Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No.

L-66469 July 29, 1986 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO QUIJANO, petitioners, vs. HON. BERNARDO SALAS (In his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Cebu, Branch VIII), MARIO ABONG, ALFREDO DE LEON, ERIWADWIN MONTEBON, ROMEO DE GUZMAN, & EDUARDO MABUHAY, respondents. Basilio E. Duaban for accused.

CRUZ, J.: Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Cebu but before he could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. 1 As a result of the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. 2 Trial commenced, but while it was in progress, the prisoner, taking advantage of the first information for homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release; and so he escaped. 3 The respondent judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest. 4 But he was gone. Nonetheless, the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain circumstances. 5 The respondent judge denied the motion, however, and suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. 6 The order of the trial court is now before us on certiorari and mandamus. 7 The judge erred. He did not see the woods for the trees. He mistakenly allowed himself to be tethered by the literal reading of the rule when he should have viewed it from the broader perspective of its intendment. The rule is found in the last sentence of Article IV, Section 19, of the 1973 Constitution, reading in full as follows: Section 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to he informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the past be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the defendant's escape. The old case of People v. Avancea 8 required his presence at certain stages of the trial which as a result, had to be discontinued as long as the defendant had not re-appeared or remained at large. As his right to be present at these stages was then held not waivable even by his escape, such escape thus operated to the fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of the authorities, insofar as the trial could not proceed as long as he had not been recaptured. The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section 19, which now allows trial in absentia, Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual

conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified. The respondent judge was probably still thinking of the old doctrine when he ruled that trial in absentia of the escapee could not be held because he could not be duly notified under Section 19. He forgets that the fugitive is now deemed to have waived such notice precisely because he has escaped, and it is also this escape that makes his failure to appear at his trial unjustified. Escape can never be a legal justification. In the past, his escape "rewarded" him by postponing all further proceedings against him and in effect ultimately absolving him of the charge he was facing. Under the present rule, his escape will, legally speaking, operate to Ms disadvantage by preventing him from attending his trial, which will continue even in his absence and most likely result in his conviction. The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will Identify the accused. 9 Under Section 19, the defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law. Trial in absentia was not allowed in Borja v. Mendoza 10 because it was held notwithstanding that the accused had not been previously arraigned. His subsequent conviction was properly set aside. But in the instant case, since all the requisites are present, there is absolutely no reason why the respondent judge should refuse to try the accused, who had already been arraigned at the time he was released on the illegal bail bond. Abong should be prepared to bear the consequences of his escape, including forfeiture of the right to be notified of the subsequent proceedings and of the right to adduce evidence on his behalf and refute the evidence of the prosecution, not to mention a possible or even probable conviction. We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth," which is not really that evanescent or elusive. As judges, we must look beyond and not be bound by the language of the law, seeking to discover, by our own lights, the reason and the rhyme for its enactment. That we may properly apply it according to its ends, we need and must use not only learning but also vision. The trial judge is directed to investigate the lawyer who assisted Mario Abong in securing bail from the city court of Cebu on the basis of the withdrawn information for homicide and to report to us the result of his investigation within sixty days. WHEREFORE, the order of the trial court dated December 22, 1983, denying the motion for the trial in absentia of the accused is set aside. The respondent judge is directed to continue hearing the case against the respondent Mario Abong in absentia as long as he has not reappeared, until it is terminated. No costs. SO ORDERED. Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Paras, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-37933 April 15, 1988 FISCAL CELSO M. GIMENEZ and FEDERICO B. MERCADO, petitioners, vs. HON. RAMON E. NAZARENO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu and TEODORO DE LA VEGA, JR., respondents. The Solicitor General for petitioners. Victor de la Serna for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.: Two basic issues are raised for Our resolution in this petition for certiorari and mandamus. The first is whether or not a court loses jurisdiction over an accused who after being arraigned, escapes from the custody of the law. The other issue is whether or not under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, an accused who has been duly tried in absentia retains his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him. The following facts are not in dispute: On August 3, 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega Jr., were charged with the crime of murder. On August 22, 1973 all the above-named. accused were arraigned and each of them pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Following the arraignment, the respondent judge, Hon. Ramon E. Nazareno, set the hearing of the case for September 18, 1973 at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. All the acused including private respondent, were duly informed of this. Before the scheduled date of the first hearing the private respondent escaped from his detention center and on the said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals handling the case (the petitioners herein) to file a motion with the lower court to proceed with the hearing of the case against all the accused praying that private respondent de la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking the application of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides: SEC. 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. (Emphasis supplied.) * Pursuant to the above-written provision, the lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but nevertheless gave the private respondent the opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he shows up in court. 1

After due trial, or on November 6,1973, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the five accused while holding in abeyance the proceedings against the private respondent. The dispositive portion is as follows: WHEREFORE, insofar as the accused Samson Suan Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula Fernando Cargando and Rogelio Baguio are concerned, this case is hereby dismissed. The City Warden of Lapu-Lapu City is hereby ordered to release these accused if they are no longer serving sentence of conviction involving other crimes. The proceedings in this case against the accused Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. who has escaped on August 30,1973 shall remain pending, without prejudice on the part of the said accused to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution and to present his defense whenever the court acquires back the jurisdiction over his person. 2 On November 16,1973 the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the above-quoted dispositive portion on the ground that it will render nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in absentia" cited earlier. However, this was denied by the lower court in an Order dated November 22, 1973. Hence, this petition. The respondent court, in its Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioners, expressed the opinion that under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the private respondent, who was tried in absentia, did not lose his right to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution and present his evidence. 3 The reasoning of the said court is that under the same provision, all accused should be presumed innocent. 4 Furthermore the lower court maintains that jurisdiction over private respondent de la Vega, Jr. was lost when he escaped and that his right to cross-examine and present evidence must not be denied him once jurisdiction over his person is reacquired. 5 We disagree. First of all, it is not disputed that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accusedprivate respondent when he appeared during the arraignment on August 22,1973 and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. In cases criminal, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by his arrest for voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary appearance is accomplished by appearing for arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in this case. But the question is this was that jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped from the custody of the law and failed to appear during the trial? We answer this question in the negative. As We have consistently ruled in several earlier cases,6 jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is terminated. To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to say that where the accused appears at the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and this continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law. Going to the second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution aforecited a "trial in absentia"may be had when the following requisites are present: (1) that there has been an arraignment; (2) that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified. In this case, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. As the facts show, the private respondent was arraigned on August 22, 1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also informed of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his signature on the notice issued by the lower Court. 7 It was also proved by a certified copy of the Police Blotter 8 that private respondent escaped from his detention center. No explanation for his failure to

appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial court considered his absence unjustified. The lower court in accordance with the aforestated provisions of the 1973 Constitution, correctly proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the prosecution and the other accused in the absence of private respondent, but it erred when it suspended the proceedings as to the private respondent and rendered a decision as to the other accused only. Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused who who escape from custody finally decides to appear in court to present his evidence and moss e the witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. As it has been aptly explained: . . . The Constitutional Convention felt the need for such a provision as there were quite a number of reported instances where the proceedings against a defendant had to be stayed indefinitely because of his non- appearance. What the Constitution guarantees him is a fair trial, not continued enjoyment of his freedom even if his guilt could be proved. With the categorical statement in the fundamental law that his absence cannot justify a delay provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified, such an abuse could be remedied. That is the way it should be, for both society and the offended party have a legitimate interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. 9 The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent will be violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also, there can be no violation of due process since the accused was given the opportunity to be heard. Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he virtually waived these rights. This Court has consistently held that the right of the accused to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is a personal right and may be waived. 10 In the same vein, his right to present evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit and protection, may be waived by him. Finally, at this point, We note that Our pronouncement in this case is buttressed by the provisions of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 1 (c) of Rule 115 which clearly reflects the intention of the framers of our Constitution, to wit: ... The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular date of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present during that trial. When an accused under custody had been notified of the date of the trail and escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody in regained.... Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that an escapee who has been duly tried in absentiawaives his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him. 11 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 112-L in so far as it suspends the proceedings against the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. is reversed and set aside. The respondent judge is hereby directed to render judgment upon the innocence or guilt of the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. in accordance with the evidence adduced and the applicable law. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Grio- Aquino, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 116511. February 12, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CALOMA TABAG, SARENAS TABAG, MARCELINO TABAG, FERNANDO MAGLINTE, JR., ARTEMIO AWOD, LAUREO AWOD, ROMEO AGUIPO, LEOPOLDO LEONCIO and ERNESTO MAWANG, accused. COLOMA TABAG and SERNAS TABAG, accused-appellants. DECISION DAVIDE, JR., J.: At about 10:00 p.m. of 11 March 1984 in Sitio Candiis, Barangay Cabidianan, New Corella, Davao, the spouses Welbino Magdasal, Sr., and Wendelyn Repalda Magdasal, together with their children Welbino, Jr., and Melisa, were massacred in their home allegedly by members of the Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force (ICHDF). On 14 March 1984, Aniceto Magdasal and Marciana Magdasal, parents of Welbino Magdasal, Sr., reported the incident to the Municipal Mayor of Asuncion, Davao, and to the police authorities of New Corella. They executed a joint affidavit on that date to request the authorities concerned to follow up said incident and to conduct proper investigation to the end in view that justice will prevail. [1] Later, they, together with one Lucrecio Dagohoy, executed sworn statements before the police authorities of New Corella.[2] Yet, the identities of the killers remained unknown. The first light on the case was shed on 27 February 1985 when Sergio Doctolero, barangay captain of Buan, Asuncion, Davao, executed a sworn statement[3] declaring that a member of the ICHDF, Romeo Guipo, had confessed to him that it was the team led by Sarenas Tabag that massacred the Magdasals. The real break came three days before the first anniversary of the massacre when Ernesto Mawang, a member of that team, gave his sworn statement[4] naming those involved in the massacre. Not long after, another member thereof, one Pablo Oca, likewise gave a sworn statement[5] corroborating Mawangs statements. On 15 July 1985, an information for murder against accused Coloma Tabag, Sarenas Tabag, Marcelino Tabag, Fernando Maglinte, Jr., Artemio Awod, Romeo Aguipo, Leopoldo Leoncio, and Ernesto Mawang was filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of New Corella, Davao.[6] Accompanying the information were the abovementioned joint affidavit, sworn statements, and death certificates of the victims. The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 897.[7] After examining, through searching questions, witnesses Pablo Oca and Sergio Doctolero, Judge Napy Agayan issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused. No bond was recommended for their temporary liberty, since they were charged with a capital offense and the evidence of guilt was strong.[8] On 21 August 1985, accused Sarenas Tabag surrendered to Judge Agayan.[9] The others could not be arrested; hence, an alias warrant for their arrest was issued.[10]

Sarenas Tabag waived submission of his counter-affidavit and preliminary investigation. Finding probable cause against him, the MTC ordered on 28 August 1985 the transmittal of the record of the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and the commitment of Sarenas at the Provincial Jail.[11] After appropriate proceedings, an information[12] was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum, Davao, charging the abovenamed accused with the crime of multiple murder. The accusatory portion thereof reads as follows: That on or about March 11, 1984, in the Municipality of New Corella, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, all members of the ICHDF, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with Coloma Tabag, Marcelino Tabag, Fernando Maglinte, Jr., Artemio Awod, Laureo Awod, Romeo Aguipo, Leopoldo Leoncio and Ernesto Mawang, who are all still at large, with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill, armed with garand, armalite and carbine, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Welbino Magdasal, Sr., Wendelyn Magdasal, Welbino Magdasal, Jr. and Melisa Magdasal, thereby inflicting upon them injuries which caused their death and further causing actual, moral and compensatory damages to the heirs of the victims. The commission of the foregoing offense is attended by the aggravating circumstance of superior strength, nighttime and in band committed with the aid of armed men. Contrary to law. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 6364 and raffled to Branch 2 of the said court. Since the other accused had remained at large, the court proceeded with the case against Sarenas Tabag only. At his arraignment on 11 December 1985, he entered a plea of not guilty.[13] On 3 March 1987, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the case as against Ernesto Mawang because it found after a thorough re-assessment of the prosecutions evidence that he does not only appear to be less guilty, but he appears not responsible in any way in the commission of the crime charged.... [He] has not participated in the killing of the victims, he has not fired any shot nor has lunged any bolo to the victims, and his presence in the crime scene was not voluntary on his part. [14] The court granted the motion and ordered the immediate release of Mawang from detention.[15] In the meantime, accused Coloma Tabag, Artemio Awod, Laureo Awod, and Romeo Aguipo were arrested.[16] All of them entered a plea of not guilty at their arraignment.[17] On 19 October 1989, accused Laureo Awod and Artemio Awod, together with three others, escaped from the Provincial Jail. Upon being informed of this incident,[18] the trial court continued the proceedings as against Sarenas Tabag, Coloma Tabag, and Romeo Aguipo only.[19] The witnesses presented by the prosecution were Pablo Oca, Sergio Doctolero, Aniceto Magdasal, Pablo Babagonyo (a member of the Philippine National Police [PNP]), Marciana Magdasal, and Enrique Bermejo (Administrative Officer of the PNP of New Corella, Davao), with Doctolero recalled as rebuttal witness. On its part, the defense presented Sarenas Tabag, Romeo Aguipo, Coloma Tabag, and Alfredo Galocino, with Sarenas Tabag and one Ricardo Agrade called as sur-rebuttal witnesses. On 7 January 1992, the trial court promulgated its decision,[20] dated 19 December 1991, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, finding the accused Sarenas Tabag, Coloma Tabag and Romeo Aguipo or Guipo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of four (4) counts of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, for the deaths of Welbino Magdasal, Sr., Wendelyn Magdasal, Welbino Magdasal, Jr. and Melisa Magdasal, each of them is sentenced to suffer four (4) indivisible prison terms of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to suffer all the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs. They are further condemned to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of their victims in the total sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND (P400,000.00) PESOS as moral damages; SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) as attorneys fees to Marciana Magdasal, mother of the late Welbino Magdasal, Sr., and FOUR THOUSAND (P4,000.00) PESOS as actual and compensatory damages.[21]

