SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 384 U.S. 436 Miranda v.

Arizona CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA No. 759 Argued: February 28-March 1, 1966 --- Decided: June 13, 1966 [*] In each of these cases, the defendant, while in police custody, was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. None of the defendants was given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all four cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions, and, in three of them, signed statements as well, which were admitted at their trials. All defendants were convicted, and all convictions, except in No. 584, were affirmed on appeal. Held: 1. The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. Pp. 444-491. (a) The atmosphere and environment of incommunicado interrogation as it exists today is inherently intimidating, and works to undermine the privilege against self-incrimination. Unless adequate preventive measures are taken to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice. Pp. 445-458. (b) The privilege against self-incrimination, which has had a long and expansive historical development, is the essential mainstay of our adversary system, and guarantees to the individual the "right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will," during a period of custodial interrogation [p437] as well as in the courts or during the course of other official investigations. Pp. 458-465. (c) The decision in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, stressed the need for protective devices to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege. Pp. 465-466. (d) In the absence of other effective measures, the following procedures to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege must be observed: the person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Pp. 467-473. (e) If the individual indicates, prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease; if he states that he wants an attorney, the questioning must cease until an attorney is present. Pp. 473-474. (f) Where an interrogation is conducted without the presence of an attorney and a

statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the Government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. P. 475. (g) Where the individual answers some questions during in-custody interrogation, he has not waived his privilege, and may invoke his right to remain silent thereafter. Pp. 475476. (h) The warnings required and the waiver needed are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement, inculpatory or exculpatory, made by a defendant. Pp. 476-477. 2. The limitations on the interrogation process required for the protection of the individual's constitutional rights should not cause an undue interference with a proper system of law enforcement, as demonstrated by the procedures of the FBI and the safeguards afforded in other jurisdictions. Pp. 479-491. 3. In each of these cases, the statements were obtained under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege against self-incrimination. Pp. 491-499. Escobedo v. Illinois Facts. After being arrested and taken into police custody as a suspect in the murder of his brother-in-law, the petitioner asked to speak to his attorney. His attorney arrived at police headquarters soon after the petitioner did and was not allowed to speak to his client as the officers said they had not completed questioning. The petitioner also was not warned of his right to remain silent before the interrogation. He was convicted of murder and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed. He was then granted certiorari. Issue. If a suspect has been taken into police custody and interrogated by police without their request to see an attorney being honored, nor being advised of their right to remain silent, have they been denied effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment? Held. Yes. Reverse the petitioners conviction and remand the case. The Sixth Amendment protects the right to effective assistance of counsel. Here, because the police investigation focused on the accused as a suspect rather than a less specific investigation, refusing to allow an accused to speak with his attorney is a denial of this Sixth Amendment right. The incriminating statements he made must thus not be admitted into evidence. A law enforcement system that relies too much on the confession is more subject to abuses than one that depends on evidence obtained through skillful investigation. The result here recognizes this idea. People VS. Grospe FACTS - Manuel Parulan is a wholesale dealer of San MiguelCorp (SMC). He issued two checks in favor of SMC(P86,071.20 and P11,918.80) that were dishonoredfor insufficiency of funds.- The checks were received at the SMC Bulacanbranch, then forwarded to the SMC Regional Office inSan Fernando, Pampanga.- SMC Finance Officer deposited the check in BPI SanFernando, Pampanga branch.- (Parulans bank is Planters Development Bank inBulacan) SMC filed for violation of BP22 (1 st

