ANNUAL FORECAST 2009:

War, Recession and Resurgence

January 2009
Annual Forecast 2009

introduction...................................................................................... 3

Hindsight & Errors......................................................................... 5

2008 report card................................................................................ 6

Major global trends...................................................................... 8

Middle East......................................................................................... 16

Europe ................................................................................................... 18

East Asia................................................................................................ 19

Latin America.................................................................................... 21

Sub-Saharan Africa........................................................................ 22

About Stratfor ............................................................................... 23

Contact Stratfor ......................................................................... 24

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INTRODUCTION

The year 2009 will be complicated. A new U.S. administration is dealing with a politically and militarily
complex war. Russia has stopped merely flexing its muscles and is working to secure its position in the
spotlight on the global stage. An economic recession is casting a pall over much of the world. These
three trends that will dominate events in 2009 are related to the three broad forecasts Stratfor made at
the beginning of 2008.

In our 2008 Annual Forecast, we predicted that the U.S.-jihadist war would wind down and the
groundwork would be laid for a drawdown of American forces from Iraq. As 2009 begins, there is the
U.S.-Iraqi Status of Forces Agreement that enables the United States to first reduce its visible presence
and ultimately remove most of its forces. Furthermore, the American focus on the jihadist conflict has
shifted from Iraq to the Afghan-Pakistani border region, but the conflict itself has become far more
diffuse.

While the war in Iraq is over in a strategic sense, it is still sufficiently unsettled to allow Iran to stir up
violence in Iraq. Tehran would do this not merely to twist the lion’s tail, but to reap sizable security
concessions from the new American administration; the only way Washington could avoid granting
such concessions would be to leave more troops in Iraq longer. Part of the Iranian confidence stems
from the U.S. focus on the Indo-Pakistani conflict next door. India is convinced, and rightly so, that the
Pakistanis have failed to contain their own radical Islamists. Yet the war in Afghanistan requires
Pakistani supply lines and cooperation. Which puts the Americans in a quadruple bind: The United
States needs the Iranians not to demand more from it in Iraq, the Indians not to seek revenge for the
Mumbai attacks and so the destroy any hope of Pakistani cooperation, the Russians to help establish an
alternative supply route for NATO troops in Afghanistan to pressure the Pakistanis, and the Pakistanis to
break with 30 years of policy and go after their own. It is a Gordian knot and in 2009 it is part of a single
interconnected conflict.

Within the Russian element of the jihadist conflict is the second aspect of our forecasts, again both for
2008 and 2009. In 2008 Stratfor predicted that Russia would take advantage of the U.S. preoccupation in
Iraq to reassert power throughout its near abroad. It did this in all of Russia’s border regions, using a mix
of financial, economic, military, political, social and — above all else — intelligence tools. The event of
the year for this prediction was Russia’s August invasion of the former Soviet state — and U.S. ally —
Georgia, amply demonstrating Moscow’s resurrected military power.

As 2009 begins, Russia’s window of opportunity remains fully in place despite the change in American
administrations; the Obama administration is not making the American military more capable of
resisting Russia’s surges in 2009, but instead is shifting forces from one theater (Iraq) to another
(Afghanistan). Russia’s focus for the year is clear: use a variety of less overt measures to consolidate its
control of the most valuable piece of the former Soviet empire — Ukraine.

Finally, against these two building — and in part interlocking — crises, the global backdrop is
remarkably different from 2008.

In 2008 we explained how strong oil prices and Asian exports were creating a new pool of global capital
located in the Gulf Arab states and China. This was most certainly the case — China and Saudi Arabia
had amassed cash reserves of approximately US$2 trillion each. But as we explained in the 2008
forecast, this generation of wealth was not a transfer of economic power. Rather than go their own way,
these states invested nearly all of their money back into the United States, both dollarizing the broader
economy and greatly supporting the American financial architecture. All that cash certainly helped
mitigate the damage of the global recession that boiled forth in September.

And boil forth it certainly did. As 2009 begins the world is experiencing its first truly global recession in a
generation, and the coming year will be riddled with its ancillary effects. For example, credit
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crunches will greatly constrain economic activity the world over, banking collapses will be a key feature
in European developments, mass protests due to closing factories could plague East Asia, and weak
commodity prices will threaten economic and political stability in a host of resource exporters.

Underlining all aspects of the recession will be a single undeniable fact. The dollarization of the global
economy that began so torrentially in 2008 will reach a fever pitch in 2009 as a variety of investors —
private, government, American and foreign — pour their resources into the American market. They will
do this first to escape the volatility that resides elsewhere in the world, and later to ride the American
recovery out of the recession.

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HINDSIGHTS AND ERRORS

Each year Stratfor issues a report card on itself, detailing forecasts from the previous year and looking at
what happened. This is both for internal discipline and for our readers, who certainly know as well as we
do how successful we were. That report card follows and you can track our performance through that.

We had many successes and also some failures. Our biggest failure by far is in forecasting the impact of
the subprime crisis on the global economy and failing to forecast the rise and fall of commodity prices.
Together, this meant that the global economy was in substantially worse shape than we predicted.

In analyzing why we made this mistake, there appears to be a single major reason. When we began
paying attention to the emerging crisis, there was a powerful view that the crisis would trigger another
“Great Depression,” that the financial and debt crisis would ultimately trigger global collapse. We found
— and continue to find — this point of view unreasonable. In our view, the probability of a 50 percent
decline in gross domestic product or any of the other symptoms of the Great Depression was absurdly
overstated. We allowed ourselves to react to the overstatement and locked ourselves into a position
where we underestimated the problem dramatically.

In many pieces outside of the Annual Forecast, we did say that a recession was overdue, but in the
forecast we dismissed even that idea, saying that growth would merely slow. We are comfortable in our
forecast of what would not happen. We were very wrong on what we said would happen. While we
continue to believe that this recession is in the range of post-war recessions on the economic side, and
believe that recovery will begin to occur by the summer, our 2008 Annual Forecast was clearly in error.
In trying to balance the extreme views, we trapped ourselves into one of the traps of forecasting: Don’t
treat a forecast as a polemic against an unreasonable position. Focus on the correct forecast.

Luckily, we can boast several such correct forecasts. From the resurgence of Russia to the rise of Brazil,
the intensification of Mexico’s drug war to the fall in oil prices, Turkey’s return to regional politics to the
inconsequence of al Qaeda prime. But do not take our word for it; you can access the entire document
here.

