Jesse Robredo and the Masbate Plane Crash: Towards Providing a Stricter Legal Safety Culture for Both

Public and Private Charters

Valdez, Ernest Aaron P. College of Law University of the Philippines 2012

INTRODUCTION The death of Jesse Robredo, the Department of the Interior and Local Government Secretary, brought much dread and morning to the Philippines. Robredo was an esteemed father and statesman, having received awards for actualizing the potentiality of Naga City from a shabby, underperforming city wallowing in corruption, to the efficient bureaucracy it is today1. On August 18, 2012, around 5:00 PM, the Piper Seneca plane carrying Robredo, his aide Police Senior Inspector Jun Abrazado, pilot Capt. Jessup Bahinting, and co-pilot Kshitiz Chand, crashed 200 meters off the shores of Masbate2. Abrazado managed to swim his way to safety after releasing himself from his seat; however, Robredo, Bahinting, and Chand were not as fortunate. Although hopes that Robredo was still alive flickered for two days, the DOTC, through the Philippine Coast Guard, confirmed the worst, after finding the DILG Secretarys body under the planes wing in an exhaustive search-and-rescue operation3. Robredo was supposed to leave Cebu via a Cebu Pacific flight. He had just attended a ground breaking of a new Philippine National Police Regional Training Center. Due to last minute changes, Robredo opted to fly to Naga via a private charter operated by Aviatour Flight School, owned by Bahinting. Robredo wanted to come home in haste to see his family, and rode a private charter instead.4

Y. Arquiza, Jesse Robredo Made Naga City a Happy Place, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/270553/lifestyle/people/jesse-robredo-made-naga-city-a-happy-place (last accessed October 9, 2012) 2 J. Cabiles and P. Tubeza, Robredo, 2 others missing after plane crash, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/252450/robredo2-others-missing-after-plane-crash (last accessed October 9, 2012) 3 K. Boncocan, Robredos body found Roxas, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/254488/robredos-body-found-roxas (last accessed September 25, 2012) 4 Ibid.

In the process of conducting investigations, the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), under Capt. William Hotchkiss III, found various problems with the plane. Text messages sent by Abrazado and Robredo to their family members revealed that planes right engine shut down midway through the flight, and could not be revived after multiple attempts5. The right engine will determine whether the problem was technical or mechanical in nature6. Another problem was that the Emergency Location Transmitter failed to function after the crash, which made it difficult to locate the plane at sea7. In interviews, Abrazado recounts seeing a directional map at the display panel flashing the words Aviation expires 18 or November 28 2010, a thought he concealed to put the Secretary of Interior at ease8. The CAAP was also speculating whether the engine fuel was diluted. The last problem, which was a general concern, was that the plane was already 40 years old9. The search operations have concluded, and the CAAP investigation is pending. Although technical and mechanical problems have yet to be determined, the mishap could have been avoided. The pilot could have foregone the security measures in haste. The maintenance crew, due to the number of planes arriving and departing in the aerodromes, might have negligently skimmed over the inspection process. In either case, the mishap could have been brought about by the failure to exercise due diligence to ensure safety.

Rappler.com, Plane locator failed to activate, http://www.rappler.com/nation/11122-plane-locator-failed-toactivate-caap, (last accessed September 15, 2012) 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Robredo crash: Coincidental questions, Romualdez, Babe, http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=840783&publicationSubCategoryId=66, (last accessed October 4, 2012) 9 C. Yamsuan, No sign of foul play in Robredo plane crash, say probers, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/267942/nosign-of-foul-play-in-robredo-plane-crash-say-probers, (last accessed October 9, 2012)

I. Statement of the Problem Despite no case having been filed against Aviatour or the CAAP, the issue of transcendental importance remains at hand: could the incident have been prevented? In line with the question, are CAAP officials or the private airline liable? Are there enough legal safeguards to prevent such incidents from happening? If there were, were they followed? A. The plane The facts before us reveal that the plane was already 40 years old, being manufactured in 197210. The plane had already experienced a minor mishap, landing awkwardly in one of its earlier flights, but showed no serious damage11. Earlier during the flight, Abrazado recalled seeing a display panel that said that aviation expired on 2010. The right engine malfunctioned while the carrier was still in operation, and efforts to restart the engine failed to revive the engine. As the tragedy was looming, one of the planes wings also broke off. After the plane had crashed into sea, the Coast Guard experienced difficulties locating the remains of the plane because the ELT failed to activate12. There were speculations that Bahinting told former Senator Sonny Osmena about planes being bought at a reduced price in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in the United States13. The type of plane the Piper Seneca has an extensive record of crashes. Sec. Robredo was also trying to make it in time to meet his family, and thus rode the charter in haste14.

