Copyright The British Psychological Society

Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society

839

British Journal of Social Psychology (2007), 46, 839858 q 2007 The British Psychological Society

The British Psychological Society

www.bpsjournals.co.uk

Rhetorically self-sufcient arguments in Western Australian parliamentary debates on Lesbian and Gay Law Reform
Mark Summers*
School of Psychology, Murdoch University, Western Australia
Western Australias Acts Amendment (Lesbian and Gay Law Reform) Bill 2001 delivered a measure of legal equality in such areas as property transfer, superannuation, inheritance and discrimination, and more controversially, adoption, lesbian access to IVF, lowering the age of consent for sex between men from 21 to 16, and incorporating information on homosexuality into high school sex education classes. This paper examines the use of various moral principles within parliamentary speeches supporting or opposing the legislation, and the extent to which they were treated by members as beyond question, or rhetorically self-sufcient. The resources of equality, human rights, democracy, the interests of the majority and the interests of children were given a kind of beyondquestion, self-sufcient status, but their use was able to be undermined in a number of ways, relating to members management of what the Bill was about, and the exibility of these social constructs. It is argued that rather than pitting one set of resources against another, members on both sides of the debate faced a rhetorical pressure to adopt and mobilize all of the same self-sufcient moral resources, due to the exible, constructed and non-hierarchical, yet often rhetorically self-sufcient nature of common-sense moral principles.

Over the period from the end of 2000 to March 2002, Western Australia experienced a great deal of debate revolving around the newly elected state Labor governments plans to address various legal inequalities affecting same-sex couples, and gay and lesbian human rights. Over this time, the proposed legislation elicited a wide spectrum of contrasting views, including strong reactions in Parliament, and from various social groups such as the Australian Family Association, which reached the peak of its public condemnation of the legislation in its Rally for Marriage and Children on 8 November 2001. At the rally, which was attended by more than 2000 people, keynote speaker, former Returned and Services League president William Digger James equated sex education on homosexuality in schools with pornography, and former Wimbledon champion Margaret Court proclaimed we love the homosexuals and were there to help

* Correspondence should be addressed to Mark Summers, School of Psychology, Murdoch University, South Street, Murdoch, Western Australia, 6150, Australia (e-mail: m.summers@murdoch.edu.au).
DOI:10.1348/014466607X202444

Copyright The British Psychological Society

Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society

840 Mark Summers

them overcome it. The controversy surrounding the legislation received a great deal of attention from the media, and from the general public, as evidenced by the huge outpouring of debate in the West Australian newspapers letters to the editor pages. The Acts Amendment (Lesbian and Gay Law Reform) Bill 2001 was introduced into WA Parliament in November 2001 and nally passed on 21 March 2002. While the legislation related to such areas as property transfer, superannuation, inheritance, medical treatment and discrimination, the majority of public debate centred around the aspects dealing with adoption, lesbian access to IVF, lowering the age of consent for sex between men from 21 to 16, and incorporating information on homosexuality into high school sex education classes. This period yielded a rich source of qualitative data, allowing the examination of an intersection of discourses, relating to ideas of sexuality, homophobia, families, democracy, equality and human rights. This paper examines transcripts of parliamentary debates concerning the Acts Amendment (Lesbian and Gay Law Reform) Bill, with a focus on the use of the aphoristic, and often moralistic, arguments identied by Wetherell and Potter (1992) as rhetorically self-sufcient. Linguistic resources such as these have been viewed from a discursive psychological perspective as interpretative repertoires broad patterns of sense-making which are organized around a number of key tropes and often involve the recurring use of particular sets of terms (Augoustinos, LeCouteur, & Soyland, 2002). An examination of the linguistic resources and techniques used to construct social reality has been a focus of discursive psychologys concern with language as social practice because talk is action performative and varies according to its function within a particular social context (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Discursive studies have shown that the discursive construction of such social objects as homosexuality (Wood, 2000), lesbians and gay men (Praat & Tufn, 1996), homophobia and heterosexism (Speer & Potter, 2000), and the relevant issues concerning legal change (Ellis & Kitzinger, 2002), is exible and performative of a range of social functions, from the advancement of lesbian and gay equality, to the legitimation of social inequality. A major strand of discursive studies on heterosexism (Praat & Tufn, 1996; Speer & Potter, 2000), and particularly racism (Condor, Abell, Figgou, Gibson, & Stevenson, 2006; Rapley, 2001; Wetherell & Potter, 1992), has been concerned with the rhetorical strategies and resources applied to the task of legitimating existing inequalities between groups, and arguing for discriminatory social consequences that disadvantage marginalized social groups, while simultaneously defending against possible allegations of prejudice. For example, in a New Zealand context, Praat and Tufn identied a number of resources recurrently drawn on by police ofcers in discussions of homosexuality and the police: an effeminate discourse associating gay men with effeminate behaviours; a deviant discourse associating gay men with morally and legally proscribed behaviours and a discourse of conditional acceptance, which positively presented a sub-type of gay men, while voicing reservations about gay men generally. These resources were deployed in such ways as to warrant the rejection of gay men as potential police ofcers (which was also justied in terms of internal and external pressures impinging on the department), while allowing ofcers to protect themselves against appearing to be heterosexist. For example, one ofcer displayed a personal acknowledgement of those gay men and lesbians that were good people, before going on to warrant the suspicion of all gay men as possible paedophiles in terms of a present lack of knowledge about how to accurately differentiate good and bad homosexuals. Other research by Speer and Potter has examined the ways in which participants defend

Copyright The British Psychological Society

Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society

Rhetorically self-sufcient arguments

841

themselves against appearing to be heterosexist when sexuality is made relevant in their talk: disclaiming personal prejudice by claiming to not be bothered; displaying a personal lack of understanding to construct homosexuality as problematic without directly stating that it is a problem; using extreme case softeners and contrasting oneself with supposedly more prejudiced individuals to dilute heterosexist arguments without challenging them and using show concessions (Antaki & Wetherell, 1999) that is conceding positive features of lesbians and gay men to bolster and present heterosexist arguments as balanced. Other studies have been concerned with the mobilization of liberal-egalitarian principles and appeals to common sense in order to indirectly justify discriminatory social practices (Rapley, 1998, 2001). These ndings parallel mainstream social psychological notions of an emerging subtle brand of prejudice, as opposed to overtly bigoted, blatant forms (McConahay, 1986; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Wetherell and Potters (1992) examination of the rhetorically self-sufcient arguments used by Pakeha (white majority) New Zealanders to legitimate existing racial inequalities in New Zealand is one treatment of this phenomenon. Their study identied 10 common forms of these arguments, which were treated by members as clinching or beyond question: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) Resources should be used productively and in a cost effective manner. Nobody should be compelled. Everybody should be treated equally. You cannot turn the clock backwards. Present generations cannot be blamed for the mistakes of past generations. Injustices should be righted. Everyone can succeed if they try hard enough. Minority opinion should not carry more weight than majority opinion. We have to live in the 20th century. You have to be practical.

