Soledad Calicdan vs. Silverio Centena (G.R. No.

155080, February 5, 2004, 422 SCRA 274) FACTS: On August 25, 1947, Fermina Calicdan executed a deed of donation inter vivos whereby she conveyed the land to respondent Silverio Cendaa, who immediately entered into possession of the land, built a fence around the land and constructed a two-storey residential house thereon sometime in 1949, where he resided until his death in 1998. On June 29, 1992, petitioner, through her legal guardian Guadalupe Castillo, filed a complaint for "Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages" against the respondent, alleging that the donation was void; that respondent took advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the land; and that she merely tolerated respondents possession of the land as well as the construction of his house thereon. In his "Answer with Motion to Dismiss", respondent alleged, by way of affirmative defenses, that the land was donated to him by Fermina in 1947; and that he had been publicly, peacefully, continuously, and adversely in possession of the land for a period of 45 years. Moreover, he argued that the complaint was barred by prior judgment in the special proceedings for the "Inventory of Properties of Incompetent Soledad Calicdan", where the court decreed the exclusion of the land from the inventory of properties of the petitioner. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner, while the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the donation inter vivos is valid HELD: The trial court found the donation of the land void because Fermina was not the owner thereof, considering that it was inherited by Sixto from his parents. Thus, the land was not part of the conjugal property of the spouses Sixto and Fermina Calicdan, because under the Spanish Civil Code, the law applicable when Sixto died in 1941, the surviving spouse had a right of usufruct only over the estate of the deceased spouse. Consequently, respondent, who derived his rights from Fermina, only acquired the right of usufruct as it was the only right which the latter could convey. After a review of the evidence on record, we find that the Court of Appeals ruling that the donation was valid was not supported by convincing proof. Respondent himself admitted during the cross examination that he had no personal knowledge of whether Sixto Calicdan in fact purchased the subject land from Felomino Bautista. In People v. Guittap, we held that: Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay. Hearsay evidence is defined as "evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others." The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told him, whether orally or in writing. In Sanvicente v. People, we held that when evidence is based on what was supposedly told the witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight for being patently hearsay. Familiar and fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is inadmissible as evidence. The Court of Appeals thus erred in ruling based on respondents bare hearsay testimony as evidence of the donation made by Fermina. Republic of the Philippines v. Leon Silim G.R. No. 140487. April 2, 2001 Kapunan, J.: Facts: Spouses Silim and Mangubat donated a 5,600 sq. m parcel of land in favour of the Bureau of Public Schools, Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur. In the Deed of Donation, respondents imposed the condition that the said property should "be used exclusively and forever for school purposes only." This donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District Supervisor of BPS, through an Affidavit of Acceptance and/or Confirmation of Donation. A school building was constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan school building that was supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land could not be released since the government required that it be built upon a one (1) hectare parcel of land. To remedy this predicament Buendia was authorized to officially transact for the exchange of the old school site to a new and suitable location which would fit the specifications of the government. Pursuant to this, Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot owned by the latter. The Bagong Lipunan school buildings were constructed on the new school site and the school building previously erected on the donated lot was dismantled and transferred to the new location. The Silim spouses learned of the Deed of Exchange when thay learned that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated property. They filed a complaint to annul the donation claiming that there was no valid acceptance made by the donee and that there was a violation of the condition in the donation. Issue: (1)Was there a valid acceptance based on Arts. 745 and 749 of the NCC? (2)Was the condition in the donation violated? Ruling: (1)Yes. There was a valid acceptance.

The last paragraph of Art. 749 reads: If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments. The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is duly communicated to the donor. Here, a school building was immediately constructed after the donation was executed. Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the school building. It was when the school building was being dismantled and transferred to the new site and when Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated property that respondents came to know of the Deed of Exchange. The actual knowledge by respondents of the construction and existence of the school building fulfilled the legal requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the donee be communicated to the donor. Under Art. 745, the law requires the donee to accept the donation personally, or through an authorized person with a special power for the purpose, or with a general and sufficient power; otherwise the donation shall be void. The respondents claim that the acceptance by Buendia of the donation was ineffective because of the absence of a special power of attorney from the Republic of the Philippines. The donation was made in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools. Such being the case, Buendias acceptance was authorized under Section 47 of the 1987 Administrative Code which states: SEC. 47. Contracts and Conveyances. - Contracts or conveyances may be executed for and in behalf of the Government or of any of its branches, subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, whenever demanded by the exigency or exigencies of the service and as long as the same are not prohibited by law. (2)No. The condition was not violated. The exclusivity of the purpose of the donation was not altered or affected when Buendia exchanged the lot for a much bigger one. It was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.

