Discrimination in Experiments Intergroup

to be Can cliscrimination trctced somesuclzorigirt as social conflict ar a history of hostiLity?Not necessarily.Apparently the rnere fact
of divisioninto grolLpsis enolLghta trigger discriminatory behuvior

by Flenri Tajfel

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fntergroup discrimination is a feature I of most modern societies.The pheI nomenon is depressingly similar regardlessof the constihrtion of the "ingroup" and of the "outgrouP" that is perceived as being somehow different. A Slovenefriend of mine once described to me the stereotypes-the common traits attributed to a large human group-that are applied in his counbry, the richest constituent republic of Yugoslavia, to immigrant Bosnians,who come from a poorer region. Some time later I pre.. sented this description to a group of students at the University of Oxford and asked them to guess by whom it was used and to whom it referred. The aImost unanimous reply was that this lvas the characterization appUed by native Englishmen to "colored" immigrants: . people coming pti*atily from the West Indies, India and ?akistan. The.intensity of discrimination varies more than the natule. of the phenomenon. In countrieswith long-standing intergroup problems-be they racial as in the U.S., religiousas in Northern Ireland or linguistic-national as in Belgium-tensionsreach the boiling point more easily than they do elsewhere. spite of rlifferIn ing econornic, culrural, historical political and psychological backgrounds,horvever, .the ottitudes of prejud.ice toward outgroups and the belwoior of discrirriination against outgroups ciearly display a set of common characteristics.Social scientistshave nafurally been concerned to hy to identify these characteristics in an effort to understand. the origins of . prejudice and discrimination.

logical causation. In The Functions of ciocultural milieu. This convergence is SocialConf.,ict; published in 1956,Lewis often consideredin terms of socia!Ie:rrnA. Coser of Brandeis University estab- ing and conformity. For instance,there is lished a reiated dichotomy when he dis- much evidence that children learn quite tinguished behveen two types of inter- early the pecking order of evaluations of group confl.ict:the "rational" and the "ir- various groups that prevails in their sorational." The forsrer is a means to an cief, and that the order remains fairly end: the con$ict and the attitudes that stable. This applies not only to the evalugo with it rbflect a genuine competition ation of groups tliat are in daily contacl between $oups. with divergent interests. such as racial grouPs in mixed environThe latter is an end in itself: it servesto ments, but also to ideas about foreign release accumulated emotional tensions nations with which there is Jittle if *y of various kinds. As both popular lore personalcontact. fn sfudies conducted at Oxford a ferv and. the psychological literah:re testify, nothing is better suited for this purpose years ago rny colleagues and I found a high consensus alnong children of six scapegoat. than a well-selected, These dichotomies have somevalue as and seven in their preference for'four analytical tools but they need not be foreign counhies. The order was'Amer. taken too seriously.'Most casesof con- ica, France, Germany and Russia, and flict between human groups, large or there was a correlation of .98 between small; .reflect an intricate interdepen- the preferences of subjects from tlvo 'dence of soiial and psychological cau- di#s1ss1 schools.As for adults, studies sation. Often it is difficulg and probably conducted by Ttromas F. Pettigrerv in fruitless, to speculate about what were the late 1950'sin South AJrica and in the the ffrst causesof real present-day social American South have shown tbat consih:ations. Moreover, there is a dialecti- formity is an important determinant of cal relation between the objective and hostile attitudes toward blacl<sin both the subjectivedeterminauts of intergroup places (above and beyond individuabtitudesand behavior. Once the process al tendencieb toward. authoritarianism, is set in motion they reinforce each other which is lcaown to be closely related to in a relentlessspiral in wbich the weight prejudice tcilvardoutgrouPs). o[ predominant causestends to shift conIike many others, were tinirousiy. For example, economic or so- rfrhese stud.ies, cial competition can.lead to discrimina- r concerned with attitudes rather than tory behavior; that behavior can then in behavior, ivith prejud.icerather than disa number of ways create attitudes bf crimination. Discriminatioq it is often prejudice; those attitudes can in turn said is more {irectly a function of the 'lead to new forms of discriminatory be- objective social situation, which somehavior tbat create new economic or so-. times does and sometimesdoes not facial disparities, and so the vieious cirele cilitate the erpression of attitudes; the attihrdes of prejudice may be socially is continued. invesbigativeappronches to this to The interdependenceof the two tylles leamed,or due to tendencies conform, Th" * taskcan be roughly classiffedinto two of causationdoesnot manifest itself only but they are not avery efficientpredictor categories.Some wor.kerssbess the so- in their mutual reinforcement. They ac- o[ d.iscriminatorybehavior. According to cial determinants of preiudice and, di3- to"ily converge because of the psycho- this view, psychological considerations criminatioa. Others emphasize psycho- logical effectson an individual of his so- are best suited to explaining and predict-