Sacks (1995) argues that aphorisms such as these are powerful and difcult to undermine, due to their encapsulation of common-sensical notions of what is true or right. According to Sacks (1995), another reason for their being limitedly attackable (Vol. 1, p. 105) is their abstract and atopical nature. For example, the correctness of the maxim, injustices should be righted, might be somewhat harder to call into question than that of an argument that some particular injustice should be righted. Wetherell and Potter (1992) stress that these interpretative repertoires should not be viewed as rigidly applied cognitive schemas or templates which direct utterances. Instead, they were found to serve as discursive resources, which were exibly and variably deployed by participants in order to do certain things, most notably to avoid being labelled and evaluated as racist, while arguing for outcomes which preserve existing racial inequalities. Being abstract social constructs, consistency and conict between the principles invoked in these rhetorically self-sufcient arguments are highly negotiable they need not be presented as forming an internally consistent whole (e.g. injustices should be righted but you cannot turn the clock backwards). Nor should they be considered inherently self-sufcient, but rather, have been shown to be routinely treated as such within a range of analytic contexts (Augoustinos et al., 2002; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) for example, by being used to provide a nishing blow to a particular line of argument before moving on to a new focus, or simply by virtue of not being challenged, or justied

Copyright The British Psychological Society

Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society

842 Mark Summers

with additional warrants. Not only are these rhetorically self-sufcient arguments themselves treated as requiring no warrant, but no further warrant need be given following their use in the construction of an issue, position or social object. That is, they are used as warrants for ones claims and arguments, insofar as they may be treated as bottom line principles of common sense, and in some cases (e.g. injustices should be righted, people should be treated equally, majority interests should be prioritized over minority interests), morality. In this sense, it is suggested that these rhetorically selfsufcient arguments may be substantially constitutive of the moral credentials that are invoked when one argues a position on social policy and intergroup relations. The rhetorically self-sufcient arguments identied by Wetherell and Potter (1992) can also be seen in the context of Australian political rhetoric. Augoustinos et al. (2002) examined the use of self-sufcient arguments concerning equality, progress, practicality and justice within Australian Prime Minister John Howards ofcial opening speech at the 1997 Reconciliation Convention. These resources, in addition to the further selfsufcient argument of moderation, that the middle way between extremist positions is the best way, were used to privilege a particular version of reconciliation which functions to legitimate existing inequalities between Indigenous Australians and the non-Indigenous majority. In a context more similar to the present study, Ellis and Kitzinger (2002) identied three key moral resources employed within parliamentary speeches against lowering the age of consent for sex between men in UK: principles of democracy; principles of right and wrong; and principles of care and protection. Ellis and Kitzinger argued that these principles were treated as taking precedence over that of equality insofar as Ellis and Kitzinger themselves dened the legislation as providing equality. In addition, proponents of change were criticized by the researchers for addressing the oppositions agenda, as opposed to prioritizing an argument based on human rights, which should be rhetorically powerful due to occupying a privileged moral position in democratic states. Human rights arguments were seen as diluted even by a focus on the notion of equality, which allowed the conation of the concepts of equity and civil rights with that of human rights. It was suggested that the best way to advance arguments for lesbian and gay equality is to prioritize the notion of universal, inalienable and indivisible human rights. Ellis and Kitzingers (2002) study adds to a growing body of discourse analytic research concerned with how social outcomes describable as heterosexist are legitimized through discourse (e.g. Clarke, 2001), and with participants own orientations to, and constructions of, heterosexism (e.g. Korobov, 2004; Speer & Potter, 2000). For example, Burridge (2004) described a recurring practice of disclaiming homophobia in UK parliamentarians arguments against the repeal of Section 28 of England and Wales Local Government Act (1998), which forbids the promotion of homosexuality by local authorities. Burridge argued that this practice constituted an orientation to the unacceptability or ineffectiveness of being observed as prejudiced when advocating discrimination (p. 328) in that context. Similarly, Billig (1991, p. 134) has interpreted such phenomena in terms of a taboo against expressing unjustied negative views against out-groups. A major concern of the literature, then, has been with how negative portrayals of homosexuality, lesbians and gay men, and the discursive legitimation of heterosexist discrimination, are presented as justied and non-heterosexist. This paper aims to continue this line of inquiry by examining the role of rhetorically self-sufcient arguments in the justication of heterosexist social consequences or the promotion of lesbian and gay equality.

Copyright The British Psychological Society

Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society

Rhetorically self-sufcient arguments

843

To date, the few studies on rhetorically self-sufcient arguments have focused primarily on the extent to which these resources are treated as self-sufcient warrants within the turn in which they occur. Requiring further investigation is the question of how the usage of these resources in one turn is treated within an opposing argument of another speaker. That is, in the highly oppositional context of a parliamentary debate on lesbian and gay law reform, to what extent are the principles of equality, democracy, protection of childrens interests, modernity and human rights treated as rhetorically self-sufcient? In investigating this question, the present study will examine the ways in which these principles are mobilized within arguments for and against the Acts Amendment (Lesbian and Gay Law Reform) Bill 2001, and the ways in which their use in speeches opposing the Bill is oriented to and managed within those supporting it, and vice versa.

Analysis
The data The analytic materials for this study consist of parliamentary transcripts from Western Australias Hansard archive, concerning the Acts Amendment (Lesbian and Gay Law Reform) Bill 2001. Specically, second reading speeches in the Legislative Assembly (Western Australias lower house of Parliament) were chosen as a focus. The second reading is the rst opportunity for members to speak in Parliament on a Bill, and primarily consists of ideological and moral arguments about the proposed legislation as a whole, as opposed to the more specic legal technicalities which are a focus of later stages. The data is presented as found in Hansard1 that is, organized into paragraphs and punctuated, but lacking the ne-grained detail (e.g. speed, pitch, timed pauses) of Jeffersonian notation. However, this projects primary concerns of broad argumentative patterns and the content of discourse can be amply handled using Hansards basic orthographic transcriptions. The Hansard transcripts comprising the data for this project are available on-line at the Parliament of Western Australia (2001) website. Members second reading speeches took place over 3 days in 2001, and yielded 109 pages of typed, single-spaced transcript. Dates and page numbers for the data are as follows: 14 November 2001 pages 5520 to 5525; 5 December 2001 pages 6458 to 6465, 6474 to 6484 and 6495 to 6532; 6 December 2001 pages 6627 to 6655 and 6672 to 6688. Members speeches were subject to time constraints, in line with parliamentary Standing Orders, the permanent rules which govern the conduct of business in each house (Parliament of Western Australia, 2005). According to Standing Order No 101, the time limit on the second reading speech given by the mover of a Bill (in this case, the Labor Governments Attorney General Jim McGinty) is 60 minutes. One nominated Opposition member (in this case, the Liberal Partys Cheryl Edwardes) can also speak for up to 60 minutes. The time limit for all other members speeches is 20 minutes, though if the member speaking so requests during or immediately upon the expiry of a speech, the time for the speech will be extended by a further 10 minutes (p. 62).

As with all transcriptions, Hansards records of parliamentary proceedings are best viewed as versions co-produced by both the speakers and the transcribers of the talk. Parliaments Reporting Services is responsible for recording and translating parliamentarians spoken words into the typed text of Hansard. Their original audio recordings are not publicly available.