HEIRS OF LUIS J. GONZAGA, namely ROMANA, FERNANDO, PAZ, LUISA and LUIS ANTONIO, all surnamed GONZAGA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES JOSE LEELIN and LILIA SEVILLA, respondents. [G.R. No. 96274. September 3, 1996] GUILLERMO Y. MASCARIAS, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES JOSE LEELIN and LILIA SEVILLA, respondents. DECISION HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: Assailed in these consolidated petitions is the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in the exercise of its review jurisdiction over a case for annulment of Torrens title and/or quieting of title with damages[3] filed before the then Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.[4] There were two (2) defendants in the said case, namely, Luis J. Gonzaga, now deceased, and petitioner Guillermo Y. Mascarias. The latters appeal from the herein assailed decision was docketed as G.R. No. 96274, while the former was substituted by his heirs whose appeal from the same decision was docketed as G.R. No. 96259. Considering that the two appeals raised the same questions and issues and involved the same private respondents, we ordered them consolidated upon petitioner Mascarias motion.[5] The irreconcilable conflict between petitioners and private respondents centers on two parcels of land which they each claim in full exclusive ownership. We gather from the records that one Jose Eugenio had once been the registered owner of lot nos. 3619 and 3620 of the Cadastral Survey of Caloocan under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 17519. Sometime in 1960, Eugenio sold the two lots to deceased defendant Luis J. Gonzaga.[6] Consequently, Eugenios TCT No. 17519 was cancelled, and the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal issued on November 29, 1960, TCT No. 81338[7] in the name of Gonzaga. On September 28, 1981, Gonzaga sold the two lots to petitioner Mascarias.[8] Following the conveyance, Gonzagas TCT No. 81338 was cancelled, and issued in the name of Mascarias was TCT No. 48078[9] covering the same two lots. Equally borne out by the records, however, is the fact that another subsisting Torrens title covers the same two lots subject of the sale between Eugenio and Gonzaga and that between Gonzaga and petitioner Mascarias. This other title is TCT No. C-26086[10]in the name of private respondent Lilia Sevilla, married to Jose Seelin, issued on August 2, 1979 by the Registry of Deeds for Metro Manila, District III. TCT No. C-26086 covers a number of lots, among them, lot nos. 65 and 66 which are identical with lot nos. 3619 and 3620 embraced by the titles issued in the names of Eugenio, Gonzaga and petitioner Mascarias. We note on the face of TCT No. C-26086 that the same is a transfer from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 which was registered on April 19, 1917 pursuant to Decree No. 36455. The court a quo made the following findings of fact as regards the circumstances of that transfer, as follows: x x x plaintiff [private respondent] purchased the two lots described as Lots No. 65 and 66 from Felicidad Rivera, Benito Rivera and Victoria Rivera, the legal heirs of Bartolome Rivera, as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale x x x which was registered on August 2, 1979, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26086 x x x xxx Bartolome Rivera and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424 are the successors-in-interests of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, and in a Decision, dated December 29, 1965, rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. C-424, an action for partition and accounting x x x it ordered the partition for the plaintiffs of the properties described under Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 982, 983, 984, 985 and 994. [emphasis supplied]

In Civil Case No. 4557, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, under Presiding Judge Cecilia Muoz-Palma, ordered the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel the name of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal from Original Certificate of Title NO. 994 and substitute in lieu thereof the name of Bartolome Rivera and his co-plaintiffs. Evidently, Bartolome Rivera, the predecessor-in-interest of herein plaintiffs appears as co-owner in the Original Certificate of Title No. 994 x x x.[11] The present controversy arose when private respondents filed on October 14, 1981, a complaint for annulment of Gonzagas Torrens title insofar as it embraced lot nos. 3619 and 3620 which are identical with those described in private respondents own title as lot nos. 65 and 66. Before the court a quo, Gonzaga interposed an answer asserting that since he had already sold and conveyed the subject lots on September 28, 1981 to petitioner Mascarias, private respondents no longer have any cause of action against him. Consequently, private respondents filed an amended complaint to include petitioner Mascarias as party-defendant. Both the court a quo and the respondent appellate court recognize that the two conflicting TCTs were derived from one common OCT, viz., OCT No. 994. However, while both the court a quo and the respondent appellate court found that OCT No. 994 was registered on May 3, 1917, we find that on the one hand, petitioners titles indicate original registration to have been made on May 3, 1917, but on the other hand, private respondents title indicates original registration to have been made on April 19, 1917. The court a quo resolved the conflicting claims in favor of private respondents. It ratiocinated in this wise: As matters stand, the Court is once more called upon to determine which of the conflicting titles is valid. Let us examine the hard facts. A deepening scrutiny over the evidence in record bares a relevant distinction between plaintiffs [private respondents] and defendants [petitioners] titles as to their origin. As may be seen, defendants [petitioners] titles were registered under Cadastral Proceedings in Cadastral Case No. 34, Cadastral Record No. 1606, Cadastral Survey of Caloocan. Whereas, as the Court finds, plaintiffs [private respondents] title was derived from the Original Certificate of Title No. 994, issued in Land Registration Case No. 4429, pursuant to Decree 36455 in 1917. As indubitably shown in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 14, 1977 x x x plaintiffs [private respondents] acquired the two properties in question, together with other several parcels of land, from Felicidad Rivera, Benito Rivera and Victoria Rivera, the legal heirs of one Bartolome Rivera. Bartolome Rivera and other co-plaintiffs are the successors-in-interests to the undivided