Nusa Tenggara Agricultural Development Project

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
PPA: INO 21147
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
OW THE
NUSATENGGARA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(Loan Nos. 952-INO[SF] and 953-INO)
rii
INDONESIA
December 1999

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency Unit - Rupiah (Rp)
At Appraisal At Project Completion At OertionEvIuation

October 1988 October 1996 February 1999
Rpl.00 $0.000583 $0. 000424 $0.0001 18
$1.00 = Rpl,715 Rp2,360 Rp8500
ABBREVIATIONS
ADB Asian Development Bank

AR appraisal report
CI cropping intensity
BAPPEDAS development planning agency
DGWRD Directorate General of Water Resources Development
EA Executing Agency
EIRR economic internal rate of return
ENT East Nusa Tenggara
EOM efficient operation and maintenance
ha hectare
1SF • irrigation service fee
kg kilogram
MIS management information system
MUV manufacturing unit value
O&M operation and maintenance
OEM Operations Evaluation MissiOn
PBB land and building tax
PCR project completion report
PMU project management unit
PRASs provincial agricultural services
PWRSs provincial water resources services
SDR special drawing right
SCF standard conversion factor
ton
TA technical assistance
TDU tertiary demonstration unit
WNT West Nusa Tenggara
WOO water operations center
WUA water users association
NOTES
(i) The fiscal year (FY) of the Government ends on 31 March.
(ii) In this report, "$' refers to US dollars.
I
Operations Evaluation Office, PE-531
CONTENTS
Page
BASIC DATA
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MAPS V

BACKGROUND I

A. Rationale I
B. Formulation I
C. Objectives and Scope at Appraisal 1

D. Financial Arrangements I

E. Completion 2

F. Operations Evaluation 2

11. IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE 3

A. Design 3

B. Contracting, Construction, and Commissioning
3
C. Organization and Management 4

0. Actual Cost and Financing 5
E. Implementation Schedule 5

F. Technical Assistance 5

G. Compliancewith Loan Covenants 6

III. PROJECT RESULTS 6

A. Operational Performance 6
B. Institutional Development 8

C. Financial Performance 10

D. Economic and Financial Reevaluation 10

E. Socioeconomic and Sociocultural
Results 11
F. Gender and Development 12
G. Environmental Impacts and Control 12

H. Gestation and Sustainability 12

IV. KEY ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE 13

A. Lack of SustanabiIity 13

B. Institutional Environment 14

C. Data Quality 15

V. CONCLUSIONS 16

A. Overall Assessment
16
B. Lessons Learned 16
C. Follow-Up Actions 17

APPENDIXES 18
BASIC DATA
Nusa Tenggara Agricultural Development Project
Loans 952-INO(SF) and 953-INO
PROJECT PREPARATION/INSTITUTION BUILDING

TA No. TA Project Name Type Person-Months Amount Approval Date
891-INO Nusa Tenggara Accelerated PPTA 1 180 $340,000 7 Aug 1987
Agricultural Development
As perADB
KEY PROJECT DATA ($ million) Loan Documents Actual
Total Project Cost 148.8 137.4
Foreign Exchange Cost 61.3 56.6
ADB Loan Amount/Utilization 119.9 107.7
KEY DATES Expected Actual

Fact-Finding Jun/JUl 1987
Appraisal 19 Sep-6 Oct 1988
Loan Negotiations 24-26 Nov 1988
Board Approval 7 Feb 1989
Loan Agreement 1 Mar 1989
Loan Effectiveness 1 Jun 1989 26 May 1989
First Disbursement 26 May 1989
Project Completion Jun 1994 Sep 1995
Loan Closing 30 Sep1994 30 Sep 1995
Months (Effectiveness to Completion) 60 76

KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATOR (%) Appraisal
PCR PPAR

Economic Internal Rate of Return 14.9 11.8 about 14
BORROWER Republic of Indonesia
EXECUTING AGENCIES Directorate General of Water Resources Development

Directorate General of Public Administration and Regional Autonomy
Directorate General of Food Crops and Horticulture
Directorate General of Reforestation and Land Rehabilitation
Directorate General of Tax
Directorate General of Regional Development
MISSION DATA
Type of Mission Missions (no.) Person-Days (no.)
Appraisal 2
1
Inception 1 7
Project Administration

- Review 7 92
- Special Loan Administration I 18
- Project Completion 4 71
Operations Evaluation I 36
PPTA = project preparatory technical assistance, TA = technical assistance.

2 -
= not available.
EXECUTR/E SUMMARY
In line with Indonesia's Fifth Five-Year Development Plan, the Project was to optimize
the performance of existing irrigation schemes in the provinces of West and East Nusa
Tenggara, where most of the income-generating activities are agricultural.
The Project's primary objective was to increase crop production and farm incomes
through improved irrigation facilities and direct involvement of farmers. The Project's scope was
wide and comprised (i) rehabilitation and upgrading of irrigation schemes on about
36,670 hectares (ha); (ii) introduction of efficient operation and maintenance (EOM), handing
over of about 4,290 ha of small irrigation schemes to water users associations, and institutional
strengthening; (iii) agricultural development and institutional strengthening; (iv) soil and water
conservation; (v) land tax improvement; and (vi) strengthening of planning and coordination in
provincial and district development planning agencies. The Project was complex and
implemented through six Executing Agencies (EAs). The National Development Planning
Agency provided overall coordination, with the provincial and district development planning
agencies coordinating project implementation and the EA5' activities.
Examination of operational performance revealed rapid build-up of benefits as farmers

responded quickly to opportunities for more intensified cropping. Benefits have occurred as
higher farm household incomes, improved housing and nutrition standards, improved availability
of better health and education services, and generally higher standards of living. Higher demand
for labor increased employment opportunities and raised the income of landless families. Other
benefits included increased opportunities for secondary business activities. Reevaluation
yielded an economic internal rate of return of 14 percent, similar to that at project completion.
Rapid crop intensification within the irrigation schemes occurred against a background of
(i) lack of budgetary support for an EOM scheme and provision of support services, (ii) minimal
progress in transferring system management responsibility to water users associations, (iii) use
of technical solutions to overcome mostly institutional and management weaknesses, and
(iv) weaknesses in institutional capabilities of the EAs. While the present lack of budgetary
provision for maintaining facilities can be attributed to the impact of the financial crisis on the
Government's ability to fund support services, little commitment existed even before the crisis to
maintain recurrent funding requirements. The effects of a lack of budgetary support, particularly
for EOM, have been observed in the (i) irrigation schemes experiencing declining cropping
intensities due to restricted water , availability resulting from a lack of effective canal
maintenance; (ii) lack of effective delivery of appropriate agricultural extension services;
(iii) degradation of project forestry achievements, which have caused increasing siltation
problems in irrigation schemes and reservoirs; and (iv) inability of farmers to take over some of
the needed support services and be fully accountable for small irrigation systems. The
institutional capacity building activities of the Project were not very effective, resulting in less
than adequate coordination between the EA5. Activities under the agricultural develbpmeht
component were inappropriate and added substantial recurrent costs that the EAs could not
meet.
These findings raise concerns about the Project's sustainability. Irrigated areas are
expected to further decline in the next few years, and the incremental benefits currently
generated would be difficult to maintain. Clearly, sustainability of irrigation projects would only
be ensured if timely and adequate maintenance could be provided. This would avoid early
physical deterioration and production shortfalls requiring costly rehabilitation works resulting in
less than optimal economic returns. ,
iv
Overall, because of moderate capital costs of rehabilitation works and a quick and
significant production response, the Project has had high economic returns in spite of
deficiencies in sustainability. In addition, significant non-quantifiable benefits have accrued early
because of the Project. High though less than optimal benefits make the Project generally
successful.
The Project's original completion date was extended by more than one year to
September 1995 to allow for the completion of the civil works and the soil and water
conservation studies. Compliance with loan covenants was generally satisfactory although
many covenants were only partially complied with. While the achievements of the EAs varied,
many had difficulties in preparing audited accounts.
The actual project cost was $137.4 million compared with $148.8 at, appraisal., The
unused balance of $0.4 million of the Special Funds resources loan of the Asian Development
Bank (ADB) was canceled in April 1996, and $9.5 million of the ordinary capital resource !oan
was canceled in May 1996.
During appraisal, improvement of irrigation schemes and financing of EOM were

expected to cover 36,670 ha. Actual achievement was about 33,240 ha for irrigtion scheme
improvement and 48,130 ha for EOM financing. However, significantly less was expended in
terms of EOM after project completion. The extent of areas being irrigated has declined, and
resulted in reduced cropping intensities. The project completion report estimate of cropping
intensities was 248 percent at full agricultural development compared with the Operations
Evaluation Mission's revised estimate of about 224 percent. Irrigated rice yields haverisen from
3 to 5.2 tons per hectare (t/ha) in West Nusa Tenggara and to 4.4 t/ha in East Nusa Tenggara.
Yields of secondary crops, such as maize, tobacco, and peanut, have also risen, mainly
because of improved water availability, increased use of fertilizer and other inputs, and greater
mechanization of land preparation.
Assessing the Project has highlighted issues that are essential in designing similar ADB
projects in the future. For example, successful adoption of the principle of paying for water use
can only be ensured if its importance is introduced at the outset and fees are set at a realistic
level in terms of the actual costs of providing EOM. If farmers have had access to free water fo
several years, the task of introducing irrigation fees becomes difficult. At the same time , , if the
amounts levied and collection levels are minimal, there is little prospect for the introduction of
EOM and for farmers to play a more prominent role. Along with the previous concern is the need
to give greater attention to strengthening the capability of water users associations so they can
play an effective role in managing water distribution. In projects involving various components
and many EAs, there should be adequate arrangements for coordination.
The view that agricultural subcomponents should not be included in irrigation projects
because the subcomponents are seldom sustainable is more of a reflection of inappropriate
project support than of inherent defects in such subcomponents. Evaluation results of this
Project reconfirmed that agricultural support services must be an integral part of any irrigation
project. This would include diversification toward high value crops. Agricultural extension staff
need the logistical support required to provide effective services. Lower cost options to remedy
this situation might include semiprivatization of such services,.
On ADB's part, present mechanisms for providing support services to irrigators rnus,t be
reviewed. Attention could be directed to alternative high value crops. A review is recommended
of the approach used for quick-yielding rehabilitation projects with low unit costs, whiqh, despite
high economic returns, often experience low sustainability, deteriorate quickly, and require
another round of rehabilitation within a few years.

ll0°00'E 1 30°OOE
INDONESIA
NUSATENGGARA AGRICULTURAL
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
- 10°OON -. (as implemented) 10000Nj
qndce
Aceh (I H f/I C Il Iii II C
IAI
0 200 400 600
I I
/i\
'ean Kilometers
V
P A ( I F I () C / A A
EUt AU IOAS a
/
\ '-----. Manado0
( )
A I(
(
V
° Pontianak '
KALMANcA1t f
I
Padan
I I 0Bmk
L\ 'JambtQ, i V
;SPflda -
i\ __Pçso
> /
r--' o Palangkaraya
8 IJLAU IiL ' 0
PaIembangs' I y Jayapura°
. SUMATRA / /
_'' (I
BengkuluC° \ Kendari IRIAN JAVA
Bargarmasin I I
/ r\ I
Tnjungkarang a ( I
Ujungpandang ( I
Jakarta I I 1 5
(I
1
N D I A TV A C I A C! Bandurg 0 V
Surabaya
Yogyakarta "0
Denpasar I
100. V I 10000's
I Kupangi'" V
10
Project Area
IViiiVVVV V VV I
1992 Earthquake-Affected Area (Damage being
ID rehabilitated under Loan 1241-INO: Flores Emergency
Reconstruction Project)
National Capital V
0 City/Town
Provincial Boundary
International Boundary
Boundaries are not necessarily authoritative.
(0
(0
(n
03 1)
a
I U0°00E 130°00E
—k

• 1 16°15'E
21 INDONESIA
WEST NUSA TENGGARA
116°15'E
Other Irrigation Schemes
10. PawangKates
11. lrengDaya
10
Mamben
%osedSeV ) EAT
(as implemented) ,..._,,LOMB0K
80S o -
Mataram ProposedK er
Diversion
Narmada_______ "131
J.Sate ir
Matara
Kupang W6ST
Lombok Strait LOMI3OK I
long
LOCATION MAP 11 6°1 5E
Heoggung
. Parung
8°45 N ®
,',
Jurariq Batu
Pengga Dam
Mujur I i Tibunanqk
________________ ____ _____ 012345 10
Appraisal As Built Katon
Name of Subproject Area (ha) Area (ha) ujur Kilometers
Pengga-Related
Irrigation Schemes
Kulem
4,149
f
1. Pengga 4,150
2. Parung 1,210 1,270 •' -
3. Jurang Batu 3,500 3,500 -
4. Tibunangka 2,270 2,285 (
5. Renggung 1,200 1,260
6. Mujur I & II 4,650 4,530
7. Katon 2,960 1,886
8. RUtus 1,400 1,453 . S
Additional Scheme
9. Kulem 0 1,135 \
Subtotal 21,340 21,468

Pioje,l Are
10. PawangKates 280 339 Other Exiting lug 1111)11 Suluem Proposed Canal
HLD
11. Ireng Days 320 278 ® Project Irrigation ch an High Level Diversion
12. Datar • 590 634 • 0 District/ViUaqe uSS0 River
13. Mamben 400 346
Co
Road ____..__ District Boundary
Co
Subtotal 1,590 1,597 Drum Wei Boundaries are not necessarily authoritative.
OC
Total
(0 22,930 23,065 9)
0 ________________________ 1100150 D
I
N)
120°00'E - 124°00'E
INDONESIA
EAST NUSATENGGARA I
PROJECT LOCATION
(as implemented)
8°00S 8°00S
I
-
• • .
/ 'C Atambua
Name of Subproject
UMATIMUR 1. Lembor. 6000 4487 SELATAN/

