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COMPILATION NO. 1 CONSTI LAW 1 by J.S.

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I.INTRODUCTION PREAMBLE: We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. 1. POLITICAL LAW Is that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory. (Macariola vs.Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77)
CASE DIGEST FACTS: On 6 Aug 1968, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion with acts unbecoming a judge. The judge apparently bought a property (formerly owned by Macariola) which was involved in a civil case decided by him; and on 31 Aug 1966, the Asuncion couples conveyed their share and interest in the said property to The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. The act of Asuncion engaging in commerce is said to be a violation of pars 1 & 5, Art 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges in active service (among others) to do so within the limits of the place where they discharge their duties. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Asuncion committed a violation in his act of engaging in business. HELD: Art 14 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, effective Aug 1888) of the Code of Commerce, prohibiting judges from engaging in commerce was political in nature and so was automatically abrogated with the end of Spanish rule in the country (Change of Sovereignty to the US by virtue of cession, 1898).

distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic. Constitutional Law designates the law embodied in the Constitution and the legal principles growing out of the interpretation and application of its provisions by the courts in specific cases. 2. STATE a. Definition, distinguished from nation. State a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a definite portion of territory, independent of external control, and possessing a government ti which a great body of the inhabitants render habitual obedience; a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. (CIR v. Campos Rueda, 42SCRA 23)
CASE DIGEST FACT: Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, (an international zone [foreign country] in North Africa), on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise, she was married to a Spanish Citizen and a permanent resident of Tangier from 1931 up to her death, on January 2, 1955. She left properties in Tangier as well as in the Philippines. Among the properties in the Philippines are several parcels of land and many shares of stock, accounts receivable and other intangible personal properties. On the real estate the respondent Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of her estate, paid the sum of P111,582.00 as estate tax and the sum of P151,791.48 as inheritance tax, on the transfer of her real properties in the Philippines, but refused to pay the corresponding deficiency estate and inheritance taxes due on the transfer of her intangible personal properties, claiming that the estate is exempt from the payment of said taxes pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code and that he could avail of the reciprocal provisions of our Tax Code. The Collector of Internal Revenue in a decision assessed the estate of the deceased, as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, the sum of P161,874.95 including interest and penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal properties of Maria Cerdeira.. ISSUE: Whether or not Rueda is rightfully assessed those taxes. HELD: Foreign Country used in Sec 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which although not an international person in the sense of international law, DOES NOT impose transfer of death taxes upon intangible personal properties of citizens not residing therein. Or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our government in order to entitle the petitioner

Constitution the document which serves as the fundamental of the state; that written instrument enacted by direct action of people by which the fundamental powers of the government established, limited and defined, and by which those powers

law the are are

COMPILATION NO. 1 CONSTI LAW 1 by J.S.O


to the exemption benefits provided by our Tax Law. But since such law has not been alleged, this case is remanded to the lower court for further trial.

3. Independent Governmentestablished by the inhabitants of the country who rise in insurrection against the parent State. Presidential vs. Parliamentary 1. In Presidential, there is separation of legislative and executive powers. The first is lodged in the President and the second is vested in Congress while in Parliamentary there is fusion of both executive and legislative powers in Parliament, although the actual exercise of the executive powers is vested in a Prime Minister who is chosen by, and accountable to, Parliament. 2. In Presidential it embodies interdependence by separation and coordination while in Parliamentary, It embodies interdependence by integration. ARTICLE I NATIONAL TERRITORY b. Territory The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. The national territory of the Philippines comprises: the Philippine archipelago all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction Philippine Archipelago that body of water studded with islands which is delineated in the Treaty of Paris (1898), as amended by the Treaty of Washington (1900) and the Treaty with Great Britain (1930). It consists of its Terrestrial Fluvial

While the distinction may be useful for purposes of political sociology, it is of little consequence for purpose of constitutional law (Bernas) State vs. Nation State is a legal or juristic concept while a Nation is an ethnic or racial concept. State is a political and geopolitical entity; while, Nation is a cultural and/ or ethnic entity. State vs. Government State possesses a government to which a great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience while a Government is merely an instrumentality of the State through which the will of the State is implemented and realized. Elements of State: 1. Peoplethe inhabitants of the State; the # of which is capable for self-sufficiency and self-defense; of both sexes for perpetuity. a. Inhabitants; b. Citizens; c. Electors. 2. Territorya fixed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited by the people of the State. 3. Governmentthe agency or instrumentality through which the will of the State is formulated, expressed and realized. De Jure vs. De Facto De Jure has a rightful title but no power or control, either because the same has been withdrawn from it or because it has not yet actually entered into the exercise thereof while a De Facto Actually exercises the power or control but without legal title. 1. De facto propergovernment that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter; 2. Government of Paramount Forcesestablished and maintained by the military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war;

COMPILATION NO. 1 CONSTI LAW 1 by J.S.O


Aerial domains including its o Territorial sea o The seabed o The subsoil o The insular shelves; and o The other submarine areas the other, extending up to 12 nautical miles from the low watermark. (LOS) Contiguous Zone extends up to 12 nautical miles from the territorial sea. Although not part of the territory, the coastal State may exercise jurisdiction to prevent infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws. Exclusive Economic Zone body of water extending up to 200nautical miles, within which the state may exercise sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the natural resources. The State in the EEZ exercises jurisdiction with regard to: - the establishment and use of artificial island, installation, and structures; - marine scientific research; - the protection and preservation of marine environment United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea The Convention has substantial provision which help in the understanding of the constitutional text. Some important concepts found are the following; Archipelagic State means a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other island. Archipelago means a group of islands form an intrinsic geographical economic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such. Territorial Sea - (supra) Baselines is the law-water line along the coast as mark on large scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State. A state exercises sovereignty over its territorial sea subject to the right of innocent passage by other states. Innocent passage - is a passage not prejudicial to the interests of the coastal State nor contrary to recognized principles of international law. Article 53 of the Convention says that archipelagic State may designate sea lanes and air routes there above, suitable for the continuous and

Internal Water - The waters around, between and connecting the island of the archipelago, regardless of their breath and dimensions. - All other Territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction - Includes any territory that presently belongs or might in the future belong to the Philippines through any of the accepted international modes of acquiring territory. Archipelagic Principle Two elements: - The definition of internal waters (supra) - The straight baseline method of delineating the territorial sea consists of drawing straight lines connecting the outermost points on the coast without departing to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast. Important distances with respect to the waters around the Philippines Territorial Sea Contiguous Zone Exclusive Economic Zone 12 nautical miles (n.m.) 12 n.m. from the edge of the territorial sea 200 n.m. from the baseline(Includes T.S. and C.Z.)