This recession mistake is not the only one we made in the 2008 forecast, but it was clearly the most
serious. Other than that, our record was pretty good. Of course, that is like asking Mrs. Lincoln after the
assassination, “Aside from that, Mrs. Lincoln, how was the play?” Apart from that, the play was not bad.
Nevertheless, we prefer focusing on our mistakes for now.

George Friedman
Founder and CEO
Stratfor

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MAJOR GLOBAL TRENDS

• Global Trend: Global Recession

Before we begin, we must make a quick comment about perspective, as what follows may seem to
ignore much of the current conventional wisdom in the United States. Stratfor sees the American
economy as a strong entity that will bounce back from this recession relatively quickly. We will receive a
great deal of criticism for this position from Americans who feel their country is falling off the precipice.
There is indeed a recession, and recessions hurt — but what is occurring in the United States is nothing
compared to what is occurring in the rest of the world. With the annual forecast our goal is to take a
global view — not a local one.

______________________________________________________________________________________

The United States is in recession, but Stratfor sees the American economy as a strong entity
that will bounce back relatively quickly.

______________________________________________________________________________________

The world begins 2009 in its first synchronized recession since 1974. The proximate cause of the global
slowdown was the collapse of the U.S. subprime housing market, which touched off a liquidity crisis as
American financial institutions that had participated in subprime were forced to set aside cash to
rebalance their asset sheets. As the recession deepened, loans far healthier than those originated in
subprime also went bad, compounding the need to rebalance and draining more capital out of the
system. This contributed to a credit crunch that continued into the New Year. This “simple” credit crisis
is hardly the end of the story.

If money is akin to water, then a liquidity crisis is analogous to a very low tide that exposes a host of
dangers lurking beneath the surface. The United States sports the fewest of these dangers. Its culture of
change means that inefficiencies are regularly and ruthlessly purged from its system. For example, the
mortgage brokers who made subprime possible are all already out of business, and most of the
investment houses that gorged on securities linked to subprime — up to and including Lehman
Brothers and Merrill Lynch — have either gone bankrupt or been acquired by more stable institutions.
This obsession with efficiency and rapid evolution results in the constant uncovering of problems, but
this very constancy means that the problems tend to be small. In the current case, subprime and its
related issues struck more or less at once, but the United States will be able to recover from the
problems without getting caught up in unrelated issues. This hardly means that the American recession
is a fun time — for one thing, the liquidity crisis has triggered a painful broad-based credit rollback —
but the United States is not facing any deeper structural issues.

The same cannot be said elsewhere. To extend the low-tide analogy, the aftermath of the liquidity
crunch has certainly made American life harder and the water certainly has some murk, but there are no
reefs to get caught on. Lower water levels in Europe, however, confront the Europeans with such a
maze of debris and navigation hazards that their downward slide into recession is only now beginning.

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The primary cultural difference between the United States and Europe is a higher European concern for
social stability. The United States has integrated change and disruption into everyday life, while most
Europeans prefer a system in which economics are somewhat managed in order to buffer the citizenry
from daily shocks. The result may be a more even-keeled system on most days, but it comes at a cost:
slower growth, a reduced capacity to deal with major shocks when they do occur, and above all an
unwillingness to deal with problems when they are small for fear of rocking the proverbial boat. When a
problem does occur — in this case, the U.S. liquidity and credit crises going global — all of the other
sublimated problems are exposed at once.

______________________________________________________________________________________

Europeans prefer economic systems that buffer the citizenry from daily shocks, though
such a system comes with a cost.

______________________________________________________________________________________

Europe’s primary difficulty at the end of 2008 — which will dominate European life in 2009 — was a
banking crisis. European banks play a central role in European development that dwarfs the still-
important role of American banks to American economic life. Yet European banks are not nearly as well
capitalized as American banks. European banks are often used as tools of the state, so their investment
portfolios tend to be less profitable, and currency variations have exposed many European banks to
massive risks from the carry trade. European companies are more dependent upon financing from
banks than their American counterparts (U.S. companies gain more of their financing from stock
markets); regions of Europe have their own subprime housing crises which are only now beginning to
manifest; the virgin nature of many European regions in financial terms has led to credit gorging and
now credit hangovers; European banks find it difficult to compete with U.S. banks in attracting Asian
capital; and so on. With less liquidity available, these problems and more are erupting simultaneously,
hamstringing Europe’s ability to deal with a “basic” liquidity problem.

And there is more. While many malign the slow decision-making process of the American governing
structure, it moves at light speed compared to its European equivalent. The U.S. Treasury and Federal
Reserve have remarkable powers to act independently to address problems as they see fit. Within the
European Union there are 27 separate treasury departments and legislative oversight bodies and 12
separate monetary authorities, and even those countries who have joined the eurozone have refused to
sign over banking oversight to the centralized power of the European Central Bank. The result is a
mishmash of competing and even contradictory policies — even on topics on which ostensibly the EU’s
member states are cooperating.

While American steps to address a “simple” liquidity crisis have been bold — with many taken as early
as a year ago — the Europeans’ steps have been halting and are only beginning to take effect.
Consequently, the economic dysfunction that the Americans are well on the way to addressing is
putting down roots in Europe. Germany, the core economy of the European Union, is ultimately driven
by exports to the rest of the eurozone, making those exports perhaps the best single measure of the
EU’s economic health. As of the time of this writing, those exports are registering double-digit monthly
declines. The result will enervate growth not just in Germany, but in countries that are utterly
dependent upon the German market for their growth — most notably the 10 EU members in Central
and Southeastern Europe. In short, Europe is facing deeper, bigger and more complex economic
problems than the United States — most of which are structural and not cyclical — and because of the
decentralized nature of European governance as compared to American governance, is less capable of
dealing with them.

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If the Europeans face water hazards uncovered by the American liquidity crunch, then the Asians have
simply seen their shipping channels run dry. The Chinese and Japanese financial systems run on
subsidized credit so cheap that any company can get a loan for any reason so long as it can maintain
employment (and thus keep social pressures contained). The Chinese in particular have attempted to
gradually implement the painful changes necessary to reform their system to make it more sustainable
in the long-run, but at the end of 2008, as the global recession bit, such efforts were utterly abandoned.
Employment is king, whatever the costs. Asian governments that ignore that fact find themselves
quickly out of power.

