front with very short distances; due to wide caterpillars and unique, in its capacity and fuel efficiency, diesel engine -34 exceeded any German tank in the endurance range, passability and cross-country speed; due to the use of a diesel engine -34 and KV exceeded any German tank in fire safety, as all German tanks without exception used the easily flammable gasoline. The superiority of three key parameters, fire power, protection and mobility says with all certainty that the -34 and KV were tanks on a totally different quality level than the best Wehrmacht's tanks of the summer, 1941. For the most careful readers I am prepared to make one important clarification. Piercing performance of the armor is a probabilistic category. In absolute majority of cases the 37-mm German anti-tank cannon did not break through the -34 armor. The "thirty-fours" came out of a combat with dozens of dents but not a single hole. It is after the encounter with the -34 the German soldiers gave their 37-mm Pak-36 cannon a nickname "a door knocker" (the gist of this black solders' humor was in that the shell can knock on the armor but cannot "enter inside"). No less eloquent are specific numbers of the "door knocker" losses. As of 1 November, 1941 the Wehrmacht lost on the East front 2,479 Pak-36, which is 1.42 times the number of total division and corps artillery system losses together. And at the same time the -34 tanks with holes from 37-mm shells were delivered to the tank-repair plants. That really happened. Why? Nobody knows the exact answer in each case. Possible causes are very numerous. For instance: the place of the penetration hole was weakened by the previous hit of the other shell; the factory spoilage in thermal treatment and/or welding of the armor sheets; this tank was previously on fire which resulted in stress relieving (decrease of the mechanical strength) of the armor; and maybe the 37-mm cannon shot at the tank literally point-

blank, from a distance of several meters, and the shell hit especially vulnerable area of the frame flank near the caterpillar-supporting rollers. And the very concept of "piercing the armor" is not so unique as it may seem from the first glance. What should be considered as piercing? A thru perforation 1 mm in diameter at the internal side of the armor sheet? Or the hole through which the armor-piercing "solid shot" came in the whole? Or a basketball size breach in the armor? Under the German standards the capability of a gun to carry through the armor 70% of the shell's mass in 50% of cases was considered as armor-piercing capacity. The Soviet standards were more rigid: 70% of the cases with carrying 90% of the shell's mass through the obstacle... When the tub-thumping about "1.5 thous. KV and -34 and some number of hopelessly outdated" got perceived as an old and stupid joke the falsifiers decided to come from a different direction. "The hopelessly outdated -26 and VT should not be taken into account as the tanks not because they are worse than the advanced -34 and KV but because they are much inferior to light tanks of the enemy". In what are they worse? In the armament? The Soviet light tanks were armed as a minimum with the 45-mm cannon. As a minimum there was a limited issue of the modification with the short-barreled 76-mm cannon. Light tanks of the enemy (Czech Pz-35/Pz-38, Pz-III of the early series D, , F) were armed with 37-mm cannon. The number 37 is clearly no smaller than the number 45. Unfortunately, many people forget that body volume depends on the cubed linear dimensions. This is why, if the geometric similarity is maintained, a 45-mm shell will be 1.8 times larger than a 37-mm shell in volume and weight. This is the theoretical scheme (the actual shells have different geometry and design). In practice, a 45-mm fragmentation shell from the Soviet tank cannon weighed 2.13 kg and a fragmentation shell from the German 37-mm cannon weighed just 0.69 kg. Moreover, the Soviet historians chronically called "tank" even the German Pz-II armed with the 20-mm cannon (shell weight, 148 grams). Mobility, passability, operating range? In these parameters all tanks in the late 1930's were, as they say, "worth one another". Narrow caterpillars, very modest operating range (150 200 km), and rather tentative passability in the cross-country landscape. Brightly stood out against this background only the Soviet wheel-track BT tanks. Due to a powerful 400 h.p. aviation engine, even on caterpillars the BT could drive at 52 km/hour on the highway and 35 km/hour on a dirt road (the Czech Pz-38, respectively, 42 and 15, the German "trinity" 40 and 20). On wheels, the BT overtook trucks on the highway... One who searches, finds. It turns out that the Soviet light tanks "were hopelessly inferior" to the enemy tanks in the armor protection. Yes, it looks like it - if to measure the "armor protection" in millimeters. In the German tanks, even the lightest Pz-II, the armor is 30 mm-thick, and in the Soviet -26, just 15 10 mm. BT-7 is somewhat better, 22 to 13 mm. The number 30 is twice the number 15. And three times the number 10. Does it mean that the