Note: There can be a Continental Shelf without an EEZ, but not an EEZ without a Continental Shelf. Territorial Sea the belt of the sea located between the coast and internal waters of the coastal state on the one hand, and the high season

COMPILATION NO. 1 CONSTI LAW 1 by J.S.O


expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft through or over its archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea. c. Sovereignty and CONSTITUTION jurisdiction Article II, Sec. 1-2, those who have a direct hand in the formulation, adoption, and amendment or alteration of the Constitution. Kinds of Sovereignty: 1. Legalthe power to issue final commands; 2. Politicalthe sum total of all the influences which lie behind the law; 3. Internalthe supreme power over everything within its territory; 4. Externalalso known as independencefreedom from external control. Characteristics: i. Permanence ii. Exclusiveness iii. Comprehensiveness iv. Absoluteness v. Indivisibility vi. Inalienability vii. Imprescriptibility Political writer distinguish between legal sovereignty and political sovereignty. The former is described as the supreme power to make laws and the latter as the sum total of all the influences in a state, legal and non-legal, which determine the course of law. Sovereign authority, moreover, is not always directly exercised by the people. It is normally delegated by the people to the government and to the concrete persons in whose hands the powers of government temporarily reside. Such authority continues with the consent of the people. Finally, is recognition by other states a constitutive element of a state such that even it has all four elements of the Montevideo Convention it is not a state if it has not been recognized? In International law, there are two views on this. One view, the constitutive theory, is that recognition constitutes a state. The other view, the declaratory theory, is that recognition is merely declaratory of the existence of the state. In practice, however, whether recognize or not is largely apolitical decision.

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. Sovereignty definition, aspects, situs, essential qualities Definition Sovereignty is the power of the State to regulate matters within its own territory. While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and allencompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. Government of Laws and Not of Men.sovereignty of the people also includes the concept that government officials have only the authority given them by law and defined by law, and such authority continues only with the consent of the people. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. This power resides in the people understood as

COMPILATION NO. 1 CONSTI LAW 1 by J.S.O


Republican State It is one wherein all government authority emanates form the people and is exercised by representatives chosen by the people. Democratic State This merely emphasizes that the Philippines has some aspect of direct democracy such as initiative and referendum. Aspects Effect of Belligerent Occupation No change in sovereignty. However, political laws, except those of treason, are suspended; municipal laws remain in force unless changed by the belligerent occupant. Principle of Jus Postiminium At the end of the occupation, political laws are automatically revived. Effect of Change of Sovereignty political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or nor with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by the affirmative act of the new sovereign. Municipals laws remain in force. (Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77). Situs Essential qualities CASES
CASE DIGEST Bayan vs. Zamora, GR 138570, Oct. 10, 2000 FACTS: The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it by (2/3) votes. Cause of Action:Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not Section 21, Article VII. Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met: it must be a treaty, it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state. Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate. ISSUE: Whether the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution. Whether or not the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty. Whether or not Philippine courts has jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed by US military personnel. HELD: The Court held: Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or international agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on treaties or international agreements and applies to any form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not limited to, extradition or tax treaties or those economic in nature. All treaties or international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective. In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further requires that "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities" may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state. It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from contradicting each other, actually share some common ground. In both instances, the concurrence of the Senate is indispensable to render the treaty or international agreement valid and effective. It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision or law prevails over a general one. Lex specialis derogat generali. Thus, where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a

COMPILATION NO. 1 CONSTI LAW 1 by J.S.O


general one which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language which are not within the provision of the particular enactment. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty: they are equally binding obligations upon nations. Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the concurrence of the Senate should be taken as a clear and unequivocal expression of our nation's consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied there under. In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Beyond this, Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International Law Commission in 1949provides: "Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty." Equally important is Article 26 of the Convention which provides that "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." This is known as the principle of pacta sunt servanda which preserves the sanctity of treaties and have been one of the most fundamental principles of positive international law, supported by the jurisprudence of international tribunals.

Personal o authority over its nationals, their persons, property, or acts, whether within or outside its territory.3. authority over persons, things or acts, outside its territorial limits by reason of their effects to its territory.

Extraterritorial o

CASES The jurisdiction of a nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty. (Reagan vs. CIR, 30 SCRA 968)
CASE DIGEST FACTS: Petitioner Reagan, a civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical assistance to the US Air Force in the Philippines, questioned the payment of the income tax assessed on him by respondent CIR on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the US Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga. It is his contention, that in legal contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to tax. He seeks that an amount of P2,979.00 as the income tax paid by him be refunded. ISSUE: Whether or not the Clark Field Air Base is a foreign property therefore excluded from the power of Philippine taxation. HELD: NO. By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. This provision is not and can not on principle or authority be construed as a limitation upon the rights of the Philippine Government. The State is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory.

Jurisdiction concept, classes Concept Jurisdiction is the manifestation of sovereignty. Classes Territorial o authority to have all persons and things within its territorial limits be completely subject to its control and protection.2.

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Principle of auto limitation: any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence. Philippine government has not abdicated it sovereignty over the American bases in the Philippine as part of the Philippine territory. (People vs. Gozo, 53 SCRA 476)
CASE DIGEST FACT: Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which is within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the Mayors Office and some neighbors, she demolished the house without acquiring the necessary permits and then later on erected another house. She was then charged by the City Engineers Office for violating Mun. Ord No. 14 Series of 1964 which requires her to secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign country. ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base? HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base.

State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service. Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable. STATE POLICIES Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination. Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory. Imperium the States authority to govern embraced in the concept of sovereignty: includes passing laws governing a territory, maintaining peace and order over it, and defending it against foreign invasion. CASES Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self preservation or public interest. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people. (Harvey vs. Commissioner, 162 SCRA840)
CASE DIGEST FACTS: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their residences. The Operation Report read that Andrew Harvey was

d. Prerogatives Imperium Article II, Secs. 3-8, CONSTITUTION Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory. Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the

COMPILATION NO. 1 CONSTI LAW 1 by J.S.O


found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the after Mission Report read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime now. Seized during the petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found. Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17 February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for selfdeportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code. Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. ISSUES: 1. 2. 3. Whether or not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of existence of probable cause. Whether or not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents. Whether or not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners. confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning. The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a counsel if desired. Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the sovereign power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people.