The material operative facts established by the evidence for the prosecution was summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Brief for the Appellee as follows: On March 11, 1984, at around 9:00 oclock in the evening, Pablo Oca was in the CHDF detachment in Barangay Buan, Asuncion, Davao. (p. 5, TSN, September 10, 1986) Also present were Marcelino Tabag, appellant Sarenas Tabag, appellant Coloma Tabag, Artemio Awod, Laureo Awod, Ernesto Mawang, Romeo Guipo and Fernando Maglinte, all members of the CHDF. (p. 6, Ibid.) While there, appellant Sarenas talked to his son, Marcelino Tabag, and his brother, appellant Coloma Tabag (Ibid.) Thereafter, Sarenas told the group to go on patrol. (pp. 7 and 14, Ibid.) Pablo asked Marcelino where they were going but the latter kicked him in the buttocks, and told him to just keep quiet and follow. (p. 15, Ibid.) Marcelino led the group to Barangay Cadi-is, Asuncion,* Davao. (p. 7, Ibid.) The group reached Cadi-is at 11:00 oclock in the evening (p. 17, Ibid.). Upon reaching the house of Welbino Magdasal, the group stood to observe for a while. (p. 12, TSN, January 18, 1988) Pablo Oca was posted as lookout five meters away from the house. (p. 17, Ibid. and p. 18, TSN, September 10, 1986) After some time, Fernando Maglinte went up the house and knocked at the door. (p. 17, Ibid.) The door was opened and Welbino Magdasal went out of the house. (p. 17, TSN, January 13, 1988) Marcelino ordered his companions to open fire at Welbino. (p. 24, TSN, September 10, 1986) The children who were inside the house started shouting. (p. 10, Ibid.) Three men from Marcelinos group went up the house and stabbed to death Welbinos wife, Wendelyn, and their two children, Welbino, Jr., and Melisa. (Ibid.) After the massacre, Marcelinos group went back to their detachment at Barangay Buan. (Ibid.) Upon arrival, appellant Sarenas asked Marcelino, Is it finished to which the latter answered, Yes, it is finished. (p. 11, Ibid.) Sarenas inquired further, Did you gather the CHDF? (Ibid.) Sarenas warned each member of Marcelino's group to keep quiet about the incident and threatened to shoot whoever will squeal. (p. 11, and 16, Ibid.) As a result of the massacre, the entire family of Welbino died. Welbinos mouth was shattered and his intestines protruded out. (p. 9, TSN, April 12, 1989) Wendelyns left leg and left arm were twisted. (Ibid.) Welbino, Jr. sustained wounds on his face and stab wounds in his chest. (Ibid.) Melisa was likewise wounded and died in the hospital. (Ibid.) A total of thirty-two empty shells of M16 spent bullets were recovered from the scene of the massacre. (p. 4, TSN, January 5, 1990) This summary is faithfully borne out by the transcripts of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses; hence, we adopt it as our own. It was further established through the testimony of Pablo Oca that after talking to his son Marcelino and brother Coloma, Sarenas called for the other members of the ICHDF and instructed them to go on patrol. While on the way to New Visayas, Marcelino separated from the others. The latter, nevertheless, followed him to Sitio Candiis and then to the house of the victims.[22] Alibi and denial were the defenses interposed by accused Sarenas Tabag, Coloma Tabag, and Romeo Aguipo. Sarenas Tabag was the head of the ICHDF team in question. He was enlisted into it when he was the barangay captain of Buan, Asuncion, Davao. The team was to serve only in the municipality of Asuncion; its specific area of operation were the barangays of Buan, New Visayas, and Sunlon, all in Asuncion. All the members of the team took orders from him.[23] On 11 March up to 12 March 1984, he was with Cpl. Gafod on a military operation of the 37th Infantry Battalion in New Visayas and Sunlon, Asuncion, Davao. Aside from Cpl. Gafod, he was with Laureo Awod, Artemio Awod, Marcelino Tabag, Ernesto Mawang, Fernando Maglinte, Jr., Pepito Tabag, and Cortez Tabag. Sarenas asserted that he could not have conducted a briefing, as some of his men, particularly Coloma Tabag and Pablo Oca, were in Mawab. [24] Sarenas likewise denied having asked Marcelino after the killing, Human na? and having threatened those who patrolled on that fateful night that anybody who squeals would be shot with a clip of bullets. Sarenas also testified that Pablo Oca could not have been at the detachment on the night of 11 March 1984, as he was relieved of his post as a member of the ICHDF as early as 24 December 1983 for having discharged seven clips from his garand rifle while drunk.[25] This then provided Ocas motive to

testify against him (Sarenas).[26] Sarenas further declared that members of his family were massacred by suspected members of the NPA.[27] Coloma Tabag declared that on 11 March 1984, he was in Mawab, Davao del Norte, panning for gold. He went there on 4 March 1984 with his two children. Mawab is more than twenty kilometers away from Barangay Buan, Asuncion, Davao del Norte.[28] Romeo Aguipo testified that at 10:00 p.m. of 11 March 1984, he was at the copra drier in Barangay Buan watching the copra. He said he was there from 9 March to 12 March 1984. The copra drier was only two kilometers away from the ICHDF detachment.[29] The trial court gave full faith to the version of the prosecution and disregarded that of the defense. As to the motive of accused Sarenas Tabag, the trial court stated: Fourth: Sarenas Tabag also declared that his family, sometime before March 11, 1984, was massacred and his suspects were the members of the New Peoples Army. The Magdasals, who first resided in Buan, Asuncion, transferred to Sunlon, Asuncion, which was infested with members of the New Peoples Army, according to Sarenas Tabag. Sunlon being infested with members of the New Peoples Army, Welbino Magdasal, Sr. and/or his family could easily be suspected or he and his family must be members of the New Peoples Army. Since the family of Sarenas Tabag was a victim of a massacre by the New Peoples Army, the killing of Welbino Magdasal, Sr. and the members of his family must be the retaliation of Sarenas Tabag perpetrated through his men who were CHDF members.[30] In support of its conclusion that four counts of murder were committed, the trial court rationalized that the deaths of Welbino Magdasal, Sr., Wendelyn Magdasal, Welbino Magdasal, Jr. and Melisa Magdasal resulted not [from] a single act punishable as complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code but [from] a series of acts ... with the qualifying aggravating circumstances of either treachery, evident premeditation, or superior strength having been taken advantage of.[31] It opted to consider evident premeditation to qualify the killing to multiple murder and considered treachery, nighttime, and band as generic aggravating circumstances.[32] From the judgment of conviction, only accused Sarenas Tabag and Coloma Tabag filed their notice of appeal.[33] On 8 August 1995, after filing his Appellants Brief,[34] accused Coloma Tabag died at the Davao Prison and Penal Farm.[35] Accordingly, in the resolution of 21 February 1996, we ordered the dismissal of the case against him. Only the appeal of accused Sarenas Tabag is left for our determination. In his Appellants Brief, accused Sarenas Tabag contends that the trial court erred in 1. CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT SARENAS TABAG NOT BECAUSE OF THE WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE BUT BECAUSE OF THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSES EVIDENCE; 2. CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT SARENAS TABAG AS CONSPIRATOR OR CONFEDERATE, THE ALLEGATION OF CONSPIRACY NOT HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;

3. NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT SARENAS TABAG ON THE GROUND THAT HE IS EXEMPTED FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLE 11, (5) & (6), OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