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FIRST EXPERII{ENT conducterl by the aurhor anil his colleagues utilized these six matricee. The nnr',hers representetl points (Iater trairslated into awards or penalties i.E money) to be assigned by a subject to other inilividuals; bycheclcing a box the srirlject assigneil the nunber of points iu the top of the box to oue persou anil the number in the bottom ol the box to ,nother person.; he tlid not koow the identiry of these people but only whether each was a member of his owu group or "the other group." (The groups had

been established by the experimenrersoh grounils tlat-were arti. ficial ancl ineignificant.) Each reatrix appeareil three ti-es in a test booklet with each row of nurnbers labeled to inilicate wbether tLe subject was choosing berween two members oI his own group (ingroup) otber.than himseU, two membere of the oritgroup or oue . me'.,her of the ingroup and one member oI the outgroup. Choices lyere scored to see if subjects chose'for fairness,maximu,m gain to their owu group or msximum difierence in favor of the ingroup.

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and functioning of attiing the genesis rudes;the trrctsof intergroup discriminntion are best related to, and predicted o[ from, objectiveindexes a social, econafure. nomic and demograPhic Although l ltave no quarrel lvith this vierv; I am leFt with a nagging feeling that it omits an important part of the story. The fact is that behavior torvard. outgroups shorvsthe samemonotonous similnrity a.srrttitudesdo, acrossa diversity of socioeconomicconditions. This apparent diversity may, of course, obscure an underlying common firctor of "rirtional" confict, of struggle to presele a sfattrs quo favorable to oneself or to obtdn an equitable share of social Another kind opportunitiesand beneEts. of underlying regularity is nonetheless common to a variebyof social sifuations and is an important psychological 9ffect o[ our socioculhual mi[eu. It is tbe assimilation by the individual of tfie various norms of conduct that prevail in his society. . Etot the prrrposesof this article I shall r define social norms as being an individual's expectation of hori others erpect him to behaveand his expectation of how others will behave in any given sobialsituation.Whether he does or does not behave according to these expecta-

tions depends primnrily on his understandingof lvhetirer or not and horv a situation relates to a specificset of exIf pectntions. a link is made betweenthe one ilnd the other-if an inclividual's understnnding o[ a situation in rvhich he ffnds himself is such that in his vierv certain frrmiliar social norns ale pertiuent to it-he behavesaccordingly. There is nothing nerv to this formulation; it is inherent in most studies and of discussions intergroup prejudice and discriminationthat stressthe importance o[ conforrniry.The p.oint I wish to ma]<e is broader. Conformily contributes to hostile attitudes and behavior torvard specified goups of people in situations that are usually characterizedby a history of intergr'oup tensions, conf.icts of interest and early acquisitionby individuals of hostile vielvs about selectedoutgroups. lVe are.dealing, however, lvith that is more general and goes a pr:ocess deeper than the learning of value jrrdgments about a speci-Ecgroup and the subsequentaeting out of accepted pl,tterns of behaviortoward that group. The child learns not only rvhom he should Iike or dislike in the complex social environment'to lvhich he is exposed but alsosomethingmore basic.An infividual his consb'ucts orvrr"web of social afi]iationi" by oppllong'principles of order

