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In Search of Eisenhowers Extended Audience: Atoms for Peace, the Cold War Rhetoric, and the Japanese Nuclear Crisis of 2011

Satoru Aonuma (Tsuda College; aonuma@tsuda.ac.jp) Mark H. Wright (Tsuda College; wright@tsuda.ac.jp)

*A paper presented at the National Communication Association Annual Convention, Orland, FL, November 15-18, 2012.

Introduction One and half years have passed since the 3/11, people in Japan are still debating what possibly caused the Level 7 nuclear power accident in Fukushima. Just like student debaters arguing over the good old issue of inherency (Zarefsky, 1977) at tournament competition, people with various backgrounds and politico-ideological persuasions are speculating about the cause of this nuclear crisis. Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) which owns and operates the Fukushima Daiichi plant blames nature, i.e., the unprecedented destructive power of the earthquake and tsunami, hoping to absolve itself from incurring the full liability. While the natural disaster was an obvious trigger, in the eyes of many others the disaster is nothing but a human-made crisis. With the insidious cover-up and crisis communication of the past and current technical failures of its nuclear facilities being debunked in the media, many people now put blame on TEPCO for the accident, making it Japans current public enemy number one. As a long-time friend of TEPCO, the Liberal Democratic Party, now a parliamentary minority, rather accuses the government and the ruling majority coalition led by the Democratic Party of Japan; Shinzo Abe (2011), the ex-Prime Ministry and the LDPs next Prime Minister hopeful, marshaled strong words and publicly blamed Prime Minister Naoto Kan and his Cabinet, whose mishandling of the situation, according to him, exacerbated the crisis. Neither accepting nor rebutting the LDPs accusation, Banri Kaieda, then

Economy, Trade and Industry Minister in the Kan Cabinet, apologetically stated, In Japan, we have something called the 'safety myth. Its a fact that there was an unreasonable overconfidence in the technology of Japan's nuclear power generation (qtd in Ohnishi, 2011, p. A1). Official and non-official investigations of the disaster have now begun circulating in the public domain (e.g., The National Diet of Japan, 2012; Japan Restoration Initiative, 2012) and, partly echoing Kaieda, Kiyoshi Kurokawa, the Chairman of the Diet-appointed investigation commission curiously blamed the Japanese culture for the crisis when he stated that the Fukushima accident was a disaster Made in Japan. Its fundamental causes are to be found in ingrained conventions of Japanese culture (The National Diet of Japan, 2012, p.7). Having observed this detective-like discourse, however, we find a set of important questions is missing therein. For us at least, it is indeed curious that, in their search of the potential location for the blame, many seem not to want to directly confront the root cause of this nuclear crisis. In the first place, the disaster originated in TEPCOs Fukushima Daiichi, without which no nuclear accident would have occurred. Moreover, as a nuclear power facility, Fukushima Daiichi is nothing unique; it is just one of many nuclear power plants located throughout Japan. Even more importantly, Japan has possessed one of the worlds leading nuclear power industries (Nuclear power: A run-away national energy, 2011); some even go so far as to say that, with its technology, capital, and abundance of stockpiled nuclear materials, Japan in some respects considers itself, and is treated by others as, as a virtual nuclear weapons state (Federation of American Scientists, n.d.). What then is the origin of Japans nuclear power program, of which Fukushima Daiichi is a part? Why is it that the Japanese allowed their country to go nuclear, despite the their bitter experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? In what condition did they allow that to happen, eventually leading to the disaster in Fukushima? How did they learn to stop worrying and love the nuke? Convinced that the real blame for 3/11 can be located by answering these questions, in what follows we attempt to dwell on issues concerning the origins of Japans

