ATIENZA, Jr.

vs COMELEC Ponente: Justice Abad

This petition is an offshoot of two earlier cases already resolved by the Court involving a leadership dispute within a political party. In this case, the petitioners question their expulsion from the party and assail the validity of the election from the party and assail the validity of the election of new party leaders conducted by the respondents. Facts of the Case: July 05, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon) as erstwhile president of the Liberal Party (LP), announced his partys withdrawal of support for the administration of then former President Gloria Arroyo. But on the other hand, petitioner Jose Atienza, LP Chairman, and a number of party members denounced Drilons move, assailing that he made the announcement without consulting the party. March 02, 2006 on a party conference hosted by petitioner Atienza wherein it will supposedly discuss local autonomy and party matters but when members convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all positions of LPs ruling body vacant and elected new officers with Atienza as the LP President. Immediately, respondent Drilon filed a petition with the COMELEC to nullify the said elections. He assailed that it was illegal taking into consideration that the partys electing bodies, the National Executive Council (NECO) and the National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not properly convened. Moreover, he also claimed that under the amended LP Constitution (the original LP Constitution known as the Salonga Constitution) the party officers were elected to a frixed three- year term that was yet to end on Nov. 30, 2007. On the contrary, petitioner Atienza asserted that the majority of the LPs NECO and NAPOLCO attended the March 2, 2006 assembly. In addition, Atienza also said that amendments to the original LP Constitution , giving the LP Officers a fixed three-year term had not been properly ratified. Henceforth, the term of Drilon and the other officers already ended on July 24, 2006. October 13, 2006 - the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued a resolution partially granting respondent Dirlons petition, weherein it annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and ordered the holding of a new election under the COMELEC supervision. It held that election conducted by Atienza and the others was invalid since the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with the Salonga Constitution but since the amendments to the Salonga Constitution was not properly ratified, Drilons term may have deemed to have ended. Both sides of the issues came to this Court to challenge the COMELECs rulings. April 17, 2007 - divided Court issued a resolution granting respondent Drilons petition and denying the plea of the petioner Atienza. The Curt held through majotiy that COMELEC had jurisdiction

over the intra party leadership dispute, that Salonga Constitution had been validly amended and as a result Drilons term as LP president was to end only on Nov. 30, 2007. The LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent Drilons term expired. 59 out of 87 NECO members who were supposed to vote attended. Eventually, respondent Manuel A. Roxas III was installed as the new LP President. January 11, 2008 Petitioners Atienza, Defensor, Valenca, Suarez, Chunglao, Zaldivar-Perez, Cast-Abayon, Macusi, Quinto filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory injunction. Atienza sought Roxas from assuming the Presidency of the LP naming that NECO assembly which had elected him was invalidly convened. It had questioned the existence of a quorum and claimed that NECO composition ought to have been based on a list appearing in the 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. On the other hand, respondents Roxas et al claimed that Roxas election as LP President faithfully complied with the provisions of the amended LP Constitution. June 18, 2009 - COMELEC issued the assailed resolution denying Atienza et al.s petition. It had noted that the May 2007 elections necessary changed the composition of the NECO since the amended LP Constitution explicitly made incumbent senators, members of the House of Rep., governors, mayors members of that body. Petitioners failed to prove that the NECO which elected Roxas as LP President was not properly convened. As for the validy of petitioners expulsion as members, the COMELEC observed that this was a membership issue that related to disciplinary action within the political party. Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution, petitioners filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65. ISSUES: Respondent Roxas, et al raise the following issues: 1. Whether or not (WON) the LP which was not impleaded in the case, is an indispensable party; and 2. WON petitioners Atienza et al., ousted LP members, have the requisite legal standing to question Roxas election.

Petitioners Atienza, et al. on the other hand, raise the following issues: 1. WON the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the NECO membership the elected respondent Roxas as LP President; 2. WON the COMELEC gravely absued its discretion when it resolved the issue concerning the validity of the NECO meeting without first resolving the issue concerning the expulsion of Atienza et al. from the party.

