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Soldiers in the Court Room: The British Army's Part in the Kenya Emergency under the Legal Spotlight
Huw Bennett Version of record first published: 08 Nov 2011

To cite this article: Huw Bennett (2011): Soldiers in the Court Room: The British Army's Part in the Kenya Emergency under the Legal Spotlight, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 39:5, 717-730 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2011.629083

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The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History Vol. 39, No. 5, December 2011, pp. 717 730

Soldiers in the Court Room: The British Armys Part in the Kenya Emergency under the Legal Spotlight
Huw Bennett
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In April 2011, civil proceedings were launched in the High Court in London concerning alleged torture during the Mau Mau Emergency in Kenya, from 1952 to 1960. In this on-going case, the claimants allege that torture was widespread in Kenya, and that it was condoned by the British state. This article explains the background to the case and describes the expert evidence given by the author on the British Armys role in the Emergency. The historical evidence on ve issues is summarised: the command and control arrangements for the security forces, the nature of the intelligence system, the relationships between British and local security forces, the armys knowledge of human rights abuses and whether efforts were made to stop them, and army participation in screening and interrogation. In each case, it is shown how the British Army was deeply implicated in a system of mass repression of the civilian Kikuyu, Embu and Meru populations. Finally, the article examines the discovery of a vast cache of documents at Hanslope Park, which covers 37 territories during the decolonisation period. The discovery of some 8,800 les is likely to have a signicant impact on the understanding of post-war decolonisation.

From 7 to 14 April 2011, the High Court in London was the stage for the latest phase in a long-running debate about the Mau Mau Emergency, which took place in Kenya from 1952 to 1960. Ever since the State of Emergency was declared on 20 October 1952, heated argument has continued about the meaning of the rebellion and the efcacy and morality of the governments response. The most recent public contributions came with the publication of David Andersons Histories of the Hanged and Caroline Elkins Britains Gulag, in 2005, and Daniel Branchs Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya in 2009.1
Correspondence to: Huw Bennett, Defence Studies Department, Kings College London, at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Faringdon Road, Shrivenham, Swindon, Wiltshire, SN6 8TS, UK. Email: hbennett.jscsc@da.mod.uk ISSN 0308-6534 print/1743-9329 online/11/05071714 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2011.629083 # 2011 Taylor & Francis

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Five KenyansNdiku Mutua, Paulo Nzili, Wambugu Nyingi, Jane Muthoni Mara and Susan Ngondibegan civil proceedings against the British government in 2006. They are supported by the Kenyan Human Rights Commission in their claims for damages for personal injuries suffered between 1954 and 1959. The claimants allege the Foreign and Commonwealth Ofce, representing the British government, is responsible for torts (actionable wrongs) of assault and battery, and negligence. The claimants state they experienced mistreatment amounting to torture at British hands in Kenya. The FCO attempted to have the case struck out, and the hearings in April 2011 were a pre-trial application for dismissal on the basis that claims could only be made against direct perpetrators of assaults and/or their direct employer at the time, the colonial government in Kenya. In short, the FCO argued that the British government of today bears no responsibility for what happened in 1950s Kenya. The FCO view any remaining liability as resting with the Kenyan Government.2 The claimants dispute this on ve grounds. First, they argue the liabilities of the old colonial government passed to London on independence in 1963. Second and third, the British government was and is liable for instigating and procuring a system of torture and ill-treatment of detainees as part of a common design with the colonial authorities in Kenya, via the Army, and the Colonial Ofce. Fourth, in July 1957 the British government authorised a policy of mistreatment of detainees. Finally, the British government, as the paramount colonial power, owed a duty of care to prevent abuses.3 Mr Justice McCoombe found that the claimants had arguable cases, t for trial, on all ve grounds except for the issue of liability passing from Nairobi to London on independence. At this stage, the Court has not found there was systematic torture in Kenya, or that the British government is liable.4 Rather, the judgment delivered in July 2011 opens the door to a full trial, which will begin most likely in early 2012. The remainder of this article will explain the role I have played in advising the Court on the British Armys campaign in Kenya, summarising the evidence given in two witness statements. The evidence concerned the command and control situation in Kenya, the intelligence system, the relationship between metropolitan British forces and local security forces, knowledge of abuse, and military participation in screening and interrogation. This part of the article gives an overview of how the British Army was systematically complicit in torture and other human rights abuses during the Emergency. The articles nal section explores issues surrounding the new archival evidence uncovered by the court case. The migrated archive at Hanslope Park is now known to contain 8,800 les pertaining to 37 colonial territories in the post-war era. How this vast archive was lost, what it might contain, and the implications for future research are discussed. The Armys Role in the Kenya Emergency I began advising Leigh Day, the solicitors for the claimants, in February 2011. My doctoral research investigated the use of force by the British Army during the military phase of the Emergency, from October 1952 to November 1956.5 I prepared two