10 11

Ibid. C. Santamaria, Meet the Piper Seneca, http://www.rappler.com/nation/10766-meet-the-piper-seneca (last accessed September 19, 2012) 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid.

There is no proof pointing that Bahinting and Chand exercise due care prior to embarking on the private charter operation. It is also assumed that the maintenance crew also failed to follow the procedure in ensuring that all the components of the plane were fully functional, due to the immediacy of the situation and the number of planes that arrive and depart from the aerodrome. B. The pilot Bahinting is a pilot who owns AviaTour, a business that offers private charters and tours. It is also a flight school, which accommodates local and international students such as Chand. Bahinting held a Commercial Pilot Licence and a Flight Instructor License, which qualify him as an aviation expert. To date, he has logged more than 5,000 flight hours, from being an aviation student in 1975 at the Mindanao Aeronautical School. He also holds an Aircraft Maintenance degree from the same school. He has the status of a local hero in Cebu, after flying through turbulence to transport cobra venom for a child15 The law presumes the carrier to be at fault in case of deaths or injuries are sustained while the aircraft is in operation, unless disproven16. The Civil Code provisions uphold a degree of utmost care and diligence that common carriers must adhere to. The law must impose a safety culture that binds the pilot, the maintenance crew, and government officials involved to minimize flight risks, as enforced by the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines.

15

T. Alberto-Masakayan, Ill-fated planes Bahinting an avid pilot, a local hero, http://ph.news.yahoo.com/illfated-plane-s-bahinting-an--avid-pilot---a--local-hero-.html (last accessed October 7, 2012) 16 Civil Code, art. 1756

II. Negligence, generally A. The Blacks Law Definition Central to the issue at hand is negligence. In relation to its definition according to the Blacks Law Dictionary, negligence is The failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation, or any conduct that falls below the legal standard established to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm, except for conduct that is intentionally, wantonly or wilfully disregardful of others rights17. The first definition implies a standard to be followed in similar situations. B. The Civil Code Definition The Civil Code definition of negligence is the omission of that diligence which is required by nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place18 The definition implies diligence by nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, the time, and the place. III. Existing Legislation Pertinent to Aircraft The Civil Code provides specific legislation pertinent to aircraft, and the obligations thereof, particularly in Book Four. Under Article 1732, airplanes, being engaged in the business of carrying and transporting passengers and goods, are classified under common carriers.

17 18

Blacks Law Dictionary, 1133, N, 9th Edition (2009) Civil Code, art. 1173

A. Article 1755 Article 1755, under subsection 3, Section 4 of the Book 4 of the Civil Code stresses the obligation of carriers to carry their passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. It is clear, by the very rule of verba legis, that the law expects utmost care and meticulousness of those held responsible for transport through common carriers. B. Article 1756 Article 1756 answers the question of imputability. Article 1756 of the Civil Code presumes that common carriers were at fault or have acted negligently, unless proven otherwise as prescribed in Article 1733 and 1755. Article 1759 implies that common carriers are still liable if their employees negligence was the cause of the death or injuries of their passengers, no matter how small or big the fares are. C. Articles 1761-1763 Articles 1761 until 1763 cover the common carriers liability in the event that their passengers negligence causes deaths or injuries, even if the common carriers employees, with the diligence of a good father of a family, could have prevented said deaths or injuries. The Civil Code clearly presumes the common carrier to be liable at all times for the deaths and injuries in the process of transporting and carrying passengers or goods, unless it is proven that the common carrier exercised due care and utmost diligence in preventing deaths and