post-WWII nuclear power from a critical-rhetorical standpoint. At the outset, our choice of the terms needs some clarification and qualification. Searching for the origin or the original cause, it is not our intent to go back to late 19th/early 20th century Paris and blame Marie Curie for her and her husbands discovery of radioactivity. Our task here would rather require that we take a trans-Pacific perspective on nuclear policy making. As Kuznick (2011), among others (Arima, 2008, 2012; Hirata, 2011; Kawamura, 2011; Ota, 2011; Tanaka, 2011; Tanaka & Kuznick, 2011; Yamazaki, 2011; Yoshimi, 2012; Yoshioka, 2011a, 2011b), succinctly suggests, [the Japanese] nuclear program was born not only in the fantasy of clean, safe power, but also in the willful forgetting of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the buildup of the US nuclear arsenal. Accordingly, the place to begin our analytical endeavor will be Atoms for Peace (Eisenhower, [1953])), a significant American politico-rhetorical offensive launched in the early phase of the Cold War, as it is in this public pronouncement where nuclear power, as a symbol of war and destruction, was pacified, given a new meaning, and became a symbol of peace and prosperity for the first time in the international rhetorical history.

The Peaceful Ambition On December 3, 1953, Dwight Eisenhower, then President of the United States, addressed his first major foreign policy speech before members of the United Nations General Assembly. In this carefully crafted masterpiece known as the Atoms for Peace speech, Eisenhower launched a series of rhetorical offensives. With this speech, he was able to convince his electorate back home and the international community at large that his administrations foreign and nuclear policy would benefit all on this planet. More importantly, by way of his rhetoric, the context in which we speak about nuclear power was also transformed significantly. Following a rather simple organization, the Atoms for Peace speech basically has two sections respectively addressing the ill (the problem) and the cure (the solution), two essential stock issues for making any policy proposal. Eisenhower began

the first section by drawing a gloomy picture of the status quo: Atomic bombs today are more than 25 times as powerful as the weapons with which the atomic age dawned. . . . Today, the United States stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of course, increases daily, exceeds by many times the total equivalent of the total of all bombs and all shells that came from every plane and every gun in every theatre of war in all the years of World War II. And in demonstrating the significance of this ill, said he, he could not but use a language he had preferred never to use: a language of atomic warfare. The atomic age has moved forward at such a pace that every citizen of the world should have some comprehension of the extent of this development, of the utmost significance to every one of us. Being consistent with Operation Candor (Alsop, 1953) to which his administration had been committed since he took the office of presidency (Chernus, 2002a), Eisenhower faced and accepted the fact that the U.S. monopoly of nuclear power had already ended. The Soviet Union now had an active nuclear weapon program and, equally important, the knowledge of nuclear weapon production will eventually be shared by others, possibly all others. Namely, nuclear proliferation is inevitable. In addition, he expressed his fear of nuclear retaliation in such a nuclearized world that would eventually lead to what we now call mutual assured destruction, an eventful finale where there would be no Day After (Foss & Littlejohn, 1986) for all the parties involved. Skillfully devising the discursive strategy combining a fear appeal and a rhetorical question, Eisenhower closed the first section of the speech, warning that a belief that two atomic colossi are doomed malevolently to eye each other indefinitely across a trembling world was not only to confirm the hopeless finality but also to accept helplessly the probability of civilization destroyedthe annihilation of the irreplaceable heritage of mankind handed down to us generation from generationand the condemnation of mankind to begin all over again the age-old struggle upward from savagery toward decency, and right, and justice. Surely no sane member of the human race could discover victory in such

desolation. Could anyone wish his name to be coupled by history with such human degradation and destruction? To cure these ills, Eisenhower offered his solution which is basically two-fold: Further fostering of peaceful negotiation and disarmament talks between the East and the West and the creation of an international organization that should deal with nuclear matters. Regarding the negotiation, Eisenhower proudly declared that the U.S. and its allies were fully committed to the creation of world peace. The U.S. had invited the Soviets to join the conference table on many previous occasions, all of which were deeds of peace. They speak more loudly than promises or protestations of peaceful intent. Accentuating the open-mindedness and sincerity of his government and those of the Western allies, Eisenhower humbly assured the Soviets, We never have, we never will, propose or suggest that the Soviet Union surrender what is rightfully theirs. We will never say that the people of Russia are an enemy with whom we have not desire ever to deal or mingle in friendly and fruitful relationship. In so doing, the attempt was made to call on the Soviet Union for joining the making of a peaceful world. Any foreign policy or diplomatic rhetoric takes on meaning in the domestic politics; determining the success of such rhetoric needs to take into consideration a variety of audiences, the relative importance of any given audience within the context of domestic politics, and the way in which official statements are or are not adapted to them (Wander, 1984, p.341). As Medhurst (1987) observes, the Atoms for Speech succeeded, at least in the eyes of many Americans, in backing the Soviets into a corner (p.213), as it would rhetorically pressure them to sit in the U.S.- and West-initiated arms reduction talks. Chernus (2002a) also writes that the most news media in the U.S. [interpreted] the speech as a powerful thrust against the enemy Whatever else it might or might not do, the presidents speech would challenge and test the Soviet leadership (p.112). Eisenhower, however, was not content with securing this psychological victory at home. Stating the United States would seek more than the mere reduction or elimination of atomic materials for military purposes and that [i]t must be put into the