HELD: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure). The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest. The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when

Issue: R.A. No. 1180 violated the UN Charter and the Philippine Chinese Treaty of Amity, therefore against the principle of Pacta sunt servanda. The Court held that the Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals upon the same term as the nationals of any other country. But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. The Retail Trade Nationalization Law is not unconstitutional because it was passed in the exercise of the police power which cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty. (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil155)
CASE DIGEST FACTS: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending among others that: it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process of law; it violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; and its provisions against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino

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capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution. Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engage therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of juridical entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation. HELD: The Court held that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power. It has been said that police power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co- extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all- embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve public interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power, Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied. The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction. The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the

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segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law , and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State. ISSUE: Whether the Letter of Instruction were considered valid and constitutional? HELD: YES, The court held that the letter of Instruction No.229,as amended as well as the implementing rules and regulations were valid and constitutional as a valid measure of police power. The Vienna Convention on Road signs and signals and the United Nations Organization was ratified by the Philippine local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices. It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance, between the International law and municipal law in applying the rule municipal law prevails. Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, 3) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles, or 4) well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision. On Police Power The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,

Principle of Pacta sunt servanda Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. Issue: Validity or the constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No. 299, issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, premised and based on the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Sings and Signals. The Court held that the LOI in question is deemed not unconstitutional as it was in the exercise of police power as such was established to promote public welfare and public safety. In fact, the LOI is based on the constitutional provision of adopting to the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.(Agustin vs. Edu, 88 SCRA 195).
CASE DIGEST FACTS: This was an original action in the Supreme Court for prohibition. Petitioner was an owner of a volkswagen beetle car, model 13035 already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights which could serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No 229, as amended, as well as the Implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No 1 issued by Land transportation Commission. Respondent Land Transportation commissioner Romeo Edu issued memorandum circular no 32 pursuant to Letter of Instructions No.229,as amended. It required the use of early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicles. Petitioner alleged that the letter of instructions, as well as the implementing rules and regulations were unlawful and unconstitutional.

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morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers, extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out to all the great public needs. Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the wellbeing of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time. The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . . . As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety. FACTS: In these two cases (G.R. Nos. 45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of filing of the information. The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military leanings, and does not wish to kill or be killed. Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one day of imprisonment, with the costs. In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused were sentenced, is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional. Held: The Court held that The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. The right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of this country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Feb., 233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of property without due process of law, because, in its just sense, there is no right of property to an office or employment. The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason of the actual existence of war does not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for deferment in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).

Issue: The validity of the National Defense Law which establishes compulsory military service is unconstitutional. The Court held that the National Defense Law does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.(People vs.Lagman, et al., 66 Phil 13)
CASE DIGEST

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Issue: Deployment of US troops in Basilan and Mindanao as part of Balikatan exercises for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution. The Court held that in the absence of concrete proof, petitioners allegation that the Arroyo government is engaged in doublespeak in trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign troops on native soil. The petitions invite us to speculate on what is really happening in Mindanao. Wherefore, the petition and the petition-in-intervention were dismissed.(Lim vs. Exec. Secy., GR151445, April 11, 2002)
CASE DIGEST FACTS: This case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition as well as a petition-in-intervention, praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called "Balikatan 02-1" and that after due notice and hearing, that judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injunction and/or prohibition against the deployment of U.S. troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution. Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in "Balikatan 02-1." These so-called "Balikatan" exercises are the largest combined training operations involving Filipino and American troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic events that occurred on September 11, 2001. On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. They were joined subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-Iist organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention on February 11, 2002. ISSUE: Whether or not the Balikatan Exercises is illegal and in violation of the Constitution. HELD: The Court held that no doubt that the US forces are prohibited / from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory. Yet a nagging question remains: are American troops actively engaged in combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged training and assistance exercise? The Court cannot take judicial notice of the events transpiring down south, as reported from the saturation coverage of the media. As a rule, it does not take cognizance of newspaper or electronic reports per se, not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the rules of evidence. It cannot accept, in the absence of concrete proof, petitioners' allegation that the Arroyo government is engaged in "doublespeak" in trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign troops on native soil. The petitions invite the Court to speculate on what is really happening in Mindanao. Wherefore, the petition and the petition-in-intervention were dismissed.

Dominium Dominium the capacity of the State to own and acquire property. Regalian Doctrine all lands of the public domain belong to the State the source of any asserted rights to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly of public dominium presumptively belong to the State. Public Dominion are those property intended for public use forpublic service. They are outside the commerce of men and therefore not subject for appropriation. Note: Property of public dominion when no longer needed for public use or public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the state. Public Land is equivalent to Public Domain. Government Lands include public land and all other lands of the government already reserved or devoted to public use or subject to private rights.

Classification of Lands of the Public Domain: Agricultural Lands Forest or Timber Lands Mineral Lands National Parks CASES Issue: The provision of the joint venture agreement for transfer of title to AMARI of some of the submerged land which had been reclaimed

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were unconstitutional. The Court held that such lands were alienable or disposable lands of the public domain which could be disposed of by PEA under certain conditions (such as public bidding). However such lands could only be disposed of by means of an absolute transfer to private individuals who were Philippine citizens, Under Sec.3, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution a disposal to a corporation could only be by way of a lease, not a sale. Accordingly the JVA was declared null and void ab initio. (Chavez vs.PEA & AMARI, GR 133250, July 9, 2002)
CASE DIGEST FACTS: On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the ManilaCavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA. The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal. On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, and the Government Corporate Counsel. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees. On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void." ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid. HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

Issue: Whether the agreement entered into by Pasay City Council and the Republic Real Estate Corporation which involved the transfer of reclaimed foreshore lands is constitutional. The Court held that the agreement cannot operate to give title to foreshores, the areas between the high tide and low tide marks, rendering the agreement null and void for being ultra vires. (Republic vs CA, GR No. 103882, Nov. 25, 1998) The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) was challenged as unconstitutional for allegedly colliding with the principle of jura regalia (Regalian Doctrine). Under IPRA, indigenous peoples may obtain the recognition of their right of ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral domains by virtue of native title. Seven members of the Supreme Court voted to dismiss the petition while seven others voted to grant the same. As the votes were equally divided, the petition was dismissed pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court with the