• io°oo's io°oos-
Kupang
4. KajumBawa 40 49 j
5. MaaBawa . 50 29 IIIVIUR
6. Mautenda IV 413 0
• 7. Magepanda 803 0
• . 8. Pruda 220 0
• 9, Kolesia 127 0
• 10. Melolo 698 698
• ( 1992 Earthquake-Allected Area 11. Mataiyang 1173 . 1216 .-
Project Irrigation Scheme 12. Kakaha 509 509
13. Kambaniru • 1,680 1,240
o • District/Town
14. Koritepe 343 359
Roa d 15. Ponu 323 - 381
River 16. Haekto - 400 388
District Boundary 17. Loll - • 37 37 0 50 100
18. Oeloan - 202 76
International Boundary
19. Peto . 70 75 Kilometers
Boundaries are not necessarily authoritative. . -
CD Total 13,740 10,171
CD
CD
01
CD
1,1
9)
CC
120°00E . - 124°00E
CA,
I. BACKGROUND
A. Rationale
1. The Project aimed to optimize the use and performance of existing irrigation schemes in
the provinces of West Nusa Tenggara (WNT) and East Nusa Tenggara (ENT) to increase crop
production and farm incomes through improved irrigation facilities and direct involvement of the
farmers. The two provinces, which are Indonesia's driest and have income-generating activities
mostly limited to agriculture, have generally received less development assistance than other
parts of the country.
2. The Project was in line with the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan, which emphasized
consolidating the gains realized from past irrigation investments, expanding diversified crop
production, creating rural employment opportunities, and achieving balanced regional
development through diversification of the agricultural base.
B. Fomiulation
3. In June 1987, the Government requested assistance from the Asian Development Bank
(ADB) in formulating a project to accelerate agricultural development in WNT and ENT (Map 1,
page v). ADB approved a technical assistance (TA) to prepare a feasibility study on enhancing
agricultural production in these provinces. 1 The study was completed in April 1988. In parallel
with the ADB-funded TA, the Subdirectorate of Planning and Design within the Directorate
General of Water Resources Development (DGWRD), using its own funds, carried out the
detailed designs of the irrigation schemes included in the Project. The designs were completed
in May 1988. The Project was appraised in November 1988 and approved in May 1989.
C. Objectives and Scope at Appraisal
4. The Project was to provide (i) irrigation development through rehabilitation and
upgrading of existing irrigation schemes on about 36,670 hectares (ha); (ii) introduction of
efficient operation and maintenance (EOM) on about 36,670 ha, handing over of about 4,290 ha
of small irrigation schemes to the water users associations (WUAs), and institutional
strengthening; (iii) agricultural development, including land development on about 2,300 ha,
establishment of 13 tertiary demonstration units (TDUs), installation of four agro-climatic
stations, improvement of seed production, and institutional strengthening; (iv) soil and water
conservation on about 10,000 ha; (v) land and building tax (PBB) improvement on about
210,000 ha; and (vi) strengthening of planning and coordination at the provincial and district
levels of the development planning agencies (BAPPEDASs).
0. Financing Arrangements
5. ADB provided a loan to finance $1 19 million equivalent or 80 percent of the total project
cost, of which $25 million equivalent (SDRI8,465,000) came from ADB's Special Funds
resources and $94 million from ADB's ordinary capital resources. The Government was to
provide the balance of $29.8 million (20 percent of the project cost). During implementation,
loan disbursements amounted to $110 million, while the Government financed $29.7 million
equivalent in local costs. The original loan closing date had been set for September 1994, but
the final disbursement was made in May 1996.
1
TA 891-INO: Nusa Tenggara Accelerated Agricultural Development, for $340,000, approved on 7 August 1987.
E. Completion
6. The Project was granted a one-year extension up to September 1995 tO allow for the
completion of the civil works for the irrigation schemes in ENT and the soil and water
conservation studies. The project completion report (PCR) provides details about the Project,
including the design, scope and implementation, and operational aspects, as well as estimates
of the economic internal rate of return (EIRR). The Government funded the production of its own
PCR that summarizes the Project's achievements.
7. The Operations Evaluation Mission (OEM) generally concurs with the findings of ADB's
PCR that the Project has substantially helped the beneficiaries in terms of increased crop
production and income. Numerous examples of the improvements in general well being within
the benefited communities exist in terms of agriculture forestry, livelihood education, and small
enterprise development. These improvements have substantially benefited women and children
and were most apparent in areas where water is abundant. However, intensification of crbpirig
resulted in considerable increases in the workload of farming households.
8. Major OEM concerns include the (i) unnecessarily high investment costs of large dams,
weirs and headworks, and canal linings (throughout many of the schemes) in relation to the
benefited areas; (ii) lack of budgetary support since the PCR for maintaining the scheme and
for providing other support services (iii) failure to introduce EOM and the lack of progress in
transferring of system management responsibility to WUAs; and (iv) use of technical solUtions to
overcome problems that are related mostly to institutional and management weaknesses.
F. Operations Evaluation
9. The project performance audit report (PPAR) presents findings of the OEM th?t visited
Indonesia during 16 February-5 March 1999. The PPAR includes an assessment of the
effectiveness of the Project in achieving its objectives and in generating and maintaining
benefits The PPAR also deals with other important issues related to the Project
10 The PPAR is based on a review of the appraisal report (AR), the PCR materials in ADB
files, and records of DGWRD and the other five Executing Agencies (EAs) Directorate General
of Public Administration and Regional Autonomy Directorate General of Food Crops and
Horticulture, Directorate General of ReforestatiOn and Land Rehabilitation, Directorate General
of Tax, and Directorate General of Regional Development. The PPAR also reflects the OEM's
discussions with staff members and officials of ADB, World Bank and the EAs as well as the
results of the site visits and interviews with beneficiaries and their representative organizations
The sample sites visited included seven schemes in WNT and six schemes in ENT (three in
West Timor and three in Sumba). Map 2 (page vi) provides details on project irnplenientation for
WNT, and Map 3 (page vii) shows project implementation details for ENT.
11. Copies of the PPAR were provided for review to the EAs and ADB staff concerned. The
comments received were taken into consideration in finalizing the PPAR. An important concern
has been the lack of interest in the OEM findings and suggestions on the parts of the EAs in the
provinces despite ADB being the largest provider of external financing for irrigation development
in WNT and ENT.
3
II. IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE
A. Design
12. The project design was complex and involved six main components, within which there
were a total of 12 subcomponents. Six EAs implemented the project components. The Project
was implemented on four islands of ENT and one island of WNT. Because of this geographic
complexity, the National Development Planning Agency provided overall coordination of the
Project in cooperation with the EAs. The provincial and district BAPPEDASs were charged with
the responsibility of coordinating project implementation at the local level and the activities of
the EAs.
13. The Project was designed to provide considerable support to developing the capability of
local institutions. The AR noted that in previous ADB-financed irrigation projects, poor
implementation performance was directly linked to (i) deficiencies in irrigation EOM; (ii) lack of
participation of beneficiaries in project development, implementation, and management; and
(iii) delays in the development of tertiary and on-farm facilities and in the implementation of land
development. These items were all linked to the need for greater emphasis on human resources
development and institution building. The project design that was prepared particularly stressed
the need for building the capabilities of the local EAs. In ENT, there was a substantial program
of support to strengthen the capabilities of the provincial and district BAPPEDAS5 to enable
them to strengthen local EAs. In response to a request from the Government, the support was
also extended to WNT in July 1991.
14. However, the coordination activities of the BAPPEDASs were weak, and this hampered
effective project implementation. The primary reason for the difficulties that the BAPPEDASs
experienced can be attributed to the inappropriate organizational structure of the BAPPEDASs
as well as their management approach. The structure of the BAPPEDASs was on a sectoral
basis that effectively replicates the divisions of responsibilities of provincial or district level
agencies. The result of this was that the BAPPEDASs tended to consider the individual sectoral
responsibilities rather than working to integrate the activities of the EAs.
B. Contracting, Construction, and Commissioning
15. The Project included several (sub)components. Improvement of irrigation schemes and
financing of EOM were expected at appraisal to each cover 36,670 ha. Actual achievement Was
about 33,240 ha for improved irrigation schemes and 48,130 ha for improved EOM. The latter
expanded beyond the project area and had a total cost of about $5.4 million during 1991-1 996.
Significantly less was expended in terms of EOM after project completion. An earthquake in late
1992 destroyed most of the improvement works of four schemes (about 1,563 ha) in ENT. The
schemes were rehabilitated under the ADB-supported Flores Emergency Reconstruction
Project2 approved in July 1993. Actual agricultural land development comprised about 5,500 ha,
nearly 2.5 times the appraisal target of 2,300 ha. Thirteen TDUs, four agro-climatic stations, and
four seed farms were all implemented as planned at appraisal. The facilities are all in a state of
disrepair and have failed to perform well. As for agroforestry and reforestation, about 9,700 of
10,000 ha targeted at appraisal have been achieved, although with an average survival rate of
less than 50 percent.
2
Loan 1241-INO(SF): F/ores Emergency Reconstruction, for $26 million, approved on 1 July 1993.
4
16. Comprehensive training programs were extended to 592 representatives of the

