I. Admissibility A. Rule 128, Sections 1 to 4 1. Reyes vs.

Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 25 GR No: 96492 Date: November 26, 1992 Rule: Rule 128 Sections 1-4 Petitioners: Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya Respondents: CA, Eufrocina de la Cruz and Violeta de los Reyes Facts: Juan Mendoza, father of Olympio Mendoza (petitioner in the CA1), is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 (23,000 sq. m.) and 106 (19,000 sq. m.)2 in Pampanga. Devoted to the production of palay, said lots are tenanted and cultivated by Julian de la Cruz, the husband of private respondent, Eufrocina de la Cruz. Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of her husband, she succeeded him as bona fide tenant of the subject lots. However, Olympio conspired with other petitioners to prevent her daughter, Violeta, and her workersthrough force, intimidation, strategy and stealthfrom entering and working on the farm lots. Petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the lots, which prompted Eufrocina to file a case for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Severino Aguinaldo (petitioner in the CA3) and petitioners Reyes, Parayao, Mananghaya, duly elected/appointed barangay officials of the locality (Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga), denied their interference in the tenancy relationship existing between Olympio and Eufrocina, particularly in the cultivation of the farm lots. Olympio, for his part, raised as his defenses the grounds of abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent and non-payment of rentals. The CA affirmed the agrarian courts decision with modification, which ordered respondents to restore possession of the farm lots to plaintiff Eufrocina. The CA likewise ruled that the petitioners are solidarily liable to pay to Eufrocina the value of cavans of palay until they have vacated the area. Issues: 1) W/N defendants must restore possession of the disputed landholding to private respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz. YES. 2) Whether or not the trial court erred when it gave favorable consideration to the affidavits of plaintiff, even if the affiant was not presented and subjected to cross-examination. NO. Held: Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

1 2

Olympio did not appeal the case before the SC, so the CA Decision is final and executory as to him. In her Complaint, Euphrocina alleged that she "is the tenant of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106. However, during Violeta's testimony, she clarified that, actually, only Lot No. 106 is not included in this controversy. The Court held that the inconsistency between the averment of the complaint and the testimony of the witness should not be pressed on because there was no showing that she intended to mislead on the subject matter of the suit. Lot 106 had been included in the complaint since together with Lot 46, it is owned by Olympio's father. 3 Aguinaldo also did not appeal the case before the SC, so the CA Decision is final and executory as to him.

Rationale: 1) Petitioners are asking the Court re-examine all the evidence already presented and evaluated by the lower courts. However, absent any exception in this case, settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari. The SC concurs with the trial court's finding on the participation of the other appellants in the dispossession of Eufrocina. They not only knew Olympio personally, some of them were even asked by Olympio to help him cultivate the land, thus lending credence to the allegation that defendant Olympio, together with his co-defendants, prevented plaintiff and her workers from entering the land through "strong arm methods." 2) The judgment is affirmed. The trial court did not err when it favorable considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson although the affiants were not presented and subjected to crossexamination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character. The same provision states that In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence. Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no more than substantial evidence. Thus, this case is an application of the rule with regard the scope of the Rules on Evidence which states that The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings except as otherwise provided by law (ex. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946) or these rules.

2. People vs. Turco, 337 SCRA 714 G.R. No. 137757 Date: 10/14/00 Rule 128, Admissibility, Rape Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Rogelio Turco, Jr. aka TOTONG Ponente: Melo Facts: Lea Tabado was a 12-year-old girl who lived in Basilan with her father and grandmother. On the evening of July 1995 as she was about to sleep, her neighbor and second cousin, Rogelio Turco Jr. alias TOTONG called her from outside the house. As she went out to meet him, she was forcibly seized by Totong and brought to the Tabado familys pig pen wherein the former proceeded to rape her. After the deed was done, Totong told Tabando that he will kill her if she does not keep the incident a secret. However after ten days Tabando finally told her father, who then sought to have her medically examined. The Tabandos filed a case against Turco. The accused on the other hand denied the allegations and claimed that he and the victim were sweethearts. The court however ruled in favor of Tabando. Turco filed an appeal challenging the decision of the court. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in finding the accused guilty based on the testimonies of the complainant and her witnesses Whether or not the court erred in ruling that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime of rape, based on the affidavits and oral testimonies of the complainant and her witnesses.

