EVANGELINE LADONGA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No.

141066, February 17, 2005

Facts: In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became Alfredo Oculams regular customers in his pawnshop business. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason CLOSED ACCOUNT; when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them. While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature; and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of the three checks that bounced but her co-accused husband under the latters account could be held liable for violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator. Held: The conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides that a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the

criminal plan. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

PEOPLE OF TH PHILIPPINES vs. LEVI SUMARAGO G.R. No. 140873-77, February 6, 2004

Facts: The spouses Vivencio and Teodora Brigole had four children. Two of them were girls and named- Norelyn and Doneza. Teodora left Vivencio and kept custody of their fpur children. Then, Teodora and Levi started living together as husband and wife. Sometime in 1995, Norelyn, who was barely ten years old, was gathering firewood with the appellant Levi in his farm. While they were nearing a guava tree, the appellant suddenly boxed her on the stomach. Norelyn lost consciousness. She had her clothes when she woke up. She had a terrible headache and felt pain in her vagina. She also had a bruise in the middle portion of her right leg. The appellant warned not to tell her mother about it, otherwise he would kill her. The sexual assaults were repeated several times so she decided to tell her sister and eventually her mother. The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime rape and sentenced him to death. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime charged. Held: Yes, the accused is guilty of the crime charged. For the accused to held guilty of consummated rape, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: 1) there had been carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused; 20 the accused achieves the act through force or intimidation upon the victim because the latter is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. Carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused may be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence that rape had been committed and that the accused is the perpetrator thereof. A finding of guilt of the accused for rape may be based solely on the victims testimony if such testimony meets the test of credibility. Corroborating testimony frequently unavailable in rape cases is not indispensable to warrant a conviction of the accused for the crime. This Court has ruled that when a woman states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that would necessary to show rape did take place. However, the testimony of the victim must be scrutinized with extreme caution. The prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits. The credibility of Norelyn and the probative weight of her testimony cannot be assailed simply because her admission that it took the appellant only short time to insert his penis into her vagina and to satiate his lust. The mere entry of his penis into the

labia of the pudendum, even if only for a short while, is enough insofar as the consummation of the crime of rape is concerned, the brevity of time that the appellant inserted penis into the victims vagina is of no particular importance.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIVIC GENOSA G.R. No. 135981, September 29, 2000

Facts: On or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, province of Leyte, accused Marivic Genosa, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, inflicting several wounds which caused his death. The lower court found the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentenced the accused with the penalty of DEATH. On appeal, the appellant alleged that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe beatings she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the lower court failed to appreciate her self-defense theory. She claimed that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of killing her husband was equivalent to self-defense. Issue: Whether or not the battered woman syndrome as a viable plea within the concept of self-defense is applicable in this case. Held: No. The court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm, from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probablenot necessarily immediate and actualgrave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LOZADA G.R. No. 141121, July 17, 2003

Facts: Reynaldo Diaz, a tricycle driver, went to a coffee shop to meet Ronnie Sanchez and this Sanchez disclosed to Diaz his plan to rob Rosita Sy. Thereafter Belleza Lozada arrived. They planned to wait Rosita Sy as she would normally leave her drugstore between 10:30 and 11 PM. They have also planned to kill Rosita Sy, upon realizing that Sy would be killed, Diaz excused himself on the pretext that he would get a weapon but he delayed himself and the plan was not implemented that night because of the delay. They have agreed to pursue it the next day. Diaz deliberately stayed away from their meeting place the next day. The following day, he learned over the radio that a lifeless body of Rosita was found in a remote area. Issue: Whether or not all elements of a Robbery with Homicide are present to constitute a penalty of death. Held: The SC ruled that all the elements were present. The taking with animo lurid or personal property belonging to another person by means of violence against or intimidation of person or using force upon thing constitutes robbery, and the complex crime of robbery with homicide arises when by reason or on the occasion of robbery, someone is killed. All these elements have satisfactorily been shown by the prosecution.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO MENDOZA Y BUTONES G.R. No. 152589 & 152758, January 31, 2005

Facts: Before us is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein accused-appellant of our Decision dated 24 October 2003 in G.R. No. 152589 and No. 152758. In said decision, we modified the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, in Crim. Case No. 6636-G finding accused-appellant guilty of rape under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and instead, we adjudged him guilty only of attempted rape. We, however, upheld the ruling of the court a quo with regard to Crim. Case No. 6637-G finding accused-appellant guilty of incestuous rape of a minor under Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 and for this, we sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the ultimate penalty of death. Issue: Whether or not the accused committed attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. Held: After a thorough review and evaluation of the records of this case, we find no sufficient basis to modify our earlier decision convicting accused-appellant of attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 6636-G.There is an attempt to commit rape when the offender commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Upon the other hand, Article 366 of the Revised Penal Code states: (a)ny person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon the other person of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional. As explained by an eminent author of criminal law, rape and acts of lasciviousness have the same nature. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the two. In rape, there is the intent to lie with a woman whereas this element is absent in acts of lasciviousness. In this case, the series of appalling events which took place on the night of 18 March 1998 inside the humble home of private complainant and of accused-appellant, establish beyond doubt that the latter intended to ravish his very own flesh and blood. As vividly narrated by private complainant before the trial court, accused-appellant, taking advantage of the cover of darkness and of the absence of his wife, removed her (private complainants) clothing and thereafter placed himself on top of her. Accused-appellant, who was similarly naked as private complainant, then proceeded to kiss the latter and he likewise touched her breasts until finally, he rendered private complainant unconscious by boxing her in the

stomach. These dastardly acts of accused-appellant constitute the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made. Far from being mere obscenity or lewdness, they are indisputably overt acts executed in order to consummate the crime of rape against the person of private complainant.