and simplification that reduce the comple.riby of crisscrossinghuman categorizations.Perhap.s most important printhe ciple of the subiective social order rve conshuct for ourselvesis the classifica'we" tion of groups as and "they"-as ingroups (any number of them to rvhich rve happen to beiong) and outgroups. may The criteria for these assignments vary according to the situation,and their emotional impact may be high or lorv, but in. our socielies this division into goups most often implies a competitive relation behveen the groups. In other of rvords; intergoup categorizations all kinds may bring into play what seemsto the in&vidual to be the appropriate form of intergroup behavior. What this essentially meansis that the need to bring somekind of orderinto our "social conshuction of reality" (a term recently used by Peter L. Berger of the Nerv School for Socia] Research and Thomas Luckmann of the University of Franldurt) combines with the hostility inherent in many of the intergoup categorizations to which we are continually exposed to develop a "generic norm" of behavior torvard outgroups. Whenever we are confronted with a situation to which some form of intergroup categori zation appears directly relevant, we are likely to act in a manner that discrimi-

IN GR OU P -OU TGR OU P C H OIC E S

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MAXIMUM GAIN FOR OUTGROUP MEMBER Y

mean choicee (colored uertical lines) are showa Lere" In the inter. group situation thb subjects gav significantly rnore points to tnembers oI their own group than to members of tLe'other group.In the intragroup nituations, however, the means.ol the choices.fell at. Rank ?.5, betwe'en the choices of maximum fairnese (brackets),

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nates agAinst the outgroup and favors the ingroup, If ttr.isis true, if drere exists such a generic norm of behavior toward outgroups, severalimpoltant consequences should follow. The ffrst is that there rnay be discrimination ag&inst an outgroup even if there is no reosottfor it in terms of th.e in&vidual's orvo iirterests-in terms of what he can gain as a result of discriminating against the outgroup. The is secondconsequence that there may be such discrimination in the ibsence of any previously eristing attitudes of hostility of disUketorvard the outgroup. And the third consequence,following directIy from the secbnd, is that this generic norm may manifest itself directly in behavior toward the outgroup before any attitudes of prejudice or hostility have been fo-rmed.If this reasoningis correct, then discriminitory intergroup behavior can sometimesbe e*pect"d Jven if the individiral is not involved in ach-ral (or even imagined) genfliqtsof interest and has no past history of attitudes of intergroup hostility. [t the Universily of Bristol, in collaba ! oration with Claude Flament of the Universify of Alx-Marseille, R. P. Bundy and M. J.Billig, I.have conductedexperiments designed to test this prediction and others that follorv from it. The main problem lvas to create experimental condidons that would enablew to assess the effects of intergroup categorizationper se, uncontaminxtsd by other variables, such asinteractions'among ind.ividualsor preexisting attitudes. We aimed, more. over, to look at the behaviorrather than the attitudbsof the subjectstoward their own group aod the obhergroup, to ensure that this behavior rvasof some importance to them and to present them rvith a clear alterirative to discriminating against the outgroup that rvould be a more "sensible"mode of behavior. Perhapsthe best meansof conveying the way these criteria were met is to describe.theprocedure we followed in the fi.rst erperiments and its variants in subrrqt rrit ones.Our subjects wele 64 boys 14 and 15 years old from'a stare, or "comprehensive,"school in a subru.b of Bristol. They came to the laboratory in separategoups of eight. AII the boys in each of the groups were from the same house in the sarneforrn at the school, so that the1,knew each other well before the erperirnent. The fust part of the e.rperiment served.to establish an intergroup categbrization and in the second part we assessed the'effects that cateof gorizationon intergroup behavior.