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result that the constitutionality of the IPRA is deemed upheld. (Cruz vs DENR, GR No. 135385, Dec. 06, 2000)
CASE DIGEST FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners. ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional. HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources somehow against the regalian doctrine. contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements. On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times, two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996. On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter. Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. They pray that the Court issue an order:(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements;(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional and null and void;(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and void; and (d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 is unconstitutional. HELD : The Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution and hereby declares unconstitutional and void: (1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person," to wit: Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for purposes of granting an exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or mineral processing permit. (2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration permittee, insofar as said section applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement, (3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or technical assistance agreement; (4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for every financial or technical assistance agreement; (5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement to convert the same into a mineral production-sharing agreement; (6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing permit to

Issue: R.A. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act, along with DENR AO No. 96-04 and the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) is unconstitutional for: allowing foreign-owned companies to extend more than mere financial or technical assistance to the State, and even permitting to operate and manage mining activities; and allowing both technical and financial assistance, instead of either technical or financial assistance. The Court held certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO No.96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA as unconstitutional, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the1987 Constitution for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of Filipino nation. ( La Bugal-Blaan TA vs DENR, GR No. 127882, Jan.27, 2004)
CASE DIGEST FACTS: On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for

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a contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement; The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are dependent on the foregoing provisions and cannot stand on their own: (1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement. Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or technical assistance agreement proposals; Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA; The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for the Government's share in a financial and technical assistance agreement; and Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to said contractors; When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

parens patriae Article II, Secs. 9-28, CONSTITUTION Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, arising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all. Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nationbuilding, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before thelaw of women and men. Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord withthe rhythm and harmony of nature. Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development. Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provide incentives to needed investments. Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform. Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development. Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation. Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building. Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

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Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity inthe public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption. Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed bylaw, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. Doctrine of Parens Patriae government as guardian of the rights of people. (Govt. of Phil. Island v. El Monte de Piedad)
CASE DIGEST FACTS: Contributions were collected during the Spanish regime for the relief of the victims of an earthquake. The Monte de Piedad, a charitable institution, in need for more working capital, petitioned the Governor-General for the transfer of $80,000 as a loan. In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000. The Monte declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement. On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands, through the Attorney-General, bring suit against the Monte de Piedad for a recover of the $80,000, together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs. After due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause. The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by the defendant was to question the competence of the plaintiff (government) to bring the action, contending that the suit could be instituted only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by their heirs. ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the respondent bank? HELD:The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from and upheld the right of the Government to file the case as parens patriae in representation of the legitimate claimants. The legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it. This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature. It is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves. The beneficiaries of charities, who are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They show that this beneficient functions has not ceased to exist under the change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever. Besides, the beneficiaries, consisting of the original sufferers and their heirs, are quite numerous. It would be impracticable for them to institute an action or actions either individually or collectively to recover the $80,000. The only course that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to again assume control of the fund and devote it to the object for which it was originally destined. The impracticability of pursuing a different course, however, is not the true ground upon which the right of the Government to maintain the action rests. The true ground is that the money being given to a charity became, in a measure, public property, only applicable, it is true, to the specific purposes to which it was intended to be devoted, but within those limits consecrated to the public use, and became part of the public resources for promoting the happiness and welfare of the Philippine Government. To deny the Government's right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound public policy.

CASES The funds collected as a result of the national subscription opened in Spain by royal order of the Spanish Government and which were remitted to the Philippine government to be distributed among the earthquake sufferers by the Central Relief Board constituted, under article 1 of the law of June 20, 1849, and article 2 of the instructions of April 27, 1875, a special charity of a temporary nature as distinguished from a permanent public charitable institution. As the Spanish Government initiated the creation of the fund and as the donors turned their contributions over to that Government, it became the duty of the latter, under article 7 of the instructions, to exercise supervisions and control over the monies thus collected to the end that the will of the donors should be carried out. The relief board had no power whatever to dispose of the funds confided to its charge for other purposes than to distribute them among the sufferers, because paragraph 3 of article11 of the instructions conferred the power upon the secretary of the interior of Spain, and no other, to dispose of the surplus funds, should there be any, by assigning them to some other charitable purpose or institution. The secretary could not dispose of any of the funds in this manner so long as they were necessary for the specific purpose for which they were

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contributed. The secretary had the power, under the law above mentioned to appoint and totally or partially change the personnel of the relief board and to authorize the board to defend the rights of the charity in the courts. The secretary of the interior, as the representative of His Majesty's Government, exercised these powers and duties through the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. The Governments of Spain and of the Philippine Islands in complying with their duties conferred upon them by law, acted in their governmental capacities in attempting to carry out the intention of the contributors. It will thus be seen that those governments were something more, as we have said, than mere trustees of the fund. Effect of laws on transfer of sovereignty: there is abrogation of laws in conflict with the political character of the substitute sovereign (political law); great body of municipal law regarding private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by new ruler. (Govt of PI vs. Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil 728)
CASE DIGEST (Gonzales vs Marcos, 65 SCRA 624) FACTS: Appeal from an order of dismissal by the Court of First Instance of Manila. Petitioner, while admitting the desirability of the objective of Executive Order No. 30 creating a trust under the name and style of the Cultural Center of the Philippines entrusted with the task of constructing a national theatre, national music hall, and an arts building and facilities, questioned its validity. The order of dismissal stressed that the funds administered by the Center came from donations and contributions, not by taxation. Petitioner appealed. Respondents moved to dismiss the appeal alleging that Executive Order No. 30 represented the legitimate exercise of executive power, there being no invasion of the legislative domain and that it was supplementary rather than a disregard of R.A. No. 4165 creating the National Commission on Culture. A second motion to dismiss was filed on the ground that the issue had become moot by the passage of Presidential Decree No. 15, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 179, creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal ruling that Executive Order No. 30 had been superseded by Presidential Decree No. 15, hence the issue as to the validity of Executive Order No. 30 had become moot and academic. ISSUE: Whether or not the E.O. 30 is creating a trust under the name and style of the Cultural Center of the Philippines. HELD: The court held the E.O 30 is valid. Hence, the petition was dismissed. The Court held that the funds administered by the Center came from donations and contributions, not by taxation. The duty of caring for governmental property is neither judicial nor legislative in character is it as surely executive. In behalf of the State as parens patriae, the President has authority to implement for the benefit of the Filipino people to administer the private contributions and donations. It would be an unduly narrow or restrictive view of such a principle if the public funds that accrued by way of donation from the US and financial contributions for the Cultural Center project could not be legally considered as governmental property.