SALVADOR D. FLOR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 139987, March 31, 2005

Facts: Information for libel was filed before the RTC, Branch 20, Naga City, against the petitioner and Ramos who were then the managing editor and correspondent, respectively, of the Bicol Forum, a local weekly newspaper circulated in the Bicol Region. It states: On or about the 18th day up to the 24th day of August, 1986, in the Bicol Region comprised by the Provinces of Albay, Catanduanes, Sorsogon, Masbate, Camarines Sur, and Camarines Norte, and the Cities of Iriga and Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court under R.A. No. 4363, and B.P. Blg. 129, the above-named accused who are the news correspondent and the managing editor, respectively, of the local weekly newspaper Bicol Forum, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without justifiable motive and with malicious intent of impeaching, discrediting and destroying the honor, integrity, good name and reputation of the complainant as Minister of the Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization and concurrently Governor of the Province of Camarines Sur, and to expose him to public hatred, ridicule and contempt, write, edit, publish and circulate an issue of the local weekly newspaper BICOL FORUM throughout the Bicol Region, with banner headline and front page news item read by the public throughout the Bicol Region VILLAFUERTES DENIAL CONVINCES NO ONE. The trial court found the petitioner guilty. The Court of Appeals likewise upheld the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether or not the questioned news item is libelous. Held: No. Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. The law recognizes two kinds of privileged matters. First are those which are classified as absolutely privileged which enjoy immunity from libel suits regardless of the existence of malice in fact. The other kind of privileged matters are the qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications which, unlike the first classification, may be susceptible to a finding of libel provided the prosecution establishes the presence of malice in fact. The exceptions provided for in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code fall into this category. The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of

free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary to any or all the agencies of Government public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy.

ENRIQUE TOTOY RIVERA Y DE GUZMAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 138553, June 30, 2005

Facts: On May 6, 1993, in the Regional Trial Court at La Trinidad, Benguet an information for direct assault was filed against petitioner, allegedly committed, as follows: That on or about the 20th day of March, 1993, at Tomay, Shilan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, employ force and seriously resist one Lt. EDWARD M. LEYGO, knowing him to be a policeman, by then and there challenging the latter to a fistfight and thereafter grappling and hitting the said policeman on his face, thus injuring him in the process while the latter was actually engaged in the performance of his official duties. The trial court convicted petitioner of the crime of direct assault. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court. Held: Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance. Unquestionably, petitioners case falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with a weapon; or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee; or (c) when the offender lays hand upon a person in authority. In any event, this Court has said time and again that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court, what with reality that it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses first-hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude while testifying. Its findings on such matters, absent, as here, of any arbitrariness or oversight of facts or circumstances of weight and substance, are final and conclusive upon this Court and will not to be disturbed on appeal.

CONRADO CASITAS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No.152358, February 5, 2004

Facts: Early in the morning of August 25, 1994, Romeo C. Boringot was awakened by his wife Aida, the latter having heard somebody shouting invectives at her husband, viz: You ought to be killed, you devil. So Romeo stood up and peeped to see who was outside. When he did not see anybody, he proceeded towards the road. Upon passing by a coconut tree, he was suddenly hacked at the back with bolo which was more that 1 foot long. He looked back at his assailant and he recognized him to be appellant Conrado whom he knew since the 1970s and whose face he clearly saw as light from the moon illuminated the place. Appellant went on hacking him, hitting him in different parts of the body, including ears and the head. While hitting him, appellant was shouting invectives at him. Appellant also hit him with a guitar causing Romeo to sustain an injury on his forehead. All in all, he sustained 11 wounds. Petitioner invoked self-defense. The trial court rejected petitioners plea of self-defense and convicted him of frustrated homicide. Issue: Whether or not petitioner acted in self-defense. Held: The petitioner was burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the confluence of the three essential requisites for complete self-defense: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable means used by the person defending himself to repel or prevent the unlawful to repel or prevent the unlawful aggression; (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. By invoking self-defense, the petitioner thereby submitted having deliberately caused the victims injuries. The burden of proof is shifted to him to prove with clear and convincing all the requisites of his affirmative defense. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not the weakness of that of the disbelieved after the petitioner admitted inflicting the mortal injuries on the victim. In this case, the petitioner failed to prove his affirmative defense. The number, nature and location of the victims wounds belie the petitioners claim that the said wounds or the victim were inflicted as they duel with each other.Witness for the petitioner testified that the wounds sustained by petitioner could not have been caused by bolo. Petitioner never surrendered voluntarily to the police and admitted that he had injured the victim. This would have bolstered his claim that he hacked the victim to defend himself. The petitioner did not do so.

NORMA A. ABDULLA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 150129, April 6, 2005

Facts: Convicted by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime of illegal use of public funds defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, or more commonly known as technical malversation, appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before this Court on petition for review under Rule 45. Along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged under an Information which pertinently reads: That on or about November, 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused: NORMA A. ABDULLA and NENITA P. AGUIL, both public officers, being then the President and cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their positions and duties are accountable for public funds under their administration, while in the performance of their functions, conspiring and confederating with MAHMUD I. DARKIS, also a public officer, being then the Administrative Officer V of the said school, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply for the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, which amount was appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public service .Appellants co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan in its decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellants sentence by deleting the temporary special disqualification imposed upon her. Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court, persistently pleas innocence of the crime charged. Issue: 1. Whether or not there was unlawful intent on the appellants part. 2. Whether or not the essential elements of the crime of technical malversation is present. Held: 1. The Court must have to part ways with the Sandiganbayan in its reliance on Section 5 (b) of Rule 131 as basis for its imputation of criminal intent upon appellant. The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to all charges of technical malversation because disbursement of public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State College to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to under existing civil service laws. There is no

dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose payment of the wages of laborers working on various projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers wages enjoy as claims against the employers funds and resources. Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. Absent this required quantum of evidence would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. The Sandiganbayans improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the day for the prosecutions deficiency in proving the existence of criminal intent nor could it ever tilt the scale from the constitutional presumption of innocence to that of guilt. In the absence of criminal intent, this Court has no basis to affirm appellants conviction. 2. The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical malversation which requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The authorization given by the Department of Budget and Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically appropriating said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABDILA SILONGAN, ET. AL. G.R. No. 137182, Apirl 24, 2003

Facts: On March 16, 1996, businessman Alexander Saldaa went to Sultan Kudarat with three other men to meet a certain Macapagal Silongan alias Commander Lambada. They arrived in the morning and were able to talk to Macapagal concerning the gold nuggets that purportedly being sold by the latter. The business transaction was postponed and continued in the afternoon due to the death of Macapagals relative and that he has to pick his brother in Cotabato City. Then at around 8:30 PM, as they headed to the highway, Macapagal ordered the driver to stop. Suddenly, 15 armed men appeared. Alexander and his three companions were ordered to go out of the vehicle, they were tied up, and blindfolded. Macapagal and Teddy were also tied and blindfolded, but nothing more was done to them. Alexander identified all the abductors including the brothers of Macapagal. The four victims were taken to the mountain hideout in Maguindanao. The kidnappers demanded P15, 000,000 from Alexanders wife for his release, but the amount was reduced to twelve million. The victims were then transferred from one place to another. They made Alexander write a letter to his wife for his ransom. But on several occasions, a person named Mayangkang himself would write to Alexanders wife. The two other victims managed to escape but Alexander was released after payment of ransom. The trial court convicted Macapagal and his companions of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal Detention. Issue: Whether it is necessary that there is actual payment of ransom in the crime of Kidnapping. Held: No, it is necessary that there is actual payment of ransom in the crime of Kidnapping. For the crime to be committed, at least one overt act of demanding ransom must be made. It is not necessary that there be actual payment of ransom because what the law requires is merely the existence of the purpose of demanding ransom. In this case, the records are replete with instances when the kidnappers demanded ransom from the victim. At the mountain hideout where Alexander was first taken, he was made a letter to his wife asking her to pay ransom of twelve million. Also Mayangkang himself wrote more letters to his family threatened the family to kill Alexander if the ransom was not paid.