Copyright The British Psychological Society

Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society

844 Mark Summers

The speeches under analysis can be split into two groups: those supporting the Bill and those opposing it. There was a direct correspondence between party membership and avowed position with regard to the Bill. The Bill was introduced by the Labor Governments Attorney General, Jim McGinty, and all the speeches of Labor Party members explicitly voiced support for the legislation. All members of the conservative opposition coalition of Liberal2 and National Parties who spoke on the Bill explicitly opposed the legislation. Liberal Party policy on this issue stated that while the Liberal Party supported the aspects of the Bill concerning superannuation, inheritance, medical treatment and anti-discrimination, it did not support the aspects dealing with adoption, lesbian access to IVF, lowering the age of consent for sex between men from 21 to 16, and incorporating information on homosexuality into school sex education classes, and therefore opposed the Bill itself. The Liberal Party argued for the Bill to be split, in which case their party would support the quick passage of the legislation dealing with superannuation, discrimination, etc., while the controversial aspects were subject to further debate and public consultation. A nal point to make about the data, with implications for analysis, is that since the Legislative Assembly allows all speakers to speak for at least 20 minutes, and places restrictions on when and how a member may interrupt another member, much of members talk is embedded within relatively long turns. This means that speakers do not hearably attend to as much of the ne-grained (i.e. sentence-by-sentence) detail of each others talk as is often observed in the analyses of interactions characterized by much shorter turns (e.g. Antaki, Young, & Finlay, 2002; Lerner, 1996). As a consequence, one cannot always observe the direct interactional consequences of specic utterances. For this reason, the attention to the broad brushstrokes of discourse allowed by Wetherells (1998) approach of identifying argumentative threads or interpretative repertoires can be seen to be particularly useful in analysing this data, as it is primarily these broad brushstrokes that are clearly observable as having interactional currency for participants. The speeches can be seen to be dialogically networked that is temporally separate yet connected interactively, thematically and argumentatively (Leudar, Marsland, & Nekvapil, 2004, p. 245) in the sense that we are able to observe how different argumentative threads are picked up in different speeches on each side of the debate. Everybody should be treated equally The argument that everybody should be treated equally, was widely used and oriented to throughout the debates, and was invoked within such formulations as equality, equity, equal opportunity, equal rights, human rights and discrimination. While the argument that everybody should be treated equally was treated by members as largely self-sufcient and beyond question, the extent to which the issue of Lesbian and Gay Law Reform is about equality is highly negotiable, as is the equality construct itself. What we see in the data is the exible, action-oriented construction of equality and its relevance to the debate, such that it is mobilized to the respective advantages of opposing arguments. In the rst paragraphs of his speech, and of the second reading stage itself, Attorney General Jim McGinty (Labor) draws heavily on the resource of equality:
2 For international readers: The Liberal Party is a socially conservative party, analogous to the Republicans in America and the Conservatives in England. The Liberal Party claims to be the party of initiative and enterprise (Liberal Party of Australia, 2004). In terms of social policy, the Australian Labor Party is generally the more liberal of Australias two major political parties.

Copyright The British Psychological Society

Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society

Rhetorically self-sufcient arguments

845

Extract 1: Jim McGinty (Labor Member for Fremantle, Attorney-General) 12:10 pm3, 14 November 2001, in Hansard, pp. 55205521
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 The Acts Amendment (Lesbian and Gay Law Reform) Bill 2001 gives effect to a simple principle: that all individuals of the Western Australian community should enjoy equal rights under the law, regardless of their sexual orientation. The Labor Party stands for that simple proposition equality under the law. Formal equality or equal treatment is an intrinsic concept that underpins international and Anglo-Australian legal culture. The Government supports unequivocally the notion that citizenship confers certain rights upon citizens. An important right that citizenship confers upon citizens is equal treatment before the law. Formal equality guarantees that the law is administered in a fair, just and impartial manner in the interests of the individual. Equality before the law is undermined when the law distinguishes between people because of their sexual orientation. When lesbians, gay men and bisexuals are treated differently, or discriminated against simply because of their sexual orientation, then the notion of equality before the law is compromised, if not obviated. Lesbians and gay men are treated differently and suffer discrimination on a daily basis because of their sexual orientation.

McGinty provides a consensus warrant and invokes support from a higher authority for the sanctity of equality in his statement that it underpins international and AngloAustralian legal culture (in lines 5 and 6). Formal equality or equal treatment is produced as central to one of Anglo-Australian societys basic institutions, and by extension, to society itself. Along with the claim that the concept of equality is intrinsic this works to produce the principle of legal equality as fundamental and beyond question. While this can be seen as a limitation to the extent to which this equality repertoire is treated as rhetorically self-sufcient and requiring no further warrant, it can also be seen as a way of heavily exploiting the rhetorically self-sufcient status of equality as a moral warrant for Labor policy, by way of sustained focus and frequent reiteration. McGintys rst words serve the important function of dening and setting the boundaries for what this debate, this issue, is about, and also what is at stake, that is, equality. His claims (in lines 1 and 2) that the Bill gives effect to a simple principle and (in line 4) that his party stands for the simple proposition of equality before the law sets narrow boundaries for the legitimate concerns of the debate. By constructing the issue and its relevant moral considerations as simple, McGinty bolsters the status of equality as what the issue is about, and importantly, rules out the applicability of alternative, competing and complicating principles. Here McGinty can already be seen to be orienting to the Liberal partys heavy use of rhetorically self-sufcient arguments concerning the interests of children and democratic representativeness that are to follow. The construction of what the issue is about is one of the main devices used by members to manage the problem of rhetorically self-sufcient arguments being used in competing and contradictory ways not only within but between opposing arguments. As these arguments encapsulate the basic common-sense moral principles of liberal society, it is critical that members do not argue against these arguments per se. Indeed, as will be shown, once one of these repertoires has been made relevant within the

The times provided atop each extract refer to the time at which the members speech began, not (necessarily) the exact time at which the words in the extract were said.

Copyright The British Psychological Society

Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society

846 Mark Summers

debate, all members face the rhetorical pressure to adopt it for their own ends, and to construct themselves as supporting it. By claiming that one is in favour of equality or democracy or childrens rights but the issue is not about these things, other peoples uses of these repertoires can be defended against and invalidated. In addition to constructing the issue as a simple matter of equality, McGinty also presents equality as at stake. McGintys use of the inclusive categories, all individuals of the Western Australian community and citizens works to counter competing discourses of democratic representativeness, which construct the legislation as a minority issue which is not in the interests of the majority the legislation protects the equality of all citizens. It is not just equality for lesbians, gay men and bisexuals that is at stake, but the notion of equality before the law itself. While the Bill gives effect to the provision of equality before the law, if the legislation is not passed (an outcome supported by the conservative Liberal opposition), equality is undermined and is thus at stake. Thus, opposition to the Bill is constructed as opposition to the basic moral principle of equality for all, posing a challenge for the Liberal party that must be dealt with. Given the setting up of equality as a central issue to the debate, and of opposition to the Bill as opposition to equality, the question of how this is dealt with by the Liberal opposition is an interesting one. Cheryl Edwardes (Liberal), who is the rst to give a second reading speech on the Bill since McGintys opening speech almost three weeks prior, orients to this problem immediately:

Extract 2: Cheryl Edwardes (Liberal Member for Kingsley) 12.59 pm, 5 December 2001, in Hansard, p. 6458
1 2 3 4 The Bill has been promoted as one that will achieve equality for gays and lesbians. The Liberal Opposition and the community in general have no disagreement with the majority of the provisions in the Bill that deal with matters of equal opportunity.