German tanks had stronger protection against the enemy fire? The answer to this question is very simple. It is necessary and sufficient to remember which fire awaited the German tanks on the Eastern front. The Red Army infantry division had in the inventory 54 anti-tank 45-mm cannons. These cannons were not only in the organization chart, they were real: by the beginning of the war the army had 14,900 "fortyfivers" (on average, 65 per infantry and mechanized division). All light tanks and armored automobiles B-10/B-11 were likely armed. From a distance 100 meters the "fortyfiver" pierced 52 mm of armor, from 500 meters, 43 mm, and from 1,000 meters, 35 mm. That is all the answer to you. Under the measure and requirements of the Eastern front all German light tanks, and also the medium tanks Pz-III and Pz-IV of earlier modifications, had in actuality only the anti-bullet armor. The 30-millimeter-thick armor of the German tanks was a mistake. The most costly and practically irremediable error in the selection of the design parameters. The difference between the Soviet and German machines was only in that the anti-bullet armor of the "hopelessly outdated" Soviet light tanks -26 and BT was rational and corresponding with the criterion of "reasonable sufficiency" (the 10-15 mm armor was quite sufficient for the protection against the infantry arms). The German tanks, however, were overloaded with the 30-mm armor which was excessive for the protection against the fire from rifles and machineguns and absolutely insufficient for the protection against 45-mm shells of the Soviet tank and anti-tank cannons. Strictly speaking this discussion of millimeters, calibers and horse powers is long in the past. Today it is no longer fashionable to talk about the "hopelessly outdated" Soviet light tanks. It became mauvais ton. New time, new songs. "Yes, there were plenty of tanks, yes, in general they were no worse in their performance parameters than the enemy tanks but they were all broken! All. Well, almost all". Unfortunately I am not kidding. The ravings that by the beginning of the war "three quarters of the old type tanks needed repairs" are propagated not only in wall newspapers of a garment factory but also in the publications claiming to be scientifically fundamental. It is sad that even the compilers of such respectful statistical publication as "The secrecy label is removed" were not ashamed to inform the reader in page 345 that out of 14,200 Soviet tank in the western military districts as of 22 June, 1941 "only 3,800 units were totally battle-ready ". Actual data about the technical status of the tanks are known at least since November, 1993 (since the day of the known publication by N.Zolotov and S.Isayev in No 11 of the "Military-historical Journal"). But it did not affect in any way the falsifiers' graphomaniacal activities. Three quarters broken tanks continue crawling in the pages of the most up-to-date books and articles. N.Zolotov and S.Isayev demonstrated that really elegant technique which was used to construct the multiyear "brain-having". Under the order by the USSR Narkom of defense No 15 of 10 January, 1940 the armored hardware in the Red Army was subdivided in the following five categories: 1st. New, not used and quite fit for usage for intended purpose.

2nd. Being used, well working and fit for usage for intended purpose. 3rd. Requiring repair in the regional plant (medium repair). 4th. Requiring repair in the central plant (capital repair). 5th. Unsuitable (tanks in this category were written-off and not included on the summary register). I hope the reader already guessed how the Soviet "historians" pulled his leg: they counted among the "battle-ready" only the 1st category, i.e., brand-new tanks, and attributed the entire 2nd category to the "requiring repair". To make it understandable to everybody, imagine a repair shop technician who agrees to issue the technical inspection sticker only to the owners of the new cars which have not been used yet. Earlier we have already mentioned several times58 the June (1941) report by the head of the RKKA Main Tank Directorate, Lieutenant General Fedorenko "On the status of the Red Army provision with armored tank technology and effects" (ZAMO, f. 38, l. 11373, c. 67, pp. 97116; published in 2007 in the collection "Tank breakthrough. Soviet tanks in the battles of 19371945."). It follows from this document that 9.3% of the tanks required medium repairs, 9.9%, capital repairs. Correspondingly, 80.8% of all tanks in the Red Army inventory were quite fit to be used "for intended purposes". This number covers the entire army including the training centers in the Siberian and Central Asian military districts. In the western military districts the percentage of fit tanks was somewhat higher. According to the last prewar "Register of the availability and technical status of the combat machines as of 1 June, 1941" (ZAMO, f. 38, l. 11353, c. 924, pp. 135-138, c. 909, pp. 2 18) out of 12,782 tanks, to the 1st and 2nd categories are attributed 10,540 tanks. This is 82.5 % of the total park. 82, not 25. You think after such shame the falsifiers moderated and, shyly lowering the eyes, moved to the side? My foot! The fight against the Red Army tanks does not slacken for a minute. The next "terrible war truth" is that there were many tanks and they were in the working state, but only till 4 a.m. of 22 June, 1941. A few days after this fateful date all tanks broke so they had to be abandoned on the enemy occupied territory The progress is there. This "truth" is quite close to the real truth. The tanks were indeed lost in the very first days of the war. Repeating once again, the official data of the Russian military historians indicate that by 69 July the forces of the three fronts (North-Western, Western and South-Western) permanently lost 11.7 thous. tanks. Comparing this fantastic number with the aforementioned initial numbers of the tank park in the western military districts we come to the conclusion that practically all intact and battle-ready (as of 1 June) tanks were lost.