At its core, the East Asians’ current problem is simple: The United States and the European Union are the
final destination for most of their exports. So long as the Americans and Europeans are in recession, the
export-oriented, employment-obsessed nature of the Asian economies puts them at extreme risk. But
unlike the Americans and (less so) the Europeans who are willing to reduce output (translation: lay off
workers) in order to force efficiencies and thus hasten the recession’s end, the Asians cannot reduce
employment without risking social explosions.

But the East Asians do have another option that they can and will select. Their export-oriented systems
have generated substantial currency reserves that can be used to flood additional capital into their
system in order to surge product output even more. The result is an absolute deluge of cheap — even
below-cost — products whose primary purpose is not so much to be sold to generate income, but to be
manufactured in order to keep people working instead of taking long marches.

______________________________________________________________________________________

In China, manufacturing’s primary purpose is not to generate income but to keep people
working.

______________________________________________________________________________________

The strategy is not sustainable in the long run. Every day spent on it will make the inevitable correction
(the point when the system can no longer maintain the burden of inefficiencies and production and
employment break apart) that much more brutal, but it is a strategy that can be sustained for some
time. Even with China’s and Japan’s combined reserves of approximately US$3.0 trillion, this cannot last
forever (and at the time of this writing, those reserves’ values are showing signs of wavering). In the
meantime, East Asian overproduction will hasten an American recovery. While Americans tend to think
otherwise, not only is their economic system the healthiest major economy in the world, but investors
seeking safety the world over have flooded their cash into the United States, sending demand for the
dollar and U.S. government debt to multi-year highs. A stronger dollar magnifies American purchasing
power. The flood of cash enables the United States to engage in deficit spending at levels — as a
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) — not seen in the post-World War II era. And the two
combined with Asian overproduction not only remove the near-term threat of inflation, no matter how
much deficit spending the Americans and Europeans engage in to combat the recession, but actually
raise the specter of deflation.

It is within this mixture of factors — and particularly American purchasing power — that the recession
will begin to end. The U.S. consumer market — fully 70 percent of a US$14 trillion economy — is the
largest in the world by a factor of five. It is also, uniquely among the world’s major economies, shielded
from international developments: Only about 15 percent of U.S. GDP is involved in some aspect of
international trade. This recession was triggered by the U.S. domestic economy transmitting a problem
to the global system, but by virtue of the economy’s combination of huge size and limited exposure, the
reverse is extremely unlikely. The recovery will begin in the United States; the only question is when.

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Of course, economic impacts will hardly be limited to the three major economic poles of the United
States, Europe and East Asia. Prices for commodities of every flavor have plummeted in response to
reduced demand. The countries most impacted are those who both massively increased their outlays in
recent years — largely due to populist policies — and do not have nest eggs that have been carefully
nurtured over the years. The countries furthest out on a limb are Argentina, Ecuador, Iran, Ukraine,
Pakistan, Egypt and Venezuela. Iran and Venezuela in particular are seeing their international influence
ripped away: Iran’s ability to finance militant groups such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah or Muqtada al-Sadr’s
followers in Iraq is being eviscerated, while Venezuela’s efforts to use petro-diplomacy to expand its
reach into Central America and East Asia will largely end. Ukraine’s government is unstable at the best
of times, and the combination of economic dysfunction and Russian pressure could well crack the
government apart. Angola and Iraq would be in this group under normal circumstances, but since both
earned money faster than they could spend it the past two years, both are actually entering the
recession with unexpectedly large coffers.

A second group — including Russia, India, Azerbaijan, Hungary, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa and the
Baltic states — is overly dependent upon foreign capital. While they do not face the same regime-
wrenching problems of the first group, these countries’ economic foundations are being shaken to their
core. But for these countries, other methods of growth and influence remain. Russia’s ability to use
money to influence its near abroad may be fading, although it maintains robust energy, political,
military and intelligence levers that are particularly applicable in Ukraine. India may see growth slam to
a halt, but so little of the economy was developed in the first place that the change will not be
particularly traumatic. And Brazil has now evolved beyond a mere commodity producer, giving it a
much more diversified economy from which to bounce back. Hungary may have made a series of very
bad decisions when it comes to economic planning, but its membership in the European Union gives it
an excellent safety net.

The final group includes Chile, the Gulf Arab states and advanced states such as Canada, Australia and
Norway. All of these states either boast heavily diversified economies of which commodities are only a
portion, or have established separate funds for storing a proportion of their commodity income. For
these states it is an issue of inconvience, not survival. These countries have sufficient economic
wherewithal to continue to purchase influence in areas of interest to them. For example, Saudi Arabia
has some US$2 trillion in funds squirreled away and therefore feels secure enough to produce its
largest-ever budget for 2009, knowing full well that even in the worst-case scenario it can afford such
luxuries. Again, the recession is hurting pretty much everyone, these states included, but the relative
position of this last group of states is increasing nonetheless.

The year 2009 will be a trying time for all of the world’s states. The recession is reducing incomes even
as it raises the demands on states’ budgets. We have outlined above, and will indicate within the
various regional pages, some of those states that face the greatest pressures.

• Global Trend: The Russian Resurgence

Russian power is in long-term decline. Compared to the Soviet Union in 1989, the Russian Federation
has less than half the population, one-third the economic bulk, lower commodity production and vastly
decreased industrial output. Demographically, Russia is both shrinking and aging at rates that have not
been seen outside of wartime since the time of the Black Death. The educational system has stalled, so
Russia is facing an impending slide in labor quantity and quality, which will make it difficult if not
outright impossible for Russia to keep up with its advancing neighbors. The long-term prognosis is, at
best, very poor.

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But “long-term” is the operative term. Russian power today must not be measured in the terms that will
dominate its existence in the future. Instead, it must be assessed dispassionately in relative terms
against its neighbors and competitors. Of those neighbors, only China can compare to Russia regarding
military and economic capability, and the two states are bending over backward to avoid an adversarial
relationship. True, in 2009 Russia faces the most dire economic challenges since the 1998 ruble crash
and debt default, but so do all the states in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans, Central Europe and
the Baltics. In fact, since Russia maintains more reserve funds and currency reserves than all the states in
this arc combined, Russia even maintains a financial edge over the competition. And even with the
global recession placing very real limits on what Moscow can achieve financially — both at home and
abroad — Russia has myriad tools that place countries of interest to it at the Kremlin’s mercy. The
Kremlin (rightly) fears that Russia’s days are numbered, but it has a simple plan: Re-establish as large of a
buffer zone around the Russian core as possible while the balance of power remains in Russia’s favor.