Held: The appealed decision was affirmed. Court ruled in favor of Tabando. Rationale: The accused alleged that the testimonies of the complainant and her witnesses were unreliable as there were discrepancies in the details of their given statements. However it has been established that minor lapses in a witness testimony should be expected when a person recounts details of an experience so humiliating and so painful to recall, as rape. Rape, as a harrowing experience, is usually not remembered in detail. Furthermore the court finds that the victim had no motive to testify falsely against accusedappellant. Her testimony deserves the credence accorded thereto by the trial court. The sweetheart theory of the accused was unavailing as he failed to introduce love letters, gifts, and the like to attest to his alleged amorous affair with the victim. Turco erroneously argued that he cannot be convicted due based on the victims testimony without actual proof of the occurrence of the rape, since the medico-legal officer was not presented in court to attest to this fact. A medical examination is not indispensible in the prosecution of rape. It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that a conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victims testimony alone is credible and sufficient to convict. pe * Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or the rules or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception. 3. Agustin vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 162571 June 15, 2005 ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA PROLLAMANTE, respondents. DECISION CORONA, J.: At issue in this petition for certiorari 1 is whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA) gravely erred in exercising its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing a decision2 and resolution3 upholding the resolution and order of the trial court,4 which denied petitioners motion to dismiss private respondents complaint for support and directed the parties to submit themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity testing. Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106.5

In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City. The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child. On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for support.6 In his amended answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martins conception. He claimed that Fe had at least one other secret lover. Arnel admitted that their relationship started in 1993 but "he never really fell in love with (Fe) not only because (she) had at least one secret lover, a certain Jun, but also because she proved to be scheming and overly demanding and possessive. As a result, theirs was a stormy on-and-off affair. What started as a romantic liaison between two consenting adults eventually turned out to be a case of fatal attraction where (Fe) became so obsessed with (Arnel), to the point of even entertaining the idea of marrying him, that she resorted to various devious ways and means to alienate (him) from his wife and family. Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and children, Arnel terminated the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as by referring potential customers to the car aircon repair shop"7 where she worked. Later on, Arnel found out that Fe had another erstwhile secret lover. In May 2000, Arnel and his entire family went to the United States for a vacation. Upon their return in June 2000, Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he had impregnated her. Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as his because their "last intimacy was sometime in 1998."8 Exasperated, Fe started calling Arnels wife and family. On January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot to demand that he acknowledge Martin as his child. According to Arnel, he could not get through Fe and the discussion became so heated that he had no "alternative but to move on but without bumping or hitting any part of her body."9 Finally, Arnel claimed that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964.10 In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel vehemently denied having sired Martin but expressed willingness to consider any proposal to settle the case.11 On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court.12 Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination.13 He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative father.14 In his motion, Arnel manifested that he had filed criminal charges for falsification of documents against Fe (I.S. Nos. 02-5723 and 02-7192) and a petition for cancellation of his name appearing in Martins birth certificate (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-46669). He attached the certification of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory that his signature in the birth certificate was forged. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Thus, this petition. In a nutshell, petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether a complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition and (2) whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioners constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.15 The petition is without merit.

First of all, the trial court properly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss because the private respondents complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiffs primary right and the defendants corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.16 In the complaint, private respondents alleged that Fe had amorous relations with the petitioner, as a result of which she gave birth to Martin out of wedlock. In his answer, petitioner admitted that he had sexual relations with Fe but denied that he fathered Martin, claiming that he had ended the relationship long before the childs conception and birth. It is undisputed and even admitted by the parties that there existed a sexual relationship between Arnel and Fe. The only remaining question is whether such sexual relationship produced the child, Martin. If it did, as respondents have alleged, then Martin should be supported by his father Arnel. If not, petitioner and Martin are strangers to each other and Martin has no right to demand and petitioner has no obligation to give support. Preliminaries aside, we now tackle the main issues. Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin as his own child and denies the genuineness and authenticity of the childs birth certificate which he purportedly signed as the father. He also claims that the order and resolution of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, effectively converted the complaint for support to a petition for recognition, which is supposedly proscribed by law. According to petitioner, Martin, as an unrecognized child, has no right to ask for support and must first establish his filiation in a separate suit under Article 28317 in relation to Article 26518 of the Civil Code and Section 1, Rule 10519 of the Rules of Court. The petitioners contentions are without merit. The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of Appeals,20 we allowed the integration of an action to compel recognition with an action to claim ones inheritance: In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the action. Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence. As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al. (43 Phil. 763 [1922]) wherein we said: The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is

nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. x x x The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs x x x; and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother x x x. In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings. (Underscoring supplied) Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or rationale for integrating them remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to support depends completely on the determination of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these proceedings. On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by this Court as a conclusive means of proving paternity. He also contends that compulsory testing violates his right to privacy and right against self-incrimination as guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution. These contentions have no merit. Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a means for determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief historical sketch of our past decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called for. In the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee21 where the appellant was convicted of murder on the testimony of three eyewitnesses, we stated as an obiter dictum that "while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or the DNA test result (emphasis supplied)." Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals,22promulgated in 1997, we cautioned against the use of DNA because "DNA, being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet been accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts, verbal and written, by the putative father." In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals:23 A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002 with our en banc decision in People v. Vallejo24 where the rape and murder victims DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that "the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile."