58

General Fedorenko was not mentioned in the text; MG

Secondly, they were lost NOT IN COMBAT. The testimony to this are also thousands of available photos in which German soldiers are posing against the background of Soviet tank on which it is impossible to find external traces of any damage, and eye-witnesses who saw through their own eyes endless lines of the abandoned tanks and armored automobiles, and preserved to our days documents of the Red Army mechanized corps, and a simple logic which says that the tank loss ratio of the parties 1 to 19 could not have been the result of engagements. To be more precise, the loss ratio 1 to 19 must have been the result of the "great tank fight", but in favor of the Red Army... Probably it would make sense to give at least one specific example of where and how the Red Army tanks vanished. We'll take as an example a brief history of the destruction of the 8th tank division (4th mechanized corps, Western Ukraine). The 8th tank was an "old" cadre division, practically 100% manned. In the number of advanced tanks (50 KV and 140 -34, total of 190 units) the 8th tank division alone exceeded four mechanized corps of the Leningrad and Baltic districts combined. Besides, in the division's inventory were 68 triple-turret medium tanks -28 (shortbarreled 76-mm cannon in the main turret and two machinegun turrets), 31 BT-7 and 36 -26. Total of 325 tanks. By the morning of 28 June (at that moment the division entered the renowned tank battle at Dubna) only one integrated tank regiment with 65 tanks remained of the entire division. These tanks also vanished soon. But the documents remained. Including the division commander's report showing the causes of the tank losses. The outstanding feature of this report is a clear and direct use of the term "abandoned" (decrease of 107 tanks for this reason). For a better perception we will summarize the data in the following table: KV Starting number as of 06.22.1941 Damaged Abandoned, unaccounted for, etc. Sent to factory, completer motorresource Stuck in a swamp Arithmetic remainder 50 13 25 8 2 2 T-34 140 54 49 32 2 3 T-28 68 10 27 31 BT-7 & T26 67 8 28 8 2 21 Total 325 85 129 48 6 57

So, the main component of the tank loss by one of the best Red Army divisions was: "abandoned", "unaccounted for", "stuck in swamps" and enigmatic "other". The remainder of 57 tanks, alas, exists arithmetically but not in actuality. Thus, based on the reports from the Red Army South-Western front's Automobile and Tank directorate of 1517 July, listed in the 8th tank division are just 32 tanks, and there are no 31 or even single -28 among them. Against the background of such "order in

the tank units"59 very doubtful is the veracity of the combat loss data: 13 KV and 54 -34, practically invulnerable for 37-mm anti-tank German guns, ostensibly were damaged but at the same time there is only one quarter of this number of the tanks with anti-bullet armor and gasoline engines (-28, BT and -26)! Both tank division commanders who wrote at the end of July, 1941 reports of the combat activities and those who received these reports equally understood that it was impossible to verify anything. The tanks remained in the enemy occupied territory. The issue of when the Red Army would come back to the Western Ukraine and if it would ever happen was at the time an open issue. Endless succession of "burnt down friction couplings" and "jammed engine pistons" in these reports was no more reliable than the numbers of ostensibly destroyed enemy's battle hardware indicated in the same reports. Today the tanks abandoned in June, 1941 are even more nonexistent. Those that did not get remelted in the German Siemens-Martin furnaces were long ago remelted in the Urals and Zaporozhe. Nobody had ever seen any protocols of technical inspection (and better yet, of the Special department and the Military prosecutor's office). Most likely, they never existed. A complex issue of the causes of so destructive "tank mortality" is solved very simple by the present-day Russian historians. If the tanks were lost prior to the engagement (without engagement) well, they broke. The argumentation is constructed precisely on the principle of a Russian flourish " "60. The technical unreliability of the Soviet tanks is substantiated by the fact that they broke. The fact that they broke within one week is substantiated by their unreliability. The unreliability is supported by the fact that the tanks broke... No argument, a hypothesis of the giant tank loss in the first two-three weeks of the war due to their low technical reliability has the right to exist. But only with one very important clarification: the very strange (if not to say absurd) HYPOTHESIS should not be pretending on the role of the truth with a capital T. To me, a more credible is the hypothesis that the tank and armored automobiles vanished for the same reason as the 6.3 million units of lost infantry arms. At least one thing is certain: neither prior to the summer of 1941 nor thereafter THERE WAS ANY such massive "plague" of the Soviet tanks. The first case of BT tanks' combat use was the war in Spain. The Republican army tank regiment was formed on the basis of 50 BT-5 tanks. In October of 1937 the regiment entered the combat activity area at the Ebro River after a two and a half-day march of 630 km. Six hundred thirty kilometers on the rugged, sometimes mountainous landscape. The most difficult test of BT tank moving capacities became Khalkhin-Gol. In the end-May, 1939 two tank brigades (6th and 11th) performed the unprecedented 800-km march in the incandescent Mongol steppe (the air temperature then reached 40oC or 104oF). That is how the Hero of the Soviet Union K.N.Abramov (the commander, tank battalion of the 11th brigade) describes the events:
59 60