injuries. The law used the phrase the diligence of a good father of a family, implying that common carriers ensure their passengers are extremely safe, without regard to the fare. The provisions in the Civil Code are not without basis internationally. Article 1 of Chapter 1, as well as Articles 17, 20, 21 25, and 27 of the Warsaw Convention seek to make the carrier liable in case of damages incurred by the passenger aboard the aircraft or in any of the operations of embarking and disembarking19. IV. Cases Relevant to Negligence A. Pilapil v. Court of Appeals In Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the presumption of negligence against the common carrier is a disputable presumption, and that contrary facts may disprove the presumed negligence. In the case, the injury was outside the ambit of the common carrier to prevent, as petitioner sustained injuries after a bystander hurled a stone at him, injuring his left eye. The Court held that a common carrier is not an insurer of risks; the laws only bind him to perform his duties with extraordinary diligence. What the plaintiff suffered was outside of human foresight20. In the Robredo incident, Bahinting can be held liable, as it was upon him as a pilot to check whether the components of his plane were fully functional, such as the ELT and the right engine, and that his aircraft had safety vests in case of distress. There was no sign of turbulence or any air disturbances during the incident, and the accident was within human foresight had they checked pre-flight that the damaged components had to be replaced. B. Lara v. Valencia
19

The Warsaw Convention, as amended by The Hague, 1955, and by Protocol No. 4 of Montreal, http://static.vayama.com/pdf/warsawConvention.pdf, 1975, (last accessed October 12, 2012) 20 Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 33 (1989)

The case of Lara v. Valencia then asserts the negligence of the passenger according to Article 1761 of the Civil Code, which binds the passenger to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid injury to himself. Plaintiff, the wife of the deceased, sought to impute the defendant, who drove a pickup truck. The deceased was an accommodation passenger who merely requested that defendant take him to Davao, because no other form of transportation was available. Sitting in the rear area of the pickup truck, defendant fell at some point, sustained injuries, and died. The highest court held that the incident which befell the deceased was only an unfortunate happening due to an unforeseen accident. The Supreme Court conjectured that the deceased must have fallen asleep as the pickup passed through a rocky part of the road. The Court applied Article 1761 and reversed the decision of the trial court which held the defendant liable21. The Robredo incident again differs, because the incident was borne out of the failure to check whether components of the plane were functional. It can be contended that Robredo was allowed to board the plane at his behest because of his public position, and that he wanted to leave in haste, but the issue was that the accident could still have been prevented had the pilot exercised due diligence in inspecting the components of the plane and refusing the passenger once the faults were recognized. C.Necesito v. Paras The case that bears the closest resemblance to the Robredo incident is the case of Necesito v. Paras. German Necesito, husband and father of the two deceased, filed actions for damages against the carrier after the driver lost control of the bus, which fell into a creek,

21

Lara v. Valencia, 104 SCRA 65 (1958)

drowning Necesitos wife and injuring Necesitos child. The Court of First Instance found out that the bus traversed in a road with a bad condition, thus causing the fracture of the right steering knuckle, which was already defective prior to the trip, as it was bubbled and cellulous. The defective condition of the steering knuckle could not have been discovered prior to the flight, even though it was periodically checked and that there was no finding of recklessness on the driver. The highest court ruled that the incident was due to a fortuitous event, caused by the reduced strength of the steering knuckle, caused by the defects in its manufacture and casting. The issue boiled down to whether the common carrier was also liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle. The Supreme Court still held the carrier liable, as the passenger has neither choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by the carrier. The Supreme Court held that the common carrier shall be held liable in case his equipment is flawed, and if those flaws were discoverable, since the passenger has no knowledge whether the carrier manufactured his means of carriage or relied on manufactured machines. The Court held that: In the case now before us, the record is to the effect that the only test applied to the steering knuckle in question was a purely visual inspection every thirty days, to see if any cracks developed. It nowhere appears that either the manufacturer or the carrier at any time tested the steering knuckle to ascertain whether its strength was up to standard, or that it had no hidden flaws that would impair its strength. And yet the carrier must have been aware of the critical importance of the knuckles resistance; that its failure or its