provincial water resources services (PWRSs), 2,594 representatives of the provincial
agricultural services (PRASs), and 6,070 representatives of the WUAs. Additionally, 16 PRAS
representatives received international training. PWRS staff increased by 54 percent under the
Project, from 386 to 593. Few WUAs have effectively assumed full responsibility for the
schemes, particularly for EOM, and notably in ENT. Most WUAs need strengthening, particulaIy
in management and financial matters, and many need to attain legal status. About, three
quarters of the targeted introduction of irrigation service fees (lSFs) on 32,380 ha has been
achieved, but collection rates have been low and decreasing. 1SF revenue plus Iocal
government funds have been insufficient to meet maintenance requirements. In ENT, the 1SF
revenue and government funds only cover the salaries of maintenance staff. PBB has improved
under the Project over about 305,000 ha, well beyond the appraisal expectation of 210,000 ha.
About 30,800 ha of project irrigation schemes have been covered compared to the appraisal
target of 36,670 ha.
17. Out of the 32 irrigation schemes of the Project, OEM evaluated 13, totaling about
16,700 ha or about half the project area. The proportion of rehabilitated areas was aboi,t
85 percent, both for the total project area and for the schemes the OEM evaluated. The. sample
selected for OEM evaluation represents the Project fairly well. The civil works contracts for, the
irrigation development were awarded through local competifive bidding except for the contract
for the construction of the Pengga dam. The performance of the civil works contractors was
generally satisfactory. The PCR noted instances where the placement of some canal
embankments and minor structures was poor as was the foundation settlement in some
buildings. In general, the quality of the structures in WNT is higher than that in ENT, due to the
easier availability of better quality construction materials and the higher quality of staff.
However, the standard of construction of the Kambaniru barrage and irrigation system in ENT is
high, which must reflect the good management and supervision provided during implementation.
C. Organization and Management
18. During implementation, project management units (PMUs) were established in the
provincial and district BAPPEDASs. Similar units were put in place in the EAs. Staff from the
respective organizations were detailed to work within these PMUs. However, the capabilities of
the EAs varied considerably, and this was reflected in the achievements under each of the
project components. DGWRD, through the PWRSs, carried out the physical works. on the
irrigation schemes but failed to sufficiently support the adoption of OEM policy and pay
adequate attention to establishing and strengthening the WUAs. The performance of the
Directorate General for Public Administration and Regional Autonomy, which was responsible
for the 1SF subcomponent, was less than satisfactory, with insufficient funds, equipment and
training being provided to provincial and district staff.
19. For agricultural development, the Director General of Food, Crops, and Horticulture,
assisted by the PMUs established in the PRAS in each province, provided ineffective guidance
and support. The Director General of Food, Crops, and Horticulture should have taken a more
active role with the PRASs during implementation to ensure better timing of activities. The
Directorate General for Reforestation and Land Rehabilitation, assisted by the subcenter for
land rehabilitation and soil conservation in each province, was responsible for managing the
program of soil and water conservation; it performed satisfactorily in WNT. In ENT, other
government watershed programs appear to have taken priority. The Directorate General for
Tax, assisted by the land and building tax inspection offices in both provinces, managed the
PBB improvement component well and exceeded the targets.
5
20. There was little evidence of farmer participation during implementation. Prior to the start
of construction, farmers in the area to be developed were consulted but simply to inform them of
the proposed construction works. During OEM visits to the schemes, there were no reports of
farmers being consulted during the design stage. However, the farmers, who in general have
received substantial benefits from the Project, did not view this as a concern. There are
instances where more substantial participation could have been achieved. An example of this is
the Mataiyang Scheme in Sumba. The predominance of livestock raising in the area resulted in
much of the irrigated area being used for grazing livestock during the dry season rather than
being cropped with rice, If more detailed studies of existing farming schemes had been done
through consultation with farmers prior to the start of the Project, it would have been recognized
that the farmers might continue to use the irrigated area for grazing rather than expanding their
rice cultivation during the dry season. Farmers in the Mataiyang Scheme view this situation as a
logical response to provide much improved grazing for their livestock during a time when they
previously experienced difficulty in providing cattle with nutrition.
21. In ENT, little evidence exists of farmers gaining employment during the construction
period. This appeared to be due to cultural factors and was reflected in the general difficulties
that government officials experience in relating to and communicating with the rural population.
During the OEM, provincial-based staff members, many of whom are migrants to the area, often
described ENT farmers as being uncooperative and lacking initiative.
D. Actual Cost and Financing
22 At appraisal, loan disbursements were to take place over five years and four months.
The period was extended to seven years because of delayed completion of the rehabilitation
and upgrading of irrigation schemes, which was most notable in ENT. The loan disbursements
from ADB's Special Funds resources amounted to SDRI8.2 million ($25.5 million equivalent)
and those from ordinary capital resources, $84.5 million. The value of the loan from the Special
Funds resources increased from $25 million at appraisal to $25.9 million at completion. The
unused balance of $0.4 million of the Special Funds resources loan was canceled in April 1996,
and the unused balance of $9.5 million of the ordinary capital resources loan was canceled in
May 1996. Actual project costs are compared with those expected at appraisal in Appendix 1.
E. Implementation Schedule
23. Significant delays were experienced in implementation of all components. The delays
were most apparent for ENT, in part because of a destructive earthquake on Flores island.
Many of the designs for rehabilitating the irrigation systems had to be revised, which was an
important contribution to the delayed commencement of the construction work. The start ofthe
work under the soil and water conservation component was delayed by almost two years in
WNT and about as long in ENT. Another component subject to long delays was the introduction
of effective EOM.
F. Technical Assistance
24. Two international consulting firms were engaged, in association with domestic consulting•
firms, to provide advisory and supervisory services during implementation. One of these
international firms was engaged for WNT and the other for ENT. At project completion, a total of
1,577 person-months of consulting time was used compared with 1,080 person-months
envisioned at appraisal. This 37 percent increase required an additional $3.44 million.
6
25. The performance of the consultants was generally satisfactory. However, the designs
the domestic consultants (engaged by DGWRD) produced before the Project started needed
substantial revision during implementation. The Pengga dam in WNT was designed' by the
project consultants, who also supervised the construction.
26. The consultants for the 1SF component performed satisfactorily However, the EA
responsible for this component (the Directorate General for Public Administration and Regional.
Autonomy) relied extensively on the project consultants to implement the component.
27. The consultants for the agricultural development component appear to have performed
satisfactorily. However, the timing of their inputs was not synchronized with the irrigation
development, which resulted in many of the expectations not being achieved. This occurrence is
another example of the inadequate coordination that hampered many aspects of project
implementation.
0. Compliance with Loan Covenants
28. Compliance with the loan covenants was generally satisfactory. Most covenants were at
least partially complied with. Although the achievements of the EAs varied, many had difficulties
in complying with the covenants for preparing audited accounts and for reporting. Consultants
wrote several of the final PCRs, and three EAs did not prepare any final PCR. For the covenant
concerning the coordination and monitoring of project implementation by the National
Development Planning Agency and the conduct of regular meetings by the provincial
BAPPEDAS, the requirements were only partially complied with because no effective
coordination existed between the various EAs during project implementation.
III. PROJECT RESULTS
A. Operational Perfomiance
29. Benefits from the Project have been substantial: farm household incomes are estimated
to have more than doubled, and similar income increases for male and female landless workers
have resulted from the increased demand for agricultural labor. The opportunities for increasing
the area of irrigated rice cropping and the expanded scope for dry season cultivation of
secondary crops through improved water availability have been the primary reasons for
improved incomes. These benefits are manifested in the improved housing and the generally
higher standards of living of all community members in the schemes the OEM visited. Other
benefits have included the increased opportunity for secondary business activities within and
around the schemes.
30. All the irrigation schemes visited have continued to operate reasonably well, although
they are managed with varying degrees of efficiency. The major problem affecting every
scheme is the lack of EOM, which is resulting in structures showing signs of early deterioration
and increasing siltation within the canals. The area actually being irrigated has declined and the
cropping intensities have consequently been reduced. The PCR estimated that cropping
intensities, would rise to 248 percent at full agricultural development, while the OEM revised
estimate is 224 percent. For the Melolo scheme on Sumba island, the high levels of siltation
have reduced the estimated cropping intensities to only 169 percent. Irrigated rice yields have
risen from 3 to 5.2 tons per hectare (t/ha) in WNT and to 4.4 t/ha in ENT. Yields of secondary
crops have also increased: irrigated maize yields have risen from 2 to 4 t/ha and soybean yields
7
from 0.7 to 1.2 tiha. Tobacco yields haverisen from 1.5 to 1.8 t/ha, and peanut yields from
0.8to 1.2tlha. These yield increases are due mainly to the improved water availability,
increased use of fertilizer and other inputs, and greater mechanization of land preparation
(Appendix 2).
31. The responsibility for providing EOM on the primary and secondary canals rests within
the PWRSs, which have not been provided with sufficient funding to ensure the schemes
continue to operate at maximum efficiency. The WUAs have done little to respond to this
deficiency. Another major concern is the lack of maintenance on large structures, such as the
Pengga dam (Map 2, page vi) and the Kambaniru weir (Map 3, page vii). These.two structures
alone comprised 30 percent of the irrigation development cost. In response to these
weaknesses, which are due to institutional and management deficiencies, the public works has
adopted purely technical solutions. An example of this is the expenditure on raising canal banks
to increase the volume of water delivered rather than developing strategies to ensure better
management and efficiency of the system and desilting of canals.
32. At äll the schemes visited, the WUAs were established during project implementation,
and limited training was provided to their officers. There are instances where these groups are
now involved in sharing irrigation water, although at most of the schemes visited the PWRSs still
provide gatekeepers to manage water distribution. The Ireng Daya scheme in WNT was the
only scheme visited where transfer of responsibility to the WUA appears to be complete.
However, the WUA members generally have not been adequately trained to enable them to
assume full responsibility for managing financial affairs. They do not maintain proper financial
records and are unable to provide evidence of any capital accumulation. Only one of the
schemes visited (the Parung scheme) reported that the farmers were paying an 1SF of
Rp15,000 ($1.75 equivalent)/ha, but the WUA does not retain any of the revenue generated.
Under the revised procedures for EOM (which are to be introduced next year) this system is to
change and the WUA will retain the revenue generated. Substantial training support is needed
for all the WUAs to prepare them for this additional responsibility of collecting 1SF.
33. The PCR raised several concerns regarding the performance of some of the EAs, and
the OEM has generally endorsed these. The most serious concern is over the inability of the
provincial and district BAPPEDASs to maintain effective coordination between the different
agencies. The coordination meetings that the BAPPEDASs were organizing have not been
maintained. Furthermore, the PMUs established by the provincial EAs were disbanded, with the
staff members reassigned to their original duties. This has reduced the sustainability of activities
in the subsequent years and particularly affected the coordination by the provincial and district
BAPPEDASs. Coordination is now only achieved informally, mainly between the PWRSs and
the PRASs. The institutional structure of the BAPPEDASs that impedes the achievement of
effective coordination has been recognized as a constraint, but no significant action has been
taken to address this issue.
34. The concern over sustainability is most apparent for the activities under the agriculture
development component, where most of the facilities established have not been maintained.
This is particularly apparent for the TDUs that have not received adequate funding for EOM and
where staff have been reassigned so that they are not fulfilling their original duties. A similar
situation applies to the agro-climatic stations that have largely been abandoned or even
destroyed. However, rainfall records are still being maintained in some cases.
35. Within the schemes visited, the number of extension staff members appears adequate to
provide basic extension services. However, the lack of operational funding prevents the
8
extension workers from providing effective services. No demonstrations are currently being
conducted anywhere within these systems to demonstrate improved technologies for irrigated
rice production or to promote diversification for dry season cropping.
36. Some farmers mentioned shortages of quality seed and that they are unable to secure
adequate supplies through the PRASs. The seed farm established through the Project in ENT is
producing less than 5 percent of its potential because of a lack of funding and water supply over
mOst of the farm. No seed was being produced on the TDUs that the OEM visited. However, the
central seed farm in WNT is functioning well, and the seed production programs through the
network, of seed growers in the area is being implemented effectively.
37. In WNT, achievements in reforestation and terracing in some of the watershed areas
visited are notable. Many check darns have also been constructed on waterways in WNT and
ENT. These check dams have brought significant additional benefits to small numbers of
farmers in the areas adjacent to these structures through small-scale intermittent irrigation.
However, measures will be required to desilt these structures (or build new ones) if they are to
remain effective. The farmers benefiting from a structure could do these tasks, although they
may need technical supervision from the PWRS to do the work well.
38. Despite the satisfactory performanOe of the Directorate General of Tax during the Project
and the provision of institutional capability training support, the efficiency of collecting PBB is
low. This is reportedly due to the lack of accurate information on the areas reclassified after the
rehabilitation and upgrading of the irrigation systems However, during the course of discussions
within the irrigation systems, farmers reported that PBB rates have increased by up to
300 percent. These higher rates of taxation should have generated additional revenue for local
governments to provide better maintenance budgets for the systems; however, this is not the
case.
39. The water: operations center (WOC) in Lombok is a useful innovation, but it has not
operated effectively. This is apparently due to reasons additional to and as fundamental as that
quoted by the PCR. 3 First, the model is based on an oversimplified assumption of equal rates of
evapotranspiration and percolation over the Pengga-related scheme area. Of greater
importance is that for the computer model to function effectively, the calibration conditions of the
model must be maintained in the canal systems. This is plainly not the case and cannot be
achieved even With more effective EOM The WOO does not appear to be an implementable
management tool. Additional management constraints will need to be addressed to improve the
means by which (i) information on water flows in the canals can be transmitted to the WOO, and
(ii) instructions on water distribution are conveyed to field staff. For the WOO to function
efficiently, telemetry would be required. to minimize the delays in transferring and relaying
information. Whether such technology is a practical proposition in the local context is uncertain.
B. Institutional Development
40. the Project provided to each of the EAs institutional strengthening programs that
included logistical, support and. training. The technical capacities of EA staff have been
enhanced. Current weaknesses concern the managerial capacity to sustain activities,
particularly to effectively plan and monitor activity progress. Related to this capacity, the, POR
noted several instances, where the consultants took over the functions of the EAs. While this
The reason for inefficiency cited in the PCR was the ineffective line of instruction involving two different agencies:
the PWRS and the iocai government.
may have ensured smoother and more timely implementation, the Project's intention of building
institutional capacity and of ensuring the sustainability of the EAs' activities was undermined.
41. The OEM was hampered by difficulties in obtaining access to reliable data, which is a
serious indictment of the management information systems (MISs) developed by the agencies.
The lack of reliable information renders the tasks of effectively managing the irrigation schemes
and providing support services almost impossible. More seriously, inaccurate information is.
being provided to the Government and external agencies for making decisions about the Project
and future irrigation ventures. The PWRSs should be encouraged to compile more precise
records on the actual areas being irrigated and planted within the irrigation schemes. Accurate
records would help assess the extent of the reductions in areas being irrigated due to the lack of
EOM. The PRASs, through the extension staff assigned within each irrigation scheme, should
also be measuring crop yields. Data from these two sources would enable the planners of the
provincial BAPPEDAS to give more precise measures of production within the provinces,
thereby providing a better basis for identifying agricultural development priorities and improving
the direction given to the PRASs and the PWRSs for their irrigation system support programs.
42. During the OEM, many instances were noted where EAs' local management was
attempting to resolve problems by simply adhering to standard procedures. This was particularly
the case regarding the maintenance of the irrigation systems where responsibility should rest
with PWRS staff. Many of the systems need repair because of the inability of the PWRSs to
provide EOM. Yet neither the agencies nor the WUAs have made significant initiatives to rectify
matters. Agencies appear to maintain a rigid stance that only one agency is responsible for the
work and that no other intervention is permitted. A more flexible and pragmatic approach might
ensure better achievement of results and development of objectives. Furthermore, such a
strategy would promote self-reliance among the WUAs that is presently lacking.
43. The promotion of WUAs is an integral part of the Government's strategy for irrigation
development. Policies are in place that require the transfer of increasing responsibilities for the
management of water distribution and, in the case of the smaller schemes (less than 500 ha),
for the complete transfer of EOM responsibility. In line with this policy, the Project provided
support for establishing WUAs but did not achieve sufficient impact to enable the WUAs to
attain the necessary degree of self-reliance. No further training appears to have been provided
at the provincial or district level to strengthen the WUAs' capabilities.
44. Experience in other ADB developing member countries has shown that a community
organizer must be assigned to work with the farmers over at least one year to strengthen the
capabilities of a group. The approach in ENT and WNT of using agricultural extension to provide
continuing support to WUA5 has not been successful because these staff members have not
been trained to effectively provide support as community organizers. The agency that could best
take responsibility for providing support to the WUAs must also be clarified. The PWRSs could
be the best choice, but during project implementation, the BAPPEDASs also played a role in
supporting the WUAs, particularly in providing training.
45. A further constraint was identified in ENT where the OEM experienced difficulties in
communicating with farmers. Many of the government staff members at the provincial level are
migrants and are not fluent in the local dialects. This renders their task of consulting with
farmers difficult and often requires them to rely on interpreters. This situation has not been
conducive to effective working relationships with the local communities in irrigation systems.
10
46. Vehicles were observed to be operating, and various office and audiovisual equipment is
still being used. Many of the staff members trained under the Project have been transferred ;,. so
are lost for the project systems or the provinces where they were located.
C. Financial Performance
47. One loan covenant concerned introducing 1SF collection in each of the schemes
developed. The PCR stated that this had been complied with. However, during the OEM,
collection was evident in only 1 of the 13 schemes visited. Furthermore, the WUAs that have a
policy regarding 1SF collection have set the level of payment at as little as Rp15,000
($1.75 equivalent)/ha and, in some cases, with repayment required only once a year despite
multiple cropping. This is inadequate to cover the cost of routine maintenance of the schemes.
The PWRSs estimate the annual cost of EOM to be Rp60,000 ($7.00 equivalent)/ha. The OEM
estimate is that the real cost could be Rp425,000 ($50 equivalent)/ha. 4 When converted at
current financial prices, this amount represents the equivalent of about 385 kg of unmilled rice.
Assuming that farmers are growing two crops per year and achieving a yield of at least 4 t/ha,
this level of 1SF would represent only 5 percent of their gross revenue. Clearly, the approach to
collecting ISFs and the 1SF level need to be changed.
48. Farmers in project schemes are paying increased rates of PBB to the national treasury,
a significant achievement in WNT and ENT as elsewhere in the country. In addition to their land
tax purposes, PBB payments were also designed to generate revenue to fund the provision of
improved EOM, although little has been provided for that purpose. Moreover, because the level
of annual PBB is set at only Rpl 2,000/ha, even full payment could not generate sufficient fUnds
to make an effective contribution toward the cost of EOM.
D. Economic and Financial Reevaluation
49. The economic reevaluation of the Project is based on the direct incremental benefits
from the irrigation development in terms of increased crop output. The economic reevaluation
does not take into account the additional benefits that have accrued from items such as new
secondary business activities, reforestation, and check dams.
50. The AR reported that the Project was expected to yield an EIRR of 14.9 percent. The
PCR estimate was 11.8 percent. Based on the sample of 13 schemes the OEM visited, the
EIRR is reestimated at about 14 percent. The EIRRs for the individual schemes range from
6.5 to 30.8 percent, except for the Datar scheme (where tobacco is an important crop), which
has an estimated reevaluated EIRR of about 50 percent. Based on the sample of seven
schemes in WNT, the average EIRR is estimated to be 16 percent. For the six schemes
sampled in ENT, the estimated average EIRR is about 9 percent, mostly because of less
favorable cropping and institutional conditions than in WNT.
51. The EIRRs are generally higher than the PCR estimates due to the. differing
assumptions used in their computation concerning the rate of build-up of benefits, levels of
cropping intensity, and provision of EOM. In the PCR, it was assumed that there would be a
gradual increase in benefits over five or more years followed by static levels of production.
Observations during the OEM revealed a rapid crop response to irrigation development under
the Project and essentially no EOM provision.
About $15-20 per ha may be required annually to maintain the on-farm facilities.
11
52. The lack of EOM will likely mean further declines in irrigated areas in the next few years
and the need for substantial rehabilitation in the future if the schemes are to remain reasonably
operational. The reevaluation baseline case for EIRR calculation has taken these into account
by including additional investment costs for an average 12 years after project construction. The
reevaluation has also ensured provision of significant EOM (Appendix 3). Despite the lack of
sustainability and the need to rehabilitate the schemes soon after project completion, the
reevaluated EIRR is as high as 14 percent. This (less than optimal) economic success is due to
quick-yielding rehabilitation, general simplicity of the schemes, and moderate average capital
costs.
53. The other major difference between the PCR and OEM estimates of EIRR concerns the
assumptions regarding the allocation of the support costs related to other components. Because
support costs are regarded as integral to the Project, they have been included in the evaluation
baseline estimates of the EIRR, whereas they were excluded from the PCR analysis. If these
costs are removed, the reestimated EIRRs all increase, especially in the case of the smaller
schemes with lower investment costs.
54. Further sensitivity tests have been conducted on the effect of changes of prices in
agricultural outputs and inputs as well as that of increases and decreases in yields of the main
crops. The effect of increasing the price of outputs has been to cause slight increases in the
EIRR5, the effect being most prominent in WNT. The effect of increasing the prices of inputs
causes marginal EIRR changes in both provinces. The effect of changing yields has more
prominent effects. With a 10 percent increase in yields, the EIRR in WNT rises significantly
more than in ENT. With a 10 percent decrease in yields, the EIRR is reduced to significantly
lower levels for the schemes in ENT. Further sensitivity analysis concerns the effect of changes
in the rice price. If the rice price expected at appraisal is used, the effects on the EIRRs for ENT
and WNT are only marginal.
E. Socioeconomic and Sociocultural Results
55. Without baseline data on the socioeconomic status of the communities within the project
schemes, the OEM relied on the information from interviews with government officials, farmers,
and their representatives within each of the schemes visited. Evidence is abundant that the
Project has had a major impact on improving the way of life of farm families within the scheme
areas as well as for those in small communities near such facilities as check dams and
agroforestry terraces. The impact is apparent not only in improved housing but also in the
reported improved nutrition standards, health, and education services that have become
available. Aside from benefits to farmers, men and women who work as laborers have also
benefited. Laborers randomly interviewed by OEM reported a three-fold increase in income and
a substantial increase in the demand for their services. Opportunities for secondary business
activities have also grown to cater for the increased demand for goods and services.
56. About 4,800 people or 1,125 families (compared with the PCR estimate of only
407 families) are reported to have resettled from two areas impounded by the Pengga dam in
WNT (Map 2, page vi) and the Kambaniru weir in ENT (Map 3, page vii) (Appendix 4).
Evaluation of these resettlement schemes is difficult due to a lack of documentation. OEM
interviews revealed that settlers received a house lot, agricultural land, 6-12 months of food
allowance, and agricultural tools. Basic public facilities were provided such as a school, roads,
and a place of worship. Despite resettlement to areas as distant as Sumbawa island, settlers
had few complaints about their new locations and indicated general satisfaction with the
compensation received. This could be due to consultation and visits by representatives of
12
potential resettlers to resettlement areas prior to moving. Little representative information could
begathered on the resettlement process and its impact on livelihood and living standards.
F. Gender and Development
57. Women, and to a lesser extent children, are involved in various activities within the
project schemes. They normally assist with rice transplanting, harvesting, and threshing.
However, they do not have significant roles in producing dry season crops, and generally only
participate in limited activities in backyard livestock raising. Overall, irrigation development has
had a substantial impact on the livelihood of both women and children in the project areas.
Benefits are most apparent for the women and children of farm families that own their land.
Furthermore, the additional burden of agricultural work created by the Project has been reduced
by farmers' increased ability to hire labor. For landless families, increased employment
opportunities in agriculture within irrigated areas of the Project have resulted in substantial
income gains.
58. Womens groups did not appear to exist in the villages within the schemes visited by
OEM. Women were generally not involved in managing WUAs, and only a few officers in the
EAs were female. In provincial and district agencies, men dominate the senior management
positions while women tend to be employed as office support staff.
G. Environmental Impacts and Control
59. The Project supported limited activities for soil conservation and stabilization in some
areas where soil erosion and consequent sedimentation pose risks to irrigation schemes. Some
examples exist of how effective these measures have been. Reforestation and terracing of
sloping lands in some watershed areas in WNT are impressive. The construction of check dams
has also been effective in reducing the siltation load on some natural drains and gullies in WNT
and ENT. These check dams have brought considerable benefits to limited numbers of farmers
in the downstream section of each dam by providing the opportunity for small-scale irrigation of
high value crops. This has been the case particularly where market access is available.
60. Besides these positive outcomes, several instances exist Where inadequate measures
have been taken. A notable example is on the main canal of the Pengga scheme that has one
section built along a hillside that is often exposed to boulders and eroded soil from the sloping
lands above. The Melolo scheme suffers from excessive siltation that has already substantially
reduced the areas being irrigated. The water that flows into the Pengga dam is heavily laden
with sediment. Despite this, the PWRSs have not been maintaining proper records of siltation
within this reservoir, which is critical for a sizable part of Lombok.
61. Because improved water supplies are available, farmers have invested in more fertilizers
and, to a lesser extent, pesticides. This has improved production levels, but has also affected
the environment within the scheme areas. Residual amounts of these inputs are reported to be
present in drainage water from some schemes. There were examples of groundwater being
polluted, resulting in shallow wells previously used for domestic purposes no longer beinga
source of potable water.
H. Gestation and Sustainability
62. The total elapsed time from the initial request for funding from the Government to the
approval of the loan was only two years. High priority was accorded to the Project because it
13
was viewed as making an important contribution to the Government strategy of achieving a