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statements for the Court, the rst was based on research already undertaken, and the second, using new material from Hanslope Park. A third statement for the full trial, based on a more comprehensive analysis of the Hanslope documents, is currently in preparation. The substantive advice given on the army was as follows. Command and Control In order to show the British government bears responsibility for abuses committed in Kenya, it is necessary to understand how the British Army was involved. During the Emergency control over the security forces was exercised through a dual mechanism: the direct chain of command, and the committee system. The system was convoluted, but designed to achieve maximum co-operation between the diverse arms of government working in the eld. The Cabinet ultimately balanced the competing views which, however, often coalesced. At rst the Governor, Sir Evelyn Baring, exercised his formal powers as Commander-in-Chief in the colony. Sir Evelyn co-ordinated police and army activities, who maintained their separate headquarters, but engaged in numerous joint sweeps through Kikuyuland. Baring chaired a Sitrep (Situation Report) Committee, deciding on Emergency policy. At the end of December 1952, Brigadier G.A Rimbault arrived to assume the post of Personal Staff Ofcer to the Governor. He held the position until 1 February 1953, when Major-General Hinde arrived as Chief Staff Ofcer. The battalions in Kenya reported to 70th (East Africa) Brigade, which came under the East Africa Command (headed by LieutenantGeneral Sir Alexander Cameron), itself subordinate to Middle East Land Forces.6 The Chief Staff Ofcer directed operations by the police and the military. He suggested policy changes to the Governors Emergency Committee for approval, and issued orders necessary to see the Committees decisions implemented.7 The Provincial Emergency Committees directed operations in their area under the chairmanship of the Provincial Commissioner. They carried out instructions from the Chief Staff Ofcer and issued their own orders. During joint operations, the Provincial Committee would nominate one ofcer to command. They were authorised to instruct the District Committees, and ensure co-operation among all government departments in re-establishing law and order. The District Committees exactly replicated their structure and function at the lower administrative level.8 Baring announced these new arrangements to the press on 10 April 1953. At the same time, he declared Major-General Hinde would be the Director of Operations. Each Provincial and District Emergency Committee (PEC and DEC) would comprise administration, police, and army representatives, and an unofcial European settler member.9 In June 1953, the command structure of the counter-insurgency was radically altered and the military and civilian chain of command was divided. On 7 June 1953, General Erskine was appointed the Commander in Chief to ensure that everything is co-ordinated at all levels between the Civil Government, the Police and the military (Army and Royal Air Force), and was given full responsibility for the restoration of law and order. The army, the Royal Air Force, the police and all colonial auxiliary and security forces were placed under his operational command. The civilian

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government was required to advise as to what methods were appropriate to restore law and order. However, responsibility rested with General Erskine.10 GHQ East Africa became an independent command, with Erskine directly responsible to the Secretary of State for War.11 As a result, Erskine operated within the existing committee system but reported directly to London. In February 1954, the Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir John Harding pushed through reforms to the committee system. They dissolved the Governors Emergency Committee, replacing it with the War Council, and abolished what had become the Deputy Director of Operations Committee (originally the Operations Committee). Only the Governor, the Commander-in-Chief, the Deputy Governor, and an Unofcial member (settler leader Michael Blundell) sat on the Council, which heard intelligence reports from GHQ and the Commissioner of Police once a fortnight.12 The War Council devised long-term plans for the Emergency. The system of Provincial and Divisional committees was retained, in order to promote inter-agency co-operation at every level. The relevance of this information for the court case is to show how the British government in London retained responsibility for the actions of the British Army, because the Commander-in-Chief reported directly to the War Ofce, at least from June 1953. The position in the early part of the Emergency prior to General Erskines arrival is more complicated, but is irrelevant to the case because the alleged torts arose from 1954. The Intelligence System The claimants allege that the abuse they suffered was not merely some accident or the product of a single rotten apple, but rather symptomatic of a wider policy. There appears to have been a dual strategic purpose to the abuses inicted on the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru peoples in the Emergency: rst, to terrorise them into submission; second, to extract information about the rebels by force. For the purposes of the case, it was necessary to explain how vital a part military intelligence played in the conict. At rst, the police, administration and army maintained separate intelligence systems. Visiting the Colony in February 1953, Sir Percy Sillitoe (Director-General of MI5) advised a re-organisation. At the pinnacle would sit the Kenya Intelligence Committee (KIC), under which existed Provincial and District Intelligence Committees, meeting at least once a fortnight.13 The Intelligence Adviser, seconded from MI5, chaired the KIC, with the Assistant Chief Secretary, the Assistant Commissioner for Special Branch, the Security Liaison Ofcer, and representatives of the Chief Native Commissioner and the GOC attending. It reported to the Governor and the Operations Committee. The Provincial and District Intelligence Committees reported sideways to the DECs and PECs, in addition to the KIC.14 In May 1953, the Kenya Intelligence Committee disbanded the extant Joint ArmyPolice Operational Intelligence Teams, and replaced them with a more integrated organisation. Instead, soldiers now served as Provincial and District Military