The phrase from a 1942 movie "A lad from our city"; figuratively means "everything is OK"; MG Not only I do not know how to translate this but I don't even know what this flourish means in Russian MG

"...The combat alarm for our brigade sounded 28 May. An hour and a half was allowed for the preparation under alarm. The battalion was ready to move in 55 minutes... The column was moving on a barely distinguishable steppe road trampled by camel caravans. Sometimes the road vanished, it was covered with sand. To cross over the sandy and swampy areas we had to convert the tanks from wheels to caterpillars. This job was done by well prepared teams in 30 minutes..." By the end of the day on 31 of May the brigade in its totality came to the assigned area. The 800-km march took slightly longer (6 days) for the 6th tank brigade. Six years after the battles at Khalkhin-Gol, in August of 1945 the BT-7 tank as part of the 6th Guards tank army participated in the so-called "Manchurian strategic operation". The old BT's (the freshest of which were manufactured five years ago) crossed then 820 km over the mountain ridge of Great Khingan at the average march tempo of 180 km per day. From the total of 1,019 tanks of all types just 78 (seventy eight) units were lost in this operation, a phenomenally high reliability level. As of 30 September, 1945, after a very difficult forced march, after engagements with individual groups of the Japanese forces more than 80% of the Far-Eastern front tanks were intact. Including: 77% of the total number of BT tanks, 87% of hopelessly outdated by that time -26 tanks, 94% -34 tanks. The history of the 34 tank, as it is written in all books, began with the two first experimental tanks which drove in March, 1940 under their own power, 3,000 km on the road Kharkov Moscow Minsk Kiev Kharkov. Drove during the spring muddy season, on the dirt roads (it was prohibited due to the secrecy considerations to use highways and even, in the day-time, bridges). Well, the march was hard on the hardware; many break-downs were identified. Eventually the time between repairs was set for the mass-produced tanks not at 3,000 km (this number, fantastic for a heavy caterpillar hardware, was included in the technical assignment) but "only" at 1,000 km. In the January cold of 1943, in the course of the offensive operation "Don", the Soviet tank brigades drove over 300 km on the snowy trans-Don steppe and crushed large forces of the German army group "" which broke through in the summer of 1942 to the oil fields of Mozdok and Grozny. In the summer of 1944 (operation "Bagration": the defeat of the German army group "Center" in Belorussia) the 5th Guards Tank Army, in its offensive in the cross-country landscape, among the forests and swamps, went 900 1,300 km at the offensive tempo of up to 60 km per day. In May, 1945 tanks of the 3rd and 4th Guards tank armies crossed 400 km from Berlin to Prague. In the mountainous-woody landscape, in five days and without significant technical loss. The legendary "thirty fourth" went through the entire war, in many world armies it was in the inventory to the mid-1950's. In the Finnish army the captured Soviet tanks and light caterpillar tow-tractors "Komsomolets" served to 1961! They worked without fail among the Finnish snows and swamps without the factory spare parts, without the user guide... The longstanding fight of historians with the Soviet tanks was bloodless. This is a pleasure but not to the extent of accepting it as totally harmless. Unfortunately it had quite specific and tangible economic consequences. Two generations of Soviet Generals were brought up and trained in the military academies on the myth that the catastrophe of 1941 occurred because of the technical backwardness of the Red Army, in particular because the tanks were "hopelessly outdated" and "technically

unreliable". The Soviet Generals did not want a repetition of the catastrophe and half a century pushed the party Big League demanding to finally and irreversibly "rearm" the Soviet army, rearm so that even the friends would be afraid. Hundreds of the scientific research and design organizations, dozens of huge factories wasted immeasurable intellectual and material resources for the armament of a vast tank horde. In the heat of this great labor battle the Warsaw Treaty "all of a sudden" fell apart and then vanished in the abhava the Soviet Union itself having left Russia with the inheritance of practically non-battle worthy army. And 30 thousand of the world-best tanks.