The Courts Ruling 1. Whether or not (WON) the LP which was not impleaded in the case, is an indispensable party; Roxas et al point out that since the petition seeks the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the NECO the controversy could not be adjudicated with finality without making the LP party to the case. But petitioners Atienza et al.s causes of action in this case consist in respondents disfranchisement of the petitioner from the election party election of party leaders and in the illegal election of Roxas as party president. The petitioners were supposedly excluded from the elections by a a series of despotic acts of the respondent who controlled the proceedings. Among these acts are the expulsion of the petitioner in the party, the exclusion from the NECO and Drilons railroading of election proceedings. Since no wrong had been imputed to the LP nor had some affirmative relief been sought form it, the LP is not an indispensable party. 2. WON petitioners Atienza et al., ousted LP members, have the requisite legal standing to question Roxas election. The court held in David vs Macapagal-Arroyo, legal standing in suits is governed by the real party in interest. The real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In other words, the standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. It is precisely petitioners allegations that respondents Roxas deprived them of their rights as LP members by summarily excluding them from the LP roster and not allowing them to take part in the election of its officers and that not at all who sat in the NECO were in the correct list of NECO members. Therefore, Atienza et al., who want to take part in another election would stand to be benefited or prejudiced by the Courts decision in this case. Consequently, they habe legal standing to pursue this petition. 3. WON the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the NECO membership the elected respondent Roxas as LP President; Petitioner Atienza et al., claim that the NECO members allowed to take part in that election should have been limited to those in the list of the NECO members appearing in the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. The list of the NECO members appearing in the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program was drawn before the May 2007 elections. After the 2007 elections changes in the NECO membership had to be withdrawn to comply with what the amended LP Constitution required. Drilon had adopted the program as common exhibit in the earlier cases only to prove that the NECO which supposedly elected Atienza as new LP President had been improperly convened. It cannot be regarded as immutable list. Nothing in the Courts resolution in the earlier cases implies that NECO membership should be pegged to the partys 60th Anniv. There have been no basis for such position. The amended LP Constitution did not intend the NECO membership to be permanent. The NECO was validly convened in accordance with the amended LP Constitution. Henceforth, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld the composition of the NECO that elected Roxas as LP President.

4. WON the COMELEC gravely absued its discretion when it resolved the issue concerning the validity of the NECO meeting without first resolving the issue concerning the expulsion of Atienza et al. from the party. As respondents Roxas et al., point out the key issue in this case is not the validity of the expulsion of petitioners Atienza et al. from the party, but the legitimacy of the NECO assembly that elected respondent Roxas as LP President. Given the COMELECs finding that NECO in question complied with the LP Constitution, the resolution of the issue cannot affect the election of the officers that the NECO held. Petitioners cannot claim that their expulsion from the party which impacts on the leadership issue because they did not specify who these members were and how their members could possibly affect the composition of the NECO and the outcome of its election of party leaders nor did they not bothered to assail the individual qualifications of the NECO members who voted for Roxas and Atienza et al. did not even present a proof that the NECO had no quorum when it then assembled. In other words, the petitioners claim were totally unsupported by evidence. The COMELECs jurisdiction over the intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the State. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions. The validity of the respondents election as LP President is a leadership issue that the COMELEC had to settle . Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national elective positions. It is also the LP president who can authorize the other LP officers to issue certificates of nomination for candidates to local elective posts. In simple terms bearer of the party. 5. Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple issue of party membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionally-protected right to due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first summoned them to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the party. According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings[20] and are, therefore, covered by the due process requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.[21] But the requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of political parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies created by the state and through which certain governmental acts or functions are performed. An administrative agency or instrumentality contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the performance of a state function.[22] The constitutional limitations that generally apply to the exercise of the states powers thus, apply too, to administrative bodies. The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the states powers are found in Article III of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the taking of life, property, or liberty without due process under Section 1 is generally a limitation on the states powers in relation to the rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to protect ordinary citizens against arbitrary government action, but not from acts committed by private individuals or entities. In the latter

case, the specific statutes that provide reliefs from such private acts apply. The right to due process guards against unwarranted encroachment by the state into the fundamental rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked in private controversies involving private parties.[23] Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that party members may have, in relation to other party members, correspond to those that may have been freely agreed upon among themselves through their charter, which is a contract among the party members. Members whose rights under their charter may have been violated have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those rights, but not as a due process issue against the government or any of its agencies. But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere in membership and disciplinary matters within a political party. A political party is free to conduct its internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association. In Sinaca v. Mula,[24] the Court said that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves the public interest by allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. It is also consistent with the state policy of allowing a free and open party system to evolve, according to the free choice of the people.[25] To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas election as LP president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the party. While the question of party leadership has implications on the COMELECs performance of its functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue pertaining to Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue of party membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot intervene, given the limited scope of its power over political parties. WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and UPHOLDS the Resolution of the Commission on Elections dated June 18, 2009 in COMELEC Case SPP 08-001.