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Intelligence Ofcers within the Kenya polices Special Branch itself, aided by Field Intelligence Assistants (later re-named Field Intelligence Ofcers). They directly briefed the intelligence and the emergency committees and co-ordinated all intelligence activity in their areas.15 A report by the Intelligence Adviser demonstrated that while the police and army sustained close intelligence co-operation, they retained their independent command structures:
During the present Emergency, co-operation between the Special Branch and Military Intelligence has been very close. Apart from the valuable assistance given by the Army in furnishing ofcers to ll the posts of P.M.I.O., D.M.I.O. [Provincial/District Military Intelligence Ofcer] and, in some cases, F.I.A.S, senior military ofcers are represented on intelligence committees at all levels. The Intelligence Adviser maintains frequent contact with the Commander-in-Chief and the P.A. to the Intelligence Adviser daily visits G.H.Q., East Africa, to ensure close liaison with army staff ofcers planning future operations. G.II(I), East Africa, is in almost daily contact with S.B.H.Q. and an ofcer of similar rank is now attached to S.B.H.Q. for dealing with operational intelligence.16

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Away from the committee rooms, the police and army co-operated at every level on a daily basis.17 By the end of January 1955, the army employed 52 Field Intelligence Ofcersand planned to increase the number to 73.18 The close relationship between military intelligence and police Special Branch is pertinent for the issue of army complicity in abuses during screening and interrogation of detainees.

British Soldiers and Local Security Forces The question of which formations were actually part of the British Army is critical to debates about abuses in Kenya. Defenders of the army have, since the Emergency itself, claimed that abuses were committed by local security forces rather than British units. Such a stance is not supported by the available archival evidence.19 Apart from British battalions, the status of the Kings African Ries, the Kenya Regiment and the Home Guard need to be understood. The Kings African Ries were a regiment of the British Army. The KAR reported to the East Africa Command, and thence to the War Ofce in London, as did British regiments. The basic training regime and disciplinary standards (based on the Army Act) were the same for British and African regiments. During the Emergency, all military units received context-specic training before deployment at the East Africa Battle School, and they all worked from the same doctrine, The Conduct of Anti-Mau Mau Operations. Most ofcers in the KAR were seconded from British battalions for two or three years, and during the national service era, the KAR could afford to select high quality candidates as it proved a popular choice. The statistical evidence on the numbers of British Army ofcers on secondment in the KAR is illuminating. By April 1953, there were 227 of them, including 57 Captains. All KAR Commanding Ofcers were seconded from British battalions. The staff ofcers running the whole operation (a Lieutenant-General, two Brigadiers, three Colonels, ten LieutenantColonels, and ve Majors) all came from the regular army too.20

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The Kenya Regiment was also ofcered by regulars on secondment. The majority of the rank and le were European settlers, although a small number of Africans served with the unit. For administrative and nancial purposes the Kenya Regiment came under the Kenya Government, but for discipline and operations it followed the normal British Army chain of command.21 East Africa Command regularly issued orders to the Kenya Regiment and included them in its overall planning. During the Emergency, approximately 1,800 men served in the Regiment, which posted about 300 to the Kings African Ries.22 The relationship between civilian law and military law is complex because in the historical documents it is stated that there was no rm rule about which system should take precedence and in which circumstances. However, the Hanslope documents contain evidence as to how the position was decided in Kenya. This evidence is clear and conclusive in showing that the Army, including the Kenya Regiment and the Kings African Ries, were subject primarily to the Army Act. Consequently, the actions of the British Army were ultimately the responsibility of the British government, rather than the colonial authorities. A telegram from the Governors Deputy set out the policy:
In all cases where a charge is likely to be preferred against a member of the military forces, the Commander-in-Chief and the Attorney General consult as to whether it should be tried by court martial or in civil courts. Generally speaking, it would be appropriate, if the charge arises out of improper conduct whilst engaged in military operations, for the matter to be dealt with in court martial proceedings.23