VERONICO TENEBRO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004

Facts: Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by a judge at Lapu-Lapu City. The two lived together continuously and without interruption until the later part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on Nov. 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to the petitioner. Villareyes confirmed in handwritten letter that indeed Tenebro was her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. During trial, Tenebro admitted having married to Villareyes and produced two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place. He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman. The trial court found him guilty of bigamy. Issues: 1. Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the crime of bigamy. 2. What is the effect of declaration of nullity of the second marriage of the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity? Held: 1. Yes, petitioner is guilty of the crime of bigamy. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of bigamy are: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The prosecution sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, proved the existence of the marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. 2. A second or subsequent marriage contracted during subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the

subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the RPC criminalizes any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PO3 ARMANDO DALAG G.R. No. 129895, April 30, 2003

Facts: Armando Dalag, a member of the Philippine National Police, was lawfully married to Leah Nolido Dalag. They had three children. Their marriage was far from idyllic. Their covertures were marred by violent quarrels, with Leah always at the losing end. Each time the couple had a quarrel, she sustained contusions, bruises and lumps on different parts of her body. On August 15, 1996, Armando was drinking when Leah admonished him not to do so. Leah was then banged on the wall by Armando. Then he pushed and kicked Leah on the left side of her body which caused her to fall on the ground. Even as Leah was already lying prostrate, Armando continued to beat her up, punching her on the different parts of her body. Leah then fled to the house of Felia Horilla but Armando ran after her and herded her back to their house. Leah fell again to the ground and lost her consciousness. The trial court convicted Armando of parricide. Issue: Whether the trial court correctly convicted the accused. Held: Yes, the trial court correctly concluded that the injuries sustained by Leah that caused her death were the consequence of the appellants deliberate and intentional acts.The crime of parricide is defined by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code thus: Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The prosecution is mandated to prove the following essential elements: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The prescribed penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua to death. The key element in parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate.

EDWARD ONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 119858, April 29, 2003

Facts: Petitioner Edward Ong, representing ARMAGRI International Corporation (ARMAGRI), executed two trust receipts acknowledging receipt from the Solid Bank Corp. of goods valued at P 2,532,500 and P 2, 050,000. In addition, he bounded himself to any increase or decrease of interest rate in case Central Bank floated rates and to pay any additional penalty until the trust receipts are fully paid. When the trust receipts became due and demandable, ARMAGRI failed to pay or deliver the goods to the Bank despite several demand letters. The trial court convicted Ong of two counts of estafa for violation of the Trust Receipts Law. Issue: Whether the appellant is guilty of two counts estafa for violation of the Trust Receipts Law. Held: Yes, he is guilty for failure by the entrustee to account for the goods received in trust constitutes estafa. The Trust Receipts Law is violated whenever the entrustee fails to: (1) turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods, or (2) return the goods covered by the trust receipts if the good are not sold. The mere failure to account or return gives rise to the crime which is malum prohibitum. There is no requirement to prove intent to defraud. The Bank released the goods to ARMAGRI upon execution of the trust receipts and as part of the loan transactions of ARMAGRI. The Bank had a right to demand from ARMAGRI payment or at least a return of the goods. ARMAGRI failed tom pay or return the goods despite repeated demands by the Bank. It is well-settled doctrine long before the enactment of the Trust Receipts Law, that the failure to account, upon demand, for funds or property held in trust is evidence of conversion or misappropriation. Under the law, mere failure by the entrustee to account for the goods received in trust constitutes estafa. The Trust Receipts Law punishes dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of money or goods to prejudice the public order. The mere failure to deliver proceeds of the sale or the goods if not sold constitutes a criminal offense that causes prejudice not only to the creditor, but also to the public interest. Evidently, the Bank suffered prejudice for neither money nor the goods were turned over the Bank.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN HILET G.R. No. 146685-86, April 30, 2003

Facts: Sometime in 1998, ten-year old Richelle Cosada was told by appellant Benjamin Hilet, the common law husband of her mother not to go to school and watch the house. At about 10 AM, while her mother was out selling fish, Richelle saw appellant sharpening his bolo. Moments later, appellant dragged her towards the room and raped her. She kept the afternoon of March 17, 1999. Richelle finally confided to her mother. The latter asked their neighbor to report the incident to the police. The trial court convicted the appellant guilty of two counts of statutory rape. Issue: Whether time is an essential element of statutory rape. Held: No, time is not an essential element of statutory rape. An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or omission constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of rape. Thus, in a prosecution of rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of rape, not the time of its commission. It is not necessary to state the precise time when the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. In statutory rape, time is not an essential element. What is important is the information alleges that the victim is a minor under twelve years of age and the accused had carnal knowledge of her, even if no force or intimidation was used or she was not otherwise deprived of reason.

PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MORALES G.R.No. 148518, April 15, 2004

Facts That on or about the 9th day of November, 1994, in the municipality of Bacolor, province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, abduct and kidnap Jefferson C. Tan, Joanna C. Tan, Jessie Anthony C. Tan, Malou Ocampo and Cesar Quiroz, while the latter were on board a L-300 van with Plate No. CKW-785 at San Vicente, Bacolor, Pampanga, for the purpose of extorting ransom money from the parents of the said victims with threat to kill the said victims if their parents failed to deliver the ransom money, that said victims were brought and detained in Bataan until the father of victims, Feliciano Tan, paid and delivered to the aforesaid accused the amount of P92,000.00. Issues: 1. Whether or not FERNANDO MORALES be granted the exempting circumstances of irresistible force and/or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury 2. Whether or not conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable doubt. Held: 1. No. Since according to the ruling in the case of People v. Del Rosario. Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom. In Del Rosario, however, we held that for such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. By not availing of the chance to escape (since the other accused were waiting for them at the distance of 1 kilometer) their allegation of fear or duress becomes untenable, for it to apply: it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat. The fear (threats against family members), were not of imminence as to prevent any chance of escape, and that this fear they allegedly suffered does not suffice to grant them the exempting circumstance.