A year later, in People v. Janson,25 we acquitted the accused charged with rape for lack of evidence because "doubts persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our doubts!" In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC26 where the Court en banc was faced with the issue of filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando Poe Jr., we stated: In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar,27 we affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with homicide, the principal evidence for which included DNA test results. We did a lengthy discussion of DNA, the process of DNA testing and the reasons for its admissibility in the context of our own Rules of Evidence: Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. A persons DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins. xxx xxx xxx In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP29/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victims vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial. Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure. Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology. Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA samples from semen recovered from a rape victims vagina were used to positively identify the accused Joel "Kawit" Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his right

against self-incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution. We addressed this as follows: The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken from the person of the accused from the realm of self-incrimination. These include photographs,28 hair,29 and other bodily substances.30 We have also declared as constitutional several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused of adultery,31 expulsion of morphine from ones mouth32 and the tracing of ones foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints.33 In Jimenez v. Caizares,34 we even authorized the examination of a womans genitalia, in an action for annulment filed by her husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures were, to be sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results, per our ruling in Yatar,35 are now similarly acceptable. Nor does petitioners invocation of his right to privacy persuade us. In Ople v. Torres,36 where we struck down the proposed national computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said: In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good. Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures,37 and the infringement of privacy of communication38 where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioners case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against selfincrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same. DNA paternity testing first came to prominence in the United States, where it yielded its first official results sometime in 1985. In the decade that followed, DNA rapidly found widespread general acceptance.39 Several cases decided by various State Supreme Courts reflect the total assimilation of DNA testing into their rules of procedure and evidence. The case of Wilson v. Lumb40 shows that DNA testing is so commonly accepted that, in some instances, ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. The Supreme Court of St. Lawrence County, New York allowed a party who had already acknowledged paternity to subsequently challenge his prior acknowledgment. The Court pointed out that, under the law, specifically Section 516 of the New York Family Court Act, the Family Court examiner had the duty, upon receipt of the challenge, to order DNA tests:41 516-a. Acknowledgment of paternity. (a) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law shall establish the paternity of and liability for the support of a child pursuant to this act. Such acknowledgment must be reduced to writing and filed pursuant to section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law with the registrar of the district in which the birth occurred and in which the birth certificate has been filed. No further judicial or administrative proceedings are required to ratify an unchallenged acknowledgment of paternity. (b) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law may be rescinded by either signators filing of a petition with the court to vacate the acknowledgment within the earlier of sixty days of the date of signing the acknowledgment or the date of an administrative or a judicial

