Drilon, Trampe, Arizala, Solis, and Abesamis v. CA, Hon.

Macli-ing (RTC Judge), and Adaza (1997) Hermosisima, Jr., J. General de Villa was then the Chief of Staff of the AFP. He wrote a letter to Sec of Justice Drilon requesting an investigation of several people for their participation in the failed Dec 1989 coup d'etat. The letter was based on the affidavit of some AFP officials (Brig. Gen. Galido, Capt. Mapalo, Col. Mamorno, Col. Figueroa, and Maj. Sebastian). Gen. de Villa's letter was referred for preliminary inquiry to the Special Composite Team of Prosecutors created pursuant to DOJ Order No. 5. Petitioner, Asst. Chief Prosecutor Trampe, the Team Leader, found sufficient basis to continue the inquiry. He issued a subpoena to the people named in the letter and assigned the case for preliminary investigation to a panel of investigators composed of the other petitioners (Prosecs Arizala, Abesamis, and Solis). The panel released a resolution which stated that they found probable cause to hold those named people for trial rebellion with murder and frustrated murder. o This resolution was the basis for the filing of an Information charged against private respondent Adaza with rebellion with murder and frustrated. Feeling aggrieved, Adaza files a complaint for damages saying that the prosecutors engaged in a deliberate, willful and malicious experimentation by filing those charges against him. Adaza claims that those prosecutors knew that such crime did not exist in the statute books. The prosecutors filed a Motion to Dismiss Adazas complaint saying that the complaint states no actionable wrong constituting a valid cause of action. RTC denied Motion to Dismiss. MR also dismissed. Petitioner prosecutors then filed certiorari in the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion in ruling that there was sufficient cause of action. o CA dismissed. Petitioner prosecutors filed in the SC for a review of the case. SC denied. After more than a year, SC reinstated the petition and granted a TRO ordering the RTC Judge from proceeding with the case against the prosecutors.

Issue: Did Adazas complaint against the prosecutors state a cause of action? Should it have been dismissed from the start? Held: There was no statement of cause of action. Shouldve been dismissed right from the start. Ratio: Re: Adazas claim that his claim was not a suit for malicious prosecution Adaza says that his claim in the RTC was a suit for damages based on tort because of the prosecutors malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance in office and some violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It was not a suit for malicious prosecution. o ^SC does not agree. The complaint was for malicious prosecution against the petitioner prosecutors for their filing of the charge of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder. This latest argument as to the nature of his cause of action is only being raised for the first time on appeal. Nowhere in his complaint in the RTC did Adaza say that his action is one based on tort or The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. A change of theory cannot be allowed. When a party adopts a certain theory in the LC, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, because to permit him would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. Re: Discussion on Malicious Prosecution Malicious prosecution has been defined in many ways. In American jurisdiction: o Malicious prosecution is one begun in malice without probable cause to believe the charges can be sustained. o Malicious prosecution is when a case is instituted with intention of injuring defendant and without probable cause, and which terminates in favor of the person prosecuted. In Philippine jurisdiction: o An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. o The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury The statutory basis for a civil action for malicious prosecution: found in NCC on Human Relations and on damages: Articles 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219 (8). To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. For malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must prove 3 elements: 1. The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal; 2. That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause;

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That the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister motive.

All requisites must concur. Judging from the complaint of Adaza, none of the requisites were alleged, and so, complaint is dismissible for failure to state a cause of action

Re: First element: Claim that criminal case has already been terminated Nothing in the records shows, and the complaint does not allege, that that the criminal case filed, has been finally terminated and the accused Adaza was acquitted. What only appears is that Adaza has been discharged on a writ of habeas corpus and granted bail. This is not considered the termination of the action contemplated under Philippine jurisdiction to warrant the institution of a malicious prosecution suit against those responsible for the filing of the information against him. Re: Second element: Prosecutor acted without probable cause The complaint does not make any allegation that the prosecution acted without probable cause in filing the criminal information Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. A suit for malicious prosecution will lie only when a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable cause. The reason for this rule is because: o It would be a very great discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their indictment miscarried. The decision to prosecution was fully justified in an 18-page Resolution. Although the prosecutors were fully aware of the prevailing jurisprudence in People v. Hernandez, which proscribes the complexing of murder and other common crimes with rebellion, they were of the honest conviction that the Hernandez Case can be differentiated from the present case. They argued: o In the Hernandez case, the common crimes were found have been committed as a necessary means to commit rebellion, or in furtherance. o And so, the fiscal in Hernandez filed an information for rebellion alleging those common crimes as a necessary means of committing the offense charged under the second part of RPC 48. o However, in this case, we do not apply the Hernandez ruling because the crimes of murder and frustrated murder were unnecessary to commit rebellion. o Hence, the applicable provision is the first part of RPC 48. While in Enrile v. Salazar, the issue of whether or not the Hernandez doctrine is still good law arose, in a 10-3 vote, three justices felt the need to re-study the Hernandez ruling in light of present-day developments. Chief Justice Fernan wrote a dissenting opinion saying: o The Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the rule that all common crimes committed on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with, rebellion are absorbed. o The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was applied by the Court in 1956 during the communist-inspired rebellion of the Huks o The doctrine was good law then, but I believe that there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that needs clarification. See, not even the SC was all in agreement in debuking the theory of the prosecutors in this case. A doubtful question of law may become the basis of good faith and, in this regard, the law always accords to public officials the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duties. Any person who seeks to establish otherwise has the burden of proving bad faith or ill-motive. Here, since the prosecutors were of the honest conviction that there was probable cause and since Adaza himself, did not allege in his complaint lack of probable cause, SC finds that the prosecutors cannot be held liable for malicious prosecution. Re: Third requirement: Prosecution was impelled by legal malice The presence of probable cause signifies the absence of malice. It is evident that the prosecutors were not motivated by malicious intent to unduly harass Adaza, but only by a wellfounded belief that Adaza can be held for trial for the crime. In Conclusion: The complaint filed by Adaza against the prosecutors does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for malicious prosecution. Lack of cause of action, as a ground for a motion to dismiss must appear on the face of the complaint itself, meaning that it must be determined from the allegations of the complaint and from none other. The infirmity of the complaint in this regard is only too obvious to have escaped respondent judge's attention. Paragraph 14 of the complaint stating: The malicious prosecution, nay persecution, of plaintiff for a non-existent crime had severely injured and besmirched plaintiff's name is a conclusion of law and is not an averment or allegation of ultimate facts. Re: Procedural notes of the SC

This case was elevated to the CA and to the SC because of Judge Macli-ing's denial of the prosecutors motion to dismiss the Adaza complaint. General rule: Is that petitioners should have filed an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal. Exception to this rule: if the court denying the motion to dismiss, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, in which case certiorari under Rule 65 may be availed of. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendants (prosecutors in this case) to undergo the ordeal and expense of trial under such circumstances, because the remedy of appeal then would then not be plain and adequate.

Re: the judge and his grave abuse of discretion Judge Macli-ing committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the prosecutors motion to dismiss the Adaza complaint Petition is granted.