The first assigned error is without basis. The trial court convicted him primarily on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. If at all the trial court considered the weakness of the evidence of the defense, it was merely to show that the massive proof of guilt was not shakened by the brazen and unmitigated lies of the accused and their witnesses.[36] Regarding Tabags second assigned error, we have held time and again that conspiracy need not be established by direct proof. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of intent.[37] It must, however, be shown to exist as clearly and as convincingly as the offense itself.[38] Indeed, Sarenas was not at the scene of the massacre at the time it was committed. His alibi was firmly established not only through his evidence but also by the testimony of prosecution witness Pablo Oca. That fact, notwithstanding, we are convinced that Sarenas was not just a co-conspirator; he was the mastermind of the massacre or the principal by inducement. His role was established with moral certainty by weighty circumstantial evidence. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. As jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time, inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.[39] In the instant case, the following circumstances were duly proven: 1. Sarenas was the leader of the ICHDF team in Barangay Buan, Asuncion, Davao. 2. Before the massacre in question, members of Sarenas family were massacred by persons whom he believed were members of the NPA. Sarenas suspected the Magdasals to be members of the NPA.[40] 3. Prosecution witness Pablo Oca and the other accused were members of Sarenas team; as such, they took orders from Sarenas. On his cross-examination, Sarenas proudly admitted of his authority to give orders.[41] 4. At about 9:00 p.m. of 11 March 1984, Sarenas team met at the ICHDF Detachment in Barangay Buan where Sarenas gave a briefing to his son Marcelino and brother Coloma. 5. After the briefing, Sarenas instructed the team to go on patrol in New Visayas and some distance away. Marcelino and Coloma led the team. 6. The area of operation of Sarenas team is comprised of the barangays of Buan, New Visayas, and Sunlon, all of Asuncion, Davao. 7. Somewhere along the way, instead of patrolling their area of operation, Marcelino proceeded toward Sitio Candiis, Barangay Cabidianan, Asuncion, Davao. 8. Pablo asked Marcelino where they were going, but the latter kicked the former on his buttocks and told him just to keep quiet and to follow. 9. Upon reaching Sitio Candiis, the team proceeded to the house of the victims. Marcelino Tabag ordered Pablo Oca to serve as look-out, while Marcelino, Coloma Tabag, Fernando Maglinte, Laureo Awod, Artemio Awod, and Romeo Aguipo fired their garands toward the victims house. Then Marcelino, Coloma, Laureo, and Artemio went up the house and started stabbing Welbinos wife and children.[42] 10. After the massacre, the team returned to its detachment in Barangay Buan. Upon arrival thereat, Sarenas asked his son Marcelino whether it was finished, and the latter answered in the affirmative.[43]

11. After Marcelino made the report to his father that it [was] finished, the members of the team were gathered. Sarenas forthwith warned them against squealing, otherwise the squealer would be shot.[44] From the foregoing, it is clear that Sarenas had the motive to eliminate Welbino Magdasal, Sr., and his family. The briefing was on a matter which he could neither openly discuss nor entrust to others who were not of his confidence. He thus chose for the purpose no less than his son Marcelino and brother Coloma. Then, as the subsequent developments showed, the briefing turned to none other than an instruction to get rid of the Magdasal family or to finish them off. If it were otherwise, Marcelino would not have led the team to a place outside of its area of operation, or to Sitio Candiis of Barangay Cabidianan, in another municipality, where the house of the victims was located. Sarenas knew exactly where Marcelino should lead the team and what it was expected to do. He even waited at the detachment in Barangay Buan for the teams return, and upon its return he asked Marcelino whether its finished. When Marcelino assured him that it was, Sarenas warned the other members of the team not to talk about or reveal the massacre, otherwise the squealer would be killed. None did, not until nearly a year later. All told, the concordant combination and cumulative effect[45] of the foregoing circumstances more than satisfy the requirements of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. In his third assigned error, accused Sarenas Tabag invokes paragraphs 5 and 6, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, which provide for justifying circumstances. [46] He contends that being a member of the ICHDF involved in the battle against insurgency, he was in the performance of an official duty or function duly authorized by law[47] and that he is, therefore, exempt from criminal liability. This assigned error is not predicated on a hypothesis that even granting arguendo that he was a coconspirator with the other accused in the massacre of the Magdasals he would still be exempt from any criminal liability because he was in the performance of an official duty or function duly authorized by law. Not being so, he thus admits that he was a co-conspirator. The slip may be showing much, or that the conscience has unwittingly told the truth. Yet, we shall not put Sarenas on a bind or be too harsh to him for the imprecise formulation of this assigned error. In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges under paragraphs 5 and 6, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, for the massacre of the Magdasals can by no means be considered as done in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of an office or in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose. Other than suspicion, there is no evidence that Welbino Magdasal, Sr., his wife Wendelyn, and their children were members of the NPA. And even if they were members of the NPA, they were entitled to due process of law. On that fateful night of 11 March 1984, they were peacefully resting in their humble home expecting for the dawn of another uncertain day. Clearly, therefore, nothing justified the sudden and unprovoked attack, at nighttime, on the Magdasals. The massacre was nothing but a merciless vigilante-style execution. As to the crime committed, we agree with the trial court that in killing Welbino Magdasal, Sr., his wife Wendelyn, and their children Welbino, Jr., and Melisa, the accused committed four separate crimes of murder, which are charged in the information. There was no challenge thereon on the ground that the information charges more than one offense.[48] Accordingly, the accused could be properly convicted of four counts of murder. As to the circumstance which qualified the killings to murders, we differ with the view of the trial court. It should be treachery,[49] not evident premeditation,[50] as ruled by the latter. The evidence for the prosecution failed to satisfy two of the three requisites of evident premeditation, viz., (a) the time when Sarenas determined to commit the crime, (b) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. [51] On the other hand, treachery was established beyond cavil. Accused Marcelino Tabag, Coloma Tabag, Fernando Maglinte, Laureo Awod, Artemio Awod, and Romeo Aguipo suddenly fired their high-powered firearms toward Welbino Magdasal, Sr., and thereafter, they went upstairs and stabbed his wife Wendelyn and his children Welbino, Jr., and Melisa. The victims, all unarmed, were caught by surprise and were in no position to offer any defense. There can be no doubt in any ones mind that the accused employed means, methods, or forms in the execution of the killings which tended directly and specially to ensure their execution, without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[52]

