Why did the CIA resist the arrest of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan?

By Dr. Ludwig De Braeckeleer

Thursday, March 23, 2006

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan has been demonized for selling nuclear technology around the world. In the post 9/11 era, the activities of his network raise fears that a terrorist group would manage to acquire and detonate a nuclear bomb in a major city. Although preventing nuclear proliferation is presented as a cornerstone of the US foreign policy, recent revelations indicate that the US government helped Kahn to escape justice. Moreover, the CIA is suspected of trying to cover up this enormous mistake.

On February 4th 2004, Dr. Khan, speaking in English on Pakistani national television, admitted "sharing" nuclear technology with other countries. Through a worldwide smuggling network, Dr. Kahn has sold the technology of ultracentrifuges . Dr. Kahn used a factory in Malaysia to manufacture key parts for centrifuges. One of his collaborators, B.S.A. Tahir, ran a front company in Dubai to ship centrifuge components to Libya, North Korea, Iran and possibly other countries.

Khan was born in Bhopal, India, in 1932. His family immigrated to Pakistan in 1952. A decade later, he moved to Europe to complete his studies. After attending courses at West Berlin University, he enrolled at the Technical University in Delft, Holland, where he received a degree in metallurgical engineering in 1967. Five years later, Khan received a Ph.D. in metallurgical engineering from the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium.

In May 1972, Khan joined the Physical Dynamic Research Laboratory, a subcontractor of Ultra Centrifuge Nederland. His first assignment was to investigate various possibilities to strengthen the metal centrifuge components that are exposed to severe stress during operation. Just a few days after his arrival at the Physical Dynamic Research Laboratory, Khan visited the advanced enrichment facility in Almelo, Netherlands. There, he became familiar with the aspects of Urenco centrifuge operations relevant to his own work. In fact, Khan had not been cleared to visit the facility. Nevertheless, he did so on several occasions. No one seemed to bother finding out why. In late 1974, he was charged with the task of translating the more advanced German-designed centrifuges documents from German to Dutch. During two weeks, he had unsupervised access to highly classified documents. On May 18 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test. In September, Khan wrote to Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to offer his expertise to Pakistan. In August 1975, Pakistan began buying components for its nuclear program from European Urenco suppliers. A physicist in the Pakistani embassy in Belgium, S.A. Butt, contacted a Dutch company to obtain electronic equipment, which is used to control centrifuge motors.

The purchases of many centrifuge components from Urenco suppliers and the behaviour of Kahn himself raised suspicion, as he inquired about technical information not related to his own projects. In October 1975, Khan was transferred away from enrichment work with the Physical Dynamic Research Laboratory as Dutch authorities became increasingly concerned over his activities.

Near the end of the year, Khan understood that he was being watched. On December 15, he suddenly fled the Netherlands for Pakistan, carrying in his baggage copies of the ultracentrifuge blueprints and contact information for nearly 100 subcontractors and

suppliers of Urenco. Dr. Kahn was convicted in absentia in November 1983 by Judge Anita Leeser. The Dutch court sentenced him to four years in prison for attempting to obtain classified information. Two letters that he had written to a former colleague reveal that Khan was asking for detailed information about ultracentrifuge components. On appeal the verdict was quashed because of procedural errors. The Dutch government elected to pursue the matter no further.

