PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. MANUEL BRIOSO y TANDA, Appellant.

FACTS: The prosecution charged appellant with raping the 13-year-old daughter of his common-law wife. The victim narrated that sometime in February 2003, appellant tried to rape her the first time, early morning, when her mother was in Lucena, but failed to insert his penis to her vagina, and afterwards threatened her. The second time was a week later, also in the early morning, this time the appellant succeeded in inserting his penis to her vagina. Afterwards appellant again threatened the victim. On December 5, 2003, around 5:30 in the morning, appellant again succeeded in raping the victim. The former, again threatened her afterwards. The victim further testified that appellant raped her so many times but she could only remember these three incidents. ISSUE: Was all the acts of rape consummated? RULING: No, the first act was only attempted rape and the two succeeding acts were consummated rape (qualified rape). For the accused to be held guilty of consummated rape, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: (1) there has been carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused; (2) the accused achieved the act through force or intimidation upon the victim because the latter was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. A finding that the accused is guilty of rape may be based solely on the victims testimony if such testimony meets the test of credibility supported by either direct or circumstantial evidence. During the first time appellant tried to rape the victim, the latter testified that appellant merely touched and failed to insert his penis into her vagina; however, she furthered that her vagina was painful then. The act of touching should be understood as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labia of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum. In other words, to constitute consummated rape, the touching must be made in the context of the presence or existence of an erect penis capable of penetration. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labia or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHNNY BAUTISTA y BAUTISTA and JERRY MORALES y URSAL, Accused. JOHNNY BAUTISTA y BAUTISTA, Accused-Appellant. FACTS: Accused conspired in detaining and depriving Fritzie So of her liberty for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim and her family. Further, if the desired amount of money by kidnappers could not be given the victim will be killed. While the victim was detained, she recognized only the appellant. Also, the victims brother testified that it was Bautista who caught the bag containing the money when it was delivered to the kidnappers. ISSUE: Did the appellant conspire with the kidnappers? RULING: Yes, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where all the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose or common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator even though such act differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit. Taking the stated facts of the state witness in conjunction with the testimony of Dexter, who testified that accusedappellant was the one who received the ransom money and apparently, was also the one giving him instructions, and that of Fritzie, who testified that accused-appellant was one of her guards at the safe house, then the commonality of purpose of the acts of accused-appellant together with the other accused can no longer be denied. Such acts have the common design or purpose to commit the felony of kidnapping for ransom. Thus, accused-appellants argument that he is a mere accomplice must fail. He is liable as a principal for being a co-conspirator in the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Art. 267 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 7659.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE PEPITO D. COMBATE a.k.a. PEPING, (Accused-Appellant.) FACTS: The accused, armed with a firearm, with treachery, with intent to kill and taking advantage of nighttime, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot on Edmund Prayco and Leopoldo Guiro, Jr, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the body of the victims which caused their death. The RTC ruled that the accused if guilty of homicide for the death of Leopoldo Guiro, Jr. and murder for the death of Edmundo Prayco. The decision of the trial court was affirmed by CA with modification. Accused-appellant contends that the trial court failed to consider several inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. First, as to Tomaro, the eye-witness, who directly implicated accused-appellant, his testimony was unsubstantiated and did not conform to the physical evidence. According to Tomaro, Edmund was shot at close range yet no powder burns were found around the entry wound. Second, as to the testimony of Shenette Guiro, accused-appellant harps on the fact that she never mentioned Tomaro being present at the scene of the crime and that she only heard one gunshot while the other witnesses heard three or four. Lastly, as to the testimony of SPO1 Salamisan, accused-appellant points out that SPO1 Salamisan testified that he only saw one spot of blood when there were two victims. ISSUE: Did the trial court err in convicting the accused despite the inconsistencies in the statements of the witnesses? RULING: No, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, sometimes even with finality. The Supreme Court will not interfere with that assessment, absent any indication that the lower court has overlooked some material facts or gravely abused its discretion. Complementing the above doctrine is the equally established rule that minor and insignificant inconsistencies in the testimony tend to bolster, rather than weaken, the credibility of witnesses, for they show that the testimony is not contrived or rehearsed. Careful review of the records shows that the RTC, as well as the CA, committed no reversible error when it gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as opposed to accused-appellants bare denials. Moreover, the testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety and not merely on its truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining the facts established by witnesses, everything stated by them on direct, cross, and redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered. It must be stressed in this regard that facts imperfectly or erroneously stated in an answer to one question may be supplied or explained as qualified by the answer to other question. The primordial consideration is that the witness was present at the scene of the crime and that he positively identified the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime charged. In this case, the alleged inconsistencies merely refer to minor details which do not affect the witnesses credibility.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL LINDO y VERGARA, Accused-Appellant. FACTS: The victim was 11 years old at the time, and accused-appellant Lindo was her neighbor. On April 3, 2001, the victim attended a pabasa at a neighbor's place, during which she fell asleep under a platform that served as a stage. While she was sleeping, Lindo took her away to a place near a creek where clothes are placed to dry. It was there that the victim woke up, as Lindo raped her. He tried inserting his penis into her vagina, whereupon his penis made contact with her sex organ but there was no complete penetration. Not achieving full penile penetration, he then made her bend over, and inserted his penis into her anus. The RTC found the testimony of the victim credible, and rendered the appellant guilty of Statutory Rape under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. Lindo appealed to the CA, assailing the credibility of AAA. Lindo failed to persuade the CA, which affirmed his conviction, but modified the award of damages to the victim. ISSUE: Was the ruling of the trial court and the CA proper in penalizing the accused under Art 335 of the RPC and RA 7610? RULING: No, the crime of rape is no longer to be found under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code, or crimes against chastity. As per RA 8353, or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the crime of rape has been reclassified as a crime against persons. As of October 22, 1997, the date of effectivity of the Anti-Rape Law, the crime of rape is now defined under Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, with the penalties for rape laid out in Art. 266-B. As the incident happened on April 3, 2001, it is no longer covered by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, but Art. 266-A. From the information filed, it is clear that accused-appellant was charged with two offenses, rape under Art. 266-A, par. 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, and rape as an act of sexual assault under Art. 266-A, par. 2. Accusedappellant was charged with having carnal knowledge of the victim, who was under twelve years of age at the time, under par. 1(d) of Art. 266-A, and he was also charged with committing "an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person" under the second paragraph of Art. 266-A. Two instances of rape were indeed proved at the trial, as it was established that there was contact between accused-appellant's penis and the victim's labia; then the victim's testimony established that accused-appellant was able to partially insert his penis into her anal orifice. The medical examination also supports the finding of rape under Art. 266-A par. 1(d) and Art. 266-A par. 2, considering the extragenital injuries and abrasions in the anal region reported.