better balance of economic growth by increased assistance to the eastern part of the country.
63. The buildup of benefits was rapid, with farmers responding quickly to the increased
opportunity for more intensified cropping within the irrigation systems. This response has
occurred against a background of weaknesses in institutional capability of the EAs, with the
result that the level of incremental bebefit has not been maintained. Most of the project
investment was in the irrigation systems developed, and much of the benefit from this is now
being progressively lost by the decline in operating performance that is a direct result of the lack
of EOM. Within the irrigated areas, farmers have experienced increases in PBB of up to 300
percent. However, PBB is still inadequate to fund improved EOM in either province.
64. There are several concerns regarding the lack of sustainability that mainly relate to the
lack of budgetary support since project completion, particularly for EOM. The immediate result
of this is apparent in the (i) irrigation schemes experiencing declining cropping intensities due to
restrictions in water availability that are a direct result of the lack of effective canal maintenance;
(ii) lack of effective delivery of appropriate agricultural extension services due to minimal
budgetary support for operational cost; (iii) degradation of project forestry component
achievements, causing increasing siltation problems in both large and small systems; and
(iv) lack of encouragement for farmers to become self-reliant and take over support services
that the Government is unable to provide, and to be fully accountable for small irrigation
systems.
IV. KEY ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE
A. Lack of Sustainability
65. Several issues have a significant bearing on the performance of the Project and the
potential for similar projects to better contribute to national, social, and economic objectives.
Solutions to many of these issues are being pursued in ongoing operations of various external
funding agencies, including ADB.
66. Across all project components, support services are not being sustained and facilities
are not being maintained due to limited government budgetary support. This is due to a complex
array of evolving factors over time, including the past rapid economic growth followed by the
recent financial crisis (Appendix 5). The crisis is having a major impact on the Government's
ability to maintain the levels of local funding and highlights that ineffective measures were
established for cost recovery within the irrigation schemes. In the future, ADB projects should
give more attention to introducing the principle of payment for water use to ensure that EOM
can be achieved and water distribution systems maintained at full efficiency.
67. Along with adequate water payments, greater attention needs to be given to
strengthening the capability of WUAs so that they can play an effective role in managing water
distribution. For smaller schemes, WUA5 should assume complete responsibility for both
operation and maintenance. The Government has a policy for transfer of responsibility of
smaller schemes (less than 500 ha) to WUAs. This policy should be reflected in the
implementation strategies of future projects through the provision of adequate and appropriate
support to strengthen WUAs to enable them to assume these additional responsibilities.
68. If the principle of payment for water consumption is to be successfully adopted, it needs
to be introduced at the outset of irrigation development. When farmers are consulted during
14
project design, they should be introduced to the 1SF concept, highlighting that ISFs are
necessary for undertaking the development work. Farmer commitment to pay 1SF once the
irrigation scheme is fully functioning should be sought. If farmers have access to free water for
several years, the task of introducing ISFs becomes difficult. The recent Government policy
change for the WUA to retain and manage the 1SF collections for use in financing EOM should
significantly contribute to the process of convincing farmers to accept the principle of paying for
water use because the funds generated will remain under their control. However, the level of
payment for 1SF needs to be reviewed and set at a level that will generate sufficient revenue to
fund EOM.
69. An additional issue concerns the intersectoral water allocation in the wake of the rapid
growth of tourism in the western portion of Central Lombok (Map 2, page vi). The substantial
increases in domestic and industrial water use for the rapidly growing urban developments in
the town of Mataram may have an impact on the water available for transfer to the drier areas of
eastern Lombok. An issue for the Government to consider is for the WOC to be taken over by a
provincial-based government corporation that manages all aspects of water resources in the
province. This takeover can only be achieved through strong political commitment and financial
autonomy based on all users paying water charges.
70. The comment in the PCR that agricultural subcomponents should not be included in
irrigation projects because the, subcomponents are seldom sustainable is certainly, in this case,,
a reflection of inappropriate project support being provided. Providing agricultural support
services must be an integral part of any proposed irrigation development activity, and include
the promotion of improved technology for irrigated crop production as well as the introduction of
high value crops to allow farmers to diversify their production system, especially during the dry
season.
71. More consideration should also be given in future ADB projects to ensuring that the
support provided will not entail large recurrent costs but will be effective in delivering the needed
support services. As a corollary, ADB should give more consideration to privatizing agricultural
support services as a response to the frequent difficulties experienced with the sustainability of
government funding. While full privatization of such services may not be feasible, the delivery of
agricultural extension through time-bound contracts with external service providers, such as
nongovernment organizations, can be a much cheaper and more effective mode for service
delivery.5
72. Finally, it should be stressed that ventures like the Project, whose sustainability clearly
depends to a considerable extent on the support of the farmer beneficiaries, must amply provide
for their active participation in all aspects of the project cycle. Farmers' participation during
project design is just as important as it is during implementation. Mechanisms are needed to
ensure that farmers are involved in decision making and physical implementation, and that they
develop a sense of ownership of the activities and a strong commitment to the Project's
sustainability.
B. Institutional Environment
73. An important issue for future project design is the need for more appropriate forms of
institutional support to enhance technical capability and, more importantly, improve structures
Project staff commented that agricultural extension services should not be privatized or turned over to
nongovernment organizations. It might be done with assistance from universities.., in association with the PRASs."
15
and management approaches to ensure more responsiveness and flexibility in local institutions.
Institutional capacity building programs are clearly an essential need in future projects but they
should focus more on developing the ability of staff to analyze situations and plan more
effectively, and to accomplish this in coordination with other agencies. It should be recognized
that, while technical training contributes to developing the technical skills of local staff, it is not
the only aspect of institutional capacity building.
74. Local institutions need to be less concerned about rigidly defined responsibilities and
more concerned about working with other agencies to achieve an integrated approach to the
provision of support services to farmers within irrigation schemes. Thus, technical or
engineering solutions should not be adopted to overcome deficiencies in water distribution that
are actually a reflection of management failures. Such approaches do not promote the
involvement of farmers in understanding the true situation and appreciating the need for their
involvement in addressing problems. Future project designs should incorporate adequate
arrangements for ensuring complete integration of support by different agencies and full
participation by farmers within the irrigation systems in devising solutions to challenges.
75. An issue that emerged from one of the schemes in Sumba was the influence that the
existing hereditary leadership culture may have on managing the scheme by the WUA. Within
that culture, it is inevitable that the hereditary leader will be appointed as the WUA leader. Such
leaders exercise considerable power within the local community and may use their position of
authority in the WUA to further their own power and influence. The result may be a decline in
the equitable distribution of water within the irrigation scheme. Such difficulties could have been
recognized by consulting more effectively with farmers prior to implementation and determining
an appropriate response, such as more active involvement of the PMU in managing the
scheme.
76. Comprehensive assessments of institutional capacities during project preparation are

needed. Such assessments would provide the basis for the decisions on the sharing of
responsibihties for activities during implementation. Local institutions that have inherent
weakness in management capability can be strengthened through project interventions. Such
strengthening takes time to become manifested, and may only be late in a project's life that full
responsibility can be transferred to a local institution.
C. Data Quality
77. For effective project management, accurate and timely information upon which to base
management decisions is essential. The need for this type of data should be addressed through
including an appropriate benefit and monitoring evaluation system in a project. Project
implementation should also provide an opportunity for the EAs to improve their data collection
and monitoring procedures. Effective and sustainable management information systems should
be the legacy of any project intervention, not only to continue to generate data on the
performance of project facilities after implementation completion but also to improve the
methods for data collection for all EA activities. Without this more reliable data, sustained
management of project facilities cannot be assured.
16
V. CONCLUSIONS
A. OveraH Assessment
78. The EIRR has been reestimated for the whole Project at about 14 percent based on a
sample of 13 out of the total 32 schemes. Schemes in both groups have about 85 percent of
their areas rehabilitated. Other significant benefits have accrued from new secondary business
activities, reforestation, agroforestry, and erosion check dams that are not reflected in the EIRR
calculations. The model used f , r calculating the EIRRs reflects realistically the prospects for
sustainability of benefits and has proved robust to changes in input and output prices. In
contrast, reducing crop yields did have an impact, although only in ENT was the effect sufficient
to reduce the EIRRs below 8 percent.
79 It is against the background of substantial incremental benefits within the irrigation

schemes that concerns regarding sustainability must be envisaged. The general lack of. cost
recovery (despite a large increase in PBB under the Project) and provision of budgetary support
to maintain facilities and to fund continuing support services are to the point where the present
benefit levels are likely to decline in the future. While this can be attributed to the serious impct
that the financial crisis has had on the Government's ability to fund support services little
commitment existed even prior to the crisis to maintain recurrent funding requirements.
80. The institutional capacity building activities of the Project were not very effective,
resulting in inadequate coordination between the EAs. At the scheme level, farmers have not
been prepared to take over any significant responsibilities for the management of water
distribution or the maintenance of the facilities in line with the current government policy. The
activities of the agriculture development component did not have sufficient impact largely
because they were inappropriate and incurred substantial recurrent costs that the EAs could not
meet. Many of the facilities provided have not been maintained and staffing levels have been
inadequate.
81. OveraU, because of moderate capital costs and a quick production response,
rehabilitation of irrigation schemes has had high economic returns even if the lack of
sustainability will require a new round of rehabilitation within a few years. Production shortfalls
will occur in the interim. Shortfalls have already occurred because of low EOM provision and
poor performance in institutional strengthening and agricultural support services provided by the
Project. High (though less than optimal) and sustainable benefits have made the Project
generally successful.
B. Lessons Learned
82. Sustainability of irrigation projects would be better ensured if timely and adequate
maintenance could be provided. This would avoid early physical deterioration and production
shortfalls requiring costly rehabilitation works resulting in less than optimal economic returns.
83. For complex ventures like the Project, where many EA5 have been involved, with
activities that are closely interrelated, there should be adequate arrangements for coordination.
Greater success could be achieved if activities were synchronized during project
implementation. For projects that are involved primarily with irrigation development, major
agencies should be the lead EAs and have the responsibility for providing coordination with
other agencies. Planning institutions should concern themselves mostly with simply providing
overall monitoring of the Project.
17
84. Providing improved physical facilities for agricultural support services is not an
appropriate response when the agricultural staff do not have the logistical support to maintain
an effective extension service. There are lower cost options to improve this situation, including
the semiprivatization of agricultural extension.
85. WUAs need adequate support from skilled community organizers to help the officers
develop, their skills and .the confidence to play more effective roles in managing water
distribution and in maintaining the systems.
86. For farmers to accept the concept of paying ISFs, they need to be introduced at the
outset of the Project and set at a level that is realistic in terms of the actual costs of providing
effective operation and maintenance. If the amounts levied and collection levels are minimal,
there is little prospect for the introduction of EOM and for farmers to play a more prominent role
than is generally the case.
C. Follow-Up Actions
87. The Government needs to thoroughly review the whole system of 1SF levels and
collection. Clearer policies need to be developed regarding the use of the revenue generated
from the collections. An effective information campaign needs to be provided throughout the
irrigation schemes to ensure that farmers have a better understanding of existing policies.
88. The Government should address the urgent need for strengthening the capacities of
WUAs so they can assume greater responsibility for system management and maintenance. In
the interim, the Government should provide adequate maintenance funds to prevent production
shortfalls and to avoid the need to prematurely rehabilitate the schemes.
89. Present mechanisms for providing agricultural support services to farmers within
irrigation systems should be reviewed. More attention could also be directed to supplying
information on alternative high-value crops that can be cultivated mostly during the dry season.
90. The support and commitment of ADB and the Government are required to ensure that
better arrangements are made for participation by all stakehoiders during both the preparation
and implementation of irrigation projects. The approach to quick-yielding rehabilitation projects
with low unit costs needs to be revised. Such projects often have high (actual) economic returns
but generally experience low sustainability, deteriorate quickly, and require another round of
rehabilitation within a few years.
91. Many of the lessons and follow-up actions proposed have already been identified in the
irrigation sector in Indonesia. These items are progressively being acted upon by major
stakeholders. The point is that they need to be effectively and comprehensively implemented.
18
APPENDIXES
Number Title Page Cited on

(page, para.)
1 ProjectCosts 19 5,22.
2 Agricultural Benefits 25 7, 3O
3 Economic Reevaluation 33 11, 52.
4 Resettlement 49 11, 56.
5 The Financial Crisis 51 13, 66.

PROJECT COSTS
Table Al .1: Comparison of Project Investment Costs

in West Nusa Tenggara
($ '000)
Foreign Currency Local Currency Total

Item Appraisal Actual Appraisal Actual Appraisal Actual
A. Irrigation Development (DGWRD)

1. Civil Works 21,697 24,394 21,211 25,574 42,908 49,968

a. Dam and Appurtenances 10,894 10,705 7,064 6,753 17,958

17,458
b. Rehabilitation and Upgrading 10,533 13,402 13,743 18,391 24,276 31,793

c. Building and Offices 270 287 404 430 674 717

2. Equipment 956 89 160 285 1,116 374

3. Consulting Services 2030 2,917 1,924 2,909 3,954 5,826

4. Training 54 48 299 458 353 506
5. Survey and Investigation 9 9

6. Incremental O&M Costs 887 1,115 887 1,115

7. Land Acquisition 2,843 5,198 2,843 5,198

8. Land Development 65 65

9. BME 54 54 Co

10. Administration 2,082 2,095 2,082 2,095

Base Cost (A) 24,737 27,448 29,415 37,753 54,152 65,201
Physical Contingencies 2,474 2,643 517
Price Escalation 2,686 6,869 9,555
B. Irrigation Service Fee (DGPARA)

1. Equipment and Materials 103 52 12 115 52

2. Consulting Services 126 305 47 201 173 506

3. Administration 12 15 12 15

BaseCost(B) 229 357 71 216 300 573

Physical Contingencies 22 7 485 1,094
Price Escalation 18 14 32
C. Agricultural Development (DGFCH)

1. Civil Works 138 58 313 244 451 302

2. Equipment 352 389 79 39 431 428

D
4. Training/Demonstrations 657 885 657 885
CD
Base Cost (C) 658 566 1,435 1,779 2,093 2,345 0
Physical Contingencies 66 134 200 ><
BME = benefit monitoring and evaluation, DGFCH = Directorate General of Food, Crops, and Horticulture, DGPARA = Directorate General -o
5)
for Public Administration and Regional Autonomy, DGWRD = Directorate General of Water Resources Development, O&M = operation and maintenance. (0
CD
West Nusa Tenggara (continued)

D. Soil and Water Conservation (DGRLR)
1. Civil Works 545 417 2,842 2,036 3,387 2,453
2. Equipment 179 218 20 10 199 228
Base Cost (D) 808 697 3085 2,236 3,893 2,933
Physical Contingencies 80 309 289
E. Land Tax Improvement (DGT)
1. Survey and Mapping 4,005 3,958 4,005 3,958
2. Equipment 192 520 21 213 520
4. Training 23 27 23 27
Base Cost (E) 304 690 4,365 4,390 4,669 5,080
Price Escalation 23 1,214 1,237
F. Strengthening of BAPPEDA (DGWRD)
N.)
1. Civil Works (office buildings) 11 17 28 0
2. Equipment 57 57
3. Consulting Services
4. Training 209 209
5. Administration 45 45
Base Cost (F) 68 271 339
Physical Contingencies
Price Escalation
Total Base Cost 26,736 29,826 38,371 46,645 65,107 76,471