The file of the Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan was probably destroyed. There is, according to Minister Donner however "no clue" that the CIA has played a role .... Donner writes in a letter to the House that he believes it is likely that the file was destroyed in 2000 or 2003. That would have happened after the expiration of the retention period. That was early 2000 reduced from 25 to 18years. Earlier this year suggested Judge Anita Leeser-Gassan in the TV program NOVA that the CIA has the file disappear. Leeser Khan sentenced in 1983 to four years in prison, but the atomic spy has never served his sentence because of a procedural error. According Leeser is strange that the prosecution Khan at that time still has not sued. The CIA would have wanted to prevent the persecution of Khan course to follow. Khan stole in the seventies information in Almelo company Urenco, the uranium enriched. With that knowledge can make Pakistan a nuclear bomb. According to former CIA spy Richard Barlow Khan and Pakistan had free rein, so as to Americans the balance of power in the region to keep. Donner now wants the rules surrounding the destruction of files change. Work is underway on 'national criteria' to criminal files with 'particular political, cultural, social or scientific interest to maintain. Over the last few months, this story has taken a new twist. Ruud Lubbers, a former Dutch prime minister, revealed in August 2005 that the Netherlands was prepared to arrest Abdul Qadeer Khan 30 years ago. Dutch authorities came close to arresting Khan twice, first in 1975 and later in 1986, but the CIA requested that they let him act freely. This revelation is embarrassing to both the CIA and Dutch minister of Justice P. H. Donner, who was previously asked about possible CIA action concerning Khan, and told parliament ''that nothing of the kind has happened. The CIA had nothing to do with it''. Dutch intelligence had suspicions that Khan was stealing nuclear secrets in the Netherlands. They began to monitor him as soon as he arrived at the Physical Dynamic Research Laboratory. However, according to Lubbers, the country's security agency asked the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 1975, then headed by him, not to act against Khan. "I think the American intelligence agency put into practice what is very common there; just give us all the information. And do not arrest that man; just let him go ahead.

We will have him followed and that way gain more information," Lubbers told VPRO Argos Radio in an interview. The CIA's pressure against the Dutch authorities and its handling of Kahn's activities resulted in a disaster. Khan skilfully outplayed the CIA, manoeuvred around the international export controls of the IAEA, and acquired all the equipment needed for the fabrication of the A-bomb. Dr. Kahn would later recall: "My long stay in Europe and intimate knowledge of various countries and their manufacturing firms was an asset. Within two years we had put up working prototypes of centrifuges and were going at full speed to build the facilities at Kahuta." Lubbers said that, while he was Prime Minister in 1983, Dutch authorities could have reopened the case after the verdict was quashed. Once again, the Dutch authorities did not do so because of US pressure. "The man was followed for almost ten years and obviously he was a serious problem. But again I was told that the secret services could handle it more effectively," Lubbers said. "The Hague did not have the final say in the matter. Washington did." The State Department declined to elaborate about Lubber's remarks2. "It is not something that I feel we really have anything to say about because it deals with events long in the past, it deals with intelligence matters and for those reasons, I don't have anything to say about it." US State Department Deputy spokesman Adam Ereli said. Lubbers suspects that Washington allowed Khan's activities because Pakistan was a key ally in the fight against the Soviets. At the time, the US government funded and armed mujahideen such Osama bin Laden. They were trained by Pakistani intelligence to fight Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Anwar Iqbal, Washington correspondent for the Pakistani newspaper Dawn, told ISN Security Watch that Lubbers' assertions may be correct. "This was part of a long-term foolish strategy. The US knew Pakistan was developing nuclear weapons but couldn't care less because it was not going to be used against them. It was a deterrent against India and possibly the Soviets." By September 10 2005, this story had taken yet another new twist. The Amsterdam court, which sentenced Abdul Qadeer Khan to four years in prison in 1983, has lost Khan's legal files. The court's vice-president, Judge Anita Leeser, suspects the CIA had a hand in the documents' disappearance. "Something is not right, we just don't lose things like that," she told Dutch news show NOVA. "I find it bewildering that people lose files with a political goal, especially if it is on request of the CIA. It is unheard of". She had asked to see Dr. Kahn case files several years ago but they had disappeared from the archive. Mr. Lubbers admitted that succumbing to CIA pressure was a mistake but emphasized that in the cold war era "you had to listen to the Americans". Lubbers also claimed that Dr. Khan continued to "slip in and out of Holland illegally" and the CIA knew about it. Regrettably, the fact that the CIA forbade the Dutch secret service to arrest Khan allowed him to become, in the words of President George W. Bush, the "primary salesman of an extensive international network for the proliferation of nuclear