The trial court likewise erred in appreciating nighttime and band as generic aggravating circumstances. Under the facts of this case, nighttime or nocturnity was absorbed in treachery, since it was evidently an integral part of the peculiar treacherous means and manner adopted to ensure the execution of the crimes, or that it facilitated the treacherous character of the attack.[53] Band or cuadrilla was likewise absorbed in treachery.[54] Aside from disregarding nighttime and band as aggravating circumstances, we also give accused Sarenas Tabag the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For, as evidenced by a certification issued by Judge Napy Agayan, Sarenas Tabag voluntarily surrendered himself before the warrant for his arrest was served on him. The penalty for murder at the time the accused committed the four separate crimes of murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. There being one mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance to offset it, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable in each case is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum. As to the civil liabilities, the award of P400,000.00 as moral damages is not correct. Current case law fixes the indemnity for death at P50,000.00. Moral damages may also be recovered in criminal cases under Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Marciana Magdasal, mother of Welbino Magdasal, Sr., left to the discretion of the trial court the quantification of her sufferings caused by the death of her son, daughterin-law, and two grandchildren. Since Marcianas husband did not testify as to his moral suffering, any award for moral damages must be in favor of Marciana only, and an award of P10,000.00 in each of the four counts of murder is adequate. Hence, the total indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of the victims shall be P200,000.00, and the aggregate moral damages to be awarded to Marciana Magdasal shall be P40,000.00. Finally, the trial court also erred in not proceeding with the case against Laureo Awod and Artemio Awod after their successful escape on 19 October 1989 while in preventive detention. They had already been arraigned. Therefore, pursuant to the last sentence of paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the Constitution,[55] trial against them should continue and upon its termination, judgment should be rendered against them notwithstanding their absence unless, of course, both accused have died and the fact of such death is sufficiently established. Conformably with our decision in People v. Salas,[56] their escape should have been considered a waiver of their right to be present at their trial, and the inability of the court to notify them of the subsequent hearings did not prevent it from continuing with their trial. They were to be deemed to have received notice. The same fact of their escape made their failure to appear unjustified because they have, by escaping, placed themselves beyond the pale and protection of the law. This being so, then pursuant to Gimenez v. Nazareno,[57] the trial against the fugitives, just like those of the others, should have been brought to its ultimate conclusion. Thereafter, the trial court had the duty to rule on the evidence presented by the prosecution against all the accused and to render its judgment accordingly. It should not wait for the fugitives re-appearance or re-arrest. They were deemed to have waived their right to present evidence on their own behalf and to confront and cross-examine the witnesses who testified against them. It is obvious that the trial court forgot our rulings in Salas and Nazareno. We thus take this opportunity to admonish trial judges to abandon any cavalier stance against accused who escaped after arraignment, thereby allowing the latter to make a mockery of our laws and the judicial process. Judges must always keep in mind Salas and Nazareno and apply without hesitation the principles therein laid down, otherwise they would court disciplinary action. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao, in Criminal Case No. 6364 is AFFIRMED, with the modification (1) sentencing accused-appellant SARENAS TABAG in each of the four crimes to an indeterminate penalty of Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months, and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and (2) deleting the award of P400,000.00 as moral damages and awarding, in lieu thereof, (a) P200,000.00 as indemnity for the deaths of Welbino Magdasal, Sr., Wendelyn Repalda Magdasal, Welbino Magdasal, Jr., and Melisa Magdasal, payable to the heirs of the victims; and (b) P40,000.00 as moral damages, payable to Marciana Magdasal. The Resolution of 21 February 1996 dismissing the case as against accused Coloma Tabag because of his death is hereby reiterated.

The trial court is ordered to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 6364 as against accused Laureo Awod and Artemio Awod if they are still alive, in accordance with the principles laid down in People v. Salas and Gimenez v. Nazareno. Costs against accused-appellant Sarenas Tabag. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 157331 April 12, 2006

ARNOLD ALVA, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, assailing the twin Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated 18 October 20021 and 19 February 2003,2 respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 24077, entitled People of the Philippines v. Arnold Alva. The CA, in the assailed resolutions, dismissed petitioners appeal of the trial courts judgment of conviction for failing to post a new bail bond to secure his provisional liberty on appeal. The Facts The present petition stemmed from an Information3 charging petitioner with having committed the crime of estafa defined under Article 315, Paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, alleging as follows: The undersigned accuses ARNOLD ALVA of the crime of ESTAFA, committed as follows: That in or about and during the period covered between October 18, 1993 up to December 18, 1993, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously defraud YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestation and fraudulent representation which he made to said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA to the effect that he could process the latters application for U.S. Visa provided she would give the amount of P120,000.00, and by means of other similar deceit, induced and succeeded in inducing said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA to give and deliver, as in fact she gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P120,000.00 on the strength of said manifestation and representation said accused well knowing that the same were false and untrue for the reason that the U.S. Visa is not genuine and were made solely to obtain, as in fact he did obtain the amount ofP120,000.00 which amount once in his possession with intent to defraud, he wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA in the aforesaid amount of P120,000.00, Philippine Currency. CONTRARY TO LAW.

The resultant criminal case was filed and docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-143803 and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, presided by Judge Manuel T. Muro. On 5 September 1995, the RTC issued a Recall Order4 of the Warrant of Arrest issued on 18 July 1995 against petitioner in view of the approval of his bail bond by Hon. William Bayhon, then Executive Judge of the RTC of Manila. Upon arraignment on 7 December 1995, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel,5 pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After the trial on the merits, in an Order6 dated 6 April 1998, the RTC considered the case submitted for decision. On 4 May 1999, petitioners counsel filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Promulgation7 praying for the resetting of the 5 May 1999 schedule of promulgation of the RTCs decision to 17 June 1999 in view of the fact that said counsel already had a prior commitment on subject date. The RTC granted the motion. The promulgation, however, was deferred only until 19 May 1999. A day before the rescheduled date of promulgation, or on 18 May 1999, petitioners counsel again moved for the deferment of the promulgation, due to prior "undertakings of similar importance."8 On 19 May 1999, petitioner and counsel both failed to appear in court despite due notice. In his stead, claiming to be petitioners representative, a certain Joey Perez personally delivered to the RTC a hand written medical certificate9 expressing petitioners inability to attend the days hearing due to hypertension. In response to the aforestated acts of petitioner and counsel, the RTC issued an Order10 directing the promulgation of its decision in absentia and the issuance of a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner for his failure to appear before it despite due notice. In its decision dated 25 March 1999,11 the RTC found petitioner guilty of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the decretal part of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under Article 315, No. 2(a) of the RPC and sentences him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years as maximum of reclusion temporalin accordance with the provisions of Article 315, first, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and further for the accused to return the P120,000.00 to the complainant with an interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) compounded annually from January 1, 1994 (the amount has been given to the accused in October and December 1993). Meanwhile, as appearing in the records of the RTC, immediately following an original duplicate copy of the aforequoted decision, a document entitled Personal Bail Bond12 dated 21 May 1999 issued by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation, seemed to have been filed before and approved by the RTC as evidenced by the signature of Judge Muro on the face of said bail bond.13 For such reason, petitioner appeared to have been admitted to bail anew after his conviction. Incongruous to the above inference, however, in an Order14 dated 25 May 1999, judgment was rendered against Eastern Insurance and Surety Corporation, the bonding company that issued petitioners original bail bond, in the amount of P17,000.00, for failure to produce the person of petitioner within the 10 day period earlier provided and to explain why the amount of its undertaking should not be forfeited. In the interregnum, Police Superintendent Ramon Flores De Jesus, Chief of Warrant and Subpoena Section,15manifested to the RTC the return of the unexecuted Warrant of Arrest issued on 19 May 1999 "for the reason that the address of the accused (petitioner) is not within our area of responsibility. x x x" Nevertheless, De Jesus reassured the RTC that "the name of the accused will be included in our list of