The arrangement applied equally to British battalions, the KAR and the Kenya Regiment. Major Grifths of the 5th Kings African Ries was tried by Court Martial twice.24 The alleged shooting of an African under interrogation in Meru District in February 1955 by Sergeant Murray of the Kenya Regiment was referred by the Deputy Public Prosecutor to the military authorities as there appeared to be an element of negligence.25 Murray was convicted by Court Martial and sentenced to nine months imprisonment.26 The relationship between the British Army and the Home Guard is important to the court case because the Home Guards are known to have committed widespread abuses during the Emergency.27 The traditional view, which was advocated by the FCO at the pre-trial hearing, is that the Home Guards had nothing to do with the army. Although those members of this militia who committed abuses must take responsibility for their own actions, the army maintained a closer relationship than is often acknowledged. Major-General Hinde formally established the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru Home Guards in March 1953, primarily to deny Mau Mau the Reserves and enable the military to concentrate its efforts on destroying the gangs.28 The second task allotted to the Guard was gathering information on Mau Mau for the other branches of the security forces.29 Members were enrolled as Special Tribal Police, under the District Administration, with Colonel P. A. Morcombe acting as their colony-wide co-ordinator.30 In July 1953, GHQ formalised the army-Home Guard relationship, directing that Full use should be made of K.G. [Kikuyu Guard] units at all times by Police/Military Commanders.31

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The Home Guard needed substantial training, and the army was the only organisation in a position to offer it. By December 1953, regiments such as the Buffs found themselves providing longer term support to Home Guard posts.32 The Kenya Regiment assumed a leading position in training the Home Guard; they often commanded them on secondment as District Ofcers Kikuyu Guard. These personnel constructed ranges and gave shooting instruction.33 Some senior commanders made efforts to restrain the Home Guard, such as the Commander of 39 Brigade in November 1953.34 However, on a general level, the Home Guards abuses were allowed to continue. In other words, the British Army were prepared to turn a blind eye to Home Guard abuses because they were vital to the counter-insurgency strategy. Far from simply observing Home Guard abuses from afar, the army pushed for the expansion of the Guard, trained them, operated with them on a regular basis, and failed to intervene to stop their mistreatment of civilians and detainees.
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Army Knowledge of Abuse and Attempts to Prevent it Knowledge about abuses taking place and a subsequent refusal to take sufcient action to stop them went beyond the armys relations with the Home Guard. When General Erskine arrived, he noted a tendency to take prisoners and interrogate them with a view to extracting information by force.35 Writing to the Secretary of State for War in December 1953, he acknowledged indiscriminate shooting by the police and army until June 1953, and widespread beating and torture at police posts. Some Administration-run screening teams also used torture to obtain information about the Mau Mau.36 On 23 June 1953, Erksine issued a directive to the army and police, calling for strict discipline and proper, humane treatment of the inhabitants of the country.37 However, abuses continued, and Erskine knew CID investigations were being obstructed by the Administration.38 Under the command and control arrangements, the army had recourse to complain about their colonial counterparts to the War Ofce, so that the British Cabinet could consider how best to proceed. This option was not taken to halt abuses. The reason was that General Erskine came to view the imposition of tight discipline on the Home Guard in particular, but also other elements of the security forces, as bad for morale. There are numerous sources to support such an interpretation, but a note by Erskine to the War Council in June 1954 is especially telling. He intervened to prevent the prosecution of Home Guard members for murder:
I have always warned the Government that by accepting the Kikuyu Guard and arming them, the Government were accepting the aid of irregular auxiliaries who were not under my disciplinary control and that they must not expect the disciplinary standards which I should require from regular troops and police. As I understand it the Government have accepted this risk because of the obvious advantages to be derived from a loyal local force. I am convinced they are an essential part of the campaign . . . But it now appears to me that the Government are proposing to try for murder some of these men because they do not come up to the standard of conduct they would expect from their regular forces. It is important that the whole case should be studied before a decision is taken . . . I must warn

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the War Council that my opinion is that if these men are tried for murder they may be faced with a deterioration in morale and perhaps some desertion from the Kikuyu Guard.39