proceeding (including a proceeding to establish a support order) relating to the child in which either signator is a party. For purposes of this section, the "date of an administrative or a judicial proceeding" shall be the date by which the respondent is required to answer the petition. After the expiration of sixty days of the execution of the acknowledgment, either signator may challenge the acknowledgment of paternity in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof on the party challenging the voluntary acknowledgment. Upon receiving a partys challenge to an acknowledgment, the court shall order genetic marker tests or DNA tests for the determination of the childs paternity and shall make a finding of paternity, if appropriate, in accordance with this article. Neither signators legal obligations, including the obligation for child support arising from the acknowledgment, may be suspended during the challenge to the acknowledgment except for good cause as the court may find. If a party petitions to rescind an acknowledgment and if the court determines that the alleged father is not the father of the child, or if the court finds that an acknowledgment is invalid because it was executed on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, the court shall vacate the acknowledgment of paternity and shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the registrar of the district in which the childs birth certificate is filed and also to the putative father registry operated by the department of social services pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two-c of the social services law. In addition, if the mother of the child who is the subject of the acknowledgment is in receipt of child support services pursuant to title six-A of article three of the social services law, the court shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the child support enforcement unit of the social services district that provides the mother with such services. (c) A determination of paternity made by any other state, whether established through the parents acknowledgment of paternity or through an administrative or judicial process, must be accorded full faith and credit, if and only if such acknowledgment meets the requirements set forth in section 452(a)(7) of the social security act. (emphasis supplied) DNA testing also appears elsewhere in the New York Family Court Act:42 532. Genetic marker and DNA tests; admissibility of records or reports of test results; costs of tests. a) The court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more genetic marker tests or DNA tests and, on the courts own motion or the motion of any party, shall order the mother, her child and the alleged father to submit to one or more genetic marker or DNA tests of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by an accreditation body designated by the secretary of the federal department of health and human services and performed by a laboratory approved by such an accreditation body and by the commissioner of health or by a duly qualified physician to aid in the determination of whether the alleged father is or is not the father of the child. No such test shall be ordered, however, upon a written finding by the court that it is not in the best interests of the child on the basis of res judicata, equitable estoppel, or the presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married woman. The record or report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test ordered pursuant to this section or pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law shall be received in evidence by the court pursuant to subdivision (e) of rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules where no timely objection in writing has been made thereto and that if such timely objections are not made, they shall be deemed waived and shall not be heard by the court. If the record or report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test or tests indicate at least a ninety-five percent probability of paternity, the admission of such record or report shall create a rebuttable presumption of paternity, and shall establish, if unrebutted, the paternity of and liability for the support of a child pursuant to this article and article four of this act. (b) Whenever the court directs a genetic marker or DNA test pursuant to this section, a report made as provided in subdivision (a) of this section may be received in evidence pursuant to rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules if offered by any party. (c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall be, in the first instance, paid by the moving party. If the moving party is financially unable to pay such cost, the court may direct any qualified public health officer to conduct such test, if practicable; otherwise, the court may direct

payment from the funds of the appropriate local social services district. In its order of disposition, however, the court may direct that the cost of any such test be apportioned between the parties according to their respective abilities to pay or be assessed against the party who does not prevail on the issue of paternity, unless such party is financially unable to pay. (emphasis supplied) In R.E. v. C.E.W.,43 a decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court, DNA tests were used to prove that H.W., previously thought to be an offspring of the marriage between A.C.W. and C.E.W., was actually the child of R.E. with whom C.E.W. had, at the time of conception, maintained an adulterous relationship. In Erie County Department of Social Services on behalf of Tiffany M.H. v. Greg G.,44 the 4th Department of the New York Supreme Courts Appellate Division allowed G.G., who had been adjudicated as T.M.H.s father by default, to have the said judgment vacated, even after six years, once he had shown through a genetic marker test that he was not the childs father. In this case, G.G. only requested the tests after the Department of Social Services, six years after G.G. had been adjudicated as T.M.H.s father, sought an increase in his support obligation to her. In Greco v. Coleman,45 the Michigan Supreme Court while ruling on the constitutionality of a provision of law allowing non-modifiable support agreements pointed out that it was because of the difficulty of determining paternity before the advent of DNA testing that such support agreements were necessary: As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which paternity can be proven has increased significantly since the parties in this lawsuit entered into their support agreement(current testing methods can determine the probability of paternity to 99.999999% accuracy). However, at the time the parties before us entered into the disputed agreement, proving paternity was a very significant obstacle to an illegitimate child's access to child support. The first reported results of modern DNApaternity testing did not occur until 1985. ("In fact, since its first reported results in 1985, DNA matching has progressed to 'general acceptance in less than a decade'"). Of course, while prior blood-testing methods could exclude some males from being the possible father of a child, those methods could not affirmatively pinpoint a particular male as being the father. Thus, when the settlement agreement between the present parties was entered in 1980, establishing paternity was a far more difficult ordeal than at present. Contested paternity actions at that time were often no more than credibility contests. Consequently, in every contested paternity action, obtaining child support depended not merely on whether the putative father was, in fact, the child's biological father, but rather on whether the mother could prove to a court of law that she was only sexually involved with one man--the putative father. Allowing parties the option of entering into private agreements in lieu of proving paternity eliminated the risk that the mother would be unable meet her burden of proof. It is worth noting that amendments to Michigans Paternity law have included the use of DNA testing:46 722.716 Pretrial proceedings; blood or tissue typing determinations as to mother, child, and alleged father; court order; refusal to submit to typing or identification profiling; qualifications of person conducting typing or identification profiling; compensation of expert; result of typing or identification profiling; filing summary report; objection; admissibility; presumption; burden of proof; summary disposition. Sec. 6. (1) In a proceeding under this act before trial, the court, upon application made by or on behalf of either party, or on its own motion, shall order that the mother, child, and alleged father submit to blood or tissue typing determinations, which may include, but are not limited to, determinations of red cell antigens, red cell isoenzymes, human leukocyte antigens, serum proteins, or DNA identification profiling, to determine whether the alleged father is likely to be, or is not, the father of the child. If the court orders a blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling to be conducted and a party refuses to submit to the typing or DNA identification profiling, in addition to any other remedies available, the court may do either of the following: (a) Enter a default judgment at the request of the appropriate party. (b) If a trial is held, allow the disclosure of the fact of the refusal unless good cause is shown for not disclosing the fact of refusal.