Issue: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works prohibiting animal-drawn vehicles from passing along specifically designated place and time infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the wellbeing and economic security of all people. The Court held that social justice must be founded on recognition of the necessity of interdependence diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the State of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.(Calalang vs Williams, 70Phil 726)
CASE DIGEST FACTS: Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of Manila filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents. It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of there commendations made by

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the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940.The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused o be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well. ISSUE: Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people? HELD: No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number. FACTS: A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the Roque Fermo, et. al. (being the officers and members of the North Edsa Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, Fermo, et. al. were given a grace-period of 3 days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, Fermo, et. al. were informed by Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) against Brigido R. Simon, Carlos Quimpo, Carlito Abelardo, and Generoso Ocampo, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Simon of Quezon City to stop the demolition of Fermo, et. al.'s stalls, sarisari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA (CHR Case 90-1580). On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing Simon, et. al. "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering Simon, et. al. to appear before the CHR. On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by Fermo, et. al. on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 Simon, et. al. carried out the demolition of Fermo, et. al.'s stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of Fermo, et. al. to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again directed Simon, et. al. to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." A motion to dismiss, dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. During the 12 September 1990 hearing, Simon, et. al. moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved, and likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts. In an Order, dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited Simon, et. al. in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them. On 1 March 1991, the CHR issued an Order, denying Simon, et.al.'s motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss. In an Order, dated 25 April 1991, Simon, et. al.'s motion for reconsideration was denied. Simon, et. al. filed the petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction, questioning the extent of the authority and power of the CHR, and praying that the CHR be prohibited from further hearing and investigating CHR Case 90 1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al." ISSUE: Whether the CHR has the power to issue the order to desist against the demolition of Fermo, et. al.s stalls, and to cite Mayor Simon, et. al. for contempt for proceeding to demolish said stalls despite the CHR order. HELD: Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on

Issue: Whether the CHR has the power to issue the order to desist against the demolition of Fermo et. al.'s stalls, and to cite Mayor Simon et. al. for contempt for proceeding to demolish said stalls despite the CHR order. The Court held as a reiteration in Export Processing Zone Authority vs CHR that the constitutional provision directing the CHR to 'provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection' may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution of by law. It is never derived by implication. Not being a court of justice, the CHR has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the judge of any court in which the action is pending, or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. (Simon vs CHR, GR No. 100150, January5, 1994)
CASE DIGEST

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complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights." Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations; such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." Herein, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by Fermo, at. al. on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park." More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, the Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if its is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining herein, the Court not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of Fermo, et. al. can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution. On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatory powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) herein, however, is not investigatory in character but rescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess. As held in Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights, "The constitutional provision directing the CHR to 'provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection' may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. 'Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law'. It is never derived by implication. Evidently, the 'preventive measures and legal aid services' mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued `by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose."

Issue: Whether or not the exercise of the freedom of assembly on the part of a certain students could be a basis for their being barred from enrollment. The Court held that respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free speech could not be a basis for barring students from enrollment. The academic freedom enjoyed by institutions of higher learning includes the right to set academic standards. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously and cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students which exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. The constitutional provision also maintains a system of free public elementary education and, in areas where finances permit, establish and maintain a system of free public education. (Villar vs TIP,135 SCRA 706)
CASE DIGEST FACTS: In Malabanan v. Ramento, it was held that respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for a negative answer. If that were then, the petitioners are entitled to the remedy prayed for. There is, however, this other circumstance to be taken into consideration. In the opposition to the petition for preliminary mandatory injunction, reference was made to the academic records of petitioners. Two of the petitioners, Rufino G. Salcon, Jr., and Romeo L. Guilatco, Jr., had only one failing grade each, with the first having failed in only one subject in either semester of 1984-1985 school year and the second having failed in only one subject, having passed in eight other subjects in the 1984-1985 school year. Petitioner Venecio Villar failed in two subjects but passed in four subjects in the first semester of the academic year, 1983-1984. Petitioner Inocencio F. Recitis passed all his subjects in the first semester of 19831984 schoolyear and had one failing grade during its second semester. He had two failing grades during the first semester of 19841985 school year. Petitioner Noverto Barreto, had five failing grades in the first

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semester of school year 1983-1984, six failing grades in the second semester of the same schoolyear, and six failing grades in the first semester of 1984-1985 school year. Petitioner Edgardo de Leon, Jr., had three failing grades, one passing grade and one subject dropped in the first semester of school year 1984-1985. Petitioner Regloben Laxamana had five failing grades with no passing grade in the first semester of 1984-1985 school year. Petitioners Barreto, de Leon, Jr. and Laxamana could be denied enrollment in view of such failing grades. Respondent educational institution is under no obligation to admit them this coming academic year. The constitutional provision on academic freedom enjoyed by institutions of higher learning justifies such refusal. ISSUE: Whether or not the exercise of the freedom of assembly on the part of certain students of respondent Technological Institute of the Philippines could be a basis for their being barred from enrollment. HELD: No. Petitioners Venecio Villar, Rufino G. Salcon, Jr., Romeo L. Guilatco, Jr. and Inocencio F. Recites are entitled to the writs of certiorari and prohibition. Malabanan v. Ramento, -held that respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for a negative answer. Same case- As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression, which is identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment and which 'is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent." Same case- Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech, they are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 'shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. Petitioners, therefore, have a valid cause for complaint if the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and peaceable assembly was visited by their expulsion from respondent College. What cannot be stressed too sufficiently is that among the most important social, economic, and cultural rights is the right to education not only in the elementary and high school grades but also on the college level. The constitutional provision as to the State maintaining "a system of free public elementary education and, in areas where finances permit, establish and maintain a system of free public education" up to the high school level does not per se exclude the exercise of that right in colleges and universities. As far as the right itself is concerned, not the effectiveness of the exercise of such right because of the lack of funds, Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: "Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit. It is quite clear that while the right to college education is included in the social economic, and cultural rights, it is equally manifest that the obligation imposed on the State is not categorical, the phrase used being "generally available" and higher education, while being "equally accessible to all should be on the basis of merit." To that extent, therefore, there is justification for excluding three of the aforementioned petitioners because of their marked academic deficiency. The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent's doctoral degree cannot be recalled without violating her right to enjoyment of intellectual property and to justice and equity. The Court held that academic freedom is guaranteed to institutions of higher learning by Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution. This freedom includes deciding whom a university will confer degrees on. If the degree is procured by error or fraud then the Board of Regents, subject to due process being followed, may cancel that degree. The CA decision was wrong and was reversed. (UP Bd. Of Regents vs. CA, GR No. 134625, August 31, 1999)
CASE DIGEST FACTS: Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and holder of a Philippine visitors visa. Sometime in April 1988, she enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology of the University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) in Diliman, Quezon City. After completing the units of course work required in her doctoral program, private respondent went on a two-year leave of absence to work, she returned to the Philippines in July 1991 to work on her dissertation entitled, Tamil Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. After going over private respondents dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Consuelo Joaquin-Paz that there was a portion in private respondents dissertation that was lifted, without proper acknowledgment to the Authority. Nonetheless, private respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation. ON April 22, 1993, the Board approved the University Councils recommendation for the graduation of qualified students, including private respondent. Two days later, on April 24, 1993, private respondent graduated with the degree of Doctor of