hands of those who will know how to strip military casting and adapt it to the arts of peace, he offered the second solution: the peaceful proliferation of nuclear power: The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military build-up can be reversed, this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind. The United States knows that peaceful power from atomic energy is no dream of the future. That capability, already proved, is herenowtoday. Who can doubt, if the entire body of the worlds scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable material with which to test and develop their ideas, that this capability would rapidly be transformed into universal, efficient, and economic usage? Referring to the U.N. General Assembly resolution that read, the Disarmament Commission [should] study the desirability of establishing a sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Powers principally involved, which should seek in private an acceptable solution, Eisenhower went further, proposing that the U.N should create the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to which the Governments principally involved, including the U.S. and its allies as well as the Soviet Union, should make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable material. Being held responsible for impounding, storing and protecting these materials, the mission of the IAEA would include to encourage world-wide investigation into the most effective peacetime uses of fissionable materials and to devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind to the needs of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities. Most importantly, [a] special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world. Thus the contributing powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind. Against the dark background of the atomic bomb, the United States does not wish to present strength, but also the desire and the hope of peace. Reiterating that the

die was cast to the U.N. member states including the U.S. allies and foes, he concluded the speech, saying, [t]he United States pledged before youand therefore before the worldits determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemmato devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life. Framed within a language of simple problem solving, Eisenhowers Atoms for Speech succeeded in turning the context of nuclear discourse. Nuclear power, once a significant problem we all face, now became a peaceful solution, a promising cure for many of the ills in the world. And it is Eisenhowers pledge to share the U.S. nuclear know-how with the less fortunate in the world that attracted many in the international audience, particularly those to whom [electric] power, agriculture and medicine are pressing needs (Medhurst, 1987, p.214).

The Nuclear Solution Among those who were less fortunate at that time, Japan, a country that just joined the post-WWII free world, was one which positively and ambitiously responded to Eisenhowers call for the peaceful use of nuclear power. Approximately three years after the speech, the Japanese government created the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) under Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyamas Cabinet. In 1966, with the help of the U.S., a nuclear power plant in Tokai-Mura, Ibaraki, began the first-ever commercial operation on the Japanese soil. Using the U.S.-offered enriched uranium, this gas-cooled reactor (GCR) utilized the technology of General Electric, then premier manufacturer of nuclear reactors in the United States. Going through several decades, Japan has introduced and operated the sum total of 63 nuclear reactor units on all of the four main islands of its archipelago for (potential) commercial use. Just before 3/11, 54 reactor units, including boiling water reactors (BWR), advanced boiling water reactors (ABWR), pressurized water reactors (PWR), and fast breeder reactors (FBR), had been in constant commercial service (except for a period of regular maintenance and safety check-up), accounting for an approximately one third of the total amount of electricity the

country generates and consumes.