check) and forestafa under par. 2d 2 (2 nd check) with the RTC inPampanga.- After hearing the facts and evidence, Judge Grospeof the Pampanga RTC dismissed the case because hesaid that the two essential elements, deceit anddamage, of the offenses charged occurred and tookplace in Bulacan. DECEIT took place when Parulangave the checks to SMC in Bulacan, with the falseassurance that it had sufficient funds. DAMAGE occurred at the moment the checks issued by theaccused were dishonored by the PlantersDevelopment Bank, the drawee bank, at Santa Maria,Bulacan which received them from the BPI, SanFernando, Pampanga branch for clearing purpose. ISSUES 1. WON any of the essential elements of theoffenses charged occurred or took place within the jurisdiction of RTC Pampanga.2. WON this petition for Certiorari places accused indouble jeopardy. HELD 1. YES- A person charged with a transitory crime may bevalidly tried in any municipality or province wherethe offense was in part committed. In transitory orcontinuing offenses in which some acts material andessential to the crime and requisite to itsconsummation occur in one province and some inanother, the Court of either province has jurisdictionto try the case, it being understood that the firstCourt taking cognizance of the Case will exclude theothers. ESTAFA under par 2d - Elements:(1) Deceit took place in Pampanga , where it wasuttered and delivered. The rule is that the issuanceas well as the delivery of the check must be to aperson who takes it as a holder, which means thepayee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is inpossession of it, or the bearer, thereof, who in thiscase is the Financial Officer of SMC(2) Damage took place in Bulacan , where thecheck was dishonored by the drawee bank.- Therefore, jurisdiction may be entertained byeither the Bulacan or the Pampanga court. BP 22 violation 2 Art. 315, par. 2(d) states: 'By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover theamount of the check - In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be continuing in nature. It is true that the offense is committed by the very fact of its performance; and that

the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check but also the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check. The case, therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan. The determinative factor(in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. However, it is likewise true that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of thecheck of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential ingredient of the offense is by itself acontinuing eventuality, whether the accused bewithin one territory or another. Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.- Jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the Information, which are controlling. The Information filed herein specifically alleges that the crime was committed in San Fernando,Pampanga, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Court below.2. NO The case was dismissed not on merits but on the erroneous conclusion of the judge that his court had no jurisdiction over the case. The dismissal being null and void, the proceedings before the RTC cant be said to have been lawfully terminated. Therefore, there is no second proceeding to place the accused in double jeopardy. Dispositive Petition granted. Judge is ordered to reassume jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 2800and 2813 of his Court and to render judgment of either conviction or acquittal in accordance with the evidence already adduced during the joint trial of said two cases

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BERNARDINODOMANTAY, @ "JUNIOR OTOT," accused-appellant. FACTS: Appellant, 29 years old, was charged with rape with homicide for the death of Jennifer Domantay, a 6-year old girl whose body was found in a bamboo grove with 38 stab wounds at the back and whose hymen was completely lacerated on the right side, though found fully clothed in blue shorts and white shirt. The trial court found appellant guilty as charged and was sentenced to death. Conviction was based primarily on the testimonies of SPO1 Espinoza and Celso Manuel, a radio reporter. SPO1 Espinoza testified that appellant confessed to the killing of Jennifer and disclosed to him the location of the bayonet used which was submitted as evidence for the prosecution. According to him, appellant waived assistance of counsel but the waiver was not put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel. On the other hand, Manuel declared that appellant, in an interview, admitted the brutal killing of Jennifer; that he was just outside the cell when he interviewed appellant accompanied by his uncle inside the jail, that the nearest policemen were about 2-3 meters from him and that no lawyer assisted appellant during the interview. Also presented as a witness was Dr. Bandonill, medico-legal expert of the NBI, who testified that it was possible that the lacerations on the victim could have been caused by something blunt other than the male organ. ISSUE: W/N the two confessions made before SPO1 Espinoza and Manuel which appellant claimed to have been obtained from him were admissible. HELD: The right to counsel of a person under custodial investigation can be waived only in