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Philosophy in Anthropology. On the other hand, Dean Paz also wrote a letter to private respondent, dated April 21, 1993, that she would not be granted an academic clearance unless the issues regarding her dissertations be cleared. In a letter, dated June 7, 1993, Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against her. On September 19, 1994, Chancellor Posadas obtained the Zafaralla Committees report, signed by its chairman, recommending the withdrawal of private respondents doctorate degree. The report states that there is overwhelming evidence of massive lifting from a published source word for word and, at times, paragraph by paragraph without any acknowledgment of the source, even by a mere quotation mark. At least 22 counts of such documented liftings were identified by the Committee. These form part of the approximately ninety (90) instances found by the Committee created by the Dean of the College and subsequently verified as correct by the Special Committee. These instances involved the following forms of intellectual dishonesty: direct lifting/copying without acknowledgment, full/partial lifting with improper documentation and substitution of terms or words (e.g., Tamil in place of Sanskrit, Tamilization in place of Indianization) from an acknowledged source in support of her thesis (attached herewith is a copy of the documents for reference); and Ms. Arokiaswamy William herself admits of being guilty of the allegation of plagiarism. Fact is, she informed the Special Committee that she had been admitting having lifted several portions in her dissertation from various sources since the beginning. On the basis of the report, the University Council, on September 24, 1994, recommended to the Board of Regents that private respondent be barred in the future from admission to the University either as a student or as an employee. On August 6, 1996, the trial court, Branch 227, rendered a decision dismissing the petition for mandamus for lack of merit. Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on December 16, 1997, reversed the lower court. ISSUE: Whether or not the UP Board of Regents has the exclusive autonomy over the case as an exercise of academic freedom. HELD: Yes. Art. XIV, 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that [a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to institutions of higher learning which is thus given a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students. If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates. Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the graduation of a student, as the Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the graduation of such a student that is in question. It is noteworthy that the investigation of private respondents case began before her graduation. If she was able to join the graduation ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many investigations conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided she should not have been allowed to graduate. Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of the Philippines. It has the power to confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University Council. It follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw what it has granted without violating a students rights. An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than bestowing a universitys highest academic degree upon an individual who has obtained the same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic excellence is the universitys concern. It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity. What U.P., through the Board of Regents, seeks to do is to protect its academic integrity by withdrawing from private respondent an academic degree she obtained through fraud. CASE DIGEST (Mandaluyong vs. Francisco, GR No.137152, January 29, 2001) FACTS: Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig City a complaint for expropriation entitled City of Mandaluyong, plaintiff v. Antonio N., Francisco N., Thelma N., Eusebio N., Rodolfo N., all surnamed Aguilar, defendants. Petitioner sought to expropriate three (3) adjoining parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,847 square meters registered under Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 59780, 63766 and 63767 in the names of the defendants, herein respondents, located at 9 de Febrero Street, Barangay Mauwag, City of Mandaluyong; on a portion of the 3 lots, respondents constructed residential houses several decades ago which they had since leased out to tenants until the present; on the vacant portion of the lots, other families constructed residential structures which they likewise occupied; in 1983, the lots were classified by Resolution No. 125 of the Board of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council as an Area for Priority Development for urban land reform under Proclamation Nos. 1967 and 2284 of then President Marcos; as a result of this classification, the tenants and occupants of the lots offered to purchase the land from respondents, but the latter refused to sell; on November 7, 1996, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of petitioner, upon petition of the Kapitbisig, an association of tenants and occupants of the subject land, adopted Resolution No. 516, Series of 1996 authorizing Mayor Benjamin Abalos of the City of Mandaluyong to initiate action for the expropriation of the subject lots and construction of a medium-rise condominium for qualified occupants of the land; on January 10, 1996, Mayor Abalos sent a letter to respondents offering to purchase the said property at P3,000.00 per square meter; respondents did not answer the letter. Petitioner thus prayed for the expropriation of the said lots and the fixing of just compensation at the fair

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market value of P3,000.00 per square meter. In their answer, respondents, except Eusebio N. Aguilar who died in 1995, denied having received a copy of Mayor Abalos offer to purchase their lots. They alleged that the expropriation of their land is arbitrary and capricious, and is not for a public purpose; the subject lots are their only real property and are too small for expropriation, while petitioner has several properties inventoried for socialized housing; the fair market value of P3,000.00 per square meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square meter. As counterclaim, respondents prayed for damages of P21 million. Respondents filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing claiming that the defenses alleged in their Answer are valid grounds for dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendants and lack of cause of action. Respondents prayed that the affirmative defenses be set for preliminary hearing and that the complaint be dismissed. Petitioner replied. On November 5, 1997, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint and named as an additional defendant Virginia N. Aguilar and, at the same time, substituted Eusebio Aguilar with his heirs. Petitioner also excluded from expropriation TCT No. 59870 and thereby reduced the area sought to be expropriated from three (3) parcels of land to two (2) parcels totalling 1,636 square meters under TCT Nos. 63766 and 63767. The Amended Complaint was admitted by the trial court on December 18, 1997. Respondents, who, with the exception of Virginia Aguilar and the Heirs of Eusebio Aguilar had yet to be served with summons and copies of the Amended Complaint, filed a Manifestation and Motion adopting their Answer with Counterclaim and Motion for Preliminary Hearing as their answer to the Amended Complaint. The motion was granted. At the hearing of February 25, 1998, respondents presented Antonio Aguilar who testified and identified several documentary evidence. Petitioner did not present any evidence. Thereafter, both parties filed their respective memoranda. On September 17, 1998, the trial court issued an order dismissing the Amended Complaint. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 29, 1998, the court denied the motion. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in upholding respondent's contention that they qualify as small property owners and are thus exempt from expropriation. HELD: The question now is whether respondents qualify as small property owners as defined in Sec. 3(q) of RA 7279. Small-property owners are defined by two elements: (1) those owners of real property whose property consists of residential lands with an area of not more than 300square meters in highly urbanized cities and 800 square meters in other urban areas; and (2) that they do not own real property other than the same. The share of each respondents did not exceed 300, and they also claim that the subject lots are their only real property. Thus, the Court denied the petition. CASE DIGEST FACTS: The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years old at the time the complaint was filed on October 10, 1964. The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The deceased insured himself and instituted as beneficiary, his child, with his brother to act as trustee during her minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him. Hence this complaint by the mother, with whom the child is living, seeking the delivery of such sum. She filed the bond required by the Civil Code. Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy. ISSUE: WON the mother is the rightful trustee for the minor beneficiary. HELD: on Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code. The former provides: "The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives. With the added circumstance that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. It is further fortified by the assumption, both logical and natural, that infidelity to the trust imposed by the deceased is much less in the case of a mother than in the case of an uncle.