______________________________________________________________________________________

Russia has many tools it can use to re-establish a large buffer zone around its core.

______________________________________________________________________________________

For Russia, most of the post-Cold War era was a chronicle of retreat from previous prominence,
culminating in the West’s decision in 2008 to recognize the independence of the former Serbian
province of Kosovo — a decision that Russia campaigned long and hard to prevent. But in August 2008,
Russia invaded its former territory of Georgia and proved to the world that Russian power was far from
spent, marking the inflection point on the question of Russia’s resurgence. The year 2009 will be about
Russia using its military, intelligence and energy might to extend its influence back into its periphery.

Russia’s primary target in 2009 is Ukraine, a country uniquely critical to Russia’s geopolitical position and
uniquely vulnerable to Russia’s energy, intelligence and military tools — and then there is the influence
Russia can wield over Ukraine’s large Russian-speaking population. Russia has many other regions that it
wants to bring into its fold while it can still act decisively — the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans, the
Baltics and Poland — but Ukraine is at the top of the list.

Ukraine occupies a piece of territory that is completely integrated into Russia’s agricultural, industrial,
energy and transport networks. Its physical position makes it crucial to Russia’s ability to project power.
A Ukraine at odds with Russia constrains Russia’s position in the Caucasus, limits Russian power in
Europe, threatens the entire Russian core and puts Moscow within spitting distance of a hostile border.
A defiant Ukraine not only forces Russia to be purely defensive, but actually makes Russian territory
indefensible from the west and south, as there are no natural boundaries to hide behind. In contrast, an
acquiescent Ukraine allows Russia to project power outward into Central Europe and gives Russia
greater access to the Black Sea and thus the Mediterranean and outside world.

Russia lost the territory in 1992 with the Soviet collapse, but managed to keep Ukraine a political no-
mans-land. In 2004, however, the Orange Revolution brought to power a government not just oriented
toward the West but downright hostile to Moscow. This sparked a panic in the Kremlin that prompted a
foreign policy leading to Russia’s resurgence. That resurgence is now stable enough that the Kremlin
feels it can return Ukraine to the Russian orbit — forcibly, if necessary.

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Russia has no shortage of tools to use on Ukraine to mold it into a shape more amenable to Russian
interests. Russia backs and bankrolls Viktor Yanukovich, Yulia Timoshenko and Rinat Akhmetov — three
of Ukraine’s four most powerful political forces. Russia supplies Ukraine with two-thirds of its natural gas
and four-fifths of its energy needs, and is not shy about using that control to damage the government.
Ukraine is integrated into the Russian industrial heartland, and Russian firms directly control large
portions of the Ukrainian metals industries. Russian control over several of Ukraine’s ports links several
Ukrainian oligarchs — and some Ukrainian organized crime syndicates — directly to the Kremlin.

Ukraine is not well equipped to resist Russia’s efforts. The United States has been working with
Ukrainian intelligence (which is currently under President Viktor Yushchenko), sparking a fierce battle
within the Ukrainian intelligence services, which spun off from the KGB. Yushchenko is trying to purge
ex-KGB forces and put in younger, American-trained staff members, but the Russian intelligence surge
into the country since 2004 has been massive and is hard to counteract. Other Western intelligence
agencies are simply too far behind to make much of a difference; only the Turks have made a notable
effort. The rest of the “Western” moves are largely limited to bureaucratized American processes, largely
financial and social, which simply are no match for the powerful, multi-vectored effort that Russia is
making.

Russia is perfectly capable of achieving its goals in Ukraine on its own. The natural gas crisis at the start
of 2009 is a testament to Russian capability, but Moscow has shown that it is willing to accept a deal
that will make Ukraine more malleable. Specifically, the United States is attempting to forge a means of
supplying its growing troop commitment in Afghanistan without becoming more dependent upon
Pakistan. Russia is willing to allow American supplies to transit Russia and Russian-influenced Central
Asia. But the price is Yushchenko’s ouster and an agreement that the United States will not parlay its
transit routes across Central Asia into actual influence over the region. And just in case the United States
decides to push for more, Russia has established a network of options in the Middle East to complicate
American efforts there should the need arise (for more information, see the Middle East section of the
Annual Forecast), and is even putting some flags in the ground in Latin America.

Under the Obama administration, American foreign policy’s initial focus is on fighting the Afghan war.
So the question regarding the Russian resurgence is not what the Americans will give the Russians, but
how much and how publicly. This will give the United States greater leverage in dealing with what it has
identified as its prime concern, but at the cost of both creating a greater challenge in the future and
undermining the strength of the Transatlantic alliance structure.

• Global Trend: The Jihadist War

Stretching from Iraq to the Indian subcontinent, the U.S.-jihadist war will remain a dominant theme in
2009. The bulk of the war will be fought in South Asia, rather than the Middle East, in the coming year,
yet the overall strategic threat posed by the transnational jihadist movement continues to wane.

The incoming Obama administration’s plan is to seize upon the progress made by the outgoing Bush
administration in Iraq, and transfer those lessons and many personnel to the war in Afghanistan. The
main success of the Bush administration’s surge strategy in Iraq was in convincing all players that the
United States was indeed involved for the long haul, and could not simply be out-waited. This split the
insurgency in half and led the various Iraqi factions — a constantly shifting amalgamation of Shiite,
Sunni and Kurdish power groups — to hammer out a power-sharing deal that took into account the
interests of the two major outside powers: Iran and the United States. The deal is fragile, informal and
(above all) not fully implemented, but it has resulted in far lower violence levels, the opportunity for Iraq
to develop its own security service and the opportunity for the United States to deploy its forces
elsewhere. This last issue opens up an entirely new set of problems.