wanted persons for our future reference." Examination of the records of the case revealed that petitioner already moved out of his address on record without informing the RTC. On 15 July 1999, hand delivered by a certain Remedios Caneda, petitioner wrote16 the RTC requesting for a certified photocopy of his exhibits submitted to it during trial. On 21 July 1999, a Termination of Legal Services was filed by petitioner before the RTC informing it of his decision to terminate the services of his counsel and that he was currently in the process of hiring a new one. On 26 July 1999,17 petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC. In an Order18 dated 30 August 1999, the RTC declined to give due course to said motion for failure to set it for hearing; thus, treating it as a mere scrap of paper. On 2 September 1999, petitioner received the above Order. The next day, or on 3 September 1999, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal19 before the RTC. In an Order20 dated 20 September 1999, the RTC again declined to give due course to the Notice of Appeal, ratiocinating thus: The "Notice of Appeal" filed by accused cannot be given due course as it was filed out of time. Although accused filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" dated 23 July 1999, the Court considered it as a mere scrap of paper and was not acted upon as the same was not set for hearing, hence, it did not stop the reglementary period to file appeal. On 25 November 1999, petitioner filed anew a motion praying for the RTCs categorical resolution of his 23 July 1999 Motion for Reconsideration. In an Order dated 7 December 1999, the RTC granted the abovestated motion, the full text of which states: The Motion to Resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of the accused, dated November 20, 1999 is granted in the interest of justice, considering that the one who prepared the Motion for Reconsideration appears to be the accused himself, who may not appear to be a lawyer and may not be conversant with the rules, among others, governing motions. Acting on the said Motion for Reconsideration itself, same is denied for lack of merit. The Decision has examined and discussed the evidence presented and the merits of the case. Because of the pendency of the Motion for Reconsideration, the appeal is deemed filed on time, and the appeal is given due course. Let the records of the case, together with three (3) copies of the transcripts of stenographic notes be transmitted to the Hon. Court of Appeals. On appeal before the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution21 dated 16 October 2001, the appellate court required petitioner to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed it appearing that no new bail bond for his provisional liberty on appeal had been posted, to wit: Considering the arrest warrant issued by the trial court against the accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment, and it appearing from the record that no new bond for his provisional liberty on appeal has been posted, appellant is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice why his appeal should not be dismissed outright. On 29 October 2001, petitioner, through new counsel, filed a Compliance22 essentially stating therein that:

xxxx 3. Upon learning of the course of action taken by the presiding judge, and for purposes of appealing the decision subject of the instant case, on May 21, 1999, accused immediately posted a new bond for his provisional liberty. The presiding judge of the lower court, which issued the questioned decision, duly approved the new bond.1avvphil.netCertified true copy of the bond is hereto attached as Annex "3" and made an integral part hereof; x x x x. In a Resolution23 dated 18 October 2002, the Court of Appeals, nonetheless dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner for "appellants failure to post a new bond for his provisional liberty on appeal despite our directive as contained in our Resolution dated October 16, 2001, and in view of the fact that his personal bail bond posted in the lower court had already expired, x x x." Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration24 thereto seeking its reversal. According to petitioners counsel, he was of the understanding that the "Show Cause" Resolution of 16 October 2001 merely sought an explanation vis--vis the absence of a bail bond guaranteeing petitioners provisional liberty while his conviction was on appeal. All the same, petitioners counsel manifested that Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation, had already extended the period covered by its 21 May 1999 bail bond. Attached to said motion was a Bond Endorsement25extending the coverage of the bail bond from 21 May 1999 to 21 May 2003. Asked to comment on the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent People of the Philippines (People), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed objections. In its Comment,26 respondent People raised two arguments: 1) that "an application for bail can only be availed of by a person who is in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty;" and 2) that "bail on appeal is a matter of discretion when the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years." On 19 February 2003, the Court of Appeals issued the second assailed Resolution,27 disposing of petitioners motion as follows: Finding no merit in appellants motion for reconsideration (citation omitted) filed on November 12, 2002, the same is hereby DENIED. We agree with the appellee that appellant has failed to submit himself under the jurisdiction of the court or under the custody of the law since his conviction in 1999 and that there was no valid bail bond in place when appellant took his appeal. WHEREFORE, appellants motion for reconsideration is DENIED. [Emphasis supplied.] Hence, this petition. The Issues Petitioner now comes to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging the following errors:28 I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT; II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION DOCKETED AS CA G.R. CR NO. 24077 ON THE GROUND OF ALLEGED FAILURE TO POST A NEW BOND FOR PETITIONERS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY

AND THAT THE PERSONAL BAIL BOND POSTED IN THE LOWER COURT HAD ALLEGEDLY ALREADY EXPIRED; III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER AS SUBSTANTIAL, THE COMPLAINCE FILED BY THE PETITIONER WHICH SHOWED THE FACT THAT INDEED THERE WAS A BAIL BOND FILED FOR THE PROVISIONAL LIBERTY OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL; IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT IGNORED THE RECENT BAIL BOND EXTENSION ATTACHED TO THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY THE PETITIONER; V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO SUBMIT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OR TO THE CUSTODY OF LAW DESPITE THE BAIL BOND POSTED ON MAY 21, 1999; and VI. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS NO VALID BAIL BOND IN PLACE WHEN THE PETITIONER TOOK HIS APPEAL. The bombardment of errors notwithstanding, only two issues are raised in this petition: 1) with the exception of the fifth assignment of error, all six can be encapsulated in one solitary question, that is, whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing the appeal in view of petitioners alleged failure to post a valid bail bond to secure his provisional liberty on appeal; and 2) whether or not petitioner failed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court or to the custody of the law despite the posting of the subject bail bond. The Courts Ruling Petitioner faults the appellate court for expressing "x x x in its questioned resolutions that herein petitioner did not submit to the jurisdiction of the court or custody of the law, or that there was no valid bail bond when the appeal was taken when the records of the case would readily prove the contrary."29 In issuing said resolution, petitioner concludes that the Court of Appeals made "x x x no careful examination of the records x x x." Petitioner rationalizes his deduction in the following manner: x x x [T]he records of the case readily reveals (sic) that several pleadings were filed by the petitioner before the lower court even after the promulgation of judgment was made. Right after the promulgation of the decision in the lower court, herein petitioner went to the court and posted a bail bond. If the posting of the bond which was approved by the same Regional Trial Court who rendered the decision subject of appeal is not yet a submission to the jurisdiction of the court, then the respondent Hon. Court of Appeals must have been thinking of another matter beyond the comprehension of the petitioner and obviously outside the matters being contemplated by law and the Rules of Court. Equally, petitioner further posits that: x x x Although it is respectfully submitted that an accused shall be denied bail or his bail shall be cancelled if sentenced to an imprisonment exceeding six (6) years as provided in Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, just the same, there must be a showing by the prosecution with notice to the accused of the fact that, the accused is a recidivist, has previously escaped from confinement, evaded sentence, has