Despite the widespread and on-going reports of detainee abuse by security forces, the British Army worked closely with those forces in a number of ways throughout the Emergency. Efforts were made by the army to prevent the application of the rule of law to brutal elements. Attempts to reign in the security forces, such as Erskines orders on discipline issued in June 1953, were half-hearted and compromised in practice. Army Participation in Screening and Interrogation Screening occupies a central place in the court case because this process of mass questioning of suspects was notoriously brutal. Caroline Elkins book provides many disturbing examples of beatings and torture inicted during screening operations. Similarly, individual interrogations could often descend into brutality. Defenders of the armys role in Kenya, and the FCO in the court case, have argued the army played little part in either mass screening or interrogation. Again, the archival evidence suggests otherwise. Screening comprised a major security policy during the Emergency and required co-operation from administration, police and army to function efciently. The standard procedure was for the army to cordon an area, the police to arrest suspects for screening, and the Administration to question suspects with the aid of the Special Branch, Home Guard, local Chiefs and Headmen, military intelligence ofcers and hooded informers. Major Harington, the Provincial Military Intelligence Ofcer for the Rift Valley, described the screening teams as One of our main sources of intelligence. The army briefed all teams on the type of information they needed.40 The army participated in numerous screening operations throughout the Emergency. During 1952, the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers and various battalions of the Kings African Ries and the Kenya Regiment rounded up at least 5,892 persons. Between March and late June 1953, the army and police together had screened at least another 11,933 people. Forces involved included the Devons, the Lancashires, The Buffs, various KAR battalions and the Kenya Regiment.41 Army intelligence personnel also went to work in static screening camps dotted throughout the Emergency areas. In August 1954, two Army Field Intelligence Assistants were sent temporarily to serve on the interrogation teams at Manyani screening camp.42 The authorities in Nanyuki District advised close liaison between military intelligence and Administration screening ofcers.43 The East Africa Command exercised control over interrogation policy for all security forces.44 The evidence emerging at the court case supports the notion that the army condoned abuses committed during screening and interrogations. Finding the Hanslope Park Files The discussion so far has sought to give a avour for the kind of evidence being presented at the High Court, and the implications for our understanding of the British

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Armys conduct during the Emergency. Clearly the evidence offered here only scratches the surface; the Hanslope les on Kenya amount to many thousands of pages. An on-going problem is that, as of 11 August 2011, the FCO have failed to nd 13 boxes of top secret les relating to the Mau Mau rebellion.45 These possibly concern intelligence operations and controversial topics such as interrogation and the detention camps. So far, we can only guess at what is contained in the les covering the other 36 territories. Lord Howell of Guildford announced in the House of Lords on 5 April 2011 that the Foreign and Commonwealth Ofce intends to release the Hanslope les to the National Archives. The necessary selection process is likely to take several years.46 No timetable for this signicant work schedule has been made public. On 5 May, the Foreign Secretary released an internal review conducted by a civil servant, Anthony Cary, into how the Hanslope les were lost and what lessons should be drawn in the future, which is discussed below. On 30 June, the Foreign Secretary appointed Professor Tony Badger as an independent reviewer to oversee the selection, review and release process, and to Provide assurance to the wider public that the process is being carried out in accordance with my commitment to transparency.47 Professor Badger is Paul Mellon Professor of American history and Master of Clare College at Cambridge University. Some sources suggest senior gures in Imperial and Commonwealth History turned down the invitation to act as reviewer.48 How adequately a non-expert can oversee the process is a question which cannot presently be answered. The degree to which the release process is going to proceed in a transparent manner is open to question. On 6 July 2011, I asked the FCO to provide an index to all the 8,800 les, under the Freedom of Information Act. Having the index, or indexes, in the public domain would allow any interested party to assess the release process. The complete index could be compared with the les placed on the National Archives catalogue. Unfortunately, the FCO denied the request, arguing it would somehow have a detrimental effect on the process.49 The matter is currently undergoing an internal review, a statutory requirement before referral to the Information Commissioner. The report on the Hanslope Park les makes fascinating, if dispiriting, reading. The FCO had told the High Court that it no longer held any les on the Mau Mau period, a stance taken in 2005 and 2006 in response to FOI Act requests. It subsequently found 294 boxes of Kenyan material at Hanslope Park. Mr. Cary was asked to examine why the les were not identied earlier, and to develop an action plan to prevent another such failure in the future.50 It is notable that the report itself is heavily redacted to hide names and le references. The migrated archives of 8,800 les were returned to the UK on independence for four possible reasons: they might embarrass the British or other governments, they might embarrass public servants or security forces personnel, they might compromise intelligence sources, or they might be used unethically by the independent government. The Kenyan les were sent back in 1963. They include Executive Council minutes from 1939 to 1957, War Council minutes from 1954 to 1961, Council of Ministers minutes from 1954 to 1963, intelligence committee minutes from 1953 to 1961, and a complete set of Provincial and District Intelligence Summaries from 1953 to 1961.51

