Declarador vs. Gubaton Facts: At around 9:45 am on July 25, 2002, in a classroom in Cabug-Cabug Natl High School in Pres.

Roxas, Capiz, Philippines, the accused armed with a knife attacked, assaulted and stabbed with the said knife [his] teacher, one YVONNE DECLARADOR, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the latter multiple fatal stab wounds in the different parts of the body which caused the immediate death of the said Yvonne Declarador. Crime was committed with the attendance of the qualifying aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength ( since the attack was made by the accused using a long knife which he carried from his house to the school against Declarador). RTC found him guilty, but the said court suspended the sentence of the accused and ordered his commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation for Youth at Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras. He was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the offense charged, thus entitled him to a special mitigating circumstance of minority and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of 12 years, 1 day to 17 years, 4 months of RT. Rennie Declarador, the surviving spouse of the deceased, filed a petition for certiorari assailing that portion of the trial courts decision suspending the sentence of the accused and committing him to the rehabilitation center. He claimed that under Art. 192 of PD No. 603, as well as AM No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, the benefit of a suspended sentence does not apply to a juvenile who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, Reclusion Perpetua or life imprisonment. Issues: 1. WON the accused could avail of the suspension of sentence. 2. WON respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the suspension of the sentence of respondent Bansales and his commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation Center for the Youth. Held: 1. As provided for in Art.192 of P.D. No. 603, it is clear that a person who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is disqualified from availing the benefits of a suspended sentence. The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime charged and the imposable penalty therefor, and not on the penalty imposed by the court after trial. Sec. 38 of RA No. 9344 merely amended Art. 192 of PD No. 603 as amended by AM No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the suspension of sentence shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is already 18 or more at the time of the pronouncement of guilt. The other disqualifications have not been deleted. Thus, since the charge against respondent Bansales was murder with the qualifying circumstance of either evident premeditation or abuse of superior strength and under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 7659, the imposable penalty for the crime is

reclusion perpetua to death, he is disqualified from availing the benefits of a suspended sentence. 2. Despite disqualification of Bansales, respondent Judge, nevertheless, ordered the suspension of his sentence. By this act, respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

Padua vs. Pp Facts: Petitioner, Michael Padua, who was then 17 years old, was involved in selling illegal drugs (violation of Sec. 5, Art. 11 of RA No. 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of 2002). Initially in his arraignment he pleaded not guilty but re-entered his plea of guilty to avail the benefits of first time offenders under Section 70 of RA No. 9165. The prosecutor interposed no objection. Thus, the RTC on the same date issued an Order stating that the former plea of Padua of not guilty was considered withdrawn. Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty. The RTC found Padua guilty of the crime charged.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Michael Padua y Tordel guilty of [v]iolation of Sec. 5 Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A. No. 8369 Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i) thereof, and therefore, sentences him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed should [the] accused fail to pay the fine pursuant to Art. 39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code.

He petitioned for Probation but was denied. Thus he filed a petition for review. Issues: 1. WON Padua's right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," violated. 2. WON Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" have application in this case. Held: Sec. 68 of RA No. 9344 and Sec. 32 of AM No. 02-1-18SC both pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation. Suspension of sentence under Sec. 38 of RA N0. 9344 could no longer be retroactively applied for petitioners benefit, since he has already reached 21 years of age and could no longer be considered a child for purposes of applying RA No. 9344. Application of Sec. 38 and Sec. 40 appears moot and academic. [Sec. 38 provides for suspension of sentence if a child under 18 is found guilty; Sec. 40 provides that once child reaches 18, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence or extend suspended sentence until child reaches the maximum age of 21]

Pp vs. Sarcia Facts: Accused was 17 years old when he raped the victim who was then a minor. He was convicted of rape with the penalty of death which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 2005. During the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court, RA 9344 took effect. Before the promulgation of the SC decision, accused was already 31 years old. Issue: WON Sec. 38 and Sec. 40 of RA 9433 has application in this case. Held: Sec. 68 of RA 9344 allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review. Hence, it is necessary to examine which provisions of R.A. No. 9344 shall apply to accused-appellant, who was below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense. Sec. 38 of RA 9344 does not distinguish as to which crimes the suspension of sentence is applicable. It applies even to heinous crimes such as in this case even if the child in conflict with the law is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his guilt. Sec. 40 limits the suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. Since the accused is already 31 years old, the application of the application of Sec. 38 and Sec. 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic. However, accused shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 where in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution he may be ordered to serve in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD. Civil liability remains the same and unaffected.

benefits of RA 9344 is rendered moot and academic in view of Sec. 40. Sec. 40. xxx If the child in conflict with the law has reached 18 years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain period or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. Remiendo was already 22 years old at the time of the imposition of his sentence, and could no longer be considered a child for the purposes of the application of RA 9344.