A college, or any school for that matter, has a dual responsibility to its students. One is to provide opportunities for learning and the other is to help them grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community. Discipline is one of the means to carry out the second responsibility. The general rule is that the authority of the school is co-extensive with its territorial jurisdiction, or its school grounds, so that any action taken for acts committed outside the school premises should, in general, be left to the police authorities, the court of justice, and the family concerned. However, this rule is subject to following exceptions: (1) violations of school policies and regulations occurring in connection with a school-sponsored activity off-campus; and (2) misconduct of student involves his status as a student or affects the good name or reputation of the school. The true test of a school's right to investigate, or otherwise, suspend or expel a student for a misconduct committed outside the school premises and beyond school hours is not the time or place of the offense, but its effect upon the morale and efficiency of the school and whether it, in fact, is adverse to the school's good order welfare and advancement of its students. (Angeles vs Judge Sison, 112 SCRA 26)

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CASE DIGEST FACTS: The petitioner was mauled by two of his students in FEU outside of the school campus, specifically in Oak Barrel Restaurant, prompting his filing of criminal complaint for assault which was dismissed on the basis of an affidavit of desistance submitted by the petitioner. The administrative complaint filed before the Dean, however, was acted on by the creation of a committee to conduct administrative investigation, headed by the Dean himself. Over the opposition of the offending parties, the respondent Judge issued an order denying their motion against the conduct of administrative investigation, hence this appeal before the Court. ISSUE: Does the school, through its authorized representative, have jurisdiction to investigate over an alleged misconduct committed outside the school premises and beyond school hours? HELD: YES. A college or any school for that matter has a dual responsibility to its students. One is to provide opportunities for learning and the other is to help them grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community. Discipline is one of the means to carry out the second responsibility. Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and property. The power of school officials to investigate, an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel, is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of such rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning. Common sense dictates that the school retains its power to compel its students in or off-campus to a norm of conduct compatible with their standing as members of the academic community. Hence, when as in the case at bar, the conduct complained of directly affects the suitability of the alleged violators as students, there is no reason why the school cannot impose the same disciplinary action as when the act took place inside the campus. (1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1. HELD: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that: 1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions 2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law 3. They are not confined to existing conditions 4. They apply equally to al members of the same class In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions. Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of public safety as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.

The concern of the government is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizen. The government has convinced the court that it is its intent. The Court did not find the impugned Order to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion. (PASEI vs Drilon, 163 SCRA 386)
CASE DIGEST FACTS: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1

The right of government employees to organize does not include the right to strike. But the current ban on them against strikes is statutory and may be lifted by statute. (SSSEA vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686) CASE DIGEST

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FACTS: On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal. It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices. ISSUE: Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike. HELD: The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31]. Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. The case at bar is the minors assertion of their right to a sound environment, and at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generation to come. (Oposa vs Factoran, GR No. 101083, July30, 1993)
CASE DIGEST FACTS: The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a petition to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. This case is filed not only on the appellants right as taxpayers, but they are also suing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility in so far as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners presented scientific evidence that deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. One of these is the reduction of the earths capacity to process carbon dioxide, otherwise known as the greenhouse effect. Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. Appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendants office regarding the plea to cancel the said TLAs. The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the said case 2. Admitting that all facts presented are true, whether or not the court can render a valid judgement in accordance to the prayer of the complaints 3. Whether or not the TLAs may be revoked despite the respondents standing that these cancellation of these TLAs are against the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution HELD: 1. The petitioners have locus standi (legal standing) on the case as a taxpayers (class) suit. The subject matter of complaint is of common and general interest to all the citizens of the Philippines. The court found difficulty in ruling that the appellants can, for themselves, and for others file a class suit. 2. The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology has been clearly stated. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. The granting of the TLAs, as the petitioners claim to be done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology hence, the full protection thereof requires that no TLAs

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should be renewed or granted. The appellants have also submitted a document with the sub-header CAUSE OF ACTION which is adequate enough to show, prima facie, the violation of their rights. On this basis, these actions must therefore be granted, wholly or partially. 3. Despite the Constitutions non-impairment clause, TLAs are not contracts, rather licenses; thus, the said clause cannot be invoked. Even if these are protected by the said clause, these can be revoked if the public interest so required as stated in Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705). Furthermore, Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that: The State shall protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the government. The said right is also clear as the DENRs duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right. Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded. It is not a contract, property or property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. ISSUE: Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the appellant to terminate her pregnancy embodied in the concept of personal liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause, in the personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, or a HELD: The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation. The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of relatively recent vintage, deriving from statutory changes generally enacted in the latter half of the 19th century. At common law abortion performed before quickening (the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero) was not an indictable offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a firmly established common law crime even when it destroyed a quick fetus. Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal abortion laws. The first is that the laws are the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this argument has been taken seriously by neither courts nor commentators. The second reason is that the abortion procedure is hazardous, therefore the States concern is to protect pregnant women. However, modern medical techniques have altered the situation, with abortions being relatively safe particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is the States interest is in protecting the prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion. For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant womans attending physician, and may not be criminalized by statute. For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the State may regulate abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health based upon the States interest in promoting the health of the mother. For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where necessary for the preservation of the mothers life, based upon the States interest in the potential of the potential life of the unborn child. Dissent. Justice Rehnquist. The right to an abortion is not universally accepted, and the right to privacy is thus not inherently involved in this case. Discussion. The Court finds that an abortion statute that forbids all abortions except in the case of a life saving procedure on behalf of the mother is unconstitutional based upon the right to privacy. However, it does allow for regulation and proscription of abortion when the statute is narrowly tailored to uphold a compelling state interest, such as the health of the mother or the viable fetus. The court declined to address the question of when life begins.