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The Kenyan Government asked for the les back in 1967, 1974 and the early 1980s. They were refused. Unsure whether these were public records, the FCO asked the Lord Chancellors Ofce and the Public Records Ofce (now the National Archives) for advice.52 By 1995, the PRO was arguing that these were not public records and they should not be accepted by the PRO. They thus fell into a limbo between the FCO and the PRO. The FCO never conducted a systematic review of what was in the les because they lacked resources.53 Gradually, the FCO came to believe the les contained little more than mundane administrative records, and that anything substantial in them would be replicated in Colonial Ofce records already in the National Archives.54 In August 2007, the National Archives advised the FCO that any signicant material should be duplicated in the Colonial Ofce London les, and thus the FCO should destroy the Hanslope les. Fortunately, someone in the FCO (whose name is redacted) objected to destruction, on the basis that the les contained much important information, which was being consulted by FCO Research Analysts, for example, on the Chagos Islands and Diego Garcia.55 That the nations professional archivists recommended the destruction of an incredibly important historical archive without even seeing it, is most alarming. Many academic historians, this author included, would simply be unable to pursue their research without the outstanding service offered by the dedicated staff at the National Archives. But present and future budget cuts to the TNA mean the chance of a repeat performance is not impossible. Another alarming conclusion drawn in the report is that not all in the FCO were poorly informed about the archives contents. The misapprehensions about administrative records replicated in London were only half believed, it being easier to forget about the FCOs sort of guilty secret.56 These problems were exacerbated by a senior management with little time for overseeing archives management.57 The report recommends that a full inventory is conducted to nd out what the FCO now holds.58 This is both reassuring and alarmingimprovement is imminent, but how could the situation be allowed to get so bad in the rst place? There are still serious resource constraints on FCO information management. These are exacerbated by FOI and the move towards a 20-year rule.59 So the potential for future mistakes remains. Finally, the report recommends that, as recently became the case, the Head of Records Management in the FCO should be an information specialist. An information specialist should also sit at the strategic level, or at least as the Head of the Information Management Group.60 Again, this is all most encouraging, but the inference that the Heads of Records Management and Information Management were not information specialists is worrying. Conclusion The evidence presented in London has argued that the British Army was integral to the reign of state terror throughout Kikuyuland in the 1950s. To some, this will hardly come as a surprise. For others the mounting evidence will do little to displace an in-built belief in British moral superiority. For historians of the period, the emerging documents do offer genuinely new insights into the dynamics of colonial violence. That

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violence was widespread is already known. The details about precisely how, why and with what consequences the state used violence in the Emergency are becoming clearer. The case brought at the High Court by survivors of torture during the Kenya Emergency has been facilitated by two turns in academic research in the last few years. The rst is that extensive work by David Anderson and Caroline Elkins has highlighted just how systematic the abuses were. Secondly, since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, writing on British imperial history, defence and foreign policy and strategic studies has taken a more critical attitude towards state power. Suggestions that British military power has been somehow more humane than that of other countries is coming under sustained scrutiny.61 Whether these studies can dislodge the inuence exerted by empire advocates, such as Niall Ferguson and Andrew Roberts, is debatable.62 Perhaps the evidence presented in London will erode what Richard Drayton calls the denial of the role of violence and terror in the making and keeping of the British Empire, which remains in British imperial historiography.63 If Draytons call is heeded, and the Hanslope archives promise to make it feasible, imperial history may now pay much closer attention to colonial violence.64 Based on knowledge of the Kenya les alone, it is obvious that the potential for detailed work on imperial intelligence, collaboration/loyalism, detention, and settler politics are possible, at a minimum. Of course the released les will have to be studied alongside as many other sources as possible to derive the richest interpretations. To a certain extent, the Hanslope les will conrm what we already know. They will also add much fuller conrmation to what were previously merely suspicions. The distinction between revealing anecdotal evidence and systematic bureaucratic records must be taken seriously. They will also add nuance. For example, the centrality of intelligence operations to counter-insurgency is well known. How intelligence operations happen in practice and how intelligence agencies function in counter-insurgencies is, by contrast, hugely under-researched. There are many reasons to be dismayed about the way in which these records were concealed for so long, and the terrible personal traumas required to bring them to light. But there are reasons to feel optimistic about the opportunities the new documents open up for research and, more importantly, for Britain to come to terms with the nature of its imperial past. Acknowledgements The author expresses his gratitude to Professors David French and Ashley Jackson for their helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to the editors for their encouragement. Notes
[1] Anderson, Histories of the Hanged; Elkins, Britains Gulag. For review essays: Carruthers, Being Beastly to the Mau Mau, 489 96; Ogot, Review Article, 493505; Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya. [2] The Hon. Mr. Justice McCoombe, Ndiku Mutua and Others and the Foreign and Commonwealth Ofce; coverage can also be found in contemporaneous press reports, in particular in The Times.