In Edwardes opening few sentences, she begins to set up her negotiation of what the issue is about. Her statement that the Bill has been promoted as one that will achieve equality for gays and lesbians carries the implication of an actively fabricated and biased perspective while being promoted as about equality, the Bill may not actually be about equality, or may be about other things in addition to equality. Wrapped up in this is the further implication that by being out of step with reality, McGintys construction of the issue in terms of equality may be indicative of bias, dishonesty or incompetence. Note that Edwardes use of the passive tense that is the Bill has been promoted as : : : , rather than the Attorney General (or the Government) has promoted this Bill as : : : averts the potential for challenges that could have arisen had she explicitly stated that McGinty and/or the Labor Party were engaged in promoting a somewhat dubious version of the facts. However, Edwardes talk can nonetheless be seen to orient to the numerous references to equality in McGintys speech. In her following sentence, Edwardes employs a reformulation of equality in terms of equal opportunity to section off those provisions of the Bill that are about achieving equality, from those that are about something else. The common legal usage of equal opportunity as referring to anti-discrimination legislation concerning housing, employment, etc., allows Edwardes to fend off allegations of homophobia, or of being against equality, by constructing equality in such a way as to create a match between those

Copyright The British Psychological Society

Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society

Rhetorically self-sufcient arguments

847

policies that are about equality and those Edwardes and her party claim to support. Importantly, this allows Edwardes to present herself and her party as for equality, as opposed to merely neutralizing possible accusations of anti-gay and anti-equality bias equality is re-appropriated and mobilized to her advantage. Edwardes narrow use of equal opportunity, as opposed to a more inclusive construction of equal opportunities to safe sex education, IVF, adoption and criminal record-free sex, demonstrates the potential for the key liberal concepts found in rhetorically self-sufcient arguments to be constructed and exibly applied to a wide range of social acts. To the extent that Lesbian and Gay Law Reform is constructed as not about equality, equality is presented as not at stake in the debate equality is neither under threat nor able to be advanced by the inclusion or omission of the provisions concerning age of consent, IVF, adoption and education. Equality is simply safe and separate from the issue of Lesbian and Gay Law Reform. This poses the question, do arguments which support the legislation differ from those opposing it, in terms of the moral principles constructed as at stake? Nowhere in the data do members voicing support for the legislation present equality as not at stake. However, even for those arguing against the legislation, there is considerable rhetorical power in mobilizing this interpretative repertoire to their advantage, rather than merely defending against its use within arguments that the Liberal Partys social policy is unjust. Thus, on occasion, those opposing the legislation argue that equality is at stake, and that Liberal party policy that the Bill should be split is the best way to bring about equality for lesbians and gay men: Extract 3: Cheryl Edwardes (Liberal Member for Kingsley) 12.59 pm, 5 December 2001, in Hansard, p. 6459
1 2 3 4 5 6 The people I have spoken to in the gay community are concerned about several matters. They have been holding out for equal opportunity for some time. As such, they do not want the controversial aspects of this legislation to hold up some of the necessary changes, which sometimes have an impact on a daily basis. That support needs to be provided. The Government should split the Bill in two so that we could quickly deal with the non-controversial matters.

Again, we see Edwardes deploys a particular construction of equality that she is able to present herself as supporting. The particular construction of equality as equal opportunity is dened so as to include those polices supported by the opposition, while excluding those policies it opposes. Edwardes presents herself and her party as representing the interests of, and providing support for, the gay community, who are used as a warrant for Liberal policy. Edwardes argues that it is the Bill in its current form as supported by Labor that is holding up the process of providing equality for gay men and lesbians, and that Liberal Party policy of splitting the Bill is the quickest way to provide equal opportunity. This speed of delivery of legal change is warranted by the time-based imperative that the gay community have been holding out : : : for some time. Thus, the notion of equality is found to be mobilized within arguments supporting the Bill and those that oppose it, highlighting the potential for abstract liberal principles such as equality to be constructed in different ways, and to serve a range of functions. Further examination of the role of this linguistic resource in the debate is concerned with how the construct of equality is managed in the context of another self-sufcient argument, that the interests of children should be paramount.

Copyright The British Psychological Society

Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society

848 Mark Summers

The interests of children should be paramount Consistent with Ellis and Kitzingers (2002) ndings that parliamentary speeches against equalizing the age of consent for sex between men in UK relied heavily on arguments that the Bill was above all a child protection issue (Baroness Blatch), the argument that the interests of children should be paramount was one of the key moral resources drawn on in members speeches. Arguments of this form were accorded a privileged status as beyond question, comparable to that of other established rhetorically selfsufcient arguments in the context of this debate:

Extract 4: John Day (Liberal Member for Darling Range) 10.57 pm, 6 December 2001, in Hansard, p. 6641
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 It is fair to say that, to a large extent, this Bill seeks to establish homosexuality as equivalent to heterosexuality in all respects. It seeks to normalise the notion of homosexuality in our community in a way that the overwhelming majority regard as excessive and extreme. I refer in particular to the proposals to provide access to invitro fertilisation procedures and adoption by same-sex couples. Of course, the important issue is what is most likely to be in the best interests of the children. That should be paramount. The demands of adults who argue that they have a right to adopt children regardless of their situation should not be paramount. We will lose sight of our responsibilities as a Parliament and as a community if we put the rights of adults before the rights of children in this respect.

The argument (in lines 6 and 7) that the best interests of the children : : : should be paramount is treated as self-evident, requiring no warrant and is explicitly framed as such (in line 5, of course). In combination with the further self-sufcient warrant (in line 3) of overwhelming majority consensus,4 childrens interests are juxtaposed with a version of what the Bill seeks to do that makes no reference to a concern for people at all. The Bill is undermined as concerned with a relatively less important consideration that of how homosexuality is to be treated as an idea (in lines 3 and 4, the notion of homosexuality). Furthermore, Days use of an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) the Bill seeks to establish homosexuality as equivalent to heterosexuality in all respects (lines 1 and 2) casts the Bill as embodying a distorted idea of homosexuality, insofar as it treats two sexualities with obvious differences as exactly the same. Note that equivalent, as used here, lacks the moral loading of an alternative, equal, that might have caused Day some interactional trouble had he instead called the establishment of homosexuality as equal to heterosexuality into question. In invoking the potent moral construct of rights (line 10) as a warrant for Liberal policy, Day demonstrates the rhetorical power of self-sufcient arguments in terms of the interests of children. By constructing a conict between two principles the rights of adults and the rights of children Day manages to undermine the central liberal-egalitarian notion of rights as mobilized in arguments supporting the Bill, not by challenging its relevance to the debate, but by presenting it as plainly less important than childrens rights. The interests of children are treated as a superordinate concern, holding a privileged moral status, even relative to another
4

The use of majority interests as a resource is explored more substantially later on in the paper.