2. Yes. The acts done by the appellants (was involved in the initial abduction, feeding/guarding the children while they are w/ them, instructing the father to go to Gumi for the ransom) clearly shows that there was close coordination, indicating a common purpose or design Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where all the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose or common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established. It must be shown that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to commit the felony. Decision of the lower court convicting the accused for the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentencing each to death is affirmed.

PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES vs. ORIENTE G.R.No. 155094, January 30, 2007

Facts: This case is about Manuel Orientes appeal of his conviction for the crime of homicide. The appellant w/ other persons, attacked and assaulted Romulo Vallo, hitting him with a lead pipe on different parts of the body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death (as confirmed by the medico- legal). In the case there was one witness for the prosecution; Arnel Tanael. When the case was tried at the C.A. the court (C.A.) found that the R.T.C erred in finding two mitigating circumstances were present, namely, lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party, so the court modified the penalty imposed by the R.T.C. Issues: 1. Whether or not the C.A. and the R.T.C err in not appreciating that there was an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, and the means employed by appellant to prevent the same was reasonable and falls under the justifying circumstances or self-defense. 2. Whether or not the accused be granted the opportunity of mitigating circumstance, due to the premise that there was lack of intent in the part of the appellant to commit so grave a wrong and that there was sufficient provocation on the part of the deceased. Held:
1. No. Since when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the

accused to show that the killing is legally justified. It must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The appellant cannot rely on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution. All three requirements for self- defense must concur; but unlawful aggression is condition sine qua non. The fact that the deceased was not able to make use of his gun after being hit in the forehead by the weapon of the appellant as alleged by the defense makes their claim of self-defense unusual. Injuries sustained by the deceased were extensive. Importantly, the appellant failed to establish the existence of the gun, that was alleged to have constituted the unlawful aggression. 2. Modification of the penalties was based on the presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The claim of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong cannot be appreciated because the acts employed by the accused were

reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim. Provocation in this case cannot be appreciated as well since provocation is deemed sufficient if it is adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, w/c must be proportionate in gravity. The fact that a heated or intense argument preceded the incident is not by itself the sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party as contemplated by law. Also, appellant failed to establish by competent evidence that the deceased had a gun and used it to threaten petitioner. PETITION DENIED. DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF C.A. ARE AFFIRMED W/ MODIFICATIONS, the C.A. erred in imposing 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. In the computation of the maximum term, the law prescribes that the attending circumstances should be considered. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in this case, the penalty that should be imposed is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by law, that is, reclusion temporal in its medium period, or, anywhere between fourteen years, eight months and one day to seventeen years and four months.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VALLEDOR G.R.No. 12929, July 3, 2002 Facts: This case is about Enrico Valledors appeal of his conviction for the crime of consummated, frustrated and attempted murder. Last 06 March 1991, the appellant attacked Roger Cabiguen (stabbed on the forearm), Elza Rodriguez (stabbed on the chest), Ricardo Maglalang (was inflicted w/ physical injuries on different parts of the body) There were two other people inside the room (they were not harmed by the appellant). Roger and Ricardo were both wounded, while Elza died from the stab wound. After his arrest, accused-appellant was intermittently confined at the National Center for Mental Health. Thus, he was arraigned only on February 19, 1993 wherein he pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the cases were archived until November 15, 1994, when accused-appellant was declared mentally fit to withstand trial. This time, accusedappellant admitted commission of the crimes charged but invoked the exempting circumstance of insanity. The appellants plea of insanity was anchored on the following instances: a) On January 1990 the Mother of the appellant noticed that he is behaving abnormally. The mother then brought the appellant to Dr. de Guzman, a medical practitioner. She then disclosed to the doctor that insanity runs in the family. b) Dr. de Guzman then diagnosed the appellant as suffering from psychosis w/ schizophrenia and prescribed the appellant w/ an anti-depressant known as thoracin which kept the appellant sane for a period of 2 months. c) On 04 March 1991, the appellants mother noticed that he is acting strangely, so she left to buy Thoracin, but when she returned the appellant is nowhere to be found. d) On 06 March 1991 (date of commission of crime) he was seen swimming across the river Barangay Captain and Councilman took the appellant out of the water inside the boat, accused-appellant kept on crying and uttering words to the effect that his family will be killed. Suspecting that appellant was mentally ill, the Barangay Captain, asked the Councilman to accompany accused-appellant to Puerto Princesa City. Sibunga acceded and thereafter took a jeepney with appellant, while on the jeepney the appellant then jumped off the jeepney and boarded a tricycle. e) On 11 March 1991 he was interviewed by the City Health Officer I and was recommended to be committed to the NATIONAL MENTAL HOSPITAL. f) While under the care of the hospital the medical findings for the appellant was that he was suffering from: Psychosis or Insanity classified under Schizophrenia . Issue: Whether or not can Insanity as an exempting circumstance be granted to the accused.

Held: No, since in considering insanity as a defense, it presumed that all persons to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and it is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously. The acts made by the appellant shows that he does not have complete absence of the power to discern as shown by his stabbing of the two victims (roger and elza) while leaving the other two people in the room unharmed, also his action of fleeing from the scene after the incident indicated that he was aware of the wrong he committed. The actions performed by the appellant does not sufficiently prove his insanity at the time of commission of the crime: "A man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so." Although it can be argued that the appellant is suffering from mental illness what is decisive is his mental condition at the time of the perpetration of the offense. Failing to discharge the burden of proving that he was legally insane when he stabbed the victims, he should be held liable for his felonious acts. The court found the accused guilty with modifications: he is guilty of the crime of murder for the killing of elza rodriguez, and attempted murder for both roger cabiguen and rogelio maglalang (from frustrated murder for injuries caused to maglalang it was reduced to attempted murder).