writing and with assistance of counsel and that confessions or admissions obtained in violation thereof are inadmissible in evidence. However, this prohibition does not apply to confessions or admissions made to private individuals, such as radio reporters. For an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the Malasiqui police station in the evening of October 17, 1996, he was already a suspect, in fact the only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer Domantay. He was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III, 12 (1) of the Constitution applied to him. . . . But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the waiver is invalid and his confession is inadmissible. SPO1 Espinoza's testimony on the alleged confession of accused-appellant should have been excluded by the trial court. So is the bayonet inadmissible in evidence, being, as it were, the "fruit of the poisonous tree."However, the SC agreed with the Solicitor General that accused-appellants confession to the radio reporter, Celso Manuel, is admissible. In People v.Andan, the accused in a rape with homicide case confessed to the crime during interviews with the media. In holding the confession admissible, despite the fact that the accused gave his answers without the assistance of counsel, this Court said: [A]appellants [oral] confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. PEOPLE v NICANDRO 141 SCRA 295PLANA; February 11, 1986 NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI Manila FACTS - Pursuant to information regarding the illegal sale of prohibited drugs by Nicandro, the WPD conductedsurveillance and organized an entrapment with theconfidential informant acting as the buyer of marijuana. With marked money, the informantasked to buy marijuana from Nicandro, and upondelivery of 4 sticks of marijuana cigarettes, the policenabbed Nicandro. The marked bills were recoveredfrom her pockets, as well as marijuana flowering top.- Allegedly, upon being investigated and after havingbeen duly apprised of her constitutional rights,Nicandro orally admitted having sold the marijuana,but refused to reduce her confession to writing. The prosecution relied principally on the testimony of Patrolman Joves, one of the officers who conductedthe entrapment. His testimony said when we sawthe accused handed the 4 sticks of suspectedmarijuana cigarettes to our confidential informantand after a prearranged signal was given by theinformant that the accused had already sold her themarijuana, we immediately nabbed said suspect and at the same time we identified ourselves as policeofficers.- When asked how he

conducted the investigation,Pat. Joves testified that the first thing I did was Iinformed the accused of her constitutional rights,then I questioned her about the marijuana that wereconfiscated xxx and she verbally admitted that shesold the 4 sticks and possessed and owned the othermarijuana leaves. CFI convicted her, relying mostlyon Nicandros confession as stated in the Jovestestimony. She appealed. ISSUES 1. WON court erred in giving probative value to thetestimony of the officer2. WON rights of accused (vs self-incrimination andto confront witness vs her) were violated, thus anyevidence obtained therefrom are inadmissible HELD 1. YES Ratio The prosecution evidence leaves much to bedesired. It is at best uncertain whether anyprosecution witness really saw the alleged sale of marijuana. Reasoning - The court found the testimony of Pat. Jovesunreliable as it appears that he himself was unsure of what he saw, first saying that he saw the marijuanabeing sold openly, but when the improbability of illegal drugs being sold openly was pointed out, hequalified his story by saying that the sale took placesecretly.-it is probable that Joves did not really see either thealleged delivery of marijuana or the supposedpayment therefor. With his testimony seriouslyplaced in doubt, there is not much left of theprosecution evidence.2. YES Ratio the right of a person under interrogation tobe informed implies a correlative obligation on thepart of the investigator to explain, and contemplatesan effective communication that results inunderstanding what is conveyed. Short of this, thereis a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said thatthe person has been informed of his rights. Reasoning - reliance on oral admission is assailed as violative of Sec20, Art.IV, 1973 Consti (No person shall be compelledto be a witness vs himself. Any person under investigationfor the commission of an offense shall have right to remainsilent and to counsel, and to be in. formed of each right. Noforce, violation, threat, intimidation, or any other meanswhich vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Anyconfession obtained in violation of this section shall beinadmissible in evidence) .- above provision is an expanded version of the rightvs self-incrimination, formally incorporating thedoctrine in Miranda v Arizona: the prosecution maynot use statements, whether exculpatory orinculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure theprivilege against self- incrimination. xxx As for theprocedural safeguards to be employed, unless otherfully effective means are devised to inform accusedpersons of their right of silence and to assure acontinuous opportunity to exercise it, the ff measuresare required. Prior to any questioning, the personmust be warned that he has a right to remain silent,that any statement he does make may be used asevidence against him, and that he has a right to thepresence of an atty, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive those rights, providedsuch is made voluntarily, knowingly & intelligently. If,however, he indicates in any manner & at any stageof the process that he