Copyright The British Psychological Society

Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society

Rhetorically self-sufcient arguments

849

liberal principle which would otherwise be considered rhetorically self-sufcient. Note Days reference to the rights of adults, as opposed to, say, Cheryl Edwardes reference (in Hansard, p. 6459) to the emotional needs of adults which were undermined within a discourse privileging rationality over emotionality. These alternative constructions can be viewed in terms of their differing social functions. Edwardes voiced understanding of the emotional needs of adults, thereby promoting herself as unprejudiced and sensitive to lesbian and gay interests while still presenting arguments in terms of emotional needs as uncompelling. On the other hand, Days use of the more powerful liberal concept of rights affords an opportunity to undermine one of the stronger forms of arguments supporting the Bill. While the argument that the interests of children should be paramount is treated as rhetorically self-sufcient, the way in which the Bill relates to childrens interests is highly negotiable. In the following extracts, Rob Johnson, who claimed the legislation left children vulnerable to paedophiles, older homosexual predators (in Hansard, p. 6476), presents the Bill as in conict with childrens interests in two ways: by facilitating a family environment prohibitive of a normal psychological life and by leaving boys vulnerable to sexual abuse by providing a defence of mistaken belief for sexual predators. These extracts employ constructions of gay men as possible paedophiles, and of same sex couples as unt parents.

Extract 5: Rob Johnson (Liberal Member for Hillarys) 2.48 pm, 5 December 2001, in Hansard, p. 6478
1 Anybody who believes that children can live normal lives perhaps they can 2 physically but not psychologically with two parents of the same sex is living in 3 cloud-cuckoo-land.

Extract 6: Rob Johnson (Liberal Member for Hillarys) 2.48 pm, 5 December 2001, in Hansard, p. 6476
1 2 3 4 5 This Bill contradicts the Bill that the Minister for Community Development introduced in this House a few weeks ago.5 The paramount theme of that legislation was the best interests of the child. Those interests will be forfeited under this legislation. Boys aged between 13 and 16 will be vulnerable to exploitation because the legislation provides a defence for the older predator.

The rhetorical demand to manage the issue of childrens interests, and to defend against appearing to be against childrens interests is oriented to in Labor speeches, as in Dianne Guises claim in the following extract that the adoption of children should be based on the best interests of children:
5

Labors Minister for Community Development, Sheila McHale neither interjected or otherwise responded during Johnsons speech nor delivered a second reading speech on the Bill. However, later during the consideration in detail stage of the Bill, McHale (in Hansard, p. 6695) moves to handle criticisms (to which she claims to be prompted to speak in response) that her partys policy on lesbian and gay law reform is at odds with childrens interests, stating that while amending the Adoption Act to ensure that the principles of equity before the law are upheld, we are also ensuring that the best interest of the child is the paramount consideration in the application of the Adoption Act. McHale thus constructs and lays claim to the advancement of childrens best interests, and lesbian and gay equality, as consistent, rather than mutually exclusive, goals.

Copyright The British Psychological Society

Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society

850 Mark Summers

Extract 7: Dianne Guise (Labor Member for Wanneroo) 3.45 pm, 5 December 2001, in Hansard, p. 6482
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 The legislation is based on human rights and respects international covenants of which Australia is a signatory. I will speak on several facets of the legislation beginning with the proposed changes to the Adoption Act, the Articial Conception Act and the Human Reproductive Technology Act. The adoption of children should be based on the best interests of children, not on the sexual orientation of the adopting parents. I want to get a few things straight. First, there are many gay parents in our community. On average, only eight to 10 stranger adoptions occur each year in Western Australia. Homosexuality should never be confused with paedophilia. For those who cannot or will not see that children are safe within the connes of same-sex families, they need to heed the research that indicates that more than 90% of child molesters are heterosexual and a child is more likely to be molested by a heterosexual partner or relative. I have not heard one reasonable argument as to why ones sexual orientation should preclude people from adopting children, especially when the decision to allow any adoption, whether it be to a homosexual or heterosexual couple, must always be based on the best interests of the child. I have been horried by statements I have heard recently that indicate that some people are prepared to see a child remain a ward of the State rather than be placed into the care of a loving couple of the same sex. I nd that deplorable.

Despite mobilizing the powerful moral warrant of human rights and establishing consensus in terms of international covenants (also invoking a sense of moral sanctity), Guise still deals with childrens interests as very much a live issue. Competing constructions of same-sex couples as unt parents are countered by a challenge to their rational basis (in line 13, I have not heard one reasonable argument) and through the construction of a loving couple. Constructions of gay men as possible paedophiles are countered with the rhetorical weight of a reference to research and statistics indicating that the homosexual population forms less of a threat than the heterosexual population in that regard. Note also Guises strategy of not merely defending against allegations that Labor policy is in conict with the interests of children, but rather, constructing Labor policy as necessary to protect childrens interests. Guise invokes moral outrage (horried, deplorable) in an argument that without the Bill, barriers to children receiving the care of a loving family will be maintained it is Liberal policy that compromises the interests of children by instead basing adoption decisions on the sexual orientation of the adopting parents, which is prioritized as a criterion ahead of childrens interests. Minority opinion should not carry more weight than majority opinion The argument that minority opinion should not carry more weight than majority opinion, found by Wetherell and Potter (1992) to be treated as rhetorically selfsufcient in the context of Pakeha race talk in New Zealand, has particular signicance in the context of parliamentary debates between elected representatives in the present data. In this context, mobilizing the construct of democracy, or the idea of representing the opinions or interests of ones electorate, all citizens, or the majority of citizens, carries a great deal of rhetorical weight. These devices are heavily drawn on by Liberal Party members arguing that (1) the Labor government has not informed the public as to what the legislation is about, or has not done so adequately, and therefore, more community consultation is required; (2) to the extent that the community is aware of the proposed legislation, they (or the majority) are against it; (3)

Copyright The British Psychological Society

Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society

Rhetorically self-sufcient arguments

851

the legislation is against the interests of the public (or the majority of citizens) and (4) Labor policy with regard to the proposed legislation is driven by the interests of an inuential minority (the Bill sells out the interests of young people in Western Australia in favour of noisy minority groups Matt Birney, Liberal Member for Kalgoorlie, in Hansard, p. 6501). Extract 8: Cheryl Edwardes (Liberal Member for Kingsley) 12.59 pm, 5 December 2001, in Hansard, p. 6460
1 2 3 4 5 6 We will oppose the legislation; rst, because it has not been subject to the full range of public debate and consultation; and, secondly, because the Government has the opportunity to split the Bill and deal with the noncontroversial issues, which we can deal with quickly, as we have dealt with noncontroversial issues in this place previously, and allow the remainder of the debate to go out to the community.

Here Edwardes presents Liberal opposition to the Bill not in terms of gay and lesbian equality, or childrens rights, or even in terms of the Bills content itself, but in terms of a need for further public consultation as part of the process of democratic representation. In the following extract, Edwardes manages to deploy two somewhat contradictory arguments that the community is not sufciently aware of the legislation, but yet at the same time opposes it, by arguing the public is becoming aware (Extract 9, line 5), and thus constructs a popular momentum against the legislation. Extract 9: Cheryl Edwardes (Liberal Member for Kingsley) 12.59 pm, 5 December 2001, in Hansard, p. 6460
1 2 3 4 5 6 It should be discussed by the local community. I receive 10 letters in opposition to this legislation for every one letter of support. If we go back a couple of weeks to the debate on the Family Court Amendment Bill, the number of letters in opposition was nowhere near as high as that. The reason I am receiving those letters is that more and more people are becoming aware of the changes that this government is about to make, and they do not like them.