(2) A blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling shall be conducted by a person accredited for paternity determinations by a nationally recognized scientific organization, including, but not limited to, the American association of blood banks. xxx xxx xxx (5) If the probability of paternity determined by the qualified person described in subsection (2) conducting the blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling is 99% or higher, and the DNA identification profile and summary report are admissible as provided in subsection (4), paternity is presumed. If the results of the analysis of genetic testing material from 2 or more persons indicate a probability of paternity greater than 99%, the contracting laboratory shall conduct additional genetic paternity testing until all but 1 of the putative fathers is eliminated, unless the dispute involves 2 or more putative fathers who have identical DNA. (6) Upon the establishment of the presumption of paternity as provided in subsection (5), either party may move for summary disposition under the court rules. this section does not abrogate the right of either party to child support from the date of birth of the child if applicable under section 7. (emphasis supplied) In Rafferty v. Perkins,47 the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test results showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the course of a marriage: The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of the blood test eliminating Perkins as Justin's father, even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Perkins, we find that no reasonable jury could find that Easter is not Justin's father based upon the 99.94% probability of paternity concluded by the DNA testing. In S.J.F. and J.C.F. v. R.C.W.,48 the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld an order for genetic testing given by the Court of Appeals, even after trial on the merits had concluded without such order being given. Significantly, when J.C.F., the mother, first filed the case for paternity and support with the District Court, neither party requested genetic testing. It was only upon appeal from dismissal of the case that the appellate court remanded the case and ordered the testing, which the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld. The case of Kohl v. Amundson,49 decided by the Supreme Court of South Dakota, demonstrated that even default judgments of paternity could be vacated after the adjudicated father had, through DNA testing, established non-paternity. In this case, Kohl, having excluded himself as the father of Amundsons child through DNA testing, was able to have the default judgment against him vacated. He then obtained a ruling ordering Amundson to reimburse him for the amounts withheld from his wages for child support. The Court said "(w)hile Amundson may have a remedy against the father of the child, she submit(ted) no authority that require(d) Kohl to support her child. Contrary to Amundson's position, the fact that a default judgment was entered, but subsequently vacated, (did) not foreclose Kohl from obtaining a money judgment for the amount withheld from his wages." In M.A.S. v. Mississippi Dept. of Human Services,50 another case decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, it was held that even if paternity was established through an earlier agreed order of filiation, child support and visitation orders could still be vacated once DNA testing established someone other than the named individual to be the biological father. The Mississippi High Court reiterated this doctrine in Williams v. Williams.51 The foregoing considered, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent for upholding the orders of the trial court which both denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and ordered him to submit himself for DNA testing. Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the remedy of certiorari is only available "when any tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."52 In Land Bank of the Philippines v. the Court of Appeals53 where we dismissed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, we discussed at length the nature of such a petition and just what was meant by "grave abuse of discretion":

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison detre for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decisionnot the jurisdiction of the court to render said decisionthe same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. (emphasis supplied) In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. The respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its decision and resolution, and any error made would have only been an error in judgment. As we have discussed, however, the decision of the respondent court, being firmly anchored in law and jurisprudence, was correct. Epilogue For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision dated January 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80961 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

B. Relevance 1. Lopez vs. Hessen, 365 P.2d 448 (1961) Date: August 22, 1961 LOPEZ v. HEESEN Facts: On the afternoon of October 15, 1958, in Colfax County, New Mexico, appealee, Heesen, negligently permitted the rifle to discharge while hunting and that as a proximate result of the joint and concurrent negligence of both appellees, appellant, Lopez and Sears, sustained a severe and disabling wound and injury to his chest, requiring hospital and surgical care. Appellant demanded damages in the amount of $55,000 against both appellees, jointly and severally. Appellee, Heesen, answered denying the allegations of the third amended complaint. Appellee, Sears, also answered denying the allegations and raising additional affirmative defenses, to-wit: That appellant's injuries were caused by an unavoidable accident; that the negligence of appellee, Heesen, was the sole