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DELIM G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003 Facts: It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46 (Urdaneta City) finding the appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to death for the murder of Modesto Bantas. Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are related for modesto is an adopted son of their father. On January 23,1999 Marlon, Robert and Ronald Delim charged into the house and poked a gun at modesto and herded him outside the house. Leon and Manuel Delim both armed stayed put and made sure that randy and rita stayed put. Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon used denial and alibi as their evidence against the charge. Issue: Whether or not conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? Held: Yes there is CONSPIRACY. It is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed. Appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts were synchronized and executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan to kill Modesto There is no TREACHERY. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove: a) employment of means of execution which gives the person no opportunity to defend himself b) the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted in the appellants case there are no evidence to the particulars on how Modesto was assaulted and killed and this in fact does mean that treachery cannot be proven since it cannot be presumed that Modesto was defenseless during the time that he was being attacked and shot at by the appellants. Sheer numbers by the appellants when they attacked Modesto does not constitute proof that the three took advantage of their numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed. Appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of homicide (the decision of the lower courts were modified to lower the crime from murder to homicide).

PALAGANAS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 165483, September 12, 2006 Facts: Brothers Servillano, Melton and Michael Ferrer were having their drinking spree at their house but later decided to proceed to Tidbits Videoke Bar to continue their drinking spree and to sing. Thereafter, Jaime Palaganas arrived together with Ferdinand Palaganas (nephew) and Virgilio Bautista. When Jaime Palaganas was singing, Melton Ferrer sang with him. Jaime Palaganas got irritated and insulted. He felt that he was being mocked by Melton Ferrer, that caused him to went to the Ferrers table and uttered statements which began the fight. Ferdinand sought help to Rujjeric Palaganas. They went to the Bar and upon seeing the Ferrers outside, Ferdinand pointing at the Ferrers instructed Rujjeric to shoot them. Rujjeric Palaganas shot Servillano, Melton and Michael with the use of unlicensed firearm. As a result, Melton was killed, Servillano was fatally wounded and Michael was shot in his right shoulder.

Issue: Whether or not the use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance which should be appreciated by the court at the case at bar. Held: Yes. It has been held by the Supreme Court from the precedents before the case that the use of unlicensed firearm is now considered as a special aggravating circumstance. The Court states that: Aside from the aggravating circumstances abovementioned, there is also an aggravating circumstance provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1866,63 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294,64 which is a special law. Its pertinent provision states: If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Therefore, the decision was affirmed with certain modifications appreciating the special aggravating circumstance in the case at bar.

VICKY MOSTER vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILPPINES G.R. No. 167461, February 19, 2008

Facts: Petitioner obtained from Presas a loan of P450,000, for which the petitioner issued as payment three postdated PhilBank checks. The three checks were all payable to cash. Presas testified she did not deposit the checks on their due dates upon petitioners request and assurance that they would be replaced with cash. When she could not wait any longer, Presas deposited Check Nos. 026138 and 026124 in her Westmont Bank account, only to be notified later that the checks were dishonored because the account had been closed. Presas said she did not deposit Check No. 026137 after she agreed to petitioners request to withhold its deposit as it had not yet been funded. After receiving notice that Check Nos. 026138 and 026124 had been dishonored, Presas immediately informed petitioner thereof and demanded payment for the value of the checks. This demand, however, went unheeded. In a letter, Presas through counsel, demanded from petitioner the settlement of P367,602, representing the total value of the three checks, within five days from receipt. Petitioner, however, did not comply. Thus, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed against petitioner. Issue: Whether Held: NO. B.P. Blg. 22 punishes as malum prohibitum the mere issuance of a worthless check, provided the other elements of the offense are proved. Section 1 enumerates the elements of B.P. Blg. 22, as follows: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. Upon careful examination of the records, however, the Court found that only the first and third elements have been established by the prosecution. By her own or not the petitioner is guilty of a violation of BP 22.

admission, petitioner issued the three subject checks, two of which were presented to PhilBank but were dishonored and stamped for the reason Account Closed. Under Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 22, the introduction in evidence of the dishonored check, having the drawees refusal to pay stamped or written thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid shall be prima facie evidence of the making or issuing of the said checks and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped or attached thereto by the drawee on such dishonored checks. As to the second element, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates the presumption that the issuer of the check was aware of the insufficiency of funds when he issued a check and the bank dishonored it. This presumption, however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a written notice of dishonor and that, within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment. Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. But in criminal cases, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the prosecution merely presented a copy of the demand letter allegedly sent to petitioner through registered mail and the registry return card. There was no attempt to authenticate or identify the signature on the registry return card. All that we have on record is an illegible signature on the registry receipt as evidence that someone received the letter. As to whether this signature is that of petitioner or her authorized agent remains a mystery. Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters, claimed to be a notice of dishonor. Unfortunately, the prosecution presented only the testimony of Presas to prove mailing and receipt of the demand letter.

JAMES SVENDSEN vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 175381, February 26, 2008 Facts: Cristina Reyes (Cristina) extended a loan to petitioner in the amount of P200,000, to bear interest at 10% a month. After petitioner had partially paid his obligation, he failed to settle the balance thereof which had reached P380,000 inclusive of interest. Cristina thus filed a collection suit against petitioner, which was eventually settled when petitioner paid her P200,000 and issued in her favor an International Exchange Bank check postdated February 2, 1999 (the check) in the amount of P160,000 representing interest. The check was co-signed by one Wilhelm Bolton. When the check was presented for payment on February 9, 1999, it was dishonored for having been Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF). Cristina, through counsel, thus sent a letter to petitioner by registered mail informing him that the check was dishonored by the drawee bank, and demanding that he make it good within five (5) days from receipt thereof. No settlement having been made by petitioner, an Information for violation of BP 22 was filed against the two. Issue: Whether Held: NO. For petitioner to be validly convicted of the crime under B.P. Blg. 22, the following requisites must thus concur: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. Petitioner admits having issued the postdated check to Cristina. The check, however, was dishonored when deposited for payment in Banco de Oro due to DAIF. Hence, the first and the third elements obtain in the case. The evidence for the prosecution failed to prove the second element. While the registry receipt, which is said to cover the letter-notice of dishonor and of demand sent to petitioner, was presented, there is no proof that he or a duly authorized agent received the same. Receipts for registered letters including return receipts do not themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters. Petitioner is civilly liable, however. For in a criminal case, the social injury is sought to be repaired through the imposition of the corresponding penalty, whereas with respect to the personal injury of the victim, it is sought to be compensated through indemnity, which is civil in nature. or not the petitioner is guilty of a violation of BP 22.