The Identity of Interest "Now, while the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain so vivid, construction of such a power plant in a country like Japan would be a dramatic and Christian gesture which could lift all of us far above the recollection of the carnage of those cities (Thomas Murray, then U.S. Atomic Energy Commissioner, quoted in Kuznick, 2011). Yet, attributing the root cause of the Japanese nuclear power development to the U.S.-initiated Atoms for Peace alone and blaming Eisenhower and his administrations foreign policy for all that happened including the Fukushima accident are, of course, too hasty and simplistic. At this point, we should be reminded that, prior to the Atoms for Peace speech in 1953, the Japanese were already and fully aware that nuclear power had potential for massive civilian and commercial applications. In the first place, with or without the Atoms for Peace, the peaceful use of nuclear power was no stranger to the Japanese, at least among the nations scientific circles. The history tells us that research programs for nuclear physics and other sciences had been existent in Japan all through the 1940s and 1950s (Kawamura, 2011). While these programs were banned and made defunct during the post-WWII Occupation Period, preparation for resuming the active nuclear research on the Japanese soil had been underway. In April 1950, for example, Japanese nuclear scientists received the donation of radioactive isotope from the U.S.; in May of the following year, Ernest Lawrence, an ex-Manhattan Project officer who invented the cyclotron accelerator, visited the country, suggesting that Japan should restore its experiments on research reactors (Yoshioka, 2011a; 2011b). Second and perhaps more importantly, during the same period, the Japanese politicians in the conservative or pro-Western camp also saw political utility in peaceful nuclear power. It is important to note that this was a period when Japan was in need of economical and stable sources for its electricity supply in order to increase its standard of living and boost economic growth; it was also the time when the country was

in the midst of political flux. This was crucial for Shigeru Yoshida, then leader of the conservative Liberal-Democratic coalition now known as the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), who took the office of Prime Minister for the second time when trade-union activities became at once more militant (Colbert, 1952, p.181). In fact, Yoshidas first term (1945-1947) in office ended rather abruptly, with the parliamentary oppositions successful no-confidence vote, particularly regarding the issue of labor relations. In late 1946, the Yoshida cabinet rejected the mediation proposal of the Central Labor Relations Committee in a labor dispute in the electric power industry. The unanimous left-wing resentment that this action aroused and the chorus of demands for the resignation of the cabinet that it stimulated, as well as widespread popular dissatisfaction with the governments economic policy in general, all gave rise to new hopes of success on the part of proponents of the [labors] united front. (Colbert, 1952, p.171) In the following year, Tetsu Katayama and the Socialist Party of Japan immediately succeeded Yoshidas government as they took advantage of the economic recession that gave the rise to dissatisfied, angry working people in the form of organized labor, general strikes and sabotage nationwide. Having seen this, it is reasonable for the conservative politicians such as Yoshida to feel a compelling need to do something more significant for the countrys economy; otherwise, Japan could continue to be socialized or, even worse, Finlandized. For them, the peaceful use of nuclear power in the form of large-scale electricity generation was particularly attractive, for it had promising potentials to help the countrys economy to recover and grow, effectively silencing and fighting the home-grown Red Menace. In the words of Matsutaro Shoriki (1956), then Minister of State and the inaugural Chair of the JAEC, The living standard of a nation is often measured, by the amount of energy it consumes. It is estimated that twenty years from now Japan's energy consumption will be doubled, if we are to continue on our course of normal

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development. On the other hand, the exploitation of our coal and water power resources is fast reaching the limit both physically and economically. The purpose of the Commission is to remedy this alarming situation by making atomic energy available for general use. And as Japan was becoming part of the Far Eastern Front of the West, doing so would, at least in their eyes, not only help their domestic survival but also contribute to the defense of the free world and Eisenhowers (Cold) War efforts where the communist threat was totalized (Ivie, 1994). This was of particularly strategic significance in its neighboring region where the Eastern bloc was gaining its allegiance in the Korean and Indo-China peninsulas. Shoriki (1956) thus concludes: We the members of the Commission have decided to dedicate ourselves to the atomic energy development program because of our desire to serve the interests of all nations, including our own. Especially do we aspire to contribute Japan's share to the development of atomic energy and the elevation of the standards of living in Asia as a whole. Given these accounts, we submit that the origins of Japans post-WWII nuclear power is traceable to a peculiar rhetorical situation (Bitzer, 1969) set up by the identity of interest across the Pacific during the Cold Wars formation period. First, it is important to note that Japans active engagement in nuclear power was enabled as the country restored and furthered the friendship and, by extension, security alliance, with the U.S. Officially, it resumed in 1951 when Prime Minister Yoshida signed the Treaty of Peace (as well as that of Mutual Security Alliance) with the U.S. in the City of San Francisco. As Yoshioka (2011a; 2011b) suggests, that signing of the Treaty lifted the ban on the countrys nuclear research programs and removed the obstacles for the Japanese government to pursue the peaceful use of nuclear power of its own. In addition, by the time when Japan was ready to actually go nuclear, the original idea contained in the Atoms for Peace had to change. While the IAEA was created as a U.N. organization in 1957 under the U.S. leadership, it was far from what Eisenhower imagined. Particularly important, as not all Governments principally involved were cooperative, he had to