share of Maria Concepcion Vidal in several parcels of land under Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 982, 983, 984, 985, and 994, as duly established in the two Decisions rendered in Civil Case No. C-424 and in Civil Case No. C-1796 by the Court of First Instance of Rizal x x x As may be seen, Maria Concepcion Vidal was one of the original co-owners of the properties registered under the Original Certificate of Title No. 994, issued by the Land Registration Court in Land Registration Case No. 4429, pursuant to Decree NO. 36455 x x x Thus, in said Decision x x x dated December 29, 1965, it ordered a partition of the subject properties among the plaintiffs being the successors-in-interest of Maria Concepcion Vidal. It bears emphasis that in said Decision of December 29, 1965 x x x it states, in part, to wit: x x x This undivided share of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, consisting of 1-189/1000 per cent of the properties described in Original Certificates of Title Nos. 982, 983, 984, 985 and 994, has never been sold or disposed of by said Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, and therefore, her said share now belongs to the herein plaintiffs who are the surviving heirs of the said Maria de la Concepcion Vidal and entitled to said undivided share in the following proportions: Bartolome Rivera, 1/3 of 1-189/1000 per cent x x x These plaintiffs, therefore, are now co-owners of the parcels of land described in Original Certificates of Title Nos. 982, 983, 984, 985 and 994, in the aforestated proportions and entitled to demand the partition of said properties. (emphasis supplied) Evidently, the sale of the property by Jose Eugenio to defendant Luis Gonzaga on November 29, 1960 has no valid basis. In final focus is the Court Order issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal x x x in Civil Case No. C-1796 ordering the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in favor of plaintiffs [private respondents] over several parcels of land including the two lots in question. xxx Considering the findings and the dispositive portion of the Decision of the then Court of First Instance x x x to the effect that there being no valid ground why the torrens title should not be issued to the petitioners x x x [private respondents], considering the deed of sale executed by Victoria, Benito and Felicidad all surnamed Rivera x x x in favor of petitioners [private respondents] were duly acknowledged before a notary public and the same found to be regular and in due form, thereby divesting the land in fee simple form, the registered owner Bartolome Rivera or his heirs in favor of petitioners x x x [private respondents] their corresponding technical descriptions having been approved and verified by the Bureau of Lands, this Court finds plaintiffs [private respondents] rights and title over the properties in question indubitably established. True, it is that defendants [petitioners] title was issued by a Cadastral Court in Cadastral Case No. 34, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 1106, which was undeniably subsequent to the Land Registration Case No. 4429 of 1917 x x x but well-settled in a catenna [sic] of cases is the doctrine that in a cadastral case the Court has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is NULL and VOID.[12]

Accordingly, the court a quo rendered judgment declaring private respondents TCT No. C-26086 as valid and legal and ordering the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City to cancel Gonzagas TCT No. 81338 and petitioner Mascarias TCT No. 48079, the same being null and void. Petitioners appealed that decision to the respondent court. Petitioners reiterated specific errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, especially as regards appreciation of the document denominated as Report and Recommendation issued by the Land Registration Commission (LRC). Said document was formally offered by petitioner Mascarias[13] but had been apparently ignored by the court a quo and considered of little probative value by respondent court for being a mere xerox copy. In that Report and Recommendation, the LRC concluded that all titles emanating from Bartolome Rivera under OCT No. 994 have been issued through fraud and misrepresentation essentially because Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, indicated on the LRC records to have died at the age of only nine (9) years old, could not have possibly borne children, among them, Severo who is said to be the ascendant of Bartolome Rivera from whose heirs, in turn, private respondents purchased the subject lots. Likewise rebuffed by the respondent court, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was however denied in a resolution[14] dated November 13, 1990. The respondent Court of Appeals, in affirming the findings and ruling of the court a quo, gave nary a significance to the aforecited LRC Report and Recommendation. It ruled: While We agree with appellants [petitioners] thesis that their respective titles are valid, the same observation must likewise be extended as regards appellee [private respondent] Sevillas title, the contrary view not having been adequately substantiated through relevant and competent evidence. This benefit of the doubt stands notwithstanding the xeroxed copy of the Land Registration Commissions purported Report and Recommendation x x x the appended [sic] copy purportedly to be that of the Commissions report was merely a xerox copy and never a certified true copy thereof as expressly mandated by Sections 25 and 26, Rule 132, of the Revised Rules of Court as reiterated in Section 7, Rule 130, of the Revised Rules of Evidence. Moreover, worth noting is the fact that said xerox copy bore no signatures of the supposed officials who executed the same x x x No wonder the court a quo did not bother to lend any weight to this piece of evidence, notwithstanding the failure of Sevilla to interpose a timely objection thereto. The lack of objection may make any incompetent evidence admissible x x x But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence x x x Failure to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence does not give probative value to the evidence x x x Granting arguendo, that the Land Registration Commission issued such a report on February 2, 1981, We believe that the same suffers from a congenital infirmity as it could not have possibly overruled the final decisions of the various branches of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. C-424, enjoining Bartolome Rivera and his co-heirs to partition the properties described under OCT Nos. 982, 983, 984, 985, and 994 x x x Civil Case No. 4557, ordering the cancellation of the name of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal from OCT No. 994 and substitute in lieu thereof the name of Bartolome Rivera and his co-heirs; and in Land Registration Case No. 1796, in which the subject realty was ordered to be registered in the name of herein appellee [private respondent] x x x. Incidentally, LRC No. 1796, dealt with a Land Registration case which is a proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, and may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the state or notice by mail to those outside of it x x x. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res x x x Accordingly, in a registration proceeding, such as LRC-1796, instituted with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant x x x [private respondent] and ordering its registration in his [sic] name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49), herein appellants [petitioners] included.[15] Petitioners now come before us seeking a reversal of the aforecited decisions of the trial court and the respondent appellate court on the basis of the following issues: (1) (2) (3) Whether or not the trial court may invalidate transfer certificate of title which have [sic] been previously cancelled. Whether or not there is a cause of action against Luis Gonzaga. Whether or not the respondent court should rule on Mascarias motion to hold in abeyance.

(4) Whether or not Sevillas petition to order the City Register of Deeds of Caloocan City to issue Transfer Certificate of Title in the Name of the Petitioner in case #C-1796 in CFI Rizal Branch 32 Caloocan City is a proceeding in rem. (5) Whether or not Luis Gonzaga was barred from questioning the title of Sevilla for his failure to file a petition for review within one year from the decree of registration issued in favor of Sevilla.[16] Unfortunately neither can we accord petitioners the relief they seek. In fact, we must affirm the decisions assailed in this petition, for we are confronted with facts that are exactly the same as those that we have passed and ruled upon in the case of Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) vs. Court of Appeals.[17] The antecedent facts of that case are as follows: Jose B. Dimson was the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Balintawak, Kalookan City x x x and covered by TCT No. C15167 which was registered on June 8, 1978. Said parcel of land was originally Lot 28 of the Maysilo Estate (LRC 5268) covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 which was registered on April 19, 1917 pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in Land Registration Case No. 4429. It appears that one of the original owners of OCT No. 994 was the late Maria Concepcion Vidal married to Pioquinto Rivera. Among the four children was Severo Rivera y Vidal who died in 1907 leaving Bartolome Rivera as the sole surviving heir. Bartolome Rivera executed a Deed of Transfer and Conveyance in favor of Jose B. Dimson whereby he agreed to transfer twenty-five percent (25%) of whatever land he is entitled in Lot 28 and Lots 25, 26, 27 and 29, all of which are covered by OCT No. 994.

In an action for partition and accounting docketed as Civil Case No. C-424 filed by Bartolome Rivera and his co-heirs, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision dated December 29, 1965 ordering the partition of the properties described in OCT Nos. 994, 983, 984 and 985 among Bartolome Rivera and his co-heirs being co-owners and successors-in-interest of the late Maria Concepcion Vidal. In an Order dated June 13, 1966, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal approved the Deed of Transfer and Conveyance executed by Bartolome Rivera in favor of Jose B. Dimson over Lot 28 and directed the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel the name of Maria Concepcion Vidal from OCT No. 994 and to substitute the names of Bartolome Rivera and his co-heirs. In a verified petition docketed as Special Proceedings No. 732 filed by Jose B. Dimson, the validity of the court Order dated June 13, 1966 was confirmed x x x. xxx On the other hand, Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS, for brevity) claimed that it is the registered owner of Lots 2693 and 2695, both with an area of 599 square meters covered by TCT No. 41028 issued by the Register of Deeds of Kalookan City on July 29, 1940 and based on the Cadastral Survey of Kalookan City, Cadastral Case No. 34. It appeared that both lots covered or included the parcels of land owned by Jose B. Dimson x x x It further appeared on the face of TCT No. 41028 that it was a transfer from TCT No. 36957 which was derived from OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917.[18] In the present controversy, judicial adjudication hinges on the question as to who, between petitioners and private respondents, have the legal and valid title to the two lots. In resolving this question, we are bound by our ruling in the aforecited earlier case of MWSS, not only because the latter involved the same OCT No. 994 and the same Cadastral Survey of Kaloocan City under Cadastral Case No. 34, but also because we squarely dealt with and ruled upon this same issue in the case of MWSS. In that case we had ruled: The main issue to be resolved is: In case of overlapping titles, which titles should prevail. It is the contention of petitioner MWSS that since its TCT No. 41028 was issued in 1940 while the TCT No. 15167 of private respondents was issued only in 1978, petitioners title prevails over that of private respondents in point of priority of issuance. We do not agree. Although petitioners title was issued in 1940, it will be noted that petitioners title over Lots 2693 and 2695 both with an area of 599 square meters was based on the Cadastral Survey of Kaloocan City, Cadastral Case No. 34, while private respondents title was derived from OCT No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917. In the case of Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, this Court ruled that in a cadastral case the court has no jurisdiction in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is null and void. It must be observed that the title of petitioner MWSS was a transfer from TCT No. 36957 which was derived from OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917. Upon the other hand, private respondents title was derived from the same OCT No. 994 but dated April 19, 1917. Where two certificates (of title) purport to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails x x x. In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and the person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. Hence, in point of priority of issuance, private respondents title prevails over that of petitioner MWSS. Lastly, a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been registered and an earlier certificate for the same is in existence. Since the land in question has already been registered under OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, the subsequent registration of the same land on May 3, 1917 is null and void.[19] We empathize with petitioner Mascarias who may be a purchaser for value and in good faith, but whose title, which is only a derivative of the void OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917, could not possibly be of force and effect more than its parent title. Certainly the spring cannot rise higher than its source. WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