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INTERGROUP DISCRIMINATfON was a deliberate strategy in the ingroup.ourgroup choices (colored' curue) and fairness a deliberate strategy in the ingrtiup-ingrou.p (Cra.yl and outgroup'outgroup (btaclc) choices. This is inclicated by the fact that the frequencies of intergroup choices tlifierecl significandy from those oI the intragroup choices only at the exlreme points of the distribution, the points oI ma.',cimum fairness ancl of maximum dis. crimination. (For this analysis the tw:o lairest choices in each matrix, the two middle ones, lvsJs lnnksd together as 0 and deparlures in either d.irection were Ecored lrom 1 to 6.)

Inthe firstpart tl-re boyswere brought togetherin a lecture room and were told that.we were interestedin the study of visualjudgments.Forty clustersof varying numbers of dots were flashed on a screen. The boys were asked to estimate the number of dots in eachciuster and to record 'eacir estimate in successionon pr:eparecl score sheets.There wer'd trvo conclitionsin this first part of the experiment. In one condition, aftei the boys had completedtheir estimatesthey were told that in judgments of this kind some people consistently overestimate the number of dots and some consistently underestimate the number, but that thesetendeneies in no way relateclto ' are accuracy. the other condiUonthe boys In were told that some people are consistentiy.more accurate than others. Foru groupso[ eight servec] eac]rof t]re'trvo in conditions. After the judgments had been made and ha.dbeen ostentatiousiy "scored" by one of the experimenters,we told. the subjectsthat, since lve lvere also intei: estedin other lcindsof decision, lve \vere going to take advantageof their.presence to-investigate tliese as lvelf and that for

easeof c.oding.lvelvere going to group them on the basis of the visual iudgments they had just made. In actuality the subjects rvere assigned to groups quite at rand.om,half to "underestimators" and half to "overestimators" in the first condition, half to "better" and half to "worse" accuracyin the secondone. Irubuctions follolved tr,bout nabure the of the forthcoming task. The boys.were told that it would cousist of giving to othersrelvardsand penaltiesin real money. They would not know the identity of the individuals to whom they would be assigning these rewards.'and penalties since everyonewould have a code number. They rvould be taken to anothel room one by one and given in-formation as to which group they lvere in. Once in the other room they were to lvork bn their own in sepalate cubicl,es. eac.h In cubicle they rvould find a pencil and a booklet conbaining 18 sets of ordered numbers, one to . each page, It was stressedthat on no occasionrvould the boys be relvalding or penalizing themselves; they lvould always be allotting money to others.At the end of tle.task each boy would be brought back into 99

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S E c o N D E X P E R I M E N T i n v o l v e i l n e w m a t r i c e s . E a c h w a s .thee bottom pr . (as in rhe illustratiou at sented in four versions labelecL the choice was between membeis of this page) to inclicate whether two members of the sane Eroup; ' of ilifferent groups or berween points bact the ingroup member'g the intergroup choices sometin'es bottom row'' The ob' hacl them in the .o-tti-es in the top row "rra three variables on t'he jective nolv was to *"1y"" the influence of (MIP)' maximum joint m'aximum ingroup profit sublects' choices: of the ingroup (MIP') and maximum difierence in lavor ;;;, patterns in the (MD). These varieil according to ili'frerent member

ilifferent versions; in sorire Type L and Type B matrices anclin the one end of the matrix antl in casesthe maximg were together at Fdr' example'in the ingroup' other casesthey ln."" "i opiosit" eucls' the maximr:m ingroup over-outgroop t...iore oiiyp" 'C matrices were at oue enil antl the maximum profit and maximum ilifierence (colored twe\; in the oEtgroup'overioilet pront.at the other end' the three maxima \YeEeto' ingroup version oi tl" s"-e lltrices (blaclc Wpe\' Type B .gether at the right'hand encl of the mauiees the bther hand' distinguish the ingroup'ov".'oo,*ti-tip o"ttioot' -on (color)' the other two gains diference in favor- oi i"g'otrp from

as PAGE OF BOOKLET, presentiug a single matrix' is reproduced addition to checking a box' the a subject might have m".kecl it. In page subject fiileil'in the blanks below it to confirm his choice' The

he was in' The awarils rver heacling reminiled him which group and group; the subjet made to personsitlentified only by number Loi onry their group iclenrificatior 'icr nor know ,"h"-;il;;-r"".u