One way in which Labor members re-appropriate democracy-based arguments is through a construction of democratic representation as not merely representing the majority, but as representing all law-abiding citizens. By virtue of their membership in the category law-abiding citizens, representing the interests of gay men and lesbians is presented as a necessary element of ones sworn duty as an elected representative: Extract 10: John Quigley (Labor Member for Innaloo) 8.12 pm, 5 December 2001, in Hansard, p. 6505
1 2 3 4 5 6 From the time I took my oath at Government House before the Governor, I decided that my duty in this Chamber was to put my biases aside and make sure that in the discharge of my sworn duty, I attempt to do it even-handedly and with equity for all law-abiding members of this community. Mr Johnson: Was it to represent the majority of the people in your electorate? Mr QUIGLEY: It was to represent all law-abiding citizens and not just the majority.

Copyright The British Psychological Society

Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society

852 Mark Summers 7 The Liberal Party is about representing perceived majorities and then driving a 8 wedge between groups and then a truck over minorities.

In Extract 10, speakers on both sides of the debate work to mobilize, for their own ends, the imperative to represent the interests of masses. Ownership of this resource is contested by Quigley and Johnson as the primary rhetorical currency affecting whose position is to be legitimized and undermined on this occasion. Johnson indirectly constructs, through questioning, a potential discrepancy between Quigleys selfclaimed priority to carry out his sworn duty, and his possible failure to represent the majority of people in his electorate. However, Quigley lays claim to an upgraded version of this resource, that of representing all law-abiding citizens, against which merely representing the majority of people is cast as inadequate. It is interesting to note that despite the numerous interjections from Liberal members Quigley goes on to receive throughout the rest of his speech, one might view Quigleys move in lines 68 as clinching in the sense that from this point onward, he receives no further suggestions that he is failing to represent the interests of the public (whether formulated as the majority, the community, his electorate or otherwise). Following the words reported in Extract 10, he continues, without interjection, to construct the Liberal Party as having a record of failing to represent minorities before he eventually shifts focus to another topic. Finally, Labor Party members orient to challenges that they are not upholding democratic principles by asserting that the public is aware of the details of the legislation, and were so prior to the election held in 2001, indicating majority support for the legislation. They also argue for the presence of continuing majority support for the legislation and move to defend against allegations that they are unduly biased by the interests of minority groups, as we can see in Extract 11.

Extract 11: John Hyde (Labor Member for Perth) 10.00 pm, 5 December, in Hansard, p. 65196520
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 A fundamental issue in this debate is the furphy6 that the community is not aware of what the Government is doing and that it has not been consulted. As far back as the 1980 s, Yvonne Henderson rst introduced, from the opposition side, Bills to decriminalise prejudice7 and provide equal rights and human rights. People would have to have been on another planet or spent 12 months in the Antarctic not to know that a vote for Labor means support for equal rights for gays and lesbians. In the last election campaign, I listened to the Premier on talkback programs on radio station 6PR. On three different occasions, I heard the Premier say that a Labor Government would introduce gay and lesbian reform legislation. Adoption, fertility and everything else were thrown in. I almost hesitated, because I did not know the Premier that well.8 I thought that as he was a politician, he could go to ground, wait until after the election and then introduce contentious legislation. However, no, he was 100% up front. If people were voting Labor, they knew they were voting for this Bill. There is no doubt about that. Mr Chris Bakers

Furphy is an Australian word for a false report or rumour. According to Hansard, Hyde did say decriminalise prejudice, but Hendersons Bills were concerned with anti-discrimination and equal opportunity. 8 Hyde was elected to his rst term in the 2001 election, which was also Geoff Gallops rst election as Labor Party leader.
7

Copyright The British Psychological Society

Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society

Rhetorically self-sufcient arguments 16 17 18 19 20 horric comments about what Labors legislation would do received a lot of coverage on television, on radio and in the newspaper. People all over the State were very much aware of what was happening and what a vote for Labor would mean. The content of this legislation was endorsed at the ALP annual conference. When I was doorknocking, the issue was raised with me.

853

Hyde constructs public knowledge of Labor policy with regard to Lesbian and Gay Law Reform as unavoidable (people would have to have been on another planet) and long standing (as far back as the 1980s). Hyde counters potential readings that his account is a self-interested fabrication (or exaggeration), by presenting himself as initially predisposed to an expectation that pre-election transparency regarding Labors Lesbian and Gay Law Reform policy would not be forthcoming (lines 11 and 12), but later proven wrong by irrefutable evidence. Further stake inoculation (Potter, 1996) is achieved by positioning himself as somewhat of an outsider to the Labor Party he did not know the Premier that well, but rather listened to the Premier on talkback radio programs, as would a member of the general public. Thus, Hyde presents himself as a prototypical instance of a citizen who was completely (through the extreme case formulation in lines 10 and 11, that adoption, fertility and everything else were thrown in) and repeatedly (in line 9, on three different occasions) informed, prior to the election, about all aspects of the legislation. Pre-election public dissemination of information about the legislation is produced as comprehensive, in spanning the entire electorate (in yet another extreme case formulation, in line 17 people all over the State), and making use of a multitude of information channels (in line 17, Hyde employs a three-part list, on television, on radio and in the newspaper). Amidst this construction of complete pre-election public awareness of the legislation, public support for Labor policy is argued most strongly with reference to an election in which the Liberal Partys Chris Baker ran on a platform of opposing Lesbian and Gay Law Reform due to its controversial provisions and lost. Thus, the mobilization of the resource of democratic representation as a warrant or mandate for Labor policy further illustrates the rhetorical imperative for both sides of the debate to reclaim any selfsufcient arguments which are made relevant as moral warrants. You have to live in the twenty-rst century Wetherell and Potter (1992) acknowledged that the common-sense liberal arguments on their 10-point list are not inherently self-sufcient, but are treated as such in a range of specic discursive contexts. This point is demonstrated in an examination of one of Wetherell and Potters rhetorically self-sufcient arguments that, in the present analytic context, is not treated by members as beyond question you have to live in the twentieth century. In the following extracts, Jim McGinty and Dianne Guise (Labor) employ the resource as a warrant for their Lesbian and Gay Law Reform Bill: Extract 12: Jim McGinty (Labor Member for Fremantle, Attorney-General) 12:10 pm, 14 November 2001, in Hansard, p. 5521
1 2 3 4 5 6 Western Australia is now the only State in Australia that does not make discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation unlawful in its Equal Opportunity Act 1984. It is the only State that makes it a criminal offence for males to engage in consensual sexual activity until they are 21 years of age. Unlike New South Wales, Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland, Western Australian laws do not recognise the rights of same-sex

Copyright The British Psychological Society

Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society

854 Mark Summers 7 partners with regard to medical treatment, inheritance and death. Lesbian and 8 gay law reform in Western Australia is long overdue.