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But first, Iraq. Assuming that the violence is not rekindled, that Iran is more or less pleased with Iraq’s
security evolution, that Iraq’s internal factions do not break out into conflict and that there are no major
policy mistakes by the new U.S. presidential administration, the United States will be able to draw down
its military presence in Iraq significantly over the next two years. Yet even under the most dramatic
drawdown estimate under discussion, some 40,000 American troops will likely remain in Iraq at least
until the end of 2009. Fortunately for the United States, transnational jihadists have been significantly
marginalized. This means that the single biggest challenge to the American withdrawal will be
integrating the militias of the Awakening Councils, also known as the Sons of Iraq (former Sunni
nationalist insurgents and tribal fighters who went from fighting U.S. forces to combating jihadists), into
the security apparatus. Provincial and parliamentary elections in Iraq this year will be very revealing of
the viability of the Shiite-dominated post-Baathist Iraqi republic. Success is far from assured, but it is
safe to say that Iraq will not be the center of the American war effort.

This assumes that relations do not worsen with the second major player in the conflict: Iran. The year
2009 will be the most critical year for U.S.-Iranian relations since the overthrow of the shah in 1979. The
rhetoric from Tehran may suggest otherwise, but Iran is increasingly compelled to deal with the United
States, given Iran’s staggering economic difficulties and strategic interests in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
logic for cooperation is there — Washington and Tehran both want American troops out of Iraq, both
want Iraq’s power limited, both want the Taliban and al Qaeda destroyed, and both have a strategic
need in balancing against Arab power — and progress made in negotiations in 2008 combined with the
turning of the administrative page in Washington has laid the groundwork for a more constructive
relationship. There may even be a basis for Iran to assist the United States somewhat in its efforts in
Afghanistan. But this is hardly to say that Stratfor expects a full rapprochement; the two states’
overlapping spheres of influence alone show that anything more than a working relationship is simply
too much to ask for.

On the far end of the crescent of conflict lies India. The November 2008 Mumbai bombings cannot go
without reprisals, and India has identified a host of Pakistani links to the attackers. Should the current
Congress government not retaliate, it runs the risk of losing power in general elections this year to a
Hindu nationalist coalition that would be more prone to taking aggressive action against Islamabad,
particularly in the event of another major attack. Retaliation is not a simple matter — Pakistan has
nuclear weapons, and any decision cannot be taken lightly. But India cannot afford to do nothing while
elements of Pakistan’s military apparatus are facilitating attacks that cut deep into the Indian economic
lifeline. At the same time, India finds itself in the same dilemma as the United States: How do you coerce
a Pakistani behavioral shift when the country runs a serious risk of becoming a failed state? India,
therefore, will be restrained in any retaliatory measures it takes against Islamabad. Yet as the Pakistani
buffer between India and jihadist-wracked Afghanistan further erodes, New Delhi will be forced into a
position in which it will have to take more security responsibility for its restive western frontier.

But this is not “just” about India and Pakistan anymore. As the Mumbai attack in India revealed, the
gradual unraveling of command and control within the Pakistani military establishment has enabled
many more of Islamabad’s Islamist militant proxies operating in Pakistan and India to team up with
transnational jihadists, resulting in deadlier and more strategically targeted attacks in the region.
Pakistan clearly does not wish to go after its own people, as these Islamists have long served as
Islamabad’s most effective foreign policy tools, first against the Soviet Union and later against India.
Ironically, the Indians have now given the Pakistanis an excuse for being even less enthusiastic about
fighting the Islamists in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region who are fighting the Americans:
Pakistan has to defend itself against India instead. Add in the fact that the supply routes for American
forces in Afghanistan go through Pakistan, and the need for a refocused Pakistan becomes obvious.

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This greatly complicates matters for the American war effort in Afghanistan. Barring a complete
reversion to the violent days of 2006 that would force troops to remain in Iraq, the United States will be
sending around 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan. Combined with NATO’s total of about 30,000, this
will push the total of U.S. and NATO forces to about 95,000. But even nearly 100,000 troops would be
insufficient to control Afghanistan’s sprawling, mountainous territory. The plan is to repeat the Iraqi
surge strategy, concentrate forces in and around Kabul, then gradually expand outward to reduce
Taliban-controlled territory until all players — including the Afghan Taliban, but not including al Qaeda
— sit down at the table and hammer out a deal. But to do this, the United States must have Pakistan’s
undivided attention — which includes Pakistan hunting not just al Qaeda, but also those Pakistani
elements that assist it. Additionally, the Obama administration will need Pakistan to bring those Afghan
Taliban that are still under its control to the table. But Islamabad’s influence over the Taliban has waned
because of the insurgency within its own borders. So this process will be a very messy one, to say the
least.

The United States plans to force Pakistan to refocus by denying Pakistan the leverage it gets from the
supply routes. This will involve refining and shipping fuel and equipment into Afghanistan from the
north, through Russia proper or at least through Russia’s sphere of influence in the Caucasus and
Central Asia. That route comes with its own costs — concessions to Russian interests in the former
Soviet Union — but it is the only way to convince the Pakistanis that they have no room to maneuver.
Pressed between an energetic new American administration with an independent supply route on one
side, and angry Indians on the other, Pakistan will — in theory at least — have little choice but to take a
stronger stance against jihadists, especially those that are also challenging the Pakistani state. Still, even
if Pakistan develops the will to crack down more forcefully, it remains unclear whether Islamabad has
the capacity to crack down effectively.

Many parts of this plan — betting on Iraqi stability, betting on an understanding with Iran, betting on
an India that can be restrained, betting on a compromise with Russia, betting that the actual war in
Afghanistan does not spin out of control — involve a high element of risk. But there is one more risk
that is on our radar: the possibility of a military coup in Pakistan. With the global recession in full swing,
any state with limited exports, weak social bonds, a crippled government or high debt is skating on the
very edge of oblivion. Pakistan faces all of these problems and more. And since Pakistan tends to be
ruled either by the military directly, or by the military in league with a weak government, the Americans
likely feel that should push come to shove, they would gain more of what they want from a different
governing structure.

The year 2009 will certainly not see the endgame for the jihadist war, but it is worth taking a step back
and looking at where years of war have led. Al Qaeda’s goal on 9/11 was to induce the United States to
chase it into the Islamic world — the theory being that the willingness of the region’s secular
governments to cooperate with the Americans would trigger mass uprisings that would overthrow all
of the region’s rulers and replace them with Islamist regimes. A transnational caliphate would be
reborn.