technology and know-how". Dr. A. Q. Khan is blamed for selling nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea and Libya but the CIA bears a significant share of the responsibilities for the worst case of nuclear proliferation in history. 1. Ultracentrifuges are fast rotating devices used to enrich uranium. Natural uranium contains 0.7% of 235U can be enriched to 3% which is suitable to fuel a civilian nuclear reactor. It may also be enriched to very high level for the making of nuclear bomb. 2. Daily Press Briefing. Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman, Washington, DC. August 9, 2005. (www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/50931.htm)
Dr. Ludwig De Braeckeleer has worked for the Department of Energy, taught at Duke University and Washington University in Seattle. He has a PhD in Science (Nuclear Physics) and currently teaches in Bogota, Colombia. Ludwig can be reached at Letters@canadsafreepress.com

How CIA "protected" A.Q. Khan

He was caught stealing designs from a Dutch uranium plant. Former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers in a radio programme says the CIA saved Khan from going to prison. LONDON: In a disclosure that is likely to embarrass American authorities, the former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers has revealed how the CIA protected the controversial Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan and saved him from going to prison after he was caught stealing secret designs from a Dutch uranium plant in 1975. Mr. Lubbers, who was Minister of Economic Affairs at the time, told a Dutch radio station on Tuesday that because of pressure from the CIA no action was taken against Dr. Khan and he was quietly allowed to return to Pakistan. "Copying secret designs" In a 35-minute programme on Radio Argos, which describes itself as the Dutch equivalent of the BBC, Mr. Lubbers said that Dr. Khan was then working for a company called FDO and his job allowed him access to the British-German-Dutch uranium enrichment facility, Urenco, in Almelo in the Netherlands. On one of his visits, he was allegedly found "copying" and taking away secret designs from Urenco. According to Mr. Lubbers, Dr. Khan was banned from entering Urenco and the matter was reported to the police but, surprisingly, the case was dropped and he was allowed to leave the country. He said he learnt later that the CIA told the Dutch authorities not to arrest him as they wanted to follow him in order to find out more about his activities relating to Pakistan's secret nuclear programme.

Hushed up Mr. Lubbers also said that the information was kept away from the country's Parliament, and the "scandal" became public only in 1979 thanks to a Dutch TV programme. Legal proceedings were launched against Dr. Khan and he was sentenced to four years' imprisonment in absentia. In 1985, Dr. Khan appealed against the judgement and the court ordered a retrial on grounds that proper procedures were not followed in the original trial. But, according to Mr. Lubbers, Dr. Khan was not put on trial a second time again because of pressure from the CIA. "A mistake" Mr. Lubbers, who was Prime Minister then, was asked in the programme why his Government succumbed to CIA pressure. He admitted that, looking back, he believed it was a mistake but said at that time the political climate in Europe was such because of the Cold War "you had to listen to the Americans." Gerard Legebeke, editor-in-chief of the programme in which Mr Lubbers was interviewed, told The Hindu that this was the first time such a senior Dutch political leader [Mr. Lubbers was Prime Minister for 12 years] had talked publicly about the CIA's role in protecting Dr. Khan at a time when American and European secret services were on his trail for smuggling nuclear material to build an atomic bomb for Pakistan. He said that Dr. Khan, who had a Dutch wife, continued to "slip in and out of Holland illegally" and the secret services including the CIA knew about it.

Why did CIA shield A.Q. Khan?

FORMER Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers in an interview to Dutch radio station on August 9 has
revealed that the CIA intervened on two occasions with the Dutch authorities to persuade them not to take action against the Pakistani proliferator, Dr A.Q. Khan. The first occasion was in the mid seventies when Dr Khan was caught copying the drawings and taking URENCO centri-fuge plant away. As the Dutch authorities were about to prosecute him he was protected by the CIA which intervened to stop the action. The second time was in 1985 when the CIA dissuaded the Dutch not to go ahead with a retrial ordered by the appellate court which entertained Dr Khans appeal against his conviction by the trial court on his