ROLANDO L. BALDERAMA vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. Nos. 147578-85, January 28, 2008 Facts: Rolando L. Balderama was employed with the Land Transportation Commission (LTO) assigned to the Field Enforcement Division, Law Enforcement Services. Juan S. Armamento, respondent, operates a taxi business with a fleet of ten (10) taxi units. Acting on complaints that taxi drivers in the Ninoy Aquino International Airport discriminate against passengers and would transport them to their destinations only on a contract basis, the LTO created a team to look into the veracity of the complaints. The team flagged down for inspection an SJ Taxi owned by respondent. The team impounded the taxi on the ground that its meter was defective. However, upon inspection and testing by the LTO Inspection Division, the results showed that contrary to the report of the team, the meter waiting time mechanism of the vehicle was not defective and was functioning normally. The vehicle was released to respondent. Respondent, feeling aggrieved of the malicious impounding of his vehicle, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint for bribery and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, against herein petitioner. He alleged that prior to the impounding of his taxi, the four LTO officers had been collecting protection money from him. Issue: Whether Held: YES. The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code contains the following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer. The Sandiganbayan found the above elements of direct bribery present. It was duly established that the accused demanded and received P300.00 as protection money from respondent on several dates. As against the prosecutions evidence, all that the accused could proffer was alibi and denial, the weakest of defenses. To hold a person liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the concurrence of the following elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution: (1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) that the said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions; (3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; and (4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, or not the petitioner is guilty of direct bribery.

evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. The Sandiganbayan found that petitioners and Lubrica participated directly in the malicious apprehension and impounding of the taxi unit of respondent, causing him undue injury. Settled is the rule that findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan in cases before this Court are binding and conclusive in the absence of a showing that they come under the established exceptions, among them: 1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; 3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 5) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; and, 6) the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence on record. We found none of these exceptions in the present cases.

ZENON R. PEREZ vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 164763, February 12, 2008

Facts: An audit team conducted a cash examination on the account of petitioner, who was then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. In the course of the audit, the amount of P21,331.79 was found in the safe of petitioner. The audit team embodied their findings in the Report of Cash Examination,which also contained an inventory of cash items. Based on the said audit, petitioner was supposed to have on hand the total amount of P94,116.36, instead of the P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of P72,784.57. When asked by the auditing team as to the location of the missing funds, petitioner verbally explained that part of the money was used to pay for the loan of his late brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family, and the rest for his medicine. As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin prepared a memorandum dated January 13, 1989 addressed to the Provincial Auditor of Bohol recommending the filing of the appropriate criminal case against petitioner. Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds, defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of malversation. Held: YES. Malversation is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The acts punished as malversation are: (1) appropriating public funds or property, (2) taking ormisappropriating the same, (3) consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, permitting any other person to take such public funds or property, and (4) being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property. There are four elements that must concur in order that one may be found guilty of the crime. They are: (a) That the offender be a public officer; (b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;(c) That those funds or property involved were public funds or property for which he is accountable; and (d) That he has appropriated, took or misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. Evidently, the first three elements are present in the case at bar. At the time of the commission of the crime charged, petitioner was a public officer, being then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. By reason of his public office, he was accountable for the public funds under his custody or control. In malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant received in his possession public funds; that he could not account for them and did not have them in his possession; and that he could not give a reasonable excuse for its disappearance. An accountable public officer may

be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily. Verily, an accountable public officer may be found guilty of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of malversation because the law establishes a presumption that mere failure of an accountable officer to produce public funds which have come into his hands on demand by an officer duly authorized to examine his accounts is prima facie case of conversion. Because of the prima facie presumption in Article 217, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to adequately explain the location of the funds or property under his custody or control in order to rebut the presumption that he has appropriated or misappropriated for himself the missing funds. Failing to do so, the accused may be convicted under the said provision. However, the presumption is merely prima facie and a rebuttable one. The accountable officer may overcome the presumption by proof to the contrary. If he adduces evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds or property to personal use, then that presumption is at end and the prima facie case is destroyed. In the case at bar, petitioner was not able to present any credible evidence to rebut the presumption that he malversed the missing funds in his custody or control.

RAUL S. TELLO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 165781, June 5, 2009 Facts: Raul S. Tello was a Telegraph Operator and Telegraphic Transfer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Telecommunications. Lordino Tomampos Saligumba, Commission on Audit Auditor II assigned at the office of the Provincial Auditor of Agusan del Sur, received an order directing him and Dionisio Virtudazo to conduct an audit examination of petitioners accounts. Saligumba and Virtudazo conducted an audit where it was initially determined that petitioner had a shortage in the total amount of P6,152.90. When the auditors questioned petitioner on the official receipts of the bank to confirm the remittance advices, petitioner informed them that they were sent to the regional office of the Bureau of Telecommunications. Saligumba wrote the unit auditor of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), San Francisco, Agusan del Sur branch, requesting for confirmation of petitioners remittances and a list of validated remittances from 1 January to 9 December 1986. In a letter dated 10 December 1986, PNBs branch auditor informed Saligumba that petitioner did not make any remittance to the bank from 31 July 1985 to 30 October 1986. Saligumba secured copies of the official receipts and compared them with the remittance advices submitted by petitioner and found that the banks official receipts did not correspond with petitioners remittance advices. The auditors found that the total shortage incurred by petitioner amounted to P204,607.70. Petitioner failed to submit his explanation and to produce or restitute the missing funds. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the RPC. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of malversation. Held: YES. The elements of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the RPC are: 1. that the offender is a public officer; 2. that he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; 3. that those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and 4. that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. In this case, all the elements of the crime are present. Petitioner is a public officer. He took his Oath of Office as Acting Operator-in-Charge on 13 January 1982. Regional Office Order No. 35 dated 27 September 1984 designated petitioner as

Telegraphic Transfer-in-Charge aside from his regular duties as Acting Operator-inCharge of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. He was appointed Telegraph Operator effective 1 March 1986. As Telegraph Operator and Telegraphic Transfer-in-Charge, petitioner was in charge of the collections which he was supposed to remit to the PNB. The funds are public funds for which petitioner was accountable. It was also established that petitioner misappropriated the money. He failed to remit his cash collections and falsified the entries in the cashbooks to make it appear that he remitted the money to PNB. Petitioner failed to explain the discrepancies and shortage in his accounts and he failed to restitute the missing amount upon demand. It was also established that petitioner stopped reporting to work starting 8 December 1986. Petitioner did not present any testimonial evidence for his defense. Instead, he merely manifested that he only incurred a shortage of P6,152.90, the initial shortage found by the auditors. The last paragraph of Article 217 of the RPC states: The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. In this case, petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of malversation. He did not present testimonial evidence to defend himself. He practically admitted the shortage except that he manifested, contrary to the evidence presented by the prosecution, that only the amount of P6,152.90 was missing. He did not report to his office when the audit examination started. We sustain the Sandiganbayans finding that petitioners guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