Eight years later, the only governments that have been overthrown are Iraq and Afghanistan — both of
which were overthrown by the Americans. The Shia of Iran — who are apostates in al Qaeda’s mind —
are sliding toward a more cooperative relationship with the United States, a development which could
lessen the relative power of Sunni Arab states. And the country that is the global headquarters of al-
Qaeda — Pakistan — is far more in danger of reverting to a military dictatorship than an Islamist
government. While the jihadist thrust is in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the al Qaeda core that pulled off
the world’s deadliest terrorist attacks is now struggling just to issue timely videos and audio statements
to stay in the picture. How times change.

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THE MIDDLE EAST

• Global Trend: The Global Recession and the Middle East

The single largest effect the global recession will have upon the Middle East will be the sustained drop
in the price of oil; oil sales are far and away the region’s primary source of capital. The impact of that
drop, however, will vary extraordinarily among different states.

Iran is a textbook example of a country that has overcommitted itself both at home and abroad to an
expensive set of policies, ranging from domestic gasoline subsidies to the arming of Hezbollah. Nearly
all of these spendthrift policies will have to be severely curtailed in 2009. U.S., EU and U.N. sanctions
against Iran massively limit the country’s ability to access international loans or issue bonds, so the
deficit spending that will be so common in the rest of the world this year simply cannot happen in Iran.

However, it is important to note how the recession will not affect the other regional oil producers. All of
the Arab Gulf states have seen their incomes slashed by proportions very similar to Iran’s, but these
states hold massive currency reserves and/or sovereign wealth funds and/or off-books cash hordes. In
2008, these states used their oil windfall money to counter Iranian influence aggressively throughout
the Middle East. These states’ savings mean that this effort will continue in 2009 — if somewhat
restrained — even as Iran’s finances falter.

• Global Trend: The Russian Resurgence and the Middle East

Russia realizes that U.S. forces will remain bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan for all of 2009 and that
this preoccupation allows the Kremlin to manipulate the former Soviet space and Europe to its heart’s
content. Russia’s interests are not in the Middle East, but that does not mean Moscow lacks the ability to
act there.

Russia spent 2007 and 2008 laying a great deal of groundwork for the sales of key weapon systems that
it can readily produce and ship with little notice. Such weapons sales could rapidly and deeply
complicate any American efforts to force the Middle East into a shape more to its liking. For example,
the sale of Russia’s S-300 strategic air defense system to Iran would add an enormous cost to any
American moves against Iranian interests by undermining the U.S. threat of military action.

The Kremlin has no intention of following through with any of these deals, or even intervening in the
Middle East in general, unless the United States unduly (in Russia’s thinking) interferes with Russia’s
resurgence in the former Soviet Union. If that does happen, however, Russia would have the option of
flooding the Middle East with advanced weapons systems to complicate American efforts throughout
the region.

• Regional Trend: Turkey’s Rise

Turkey is fairly comfortable with its position both at home and abroad. There are concerns of Kurdish
and Islamist terrorism, but neither is a major security threat. The global credit crunch is likely to push
Turkey into recession and an International Monetary Fund loan is possible, but the Turkish population is
used to living with economic dislocation, so little social unrest will arise. Even the perennial clash
between the secularist military and the Islamist-based Justice and Development Party government has
wound down; in 2008, the two factions worked out a means of managing their differences.

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In 2009, Turkey is a country at peace with itself and its neighbors, and internally there is agreement that
the time has arrived for the country to explore a larger regional role. That effort will manifest in a
number of ways, but three will be most notable. First, Turkey is obsessed with the development of
Kurdish issues in Iraq. Ankara will try to influence Baghdad in order to affect the country’s political
development and will try to get involved in northern Iraqi energy issues in order to ensure a firm grip on
the Iraqi Kurds’ economic future.

______________________________________________________________________________________

Turkey is at peace with itself and its neighbors and is exploring a larger regional role.

______________________________________________________________________________________

Second, Turkey will extend its good offices in an attempt to get a diplomatic foot in every door possible.
This will include involvement in Lebanon, Israeli-Syrian negotiations, various Palestinian issues,
European efforts to diversify natural gas sourcing and U.S.-Iranian negotiations over Iraq.

Finally, the Turks will monitor the rising Russian influence in Ukraine, the Caucasus and the Middle East,
and will lay the groundwork for countering Russian power in the long run.

• Regional Trend: Israeli-Syrian Normalization

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Israeli military incursion into the Gaza Strip actually increases the
chances of an Israeli-Syrian rapprochement in 2009. Syria views the Palestinians as a bargaining chip in
its negotiations with Israel. Damascus will likely work toward restarting talks on a peace treaty as soon
as the region has some time to cool off from the Gaza incursion and the Israeli government settles after
elections (likely in February). Such feelings are reciprocated among most Israeli political factions.

Of course this hardly means that such a deal will happen in 2009 — and it will not be easy to iron out
issues such as the Golan Heights, water rights or Hezbollah. It simply means that the environment is the
most promising for a peace deal since 1948.

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EUROPE

• Global Trend: The Russian Resurgence and Europe

While Russia’s primary concern for 2009 is Ukraine, Russia still has ancillary goals it wants to pursue in
Europe.

First and foremost, there is the tool Russia typically uses to break Ukraine’s government apart: the denial
of natural gas shipments. Roughly 80 percent of the natural gas that Russia ships to Europe transits
Ukraine, but not all European states are dependent on Russian energy to the same degree. This does
more than simply leave Europeans in the cold; it fractures the European Union’s ability to act as a single
entity, because members are forced to deal with Russia independently. Germany worked with Russia to
impose a solution on Ukraine in the kind of bilateral arrangement Russia greatly prefers. After all, any EU
member state can veto foreign policy at the EU level, and Russia wants to play the Europeans off of one
another to keep unanimity elusive.

Russia also wants to destroy the U.S. effort to expand the American military presence in Europe.
Washington has a two-pronged strategy: Deploy ballistic missile defense installations in Poland and the
Czech Republic, and establish logistical “lily-pad” bases in Bulgaria and Romania. But the American plan
has three weak points, which Russia will target aggressively: the weak Czech government, which also
currently holds the rotating EU presidency; the Bulgarian government, which has been heavily
infiltrated by Russian intelligence assets; and the Baltic states, which are teetering on the edge of
destabilization due to the global financial crisis. Russia intends to use the carrot of assistance in
shipping U.S. supplies and equipment to Afghanistan to get Washington to partially disengage from
Central Europe, and then use energy supplies as a stick to force the Central European states to seek an
accommodation with Moscow.