wishes to consult with an attybefore speaking, there can be no questioning.Likewise, if the individual is alone & indicates in anymanner that he does not wish to be interrogated, thepolice may not question him. The mere fact that hemay have answered some questions or volunteeredsome statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any furtherinquiries until he has consulted with an attorney &thereafter consents to be questioned. (the courtpoints out that the Miranda doctrine rests on theconstitutional guarantee that no person shall becompelled to be a witness vs himself)since right to be informed implies comprehension,degree of explanation required will necessary vary,depending upon the education, intelligence & otherrelevant personal circumstances of the person underinvestigation. A simpler & more lucid explanation isneeded where the subject is unlettered- Like other constitutional rights, the right vs selfincrimination, including the right of a person underinvestigation to remain silent & to counsel, and to beinformed of such right, may be waived. To be valid,however, a waiver must not only be voluntary; itmust be made knowingly & intelligently, whichpresupposes an awareness or understanding of whatis being waived. It stands to reason that where theright has not been adequately explained and thereare serious doubts as to whether the personinterrogated knew and understood his relevantconstitutional rights when he answered thequestions, it is idle to talk of waiver of rights.- in this case, Joves did not say what specific rightshe mentioned to Nicandro, neither did he state themanner he advised her of her rights so as to makeher understand them. This is particularly imptbecause Nicandro was illiterate and cant beexpected to be able to grasp the significance of herrights merely by hearing an abstract statementthereof.- As it is the obligation of the investigator to inform aperson under investigation of his rights, so is it theduty of the prosecution to affirmatively establishcompliance by the investigator with his saidobligation. Absent such affirmative showing,admission or confession made by a person underinvestigation cannot be admitted in evidence.- Miranda v Arizona: we will not presume thatdefendant has been effectively apprised of his rightsand that his privilege vs self incrimination has beenadequately safeguarded on a record that doesntshow that any warnings have been given or anyeffective alternative has been employed. Nor can awaiver of these rights be assumed on a silent record PEOPLE v ALICANDO 251 SCRA 293PUNO; December 12, 1995 NATURE Automatic review FACTS - Alicando was charged of rape with homicide for thedeath of Khazie Penecilla on June 12, 1994 in IloiloCity. In the process of raping Khazie, he choked herthus causing her death.> Khazies father Romeo was having a drink withtwo friends in Romeos house. Alicando eventually joined them. At around 4:30 PM, Romeos friendsleft. > At around 5:30 PM, Rebada, one of Penecillasneighbors, spotted Khazie by the window of Alicandos house. Khazie offered to buy yemasfrom Rebada but Alicando closed the window.Rebada then heard Khazie crying so sheapproached the house and saw through anopening between the floor and the door thatKhazie was being raped.> Khazie did not come home so Romeo and hiswife looked for her. Rebada did not tell them whatshe saw.> In the morning, Khazies corpse was found underthe house of Santiago,

another neighbor. Rebadathen told the Penecillas what she knew.> Alicando was arrested and her verballyconfessed his guilt to PO3 Tan without theassistance of counsel. Based on his confessionand follow-up interrogations, Khazies slipperswere recovered from Alicandos home along with astained T-shirt and pillow.- June 29, 1994 Alicando was arraigned andpleaded guilty. After the plea of guilt, the trial courtordered the prosecution to present its evidence.- July 20, 1994 The trial court sentenced Alicando todeath by electric chair or, if the penal facilities wouldbe available by then, by gas poisoning. ISSUE WON the accused was properly meted the sentence of death HELD NO1. Arraignment of the accused was null and void Ratio During arraignment, the complaint or theinformation should be read in a language or dialectwhich the accused understands. Reasoning - The trial judge failed to follow the procedure outlined in Rule 116 of the RoC.- The information was written in English and it was unknown whether or not the accused could understand English well. It could not be said with certainty that the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.2. The plea of guilt was null and void. Ratio Rule 116, Sec. 3 provides that in a plea of guilt, the court should ascertain that the accused voluntarily entered into the plea and fully comprehends the ramifications of such a plea and, in addition, the prosecution should also be required to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. Reasoning - This rule is a restatement of the doctrine laid down in People vs. Apduhan. The searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntarinessof the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea.- The questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nordid the questions demonstrate appellant's fullcomprehension of the consequences of his plea.> The records do not clearly illustrate thepersonality profile of the accused.> The age, socio-economic status and educationalbackground of the accused were not examined.> With regard to voluntariness, questionsregarding the presence or absence of maltreatment of the accused are deemedinsufficient when a record of events in the penalfacility indicate that Alicando suffered a hematomafrom being locked up in a cell with violent inmatesupon his arrest.> With regard to comprehension, the trial courtinadequately warned Alicando that a plea of guiltwould result to a mandatory of penalty of deathwithout explaining to him what mandatory meant.- The rule requires that after a free and intelligentplea of guilt the trial court must require theprosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant andthe precise degree of his culpability beyondreasonable doubt. Rule 116, Sec. 3 modifies priorituisprudence that a plea of guilt even in capital offensesis sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in theinformation without need of further proof.3. Some prosecution evidence, offered independentlyof the plea of guilt of the appellant, wereinadmissible, yet were considered by the trial court convicting the

