Araneta vs. Gatmaitan GR Nos.

L-8895, L-9191, April 30, 1957 FACTS: The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, between the provinces of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn the operation of trawls in the said area and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the same League of Mayors prayed that the President ban the operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In response to the pleas, the President issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was amended by EO 66 apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing during the typhoon season only. Subsequently, EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22. Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction praying that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Fisheries be enjoined from enforcing said executive order and to declare the same null and void. The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation and held that the EOs 22 and 66 are invalid. ISSUES: 1. W/N the President has authority to issue EOs 22, 66 and 80 2. W/N the said EOs were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President HELD: 1. YES. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. However, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines, the President can exercise the same power and authority through executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. Hence, EOs 22,66 and 80 restricting and banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by authority of law. 2. YES. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing devise like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of seafood, and to that end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations and such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued EO 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.

BAUTISTA VS. JUNIO, digested GR # L-50908 January 31, 1984 FACTS: The constitutionality of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 869, a response to protracted oil crisis, banning the use of private motor vehicles with H (heavy) and EH (extra heavy) plates on week-ends and holidays, was assailed for being allegedly violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by herein respondents imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license of owners of the above specified vehicles found violating such LOI, is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of undue delegation of legislative power. Respondents denied the above allegations. ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights. HELD: No, the disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a problem that presses urgently for solution, wherein its reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus due process is not ignored, much less infringed. The exercise of police power may cut into the rights to liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. Those adversely affected may invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show a factual foundation for its invalidity. Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted pursuant to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code which contains a specific provision as to penalties, the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid with the exception of the impounding of a vehicle.

Bito-Onon vs. Fernandez G.R. No. 139813 January 31, 2001

Facts: The petitioner, Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Tacras, Narra, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Narra, Palawan. The private respondent, Elegio Quejano, Jr. on the other hand, is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both Onon and Quejano were candidates for the position of Executive Vice-President in the August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial Chapter of the province of Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winning candidate in the said election prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the Board of Election Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him on August 25, 1997. Not satisfied with the decision of the BES, Quejano filed a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City (RTC). On April 26, 1999, Onon filed a motion to dismiss the Petition for Review raising the issue of jurisdiction. Onon claimed that the RTC had no jurisdiction to review the decisions rendered by the BES in any post proclamation electoral protest in connection with the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election of officers and directors. In his motion to dismiss, Onon claimed that the Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election issued by the DILG on August 11, 1997 in its Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, providing for review of decisions or resolutions of the BES by the regular courts of law is an ultra vires act and is void for being issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, as its issuance is not a mere act of supervision but rather an exercise of control over the Liga's internal organization. On June 22, 1999, the RTC denied Onon's motion to dismiss. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not QUESTIONED PROVISION IN MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR 97-193 WAS ISSUED BY THE DILG SECRETARY IN EXCESS OF HIS AUTHORITY.

Held: The court held that Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG insofar as it authorizes the filing a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in a post proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality. We agree with both the petitioner and the Solicitor General that in authorizing the filing of the petition for review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts, the DILG Secretary in effect amended and modified the GUIDELINES promulgated by the National Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA which provides that the decision of the BES shall be subject to review by the National Liga Board. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President does not have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by local government units of such issuances. To monitor means "to watch, observe or check" and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory

enactments. Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government. **take note of the meaning of power of supervision and power of control.. The President's power of general supervision over local government units is conferred upon him by the Constitution.14 The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law."15 This is distinguished from the power of control or "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter."

MAURICIO CRUZ vs. STANTON YOUNGBERG G.R. No. L-34674 October 26, 1931

FACTS: This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid. The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the petitioner to file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent as cause of action HELD: Yes. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power. The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefore and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted.