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give up the idea of international allocation of the fissionable materials and technology through the IAEA, which, he described in 1953, should be the agencys more important responsibility. In fact, Japans first commercial nuclear reactor which began its operation in 1966 used the enriched uranium leased directly from the U.S., which was the result of coming into effect of the Japanese-American Atomic Energy Agreement (Shoriki, 1956), i.e., a bilateral agreement between these two countries, significantly diminishing the role of the international cooperation between the East and the West regarding nuclear matters. Finally, the above accounts suggest that, as a significant international-public pronouncement, the Atoms for Peace speech came into being as a response to a question, or a solution to a problem and was given significance as answer or as solution by the question or problem (Bitzer, 1969, p.5-6) in the Japanese context, just as it did and was for Eisenhower and the U.S foreign policy, during this time. More specifically, the Atoms for Peace worked as a fitting response in the eyes of those Japanese nuclear power proponents who were in need of a new linguistic context, namely that of peace and prosperity. Almost reciting Eisenhowers language, Shoriki (1956) stated, The Japanese people, who themselves have suffered the horrors of atomic war, fervently hope and pray that mankind anywhere will never again be subjected to the same harrowing experience and the JAEC is pledged to concentrate all its efforts on peaceful uses of atomic energy. He further contended, The swift and astounding progress of science should make us realize all the more keenly our responsibility to see that new discoveries and inventions are used for the betterment of society and for the furtherance of world peace and prosperity. Needless to say, this new language of nuclear power makes sense only within the context of the trans-Pacific friendship and alliance. As Yoshida ([1951]) stated at the San Francisco Peace Conference approximately three years before Eisenhowers Atoms for Peace speech, With her[Japans] war-shattered economy salvaged through American aid, Japan is making progress on the road of recovery. We are determined that our

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nation shall contribute positively to world prosperity, while observing fully the fair trade practices in international commerce. For this purpose domestic laws have already been promulgated. The present [peace] treaty opens the door to the realization of such aspirations of Japan in the field of international economy.

Japans Dreaming Thus contextualized and given a new meaning, nuclear power has become the countrys chief answer to many, if not all, of the problems that the Japanese people have confronted all through the post-WWII years. Indeed, as a significant rhetorical idiom, the peaceful use of nuclear power symbolizes New Japans post-WWII recovery and prosperity. Given the scarcity of the domestic natural resources, the issue of energy security has long been a significant politico-economic concern for the country. Going through the oil crisis in the 1970s, the need for stable energy sources became even more compelling, to which nuclear power was presented as a viable alternative. Regarding economic growth, nuclear power has been an important public (construction) project for the promotion and revitalization of both national and regional economy; from the mid-1970 onward, the countrys leading heavy industry firms as well as electric manufacturers have always been involved in the projects concerning nuclear power, such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, Ishikawajima-Harima, Hitachi, and Toshiba, to name a few (Nuclear power: A run-away national energy, 2011). In the 1990s nuclear power has suddenly become, curiously enough, Japans chief answer to the issue of environmental protection and global warming. Upon ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (which, in fact, does exclude nuclear power as a means to reduce CO2 emission), this rhetorical climate had further intensified as the government launched so called Team Minus Six Percent project, a nation-wide campaign to raise eco-friendly public consciousness and encourage the use of clean energy (What is team minus 6 percent, n.d.). Just as in the U. S. (Hillgartner, Bell & OConnor, 1983), the public