appellant. Ratio Fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine: once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary orderivatie evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. In other words, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. Reasoning - The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegallyobtained evidence taints all evidence subsequntly obtained. - The Court admitted as evidence the things seized inAlicandos house. These are inadmissible evidencefor they were gathered by PO3 Tan of as a result of custodial interrogation where appellant verballyconfessed to the crime without the benefit of counsel.- This is in violation of Art. 3, Sec. 12 of the 1987Constitution which requires the assistance of counselfor the accused as well as provides for the right of the accused to remain silent and to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him and thatthese rights cannot be waived subject to exceptions.A violation of this provision renders the evidencegathered inadmissible.- Even if the evidence gathered were admissible,they are still insufficient as evidence.> The alleged bloodstains on the pillow and shirt were never proven with laboratory tests.> There was no testimony that the shirt inquestion was worn by the accused when hecommitted the crime. It was not unnatural for him to have a shirt with bloodstains because he was a butcher.- The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals247 SCRA 741Facts: Petitioner Miguel Paderanga was belatedly charged as co-conspirator inthe crime of multiple murder for the killing of members of the Bucag familyin Gingoog City of which, petitioner was the mayor at the time. The trial of the case was all set to start with the issuance of an arrestwarrant for petitioners apprehension, but before it could be served on him,petitioner, through his counsel filed a motion for admission to bail with thetrial court. Petitioner furnished copies of the motion to State ProsecutorGingoyon , to the Regional State prosecutor and the private prosecutor. Thetrial proceeded to hear the application for bail, but only assistant prosecutorappeared for the prosecution and four of petitioners counsel.Petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College GeneralHospital due to acute costochondritis, his counsel manifested that theywere submitting custody over the person of their client to the local chapterof the IBP and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he isconsidered being in custody of the law. The prosecution neither supportednor opposed the said application for bail. The trial court admitted petitionerto bail. The following day, petitioner managed to personally appear beforethe clerk of court of the trial court and posted bail in the amount fixed. Hewas thereafter arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also appearedpersonally and

attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case.20 days after the resolution of the trial court, Prosecutor Gingoyon fileda motion for reconsideration alleging that he received a copy of the petitionfor admission to bail only a day after the hearing. The trial court denied themotion for reconsideration, and so Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matterthe respondent Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals annulled the decisionof the trial court in granting bail to petitioner on the ground that they weretainted with grave abuse of discretion. Responednt court observed that atthe time of petitioners application for bail, he was not yet in the custody of the law, apparently because he filed his motion for admission to bail beforehe was actually arrested or had voluntarily surrendered. Respondent court also noted that petitioner was charged with a crime punishable by reclusionperpetua, the evidence of guilt was strong as borne out by the fact that nobail was recommended by the prosecution, for which reasons held that thegrant of bail was doubly improvident. Issue:A. Whether or not petitioner was in the custody of the law when itapplied for bail before the arrest warrant was served on him. B . Whether or not bail was granted with grave abuse of discretionconsidering that petitioner was charged with a crime punishable byreclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt was strong. Ruling:A. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security givenfor the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or abondsman, conditioned upon his appearing before any court as requiredunder the conditions specified in said Rule. Its main purpose, then, is torelieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction andyet secure his appearance at the trial. 10 As bail is intended to obtain orsecure one's provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custodyover him has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawfularrest or voluntary surrender. 11 As this Court has put it in a case "it would beincongruous to grant bail to one who is free."As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have eitherbeen arrested, detained, or other wise deprived of their freedom will everhave occasion to seek the protective mantle extended by the right to bail. The person seeking his provisional release under the auspices of bail neednot even wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed against him asit is available to "all persons" where the offense is bailable. The rule is, of course, subject to the condition or limitation that the applicant is in thecustody of the law . On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of thelaw (a) when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issuedpursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or