Extract 13: Dianne Guise (Labor Member for Wanneroo) 3.45 pm, 5 December 2001, in Hansard, p. 6481
1 The legislation brings us into the twenty-rst century and is in step with the 2 broader community.

The claim that the legislation brings us into the twenty-rst century employs a discourse of modern progress to legitimate the Bill. McGinty and Guises use of this argument of having to live in the 21st century works to create a sense of urgency concerning Lesbian and Gay Law Reform, which is constructed as beyond warranted it is overdue. This is bolstered by the consensus warrant that Western Australia is the only State in Australia not to have already made similar legal changes, which introduces a further time-based imperative for legal change insofar as Western Australia has been left behind by other States. However, in contrast to members treatment of the equality, democracy and childrens rights constructs, those members voicing opposition to the Bill were quite willing to call into question the need to make some sort of jump into modernity:

Extract 14: Phillip Pendal (Independent Liberal Member for South Perth) 3.21 pm, 5 December 2001, in Hansard, p. 6480
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 I am at a loss because the Bill is supported by an Attorney General and a Premier who, by their own admission, seek to enjoy, in theory at least, the reputation of possessing human rights credentials. Members are repeatedly told in this House as late as today that the Premier seeks to bring Western Australia into the modern world. It is a terribly supercial thing to say, but it is all about modernity. That has been heard many times. The weakness with that argument is that civil and human rights are not about modernity. The rights that we keep hearing about have nothing to do with modernity. They are the exact opposite. Those principles have been sought, created and won over long periods throughout human history. Therefore, there is no argument, in my view at least, that we need to make some sort of jump into modernity, as though that is the only way human rights can be achieved.

As opposed to the familiar strategy of presenting the issue as not about modernity, Pendal calls into question whether a push towards modernity is a legitimate basis for social policy in the rst place. The problem, in fact, is that it is all about modernity. Pendal invokes the principle of civil and human rights as a central concern of the debate, a self-sufcient claim in the present context of a focus on human rights in the speeches of Labor members. Also treated as self-evident and beyond question is the superordinate status of concerns of civil and human rights relative to those of modernity. Modernity is unproblematically delegitimized to the extent that it is constructed as in conict with human rights. Perhaps relevant here is that modernity lacks the moral avour of other constructs such as human rights and equality. In this sense, we can begin to see a kind of hierarchy of moral principles within Wetherell and Potters rhetorically self-sufcient arguments. While these principles are specic embodiments of what is sensible, true or right, a general reference to morality itself, or to doing the right thing (related to Wetherell and

Copyright The British Psychological Society

Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society

Rhetorically self-sufcient arguments

855

Potters self-sufcient argument injustices should be righted), can be similarly used as a moral warrant. In cases of contradictions between two principles, the use of the notion of righteousness itself as a warrant for creating exceptions to such rules as you have to live in the twenty-rst century holds great rhetorical power. In the following extract, Liberal party arguments of democratic representativeness are treated as being trumped by the conicting, superordinate concern of doing the right thing.

Extract 15: John Bowler (Labor Member for Eyre) 9.56 pm, 5 December 2001, in Hansard, p. 6519
1 This legislation may be unpopular. However, there comes a time in life when 2 people must do what is right. The Government is doing what is right, and that is 3 why I totally support this Bill.

As in John Days earlier construction of adults rights which were undermined in contrast to childrens rights, Bowler sets Liberal arguments that the Bill does not have popular support against a superordinate concern. Even if the legislation is unpopular, this concern is delegitimized as simply less important than the principle of doing what is right.

Discussion
The preceding analysis demonstrated that many of the liberal-egalitarian arguments seen to be deployed in the race talk of Pakeha white majority members in New Zealand (Wetherell & Potter, 1992), and in a public address by the Prime Minister of Australia (Augoustinos et al., 2002) that everybody should be treated equally, injustices should be righted and that minority opinion should not carry more weight than majority opinion were treated in Western Australian parliamentary speeches as the key moral concerns of the Acts Amendment (Lesbian and Gay Law Reform) Bill 2001. In addition, the notion of human rights and the argument that the interests of children should be paramount were accorded a similarly privileged moral status. These principles were to some extent treated by members as rhetorically self-sufcient, insofar as they served as the bottom line moral warrants for policy. The status of rhetorically self-sufcient arguments as beyond question was demonstrated in members orientations to the rhetorical demands of not appearing to be against any of these principles. Furthermore, it was not enough to present oneself and ones party as in favour of these principles, and to defend against allegations to the contrary, but wherever possible, it was preferable to present ones policy as necessary for the preservation of these principles, and the opposing partys policy as undermining these principles. That is, once presented as relevant to the concerns of the debate, each one of these rhetorically self-sufcient arguments is actively adopted and mobilized within arguments opposing the legislation, as well as arguments against it. The analysis also points to a number of limitations to the self-sufcient status of these arguments. First, varied constructions of what the issue is about allowed the neutralization of certain versions by challenging the applicability or relevance of a principle while providing no challenge to the sanctity of these moral principles, per se. This strategy allowed members to argue, for example, that they were supportive of equality, but that equality was not at stake, that the issue had nothing to do with equality. A further limitation to the notion of rhetorically self-sufcient arguments can be seen in instances where two of these arguments are presented as inconsistent or in conict with

Copyright The British Psychological Society

Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society

856 Mark Summers

each other. In such cases, one is granted superordinate status as a higher moral imperative which provides a legitimate challenge to the other. This was most clearly seen in Phillip Pendals arguments that civil and human rights are not about modernity, in which the argument of the form, we have to live in the twenty-rst century was unproblematically presented as trumped by the superordinate goal of civil and human rights. In this sense, we can see the possibility of a hierarchical order to otherwise rhetorically self-sufcient arguments, in the context of particular comparisons. The construct of human rights was, as argued by Ellis and Kitzinger (2002), accorded a privileged moral position by members and was never treated as subordinate to other principles. Additionally, members presented the interests of children as a priority, relative to the interests of adults. Finally, by invoking the abstract notion of righteousness or morality more directly, an argument in terms of justice and doing the right thing (as in John Bowlers argument, in Extract 15, that this legislation may be unpopular, but people must do what is right) demonstrated a degree of rhetorical power,9 though not in the sense that it exerted a clear, observable inuence on members speeches or voting behaviours which were to follow. Rather, on the occasion of its use, it worked to produce the speakers position, even in the event of conicting moral principles and competing interests, as the higher moral ground. However, due to the inherent malleability of the constructs comprising rhetorically self-sufcient arguments (e.g. equality can be constructed in terms of human rights or equal opportunity) and their lack of an objective, logical relation to one another (consistency and conict between these resources is not inherent but constructed by members for particular social consequences) each of these resources demonstrates great resilience in maintaining its relevance to the debate. This resilience is bolstered by the extent to which this parliamentary debate consists of a series of self-contained monologues in which one member has the oor, with few persistent rhetorical demands to directly address members specic challenges or dilemmas in logical terms. That is, although the speeches can be seen to be networked (Leudar et al., 2004) in terms of their broad argumentative threads, rarely are members held to account, in detail and under sustained questioning, for their specic utterances (i.e. words, phrases, sentences, specic instances of the use of a particular moral repertoire) immediately after they are said. A great proportion of the members utterances are most proximally contextualized by their own, not others talk. This allows the opportunity to gloss over potential challenges and further contributes to the fact that none of these rhetorically self-sufcient arguments are blown out of the water such that the terms of the debate are whittled down to one or two key moral concerns. Each of these resources remains live, meaning that rather than pitting one set of resources against another, members on both sides of opposing arguments face a rhetorical pressure to adopt and mobilize all of the same selfsufcient moral resources. This contrasts with Ellis and Kitzingers (2002) nding that arguments opposing gay law reform presented the principles of right and wrong, care and protection, and democracy as taking precedence over that of equality. In the present data, arguments opposing the legislation mobilized the principle of equality for their own ends, as part of a wider discursive context in which arguments for and arguments against the legislation were essentially jostling for ownership of the same resources. These
9 Of course, additional warrants for why peoples positions are just permeate the debate. In Extract 15, Bowler trades on the fact that arguments for why supporting the Bill is right are given by other members, throughout the debate. It is difcult to imagine that Labor members would not have run into problems if they had only used the because it is right argument amidst a sea of challenges from the Liberal Party.