breakage would result in loss of balance and steering control of the bus, with disastrous effects upon the passengers.22 In the same vein, it was not ascertained in the Robredo incident whether Bahinting performed the necessary checks before the flight. What was known was that it underwent maintenance in November of the previous year. It was not shown that it was maintained in between 25-hour intervals. Yet, Bahinting, as a veteran pilot, must be well-aware that the engine was vital to the functioning of the aircraft. The diligence of a good father of a family requires him to ascertain whether the ELT of his plane was fully functional and that his planes had security vests in case of distress and turbulences. If hastening pre-flight procedures to meet the publics demand for public transport entails skimming over safety procedures, it would definitely lead to occasional accidents, due to failure to check the most important components of an aircraft, and the failure to supply tools and equipment necessary for distress situations. The government has instituted the Civil Aviation of the Philippines, and it is this authority that must enforce strict safety pre-flight and emergency situation measures. As the law demands an extreme of diligence from common carriers, it must assist in its pursuit of regulating quality public air transportation. V. Republic Act 9497 The President issued Republic Act 9497, entitled An Act Creating the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines. The CAAP was designed to restructure the civil aviation system, the promotion, development, and regulation of the technical, operational, safety, and aviation

22

Necesito v. Paras, 104 Phil. 75 (1958)

security functions under the civil aviation authority23. Like the Philippine Coast Guard, the CAAP is attached to the Department of Transport and Communication (DOTC), and such, allocations are derived from the DOTC. The CAAP is headed by its Director General and Board24, Stated in the CAAPs policies is its adherence to consider. (d) Ensuring the safety, quality, reliability, and affordability of air transport services for the riding public;25 Notable in said Republic Act is the creation of the Flights Standards Inspectorate Service (FSIS), which shall perform the following functions: (1) Airworthiness inspection (2) Flight operations inspection and evaluation Furthermore, the Board shall create, but not limited to, the following offices which will provide support to the functions of the FSIS, namely: Aircraft Registration, Aircraft Engineering and Standards, Airmen Examination Board, and Office of the Flight Surgeon26 There already is existing legislation and a committee devoted to the safety and airworthiness of aircraft. There must, however, be existing safety standards so fixed for aircraft, as much as standards are fixed for airmen. It is no question that the pilot, Capt. Jessup Bahinting,
23

RA 9497, An Act Creating the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines, Authorizing the Appropriation of Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2008/ra_9497_2008.html (last accessed October 11, 2012) 24 Ibid. 25 Rep. Act No. 9497 (2008), Sec. 21 26 Rep. Act. No. 9497, Sec. 40

had already been in service for decades, and it is highly likely the aircraft was already faulty due to its old age. Whereas the common carriers are liable for the deaths and injuries incurred by their passengers while aboard in the aircraft and while the aircraft is in the process of embarking and disembarking, there should be legislation fixing certain safety measures strictly adhered to, as well as standards for aircraft before an aircraft can truly be deemed airworthy. The FSIS is tasked, among other things, to conduct airworthiness inspections and flight operations inspection and evaluation, according to RA 9497. In its website, the FSIS, under its Airworthiness and Flight Operations Department, one of the FSISs function is to provide for a body of regulations relating to airworthiness of the aircraft, and to approve and inspect aircraft maintenance organizations. Legislation should provide a special and more refined legal standards that the FSIS can enforce, and measures that will deny flights if conditions are unfulfilled. VI. A Safety Culture for All Public and Private Charters in the Philippines The author wishes to propose a safety culture that will be binding on the pilot and his maintenance crew, as well as the FSIS, to minimize the safety risks and to ensure that the aircraft exiting any aerodrome in the Philippines shall have been thoroughly checked. Only through a culture that promotes safety will technical and mechanical errors be minimized. Although a tedious and repetitive exercise, the CAAP should make sure, through its FSIS, that more stringent technical and mechanical standards are met. The FSIS shall collate the standards and furnish their pilots and mechanics a checklist to ensure that the standards are met. Whereas aircraft fail to meet standards, the FSIS, through the CAAPs authority, shall refuse the flight of the aircraft, without regard to the nature of their duties. This is in line