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the fust room and would receive the amount of money the other boys had awarded him. The value o.[ each point they were awarding tvas a tenth of a penny (about a tenth of a U.S. ceni). Afber these instructions were given, tle boys were led individually to tireir cubicles to fill out their booklets. On eachpage in the booklet there was one makix consisting of 14 boxes containing two numbers each.The numbers' in the top rolv were the rewards and penalties to.be awarded to one person and thosein the bottom row rffere those to be awarded to anolher. Each row was labeled "These are relvardsand penalties for menber No. of your group" o, "...of the other group." The. subjects had to in&cate their choicesby checking one box in eachmabix. On the cover of each booklet and at the top of each page was written: "Booklet for member of the group." were six mahices [see itlust afhere L tion on page g7] and each of them appeared three times in the booklet-. once for each of three $pes of choice. There wer.e ingroup choi.s, with the top and the bottom row signifying the rewards and penalties to be awarded to two members of the subject'sown group (other than.himself). Then there were outgroup choices, with both rows signify=og the rewards and penalties for a member of the other goup. Finally there were intergroup, or "r{i$grentia!" ehoices, one row indicating the rewards and penalties to be awarded to an ingroup member (other than himself) and the other. the points for an outgroup member. (The top and bobtompositio* of ingroup and outgroup members were varied at random.) The results for the intergroup choices were first scored in terms of ranks of choices.In each matrix Rank 1 stood for the choice of the tenn that gave to the member of the ingroup the" minimum . possible nurnber of points in that matrix; RanI<14, at the opposite exbeme of the matrix,'stood for the maximu:n possible number of points. Comparable(butmore complex) methods of scoringwere adopted for the other two kinds of choice, the ingroup choices aad the outgroup ones, and for comparisonof thesechoiceswith those made in the differential situation. The results ]vere sbiking. In making their intergroup choices a large majority of the subjects,in ail groupsin both conditions, gave more money to members of their own group than to members of the other group. All the results were-at a very high level of statisticalsign;fig*r..

-above both Rank 7.S, which represents the point of ma-xjmumfairness,La tn" mean ranla of the ingogp and outgroup choices. conbast the ingro,rp *nI ootln group .tvere closely &sbibuted _choices abou[ the point of fairuess.F,rrth", analysis made it elear that intergroup dis_ crimination was the delibera6 sdategy adoptedin making intergroup choices. Before continuing, Iet us revieW the situation.The boys, who knew each oth_ -erwell, were djvided into groups defined by flimsy and unimportauicritJri*. Th"ir own individual interests were not affected by_theirchoices,since they aiways assigned points to two other peopie and no one could know what any othlr bpy,, choices rvere. The amounL of monev were not trivial for them: each boy left the experiment with tle equivalerit of about a dollar. Inasmuch thuy.couid ", not know who was in their group and who was in the other group, Ihey'could have adopted either oT t o reasonable sbategies. They could have,chosenthe ma..cimum-joint-profitpoint of the ma.trices,which would mean.that the boys as a total group would get the most mon-. .or ey they 9_ut qf the experimenters, could choos'e pour*tof ma-ximumfairthe ness. Indeed, they did tend to choose the secondalternativewhentheir choices did not involve a distinction bebweenin_ group and outgroup. As soon as this dif_ ferentiatiotr was involved, however, they discriminated.in favor of the ingroup. The only thing we needed to ?o to achieve this lssuh was to associatetheir judgments of numbers of dots witd.the ..the use of the terms "yo* Soup,' and other group" iu. the insU.uctiins and on the bookletsof matrices. he results lvere at a very high level of statistical in _significaoce alt eight groups of eight boys. lfParately-gted In vierv of the consistency of the phenomenon we.decided to analyze it-further and also to validate it \\rith a d.ifferent criterion for intergroup categorization, We testedthree i"*ioops"of 16time with ae-stheic pref_ .boys each, -this_ erence as the basis of the division into . t_wogioups. The boys were shown 12 slides, slx of which wete reprod,uctions Kandinsky, and they were asked to erpresstheir preference for one or the other of these two "foreign pejnlg15.,, The reproductions were prJren*ted. with_ out the painter's signature, so that ha,lf of the subjectscould be assigned, ranat dom to the "KIee group" *a n*U to the "Kandin5\, group.,' The matrices&at confronted the boys