VIOLETA BAHILIDAD vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 185195, March 17, 2010

Facts: Acting on a complaint filed by a Concerned Citizen of Sarangani Province with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against Mary Ann Gadian, Amelia Carmela Zoleta, both assigned to the Office of the Vice-Governor, and a certain Sheryll Desiree Tangan, from the Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, for their alleged participation in the scheme of giving fictitious grants and donations using funds of the provincial government, a special audit was conducted in Sarangani province. The Special Audit Team, created for the purpose, conducted its investigation from June 1 to July 31, 2003. Included in the list of alleged fictitious associations that benefited from the financial assistance given to certain Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Peoples Organizations (POs), and Local Governmental Units (LGUs) was Women in Progress (WIP), which received a check in the amount of P20,000.00, issued in the name of herein petitioner Bahilidad, as the Treasurer thereof. Based on its findings, the Special Audit Team recommended the filing of charges of malversation through falsification of public documents against the officials involved. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of malversation of public funds. Held: NO. In the instant case, petitioner was found guilty of conspiring with Zoleta and other public officials in the commission of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents. The trial court relied on the dictum that the act of one is the act of all. It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. Hence, the mere presence of an accused at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active participation in the same, is not enough for purposes of conviction. In the instant case, we find petitioners participation in the crime not adequately proven with moral certainty. Undeniably, petitioner, as a private individual, had no hand in the preparation, processing or disbursement of the check issued in her name. A cursory look at the disbursement voucher (No. 101-2002-01-822) reveals the following signatures: signature of Board Member Teodorico Diaz certifying that the cash advance is necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision; signature of Provincial

Accountant Camanay certifying to the completeness and propriety of the supporting documents and to the liquidation of previous cash advances; signature of Moises Magallona, Jr. over the name of Provincial Treasurer Cesar M. Cagang certifying that cash is available; signature ofConstantino, with the initials of Zoleta adjacent to his name, certifying that the disbursement is approved for payment, and with petitioners signature as the payee. The Sandiganbayan faulted petitioner for immediately encashing the check, insisting that she should have deposited the check first. Such insistence is unacceptable. It defies logic. The check was issued in petitioners name and, as payee, she had the authority to encash it. All told, there is reasonable doubt as to petitioners guilt. Where there is reasonable doubt, an accused must be acquitted even though his innocence may not have been fully established. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, exoneration must be granted as a matter of right.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs DIONISIO CALONGE G.R. No. 182793, July 5, 2010 Facts: Rosita A. Calonge was appellants legitimate wife, with whom he had three children. On December 1, 2001 at around 6:00 oclock in the morning, the Villaverde Police Station received a radio call from the barangaycaptain of Cabuluan that a massacre took place in their locality. Rositas bloodied body was found lying on the ground about fifteen (15) meters away from their house. Her right hand was loosely clasping a knife. Lying on his back near the stairs was appellant who was also wounded but still conscious. Beside him were a bolo and a flashlight, both stained with blood. While the windows of the house were locked with a piece of tie wire, the door was already opened. Inside the two bedrooms of the house separated only by a curtain, they found the lifeless bodies of the two young girls, Kimberly and Dony Rose. The other child, Melody, was also bloodied but alive and conscious. They brought Melody to the Veterans Regional Hospital where she was treated and confined for seventeen days. Melodys grandparents said they knew it was appellant because they had heard Rosita shouting that appellant will kill them. On the other hand, when appellant was asked what happened and who attacked him, he answered he does not know. Appellant was charged with parricide and frustrated parricide. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime charged. Held: YES. Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused. The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. All the elements of the crime were clearly and sufficiently proved by the prosecution. Even granting arguendo that Melody did not see the actual stabbing of her mother and two (2) sisters, the attendant circumstances point to no one else but the appellant as the perpetrator. Direct evidence of the actual killing is not indispensable for convicting an accused when circumstantial evidence can sufficiently establish his guilt. The oft-repeated rule has been that circumstantial evidence is adequate for conviction if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven and the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and

at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person. In the killing of victims in this case, the trial court was correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery. There is treachery when the attack is so sudden and unexpected that the victim had no opportunity either to avert the attack or to defend himself. Indeed, nothing can be more sudden and unexpected than when a father stabs to death his two young daughters while they were sound asleep and totally defenseless.

People vs. Tabuelo G.R. No. 178059, January 22, 2008 Facts: An Information was filed charging appellant with murder. The accused admits that he stabbed Clinton Badinas on or about that time on said place and as a consequence of the wound he sustained Clinton Badinas died. However, he claimed that he acted in self-defense. The trial court found the version of the prosecution credible thus rejecting appellants theory of self-defense. On May 6, 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty of murder. Appellant alleges that the justifying circumstance of self-defense was not properly considered in his favor; that assuming the killing was committed not in selfdefense, still the courts below erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Issue: Whether or not the appellants contention is meritorious. Held: The petition is partly meritorious. In invoking self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, the onus probandi is shifted to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the elements of justifying circumstance, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The accused, in cases of self-defense, must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions evidence since he admits the commission of the alleged criminal act. One who admits the infliction of injuries which caused the death of another has the burden of proving self-defense with sufficient and convincing evidence, for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing. Self-defense, like alibi, is a defense which can easily be concocted. If the accuseds evidence is of doubtful veracity, and it is not clear and convincing, the defense must necessarily fail. In the instant case, appellant failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; moreover, his narration of the events was unbelievable. As correctly observed by the trial court, considering the alleged disadvantageous position of the appellant and the relentless assault from the victim, it is surprising that appellant remained unscathed. The presence of a pitcher and a knife conveniently within the reach of appellant was highly suspect and coincidental. As noted by the trial court, "the presence of a pitcher of water which the accused picked up to repel the attack of the deceased and the knife which the accused was able to grasp and swung it to the (victim) hitting him near the left armpit seems to suggest that pitchers and knives are scattered around Fort Ilocandia." Moreover, if it were true that the victim was pursuing

Roger Domingo with a broken bottle, then it is preposterous for the appellant to shout at and order Domingo, instead of the victim, to stop, thus putting Domingos life at risk. Further, if Domingo stopped as narrated by appellant, then it is inconceivable that he was not harmed by his alleged pursuer. In fine, the trial court correctly held that the defense failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. There being no unlawful aggression, there is no need to discuss whether the means employed to repel the attack was reasonable or whether appellant sufficiently provoked the victim into attacking him. However, we cannot agree with the findings of the trial court that treachery attended the commission of the crime. The trial court appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery because "the attack by the accused upon the victim was sudden and coming from behind, thus, precluding any possible way for the victim to defend himself." Nevertheless, mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to treachery. It bears stressing that treachery cannot be presumed. It must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself. The fact that the victim might have been unaware or helpless when he was stabbed does not constitute proof of treachery. The prosecution has the burden to prove that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, method and forms of attack employed by him. In the instant case, there was no proof that appellant consciously adopted the mode of attack, hence he may only be held liable for homicide, not murder. The Decision of the Court of Appeals finding appellant guilty of murder is MODIFIED. The Court finds appellant guilty of Homicide.