cause thereof; that the rifle involved was of a recognized quality and of proper design and functioned properly by all commercial sporting arms standards when used with reasonable care; that rifles of this type had been manufactured by the millions and used by hunters generally and by the government of the United States and foreign countries; that the safety mechanism and its qualities were patent and obvious, and had been seen and inspected by Heesen prior to the accident; Appellant, in the third amended complaint, alleged that the Higgins Model 51 rifle was in a dangerous and defective condition due to its negligent manufacture, design, assembly or maintenance, in that the safety mechanism thereof moved readily and in a dangerous manner from "safe" to "fire" position. This is an allegation of an ultimate issue of fact which the jury had to decide. Here is an issue, the proper understanding of which by a jury composed of six men and six ladies, requires specialized knowledge or experience and cannot be determined independently merely from deductions made and inferences drawn on the basis of ordinary knowledge. The jury was instructed that expert testimony is intended only to assist them in coming to a correct conclusion upon facts which are of a technical nature, but that the opinion of experts was not binding upon them and the jury must determine the weight to be given to such testimony. Appellant introduced evidence tending to prove that the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 rifle is easy to knock off safety, making the rifle dangerous. Appellant's witness, Frank Doyle, over appellee's, Sears', objection, expressed the opinion that the safety device, without the telescopic sight, is not a safe piece, in that the projection is too long and it is too prone to be knocked from "safe" to "fire" position. There is also testimony of certain tests made with the Higgins Model 51 and the witness, Ira Kessler, expressed the opinion that the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe without the telescopic sight. Another witness, Robert Allen, testified as to the manner in which the safety lever of the Higgins Model 51 moved from "safe" to "fire" position without his knowledge. Appellee, Sears, introduced testimony of witnesses who were either experts in the small arms field or experts in gun designing. The witness, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., testified that he is a gun designer employed by High Standard Manufacturing Company who manufacture the Higgins Model 51 for Sears. He qualified as an expert gun designer with many years' experience with other rifle manufacturers and in factories designing and building weapons of the small arms design. La Violette has two gun patents pending. La Violette testified that the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 is supplied to High Standard Manufacturing Company by Fabrique Nationale of Belgium. He also testified extensively as to the advantages of the safety device of the Higgins Model 51 and stated that six different makes of guns have the same modified leaf safety device as does the Higgins Model 51. The manufacturers of these guns are F.N. Mauser, Colt, Marlin, Nato and Weatherby. The evidence also shows that since 1951, 75,572 Higgins Model 51 rifles with the modified leaf safety device have been sold by High Standard Manufacturing Company to appellee, Sears. High Standard Manufacturing Company has never been sued by reason of the design of the Higgins Model 51 rifle. There is also opinion evidence that the Higgins Model 51 rifle is safe by all commercial sporting goods standards. Issue: Whether or not the expert testimony can be admitted as evidence by the jury? YES Held: Appellant's witnesses testified at great length in what respect they considered the safety mechanism "dangerous," "unsafe," and "defective," and expressed the opinion that the safety mechanism was not a safe piece and was unsafe without the telescopic sight. Appellees' expert witnesses likewise testified in great detail as to the safety mechanism and they were of the opinion that the safety mechanism on the Higgins Model 51 rifle was safe by all commercial sporting goods standards, was suitable for hunting, and was not negligently or defectively designed. Thus the jury was free to adopt either view and then fix the liability. Appellant's witnesses testified at great length in what respect they considered the safety mechanism "dangerous," "unsafe," and "defective," and expressed the opinion that the safety mechanism was not a safe piece and was unsafe without the telescopic sight. Appellees' expert witnesses likewise testified in great detail as to the safety mechanism and they were of the opinion that the safety mechanism on the Higgins Model 51 rifle was safe by all commercial sporting goods standards, was suitable for hunting,