by warrantless arrest under Section 5,Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised Rules on CriminalProcedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities. In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeedfiled his motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factualambience therefore, be considered as being constructively and legally undercustody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filingof his bail application with the trail court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to thecustody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court whichthereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either byactual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. 19 The latter mode may be exemplified by theso-called "house arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being "confinedto quarters" or restricted to the military camp area B. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that beforeconviction, all indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those charged withoffenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt isstrong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended, nowprovides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regionaltrial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or lifeimprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail,which may be waived considering its personal nature and which, to repeat,arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the law, springs from thepresumption of innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not beinflicted incarceration at the outset since after trial he would be entitled toacquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trialcourt of a criminal offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail as amatter of right, the present exceptions thereto being the instances wherethe accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong.Under said general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, thecourt having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant thesame after a hearing conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On theother hand, as the

grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion onthe part of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatoryin nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of thecourt, is required with the participation of both the defense and a dulynotified representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether ornot the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the applicant.Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that theevidence meets the required quantum. The Court ruled that Prosecutor Abejo was authorized and could validlyrepresent the prosecution in the hearing for bail. He was also explicitlyinstructed about the position of the Regional State Prosecutors Office, to manifest to the court that the prosecution was neither supporting noropposing the application for bail and that they were submitting the matter toits sound discretion. Obviously, what this meant was that the prosecution, atthat particular posture of the case, was waiving the presentation of anycountervailing evidence. The prosecution was dispensing with theintroduction of evidence en contra and this it did at the proper forum andstage of the proceedings, that is during the mandatory hearing for bail andafter the trial court had fully satisfied itself that such was the position of theprosecution

the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited theexercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of thevarious international treaties giving recognition and protection to humanrights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courtsruling in Purganan is in order. First , we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individualof his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondentsin administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, 4 havelikewise been detained. Second , to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes toour jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited theexercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court hasadmitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. Infact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention duringthe pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance theobligation of the Philippines under international conventions to upholdhuman rights. The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco 5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facingdeportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration wasgranted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the

prospective deporteehad committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treathim as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;"and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of themachinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisionsrelating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons 6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration , 7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formalcriminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finalityof an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff reliedupon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detaineesright to bail.If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why itshould not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering thatthe Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases,there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all,both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of theperson detained is not in issue.Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of humanliberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of everyindividual is not impaired.Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine ExtraditionLaw) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippineswith the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with anycriminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penaltyimposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state orgovernment."Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power,created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of acrime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the otherstate to surrender him to the demanding state. 8 It is not a criminalproceeding. 9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extraditionproceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime,even though such punishment may follow extradition. 10 It is suigeneris, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between differentnations. 11