De Jesus vs. Civil Service Commission, 471 SCRA 624 (Admin Law, quasi-judicial power) Facts: Sec. 13 of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) Charter (PD 198, as amended) expressly allowed the director of water districts to be granted per diems, and shall receive no other compensation for services to the district. CSC issued Resolution No. 95-4073 ruling that it is illegal for any LWUA officer or employee who sits as a member of the board of directors of a water disctrict to receive and collect any additional, double or indirect compensation from said water disctricts except per diems pursuant to Sec. 13 of PD 198 as amended. CSC based its ruling on Sec.8, Art IX (B) of the 1987 Constitution which is deemed included the power to promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions. Petitioners argue that CSC had no plenary jurisdiction to construe any provision of PD 198 on matters pertaining to compensation and other benefits of water district directors based on Sec.8 of the decree authorizing LWUA to appoint any of its personnel to sit on the board of director of a water district that has availed financial assistance from LWUA and any such personnel so appointed is entitled to enjoy the rights and privileges pertaining to a regional director. The present controversy originated from an administrative case filed with the SCS for violations of RA 6713. Issue: WON CSC has plenary jurisdiction to motu proprio construe PD 198 as amended. Held: No. For the Court to sustain them would be to allow the board of an admin agency, by merely issuing a resolution, to derogate the broad and extensive powers granted by the Constitution to the CSC. LWUA has quasi-judicial power only as regards rates or charges fixed by water districts, which it may review to establish compliance with the provisions of PD 198.

Grego vs COMELEC [274 SCRA 481]

Facts: Sec 40 (b) of Republic Act 7160 (the Local Government Code) which took effect on January 1, 1992, disqualifies a person for any elective position on the ground that had been removed from office as a result of an administrative case. On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint. He ran as a candidate for Councilor, won and assumed office for three terms during the Elections of January 18, 1988; May 11, 1992 and May 8, 1995. As in the past, respondents right to office was contested. On May 13, 1995, petitioner seeks for the respondents disqualification, pursuant to the above provision, contending that as long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an administrative case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the Effectivity of the Code, the disqualification applies. Respondent contends that the petitioner is not entitled to said relief because Section 40 par. b of the LGC may not be validly applied to persons who were dismissed prior to its effectivity. To do so would make it ex post facto, bill of attainder, and retroactive legislation which impairs vested rights. Issue: WON Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 applies retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992. Held: No. It is a settled issue that Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 does not have any retroactive effect. Laws operate only prospectively and not retroactively. A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage: Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward.

Legaspi vs Minister of Finance, 115 SCRA 418 Other Options Available to the President Aside from Declaring Martial Law Amendment No. 6 FACTS: In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840 granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes unconstitutional. He argued that said decree was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution (T)he Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa. In this case, there was no concurrence given by the IBP. Legaspi averred that since Martial Law is already lifted, the president can no longer arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time, Legaspi averred that Amendment No. 6, which provides legislative powers to Marcos, is invalid because that is no longer allowed after the lifting of the ML.

ISSUE: What are the possible options available to the president other than declaring martial law. HELD: SC ruled PD 1840 to be valid. SC declared it must be emphatically made clear that explicitly the power that Amendment No. 6 vests upon the President (Prime Minister) are to be exercised only on two specified occasions, namely, (1) when in (his judgment) a grave emergency exists or there is a threat or imminence thereof and (2) whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly (now regular Batasang Pambansa) fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action. The power is to issue necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction which shall form part of the law of the land. As the tenor of the amendment readily imparts, such power may be exercised even when the Batasan is in session. Obviously, therefore, it is a power that is in the nature of the other powers which the Constitution directly confers upon the President or allows to be delegated to him by the Batasan in times of crises and emergencies. The SC also noted that Amendment No. 6 is a measure seen by the president to avoid declaring another martial law. There are also other options that the presidents can recourse to; they are: (a) Emergency powers expressly delegated by the Batasan; (b) Call of the armed forces, who otherwise are supposed to be in the barracks; (c) Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (d) Martial law [being the last] President must first exercise emergency powers as may be provided by the legislature. When it fais, it cannot be adequate when lawless violence becomes generalized and public safety is in jeopardy, hence the need to call out the armed forces. And when such situation still aggravates to the point of requiring the preventive incarceration or detention of certain leaders or over active elements, it becomes inevitable to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Should matters really go out of hand even after the putting into effect of the measures aforementioned, under the constitution, without Amendment No. 6, the only recourse would be to proclaim martial law. But inasmuch as martial law is an extreme measure that carries with it repressive and restrictive elements unpopular to liberty loving and democratically minded sectors of the country, it is but natural to think of it only as a very last resort. Again, this is to avoid the necessity of resorting to the proclamation of martial law that Amendment No. 6 was conceived. Paraphrasing President Marcos himself, martial law is the law of the gun that implies coercion and an active and direct role in the government by the military. Thus, the virtue of Amendment No. 6 is that such undesirable features of martial law do not have to accompany the exercise of the power thereby conferred on the Executive. To be sure, the calling out of the armed forces and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which are concomitants of martial law, may be left out or need not be resorted to when the President acts by virtue of such power. It is, therefore, evident that it is grossly erroneous to say that Amendment No. 6 is in reality no less than disguised martial law.