• Regional Trend: France’s Moment

Most of Europe’s major powers are tied down with internal feuds and/or election cycles in 2009.
Germany faces September polls; British Prime Minister Gordon Brown is in effect a lame duck, with early
elections a very real possibility; Italy and Spain are grappling with a particularly deep recession
complicated by a home-grown housing crisis. That leaves only France with a government that is united
at home and undistracted abroad. And since the EU presidencies for 2009 are split between the Czech
Republic and Sweden — who do not carry enough geopolitical weight to be effective EU leaders —
France will attempt to speak for all of Europe, bypassing the formal EU power channels.

However, France will discover that while Paris can certainly steal the spotlight, it will have a hard time
making the structural changes necessary to entrench its position in the long term. Germany has a larger
economy, and the United Kingdom’s economy is more dynamic, and there is nothing France could
achieve in a year that will change that, no matter how many bilateral meetings French President Nicolas
Sarkozy has with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin or how many mediation trips French diplomats
make to the Middle East.

This leaves France with one possible route to power: the United States. If France can establish itself as a
mediator between Russia and the United States, Paris would be in a unique position to influence events
well beyond 2009. It is a long shot, and one that would require suitably impressing the new American
administration — a full return to NATO and a robust French contingent in Afghanistan would do
wonders for that — but if any of France’s gains are to stick once the other European powers return to
the stage, Paris must act in 2009.

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EAST ASIA

• Global Trend: The Global Recession and East Asia

The global recession holds both peril and promise for China. First, the peril. China is much less socially
unified and much poorer than Japan or the United States, and so is much more susceptible to social
disruption and unrest generated by economic problems. The danger for China goes well beyond coping
with unemployment and mass protests — which is not to belittle the scope or impact of such issues —
but extends to the ability of the central government to maintain control of the provinces. The coastal
economic centers control most of the wealth, but to keep the country on an even keel much of that
wealth must be transferred elsewhere (such as inland to fund infrastructure projects). The coastal
regional capitals, as one might expect, will resist such efforts, preferring to keep their resources locally
to deal with their own serious problems.

But there is another split in the Chinese system that the economic crisis is exacerbating, and this one is
within the Politburo itself. For years, former Chinese President Jiang Zemin followed in the footsteps of
the late Deng Xiaoping, whose reforms entered China into the international system as a relatively free-
market economy, with minimal central government interference for those regions that seemed to work
relatively well. Current President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao altered that strategy, seeking to
recentralize economic controls and take a more active role in the economy. Many in the Politburo now
see this as the wrong path, and backroom tensions in the Politburo will grow more intense as Beijing
seeks to deal with the current economic downturn.

______________________________________________________________________________________

The economic crisis is exacerbating a split in China’s Politburo.

______________________________________________________________________________________

Both are right, and both are wrong. A free-market system is more efficient and stable in the long run,
but it requires years to implement and a population willing to accept change (and a higher level of
unemployment) during the transition. But it also requires a government willing to change — and one of
the major considerations influencing Chinese economic policy is the elites’ desire not to lose their
positions, power or perks.

Here we are seeing the stirrings of change coming from within the Party itself, as a younger generation
debates not only economic policy but also the prospects and possible need for political change. This
adds further stress to a political leadership already struggling with a global economic slowdown and
recalcitrant regional and local leaders.

A centralized system can more easily shuffle resources to contain social pressures, but that policy
flexibility comes at the cost of social inflexibility: If the flow of aid and subsidies stops, or if certain
sectors are deprived, the results can be explosive. A freer market could well allow China to become
more stable in the long run, but at the cost of disruption in 2009 and in the immediate future, while
further stabilization could allow China to weather 2009, but at the cost of falling into a Soviet-style
collapse in the long run. This clash of visions provides a stark backdrop to the confusing world of
Chinese economics this year.

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Now, the opportunities. Unlike most states, China was showing continued positive economic growth as
of Jan. 1, as well as a currency reserve of nearly US$2 trillion. This is hardly all free cash to spend — most
is invested in U.S. dollar assets, and even if a mass cashing of them were possible, that would eviscerate
China’s critical exports to the United States — but it does give China remarkable room to maneuver at
home, and policy options abroad that most other states simply do not have in times of recession.

______________________________________________________________________________________

China’s currency reserve gives it remarkable room to maneuver at home and options for
foreign policy that many other countries do not have.

______________________________________________________________________________________

Simply put, in a capital crunch, states that have spare capital have the advantage. For China that means
having funds available to keep businesses afloat and keep unemployment down. It also allows China in
2009 to accelerate efforts to link its infrastructure with Thailand, Myanmar and Central Asia. Such
projects not only boost employment at home, but also extend Beijing’s economic and political reach.
Chinese energy firms will be particularly interested in buying up foreign assets on the cheap — much to
the chagrin of a central government that desperately wants to keep all the investment capital at home.
Yet such foreign acquisitions are not likely to come from the State Council itself, whose funds are
directly controlled by Hu and his allies. Here, the energy firms’ enthusiasm will be counterbalanced by
the conservatism of a somewhat shell-shocked Hu, who was burned by China’s 2007-2008 forays into
international financial investments just before the global recession hit.

• Regional Trend: The Return of the Chinese Military

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is being invited back into the halls of power. China’s economic
security is based upon links to the rest of the world, and the PLA is being called upon as a tool of foreign
relations and security to help protect the overseas supply lines and markets. The PLA is also being called
upon to shape foreign policy in dealing with neighboring states — primarily North Korea, Japan and
Taiwan. This does not presage a hostile China, but recognizes that the military has a role to play in
foreign policy far afield and has relevant expertise and capabilities that can be brought to bear in a
more integrated and deliberate way. It is an integration of the foreign policy process rather than a
reversal of any particular policy.

The evolution is not limited to foreign policy. The PLA will also take a much more prominent role in
containing outbreaks of social unrest generated by the pressures of the economic crisis — directly, in
that troops will be made available for domestic contingencies from Tibet and Xinjiang to address
excessive social unrest in other provinces, and indirectly, in that China’s military-industrial complex is
among the country’s largest employers. Added to the list are a series of anniversaries that the state —
and thus the military — must cope with: 60 years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China,
50 years since the Tibet uprising, 30 years since China’s first economic opening under Deng, 20 years
since the Tiananmen Square massacre, 10 years since the Falun Gong suppression. Finally, with Pakistan
and India sliding toward conflict, Russia resurging and the war in Afghanistan heating up, it simply
makes sense for Beijing to formally and deeply reintegrate the military formally and deeply into the
country’s senior leadership in order for China to gain the foreign policy advantages of having an active
and deployable military and gain the knowledge and experience in international relations the PLA has
been building up.