G. Taxes and Duties 6,585 6,739 6,585 6,739

H. Interest and Service Charge 10,400 10,430 10,400 10,430

- during Construction 286
9,100 >
D
I. Refinancing TA 18,295
CD
1. Physical Contingencies 2,672 3,509 6,181

2. Price Contingencies 2,868 9,309 2,868 0.
><
-'
Total Project Cost 42,676 40,256 57,774 .53,384 109,436 93,640
-o
DGRLR = Directorate General for Reforestation and Land Rehabilitation, DOT = Directorate General for Tax, DGWRD = Directorate General of
Water Resources Development, TA = technical assistance. . . '- . CD
Source: Appraisal report and project completion report. NJ
Table Al .2: Comparison of Project Investment Costs
in East Nusa Tenggara
($ 000)

1. Civil Works 6,902 8,917 10,360 13,365 17,262 22,282
a. Dam and Appurtenances
c. Building and Offices 192 172 295 247 487 419
2. Equipment 717 705 177 94 894 799
3. Consulting Services 532 1,147 930 2,101 1,462 3,248
4. Training 22 179 269 201 269
6. Incremental O&M Costs 373 384 373 384
7. Land Acquisition 142 490 142 490
9. BME
10. Administration 821 1,420 821 1,420
BaseCost(A) 8,173 10769 13,105 18,270 21,278 29,039
Physical Contingencies 818 1,192 2,010
Base Cost (B) 145 154 42 107 187 261
1. Civil Works 428 181 1,589 1,237 2,017 1,418
2. Equipment 536 592 78 39 614 631
4. Training/Demonstrations 860 1,159 860 1,159
BaseCost(C) 1,132 892 3,109 3,319 4,241 4,211
BME = benefit monitoring and evaluation, DGFCH = Directorate General of Food, Crops, and Horticulture, DGPARA = Directorate General X
-S
for Public Administration and Regional Autonomy, DGWRD Directorate General of Water Resources Development, O&M = operation and maintenance.
1J
(0
CD
East Nusa Tenggara (continued)

1. Civil Works 314 240 1,207 865 1,521 1,105
2. Equipment 96 117 32 17 128 134
Base Cost (D) 746 606 1,552 1,293 2,298 1,899
1. Survey and Mapping 649 641 649 641
2. Equipment 90 244 10 100 244
4. Training 15 18 15 18
Base Cost (E) 118 287 746 765 864 1,052
1. Civil Works (office buildings) 180 133 270 199 450 NJ
332 NJ
2. Equipment 244 216 101 10 345 226
4. Training 478 117 478 117
Base Cost (F) 676 546 964 479 1,640 1,025

Total Base Cost 10,990 13,254 19,518 24,233 30,508 37,487
G. Taxes and Duties 3,415 3,237 3,415 3,237

H. Interest and Service Charge 5,200 5,215 5,200 5,215
during Construction

I. Refinancing TA 190 143 190 286

1. Physical Contingencies 1,098 1,821 9,100 CD

2. Price Contingencies 1,146 4,972 18,295 0
><
Total Project Cost 18,624 18,612 29,726 27,470 66,708 46,225
0
DGRLR = Directorate General for Reforestation and Land Rehabilitation, DGT = Directorate General for Tax, DGWRD = Directorate General of 0)
Co
Water Resources Development, TA = technical assistance. - - CD
Source: Appraisal report and project completion report.
Table A1.3: Comparison of Project Investment Costs
($ 000)

1. Civil Works 28,599 33,311 31,571 38,939 60,170 72,250
a. Dam and Appurtenances 10,894 10,705 7,064 6,753 17,958 17,458
c. Building and Offices 462 459 699 677 1,161 1,136
2. Equipment 1,673 794 337 379 2,010 1,173
3. Consulting Services 2,562 4,064 2,854 5,010 5,416 9,074
4. Training 76 48 478 727 554 775
6. Incremental O&M Costs 1,260 1,499 1,260 1,499
7. Land Acquisition 2,985 5,688 2,985 5,688
9. BME 54 54
10. Administration 2,903 3,515 2,903 3,515
Base Cost (A) 32,910 38,217 42,520 56,023 75,430 94,240
Physical Contingencies 3,292 3,835 7,127
Price Escalation 3,552 10,093 13,645
Base Cost (B) 374 511 113 323 487 834
1. Civil Works 566 239 1,902 1,481 2,468 1,720
2. Equipment 888 981 157 78 1,045 1,059
3. Consulting Services 336 238 724 1,284 1,060 1,522
4. Training/Demonstrations 1,517 2,044 1,517 2,044
Base Cost (C) 1,790 1,458 4,544 5,098 6,334 6,556
BME = benefit monitoring and evaluation, DGFCH = Directorate General of Food, Crops, and Horticulture, DGPARA = Directorate General
for Public Administration and Regional Autonomy, DGWRD = Directorate General of Water Resources Development, O&M operation and maintenance. -
-o
(0
CD
Comparison of Project Investment Costs (continued)

1. Civil Works 859 657 4,049 2,901 4,908 3,558
2. Equipment 275 335 52 27 327 362
BaseCost(D) 1,554 1,303 4,637 3,529 6,191 4,832
1. Survey and Mapping 4,654 4,599 4,654 4,599
2. Equipment 282 764 31 313 764
4. Training 38 45 38 45
BaseCost(E) 422 977 5,111 5,155 5,533 6,132

1 Civil Works (office buildings) 180 144 270 216 450 360 N)
2. Equipment 244 273 101 10 345 283
4. Training 478 326 478 326
Base Cost (F) 676 614 964 750 1,640 1,364

Total Base Cost 37,726 43,080 57,889 70,878 95,615 113,958

G. Taxes and Duties 10,000 10,000

H. Interest and Service Charge 15,600 15,645 15,645 15,600 31,290
during Construction

I. Refinancing TA 190 143 143 190 286

1. Physical Contingencies 3,770 5,330 9,100 (P

2. Price Contingencies 4,014 14,281 18,295 0.
x
Total Project Cost 61,300 58,868 87,500 86,666 148,800 145,534
DGRLR = Directorate General for Reforestation and Land Rehabilitation, DGT = Directorate General for Tax, DGWRD = Directorate General of
Water Resources Development, TA = technical assistance. (P

Source: Appraisal report and project completion report 0)
25 Appendix 2, page 1
AGRICULTURAL BENEFITS
A. Introduction
1. The agricultural benefits have been calculated based on estimates of cropping areas
and intensities, and crop yields that were derived from information gathered when the
Operations Evaluation Mission (OEM) visited the schemes. Farmers' yield estimates were
generally reasonable. These estimates were supplemented by other data from the extension
staff of the provincial agricultural services (PRASs) and the irrigation staff of the provincial and
district public works (PU), supplemented by data from the project completion report (PCR). Yield
data was also provided from the demonstration trials conducted at the technical demonstration
units (TDU5) financed by the Project. The yields from the TDUs were exceptionally high,
although these were from small plots, which typically overestimate yields. The data did not
provide evidence of consistent differences between wet and dry season yields of rice, so an
average estimate for both seasons was taken. In addition, because of the inherent weaknesses
in the data obtained, no attempt was made to use yield estimates for individual schemes.
However, for irrigated rice, lower yields were assumed for East Nusa Tenggara (ENT) because
some difference exists due in part to the lower levels of technology being used. To obtain some
estimates of the crop yields for the "without-Project" situation, average crop yields were
obtained for the districts with smaller schemes, and yields from adjacent districts were used for
the larger schemes. The yield estimates used for the major crops (under both irrigated and rain-
fed conditions) and the comparable figures from the appraisal report (AR) and FOR are
presented in Table A2. 1.
2. The information on cropped areas within the irrigation systems was imprecise. The main
difficulty is with the information compiled by the PRASs, which do not have reliable data on
cropped areas within the irrigation schemes. PRAS staff members do not recognize the
irrigation scheme as a distinct entity, and the data on areas that they record does not distinguish
between the cropping seasons. The PU irrigation staff members provide slightly better quality
data on areas, although there was a tendency to assume that the entire irrigation area was
being cropped during each season, which was not the case in some of the schemes visited. !
view of these limitations in data quality, the OEM relied mainly on the information provided by
farmers, and particularly the leaders of the water users associations (WUA5), to provide a
clearer picture of the actual situation and then to try to match their estimates with the data
obtained from official sources. The data on the cropped areas together with the cropping
intensities (CIs) are in Tables A2.2 and A2.3. 1 Based on the before project situation, the overall
reestimated Cl is 169 percent, compared with the AR estimate for the without-Project case of
153 percent and FOR estimate of 186 percent. For the "with-Project" situation, the reestimated
Cl is 224 percent compared with the AR estimate of 194 percent and the FOR estimate of
248 percent. The FOR estimates of Cl for the future "with-Project" situation (about 28 percent
higher than assumed in the AR) have not been met.
1
CIs are ca!culated for all areas cropped during the course of one year, whether under irrigated or conditions.
B. Schemes Visited in West Nusa Tenggara
3. The OEM visited seven schemes in the province of West Nusa Tenggara (WNT),
including the main Pengga scheme covering a total command area of 4,149 hectares (ha) and
four other schemes related to the Pengga scheme (Map 2, page vi). In addition, two of the
smaller independent schemes were visited. The schemes were all easily accessible by road and
in the case of the Ireng Daya scheme is situated very close to the town of Mataram in Lombok.
4. These schemes all involved rehabilitation, with only the main Pengga scheme adding
300 ha of area. The total command area is now 4,149 ha. Prior to the Project, severe water
shortages occurred in some areas of the Pengga scheme, where the cropping pattern generally
consisted of the main wet season rice crop with only very limited areas being planted to a
second rice crop. Over most of the irrigated areas, limited supplies of irrigation water were used
to extensively grow secondary crops during the remainder of the year. While irrigation
development has brought improvements in water availability, irrigation has not provided
sufficient water for successfully growing two rice crops per year over some of the schemes. In
the Pengga scheme, two rice crops are generally planted, although some farmers resort to a
secondary crop for the second season. In the third season, there is additional cropping of
secondary crops, consisting mainly of maize and soybean, the latter being directly sown into the
rice field without land preparation. The project farmers reported that their rice yields rose from
2 to 4.5 tons per hectare (tlha) in the wet season and to 3.5 t/ha in the dry season. For
soybeans, the farmers are now achieving yields of 1.4 t/ha. The average Cl for the Pengga
scheme increased from 187 percent before the Project to 219 percent at present,
5. The Parung scheme has an irrigated area of 1,270 ha. There are water limitations in
some sections because the scheme is supplied after water has traveled through the Renggung
scheme. As a result, two rice crops are grown only in the upstream portions, while downstream
farmers generally plant only secondary crops during the dry season. Small areas of tobacco are
now established over about 30 ha where irrigation is available during the dry season. Aside from
tobacco, the main secondary crop is maize grown under either partly irrigated or rainfed
conditions. Farmers reported that rice yields have increased from 3 to 5.5 t/ha with the Project.
The average Cl is estimated to have increased from 174 percent before the Project to 222
percent With the Project. In the adjacent system of Ranggung, which has an irrigated area of
1,260 ha, there is greater water availability and larger areas of rice are planted in the dry season
mainly in the upstream sections. This system also has about 300 ha planted to tobacco. In this
scheme, rice yields were reported as 4 t/ha before the Project and 5.5 t/ha at present. The
average Cl increased from 198 percent before the Project to the present figure of 254. percent.
6. The Jurang Batu scheme has a command area of 3,500 ha and a good water supply.
Farmers are achieving two crops of rice per year as well as one dry season secondary crop,
either tobacco or soybean. Rice yields have increased from 2 tlha before the Project to more
than 5 t/ha at present. This increase is attributed mainly to improved water availability, although
farmers have reported that they are now investing more in seed of improved varieties and
fertilizer. The average Cl was 151 percent before the Project, increasing to 214 percent at
present.
7. The Mujur I & II schemes are downstream of Jurang Batu and have a joint irrigated area
of 4,530 ha. These schemes have difficulties with water supplies. Prior to the Project, farmers
could plant only one rice crop per year using late maturing local varieties with a five-month
growing period during the wet season. With the Project, they grow one rice crop per year and
plant two other crops during the dry season. Soybean is an important crop during the dry
season although farmers report that their yields are less then 1 tfha. The average Cl within this
scheme increased from 171 percent before the Project to 219 percent at present.
8. In the smaller scheme of Ireng Daya, the irrigated area is 278 ha. Although there was
year-round irrigation before the Project, water management was very poor, most farmers only
growing one rice crop during the wet season and one secondary crop during the dry season.
The situation has improved. The current water supply is adequate for two rice crops over most
of the irrigated area, and yields have increased from 3.5 to 5.5 t/ha. An important secondary
crop for this system is peanut. The average Cl increased from 183 percent before the Project to
246 percent at present.
9. The other small scheme visited was Datar, with an irrigated area of 634 ha and no water
shortages. Farmers grow two rice crops per year and one secondary crop during the third
season. Rice yields are reported to have risen from 3 t/ha prior to the Project to more than 5 t/ha
at present. The main secondary crops are soybean and tobacco, with small areas of maize and
grain. The average CI increased from 180 percent before the Project to 247 percent at present.
C. Schemes Visited in East Nusa Tenggara
10. In ENT, six schemes were visited: three larger schemes on Sumba Island and three
smaller schemes in the western part of West Timor (Map 3, page vii). Two of the systems on
Sumba, Kambaniru and Melolo, are new schemes. The others are rehabilitated schemes; two of
these schemes also had small expansions of areas. The schemes on Sumba were accessible
by road. However, in West Timor, the Haekto scheme is about 10 kilometers off the main
highway, and the road is in a poor state of repair. The Oeloan scheme is only a short distance
from the highway, and its access road is currently being upgraded. The Loli scheme is along the
highway.
11. The Kambaniru scheme has an irrigated area of 1,240 ha and ample water resources.
Farmers in most parts of the scheme are growing three rice crops per year. Small areas are
planted to secondary crops (mainly maize). This is a new scheme, although limited areas were
irrigated before the Project. Irrigation has substantially increased rice production, with yields of
up to 6 t/ha being reported. The average CI within the scheme increased from 176 percent
before the Project to 261 percent at present.
12. The Melolo scheme has an irrigated area of 698 ha. Irrigated cropping has replaced
primarily rain-fed rice and maize. The high levels of siltation within the system have restricted
water supplies to downstream sections. As a result, only farmers in less than half the irrigated
area are growing three rice crops per year. In the downstream sections, only one or
occasionally two rice crops are normally achieved. An area of about 130 ha is reported to
receive no irrigation water. The average Cl increased from 138 percent before the Project to
169 percent at present. This lower level of increase in Cl reflects the restricted water supply to
the downstream sections of the system.
13. The Mataiyang scheme has an irrigated area of 1,216 ha. Under the Project, the existing
irrigated area was rehabilitated and new area was added. The scheme is in an area where
farmers traditionally raise livestock as their primary livelihood. Prior to the Project, about 200 ha
was receiving irrigation water. Farmers grew one rice crop per year with yields of 2 t/ha. With
the improved water availability brought about by the Project, farmers now plant two crops of
rice, with yields of up to 4 t/ha. However, because of the shrinking availability of water from
springs and the interest in livestock, the farmers are grazing livestock on almost 75 percent of
the irrigated area during the dry season, using some of the available water to irrigate the
pasture. In calculating the average Cl, grazing was included (rather than being treated as
fallow). Cl was 123 percent before the Project and 244 percent at present. In the economic
reevaluation, dry-season grazing was valued at the equivalent of a rain-fed maize crop.
However, in terms of livestock conversion, this value likely underestimates the actual
contribution of pasture to farm income in terms of increased !ivestock production.
14. Among the three schemes in West Timor, the largest was Haekto, with an irrigated area
of 380 ha. Due to water restrictions only half the farmers are growing two crops of rice per year.
Current yields are more than 4 t/ha compared with yields before the Project of 2 t/ha. Maize
appears to be the only secondary crop being planted by farmers who are unable to take
advantage of water during the dry season. The average Cl was estimated at 165 percent for
before the Project and 244 percent for the present.
15. In the case of the Oeloan scheme, the irrigated area is 76 ha. Due to water shortages,
only about 36 ha are receiving reliable supplies of irrigation water. The result is that onlytwo
rice crops are grown on this reduced area while, on the remainder of the land, rice may be
planted as a partly rain-fed crop with maize. Rice yields quoted by farmers in this scheme were
2.4 t/ha before the Project and 6 tlha at present. The average Cl was 153 percent before the
Project and 213 percent now.
16. Finally, the Loli scheme has an irrigated area of only 37 ha. Some 25 ha is currently
being cropped because about 12 ha have been converted into fishponds. The financial returns
from fish culture to the farmer are substantially higher than that attainable from rice cultivation.
Farmers in this scheme reported significantly lower yields: 1.2 t/ha before the Project and
1.8 t/ha now. Farmers use few if any agricultural inputs and rely on local rice varieties. The
average Cl (including fishpond areas) was estimated to be 168 percent before the Project and
219 percent now.
0. Agricultural Development Component
17. The Project included a component to provide complementary support to irrigation