C-J YULO & SONS, INC., petitioner, vs. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SAN PABLO, INC., respondent. DECISION GARCIA, J.: Appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari are the Decision[1] dated December 19, 1997 and Resolution[2] dated April 30, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45392, reversing an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court at Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34, which ruled in favor of the herein petitioner C-J Yulo & Sons, Inc., in a suit for revocation of donation with reconveyance of title, thereat commenced by the petitioner against the herein respondent, Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc. The facts are not at all disputed:

On September 24, 1977, petitioner donated unto respondent a parcel of land at Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna with an area of 41,117 square meters and registered in its name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-82803. The deed of donation which also bears the acceptance of the donee recites the considerations therefor and the conditions thereto attached, to wit: WHEREAS, Donee is a religious corporation engaged in much (sic) humanitarian Christian work in Laguna and elsewhere, educating and forming the young, caring for the infirm and the aged in the fulfillment of its mission; WHEREAS, Donor recognizes the need for a privately endowed institution that will care for the homeless and destitute old people in the community, as well as the other senior citizens who for some reason or other find themselves without family with whom to live the last years of their life: WHEREFORE, Donor is willing, in order to help establish and support such an institution to donate the land necessary for its housing, as well as an area of land whereon it may raise crops for its support and for the sustenance of its residents; WHEREAS, Donee is willing and able, with the wanted help of Donor and of other benefactors, to establish, operate and maintain such a home for the aged. NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of all the foregoing premises, Donor hereby transfers and conveys to Donee by way of donation all its rights, title and interest in that certain parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-82803 of the Land Records of Laguna, the technical descriptions of which are recited above, subject to the following conditions and covenants, each of which is a material consideration for this Deed: 1. So much of the land as may be necessary shall be used for the construction of a home for the aged and infirm, regardless of religion or creed, but preferably those coming from Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna; provided that retired and/or aged priests may be admitted to the home; and provided further that any senior citizen from the area who has retired from business or work may likewise be admitted to the home, subject to the payment to the institution of such sum as he may afford for his support. 2. A Green Belt that is 15 meters wide shall be established and maintained by the Donor along the length of the land to separate and insulate it from the projected highway. 3. Such part of land as may not be needed for the residence and the Green Belt shall be devoted by Donee with the help of such residents of the home as are able, to the raising of agricultural crops for the consumption of the residents of the home, and of such other crops that may be sold to defray the cost of running the home and feeding its residents; provided, that should the area later become so fully urbanized as to make this limitation on use economically, impractical, any portion of the land may, with the written consent of the Donor, be put to commercial use by the Donee by leasing the same for wholesome and socially-acceptable activities; provided further that the rentals from such commercial leases shall be used, first, to meet the expenses of the home; second, to enlarge its population and expand its facilities; and finally for other charitable purposes in Laguna, in that order. 4. Donee acknowledges that Donors generous act will greatly aid Donee in accomplishing its mission on earth, and, recognizing the generosity of the Yulo family as the reason for such act, Donee undertakes to cause every year the celebration of masses for the intention of the various members of the family of Mr. Jose Yulo, Sr., on festive and solemn occasions in the said family. 5. Except with prior written consent of the Donor or its successor, the Donee shall not use the land except for the purpose as provided above in paragraph 1 hereof, nor sell or dispose the land for any reason whatsoever, nor convey any portion of the same except in lease for commercial use as provided above in paragraph 3 hereof, otherwise the said land with all real improvements thereon shall revert in trust to the Donor for prompt disposition in favor of some other charitable organization that Donor may deem best suited to the care of the aged. (Underscoring supplied). On the basis of the same deed, TCT No. T-82803 of the donor was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-91348 in the name of donee Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc. Thereafter, or sometime in 1980, the donee, for purposes of generating funds to build the perimeter fence on the donated property and the construction of a nucleus building for the aged and the infirm, leased a portion of the donated property to one Martin Gomez who planted said portion with sugar cane. There is no dispute that the lease agreement was entered into by the donee without the prior written consent of the donor, as required in the deed of donation. The lease to Gomez ended in 1985. The following year, 1986, a portion of the donated property was again leased by the donee, this time to one Jose Bostre who used the leased area as a ranch. As