Despite the CAAPs involvement in maintenance and quality checks, common carriers shall still be liable for deaths and injuries incurred by its passengers which are within its ambit and those from extrinsic causes. A. Safety Blacks Law Dictionary does not define safety, but it has a working definition for safe: Safe, adj. 1. Not exposed to danger; not exposed to danger; which is a meaning too broad and too absolute, as the standards set forth by the definition are clearly not attainable. The FSIS will be primarily tasked to center its operations on safety, to minimize the effects of pilot negligence and provide safety measures in case of accidents outside the pilots calculation. Safety, in the aviation sense, the acceptability of risk in a specific operation27. Another definition of safety is culled from Airservices Australia, which posits that safety is being in a situation where the risks of an aircraft accident or air safety incident are reduced to a level as low as reasonably practicable28. The law demands extreme care from the common carrier, but not absolute safety, hence, risks are still present, but kept at a low, and within measures that are reasonably practicable. B. Culture Culture here is construed in its corporate and organizational sense, where the organization adopts a specific mindset to keep the corporation or the organization working. As defined by Charles W. L. Hill, culture is
27 28

Flannery, John, Safety Culture and its Management in Aviation, University of Newcastle 2001 Airservices Australia, Safety Management Manual, 2001

the specific collection of values and norms that are shared by people and groups in an organization that control the way they interact with each other and with stakeholders outside the organization29. The keywords in this definition are norms, organization, and stakeholders. In organizational culture, its constituents are bound to norms that govern their actions within and outside of the organization. In another definition by MIT professor Edgar Schein, he says that culture is A pattern of shared basic assumptions invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaption and internal integration that have worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems30 This is the definition of culture which will be adopted herein, as it is suitable to the workings of the CAAP and the aviation industry. VII. Providing Legislation to Ensure a Safety Culture in Philippine Aviation The proposed legislation will seek to espouse a safety culture which will minimize the hazards and accidents in a heavily technical industry, the aviation industry. An ideal safety culture is defined as:

29 30

C.W.L. Hill and G. Jones, Strategic Management, 334 E.H. Schein, What is culture? In P.J. Frost, L.F. Moore, M.R. Louis, C.C. Lundberg, & J. Martin (Eds.), Reframing organizational culture (1991)

the engine that drives the system toward the goal of sustaining the maximum resistance towards its operational hazards, regardless of the leaderships personality or current commercial concerns31 In a paper entitled Safety culture: Theory and Practice, James Reason interposes that a safe culture can be engineered through an informed culture - that is - gathering information to better prevent organizational accidents. He espouses a reporting culture, where the stakeholders submit their information so the organization responds better to provide solutions32. The FSIS duty is to be the enforcing body, which will exercise its functions of certifying airworthiness, inspecting aircraft, monitoring airworthiness information, evaluating aircraft and its on-flight employees, and imposing violations upon those fail to measure up to the exhaustive standards that the FSIS will set. It will then be the goal of the FSIS, if not the entire CAAP, to prioritize safety above everything, to prevent so-called organizational accidents, defined as accidents which happen to systems or subsystems. They have multiple causes involving many people operating at different levels within their respective companies. Though extremely rare within any one domain, organizational accidents can have devastating effects on uninvolved populations, assets, and the environment33 Flight operations consist of many layers: the aerodrome personnel, the maintenance crew, the CAAP/FSIS officials, and pilots and co-pilots. Errors are like holes in each layer, eventually, eventually allowing for the probability of accidents to pass through. The idea is to make the
31 32

J. Reason, Achieving a safe culture: theory and practice, Vol. 12, Work & Stress, 294 (1998) Ibid., 294 33 Ibid., 295

layers reduce the size of hole only, as absolute safety is not attainable in aviation, and because the measures must be reasonable34. The legislation will be binding on both pilots and employees of public charters and carriers, as well as CAAP officials assigned in the FSIS. The safety culture will be engineered by setting certain goals enumerated in a checklist to be followed pre-flight. Central to the operation of the safety culture will be the Information Center, which will gather a history including logbooks, manuals, technical reports, and other pertinent documents - of recent casualties to determine the recurrent trends. The FSIS shall identify the technical and mechanical threats and hazards to produce a checklist that will offset or seek to prevent these threats and hazards. Legislation will be based off these possible dangers, and hereunder is legislation as an example, culling from errors that could have been prevented in the Masbate plane crash: First, the FSIS shall impose an age limit for planes. Seeing that the Piper Seneca was 40 years old by the time it had crashed, and that it needed a check every 25, 50, and 100 hours of use, certain care must be had with regard to older aircraft35. The FSIS shall impose a maximum age of 40 years old, with additional safety measures once the aircraft ages to 20 years of age. Second, the FSIS shall mandate the need for safety vests in every aircraft, even for private charters.