Copyright The British Psychological Society

Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society

Rhetorically self-sufcient arguments

857

ndings also pose a difculty for the view that presenting legal change strictly in terms of human rights is the best way to advance gay and lesbian equality. As demonstrated in the data, even the issue of human rights can be complicated by being framed in terms of childrens human rights vs. adults human rights, which is likely to require some management of the question of the interests of children. Discursive work on parliamentary debates about progressive LGBTTI law reform has tended to focus primarily on arguments against law reform (e.g. McCreanor, 1996) and to stress the differences between distinct oppositional stances in terms of the resources or repertoires used (e.g. Baker, 2004). In doing so, it is argued, this literature conveys a sense that heterosexist discourse in these contexts is characterized by certain kinds of arguments by which it can be differentiated from other talk. However, accentuating the differences between arguments against reform and those in favour of it runs the risk of missing the phenomena by associating particular resources with particular practices in too rigid a way. This is borne out by the discursive similarities observed between speeches arguing in favour of the Acts Amendment (Lesbian and Gay Law Reform) Bill 2001, and those that oppose it. That is, the same set of moral warrants was used in the achievement of the divergent social practices of opposition to, or support of, the Bill. In this way, speeches against the Bill did not resemble a unique (heterosexist) species of discourse, but could be protably understood in terms of their commonalities with Labor members speeches, and the broader situational demands within the context of the debate. As suggested by the preceding analysis, the demands oriented to and the resources employed in order to argue for heterosexist legal consequences may be in many ways the same as those employed to argue against them.

References
Antaki, C., & Wetherell, M. (1999). Show concessions. Discourse Studies, 1(1), 727. Antaki, C., Young, N., & Finlay, M. (2002). Shaping clients answers: Departures from neutrality in care-staff interviews with people with a learning disability. Disability and Society, 17(4), 435455. Augoustinos, M., LeCouteur, A., & Soyland, J. (2002). Self-sufcient arguments in political rhetoric: Constructing reconciliation and apologizing to the stolen generations. Discourse and Society, 13, 105142. Baker, P. (2004). Unnatural acts: Discourses of homosexuality within the house of lords debates on gay male law reform. Journal of Sociolinguistics, 8(1), 88106. Billig, M. (1991). Ideology and opinions. London: Sage. Burridge, J. (2004). I am not homophobic but: : : Disclaiming in discourse resisting repeal of section 28. Sexualities, 7(3), 327344. Clarke, V. (2001). What about the children? Arguments against lesbian and gay parenting. Womens Studies International Forum, 24(5), 555570. Condor, S., Abell, J., Figgou, L., Gibson, S., & Stevenson, C. (2006). Theyre not racist . . . : Prejudice denial, mitigation and suppression in dialogue. British Journal of Social Psychology, 45, 441462. Edwards, D., & Potter, J. (1992). Discursive psychology. London: Sage. Ellis, S. J., & Kitzinger, C. (2002). Denying equality: An analysis of arguments against lowering the age of consent for sex between men. Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, 12, 167180. Korobov, N. (2004). Inoculating against prejudice: A discursive approach to homophobia and sexism in adolescent male talk. Psychology of Men and Masculinity, 5, 178189. Lerner, G. H. (1996). Finding face in the preference structures of talk-in-interaction. Social Psychology Quarterly, 59(4), 303321.

Copyright The British Psychological Society

Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society

858 Mark Summers Leudar, I., Marsland, V., & Nekvapil, J. (2004). On membership categorization: Us, them and doing violence in political discourse. Discourse and Society, 15, 243266. Liberal Party of Australia (2004). Our beliefs. www.Liberal.org.au/about/beliefs.htm. McConahay, J. B. (1986). Modern racism, ambivalence, and the modern racism scale. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice, discrimination and racism (pp. 91125). New York: Academic Press. McCreanor, T. (1996). Why strengthen the city wall when the enemy has poisoned the well?: An assay of anti-homosexual discourse in New Zealand. Journal of Homosexuality, 31(4), 75105. Parliament of Western Australia (2001). Hansard. Accessed online on 14th September 2003 at http://www.parliament.wa.gov.au/web/newwebparl.nsf/iframewebpages/Hansard - Advanced Search. Parliament of Western Australia (2005). Standing Orders of the Legislative Assembly of the Parliament of Western Australia. Accessed online on 14th September 2005 at http://www.parliament.wa.gov.au/web/newwebparl.nsf/iframewebpages/Standing Orders. Pettigrew, T. F., & Meertens, R. W. (1995). Subtle and blatant prejudice in western Europe. European Journal of Social Psychology, 25, 5775. Pomerantz, A. (1986). Extreme case formulations: A way of legitimising claims. Human Studies, 9, 219230. Potter, J. (1996). Representing reality. London: Sage. Potter, J., & Wetherell, M. (1987). Discourse and social psychology: Beyond attitudes and behaviour. London: Sage. Praat, A. C., & Tufn, K. F. (1996). Police discourses of homosexual men in New Zealand. Journal of Homosexuality, 31(4), 5773. Rapley, M. (1998). Just an ordinary Australian: Self-categorisation and the discursive construction of facticity in new racist political rhetoric. British Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 325344. Rapley, M. (2001). How to do X without doing Y: Accomplishing discrimination without being racist doing equity. In M. Augoustinos & K. J. Reynolds (Eds.), Understanding the psychology of prejudice and racism. London: Sage. Sacks, H. (1995). Lectures on conversation. Oxford: Blackwell. Speer, S. A., & Potter, J. (2000). The management of heterosexist talk: Conversational resources and prejudiced claims. Discourse and Society, 11, 543572. Wetherell, M. (1998). Positioning and interpretive repertoires: Conversation analysis and poststructuralism in dialogue. Discourse and Society, 9(3), 387412. Wetherell, M., & Potter, J. (1992). Mapping the language of racism: Discourse and the legitimation of exploitation. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Wood, M. E. (2000). How we got this way: The sciences of homosexuality and the Christian right. Journal of homosexuality, 38(3), 1940. Received 26 September 2005; revised version received 8 February 2007