development through assistance with land development, establishment of TDUs and agro-
climatic stations in ENT, improvement of seed production, and institutional strengthening for the
PRASs. The PCR noted that achievements under each of these components were
unsatisfactory; the OEM reaffirmed these findings..
18. The Project financed the establishment of 13 TDUs (7 in WNT and 6 in ENT). The
purpose of the TDUs was to (i) demonstrate improved rice and secondary crop production as
well as improved on-farm water management, and (ii) provide a site for conducting farm
demonstrations and trials. While the TDUs appear to have functioned e ffectively during project
implementation, it was apparent from the visits during the OEM that the TDUs have effectively
been abandoned. Three TDUs were visited: one in the Melolo scheme on Sumba Island in ENT
and two in the Parung and Pengga schemes in WNT. In all cases, the TDUs are now only
empty buildings, with all the original office equipment and furniture removed because of fears of
theft. No extension staff members appear to be permanently assigned at the TDUs. Although
there was one instance where the building was being used for occasional farmer meetings, it is
clear that aJI programs have ceased. The land originally allocated to the TDUs is not being fully
used, and farmers have been cropping some of the area. The agro-climatic stations adjacent to
the TDUs have no permanent staff assigned to them, and only rainfall is being recorded.
20. The Project also provided support to strengthen the seed production capabilities within
the two provinces. In ENT, a new seed farm was established in the Mataiyang scheme in East
Sumba. The farm is in a condition similar to that of the TDUs. The failure of the irrigation system
has resulted in only 8 out of the original 18 ha being irrigated. Production of rice seed is very
limited, and the staff reported rice yields of only 2 t/ha being achieved on the farm. Furthermore,
the production program appears to focus on producing seed of local varieties rather than of
improved high-yielding varieties: All the equipment from the seed farm has been transferred to
the PRAS office in Waingapu, the island's principal city.
21. The lack of adequate budgetary support for maintaining the facilities and for hiring
qualified staff to manage them has caused this unsatisfactory situation. The OEM considered
the TDU concept to be inappropriate as a government-owned and -managed research and
demonstration facility. Within the schemes visited, the extension staff members assigned are
providing services (within the limits of their capacity), and the need for the TDUs to enable the
extension workers to perform more effectively is doubtful.
22. Nonetheless, the overall delivery of extension services needs to be enhanced. Increased
operational funding and more direction to the extension message need to be provided. Over the
past few years (commencing with the support from the Project), considerable emphasis has
been given to promoting improved technologies for irrigated rice culture. This has been
particularly relevant in ENT, where farmers were not as familiar with irrigated production
technologies. However, in all the schemes visited, there are other crops being grown that, in
general, are not producing optimum yields. In WNT, farmers have expressed the need for
assistance to enable them to diversify into other high-value crops. The role of the extension
service should be to identify, demonstrate, and promote these alternative crops to provide
farmers with the opportunity to make better use of their land and of the available irrigation water
during the drier periods of the year when rice cultivation is not feasible.
E. Other Agricultural Support Services
23. The use of agricultural inputs varied from one scheme to another. Based on the
schemes visited, there appeared to be less investment in inputs in ENT than in WNT. This is so
because the extent to which farmers invest in additional inputs is closely related to the reliability
of irrigation water supplies. However, the moderate reliability of the yield information provided to
the OEM does not permit much meaningful comparison between schemes .to determine the
relative impact on yields of improved water availability and increased input use. Several of the
farmers interviewed reported that they had increased their use of agricultural inputs where a
reliable supply of water was available. The adoption of high-yielding varieties was more difficult
to judge. Many farmers interviewed continue to grow improved local rice varieties rather than
improved high-yielding varieties. Even for these improved local varieties, farmers reported
substantial yield gains.
24. Given the opportunity to invest in rice production capacity, farmers were expected to
seek credit in the form of production loans. The AR described the establishment of village
cooperatives as a means of channeling credit to farmers. Throughout the schemes visited by
the OEM, farmers described how they have been able to access loans from this source if they
wish to invest in production inputs. From the information provided, the loan is in-kind for the
material inputs required; cash is provided for labor costs.
Appendix 2, page 6
Table A2.1: Average Crop Yields and Cropping Intensitiesa
ARb PCRb OEM?

Without- With- Without- With- Without- With-
Item Project Project Project Project Project PrOject
A. Crop Yields (tlha)

Irrigated rice WNT 2.40 4.40 3.60 5.20 3.00 5.20

ENT 2.50 4.20 3.60 4.50 3.00 4.40

Rain-fed Rice 1.50 - 2.60 1.70 2.60

Irrigated Maize 0.90 3.10 2.30 3.50 2.00 4.00
-
Rain-fed Maize - 1.30 1.20 1.50

Irrigated Peanut 0.60 1.20 0.80 1.20 0.80 1.20

Irrigated Soybean 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.20 0.70 1.20
-
Irrigated Tobacco - 0.80 1.75 1.50 1.75
-
Rain-fed Cassava - 8.00 4.00 4.00
B. Cropping lntensitiesd

Overall Cropping Intensities (%) 152 194 186 248 469 224
- = not available, AR = appraisal report, ENT = East Nusa Tenggara, OEM = Operations Evaluation Mission,
PCR = project completion report, PWRs = provincial water resources services, PRAS = provincial agricultural services,
t/ha = ton per hectare, WNT = West Nusa Tenggara.
a
The OEM estimates solely based on data for the 13 schemes visited.
b
'With-Project" estimates are based on full agricultural development.
C
The OEM yield estimates are derived from PWRs and PRAS data as well as from farmer interviews: (i) without-Project
reflects the before Project situation, and (ii) With-Project reflects the present situation. In the case of both without-
and with-Project situations, future increases in yields for both rice and maize are assumed (para. 14, Appendix 3).
d
The OEM estimates of crop intensities are based on total areas of crops planted within irrigation
schemes and includes crops grown under both irrigated and rain-fed conditions.
Source: Crop yields were estimated from records of PWRs and PRAS and then adjusted using
data gathered during the OEM visits to schemes.
Cropping intensities were calculated from estimated areas from PWRs and PRAS data supplemented
by data from the water user associations within schemes visited by the OEM.

Table A2.2: Comparison of Crop Areas and Cropping Intensities Without-Project and With-Project,
a
West Nusa Tenggara Province
Province Appraisal Actual _________ Without-Project With-Project

Scheme Area Command - WSI OSI DS2 WSI OSI DS2
(ha) Area (ha)(ha) Crop (ha) Crop (ha) Crop (ha) Crop (ha) Crop (ha) Crop (ha) Crop (ha) Crop (ha) Crop (ha) Crop (ha) Crop (ha) Crop
Irrigated Crop Areas
Pengga-Related Irrigation Systems
Pengga 1750 R 0 - 1750 R 0 - 0 - 0 - 3,250 R 100 P 3,000 R 300 P 500 R 300 P
Parung 1,200 R 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 1,100 R 0 - 300 R 705 P 0 - 350 P
Jurang Batu 3,000 R 0 - 0 B 0 - 0 - 100 P 3,500 R 0 - 2,000 R 700 P 0 - 600 P
lfenggung 1,000 R 0 - 500 R 200 P 0 - 0 - 1,100 B 0 - 900 R 300 P 0 - 0 -
Mujur I & II 2,000 B 200 P 1,000 R 200 P 0 - 0 - 4,000 R 200 P 0 - 3,000 P 0 - 0 -
IrengDaya 250 R 0 - 100 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 255 B 0 - 210 B 45 P 0 - 50 P
Datar 550 R 0 - 250 R 95 P 0 - 0 - 634 R 0 - 384 B 175 P 0 - 25 P
Total 9,750 200 3,600 495 0 100 13,839 300 6,794 5,225 500 1,325
Rain-fed Crop Areas
Pengga-Related Irrigation Systems
Pengga 1,750 B 100 P 1,350 R 550 P 0 - 500 P 450 R 349 P 0 - 500 P 0 - 350 P
Parung 10 R 0 - 0 - 750 P 0 - 250 P 170 R 0 - 0 - 200 P 0 - 0 -
Jurang Balu 0 - 0 - 1,000 R 1,000 P 0 - 200 P 0 - 0 - 200 B 300 P 200 R 0 -
Renggung 200 R 0 - 100 B 200 P 0 - 300 P 60 R 100 P 40 R 0 - 400 R 300 P
Mujur I & II 1,330 R 0 - 1,000 R 1500 P 0 - 500 P 100 R 230 - 1000 R 400 P 500 R 500 P -

Ireng Daya 0 - 0 - 50 R 60 P 0 - 50 P 0 - 23 P 0 - 0 - 50 R 50 P
Dater 0 - 70 P 50 R 75 P 0 - 100 P 0 - 0 - 50 R 0 - 0 - 300 P
Total 3,290 170 3,550 4,135 0 1,900 780 702 1,290 1,400 1,150 1,500
Cropping lntensitiesd Overall Cl Overall Cl
Pengga. Related Irrigation Systems

Pengga 3,850 4,149 87 % 88 % 12% 187 % 100 % 92 % 28% 219%

Parung 1,210 1,270 95% 59 % 20% 174 % IOU % 95 % 28% 222%

Jurang Balu 3,500 3,500 86 % 57 % 9% 151 % 100 % 91 % 23% 214%

Renggung 1,200 1,260 95% 79 % 24% 198 % 100 % 98 % 56% 254%

Mujur I & II 4,650 4,530 78 % 82 % 11% 171 % 100 % 97 % 22% 219%

lrerig Daya 320 278 90 % 76 % 18% 183 100 % 92 % 54% 246%

Datar 590 634 98 % 74 % 16% 188 100 % 96 % 51% 247%

Total 15,320 15,621 86 % 75 % 13% 174 100 % 94 % 29% 223%
UI= cropping Intensity, tm = ory season, r = rice, r = otner crops, vvts = wet season.
Data presented for sample systems visited during OEM
Based on estimates of the before project situation. Areas may be overestimated because actual irrigated areas would have been likely to decline slightly in the without-Project situation.
The with-Project situation reflects the present situation.
Cropping intensities are calculated as the ratio of total cropped area (irrigated and rain-fedj to the actual irrigation area, espressed in percentages.
During OEM, crop areas were estimated from records of PWRS and PRAS adjusted based on data gathered during visits to schemes.
Source: Appraisal report and project completion report.

Table A23: Comparison of Crop Areas anc Cropping Intensities Without and With Project,
East Nusa Teggara Provincea
Province Appraisal Actual Without-Project 0 With-Project0

Scheme Area Command WSI - DSI DS2 WSI DSI 082
(ha) Area (ha) (ha) Crop (ha) Crop (ha) Crop (ha) Crop (ha) Crop (ha) Crop (ha) Crop (ha) Crop (ha) Crop (ha) Crop (ha) Crop (ha) Crop
Irrigated Crop Areas
Sumba
Kambaniru 400 R 50 P 0 R 0 P 0 - 0 - 1110 R 0 - 900 R 0 - 500 R 0 -
Melolo 100 R 0 P 0 - 0 P 0 - 0 - 400 R 0 - 250 R 0 - 100 R 0 -
Mataiyang 600 R a p 0 - 0 P 0 - 0 - 1105 R 50 P 150 R 0 - 0 - 0 -
Timor
Haekto 175 R 0 P 125 R 0 P 0 - 0 - 250 R 0 - 180 R 0 - 0 - 0 -
LoU 17 R 0 P 10 R 0 P 0 - 0 - 25 R 6 P 9 R 6 P 5 R 6 P
Oeloan 50 R 0 - 20 R 0 P 0 - 0 - 65 R 0 - 36 R 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total 1,342 50 155 0 0 0 2,955 56 1,525 6 605 6
Overall Cl Overall Cl
Rain-fed Crop Areas
Sumba
Kambaniru 170 R 620 P 390 R 550 P 0 - 0- 130 R 0 - 0 - 200 P 0 - 400 P C-')
Melolo 400 R 200 P 100 300 p 0 - 50 P 1\)
R 0- 100 R 100 P 200 R 150 P 0 -
Malaiyang 200 R 200 P 0 - 500 P 0 - 0- 0 - 61 P 0 - 1000 P 0 - 600 P
Ttmor
Haekto 150 R 25 P 50 R 100 P 0 - 0 -
Lou 0 - 20 P 5 R 10 P 0 - 0 - 130 R 0 - 100 R 50 P 0 - 100 P
Oeloan 26 R 0 - 10 R 10 P 0 - 0- 6 R 0 - 15 R 3 P 0 - 0 -
0 - ii p 0 - 20 P 0 - 3Q p
Total 946 1,065 555 1,470 0 0 366 172 315 1,423 0 1,180
Cropping lntensitiesd Overall Cl Overall Cl

Sumba
Kambaniru 1680 1240 100 % 76 % 0 % 176 % 100 % 89 % 73 % 261 °Io
Melolo 698 798 88 % 50 % 0 % 138 % 75 % 75 % 19 % 169 'I,
Mataiyang 1173 1216 82% 41 % 0% 123% 100 % 95% 49% 244 %
Timor
Haekto 400 380 92 % 72 % 0 % 164 % 100 % 87 % 26 % 213 %
Lou 37 37 100 % 68 % 0 % 168 % 100 % 89 % 30 % 219 %
Oeloan 202 76 100 % 53 % 0 % 153 % 100 % 74 % 39 % 213 % >
Total 4190 3747 91 % 58 % 0 % 149 % 95 % 87 % 48 % 230 %
- Data presented for sample systems visited during OEM.
Based on estimates of the before project situation. Areas may be overestimated because actual irrigated areas would have been likely to decline sli9htly in the without-Projectsituation
The with-Project situation reflects the present situation. -.
dCropping intensities are calculated as the ratio of total cropped area (irrigated and rain-fed) to the actual irrigation area, expressed in percentages
During OEM, crop areas were estimated from records of PWRS and PRAS adjusted based on data gathered during visits to schemes N)
0)
CD
ECONOMIC REEVALUATION
1. The economic internal rate of return (EIRR) was reestimated for each of the
13 schemes visited by the Operations Evaluation Mission (OEM). Based on the reestimated
EIRRs for these schemes, estimates of the EIRRs of the Project in West Nusa Tenggara (WNT)
and East Nusa Tenggara (ENT) have been derived as well as an estimate of the EIRR for the
whole Project. Six out of the total 19 schemes in ENT were visited, including 3 in West Timor
and 3 on Sumba island, together with 7 out of the 13 schemes in WNT on Lombok. The
schemes ranged in size from 37 to 4,149 hectares (ha).
A. Capital Costs
2. The Project's financial costs were converted to constant economic prices by removing
taxes and interest payments and by applying a 0.9 standard conversion factor (SCF) to the
financial local costs (except skilled services). These costs were then converted forward to
constant 1999 levels by applying different rates for the local currency cost and foreign exchange
cost components. For the local currency cost component, the Biro Pusat Statistik (BPS) inflation
index was used. For the foreign exchange cost component, the World Bank manufacturers' unit
value (MUV) index was used. For currency conversions, an exchange rate of Rp8,500 per dollar
was applied.
3. The economic cost of the Project comprises civil works, supervising consulting services,
land development, land acquisition, and administration costs. The success of much of the
Project is contingent on the future provision of adequate operation and maintenance (O&M).
Based on the schemes visited during the OEM, little, if any, funding has been provided for O&M
and irrigation service fees (1SF) have not been collected. It is unlikely that this situation will
change in the foreseeable future. No O&M funding was included in the economic reevaluation.
Because Of this inadequate provision for O&M, the OEM assumed that the schemes will need to
be rehabilitated, on average, about 12 years after project completion. These costs were
estimated as comparable to the costs incurred during irrigation development under the Project.
The OEM assumed that efficient O&M will be provided thereafter at a rate of about $50/ha.
4. The costs for the other components of the Project were applied to the development costs
of the individual schemes. As these other component costs are concerned with service
provision, a weighting procedure was used based on the irrigated area of each scheme. This
procedure was performed separately for WNT and ENT due to the higher levels of expenditure
in ENT, particularly on institutional building.
B. Project Benefits
5. In line with the approach adopted in the project completion report (PCR), only the direct
benefits of the incremental value of agricultural production were used in the economic
reevaluation. Other benefits from the Project cannot be easily quantified, including the
institutional capacity building of local institutions; establishment of water users associations
(WUAs); and improved nutritional status, housing, and health of the beneficiaries. In addition,
secondary business opportunities have occurred as a direct result of crop intensification and
yield increases.
6. For the direct benefits, financial crop budgets have been prepared for rice, maize,
peanut, soybean, and tobacco under irrigated conditions and for rice and maize under rain-fed
conditions (Table A3.1). These budgets were based on information gathered from the records of
0