Metropolitan Traffic Command West Traffic District vs. Gonong GR No. 91023, July 13, 1990 FACTS: Atty. Dante David claims that the rear license plate of his car was removed by petitioner while his vehicle was parked in Escolta. He filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila. He questioned the petitioners act on the ground that not only was the car not illegally parked but that there was no law or ordinance authorizing such removal. The lower court ruled that LOI 43, which the defendant (petitioner) invoked, did not empower it to detach, remove and confiscate vehicle plates or motor vehicles illegally parked and unattended. It merely authorizes the removal of said vehicles when they are obstacles to free passage or continued flow of traffic on streets and highways. Moreover, the said LOI had been PD 1605. ISSUE: W/N petitioner is authorized to penalize traffic violations as such HELD: No. What the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but a traffic obstruction, which is an altogether different offense. LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles that stall on streets and highways and not those that are intentionally parked in a public place in violation of a traffic law or regulation. In the case at bar, it is not alleged or shown that private respondents vehicle stalled on a public thoroughfare and obstructed the flow of traffic. The charge against him is that he purposely parked his vehicle in a no-parking area. The act, if true is a violation that may not be punished under LOI 43. The applicable law is PD 1605, which does not include removal and confiscation of the lice

National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes, 439 SCRA 130 (Admin Law, DILG-Liga ng mga Barangay, quasi-legislative power) Facts: DILG, appointed as interim caretaker to administer and manage the affairs of the Liga ng mga Barangay in giving remedy to alleged violations made by the incumbent officer of the Liga in the conduct of their elections, issued 2 memorandum circulars which alter, modify, nullify or set aside the actions of the Liga. Petitioner contends that DILGs appointment constitutes undue interference in the internal affairs of the Liga, since the latter is not subject to DILG control and supervision. Respondent judge contends that DILG exercises general supervisory jurisdiction over LGUs including the different leagues based on sec. 1 of Admin. Order No. 267 providing for a broad premise of the supervisory power of the DILG. Issue: WON DILG Secretary as alter-ego of the President has power of control over the Liga ng mga Barangay. Held: No. Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that the President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local government, which excludes the power of control. As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga, the DILGs authority is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace the same.

Pelaez vs Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test FACTS: From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-province, municipality, [township] municipal district or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovincesThe VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Pelaez argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?" The Auditor General countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of Pelaez argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC.

HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not administrative.

People vs. Maceren G.R No. 32166, October 18, 1977

Facts: On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz using a device or equipment to catch fish thru electric current which thereby destroy any aquatic animals within its current reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace. The municipal court quashed the complaint and the CFI affirmed such dismissal. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission is valid. Held: No. The court held that the that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.

Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres, 212 SCRA 298; G.R. No. 101279, August 6, 1992 Topic: (Admin Law, DOLE, quasi-legislative power) Facts: DOLE Dept. Order No. 16 temporarily suspends the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino DH going to Hong Kong in view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for the same. The DOLE, through POEA took over the business of deploying such HK-bound workers. Pursuant to the above order, POEA issued memorandum circular no. 30 providing guidelines on the government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to HK and the accreditation of HK recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers, and the memorandum circular No. 30, pertaining to the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for HK. Petitioner contends that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars. Issue: WON the take-over of the business deploying DH to HK by DOLE and POEA through an administrative order and circular is valid. Held: Yes. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. The challenge administrative issuance discloses that the same fall within the administrative and police powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon the respondents. II FACTS: as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong". The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. Pursuant to the DOLE circular, POEA issued a Memorandum providing guidelines in the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers. POEA administrator also issued a Memorandum circular on processing employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.

Petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the following reasons: 1. That the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rulemaking authority in issuing said circulars;

2. That the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and 3. That the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitions are with merit HELD: There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title. (Emphasis ours.)