and was not negligently or defectively designed. Thus the jury was free to adopt either view and then fix the liability. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the experts to express their opinion. 2. State vs. Ball, 339 S.W2d 783 (1960) 339 S.W2d 783 Date: 14 November 1960 State v. Ball Petitioner: State of Missouri Respondent: William Arthur Ball Facts: About 2:30PM on October 15, 1958, two colored men (one tall, one short) entered the Krekeler Jewelry Store. Later in the day, about 5:50PM, the two men went back to the store. John Krekeler, who was in the store placing the rings and watches in the safe, recognized the two men as the ones who had been in the store earlier, especially the taller man. The shorter man started to walk behind the counter and as Krekeler intercepted him he drew a long barreled blue .38 and stuck it in my fact. Krekeler was directed to the rest room in the rear of the store where he stood facing the wall and was told not to turn around. While he stood there, Krekeler could hear jewelry being dumped into a bag and jingle in the cash register. After the two men left the store Krekeler called the police. Later, Krekeler identified William Arthur Ball from the pictures. On November 4, 1958, about three weeks after the robbery, police officers in a squad car saw Ball walking and stopped him and arrested him after he attempted to flee. During the trial, some of the pieces of evidence presented were the testimony of his flight from the police and the $258.02 found with Ball when he was arrested. The proof of the money was on the theory that Ball did not have or was not likely to have such a sum of money on his person prior to the commission of the offense. The court found Ball guilty of first-degree robbery of the jewelry store. Issue: Whether or not the pieces of evidence presented (i.e., the testimony and $258.02) were relevant Held: The unexplained flight even thirty days after the commission of the robbery is a relevant circumstance. However, the money confiscated is irrelevant. The admission of the evidence in the circumstances of this record infringed the right to a fair trial and for that reason judgment is reversed and the case remanded. Rationale: Not only was Krekeler unable to identify the money or any of the items on Balls person as having come from the jewelry store so that in fact they were not admissible in evidence, the charge here was that Ball and his accomplice took jewelry and cash from the cash register. There was no proof as to the denomination of the money in the cash register, it was simply a total of $140. Here 19 days had elapsed, there was no proof that Ball had suddenly come into possession of the $258.02 and in all these circumstances, the mere possession of a quantity of money is in itself no indication that the possessor was the taker of the money charged as taken, because in general all money of the same denomination and material is alike, and the hypothesis that the money found is the same as the money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be receivable. In the absence of proof or of a fair inference from the record that the money in Balls possession at the time of his arrest came from or had some connection with the robbery and in the absence of a plain showing of his impecuniousness before the robbery and his sudden affluence, the evidence was not in fact relevant and in the circumstances was obviously prejudicial for if it

did not tend to prove the offense for which Ball was on trial the jury may have inferred that he was guilty of another robbery.

C. Competence 1. Section 3, Rule 128 2. Exclusionary Rules under the 1987 Constitution (a) Article III, Sections 2 and 3 (b) Article III, Section 12 (c) Article III, Section 17 3. Statutory Rules of Exclusion (a) Section 201, Tax Reform Act of 2007 (b) R.A. 1405, Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits (c) R.A. 4200, the Anti-Wire Tapping Act i. Ganaan vs. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 GANAAN v. IAC and People, GR No. L- 69809, October 16, 1986 Facts: In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault. Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money. Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary. Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the

telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200. Thus, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the SC. Issues/Held: Whether or not the person called over the telephone and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line should both face prison sentences simply because the extension was used to enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion. (Issue of interpretation of a penal statute, not a rule of evidence) Petition GRANTED. An extension telephone is not one of the devices which fall under the law on Wire-Tapping. Rationale: An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. The phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation. An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with another. Penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited device or arrangement" but of greater importance, they were more concerned with penalizing the act of recording than the act of merely listening to a telephone conversation. o Senator Taada. But what this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape record and other electronic devices to intercept private conversations which later on will be used in court. It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.

ii. Salcedo-Ortanez vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 111 G.R. No. 93833 Date: 09/28/1995 RAMIREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS R.A. No. 4200 or Anti-Wire Tapping Act [ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE: COMPETENCE] Petitioner: Socorro D. Ramirez Respondent: Court of Appeals and Ester S. Garcia Ponente: Kapunan Facts: Socorro Ramirez filed a civil case for damages in the amount of P610,000.00 in RTC, Quezon City against Ester Garcia, alleging that Garcia vexed, insulted, and humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in manner offensive to petitioners dignity and personality. To support her claim, petitioner presented a verbatim transcript of the event, which was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation between the petitioner and respondent. In the conversation, Garcia hurled invectives at Ramirez, calling her walang utak and accusing her of the act of paglapastangan. (See hardcopy for the actual transcript) As a result of the petitioners recording of the event , Garcia (the respondent) filed a criminal case against her on the ground that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal for being in violation of RA No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Act. The trial court ruled in favor Ramirez. The CA ruled in favor of Garcia, declaring that the allegations constituted an offense punishable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. Issue: WON the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation is violative of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

Held: Petition is denied. The act is illegal for being violative of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. Rationale: 1. The legislative intent is clear from the language of the statute. Sec. 1 of RA No. 4200 clearly states that it is illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. Therefore, even a person privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter will qualify as a violator under RA No. 4200. 2. The nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What RA No. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording private communication by means of devices enumerated in the law. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense.