Pp vs. Jacinto Facts: Accused-appellant Hermie Jacinto was charged and convicted in the lower courts of raping a 5-year-old child, AAA. Jacinto is neighbors with the family of AAA for a long time and he was friends with the victims father. The victim AAA knew Jacinto well, as she calls him kuya. On January 2003, the victims father sent his other daughter CCC to the store to buy cigarettes and the victim followed her older sister but did not return with the latter. The father thought that she was left behind to watch television at another house. A witness saw Jacinto with the victim later on, at the store, where the latter was seated on his lap. The victim testified that when she left the store with the accused Jacinto, he had carnal knowledge of her. She went home crying after the incident. The victims father confronted Jacinto and called the police. AAA underwent physical check-up which leads to findings that she had been raped. For his defense, Jacinto interposed an alibi, that he attended a birthday party at the time of the incident and that the victim merely followed him when he went to the store. The RTC found Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Remiendo vs. Pp Facts: Robert Remiendo was accused of 2 counts of statutory rape. Petitioner was a minor whose age is above15 but below 18 years old when he raped AAA a minor when the latter was left alone in her house sometime in March 1997. The second act of rape happened sometime in May 1997 when the victim was on her way to her mothers workplace and this took place in the house of the accused. In violating the minor, he threatened to kill the minor if she told anyone about what happened. Petitioner was convicted of rape but on appeal invoked a suspension of sentence pursuant to RA 9344. By the time he was convicted by the trial court and before the case was elevated to the CA, he was already 22 years old. Issue: WON accused-appellant could claim benefits of RA 9344. Held: Remiendo being above 15 and under 18 years of age at the time of the rape, and having acted with discernment, but having already reached 21 years of age at the time of the imposition of his sentence by the trial court, his claim for the

Thereafter, the defense moved to reopen the trial for reception of newly discovered evidence. It is stated that appellant Jacinto was born on March 1, 1985. This means that at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, he was merely 17 years old. The RTC appreciated the new evidence and reduced the penalty. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Issue: WON accused-appellant could avail the benefits of a suspended sentence. Held: Benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply to accused-appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of 21. Sec. 40 of RA 9344 and Sec. 48 of the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, accused-appellant is already 25 years old. But he is entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51. (Following the pronouncement in Sarcia, the case shall be remanded to the court of origin to effect accused-appellants confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility.)

Pp vs. Salcedo Facts: At around 12:30 past midnight ofJune 2, 2001, the Abu Sayaff Group led by Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu Sabaya with 30 armed followers entered and took control over the Jose Maria Torres Memorial Hospital in Lamitan, Basilan. A firefight ensued between the military forces and the group of Janjalani and Sabaya. It lasted until the afternoon of June 2, 2001. At around 6:00 in the evening, the Abu Sayaff Group and their hostages were able to slip out of the hospital through the backdoor and they hiked towards the mountain. Some of the hostages were beheaded, others were able to escape during a firefight between the group and the military and others were released allegedly after paying ransom. A manhunt by the military was conducted, where the accusedappellants were subsequently captured and held for trial. Hence, criminal informations for kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Sec. 8 of RA 7659 were filed against 17 Abu Sayaff Group members. It was averred that 4 of the accused-appellants (Wahid Salcedo, Magarni Hapilon Iblong, Nadzmer Mandangan and Kamar Jaafar) were supposedly minors at the time the alleged kidnapping took place; hence RA 9344 should apply to said accused-appellants. Issue: WON RA 9344 should apply to accused-appellants claiming minority at the time of the alleged kidnapping. Held: Iblong claimed he was born on August 5, 1987; Mandangan stated his birth date as July 6, 1987; Salcedo said he was born on January 10, 1985; and Jaafar claimed he was born on July 13, 1981. If Jaafar's birth date was indeed July 13, 1981, then he was over 18 years of age when the crime was committed in June of 2001 and, thus, he cannot claim minority. It should be noted that the defense absolutely failed to present any document showing accused-appellants' date of birth, neither did they present testimonies of other persons such as parents or teachers to corroborate their claim of minority. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that: Sec. 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents.1avvphi1 In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor. xxxx If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the appropriate court, the person shall file a motion to determine the age of the child in the same court

where the case is pending. Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the main case shall be suspended. In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict with the law. A reading of the afore-quoted Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 shows that this manner of determining accused-appellants' age is also sanctioned by the law. The accused-appellants appeared to the trial court as no younger than twenty-four years of age, or in their mid-twenties, meaning they could not have been under eighteen (18) years old when the crime was committed. As discussed above, such factual finding of the trial court on the age of the four accused-appellants, affirmed by the CA, must be accorded great respect, even finality by this Court. If accused-appellants' claim are true, that they were born in 1985 and 1987, then they have already reached 21 years of age, or over by this time and thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 of R.A. No. 9344 is now moot and academic. However, just for the guidance of the bench and bar, it should be borne in mind that if indeed, an accused was under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, then as held in People v. Sarcia,such offenders, even if already over twenty-one (21) years old at the time of conviction, may still avail of the benefits accorded by Section 51 of R.A. 9344. Nevertheless, as discussed above, the evidence before the Court show that accused-appellants Iblong, Mandangan, Salcedo and Jaafar, were not minors at the time of the commission of the crime, hence, they cannot benefit from R.A. No. 9344.

Pp vs. Mantalaba Facts: Allen Mantalaba violated Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 for selling and in possession of shabu. He was arrested after the Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) had conducted a buy-bust operation. The appellant was 17 years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the RTCs Decision. Issue: WON appellant can avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence. Held: In People v. Sarcia, while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twentyone (21) years can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and academic.

It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603. Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA No. 9344 which provides that in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.