34 35

Ibid. 295 C. Yamsuan, No sign of foul play in Robredo plane crash, say probers, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/267942/nosign-of-foul-play-in-robredo-plane-crash-say-probers, (last accessed October 9, 2012)

The Piper Seneca was not equipped with safety vests, as Abrazado said that what kept him afloat the waters was his backpack36. None of the bodies recovered were wearing life vests, and none were reported to have been seen. In the absence of such, it is assumed that the plane was not equipped with life vests. Third, the FSIS shall mandate that the FSIS check on the aircrafts engines and turbines, to make sure that they function to a working level that will enable the aircraft to traverse the whole trip. Fourth, the FSIS should ensure the slats, spoilers, ailerons, flaps, elevators, rudders, vertical and horizontal stabilizers, winglets and in some cases the propellers, be checked for durability, as these control the drag, lift, and pitch of the aircraft. Fifth, the FSIS shall make a routine check of the aircrafts fluids, including the carriers fuel, the oil, and such. Sixth, the cockpit shall test correspondence with the control center, to test if communication is clear and viable. Seventh, reserve fuel, ELT, emergency lights, distress signals and the like shall be checked, to ensure that the aircraft is equipped in cases of distress. Lastly, the FSIS shall adhere to the standards and procedures set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regarding safety and implementation.

36

B. Romualdez, Robredo plane crash: Coincidental questions, http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=840783&publicationSubCategoryId=66 (last accessed October 1, 2012)

No aircraft shall be allowed to leave any aerodrome without complying to the necessary inspection conducted by trained officials of the FSIS. The safety culture shall strictly ban any flights37 that fail to comply with the heightened safety standards. Failure to comply will result in violations to be determined by the CAAP. The abovementioned measures are yet to be exhaustive. These measures are based off the Masbate incident, and the more information that the Information Center or Committee gathers, the more stringent legislation and the stricter the measures will be. VIII. Limitations of the Study The study has come up with a weak legislation based off only the recent events. The CAAP has no contemporary data regarding recent plane crashes, as the only present data they have is for year 2009. The proposed legislation came from a single incident, and no doubt there are many others in documentation that will contribute to legislation. The study also assumes that common carriers and the FSIS have the wealth of time and the financial allocations to execute such safety culture. Due to the number of flights and the time constraints on aviation operations, the proposed legislation might be too exhaustive and taxing on all stakeholders, and might thus curtail progress and activity in the aerodromes. The study might have also been helped by an interview from an actual official from the CAAP and the FSIS, but due to the time constraints, the author of the study was not able to

37

RA 9497, 2008, Sec. 39. Authority to Prevent Flight (a) The Director General is authorized to direct the operator or airman of a civil aircraft that the aircraft is not to be operated in situations where: (1) The aircraft may not be airworthy; (2) The airman may not be qualified or physically mentally capable for the flight; (3) The operation would cause imminent danger to persons or property on the ground (b) The Director General may take such steps as necessary to detain such aircraft or airmen.

schedule an interview with such officials, in view of his studies and his employment on weekends. The study did not delve into statistics, but was a case study based solely on what had happened in the Robredo incident. As such, the study did not investigate the aviation industrys common practices. One pressing question was whether private charters are allowed to accommodate passengers impromptu or upon request. Is it a common practice to skim over safety procedures? How often does the CAAP or the pilot check his engines? A more hands-on and in-depth study will no doubt yield more accurate legislation. IX. Related studies James Reasons Achieving a safe culture: Theory and Practice, is a mix of a theoretical and practical treatise on safety culture. Like this study, it tries to define a safety culture, albeit in a broader horizon. He tackles four issues, namely, (a.) unsafe cultures as a cause for the trajectory of organizational accidents; (b.) pathological adaptations of unsafe cultures; (c.) the recurrent accident patterns and their relevance to safe cultures; and (d.) the practical application and engineering of a safe culture. He espouses that an informed culture is central to a safe culture, and reinforces the concept of violations and punishment in an organization38 John A. Flannerys Safety Culture and its Measurement in Aviation provides a more indepth study of how safety culture penetrates the aviation industry. His study attempts to provide measurements to quantify the success of safety culture in its intervention in the aviation industry. He proposes that safety measures be quantified, and although the quantitative tasks are