3. The phrase private communication in Sec. 1 of RA No. 4200 includes verbal or non-verbal, written, or expressive communications of meanings or thoughts and can be interchangeably used with private conversations.

iii. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 II. What Need Not be Proved A. Rule 129, Secs. 1-4; Rule 10, Section 8 B. Cases 1. Judicial Notice (a) City of Manila vs. Garcia, 19 SCRA 413 G.R. No. -26053 February 21, 1967 City of Manila vs. Garcia Petitioner: CITY OF MANILA Respondent: GERARDO GARCIA CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA, MODESTA PARAYNO NARCISO PARAYNO, JUAN ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA SIMEON DILIMAN, AQUILINO BARRIOS LEONORA RUIZ, LAUREANO DIZO, BERNABE AYUDA LEOGARDA DE LOS SANTOS, ISABELO OBAOB ANDREA RIPARIP, JOSE BARRIENTOS, URBANO RAMOS,1 ELENA RAMOS, ESTEFANIA NEPACINA, MODESTA SANCHEZ, MARCIAL LAZARO, MARCIANA ALANO, HONORIO BERIO SEDORA ORAYLE, GLORIA VELASCO, WILARICO RICAMATA, BENEDICTO DIAZ, ANA DEQUIZ (MRS.) ALUNAN, LORENZO CARANDANG, JUAN PECAYO, FELICIDAD MIRANDA EMIGDIO EGIPTO, Facts: City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area, bordering Kansas, Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila, and covered by Torrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082 and 37558. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to the present. In 1947, the presence of defendants having previously been discovered, some of the defendants were given by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits each labeled "lease contract" to occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. IN 1948, Defendants Obaob and Garcia received their permits from Mayor Manuel de la Fuente. The rest of the 23 defendants exhibited none. For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals. Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close to the property needed expand and build a new building. In 1961, Manila's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each of defendants thirty (30) days to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the premises. This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each defendant for the payment of rentals. Defendants refused. Hence, this suit to recover possession.

 The judgment below directed defendants to vacate the premises; to pay the amounts heretofore indicated opposite their respective names; and to pay their monthly rentals until they vacate the said premises, and the costs. Defendants appealed. The trial court found that the city needs the premises for school purposes. The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That document recites that the amount of P100,000.00 had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-1963 Manila City Budget, for the construction of an additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. The Trial Court ruled out that the Certification was admissible. ISSUE/HELD: WON the CFI of Manila properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes by basing it on certification of the Chairman on Appropriations. YES It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its power, to make it conformable to law and justice.3 Such was done here. Defendants' remedy was to bring to the attention of the court its contradictory stance. Not having done so, this Court will not reopen the case solely for this purpose. Anyway, elimination of the Certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not profit defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken because the Court was duty bound to take judicial notice of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila.6 And, Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for the "construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. Defendants have not acquired the legal status of tenants. They entered the land, built houses of second-class materials thereon without the knowledge and consent of the city. Their homes were erected without city permits. These constructions are illegal. These permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were issued by the mayors in 1947 and 1948 when the effects of the war had simmered down and when these defendants could have very well adjusted themselves. Two decades have now elapsed since the unlawful entry. Defendants could have, if they wanted to, located permanent premises for their abode. And yet, usurpers that they are, they preferred to remain on city property.//We, accordingly, rule that the Manila mayors did not have authority to give permits, written or oral, to defendants, and that the permits herein granted are null and void. Let us look into the houses and constructions planted by defendants on the premises. They clearly hinder and impair the use of that property for school purposes. The courts may well take judicial notice of the fact that housing school children in the elementary grades has been and still is a perennial problem in the city. The selfish interests of defendants must have to yield to the general good. The public purpose of constructing the school building annex is paramount. In the situation thus obtaining, the houses and constructions aforesaid constitute public nuisance per se. And this, for the reason that they hinder and impair the use of the property for a badly needed school building, to the prejudice of the education of the youth of the land. They shackle the hands of the government and thus obstruct performance of its constitutionally ordained obligation to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and more, to "provide at least free public primary instruction".

 Reason dictates that no further delay should be countenanced. The public nuisance could well have been summarily abated by the city authorities themselves, even without the aid of the courts. (b) Baguio vs. Vda. De Jalagat, 42 SCRA 337 (c) Prieto vs. Arroyo, 14 SCRA 549 (d) Yao-Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA736 (e) Tabuena vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 650 (f) People vs. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 (g) BPI-Savings vs. CTA, 330 SCRA 507 (h) Calamba Steel Center, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenu, G.R. No. 151857, April 28, 2005 2. Judicial Admissions (a) Lucido vs. Calupitan, 27 Phil. 48 (b) Torres vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 24