Appendix 3, page 2
the irrigation section of the public works (PU) and the provincia I agricultural services (PRAS),
and from individual farmer interviews conducted during the OEM visits to the schemes.
Financial crop budgets were converted o economic crop budgets using the following
procedures:
(i) The commodity prices for tradable items were taken from the November 1998
World Bank commodity prices and converted to a copstant 1999 price basis
consistent with the valuation of the project costs. This was based on actual as
well as forecast commodity prices. In the cases of rice, maize, and soybean, the
prices were valued at import parity levels using actual and forecast commodity
prices from the World Bank (Table A3.2). The World Bank reference price for rice
was decreased by 10 percent to reflect the slightly lower quaflty of project rice.
For the other crops, the economic price was equated to the financial price.
(ii) Fertilizer was valued at border prices using the World Bank actual and forecast
prices (Table A3.3). Urea was valued at export parity while triple superphosphate
was valued at import parity. The current economic value of urea is about
1 .4 times the current financial price, for triple superphosphate the proportion is
1.2 times.
7. Farm labor was shadow priced with a factor of 80 percent of the average financial daily
wage rate of Rp5,000 to account for unemployment and underemployment f labor in the
remote rural areas of the Project. The SCF was used to convert draft power and the costs of
mechanical land cultivation to economic values. Seed was valued at 50 percent above the
economic value of the crop to reflect storage costs and losses.
C. Project Life and Phasing of Benefits
8. The PCR assumed a project life of 30 years for the irrigation §tructures and 40 years for
the major civil works at the Pengga dam and the Kambaniru weir. Based on the assumptions of
additional rehabilitation after the twelfth year and the subsequent provision of O&M, the
economic life for the reevaluation was set at a total of about 40 years. The commencement and
duration of construction varied across schemes, with the civil works in WNT being completed
slightly earlier than those in ENT. In line with the PCR, the year of commencement of benefits
was taken as the year following the completion of construction.
9. In the PCR, the economic analysis was conducted on the assumptions that the benefits
arising from the expansion of irrigated area would gradually build up and that farmers would
take several years to respond to the improved availability of irrigation water. The observations
from the OEM visits to individual schemes demonstrated that farmers were quick to take
advantage of the improved water availability. This reality required a. different approach in the
economic reevaluation of the Project. The following assumptions were adopted for the analysis:
(i) Upon completing the civil works, the area being irrigated increased from
80 percent of the potential command area to full use over the first two years.
(ii) The decline in operational efficiency within the schemes that can be attributed
entirely to the lack of efficient operation and maintenance (EOM) has caused a
progressive reduction in the irrigated areas. By the twelfth year after completion,
only about 70 percent of the command area is expected to still be supplied with

irrigation water. In the case of the Melolo scheme, where siltation is particularly
severe, it was assumed that the area will be reduced by about 50 percent.
(iii) During the thirteenth and fourteenth years after completion (depending on the
size of the scheme), rehabilitation work is undertaken to enable the original
command areas to again be fully irrigated. The cost of this repair work was
estimated to be the same as the original project irrigation development costs,
omitting the investment for substantial dams and weirs that occurred in the cases
of Pengga and Kambaniru.
(iv) From the fifteenth to the twentieth year, EOM is expected to be achieved with the
result that full efficiency would be maintained and the entire scheme areas would
be fully irrigated.
14. To account for the long-term increase in yields that is expected to accrue from the
increasing adoption of high-yielding varieties and the greater use of agricultural inputs and
improved methods of land preparation, the yields of irrigated rice and maize were assumed to
rise by 3 percent per annum, the yield of rain-fed rice by 2 percent per annum, and the yield of
rain-fed maize by 1 percent per annum.
0. Results of Economic Reevaluation
15. Table A3.3 provides an example of calculations for the Juran Batu scheme in WNT
regarding the annual economic and financial value of crop production. Table A3.4 provides
EIRR calculations, and Table A3.5 summarizes the main performance indicators of the
13 schemes visited during the OEM.
16. In WNT, all seven schemes visited during the OEM can be regarded as generally
successful. In the case of the three schemes for which EIRRs were calculated in the appraisal
report (AR), the Ireng Daya and Datar schemes show substantial increases in economic returns.
The Ireng Daya scheme is close to the town of Mataram on Lombok. The scheme was turned
over to the WUA in late 1994 and is now well managed. The Datar scheme is in an area where
farmers plant tobacco, which brings much higher returns than rice. In the case of the Pengga-
related schemes, The EIRR was only slightly reduced to 11.2 percent from the AR estimate of
14 percent and the PCR estimate of 12.4 percent.
17. In ENT, a different pattern emerges. When compared with the AR estimates, the EIRRs
of at! six schemes visited, were reduced except for the Loli scheme where the returns are
essentially the same. In the Loli scheme, about one third of the irrigated area was converted into
fishponds that produce higher returns for the farmers than irrigated rice culture. All schemes in
ENT have recalculated EIRRs that make the schemes generally successful. The Kambinuru
scheme is the only exception and is considered to be partly successful, with an EIRR of about
7 percent. The Kambinuru scheme has a substantial weir for which the investment cost was
higher than the remainder of the irrigation development within the scheme.
18. The schemes visited by the OEM had a range of investment costs. The highest was the
Kambinuru scheme, with a total of Rp123 million per ha (equivalent to $14,470 per ha), which
resulted in the lowest recalculated EIRR.
19. The overall EIRR for the two provinces was reestimated based on the analyses for the
schemes visited. The recalculated EIRRs for the baseline cases are 15.6 percent for WNT and
8.6 percent for ENT. The pooled estimate of the EIRR for the whole Project is 13.8 percent.
20. Sensitivity analysis was conducted on several variables to determine their impact on the
overall EIRRs for each province and on the EIRR for the whole Project. Table A3.6 provides the
results, which were as follows:
(i) The support costs were excluded from the overall investment. This exclusion had
a substantial positive impact on the EIRRs, most particularly for the schemes that
had relatively lower levels of investment for civil works. This exclusion has also
had a greater impact for schemes in ENT, where there was higher expenditure
on support costs, particularly on institution building.
(ii) The AR projection for the price of rice in 1999 was used. This had marginal
effects on the EIRRs for the two provinces and the overall Project.
(iii) An increase in the price of outputs by 10 percent caused slight increases in the
EIRRs, the effect being most prominent in WNT.
(iv) An increase in the price of inputs by 10 percent caused little change to the
EIRRs.
(v) Changing crop yields had more prominent effects than changing input and output
prices. With a 10 percent increase in yield, the EIRR for WNT rose significantly
more than that for ENT. A 10 percent decrease in yield would reduce the EIRR
for ENT toward a level that would make the schemes only partly successful.
E. Comparison with EIRR Estimates at Appraisal and Completion
21. The recalculated EIRRs for WNT are slightly higher than those estimated in the AR
(14.6 percent) and PCR (12.9 percent). In the case of ENT, the recalculated EIRRs are in
reasonable agreement with the PCR overall figure of 9.8 percent but considerably lower than
the original AR estimate of 16.2 percent. The PCR estimates do not take account of the prOject
support component costs. The PCR stated that, when these were included, the overall project
EIRR was reduced to 10.3 percent, which is lower than the reestimated value. Overall, the
findings of the OEM appear to confirm those of the PCR that the EIRRs are higher for the
schemes in WNT. This is contrary to the appraisal expectation.
22. For a valid comparison, the PCR estimates should be compared with the EIRRs
recalculated without the support component costs. Substantially higher rates of returns are
encountered from the recalculated estimates, due to a major difference in the assumptions
made between the PCR and the OEM concerning the rate of increase of the benefits. The PCR
assumed a gradual increase in benefits that would reach a plateau after only five orsix years
and remain static thereafter. The OEM recalculated estimates adopted the rapid expansion in
irrigated cropping areas and intensity observed during the first years of scheme operation, and
assumed a gradual decline of the same thereafter because of current and expected lack of
adequate system O&M.
F. Average Project Farm Income
17. Table A3.7 provides an analysis of the financial budgets for the major crops. Table
A3.8 provides estimates of the average farm incomes of 0.5 ha farms in WNT and ENT. It was
assumed that farmers in WNT would move from growing one irrigated rice crop and limited rain-
fed crops to cultivating two rice crops per year in addition to some secondary crops (soybeans
and tobacco). In ENT, it was assumed farmers would move from one irrigated rice crop on part
of their land, and rain-fed crops on the remainder, to one fully irrigated crop of rice and
additional irrigated crops in the dry season but with only rain-fed maize as the secondary crop.
18. The effect of the assumed increase in yields as a result of improved water availability,
higher levels of fertilization and larger areas of secondary crops, should enable farmers to
achieve an increase in net income of about 160 percent in WNT and about 130 percent in ENT.
No allowance was made in this calculation for changes in other livelihood activities. However, it
is likely that many farmers would do other paid work, but the opportunity for such work would be
reduced by the greater amount of labor they would need to devote to their own farms.
Table A3.1: Economic Value of Tradable Commodities
Item 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Rice (Import Parity)

Reference price 1990 245.1 270.9 287.0 251 0 221.4 242.8 269.2 297.3 280.5 3029 3017 296.1 292.3 288.5 284.7 280.9 277.1 275.1 273.1 271.0 269.0 267.0 265.0 263.0 260.9 258.9
1999 2649 292.8 310.2 271.3 239.3 262.4 290.9 321.3 303.1 3273 326.1 320.0 315.9 311.8 307.7 303.6 299.5 297.3 295.1 292.9 290.7 288.6 286.4 284.2 282.0 279.8
Quality Differential (-10%) (265) (29.3) (31.0) (27.1) (23.9) (26.2) (29.1) (32.1) (30.3) (327) (32.6) (32.0) (31.6) (31.2) (30.8) (30.4) (29.9) (29.7) (29.5) (29.3) (29.1) (28.9) (28.6) (28.4) (28.2) (28.0)
Shipping/Insurance 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 - 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0
CIF Bagged. Milled Rice, Nusa Tenggara Port
(S/t) 283.4 308.5 3241 289.1 260.3 281.2 306.8 334.2 317.8 339.6 338.4 333.0 329.3 325.6 321.9 318.2 314.5 312.8 310.6 308.6 306.7 304.7 302.7 300.8 298.8 296.8
(Rp 8,500/Si) (000 Rp/t) 2408.9 2,622.2 2.755.3 2,457.6 2,212.9 2,389.8 2,608.1 2,840.4 2,701.5 2,886.7 2,876.8 2830.5 2,799.1 2,767.7 2,736.3 2,704,8 2,673,4 2,656.7 2,640.0 2,623.3 2,606.6 2,589.9 2,573.2 2,556.5 2,539.8 2,523.1
Port Handling/Storage (5%) 120.4 131.1 137.8 122.9 110.6 119.5 130.4 142.0 1351 144.3 143.8 141.5 140.0 138.4 136.8 135.2 133.7 132.8 132.0 131.2 1303 129.5 128.7 127.8 127.0 126.2
Transport to Wholesaler 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
///TholesalerMargin 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15,0 15,0 ' 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 l5.0 15.0 15,0 15.0 15.0
VimolesalerMarlcetPnce 2,554.3 2,778.3 2.9180 2,605.5 2,348.6 2,534.3 2,763.5 3,007.4 2,861.6 3,056.1 3045.6 2,997.0 2,964.0 2,931.1 2,898.1 2,865.1 2,832.1 2,814.6 - 2,797.0 2,779.5 2,761.9 2,744.4 2,726.9 2,709.3 2,691.8 2,674.3
Transport Mill to W,olesaler (10.0) (10.0) (100) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (100) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0). (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0)
Traders Margin (15.0) (15.0) (160) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0) (15.0)
Ex-mill Price 2.579,3 2,803.3 2,943.0 2,630.5 2.373,6 2,559.3 2,788,5 3,032.4 2.886,6 3,081.1 3,070.6 3,022.0 2,989.0 2,956,1 2,923,1 2,890,1 2857.1 2,839.6- 2,822.0 2,804.5 2,786.9 2,769.4 2,751.9 2,734.3 2,716.8 2,699,3
Unmilled Rice equivalent (65%) 1,676.5 1.822,1 1,913.0 1,709.8 1,542.8 1,663.6 1,812.5 1,971.1 1,876.3 2,0027 1.995,9 1,964.3 1,942.9 1,921.4 1,900.0 1,878.6 1,857.1 1,8457 1,834.3 1,822.9 1.811,5 1,800.1 1,788.7 1,7773 1,765.9 1,754.5
t.ocal Transport (10.0) (10.0) (100) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0) (10.0)
Economic Farmgate Price 1.686,5 1,832.1 1,923.0 1,719.8 1,552,8 1,673.6 1.822,5 1,981 1 1,886.3 2.0127 2,005.9 1,974.3 1,952.9 1,931.4 1.910,0 1.888,6 1;867 1 1,855.7 1,844.3 1,832.9 1,8215 1,810.1 1,798,7 1,7873 1,775.9 1,764.5
Maize (Import Parity) -