pT"$gs Kleei.nd sir by ll -by-Paul Wassiiy

subsequently itr their individual cubicles were different from those in the ffrst experiment. We were norv interested in as_ sessingthe relative rveights cjf some of the variables that may have pulled their decisions one dtection or the other.In in this experiment lve Iooked at three variabies:ma.timum joint profit, or the larg_ est possiblejoint award to both peopl!; ma-rimum ingryup profit or the largest possible arvard to a mernber of thJingroupr and ma.timum difference, or the largest posSible difference in gain between a member of the ingroup and a member of the outgroup inlavor of the former. ." There were' .four difierent mabices lsee tep illustration on o.pposite pagel. As'in the first experiment, there were three tfp"r of choice: between a member of the ingroup and a member of the outgroup, between tr,vomembers of the. ingroup and bebween two members of the outgroup. In the outgroup-over-ingFoupversion of Type A mabices (that is, where the numbers in the'top row representedamounts gtven to a member of the outgroup and in the bottom row to a member of the ingroup) th" tliree gains*jointprofit, ingroup profit and difference in favor of the ingroup-varied together; their maxima (mlxr.mum joint profft, ma.rimum ingroup profft and manmum difference) were all at the same end of the matrix. In the ingroupover-outgroup version, ingroup profit and difference in favor of ingroup went together in one direction and were in direct ssnflisl with choicesapproaching rna-rcimum joint profit. In the Type B ma bices outgro up-over-ingoup versions again represented a covariation of the three gain.1; in the ingroup-over-outgroup versiod,s, difference in favor of ingroup varied in the direction opposite to joint profit and ingroup profit combined. A comparison of the boys' choicesin the various mabices showed that ma-ri. mum joint profit exerted hardly any effect at aII; the efiect of mzuCmumingloup profft and ma.rimr::n difierence combined against madmum joint profft we,s shong and highly significant; the effect of maximum difierence againstma*''cimu:n joint piofit and ma..cim,ril i;group profit was also sbong and highly significant. In other lvords, when-thl subjects had a ihoice between marimjzi"99"_ profit f91 ali and maximizing the p_rofitformem,bers_cif their own group, ttrey acted on behalf of their o* [-oup. When they had a choice between proftt for all and for tleir own group lo*bined, as again.sltheir own gtrOup's win-