It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of thepotential extraditee. 12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that ismerely administrative in character. 13 Its object is to prevent the escape of aperson accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the statefrom which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. 14 But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by thefollowing: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potentialextraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown bySection 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandatesthe " immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused " if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section 20allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the " provisionalarrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request forextradition; " and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudicere-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition isreceived subsequently." A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolongedrestraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding statefollowing the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessarystep in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detentionshould be reasonable. The accused had been detained for over two (2) years without havingbeen convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended periodof detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. Infact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted theextradition court to grant him bail.While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to anextraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing amotion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same asthat in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process ispremised on the presumption of innocence of the accused.As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind thepurpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of thearrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of thepotential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee isa fugitive from justice. 15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thusbears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk andshould be granted bail. The time-honored principle of

pacta sunt servanda demands that thePhilippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered intowith the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply withthese obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats thepurpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that inkeeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potentialextraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where theserights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by internationalconventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore,deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certainstandard for the grant is satisfactorily met.An extradition proceeding being sui generis , the standard of proof required ingranting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt incriminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civilcases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantialevidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the objectof extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeingour jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan , then Associate Justice,now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which hetermed " clear and convincing evidence " should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lowerthan proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincingevidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk . Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." WHEREFORE , we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE TAMPUS Y PONCE, accused whose death sentence is under review. FACTS: At around ten o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1976, Celso Saminado, a prisoner in the national penitentiary at Muntinlupa, went to the toilet to answer a call of

nature and to fetch water. The accused, Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila, prisoners in the same penal institution, followed Saminado to the toilet and, by means of their bladed weapons, assaulted him. Saminado died upon arrival in the prison hospital. After emerging from the toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered to a prison guard with their knives. They told the guard: "Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami." The officer of the day investigated the incident right away. In his written report submitted on the same day when the tragic occurrence transpired, he stated that, according to his on-the-spot investigation, Avila stabbed Saminado when the latter was armed in the comfort room and his back was turned to Avila, while Tampus stabbed the victim on the chest and neck Two days after the killing, or on January 16, another prison guard investigated Tampus and Avila and obtained their extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted that they assaulted Saminado. The trial was held at the state penitentiary at the insistence of the Avila. The court found Tampus and Avila guilty for the murder of Saminado. In this review of the death sentence, the counsel de oficio of appellant raises the following issues: ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the confession of Tampus was taken in violation of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution (now Sec. 12, Art. IV of the 1987 Const) 2. W/N the trial court should have advised defendant Tampus of his right to remain silent after the fiscal had presented the prosecution's evidence and when counsel de oficio called upon Tampus to testify 3. W/N defendant Tampus was denied to his right to public trial because the arraignment and hearing were held at the state penitentiary HELD: 1. No. Even before the investigation for the killing was inititated, Tampus and Avila had already admitted it when, after coming out of the scene of the crime, they surrendered to the first guard whom they encountered, and they revealed to him that they had committed an act of revenge. That spontaneous statement, elicited without any interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the same time was a voluntary confession of guilt. Not only that. The two accused, by means of that statement given freely on the spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion, waived their right to remain silent and to have the right to counsel. That admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty and testimony in court. Under the circumstances, it is not appropriate for counsel de oficio to rely on the rulings in Escobedo vs. Illinois and Miranda vs. Arizona regarding the rights of the accused to be assisted by counsel and to remain silent during custodial interrogation. It should be stressed that, even without taking into account Tampus' admission of guilt,

confession, plea of guilty and testimony, the crime was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence of the prosecution. 2. No, considering that Tampus pleaded guilty and had executed an extrajudicial confession. The court during the trial is not duty-bound to apprise the accused that he has the right to remain silent. It is his counsel who should claim that right for him. If he does not claim it and he calls the accused to the witness stand, then he waives that right 3. No. The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from the place where the trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial in the national penitentiary. Besides, there is a ruling that the fact that for the convenience of the witnesses a case is tried in Bilibid Prison without any objection on the part of the accused is not a ground for reversal of the judgment of conviction (U.S. vs. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304). The accused may waive his right to have a public trial as shown in the rule that the trial court may motu propio exclude the public from the courtroom when the evidence to be offered is offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also, upon request of the defendant, exclude from the trial every person except the officers of the court and the attorneys for the prosecution and defense. GAMBOA VS. CRUZ [162 SCRA 642;L-56291; 27 JUN 1988] Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The court denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition. Issue: Whether or Not petitioners right to counsel and due process violated. Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel. On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.