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acceptance for nuclear power has been created and propagated through massive public relations campaign by the national government and the electric power industry. They spend the annual amount of approximately 200 billion yen on such media campaigns (Sataka, 2011). It is important to note that the JAECs Shoriki owned one of these media outlets, i.e., Yomiuri Newspaper Group, the biggest media firm in Japan; the history tells us that this powerful media conglomerate has been playing a significant instrumental role in the nuclear acceptance campaign all through the post-WWII period (Arima, 2008; Shibata, 1985). Equally important, in many of these pro-nuclear power campaign discourses, nuclear power is presented not only as a promising cure for all ills but also as the significant national dream for the post-WWII generations (Yoshimi, 2011). This dream of technology (Farrell & Goodnight, 1981) has become part of the nationalistic discourse of techno-science, playing a powerful role to promote the peaceful use of nuclear power as well as to shape a post-WWII politico-rhetorical climate where techno-science-driven economic growth becomes of paramount important national imperative. Speaking generally, science and technology are what the Japanese could identify with, because doing so would help them to regain their national pride after the defeat in World War II. Many still conceive that techno-science is what has made Japan Number One in the world; for instance, Toyota, Nissan, Toshiba, and Sony, to name a few, are all considered as proud high-tech products of Japanese genius. Regarding nuclear power in particular, a Japanese scientist named Hideki Yukawa won the countrys first Nobel Prize in 1949 for his prediction of the existence of mesons, an elementary particle. While Yukawa was already a world-renowned nuclear physicist by that time (in fact, he had been invited to the U.S. as a physics professor and had taught at Princeton and Columbia), [c]oming so soon after their disastrous defeat in World War II, Yuwakas international recognition gave the Japanese particular pride and encouragement (Yukawa Hideki, 2008). And for children of post-WWII generation, there is Tetsuwan Atom (aka Astro Boy in the English speaking world), a popular cartoon/animation

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character created by Osamu Tezuka, to identify with (cf. Astro Boy, n.d; Davidson, 2001). Just as Our Friend the Atom, a Disney animation project, did in 1950s America (Mechling & Mechling, 1995), this robotic hero rhetorically worked to pacify and domesticate nuclear power. As the name may suggest, Atom is nuclear power operated: He is not only powerful and mighty; he also has human feelings and sense of justice that are more conscientious than those of human beings. Precisely because of these, many children cheered for Atom; not only that, they wanted to become (like) him, i.e., nuclear children who love justice, peace and prosperity. Given this, we agree with Morone and Woodhouse (1989) when they state that the most accurate characterization of human relations to technology in general and, by extension, the post-WWII Japanese relationship with nuclear power is technological somnambulism, the term they borrow from Winner (1986). As they explain, this idea holds that human choices indeed launch particular technological development but that the new endeavors seldom receive the degree of conscious, careful design necessary to satisfy the long-term needs of society. Moreover, human choices may be substantially constrained and distorted by a variety of cultural, organizational, political, and economic forces [B]efore diffusing new technologies, governments and businesses do not ask sufficiently pointed questions about the purposes the technologies are supposed to serve, how they should be controlled, or how they are to be held to the intended purposes and not others. The result is technological drift, in which technologies seem to take on a life of their own. (p.20-21) Since the mid-1990s, Japan has been engaged in the policy of nuclear fuel recycling. Central to that policy is the so-called pluthermal program, a project that seeks to utilize MOX (i.e., fuel composed of uranium mixed with recycled plutonium extracted and reprocessed from nuclear waste) for thermal power plant operation (Katsuta & Suzuki, 2006). For the Japanese government, pluthermal reactors are just the next step toward the long-cherished dream of nuclear self-sufficiency (Adams, 2010, italics added). It is