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-the were askedto do. It was enoughfor them ning more than . the outgroup at see themselves as clearly categorized' ,*.iifi." o[ both of these utilitarian ad- to an ingroup and'an oulgroup, flimsy o[ it vantages, rvas the ma'ximization dif- into wereimportant to as the criteria for this division ferenie that seemedmore even though the boys knew one another them. ,. \Sf , lvell before the erperiments, tierr orvn Evidence leading in the same firec' in individual gains oi.te not involved from the other hvo typesof tion emergecl their actions could their decisions and ehoice,bJrween two rnembersof the inof achieve the gi-eatest The.Face the DeeP tlvo members of the have been aimed'to f'gmonrDolt'erty group and.behveen BRUCE C- HEEZEN' good. Bv corunon iutgioup, the ingroup choiceswere eonand significantly nearer. to tire sistJndy then, that the generic joint proftt than were the out- Tt rvould' seem' or the oceanbotto-min more madmum I- oo* of outgroup behavior !o which ;;"id";[i[i. eight of.which1T"'in photographs, t of.which arein group ,.rui-"o& this lvas so in spite of than 600 iT" ioii"pr's, lrtl'ri'606'' -"" and that it "igh f:]l dl' )".1i^.'t.ft ani ci,ptions"providea full de' ifr" tn"t that giving as much as possible I have referrel dols exist :,;i;." t""fi a""iptif ns"provide I area' iil -""*tv uriexplored. In might have been lliiJ;r"i.";i of th" out$oup in the helps to distort what .il; ;il ;t " r.su.chfeatu' l t "t .tLt -{ H:9:-t-1.,'.' to trvo.memb-ers conduct' This norm decurrents, bottom currents' choices aPPlylng solely to them Pre- ;;;. reasonable iilas;- ilrUidity. trails, the tpirs'- autho-rsp.re' snd it"i,ttto"a il;";L G;i t'"6ks ; d cur r 1!1nt r oduct ion sented.tto *ttfli.t with the ingroup's in- termines behavior-as ot'her social norns i en! l-**::"t:'i [iTt ;ii;"fii ;"-;i;b I; " an in&vid'ual ffnds himself in' ceanogtaPhY'' terest. It simply would have meant giv- do-rvhen i"' ohloi?"t'o his view' the illus. 6so i;iJ,;i'"1;ii p'p.'oda cloth $25.00 ing more to ithe others" lvithout gt"t"g a situatioir to which, in never-motivepaPer$12.50 applies. Behavior is *.r] l"rt to "yout olvr." This represented" norrn grahritous d'is- less, bul it is a crude oversimphffcation therefore, a clear case of Exploring the Universe ttink that motives in social sihrations crtmination. We also included in the to more than calculations of Edition, Seconcl dxperiment;om.9 of the original include no Etlitor' s'econd. or that they can be derived LOUISE B' Y0UNG' Scicnce seif-interest Editeclbr g Edu ca' matrices used in the firit one, rvith rei;;' ;;; ; i,, i oii-ai' tio" fo r Co ntinui n under' a felv supposedly universal human ttt ori6ntationfor an. 'oi sults much the same as before' Again aii from iirt.' F.."i,ti,,g toward the outdrives such as aggression tl't. principles upon rvhich the the results in this erperirnent were at a rr"ilai.* b'o r':.1i u lt, this. on,o lnq? and so on: To :;il' ilt i "''il.t'i "imethodsandtature of high level of statisticalsignificance' sider, the need to "nUote i[r,t"t"tuggests the is a complex business'It oi L.prE"tation the universe' T-hereader in subsequentexperimentslve tested behave socially "t"";t tn.Gh the .use o[ orieinal involves a iong learning process; it is il'iltA';;"i, of the importance of fairness in making the ;rt,t;;:;;-i[e-atrit'iaes and moti*atiois based on the i:anipulation of qymbols and .his dis' choicei, the effect on the choices of scientistsrangrng-fromNervtor.r of light to the mod' and the and.abstractions;it implies the capaci$ 'Er'ottion ;ili;;"i-n? familiarity with the situation and their dibates over the ffi";;;;;l"si." for mociification of cJnduet when the uoon subiects' ideas about the choices that is..placed Emphasis cieation' ii".ii* irnd othe.s lvere making. Fairness,lve fourrd, situation changes-and social situations "f ;ii;"reil;r. oi =ti"nt" to art' philbsophv' static. To behave aPPro' an important determinant;'mostof never remd.in 6so 2oo Hi:i:,!l""OtI pp. llus.cloth $12.00 waschoicesmust be understoodas being priately is therefore z pow-erful social paper$6.50 the ancl,fa- motive, and attemPting to do so rheans a comPromisebetween fairne-ss to to'behave accord-ing one'sbest underlVe fgun{ An Introcluction to Stellar | "ori"g one'solvn groug' 1ha1 standing of the situation.