38

J. Reason, Achieving a safe culture: theory and practice, Vol. 12, Work & Stress, 295 (1998)

meticulous, they will serve the aviation administration through feedback. He proposes that these measurements be answered in the form of surveys and questionnaires39. X. Conclusion It was held in Pilapil v. Court of Appeals that although the law expects a high degree of diligence and care from common carriers to provide safety, the common carrier cannot insure absolute safety40. However, it is not outside the ambit of the law to provide stricter legal safeguards and preventive measures pre-flight to assist in reducing errors, as stated in RA 9497. In the Necesito case, the Supreme Court said that It may be impracticableto require of carriers to test the strength of each and every part of its vehicles before each trip; but we are of the opinion that a due regard for the carriers obligations toward the traveling public demands adequate periodical tests to determine the condition and strength of those vehicle portions the failure of which may endanger the safety of the passengers41. Indeed, it may be an exhaustive and impracticable process to subject each and every aircraft to technical and mechanical checks for each and every flight, even if the carrier looks unscathed and relatively new; however, the toil and the hassles of minimizing the risk and ensuring that the aircraft is well-equipped to handle distress situations will be worth more than the disasters it will have to face in case of injuries and deaths to the passengers. The current Constitution places a high regard on human life, and a few hours of preparation will further reduce the risk that human lives are lost.
39 40

Flannery, John, Safety Culture and its Management in Aviation, University of Newcastle 2001 Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 140 (1989) 41 Necesito v. Paras, 104 Phil. 75 (1958)

The Civil Code repeatedly emphasizes the phrase the diligence of a good father of a family42. Secretary Robredo no doubt exercised such, foregoing his safety in order to see his family. It was unfortunate that upon his observance of such diligence that he had to suffer unforeseen consequences which could have been avoided. Hopefully, the government takes into consideration placing a primer on stricter safety guidelines to give the general public the safe society that they so deserve.

42

Civil Code, art. 1163

BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Airservices Australia, Safety Management Manual, 2001 Hill, Charles W. L. & Jones, Gareth R., Strategic Management: An Integrated Approach, Houghton Mifflin (2006) Rex Bookstore Incorporated Editorial Staff, The New Civil Code, 1949 Periodical Articles Flannery, John, Safety Culture and its Management in Aviation, University of Newcastle (2001) Reason, James, Safe culture: theory and practice, Vol. 12, Work & Stress (1998) Schein, Edgar Henry, What is culture? In P.J. Frost, L.F. Moore, M.R. Louis, C.C. Lundberg, & J. Martin (Eds.), Reframing organizational culture (1991) Internet Sources Alberto-Masakayan, Thea, Ill-fated planes Bahinting an avid pilot, a local hero, http://ph.news.yahoo.com/ill-fated-plane-s-bahinting-an--avid-pilot---a--local-hero-.html (last accessed October 7, 2012) Arquiza, Yasmin, Jesse Robredo Made Naga City A Happy Place, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/270553/lifestyle/people/jesse-robredo-madenaga-city-a-happy-place (last accessed October 9, 2012) Boncocan, Karen, Robredos body found Roxas, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/254488/robredosbody-found-roxas (last accessed September 25, 2012) Cabiles, Jonas & Tubeza, Philip, Robredo, 2 others missing after plane crash http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/252450/robredo-2-others-missing-after-plane-crash (last accessed October 9, 2012) RA 9497, An Act Creating the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines, Authorizing the Appropriation of Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2008/ra_9497_2008.html (last accessed October 11, 2012) Rappler.com, Plane locator failed to activate, http://www.rappler.com/nation/11122-plane-locatorfailed-to-activate-caap (last accessed September 15, 2012) Santamaria, Carlos, Meet the Piper Seneca, http://www.rappler.com/nation/10766-meet-the-

piper-seneca (last accessed September 9, 2012) The Warsaw Convention, as amended by The Hague, 1955, and by Protocol No. 4 of Montreal, http://static.vayama.com/pdf/warsawConvention.pdf, 1975, (last accessed October 12, 2012) Yamsuan, Catherine, No sign of foul play in Robredo plane crash, say probers, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/267942/no-sign-of-foul-play-in-robredo-plane-crash-sayprobers, (last accessed October 9, 2012)