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important to note that the third reactor unit at Fukushima Daiich was one of the first nuclear facilities that participate in this national energy policy of nuclear fuel recycling. More importantly, just a half year before the Level-7 accident, in the eyes of the Fukushima prefecture governor Yuhei Sato, Fukushima Daiichi was immune to natural disaster risks. And we suspect that he, like many other Japanese, must have been daydreaming when he stated to the press, I finally decided to accept (the [pluthermal] project) since certain conditions (including quake resistance) we requested have been met (Japan: Fukushima gov. to OK pluthermal, 2010). More disturbingly, even 3/11 does not seem to have functioned as a wake-up call in nuclearized Japan. Still sleepwalking and dreaming, Japan is currently attempting to sell its state-of-the-art nuclear reactors as well as dreams of a nuclear renaissance in advanced economies (Ohnish, 2012, italics added) to its Asian neighbors. A joint statement issued at the close of the [Japanese Premier] Noda-Dung [the Vietnamese counterpart] meeting declared Vietnam has expressed its strong desire for the provision of nuclear technologies from Japan. Japan, for its part, has committed in the statement to provide Vietnam with technologies that represent the world's highest level of nuclear safety (Exports to Vietnam offer chance to prove nuclear safety, 2011, p.2). And these Asian friends, we are afraid, seem to suffer from the exactly same technological somnambulism as the Japanese: Hien Pham Duy, one of Vietnam's most senior nuclear scientists and an adviser to government agencies overseeing nuclear power, said it had been his dream for many years to bring nuclear power to VietnamThe Vietnamese government fears that the country's strong economic growth will be jeopardized without the energy provided by nuclear plants. Vietnam, which relies mostly on hydroelectricity, is expected to become a net importer of energy in 2015. ''One of the reasons for the introduction of nuclear power in Vietnam is the shortage of conventional fuel supply sources, including imported,'' [said] Le Doan Phac, deputy director general of the Vietnam Atomic

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Energy Agency, the government's main nuclear research and development body. (Ohnish, 2012, A4, italics added)

Conclusions The foregoing endeavor has been our attempt to search the root cause of the Japanese nuclear power program leading to the disaster in Fukushima from a trans-Pacific rhetorical perspective. And if we are successful in engaging this critical endeavor, we have at least demonstrated two things. First, it is truly unfortunate that Eisenhower found an audience who were already receptive to, and welcoming priori, his call for Atoms for Peace in the trans-Pacific alliance. Namely, the post-WWII Japanese nuclear program was not a product of Eisenhowers rhetoric per se but rather that of the identity of the national interests between Japan and the U.S., i.e., the peace and prosperity of the free world which his discourse symbolized. Second, it is equally unfortunate that the Japanese dream of nuclear technology has continued unchecked all through the post-WWII years. Extending the rhetorical situation that gave birth to Eisenhowers Atoms for Peace and its own over time and space, nuclearized Japan ambitiously continues to strive for its dream at home and to spread the gospel of nuclear peace and prosperity abroad. In short, Japan is still in the midst of long, deep and dangerous sleepwalking. As we are closing our rhetorical endeavor, we are compelled to once again go back to Eisenhowers discourse, not the 1953 Atoms for Peace addressed to the U.N. General Assembly but his 1961 Farewell to the American people. In this televised speech delivered three days before he left the office, Eisenhower publicly accused the military-industrial complex [t]he potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power: We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of huge industrial and

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military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together. Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades. In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government. Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been over shadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present and is gravely to be regarded. (Eisenhower, [1961]) The post-WWII Japanese discourse of nuclear power advocacy are always already hegemonic (cf. Gramsci, 1971), where public policy regarding research and development in the area of nuclear power is the captive of a scientific-technological elite (Eisenhower, [1961]). As Yoshioka (2011a) coins the term, the Japanese development of nuclear power is part of the governmental-industrial complex (p.24) which many Japanese alternatively call genshiryoku-mura or the nuclear village. As equally insidious as Eisenhowers military-industrial complex, this village embraces and represents a variety of the vested interests and promises of those who are involved in nuclear power. Just as in any Japanese village, the like-mindednuclear industry officials, bureaucrats, politicians and scientistshave prospered by rewarding one another with construction projects, lucrative positions, and political, financial and regulatory support. The few openly skeptical of nuclear powers safety become village outcasts, losing out on promotions and backings (Ohnishi & Belson, 2011). In his analysis of Eisenhowers Farewell, Griffin (1994) writes that, while it is unlikely that Ike

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will be remembered as an orator, [h]is rhetorical instinct, however, could be uncommonly good, and they deserve our continuing attention (p.282). It is indeed unfortunate that, unlike the Atoms for Peace, Eisenhowers admonition of military-industrial complex found no timely, extended audience at the other end of the Pacific.

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