explained by the donee, it entered into a lease agreement with Bostre to protect the premises from vandals and for the electrification of the nucleus building of the home for the aged and in the infirm, which was named as Casa dela Merced. As before, however, the donee executed the lease contract without the prior written consent of the donor. After the termination of the Bostre lease agreement, the donee, for the third time, leased a portion of the donated property to one Rudy Caballes who used the leased area for fattening cattles. The donee explained that the lease agreement with Bostre was also for the purposes of generating funds for the completion of Casa dela Merced. Again, however, the donee did not secure the prior written consent of the donor. Hence, on September 20, 1990, pursuant to a board resolution, the donor, through its president Miguel A. Yulo, addressed a letter to the donee informing the latter that it was revoking the donation in accordance with Section 5 of the deed due to the donees noncompliance with and material breach of the conditions thereunder stipulated. In the same letter, the donor requested for the turnover of the donees TCT No. T-91348 over the donated property. In a reply-letter dated November 5, 1990, the donee, through Bishop Pedro N. Bantigue, D.D., denied any material breach of the conditions of the deed of donation and manifested its continued and faithful compliance with the provisions thereof. In the same letter, the donee refused the turn-over of its title to the donor. It was against the foregoing backdrop of events when, on November 19, 1990, in the Regional Trial Court at Calamba, Laguna the donor, alleging non-compliance with and violation by the donee of the conditions of the deed of donation, filed its complaint in this

case against donee Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Pablo, Inc., therein reciting the imputed non-compliance and violations by the donee of the terms and conditions of the deed of donation, as follows: a) non-construction of the home for the aged and infirmed in the lot despite the lapse of a reasonable and considerable length of time; b) present land use of the area is a cattle farm, the owner of which has a lease contract with the donee; and c) no prior written consent of the donor has been obtained for the present and actual use of the property donated, and accordingly prayed that the subject deed of donation be adjudged revoked and void and the donee ordered to return and/or reconvey the property donated. In its answer, defendant donee alleged that it was doing its best to comply with the provisions of the deed of donation relative to the establishment of the home for the aged and the infirm, adding that the leases of portions of the land were with the express, albeit unwritten consent, of Jesus Miguel Yulo himself. In the same answer, defendant donee interposed the defense that the donors cause of action for revocation, if any, had already prescribed because the leases were known to the latter since 1980. In a decision dated December 22, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment for donor-plaintiff C-J Yulo & Sons, Inc., thus: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for plaintiff and against the defendant, declaring the Deed of Donation dated September 24, 1977 (Exh. C) REVOKED, affirming plaintiffs revocation of the same in the letter dated September 20, 1990 (Exh. D). Defendant and all persons claiming rights under them are hereby ordered to immediately vacate the premises of the donated property and to hand over to plaintiff the peaceful possession of the aforesaid premises. To avoid multiplicity of suits, the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna, is hereby ordered to require the defendant to surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-91348 (Exh. B) and thereafter cancel the same and issue, upon payment of the required fees, a new Transfer Certificate of Title in favor of plaintiffs, with cost against the defendant. SO ORDERED. Therefrom, donee-defendant Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc., went to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45392. In the herein assailed Decision dated December 19, 1997,[3] the Court of Appeals reversed that of the trial court and upheld the donation in question, to wit: WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated December 22, 1993 is hereby REVERSED and the donation dated September 24, 1977 (Exhibit C) which conveyed title to the donated property in the appellees name is hereby UPHELD. SO ORDERED. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the same court in its Resolution of April 30, 1998,[4] donor C-J Yulo & Sons, Inc., has come to this Court via the present recourse on its sole submission that THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS (THAT THE REVOCATION OF THE DONATION BY PETITIONER WAS IMPROPER) IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE. We DENY. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts finding that the donation is an onerous one since the donee was burdened with the establishment on the donated property of a home for the aged and the infirm. It likewise agreed with the trial court that there were violations of the terms and conditions of the deed of donation when the donee thrice leased a portion of the property without the prior written consent of the donor. Likewise upheld by the appellate court is the ruling of the trial court that the prescriptive period of the donors right to revoke the donation is ten (10) years based on Article 1144 of the Civil Code, instead of four (4) years per Article 764 of the same Code, and therefore the action for revocation filed by the petitioner is not barred by prescription. Even then, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision, the reversal being premised on the appellate courts finding that the breaches thrice committed by the respondent were merely casual breaches which nevertheless did not detract from the purpose of which the donation was made: the establishment of a home for the aged and the infirm. We agree. Petitioner contends that the case at bar is similar to the 1995 case of Central Philippine University vs. Court of Appeals,[5] where the donee failed for more than 50 years to establish, as required, a medical school on the land donated, and where this Court declared the donation to have been validly revoked. To the mind of the Court, what is applicable to this case is the more recent [2001] case of Republic vs. Silim,[6] where respondent Silim donated a 5,600-square meter parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur with the condition that the said property should be used exclusively and forever for school purposes only. Although a school building was constructed on the property through the efforts of the Parent-Teachers Association of Barangay Kauswagan, the funds for a Bagong Lipunan school building could not be released because the government required that it be built on a one-hectare parcel of land. This led the donee therein to exchange the donated property for a bigger one. In Silim, the Court distinguished the four (4) types of donations:

Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2) remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous. A pure or simple donation is one where the underlying cause is plain gratuity. This is donation in its truest form. On the other hand, a remuneratory or compensatory donation is one made for the purpose of rewarding the donee for past services, which services do not amount to a demandable debt. A conditional or modal donation is one where the donation is made in consideration of future services or where the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges upon the donee, the value of which is inferior than that of the donation given. Finally, an onerous donation is that which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be more precise, this is the kind of donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more than the thing donated. Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the onerous type are the most distinct. This is because, unlike the other forms of donation, the validity of and the rights and obligations of the parties involved in an onerous donation is completely governed not by the law on donations but by the law on contracts. In this regard, Article 733 of the New Civil Code provides: ARTICLE 733 Donations with onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed. The donation involved in the present controversy is one which is onerous since there is a burden imposed upon the donee to build a school on the donated property. Here, the Court of Appeals correctly applied the law on contracts instead of the law on donations because the donation involved in this case is onerous, saddled as it is by a burden imposed upon the donee to put up and operate a home for the aged and the infirm. We thus quote with approval the terse ruling of the appellate court in the challenged decision: First, the violations of the conditions of the donation committed by the donee were merely casual breaches of the conditions of the donation and did not detract from the purpose by which the donation was made, i.e., for the establishment of a home for the aged and the infirm. In order for a contract which imposes a reciprocal obligation, which is the onerous donation in this case wherein the donor is obligated to donate a 41,117 square meter property in Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna on which property the donee is obligated to establish a home for the aged and the infirm (Exhibit C), may be rescinded per Article 1191 of the New Civil Code, the breach of the conditions thereof must be substantial as to defeat the purpose for which the contract was perfected (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, pp. 179-180; Universal Food Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 1, 18; Ocampo v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 551, 562). Thus, in the case of Ocampo v. C.A. (ibid), citing the case of Angeles v. Calasanz (135 SCRA 323, 330), the Supreme Court ruled: The right to rescind the contract for non-performance of one of its stipulations x x x is not absolute. In Universal Food Corp. v. Court of Appeals (33 SCRA 1) the Court stated that: The general rule is that rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only for such substantial and fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of the parties in making the agreement (Song Fo & Co. v. Hawaiian-Philippine Co., 47 Phil. 821,827). The question of whether a breach of a contract is substantial depends upon the attendant circumstances (Corpus v. Hon. Alikpala, et al., L-23707 & L-23720, Jan. 17, 1968). The above ruling of the Court of Appeals is completely in tune with this Courts disposition in Republic vs. Silim, supra. The donor therein sought to revoke the donation on the ground that the donee breached the condition to exclusively and forever use the land for school purpose only, but this Court ruled in favor of the donee: Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was not in any way violated when the lot donated was exchanged with another one. The purpose for the donation remains the same, which is for the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved way for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot. As in Silim, the three (3) lease contracts herein entered into by the donee were for the sole purpose of pursuing the objective for which the donation was intended. In fact, such lease was authorized by the donor by express provision in the deed of donation, albeit the prior written consent therefor of the donor is needed. Hence, considering that the donees acts did not detract from the very purpose for which the donation was made but precisely to achieve such purpose, a lack of prior written consent of the donor would only constitute casual breach of the deed, which will not warrant the revocation of the donation. Besides, this Court cannot consider the requirement of a prior written consent by the donor for all contracts of lease to be entered into by the donee as an absolute ground for revocation of the donation because such a condition, if not correlated with the purpose of the donation, would constitute undue restriction of the donees right of ownership over the donated property. Instructive on this point is the ruling of this Court in The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Court of Appeals,[7] viz: Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose certain conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy. x x x

In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation against the alienation of the property for an entire century, being an unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of ownership, should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically stated in said statutory provision, such condition shall be considered as not imposed. No reliance may accordingly be placed on said prohibitory paragraph in the deed of donation. The net result is that, absent said proscription, the deed of sale supposedly constitutive of the cause of action for the nullification of the deed of donation is not in truth violative of the latter, hence, for lack of cause of action, the case for private respondents must fail.