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[3] Justice McCoombe, Summary of Judgment. [4] Justice McCoombe, Summary of Judgment. [5] Huw Bennett, British Army Counterinsurgency. I have published the following on the topic: Bennett, The British Army and Controlling Barbarisation, 59 80; Bennett, The Mau Mau Emergency, 143 63; Bennett, The Other Side of the COIN, 63864; Bennett, Erskine, Sir George Watkin Eben James (18991965). [6] Percox, British Counter-Insurgency in Kenya, 195256, 60, 62, 69, 70. [7] Kenya National Archives [hereafter KNA]: CS/2/8/198: Functions of Emergency Committees etc, forwarded from J. M. Kisch, Secretary to the Governors Emergency Committee, to the Chief Secretary, Cabinet members, Provincial Commissioners et al., 19/3/53. [8] KNA: CS/2/8/198: Functions of Emergency Committees etc, forwarded from J. M. Kisch, Secretary to the Governors Emergency Committee, to the Chief Secretary, Cabinet members, Provincial Commissioners et al., 19/3/53. [9] The National Archives, Kew [hereafter TNA]: CO 822/486: Telegram from Baring to Colonial Secretary, 10/4/53. [10] KNA: AH/9/40: Emergency Directive No. 7, 17/6/53. [11] TNA: CO 822/457: Telegram from Colonial Secretary to Baring, 29/5/53. [12] TNA: WO 276/473: Emergency Organisation. War Council, WAR/C.6, 26/3/54. [13] KNA: DC/NKI/3/1/14: Letter from Potter, Chief Secretary, to all Provincial Commissioners, Commissioner of Police, and Heads of Departments, 4/3/53. [14] KNA: DC/NKI/3/1/14: Memorandum on the Reorganisation of Intelligence in Kenya Colony, 4/3/53. [15] Hanslope Archive [hereafter Hanslope. All cited Hanslope documents are drawn from my second statement to the High Court, dated 1/4/2011] DO 3/2: Reorganisation of Intelligence in Kenya Colony. Progress Report Aug. 1953 Part I, by the Intelligence Adviser, 6. [16] Hanslope: DO 3/2: Reorganisation of Intelligence in Kenya Colony. Progress Report August 1953 Part I, by the Intelligence Adviser, 7 8. [17] Kitson, Gangs and Counter-Gangs, 23. [18] KNA: WC/CM/1/1: The Operational Intelligence Organisation. Memorandum by the Kenya Intelligence Committee, 28/1/55. [19] Thornton, Minimum Force, 215 26; Bennett, Minimum Force in British Counterinsurgency, 459 75. [20] Bennett, Minimum Force in British Counterinsurgency, 465. [21] WO 276/542: Booklet The Story of the Kenya Regiment T.F. 19371959. [22] Parker, The Last Colonial Regiment, 206 07, 261. [23] Hanslope: CO 968/424: Telegram from Governors Deputy to Secretary of State, 12/12/53. [24] Bennett, The British Army and Controlling Barbarisation, 64 70. [25] Hanslope: CAB 19/4 Vol. I: Record of the Chief Secretarys Complaints Co-ordinating Committee, 7/3/55. [26] Hanslope: CAB 19/4 Vol. I: Record of the Chief Secretarys Complaints Co-ordinating Committee, 6/6/55. [27] See Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya, 55 93. [28] TNA: WO 276/411: Appreciation of the Situation, by Major-General Hinde, 5/3/53. [29] TNA: WO 276/200: Emergency Directive No. 3, Kikuyu Guard, 22/4/53. [30] TNA: WO 276/510: Ofce of the Director of Operations, Emergency Directive No. 3: Kikuyu Guard, 23/4/53. [31] TNA: WO 276/200: Emergency Directive No. 8, Role of and co-operation with the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru Guards, 15/7/53. [32] KNA: VP/2/22: Nyeri District Emergency Committee [NDEC] Minutes, 10/12/53 and 24/12/ 53. [33] KNA: VP/2/22: NDEC Minutes, 2/2/54.