committed an offense while under probation, there are circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail, etc. But there was none of the said instances that may be attributable to herein petitioner.30 Respondent People, in contrast, counters that "x x x [a]lthough a personal bail bond dated May 21, 1999 was executed in favor of petitioner by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation two days after the promulgation of the Decision, there is nothing on record which shows that petitioner had surrendered, was arrested or otherwise deprived of his liberty after the promulgation of the judgment of his conviction in his absence. x x x." To illustrate its point, respondent People cites the following facts: 1) the return of the Warrant of Arrest issued on May 19, 1999 signed by P/Superintendent Ramon Flores De Jesus, Chief of Warrant and Subpoena Section, which states in full: Respectfully returned this unexecuted Warrant of Arrest for the reason that the address of the accused is not within our area of responsibility. Further request that the warrant of Arrest be forwarded to the Police Station which has Jurisdiction over the address of the accused. However, the name of the accused will be included in our list of wanted persons for our future reference. 2) the fact that six days after the decision of the RTC was promulgated, or on 25 May 1999, said court rendered judgment against the bail bond issued by Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation executed to secure petitioners provisional liberty during the trial, for the bondsmans failure to produce petitioner before the court, to wit: In view of the failure of Eastern Insurance & Surety Corporation, bondsman of herein accused, to produce the herein accused within the period granted it by this Court, judgment is hereby rendered against said bond in the amount of Seventeen Thousand (P17,000.00) Pesos.31 Respondent People explains that the first two facts make it improbable to conclude that there existed a valid bail bond securing petitioners provisional liberty even after conviction. Stated in another way, petitioners admission to bail presumes that the latter surrendered, was arrested or he had otherwise submitted himself under the custody of the law. And, 3) "that petitioner belatedly attached a bond endorsement to his motion for reconsideration dated November 7, 2002 submitted before the Court of Appeals, purportedly to extend the expired personal bond dated May 21, 1999 x x x, did not automatically confer on petitioner the benefits of an effective bail bond,"32 as petitioner made no extension of the previous personal bond before the same expired. We disagree in petitioners assertions; hence, the petition must fail. A definitive disposition of the issue relating to the existence and validity of petitioners bail bond on appeal presupposes that the latter was allowed by law to post bail notwithstanding the RTCs judgment of conviction and the imposition of the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years as maximum of reclusion temporal. Section 5 of Rule 114 of the 1994 Rules of Court, as amended, intrinsically addresses the foregoing prefatory matter viz: SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail. The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman. If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstances of reiteration; (b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime. The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the adverse party. [Emphasis supplied.] From the preceding quoted provision, the RTC is given the discretion to admit to bail an accused even after the latter has been convicted to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of more than six (6) years but less than twenty (20) years. However, the same also provides for the cancellation of bail bonds already granted or the denial of a bail bond application upon the concurrence of two points: 1) if the judgment of the Regional Trial Court exceeds six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years; and 2) upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the presence of any of the five circumstances therein enumerated or other similar circumstances. In the case at bar, petitioner was convicted by the RTC to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate term of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years as maximum ofreclusion temporal. Quite clearly, the approval of petitioners application for bail was discretionary upon the RTC. It is incongruous, to say the least, that the posting of a bail presupposes that the accused and/ or accused-appellant is detained or in the custody of the law.33 In the case at bar, the bench warrant issued by the RTC on 19 May 1999 still remains unserved. Nothing in the records of the case, neither in the RTC nor the Court of Appeals, demonstrates that petitioner was ever arrested, as there has been no related Order of Release issued by any court, or that he voluntarily surrendered or at the very least placed himself under the custody of the law. Basic is the principle that that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, x x x, to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.34 All told, no bail should have been granted petitioner. It is beyond dispute that the subject bail bond issued by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation was irregularly approved. Worth noting is the fact that nowhere in the records of the case is it shown that petitioner applied for bail through a motion duly filed for such purpose nor is there showing that the RTC issued an Order of Approval or any other court process acknowledging such document. Be that as it may, even granting for the sake of argument that it was indeed approved by Judge Muro, such approval did not render the subject bail bond valid and binding for it has been established that petitioner was not entitled to bail on appeal. That the prosecution appears not to have been given the chance to object, as evidently required under the quoted rule, to the application or approval of the subject bail bond (with notice to the accused), fortifies the declaration as to its invalidity. Nowhere in the original records of the RTC does it even show that the prosecution was informed of petitioners application for bail, much less the approval of such application. Noting that the raison d'tre for such requirement is the discretionary nature of the admission to bail of an accused after conviction, though discretionary, such assessment must be exercised in accordance with

applicable legal principles. As when there is a concurrence of the enumerated circumstances and the range of penalty imposed, the prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to object and present evidence, if necessary, with notice to the accused. It is on this basis that judicial discretion is balanced in determining whether or not an accused-appellant should be admitted to bail pending appeal of his conviction vis--vis the increased possibility or likelihood of flight. Approval of an application for bail on appeal, absent the knowledge of the prosecution of such application or, at the very least, failing to allow it to object, is not the product of sound judicial discretion but of impulse and arbitrariness, not to mention violative of respondent Peoples right of procedural due process. This is especially true in this case as a close scrutiny of the original records of the case at bar reveals that petitioner violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification his failure to appear before the RTC, despite due notice, on the day of the promulgation of the latters judgment, absent any justifiable reason. His absence was a clear contravention of the conditions of his bail bond to say the least. As evidenced by the undertaking printed on the face of the bond issued by Eastern Insurance and Surety Corporation and likewise required under Section 635 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, petitioner must present himself before the court for the reading of the judgment of the RTC in order to render himself to the execution thereof. While, indeed, a medical certificate was hand delivered and filed by a certain Joey Perez, allegedly a representative of petitioner, stating therein the reason for the latters absence, the RTC found insubstantial the explanation proffered. Appropriately, it ordered the promulgation of its judgment in absentia. It also issued a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner. Upon examination, the subject medical certificate36 merely states that petitioner was diagnosed to be suffering from hypertension. It failed to elucidate further any concomitant conditions necessitating petitioners physical incapability to present himself before the court even for an hour or two; thus, it considered the absence of petitioner unjustified. What's more, though notarized, the subject document failed to indicate evidence of affiants37 identity making its due execution doubtful. Further, it should be recalled as well, that as early as 4 May 1999, petitioner and counsel had already been notified of the 19 May 1999 schedule of promulgation. The first having been postponed in view of the Urgent Motion to Cancel Promulgation (on 5 May 1999) filed by petitioners counsel. Another telling evidence of the violation of petitioners original bail bond is revealed by the Process Servers Return,38 indicated at the dorsal portion of the RTCs Produce Order, indicating petitioners change of address without prior notice to the RTC, it states: PROCESS SERVERS RETURN This certifies that on the 17th day of May, (sic) 1999, undersigned return (sic) again to Fersal Apartelle located at 130 Kalayaan Ave. (sic) Diliman, Quezon City for confirmation and indeed the addressee, Arnold Alva, had no (sic) longer been residing nor holding office at the aforementioned address. By failing to inform the RTC of his change of address, petitioner failed to hold himself amenable to the orders and processes of the RTC. It was an unmistakable arrant breach of the conditions of his bail bond. Prescinding from the above discussion, the conviction of petitioner to a period beyond six (6) years but less than twenty (20) years in tandem with attendant circumstances effectively violating his bail without valid justification should have effectively precluded him from being admitted to bail on appeal. The issue of the validity of petitioners bail bond on appeal having been laid to rest by Section 5 of Rule 114 of the 1994 Rules of Court, as amended, petitioners alleged failure to post a bail bond on appeal is, therefore, inconsequential as, under the circumstances, he is disallowed by law to be admitted to bail on appeal. Thus, for all legal intents and purposes, there can be no other conclusion than that at the time petitioner filed his notice of appeal and during the pendency of his appeal even until now he remains at large, placing himself beyond the pale, and protection of the law.