People vs. Gutierrez G.R. No. 188602, February 4, 2010 Facts: On August 15, 2003, five (5) separate Informations for murder, frustrated murder and three (3) counts of attempted murder were filed against appellant. When arraigned, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the charges. Trial on the merits then ensued. Not finding credence in appellant's claim of self-defense, the RTC convicted him of murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder on three (3) counts. Appellant assails the trial court and the CA for giving credence to the prosecutions evidence. He admits having killed Regis and wounding Dalit, but insists that he did so in self-defense. Issue: Whether or not the accused act in self-defense. Held: No. Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability for crimes only if satisfactorily proved. It requires (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on his part. In People of the Philippines v. Bienvenido Mara, it was explained: One who admits killing or fatally injuring another in the name of selfdefense bears the burden of proving: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming selfdefense. By invoking self-defense, the burden is placed on the accused to prove its elements clearly and convincingly. While all three elements must concur, selfdefense relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded. In this case, appellant utterly failed to discharge the burden of proving unlawful aggression. His version of the events was uncorroborated, and his testimony was found to be less credible by the trial court. On the other hand, the surviving victims were unanimous that appellant suddenly fired at them, without any provocation on their part. The credibility of the prosecution witnesses had been weighed by the trial court, and it found their testimonies to be more convincing. As a rule, the appellate court gives full weight and respect to the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, since the trial judge has the best opportunity to observe their demeanor. While this rule admits of exceptions, none of such exceptions obtains in this case. In Razon v. People, it was held: Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself.

Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. The trial court and the CA cannot, therefore, be faulted for rejecting appellants plea of self-defense. This Court also agrees with the trial court in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims. The pieces of evidence gleaned by the trial court, the facts, are enough to show that treachery was employed by appellant. The attack was sudden, as testified to by the witnesses, and unexpected. Provocation on the part of the victims was not proven, and appellants testimony that the victims were about to attack him cannot be given credence. The victims had no inkling that an attack was forthcoming and had no opportunity to mount a defense. Thus, treachery was correctly appreciated as a circumstance to qualify the crime to murder. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, the penalty imposed for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 223 of the RPC. The prison term imposed by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 03-3639 is correct. The SC affirm the CA ruling that appellant is guilty of attempted murder, not of frustrated murder, in Criminal Case No. 03-3640 for the injury sustained by Dalit. No convincing proof was offered to show that the wound inflicted on Dalit was fatal and would have caused his death had medical help not been provided. It is well settled that where the wounds inflicted on the victim are not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, as the accused had not performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about the victim's death.

People vs. Dela Cruz G.R. No. 188353, February 16, 2010 Facts: In an Information filed on August 11, 2003, accused-appellant Leozar Dela Cruz y Balobal was indicted for the crime of murder of Vincent Pimentel under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the charge. On September 5, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision, finding Leozar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder attended by treachery and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. On February 27, 2008, the CA rendered the appealed decision, affirming the findings of the RTC and the conviction of Leozar but modifying the award of damages. Accused raises the same assignment of errors as in his Brief, to wit: first, that the courts a quo erred in appreciating the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery; and second, that the courts a quogravely erred in convicting him of murder instead of homicide. Issue: Whether or not there was treachery. Held: Yes. The fact that Leozar and Vincent did not quarrel prior to the killing is indicative of the treachery employed by Leozar. After Vincent paid Leozar some money, he left and went inside the alley. When Vincent came back to Mockingbird St. from the alley, Leozar deliberately employed means with treachery affording Vincent no opportunity to defend himself, i.e., Leozar draped his arm around Vincent and slash/slit his neck using a 24-inch bladed samurai. The fatal neck wound caused Vincents death, described in his death certificate as "hemorrhagic shock secondary to an incised wound of the neck." All told, the victim was unaware of the imminent attempt on his life, and was not in a position to defend himself. Clearly, treachery was present in this killing. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORBERTO MATEO G.R. No. 170569, September 30, 2008 Facts: In a Complaint dated November 2, 1995, AAA, assisted by her father, BBB, charged Norberto MATEO (appellant) with rape by means of force and intimidation. The Assistant City Prosecutor certified that it was filed with the prior authority of the City Prosecutor. Upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Upon medical examination, Dr. Reyes testified that AAA could have been laid on a rough surface as shown by the multiple linear abrasions found at her back and the anterum medial aspect of her thigh;that she had been sexually penetrated possibly with the use of force and violence; that he noticed that AAA was suffering from some form of mental retardation as she was not responding to his question like a 17-year old girl should, compelling him to refer her to a neuro-psychiatrist for examination; that based on the result forwarded to him, AAA had a mental age of 5 years and 8 months with an IQ of 38. After trial, the RTC found MATEO guilty of raping a mental retardate. This was affirmed by the CA. MATEO questioned the affirmation of the CA in the SC, arguing that 1) there was no proof beyond reasonable doubt there was no physical struggle by the victim, and 2) the court a quo erred in finding that the victim AAA was a mental retardate. Issue: Whether or not MATEO is guilty of rape. Held: Yes. Appellant's claim that the records do not show any sign or presence of struggle is irrelevant. Physical resistance is not an essential element of the felony, and need not be established when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapist's embrace because of fear for her life and personal safety. It is enough that the malefactor intimidated the complainant into submission. Failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary the complainant's submission to the criminal acts of the accused.Furthermore, not every victim of rape can be expected to act with reason or in conformity with the usual expectations of everyone. During the trial, the prosecution presented evidence tending to show that AAA was a mental retardate. It is settled that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes statutory rape, which does not require proof that the accused used force or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of the victim for conviction.

In any event, the prosecution presented adequate evidence which showed that the appellant used force and intimidation in committing the crime of rape, and which the RTC relied upon in convicting appellant.