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The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History

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[34] TNA: WO 276/170: Central Province Emergency Committee Minutes, 13/11/53. [35] Imperial War Museum Department of Documents: Erskine papers, Accession No.: 75/134/4, Report to the Secretary of State for War, The Kenya Emergency, signed Erskine, 2/5/55, para. 18. [36] TNA: WO 32/15834: Letter from Erskine to Secretary of State for War, 10/12/53. [37] Reprinted in Clayton, Counter-insurgency in Kenya, 1952 to 1960, 38 39. [38] TNA: WO 216/879: Telegram from Erskine to War Ofce, 7/1/55. [39] TNA: WO 276/474: Kikuyu Guard. Note by the Commander-in-Chief . WAR/C.114, 9/6/54. [40] TNA: WO 276/404: Letter from Major J. T. Harington, to Special Branch Rift Valley Province Headquarters, 7/11/53. [41] Bennett, The Other Side of the COIN, 648 49. [42] Hanslope: AA 45/26/3/2A Vol. I: Letter from Secretary for Defence to Secretary for African Affairs, 30/8/54. [43] Hanslope: AA 45/26/2A Vol. II Box 135: Screening Method and Policy Nanyuki District. [44] Hanslope: DO 3/2: Provincial Special Branch Circular No. 2, Operational Intelligence, 28/10/53. [45] Hansard, available from http://services.parliament.uk/hansard/Lords/bydate/20110811/writte nanswers/part102.html [46] Hansard, available from http://services.parliament.uk/hansard/Lords/ByDate/20110405/writte nministerialstatements/part012.html [47] Hansard, available from http://services.parliament.uk/hansard/Commons/ByDate/20110630/ writtenministerialstatements/part009.html [48] Condential information to the author. [49] Email to the author from Mary Pring, Information Management Group, FCO, 4/8/11. [50] Cary, The Migrated Archives. [51] Cary, The Migrated Archives, 1. [52] Cary, The Migrated Archives, 2 3. [53] Cary, The Migrated Archives, 4 5. [54] Cary, The Migrated Archives, 5. [55] Cary, The Migrated Archives, 6. [56] Cary, The Migrated Archives, 12. [57] Cary, The Migrated Archives, 12. [58] Cary, The Migrated Archives, 15. [59] Cary, The Migrated Archives, 17. [60] Cary, The Migrated Archives, 20 21. [61] Bennett, Minimum Force in British Counterinsurgency, 46061, 46768. [62] Drayton, Where Does the World Historian Write From?, 682. [63] Drayton, Where Does the World Historian Write From?, 676. [64] Drayton, Where Does the World Historian Write From?, 680.

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References
Anderson, David. Histories of the Hanged. Britains Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005. Bennett, Huw. The British Army and Controlling Barbarisation During the Kenya Emergency. In The Warriors Dishonour: Barbarity, Morality and Torture in Modern Warfare, edited by George Kassimeris, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, 59 80. Bennett, Huw. British Army Counterinsurgency and the Use of Force in Kenya, 195256. Ph.D. thesis, University of Wales, Aberystwyth. 2007. . The Mau Mau Emergency as Part of the British Armys Post-war Counter-insurgency Experience. Defense and Security Analysis 23, no. 2 (2007): 14363. . The Other Side of the COIN: Minimum and Exemplary Force in British Army Counterinsurgency in Kenya. Small Wars and Insurgencies 18, no. 4 (2007): 638 64.

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. Minimum Force in British Counterinsurgency. Small Wars and Insurgencies 21, no. 3 (2010): 459 75. . Erskine, Sir George Watkin Eben James (1899 1965). Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, online edn. Oxford University Press, 2011. Available from http://www. oxforddnb.com/view/article/97289; INTERNET. Branch, Daniel. Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Carruthers, Susan. Being Beastly to the Mau Mau. Twentieth Century British History 16, no. 4 (2005): 489 96. Cary, Anthony. The Migrated Archives: What Went Wrong and What Lessons Should We Draw?. FCO Report, 24/2/11, 22. Available from http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/migratedarchives; INTERNET. Clayton, Anthony. Counter-insurgency in Kenya, 1952 to 1960. Nairobi: Transafrica Publishers, 1976. Drayton, Richard. Where Does the World Historian Write From? Objectivity, Moral Conscience and the Past and Present of Imperialism. Journal of Contemporary History 46, no. 3 (2011): 671 85. Elkins, Caroline. Britains Gulag. The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya. London: Jonathan Cape, 2005. Kitson, Frank. Gangs and Counter-Gangs. London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960. McCoombe. Ndiku Mutua and Others and the Foreign and Commonwealth Ofce: Summary of Judgment, Case No: HQ09X02666. London: Royal Courts of Justice, 2011. Ogot, Bethwell A. Review Article: Britains Gulag. Journal of African History 46, no. 3 (2005): 493 505. Parker, Ian. The Last Colonial Regiment. The History of the Kenya Regiment (T.F.). Kinloss: Librario Publishing, 2009. Percox, David A. British Counter-insurgency in Kenya, 195256: Extension of Internal Security Policy or Prelude to Decolonisation?. Small Wars and Insurgencies 9, no. 3 (1998): 46 101. Thornton, Rod. Minimum Force: A Reply to Huw Bennett. Small Wars and Insurgencies 20, no. 1 (2009): 215 26.