PEOPLE v CABRAL 303 SCRA 361ROMERO; February 18, 1999 NATURE Special Civil Action FACTS - Roderick Odiamar was charged with the rape of 15year old Cecille Buenafe. In a bid to securetemporary liberty, the accused filed a motion for bailwhich was opposed by the petitioner.- The lower court grated the motion on the groundthat despite the crime alleged to have beencommitted is punishable by reclusion perpetua, theevidence thus far presented is not strong enough towarrant denial of the bail. The judge in concludingthus cited the fact that the girl went with theoffender voluntarily and did not resist during thecommission of the rape. In addition, the judge quotedthe medico legal report as not conclusion that rapewas in fact committed consideration that thelacerations on the victim may have been weeks ormonths old when the medical examination wasperformed six days after the offense occurred.- The CA affirmed the decision saying that there wasno abuse of discretion in this case. There is graveabuse of discretion where the power is exercised inan arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting toan evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal toperform the duty enjoined or to act at all incontemplation of the law. The People filed theappeal on the ground that while the judge haddiscretion on the grant of bail, he had abused thisdiscretion. ISSUE - WON the Court of Appeals acted with grave abusedespite a showing by the prosecutor that there isstrong evidence proving respondents guilt for thecrime charged. HELD YES- The SC held that the CA and the lower court failedto mention and include some facts which aresignificant factors and circumstances which arestrong, clear, and convincing. Consideration of thesaid factors and circumstances would have resultedin the denial of bail. Reasoning Article III, Section 13 of the Bill of Rights provides:All persons, except those charged withoffenses punishable by reclusion perpetuawhen evidence of guilt is strong, shall beforeconviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. the right to bail shall not beimpaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessivebail shall not be required. - Section 7 Rule 4 of the Rules of court provides:No person charged with a capital offense, or anoffense punishable by reclusion perpetua or lifeimprisonment, when the evidence of guilt is strong,shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of criminal prosecution.- In the case at bar, bail is discretionary and not amatter of right considering that the punishment forthe offense is reclusion perpetua. the grant of thebail is dependent on the evidence of the guilt whichshould which should be strong to justify denial. thisdetermination is a matter of judicial discretion.- By judicial discretion, the law mandates thedetermination of whether proof is evident or thepresumption of guilt is strong. Proof evident orevident proof is this connection, has been held tomean clear, strong evidence which leads a wellguarded dispassionate judgment to the conclusionthat

an offense has been committed as charged, thatthe accused is the guilty agent, and that he willprobably be punished capitally if the law isadministered. Presumption great exists when thecircumstances testified to are such that the inferenceof guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong,clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment andexcludes all reasonable probability of any otherconclusion. In other words, the test is not whethe the evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonabledoubt but rather whether it shows evident guilt or agreat presumption of guilt.- In the case of an application for bail, the duties of the judge are as follows:1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of theapplication for bail or require him to submit hisrecommendation;2. Conduct a hearing of the application for bailregardless of whether or not the prosecution refusesto present evidence to show that the guilt of theaccused is strong for the purpose of enabling thecourt to exercise its discretion3. Decide whether the evidence of guilt of theaccused is strong based on the summary of evidenceof the prosecution4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong,discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. Otherwise the petition should be denied.- Based on the duties, the courts order granting ordenying bail must contain a summary of theevidence for the prosecution. A summary is definedas a comprehensive and usually brief abstract ordigest of a test or statement. HENCE, THE SUMMARYSHOULD NECESSARILY BE A COMPLETE COMPILATIONOR RESTATEMENT OF ALL THE PIECES OF EVIDENCEPRESENTED DURING THE HEARING PROPER. TheLower court cannot exercise judicial discretion as towhat pieces of evidence should be included in thesummary. Otherwise, the same will be considereddefective in form and substance which cannot besustained or be given a semblance of validity. Dispositive Grant of bail is declared void. The courtshould issue a warrant of arrest of Odiamar if his bail bond has been approved