The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment.

The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government.

Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.

FACTS: Petitioner, Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom), a commercial banking corporation duly organized under Philippine laws, filed its quarterly income tax returns for the first and second quarters of 1985, reported profits, and paid the total income tax of P5,016,954.00 by applying PBCom's tax credit memos for P3,401,701.00 and P1,615,253.00, respectively. Subsequently, however, PBCom suffered net loss of P25,317,228.00, thereby showing no income tax liability in its Annual Income Tax Returns for the year-ended December 31, 1985. For the succeeding year, ending December 31, 1986, the petitioner likewise reported a net loss of P14,129,602.00, and thus declared no tax payable for the year. But during these two years, PBCom earned rental income from leased properties. The lessees withheld and remitted to the BIR withholding creditable taxes of P282,795.50 in 1985 and P234,077.69 in 1986. On August 7, 1987, petitioner requested the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, among others, for a tax credit of P5,016,954.00 representing the overpayment of taxes in the first and second quarters of 1985. Thereafter, on July 25, 1988, petitioner filed a claim for refund of creditable taxes withheld by their lessees from property rentals in 1985 for P282,795.50 and in 1986 for P234,077.69. Pending the investigation of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner instituted a Petition for Review on November 18, 1988 before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The petition was docketed as CTA Case No. 4309 entitled: "Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue." The CTA decided in favor of the BIR on the ground that the Petition was filed out of time as the same was filed beyond the two-year reglementary period. A motion for Reconsideration was denied and the appeal to Court of Appeals was likewise denied. Thus, this appeal to Supreme Court.

Issues: a) Whether or not Revenue Regulations No. 7-85 which alters the reglementary period from two (2) years to ten (10) years is valid. b) Whether or not the petition for tax refund had already prescribed.

Ruling: a. RR 7-85 altering the 2-year prescriptive period imposed by law to 10-year prescriptive period is invalid. Administrative issuances are merely interpretations and not expansions of the provisions of law, thus, in case of inconsistency, the law prevails over them. Administrative agencies have no legislative power. When the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RMC 7-85,

changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years on claims of excess quarterly income tax payments, such circular created a clear inconsistency with the provision of Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC. In so doing, the BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by Congress. It bears repeating that Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered administrative rulings (in the sense of more specific and less general interpretations of tax laws) which are issued from time to time by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is widely accepted that the interpretation placed upon a statute by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found to be erroneous. Thus, courts will not countenance administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement. Further, fundamental is the rule that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. As pointed out by the respondent courts, the nullification of RMC No. 7-85 issued by the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue is an administrative interpretation which is not in harmony with Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC, for being contrary to the express provision of a statute. Hence, his interpretation could not be given weight for to do so would, in effect, amend the statute. b. By implication of the above, claim for refund had already prescribed. Since the petition had been filed beyond the prescriptive period, the same has already prescribed. The fact that the final adjusted return shows an excess tax credit does not automatically entitle taxpayer claim for refund without any express intent. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is AFFIRMED, with COSTS against the petitioner.

Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208

Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies

FACTS: Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled An Act Creating the Videogram RegulatoryBoard with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The PD was also reinforced by PD1994 which amended the National Internal Revenue Code. The amendment provides that there shall be collected on each processedvideo-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax. The said law was brought about by the need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessen the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Tio countered that there is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by the Amendment and that there is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.

HELD: It cannot be successfully argued that the PD contains an undue delegation of legislative power. The grant in Sec 11 of the PD of authority to the Board to solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such assistance is for a fixed and limitedperiod with the deputized agencies concerned being subject to the direction and control of the Board. That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the PD as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.

United States vs Ang Tang Ho 43 Phil 1

Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies

FACTS: On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the GG issued EO 53 which was published on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegallysold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On 08 August 1919, he was charged in violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

HELD: Fist of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. The said Act, as to the judgment of the SC, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination ofthe insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

YNOT vs. IAC, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987

Topic: Powers of Administrative Agencies: Tests of Delegation Facts: The six carabaos transported by petitioner, Restituto Ynot, in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of Executive Order No. 626-A. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersede as bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which upheld the trial court, and he has now come before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari. The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A is unconstitutional due to invalid delegation of legislative powers.

Held: Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.)The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently

boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.