Inexorably, having jumped bail and eluded arrest until the present, the issue of whether or not petitioner has lost his right to appeal his conviction now ensues. The manner of review of petitioners conviction is governed by the Rules of Court. Appropriately, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court presents the procedural requirements regarding appeals taken to the Court of Appeals. Section 8 of said Rule finds application to the case at bar, viz: SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. The appellate court may, upon motion of the appellee or its own motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except in case the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio. The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. [Emphasis supplied.] By virtue of the second paragraph of the abovequoted provision, the act of jumping bail, among otherthings, will result in the outright dismissal of petitioners appeal. As pointed out by the Court in the case of People v. Mapalao,39 the reason for said rule is that: [O]nce an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he losses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing petitioners appeal. Within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, petitioner impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the RTC final and executory.40 By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal processes of the land, petitioner revealed his contempt of the law and placed himself in a position to speculate at his pleasure his chances for a reversal. This, we cannot condone. Once more, by jumping bail, petitioner has waived his right to appeal. In the case of People v. Ang Gioc,41 we enunciated that: There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him x x x. Coming now to the second issue of whether or not petitioner failed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court or to the custody of the law, despite the posting of the subject bail bond, petitioner argues that his act of filing several pleadings after the promulgation of the RTCs judgment plus his filing of the application for his admission to bail should be considered a submission to the courts jurisdiction. He rationalizes that: [T]he records of the case readily reveals that several pleadings were filed by the petitioner before the lower court even after the promulgation of judgment was made. Right after the promulgation of the decision in the lower court, herein petitioner went to the court and posted a bail bond. If the posting of the bond which was approved by the same Regional Trial Court who rendered the decision subject of appeal is not yet a submission to the jurisdiction of the court, then the respondent Hon. Court of Appeals must have been thinking of another matter beyond the comprehension of the petitioner and obviously outside the matters being contemplated by law and the Rules of Court. For the resolution of the second issue, it should have been sufficient to state that for reasons stated in the foregoing discussion, the question posed has now become academic. However, to diminish the confusion brought about by ostensibly equating the term "jurisdiction of the court (over the person of the accused)" with that of "custody of the law", it is fundamental to differentiate the two. The term:

Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender (citation omitted); while (the term) jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance (citation omitted). One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced (citation omitted).42 Moreover, jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of parties, as when an accused escapes from the custody of the law, but continues until the case is terminated.43 Evidently, petitioner is correct in that there is no doubt that the RTC already acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused petitioner when he appeared at the arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged notwithstanding the fact that he jumped bail and is now considered a fugitive. As to whether or not petitioner has placed himself under the custody of the CA, alas, we cannot say the same for "[b]eing in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law (citation omitted). Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention."44 In the case at bar, petitioner, being a fugitive, until and unless he submits himself to the custody of the law, in the manner of being under the jurisdiction of the courts, he cannot be granted any relief by the CA. Parenthetically, we cannot end this ponencia without calling attention to a very disturbing fact that petitioner admits of being the author of a falsified public document was treated nonchalantly by authorities. In fine, the petitioner has remained at large even as he hopes that his appeal, and consequently, this petition, will succeed and he can then appear before the Court to claim his victory. He hopes in vain. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 24077, which dismissed petitioners appeal, are hereby AFFIRMED. In this connection, Judge Manuel Muro is DIRECTED to issue forthwith a warrant of arrest for the apprehension of Petitioner Arnold Alva and for proper disposition of the case in line with the foregoing discussion. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice Chairman CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Asscociate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 192898, January 31, 2011] SPOUSES ALEXANDER TRINIDAD AND CECILIA TRINIDAD, PETITIONERS, VS. VICTOR ANG, RESPONDENT. RESOLUTION BRION, J.: We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner spouses Alexander Trinidad and Cecilia Trinidad (petitioners) to challenge our Resolution of September 29, 2010. Our Resolution denied the petition for review on certiorari for its failure to state the material dates of receipt of the order[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, Masbate City, and of filing the motion for reconsideration, in violation of Sections 4(b)[2] and 5,[3] Rule 45, in relation to Section 5(d),[4] Rule 56 of the Rules of Court. Antecedent Facts On September 3, 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Masbate City, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against the petitioners. On October 10, 2007, the petitioners filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for review challenging this Resolution. On March 3, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Fifth Judicial Region, Masbate City, an Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against the petitioners. As the case was covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the MTCC ordered the petitioners to submit their counter affidavits and to appear in court within 10 days from receipt of the said order. The petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Arraignment and Proceedings and Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest[5] praying, among others, for the deferment of their arraignment in view of the pendency of their petition for review before the DOJ. The MTCC, in its Order[6] dated May 28, 2009, granted the motion, "subject x x x to paragraph c[,] Section 11, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure." On August 10, 2009, the MTCC reconsidered this order, and set the petitioners' arraignment on September 10, 2009.[7] The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC, docketed as SCA No. 05-2009. The RTC, in its decision[8] of January 6, 2010, denied this petition. The petitioners moved to reconsider this decision, but

the RTC denied their motion in its order[9] dated July 5, 2010. The RTC held that the MTCC judge did not err in setting the arraignment of the petitioners after the lapse of one (1) year and ten (10) months from the filing of the petition for review with the DOJ. It explained that the cases cited by the petitioners were decided before the amendment of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. After the amendment of the Rules on December 1, 2000, the Supreme Court applied the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment in case of a pendency of a petition for review with the DOJ. The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari essentially claiming that the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment is only a general rule. They cited several cases to show that the arraignment of an accused should be deferred until the petition for review with the DOJ is resolved. As earlier stated, we denied the petition for its failure to state the material dates of receipt of the assailed RTC order and of filing the motion for reconsideration. The Motion for Reconsideration In the present motion for reconsideration, the petitioners claim that the date of receipt of the assailed RTC order was stated in the petition. The petitioners further state that they filed the motion for reconsideration on January 2, 2010. The Court's Ruling We grant the motion for reconsideration and reinstate the petition for review oncertiorari. A careful examination of the petition reveals that it stated the date when the petitioners received a copy of the RTC's assailed order. In addition, the petitioners' failure to state the material date of filing the motion for reconsideration is only a formal requirement that warrants the relaxation of the rules in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice. Nevertheless, we resolve to deny the petition for its failure to show any reversible error in the challenged RTC order. The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which provides: SEC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment. - Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases: (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him

unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose; (b) There exists a prejudicial question; and (c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. In Samson v. Daway,[10] the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on October 10, 2007. When the RTC set the arraignment of the petitioners on August 10, 2009, 1 year and 10 months had already lapsed. This period was way beyond the 60-day limit provided for by the Rules. In addition, the cases cited by the petitioners - Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How,[11] Roberts, Jr. v. CA,[12] and Dimatulac v. Villon[13] - were all decided prior to the amendment to Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedurewhich took effect on December 1, 2000. At the time these cases were decided, there was no 60-day limit on the suspension of arraignment. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to: (1) GRANT the present motion for reconsideration, and REINSTATE the petition for review on certiorari; and (2) DENY the said petition for petitioners' failure to show any reversible error in the challenged RTC order. SO ORDERED. Carpio Morales, (Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Sereno, JJ., concur.