removing secret documents. According to Dr Lubbers, the CIA argued that if Dr Khan was left free they would be able to follow him and keep track of his activities in respect of the Pakistani nuclear programme. In the light of these disclosures of the former Dutch PM it is obvious that the CIA had continued interest in Dr Khan from the mid-seventies to 1985. Since 1987 was the year when Dr Khan boasted to Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar about Pakistan having assembled the bomb it is logical to expect that the CIAs interest in Dr Khan continued. Dr Khan has confessed that he was approached by the Iranian authorities in 1987 for transfer of nuclear technology and he started his proliferation to Iran from that period with the full approval of Gen Zia-ul-Haq. The CIA which was keeping watch over Dr Khan should therefore have known about Dr Khans proliferation to Iran and his black market contacts with Western European firms. Senator Kerrys Senate Committee report on the activities of Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) of 1992 has referred to the linkage between BCCI, Dr Khan, Iranian proliferation and the lack of cooperation on the part of the CIA in regard to its interactions with the bank. It is now established that BCCI, which was financing the Pakistani nuclear programme was also used by the CIA in the Iran-Contra deal. The CIA which should have kept a close watch on Dr Khan according to the disclosures of Dr Lubbers should have known about Dr Khans repeated trips to North Korea for missiles in exchange of uranium enrichment deal after Ms Benazir Bhuttos visit to Pyong-yang in 1994. In that case the US should have known about Dr Khans proliferation activity to North Korea from the very beginning. Against this background the claims of former CIA director George Tenet about the CIA coming to know about Dr Khans activities from the year 2001 onwards and US communicating its doubts about Dr Khan to General Musharraf and consequently his being removed raises problems of credibility. There appears to be a high probability that the CIA was watching Dr Khan from the mid-seventies and it was fully aware of proliferation network involving Western European companies, China, North Korea, Dr Khan and the Pakistan Army. That Carter and Reagan administrations decided to look away from Pakistan-China-West European companies proliferation network has been well researched and documented by many American authors and journalists. There is a view that Dr Khan has got away lightly because of the Pakistan Armys involvement in his activities and his ability to spill the beans in respect of the Armys connivance in Dr Khans proliferation. Now with the disclosures of Dr Lubbers it would be logical to speculate whether Dr Khan and the Pakistani leadership have not been let off lightly in spite of the proven proliferation perhaps because they are in a position to tell the world about the CIAs long connection with the nuclear walmart run by the Pakistani army leadership and Dr Khan. It has always been a mystery why the US administration was soft on China-Pakistan proliferation interaction in the 90s. It took some seven years after Pakistan officially admitted receipt of missiles from China, for the US to admit that. Till then, the Clinton administration pretended that it was still to make a determination about the receipt of Chinese missiles in Pakistan. While North Korea and Iran are denounced as rogue states, the US establishment rarely refers to the original proliferators, China and its partner, Pakistan. Even as the Bush administration concludes a deal with India to lift sanctions against civil technology transfer on the ground that India has behaved as a responsible nuclear power, some former American officials who were in the decision making loop have raised the issue whether this arrangement with India with irreproachable record on proliferation should not be extended to Pakistan as well, whose chief nuclear scientist, Dr Khan, according to Dr El Baradei Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, ran a nuclear walmart black market chainstore. Going by Dr Lubbers disclosures of the CIAs benign interest in Dr Khan going back three decades and the US having looked away from China-Pakistan proliferation, is the interest in extending the Indo-US nuclear arrangement to Pakistan purely a matter of principle or an attempt to prevent the roles of former

US administrations and some of the prominent officials in them being exposed for their activities in regard to global proliferation. While President George Bush and Secretary Rice may have chosen to make a clean break with the past and work out effective measures to deal with proliferation threat from non-state actors, they may face resistance from those former officials in the administration and the agencies who have been colluding with the nuclear walmart of Dr Khan, Pakistani generals, China and West European black market. Otherwise it is difficult to explain the interest of such people in demanding the same treatment for Pakistan as has been extended to India.