If petitioner would insist that the lack of prior written consent is a resolutory condition that is absolute in character, the insistence would not stand the validity test under the foregoing doctrine. What would have been casual breaches of the terms and conditions of the donation, may, in that event, even be considered as no breach at all when the Court strikes down such absolute condition of prior written consent by the donor in all instances without any exception whatsoever. The Court, however, understands that such a condition was written with a specific purpose in mind, which is, to ensure that the primary objective for which the donation was intended is achieved. A reasonable construction of such condition rather than totally striking it would, therefore, be more in accord with the spirit of the donation. Thus, for as long as the contracts of lease do not detract from the purpose for which the donation was made, the complained acts of the donee will not be deemed as substantial breaches of the terms and conditions of the deed of donation to merit a valid revocation thereof by the donor. Finally, anent petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals failed to consider that respondent had abandoned the idea of constructing a home for the aged and infirm, the explanation in respondents comment is enlightening. Petitioner relies on Bishop Bantigues letter[8] dated June 21, 1990 as its basis for claiming that the donee had altogether abandoned the idea of constructing a home for the aged and the infirm on the property donated. Respondent, however, explains that the Bishop, in his letter, written in the vernacular, expressed his concern that the surrounding area was being considered to be re-classified into an industrial zone where factories are expected to be put up. There is no question that this will definitely be disadvantageous to the health of the aged and the infirm. Thus, the Bishop asked permission from the donor for a possible exchange or sale of the donated property to ultimately pursue the purpose for which the donation was intended in another location that is more appropriate. The Court sees the wisdom, prudence and good judgment of the Bishop on this point, to which it conforms completely. We cannot accede to petitioners view, which attributed the exact opposite meaning to the Bishops letter seeking permission to sell or exchange the donated property. In Silim, supra, this Court ruled that such exchange does not constitute breach of the terms and conditions of the donation. We see no reason for the Court to think otherwise in this case. To insist that the home for the aged and infirm be constructed on the donated property, if the industrialization indeed pushes through, defies rhyme and reason. Any act by the donor to prevent the donee from ultimately achieving the purpose for which the donation was intended would constitute bad faith, which the Court will not tolerate. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. ALEJANDRO V. GERALDEZ- Donation Mortis Causa All provisions of a deed of donation should be construed together in case of conflicting statements in order to determine whether it is inter vivos or mortis causa. FACTS: Sps. Gavino Diaz and Severa Mendoza executed a Deed of Donation in favor of their children, Olimpia, Angel and Andrea Diaz. In the deed of donation, the Sps. Donated 8 lots, with reservations on certain lots, to their children and daughters-in-law and with conditions that they are not allowed to alienate the same to 3rd persons while the couple are still alive and that they shall continue to administer the same until their death. The donees manifested their acceptance in the same deed of donation. When Gavino died, Severa executed a deed of donation in favor of Angel and Andrea, giving the siblings each a portion of Lot 2377-A. When Severa died, Andrea sued Angel to have the lots 2377-A and 2502 partitioned. Teodorico Alejandro, the surviving spouse of Olimpia, moved to intervene claiming 1/3 portion of Lot 2502. The CFI ruled that the donation was a donation mortis causa because the ownership of the properties donated did not pass to the donees during the donors lifetime but was transmitted to the donees only upon the death of the donors. It, however, sustained the partition of Lot 2502 since it was an extrajudicial partition. Both parties appealed to the SC, Andrea contending that it is a donation inter vivos while Alejandro contending it to be mortis causa. ISSUE: Whether or not the donation is a donation inter vivos or mortis causa RULING: Donation inter vivos The donation is a donation inter vivos because it took effect during the lifetime of the donors as provided in Art. 729. It was stipulated in the deed that out of love and affection by the donors to the donees, the latter are donating wholeheartedly and unconditionally free from any kind of lien and debt. Likewise, it was accepted by the donees which is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa are never accepted during the donors lifetime. The reservation clause which provides that the donees cannot sell the lots to 3rd persons while the couple is still alive implies that the ownership already passed. Although there was a stipulation where the couple reserved to themselves the administration, ownership and rights over the properties mentioned, this should not be construed as to mean that ownership will pass only after their death. This refers to the beneficial ownership and not the naked title and what the donors reserved to themselves by means of that clause was the management of the donated lots and the fruits thereof.