This special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside the order1dated 25 November 2002 in OMB-4-97-0965, affirming and reinstating in toto the memorandum dated 12 December 2001, and the order2 dated 17 September 2003 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The instant petition appears to have originated from the special audits conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) on the Headquarters of the Philippine Navy (HPN).3 After perusal and evaluation of the pertinent documents in HPN, the COA auditors allegedly found evidence of violations of accounting and auditing rules. Thus, the COA auditors filed complaints before the Office of the Ombudsman based on the adverse findings they uncovered. The findings of the COA auditors were embodied in the two audit reports, namely: (1) SAO Report No. 92-1284which pertains to the transactions of the HPN for the period July 1991 to June 1992 and a portion of transactions for the period January to June 1991; and (2) SAO Report No. 94-98 which covered selected procurements or transactions made by the same agency during CYs 1990 and 1991 that were paid in 1992 and 1993.5 Resident Ombudsman for the Department of National Defense, Atty. Merba A. Waga, conducted a preliminary investigation on the allegations in SAO Report No. 94-98. In a memorandum dated 17 March 1997, Atty. Waga recommended to the then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto that a further preliminary investigation be conducted by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military (ODOM) on the audit findings and observations of the COA, particularly for findings numbered 1, 2, 3.a, 3.c, 3.d, 3.e, 3.h, and 5.a. 1. Funds obligated in 1984 and 1985 amounting to P153,497,882.40 intended for payment of previous years accounts payable were used to pay transactions incurred in 1990 and 1991 amounting toP85,854,775.50; and to cover check payments made in 1992 in the amount of P67,643,106.90 in violation of Sec. 85 of PD 1445. Moreover, these funds were not reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the General Fund of the National government in violation of Sec. 33 of PD 1177. 2. Check payments amounting to P67,643,106.95 charged against Journal Voucher No. 3159289 dated December 29, 1986 were not accounted for. 3.a Procurement of items costing more than P50,000 were not made through public bidding, in violation of COA Circular No. 85-55A. Instead, purchases worth P55,537,282.23 were made through emergency purchase although the items were not urgently needed or absolutely indispensable to prevent immediate danger to, or loss of life or property or to avoid detriment to the public service. As a result, purchase price of at least 131 items of medicines, medical supplies, office and construction supplies in the amount ofP10,000,709.00 exceeded the prevailing market price by P6,146,444.29; the excess prices ranging from 4.90% to 1,071.25% per item. Comparison of Purchase Orders revealed a price difference of P356,690.20 on similar items procured by the command. 3.c Purchases of medicines and medical supplies in 1990 and 1991 worth P53,998,124.00 were not accounted for. Moreover, the alleged deliveries of medicines and medical supplies at Cavite Naval Hospital and at the Office of the Chief Surgeon amounting to P16,195,519.87 and P23,879,397.00, respectively, were in excess of the normal three-month supply requirement of these offices, in violation of COA Circular No. 85-55A dated September 8, 1985.

3.d Construction and asphalting materials amounting to P31,269,562.66 could not be accounted for. No documents could be presented by the concerned officials to show that these materials were actually received by the Phil. Navy units nor were they able to pinpoint the exact location of the projects where these materials were used. Moreover, no approved program of work were submitted for these projects contrary to the Implementing Rules and Regulations of PD 1594. These purchases were made through the Emergency mode of procurement and no bidding was conducted in violation of COA Cir. No. 85-55A dated September 8, 1985. 3.e Deliveries of construction materials and supplies used at the Subic Command totaling P10.4M could not be validated since delivery receipts furnished by the command did not indicate the Sales Invoice to which these pertains; and most DRs were not acknowledged by the recipients. Furthermore, the former SUBCOM Supply Accountable Officer certified that the signatures on the documents in support of claims amounting toP3.2M were not genuine signatures. Lastly, P9.3M worth of these construction materials as well as those used at Naval District I in San Fernando, La Union amounting to P1,093,910 were purchased in Metro Manila instead of within the locality of Zambales and La Union, in violation of Section 11 of PD 1342. 3.h Spare parts amounting to P886,000 were purchased from a supplier who did not quote the lowest price; with a price difference (from that of the lowest bidder) of P85,750. Moreover an overpayment of P13,180 was noted in at least five claims due to erroneous computations. Further, it was noted that hospital supplies amounting to P999,741 were paid in 1992 but the Sales Invoice attached was dated August 26, 1994. 5.a Twenty-two checks totaling P18,860,945.64 issued on July 30, 1993 were not supported by duly approved disbursement vouchers and were not included in the Report of Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing Officer (RCIDDO); and all payments were deposited to one bank account. The ODOM prosecutors conducted the preliminary investigation. The case was docketed as OMB-4-97-0965. In a resolution dated 18 March 1999, the ODOM prosecutors recommended the dismissal of the said case. The resolution was forwarded to the Office of the Special Prosecutor for review. In a memorandum dated 11 August 1999, Special Prosecution Officers (SPO) Antonio T. Manzano and Florita S. Linco recommended that the 18 March 1999 resolution of the ODOM investigators be set aside and that the OSP be allowed to a conduct a preliminary investigation and reinvestigation of the case. The recommendation was approved by Ombudsman Desierto. After conducting the preliminary investigation and reinvestigation of the case, SPO Linco, in a memorandum dated 12 December 2001, recommended that petitioner, among other respondents in OMB-4-97-0965, be indicted for 170 counts of violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, 21 counts of Malversation of Public Funds Thru Falsification of Public Documents and one count of violation of Section 4(a) of Rep. Act 6713. Ombudsman Desierto approved the recommendation and accordingly, informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 27234-27429 and were raffled to the third division thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation before the Sandiganbayan which was granted by the said court.