-Judg*ents of only persistecl but discriirittation not by Atmospheres and Interiors situation rvhat dappropriate are determined Astronorny also increasedwhen the entire StaffScien'tist' Br EVA NOVOTNY, ttot*s, or setsof axpectations' social Ivlannedftiace{ruft Qentgr' .Houston' became more familiar to the subjects' hi;;i:' "\i;i;;; It seems clear that two such norms intdrmediate -".ttopttysic-s level' this intro' lvith familiarity there was also an in"i-itt" apply . explores the basic to i;;,i;; ' asked to were understood by our subjectsto oI steUar atmospheres crease (lvhen the boys lvere In*.tti""f on them: to the situation we'imposed' "on""ptJ such.topicsas radta' pred.ict the other subjects' beiravior) in -it ;',"f i;i*;i"rs- It iricludes " Thgy manmodel atmospheres' ;i;; ,;;;;i"i that other boys rvere "groupness" and "fairness." "o.v' qu e r v- 'il;r ; 'd- 'ii"-;:i i" " fo'* i tiol:,,"-1"191, ^tio'' iheit'erpectabion io achievea neat balancebetween o!.d flI l'i' fiscriminating. decenerate matLer' nrlstellarevblution' g l $9.s0 Much ,"*oitts to be done to analYze ti'. t*o, and one might asfllme that in 350 PP. approx. Fsll I971 ldnd of in greater detail real-life sihrabions the same it is : the entire phenomenou Nlolecuiar uantumMechanics and to gain a fuller understandingof its balance would aPPIy. Unfortunately real Q of examplesin too easyto ;hdk determining conditions, but some clear only An Introductionto go out the be made' Out- life nuhere fiairness would inferences can ah'eady Quanturn CltemistrY since grouPnessis often based is exlraordinarily wind.otv, Bv P.W. ATKINS' Oxford Uniuersily' This group discrimination more weighty'thau either guantum me' trigger ofi. In some-previous on. criterift b6ok introducesthe ideas--ot. easy-to l. Part II deils with the 'group conflict, such ns one preferring a painter ooi h*t never heard "fr"^r".'"i.-P;'t ot i ons-of th e-theory, while sfudies of' i;oi ro ;;'ib; of b"fo.. or iesembling someoneelse in " an account of aroniic and conducted6y U,rz"ter Sherif at tbe Uni"d "; ii;;'lii-;ft'ers one'slvay of counting dots' So-cialization *otl."t"t structure and spectra and further versif of Oklahoma, grouPs had to be propertiesof and unand maghetic. ;;-r;;il; eiectric sev- into "groupness" is powerful The rvork is available as a tlYo' placed in interue competition .for molecules. .has innumerabie valuable p"perbouirdset, or in one volume' lral days for such results to opcur lsee avoidaile; it ""f"-rn- o u n d ,I 7 - ? 5 . Ii also has some odd' side ef$ " clothb "Erperiments in Group Con-0'ict by functiotu. i'9i0 V;:'i'1P*1t',I, il1 230 pp' VoL iI (Part that may-and do-reinforce acute n4 25i PP.Pilet, each$5'50 lv{uiafer Sherif; ScrsNTrrrc Arvruntce'N, fects tensioirswhoseroots lie elseNovember, 1956]; in other situations intergroup ruheti. Plrhaps those educatorsin oul CXFORDW behavior of this kind can occur without societieswho from the ear]idirect confl.ict'ifit is basedon previously compehitive }ry UNIVERSITY are so keen on "teams" and existinghostility, Yet neither an objective est sihooling ir"** spiril could give-som-e thought to }g PRESS conflict o[ intelests nor hostility had any 200MadisonAvcnue, sideefiects' these rvhateverto lvhat our subiects the opeiationof relevance Ncw York, N.Y. 100.16

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