The United States Supreme Court liberalizes abortion laws up to the sixth month of pregnancy at the discretion of the mother anytime during the first six months when it can be done without danger to the mother. (Roe vs. Wade, 410 US 113)
CASE DIGEST Brief Fact Summary. Appellant Jane Roe, a pregnant mother who wished to obtain an abortion, sued on behalf of all woman similarly situated in an effort to prevent the enforcement of Texas statutes criminalizing all abortions except those performed to save the life of the mother. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Statutes that make criminal all abortions except when medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother are an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. FACTS: Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except when medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to prevent defendant Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing the statutes. Appellant alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant, and that she was unable to receive a legal abortion by a licensed physician because her life was not threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming that the statutes were

The constitutional right to information on matters of public concern is self-executing without the need for any ancillary act of legislation. When the question is one of public right and the object of mandamus is to

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procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party interest, and the person at whose instigation the proceeding are instituted need not show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. (Legaspi vs CSC, 150 SCRA 530)
CASE DIGEST FACTS: The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspis request for information on the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas who were employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. Sibonghanoy and Agas had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligible who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians. Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent CSC to disclose said information. The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring the suit. It is asserted that the petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspis actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit. HELD: The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the person at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner isa citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right.

national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community. (Tanada vs Angara, GR No. 118295, May 02, 1997)
CASE DIGEST FACTS: The suit was filed to nullify the concurrence of the Philippine senate to the presidents notification of the WTO argument. It was contended that the argument places nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products in contravention of the Filipino first policy. Petitioners maintain that the Philippines because it meant that congress could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if each legislation would not conform to the WTO agreement. ISSUES: Whether or not the contention is meritorious. HELD: No. while sovereignty has traditional been deemed absolute and allencompassing in the domestic level. It is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family nations. Unquestionably, the constitution did not envision hermit-type solution of the country from the rest of the world. By the inherent nature, Treaties limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by a derived from a convention or pact.

Issue: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was challenged as an unconstitutional treaty for placing foreign investors on the same level as Filipinos. The Court held that while the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interest sonly against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. The constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent

The interconnection which has been required of PLDT is a form of intervention with property rights dictated by the objective of the government to promote the rapid expansion of telecommunications services in all areas of the Philippines at an acceptable standard of service at reasonable cost. The decisive considerations are public need, public interest, and the common good. A modern and dependable communications network rendering efficient and reasonably priced services is also indispensable for accelerated economic recovery and development to these public and national interests, public utility companies must bow and yield. (PLDT vsNTC,190 SCRA 717)
CASE DIGEST FACTS: On 22 June 1958, RA 2090 was enacted granting Felix Alberto & Co. (later ETCI) a franchise to establish radio stations for domestic and transoceanic telecommunications. On 13 May 1987, ETCI filed an application with the NTC for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to operate, etc. a Cellular Mobile Telephone System and an alpha numeric paging system in Metro Manila and in the Southern Luzon regions,

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with a prayer for provisional authority to operate within Metro Manila. PLDT filed an opposition with a motion to dismiss. On 12 November 1987, NTC overruled PLDTs opposition and declared RA 2090 should be liberally construed so as to include the operation of a cellular mobile telephone service as part of services of the franchise. On 12 December 1988, NTC granted ETCI provisional authority to install, operate, and maintain a cellular mobile telephone service initially in Metro Manila subject to the terms and conditions set forth in its order, including an interconnection agreement to be entered with PLDT. PLDT filed a motion to set aside order which was denied by the NTC on 8 May 1989. PLDT challenged the 12 December 1988 and 8 May 1989 NTC orders before the Supreme Court through a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. ISSUE: Whether PLDT can refuse interconnection with ETCI. HELD: The NTC merely exercised its delegated authority to regulate the use of telecommunication networks when it decreed interconnection. PLDT cannot refuse interconnection as such is mandated under RA 6949 or the Municipal Telephone Act of 1989. What interconnection seeks to accomplish is to enable the system to reach out to the greatest number of people possible in line with governmental policies. With the broader reach, public interest and convenience will be better served. Public need, public interest, and the common good are the decisive, if not the ultimate, considerations. To these public and national interests, public utility companies must yield. The NTC order does not deprive PLDT due process as it allows the parties themselves to discuss and agree upon the specific terms and conditions of the interconnection agreement instead of the NTC itself laying down the standards of interconnection which it can very well impose. FACTS: Petitioners are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 "An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes", took effect. Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates. Certain additional compensations, however, were exempted from consolidation. Prior to this, they were receiving honoraria as designated members of the LWUA Board Secretariat and the Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee. To implement RA 6758, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10), discontinuing without qualification effective November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary. Pursuant to said Circular, respondent Leonardo Jamoralin, as corporate auditor, disallowed on post audit, the payment of honoraria to the herein petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the COA, questioning the validity and enforceability of DBM-CCC No. 10. They contend that the Circular is inconsistent with the provisions of Rep. Act 6758 (the law it is supposed to implement) and, therefore, void. And it is without force and effect because it was not published in the Official Gazette.COA upheld the validity and effectivity of DBM-CCC No. 10. Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General supported the petitioners, saying that Sec. 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 is a nullity for being inconsistent with and repugnant to the very law it is intended to implement. The DBM Secretary asserted that the honoraria in question are considered included in the basic salary, for the reason that they are not listed as exceptions under Sec. 12 of Rep. Act6758. ISSUE: Whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 has legal force or effect despite its lack of publication in the Official Gazette HELD: No. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446),publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. It is clear that DBM-CCC No. 10 is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. Before the said circular under attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government officials and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency. The ineffectiveness of the Circular makes resolution of the other issues at bar unnecessary.

The applicable provision of law requiring publication in the Official Gazette is found in Art, 2 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines. The court succinctly construed that cited provision of law in point, holding that all statutes including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectively, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectively date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. (De Jesus vs. COA,GR 109023, August 12, 1998) CASE DIGEST

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