In an order dated 25 November 2002, Special Prosecution Officer II Cicero D. Jurado, Jr. recommended the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 27234-27429. Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo disapproved the said recommendation and affirmed the 12 December 2001 memorandum recommending the filing of informations against, among other accused, petitioner, viz: The recommended dismissal of the charges against respondents VAdm. Dumangcas, et al. is denied, while the implied recommended continuation of the prosecution of respondents Capt. Batestil, et al. is approved. Otherwise stated, the Resolution dated Dec. 12, 2001 (approved on Mar. 1, 2002) is affirmed in toto, there being no cogent reason to set aside or modify the same.8 Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The said motion was denied in an order dated 17 September 2003. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: The sole issue in this petition is whether or not the Ombudsman has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in setting aside the recommendation of SPO Cicero D. Jurado, Jr. to dismiss the charges against petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 27234-27429. Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against him. He asserts that there exists no probable cause to indict him as shown by the foregoing proceedings: first, in a case filed in OMB-4-97-0965 involving P53 million, the same was dismissed by the Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that the COA auditors made the admission that an error was committed in the conduct of their audit; second, in Criminal Case Nos. 25362-25385 (another separate cases filed before the Sandiganbayan), the charges against him were dropped as there was no probable cause to include him in the said cases. Petitioner argues that since the foregoing proceedings were based on SAO Report No. 92-128 in the same manner as the instant indictments, then to hold him liable of the latter is baseless considering his exculpation in the former. He likewise bewails the manner in which the Ombudsman resolved the motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation by merely making a marginal note. Said marginal note which does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based offends his right to due process. On the other hand, the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor maintains that the present indictments against petitioner, i.e., Criminal Case Nos. 27234-27429 have reference to COA SAO Report No. 92-128 contrary to the asseveration of the petitioner. The Ombudsman points out that SAO Report No. 92-128 is not the subject of any of the cases in the instant indictments. Petitioners argument is not meritorious. Petitioner anchors his contention on the belief that SAO Report No. 92-128 is the basis of OMB4-97-0965, memorandum dated 12 December 2001 and ultimately Criminal Case Nos. 2723427429. A closer examination of the records of this case reveals the contrary view.

In fact, the said memorandum incorporated the summary of the COA auditors findings and observations contained in SAO Report No. 94-98. The memorandum recommended to the Ombudsman a further preliminary investigation on some of the findings in SAO Report No. 9498 by the ODOM prosecutors which the Ombudsman approved. As earlier mentioned, the ODOM prosecutors conducted a preliminary investigation. The case was docketed as OMB-4-97-0965. With the termination of the preliminary investigation, the ODOM prosecutors in a resolution dated 18 March 1999 recommended that the case be dismissed for lack of probable cause. Subsequently, the case was forwarded to the Office of the Special Prosecutor for review. SPO Manzano and Linco evaluated the resolution of the ODOM prosecutors. Finding that there exists probable cause to hold respondents for trial, SPO Manzano and Linco, in a memorandum dated 11 August 1999, recommended that the resolution of the ODOM prosecutors be set aside and that they be authorized to conduct preliminary investigation and reinvestigation of the case. The Ombudsman approved the said recommendations.