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LATIN AMERICA

• Global Trend: The Global Recession and Latin America

The global financial crisis is hitting Latin America harder than any other region. Most of Latin America is
heavily reliant upon on external capital, so when global capital markets dry up, Latin American states
are left extremely vulnerable. In fact, most Latin American states are taking a double hit from the
financial crisis: They are primary producers of commodities — from oil to bananas — and during
recessions, demand for these products plummets, taking prices with it.

The states most deeply affected are the leftist trio of Venezuela, Ecuador and Argentina. The populist
policies of all three countries have radically overextended the economic reach of the state while
alienating their neighbors and making international players — whether the International Monetary
Fund or the United States — unwilling to come to their aid. All three face critical capital and skilled labor
shortages and increasingly organized political oppositions, the combination of which will likely present
these countries’ current political regimes with major challenges in 2009.

The Latin American state that will suffer the least is Brazil (which is not to say that Brazil will not suffer).
Brazil boasts the region’s most diversified economy and is the least dependent upon commodity
exports for income. It is the state with the best chance of generating its own capital, taking the sting out
of the liquidity crunch. The Brazilian government has also followed conservative fiscal and monetary
strategies and as a result will be one of the first places on the continent that foreign investors will return
to when the global recession subsides.

• Regional Trend: Mexico’s Cartel Crisis Will Build

At the time of this writing, there are no reasons to expect the level of violence in Mexico’s cartel wars to
lessen. The death toll of drug-related violence in 2008 was about 5,700, more than twice the previous
year’s figure. There are no signs that competition among the cartels is diminishing, and the government
does not appear to be letting up on its assault on the cartels. The cartels have demonstrated the ability
to undermine the effectiveness of law enforcement around the country and have even demonstrated
the ability to strike at government targets in Mexico City. An increase in either the frequency of attacks
or the severity of intimidation tactics by cartels against Mexican law enforcement is all but certain.
Escalation could include the use of devices such as car bombs and other methods of targeted
assassination. As the global recession generates more unemployment, the likelihood of more violence,
civil unrest, rising crime and a surge of cartel recruits will only increase.

But although Stratfor sees the situation in Mexico on a continued downward spiral, we do not envision
a sharp escalation of violence spilling into the United States in 2009. The cartels must balance the need
to move their product across the border with their need to fight law enforcement interference, and it is
not in their interest to provoke a substantive response from the United States. For now, Mexican cartels
use U.S. street and prison gangs to manage drug distribution and retail inside the United States. That
relationship will continue, and potentially increase during 2009, but not to the extent that the cartels’
bases of operations will move north of the border. An increase in cartel-related gang violence in the
United States is likely in 2009, but a massive increase in cartel violence that severely impacts U.S.
civilians — or a high-profile increase in cartel corruption of U.S. politicians and law enforcement
(congruent to the situation on the Mexican side of the border) — would be counterproductive. As long
as that is true, the side effects of the cartel war that spill over the border will remain a law enforcement
challenge — as opposed to an existential threat — for the United States.

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Global Trend: The Global Recession and Sub-Saharan Africa

Not only does sub-Saharan Africa depend utterly on the rest of the world for development capital, but
its integration into the global economy is limited to its export of raw materials. Since the global system
is awash in raw materials that are cheap and getting cheaper, investment into Sub-Saharan Africa is one
of the first capital flows to be suspended in a broad recession and one of the last to be restarted.
Consequently, all the major global players in African goings-on will take a year off, and projects of all
sizes will be downgraded, delayed or abandoned outright. The only major outside player that will do
more than dabble in the region in 2009 is the United States, and its interest will be largely limited to
small counterterrorism operations in the Horn of Africa, a sideshow in the much broader jihadist war.

Economic development in Africa in 2009 will be affected by three major factors. First, outsiders will only
be interested in basic exploration — new project development will have to wait for another day.
Second, the only two states that can engage in any noticeable development efforts are Angola —
which, as a new oil producer, has a fat wallet — and South Africa, which has some indigenous economic
sectors more advanced than simple commodity production. Finally, Nigeria will have a particularly
violent year. Ruling Nigeria in the best of times requires a continual network of bribery channels. Since
Nigeria does not have the funds to pay off various clashing interests without crude oil revenue, and that
revenue is drying up, 2009 will see a torrent of kidnapping, bunkering, theft and violence in the Niger
Delta. However, direct attacks against the region’s oil infrastructure will be less frequent, as militants
and their political patrons do not for the time being want oil production — or the money that it
generates — interrupted.

• Regional Trend: Angola Arrives

In our 2008 annual forecast, Stratfor explained how South Africa’s preoccupation with its leadership
transition and the influx of petrodollars into Angola would make Angola a new regional power on the
continent. Despite the economic downturn, Angola remains capital-rich — the money earned from
ever-increasing oil production flowed in so fast (complementing revenue from Angola’s significant
diamond mining sector) that the country did not have enough time to develop mechanisms to spend it.
Furthermore, South Africa will remain distracted for the first half of 2009, cementing Angola’s arrival as a
major power on par with both South Africa and Nigeria. The core of Angola’s power is not population
(like Nigeria) or industrial strength (like South Africa) but a combination of cash and a battle-hardened
population finally free of a decades-long civil war.

Since Angola does not know its own strength, and it does not face any existential domestic or foreign
threats at present, 2009 will be a year for testing the waters. Angola’s primary playground will be in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, where a long-simmering war in the North Kivu province continues
to attract other African states’ interest and involvement. But Angola has a broader goal: roll back South
Africa’s heretofore dominant position in Southern Africa.

Before South Africa can begin to recognize, much less respond to, Angola’s arrival it must complete its
leadership transition from former President Thabo Mbeki to Jacob Zuma (via caretaker President
Kgalema Motlanthe). That will not happen until the second half of 2009, and that assumes that the
transition goes completely as planned. More likely, political infighting in South Africa will force Zuma to
take the rest of the year to consolidate his power at home, which gives Angola ample time to stretch its
wings.

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Who We Are

STRATFOR is the world leader in global intelligence. Our team of experts collects and analyzes
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