Reference Price 5 1990 85.6 109.3 1050 980 93.1 97.6 103.6 145.5 108.2 96.1 98.7 101.8 102.9 104.0 105.2 106.3 107,4 105.9 104.4 102.9 101.4 99.9 98.4 96.9 95.4 93.9
1999 92.5 118.1 113.5 105.9 100.6 105,5 112.0 157.2 116.9 103.9 106.7 110.0 111.2 112.4 113.6 114.9 116.1 114,4 112.8 111.2 109.6 108.0 106.3 104.7 103.1 101,5
Shipping/Insurance 38.0 38,0 38 0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0
ClFNusalenggaraPort(S/t) 130.5 156.1 151.5 143.9 138.6 143.5 150,0 195,2 164.9 14t9 144.7 148.0 149.2 150,4 151.8 152,9 -154.1 152.4 150.8 149.2 147.6 146.0 144.3 142,7 141.1 139.5
(©Rp 8,500/Si) C000 Rp/t) 1,109.3 1.3270 1.287,5 1,223.2 1,178.2 1,219.6 1,274.7 1,6596 1,316.9 1,2058 1,229.7 1.258,1 1.268,4 1,278.7 1,289.0 1,299.3 1,309.6 1,295.8 1,282.0 1,268.2 1,254.5 1,240.7 1,226.9 1,213.1 1,199.4 1,185.8
Port Handling, Storage & Bagging 12 0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12 0 12 0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12 0 12.0 12.0 12,0
Wholesale Price 1.121,3 1,339.0 1,299.5 1,235.2 1,190.2 1,231.6 1,286.7 1,671.6 1,328.9 1.2178 1.241,7 1,270.1 1,280.4 1,290.7 1,301.0 1,311.3 1,321.6 1,307.8 1,294.0 1,280.2 1,266.5 1,252.7 1,238.9 1,225.1 1,211,4 12.0
Dealer Handling & Transport 25.0 250 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25,0 25.0 25.0 25.0 250 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
LocalTransport 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 100 10.0 100 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 100 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Economic Farmgate Price 1,156.3 1,374.0 1,334.5 1,270.2 1,225.2 1,266.6 1,321.7 1,706.6 1,363.9 1,252.8 1,276.7 1,305.1 1,315.4 1.325,7 1,336.0 1,346.3 1,356.6 1,342,8 1,329,0 1,3152 - 1,301.5 1,287.7 1,273.9 1260.1 1,246.4 47.0
Soybean (Import Parity)

ReferencePrice 1990 230.7 246,8 242.2 237.7 233.1 228.5 217.5 267.4 273.1 2308 214.4 222.1 228,7 235.4 242.0 248.7 255.3 253.6 251,8 250.1 248.3 246.6 244.9 243.1 241.4 239.6
1999 249.4 266.7 261.8 256.8 251.9 246.9 235 1 289.0 295.1 249.4 231 7 240.0 247.2 254.4 261.6 268.7 275.9 274.0 272.1 270.3 268.4 266.5 264,6 282.7 280.9 259.0
Shipping/Insurance 38.0 38.0 38,0 38,0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38,0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0
CIF Nusa Tenggara Port (SIt) 287.4 304.7 299.8 2948 269.9 284.9 273.1 327.0 333.1 287.4 269.7 278,0 285.2 292.4 299.6 306.7 313.9 312.0 310.1 308.3 306.4 304.5 302.6 300.7 298.9 297.0
(@Rp 8,500/Si) ('000 RpIt) 2.442,6 2,590.1 2,548.1 2,506.1 2,464.0 2,422.0 2,321.0 2,779.4 2,831.7 2,443.2 2,292.5 2,363.2 2,424.2 2,4852 2.546,2 2,607.2 2,668.2 2,652.2 2,836.2 2,620.3 2,604.3 2,588.3 2,572.3 2,556.3 2,540.3 2,524.4
PortHundling,Storage&Bagging 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 120 12.0 12.0 12.0 -12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
Wholesale Price 2,454.6 2,602.1 2,560.1 2,518.1 2,476.0 2,434.0 2,333.0 2,791.4 2,843.7 2,455.2 2,304.5 2,375.2 2,436.2 2,497.2 2,558.2 2,619.2 2,680.2 2,664.2 2,648.2 2,632.3 2,616.3 2,600.3 2,584.3 2,568.3 2,552.3 2,536.4
Dealer Handling & Transport 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
LocalTranspoct 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 100 100 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Economic Farmgate Price 2,489.6 2,637.1 2,595.1 2,553.1 2,511.0 2,469.0 2,368.0 2,826 4 2,878.7 2,490.2 2,339.5 2,410.2 2,471.2 2,532.2 2,553.2 2,654.2 2,715.2 2,699.2 2,683.2 2,667.3 2,6513 2,6353 2,619.3 2,603.3 2,587.3 2,571.4
CIF = east, inseranee, freight, t = ton, US United States. -- --

Milled rime with 5 perseot brokees, free on board Bangkok based oo World Bank oammndily price tarecusts, August 1598.
Yellow maize (US) No.2, tree on board US Gulf path. - - . .
Soyboan (USl cifRotterdam.
5
Cs)
0)
(0
CD
0)

Table A3.2: Economic Value of Tradable Commodities

Item 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Urea (Export Parity)

Reference Price, $/t 1990 149.0 157.0 151.3 145.6 139.9 134.2 177.4 180,3 135.0 119.2 142.3 151.7 150.4 149.1 147.9 146.6 145.3 144.0 142.7 141.3 140.0 138.7 137.4 136.1 134.7 133.4
1999 161.0 169.7 163.5 157.4 151.2 145.0 191.7 194.9 145.9 128.8 153.8 163.9 162.6 161.2 159.8 158.4 157.0 155.6 154.2 152.7 151.3 149.9 148.5 147.0 145.6 144.2
Price Differential toAsia
(16.1) (17.0) (16.4) (15.7) (15.1) (14.5) (19.2) (19.5) (14.6) (12.9) (15.4) (16.4) (16.3) (16.1) (16.0) (15.8) (15.7) (15.6) (15.4) (15.3) (15.1) (15.0) (14.8) (14.7) (14.6) (14.4)
FOB Price Bagged at Factory in
Indonesia (SIt) 177.1 186.6 179.9 173.1 166.3 159.5 210.9 214.3 160.5 141.7 169.2 180.3 178.8 177.3 175.8 174.3 172.7 171.2 169.6 168.0 166.5 164.9 163.3 161,7 160.2 158.6
(Rp 8,500/si) ('000 Rp/t) 1,506 1,586 1,529 1,471 1,414 1,356 1,793 1,822 1,364 1,204 1,436 1,533 1,520 1,507 1,494 1,481 1408 1,455 1,442 1,428 1,415 1,402 1,388 1,375 1,362 1,348
Transport to Nusa Terrggara 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25

Port Handling & Storage 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Wuiolesate Price . 1,543 1,623 1,566 1,508 1,451 1,393 1,830 1,859 1,401 1,241 1,475 1,570 1,557 1,544 1,531 1.518 1,505 1,492 1.479 1,465 1.452 1,439 1,425 1.412 1,399 1,385
(a)
Transportto Farm 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 iS 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15(0
Economic Farnigate Price 1,558 1,638 1.581 1.523 1,466 1,408 1,845 1,874 1,416 1.256 1,490 1,585 1,572 1,559 1,546 1,533 1,520 1,507 1,494 1,480 1,467 1,454 1,440 1,427 1,414 1,400
TSP (Import Parity)

Reference Price, $/t° 1990 113.0 131.8 128.8 125.9 122.9 119.9 125.5 154.3 . 158,9 168.3 161.3 152.7 151,2 149.7 148.3 146.8 145.3 138.7 132.1 125.6 119.0 112.4 105.8 99.2 92.7 86.1
1999 122.1 142.4 139.2 136.0 132.8 129.6 135.6 166.8 171.7 181.9 174.3 165.0 163.4 161.8 160.2 158.6 157.0 149.9 142.8 135.7 128.6 121.5 114.4 107.3 100.1 93.0
Shipping/Insurance 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0
CIF Nusa Tenggara Port(S/t) 162.1 182.4 179.2 176.0 172.8 169.6 175.6 206.8 211.7 221.9 214.3 205.0 203.4 201.8 200.2 195.6 197.0 189.9 182.8 175.7 168.6 161.5 154.4 147.3 140.1 133.0
(@ Rp 8,500/51) ('000 Rp/t) 1,378 1,551 1,523 1,496 1,469 1,441 1,493 1,757 1,800 1,886 1,822 1,743 1.729 1,716 1,702 1,688 1,675 1,614 1,554 1,493 1,433 1,373 1.312 1.252 1,191 1,131
Port Handling, Storage, and Baggin 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12

'Mmlesale Price 1,390 1,563 1,535 1,508 1,481 1,453 1,505 1,769 1,812 1,898 1,834 1,755 1,741 1,728 1,714 1,700 1,687 1,626 1,566 1,505 1,445 1,385 1,324 1,264 1,203 1,143
Transport to Farm 25 25 26 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Economic Farmgate Price 1,415 1,588 1,560 1.533 1,506 1.478 1,530 1,794 1,837 1,923 1,859 1,780 1,766 1,753 1,739 1,725 1,712 1,651 1,591 1,530 1,470 1,410 1,349 1,289 1,228 1,168
dr = cost, Insurance, freight, FOB = free on beard, TSP = teipte seperphosphate.

'Bagged, free on board, Westem Europe.
-
Bulk, free on board, US Gull ports.
CD
a-
x
(a)
(a
CD
Table A3.3: Financial and Economic Values of Production for the
Jurang Batu Scheme, WNT
Item 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 3003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013-2034
A. Total Crop Area (ha)
Without-Project
Irrigated Rice 3,000 2,925 2,852 2,781 2,711 2,643 2,577 2,513 2,456 2,389 2,329 2,271 2,214 2,159 2,105 2,052 2.001 1,951 1,902 1,854
Maize 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Soybean 50 49 48 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 33 32 31
Tobacco 50 49 48 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 35 37 36 35 34 33 33 32 31
Rain-fed Rice 1,000 1,075 1,140 1,219 1,289 1,357 1.423 1,487 1.550 1,611 1,671 1,729 1,786 1,841 1.895 1.948 1.969 2,049 2,098 2,146
Maize 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1.200 1.200 1,200 1,200
With-Project
Irrigated Rice 4,503 6,111 5.806 5,500 5,370 5,194 5.072 4.889 4,706 4,583 4,400 4,278 4,094 4,278 4,889 5.194 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500
Maize 417 556 528 500 489 472 461 444 428 417 400 389 372 389 444 472 500 500 500 500
Soybean 333 444 422 400 391 378 369 356 342 333 320 311 298 311 356 378 400 400 400 400
Tobacco 333 444 422 400 391 378 369 356 342 333 320 311 298 311 356 378 400 400 400 400
Rain-fed Rice 500 333 367 400 413 433 447 467 487 500 520 533 553 533 467 433 400 400 400 400
Maize 400 233 267 300 313 333 347 367 387 400 420 433 453 433 367 333 300 300 300 300
B. Total Inputs
Without-Project

Seed (kg) Rice 200,000 200.000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200.000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200.000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200.000 200,000 200,000
Maize 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24.000 24.000 24,000 24.000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24.000 24.000 24.000 24,000 24,000
Soybean 1,500 1.463 1,426 1,390 1,356 1,322 1,289 1,256 1,225 1,194 1,164 1,135 1.107 1,079 1,052 1.026 1,000 975 951 927
Tobacco 50 49 48 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 33 32 31
Urea (kg) 362,500 350.438 354,477 350,615 346,849 343,178 339,599 336.109 332,706 329,388 326,154 323,000 319,925 316,927 314,003 311,153 308,375 305,665 303.024 300,448
TSP (kg) 155,000 151,125 147,347 143.663 140,072 136,570 133.156 129.027 126.581 123,417 120,331 117,323 114,390 111,530 108,742 106,023 103,373 100,788 98,269 95.812 -.
Pesticide (I) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Labor(pd) 585,000 582.375 579.816 577,320 574,887 572,515 570,202 567.947 565.748 563,605 561,515 559,477 557,490 555,553 553,664 551,822 550,027 548,276 546,569 544,905
Tractor Hire (ha) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
With-Project
Seed(kg) Rice 254,167 305,556 290,278 275,000 268,889 259,722 253,611 244,444 235,278 229,167 220,000 213,889 204,722 213,889 244,444 259,722 275.000 275,000 275,000 275,000
Maize 16,333 15.778 15,889 16,000 16,044 16,111 16,156 16,222 16,289 16,333 16,400 16,444 16,511 16,444 16,222 16,111 16,000 16,000 16,000 16,000
Soybean 10,000 13,333 12,667 12,000 11,733 11,333 11,067 10,667 10,267 10,000 9,600 9,333 8,933 9,333 10,667 11,333 12,800 12.000 12,000 12,000
Tobacco 333 444 422 400 391 376 369 356 342 333 320 311 298 311 356 378 400 400 400 400
Urea (kg) 1,066,667 1.405,556 1,337,778 1,270,000 1,242,889 1,202,222 1,175.111 1,134,444 1,093.770 1,066,667 1.026,000 998,889 950,222 998,889 1,134,444 1.202.222 1.270,000 1.270,000 1,270,000 1,270,000
TSP (kg) 525,000 700,000 665.000 630,000 016,000 599,000 581,000 560.000 539,000 525,000 504,000 490,000 469,000 490,000 560,000 595,000 630,000 630,000 630,000 630,000
Pesticide (I) 4,583 6,111 5,806 5,500 5,378 5,194 5,072 4,889 4,706 4,583 4,400 4,278 4,094 4,278 4,889 5,194 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500
Labor (pd) 897,500 1.156,667 1,104,833 1,053,000 1,032,267 1,001,l67 990,433 949,333 918,233 897,500 066,400 845,667 814,567 645,667 949,333 1,001,167 1,053.000 1.053,000 1,053,000 1,053,000
Tractor Hire (ha) 5.000 6.667 6.333 6,000 5,867 5,667 5,533 5,333 5,133 5,000 4,800 4,667 4.467 4,667 5,333 5.667 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000
C. Total Volume of Output (t)

Without-Project
Rice 10,700 10,902 10,803 11,007 11,213 11,422 11,634 11,848 12,066 12,287 12,511 12,739 12,969 13,203 13,440 13,681 13,926 14,174 14,425 14,681
Maize 1,800 1,333 1,333 1,347 1,360 1,374 1,387 1,401 1,415 1,429 1,444 1,458 1,473 1,407 1,502 1,517 1,532 1,548 1,563 1,579
Soybean 35 34 33 32 32 31 30 29 29 28 27 26 26 25 25 24 23 23 22 22
Tobacco 75 73 71 70 60 66 64 63 61 60 58 57 55 54 53 51 50 49 48 46
With-Project
Rice 24,683 33,309 31,730 31,049 31,303 31,199 31,415 31,249 31,044 31,187 30,910 31,000 30,641 32,865 38,360 41,829 45,473 46,828 48,224 49,661
Maize 1,433 1,498 1,491 1,520 1,553 1,583 1,616 1,645 1,674 1,705 1,733 1,763 1,789 1,641 1,931 2,003 2,080 2.132 2,186 2,241
Soybean 400 533 507 480 469 453 443 427 4l1 400 364 373 357 373 427 453 460 480 480 460
Tobacco 583 778 739 700 684 661 646 622 599 583 560 544 521 544 622 661 700 700 700 700
0
ha = hectare, kg = kilogram, I = titer, pd = person-day, I = Ion, TSP = triple superphosphate, WNT = West Nusa Tenggara.
0)
l)
(0
CD
OD
T able A3.3: Financial and Economic Values of Production for the
Jurang Batu Scheme, WNT (continued)
Item 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2911 2012 2013-2034
D. Input Prices (Rp)

Input Prices (financial)
Seed(pnrkg) Rice 1,650 1,650 1,650 1,650 1,650 1.650 1,650 l,650 1,650 1,650 1,650 1650 1,650 1650 1,650 1,650 1,650 1,650 1600 1,650
Maize 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1500 1,500 1,500 1.500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
Soybean 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 5.250 5,250 5.250 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250
Tobacco 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250.000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250.000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000
Urea (kg) 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 l,l00 I,tOO 1,100 1,l00 1,100 1,100
TSP (kg) 1,500 l,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 l,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
Pesticide (I) 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,050 30,000 35,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000
Labor (p4) 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,050 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,050 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5.000 5,000
Tractor Hire (ha) 300,000 300,000 300,000 300,000 300,000 300.000 300.000 300,000 300,000 300.000 300,000 300,000 300,000 300.000 300,000 300,000 300,000 300.000 300,000 300,000
Input Prices (economic)

Seed (per kg) Rice 2,510 2,734 2,972 2,829 3,019 3,009 2,061 2,925 2,897 2.865 2,033 2,801 2,704 2,766 2,740 2,732 2,715 2,698 2,681 2,664

Maize 1,900 1,983 2,500 2.046 1,879 1.915 1,850 1,973 1,989 2,004 2,019 2,035 2,014 1,904 1,873 1,952 1.932 1,911 1,890 1,970

Soybean 3,704 3,552 4,240 4.318 3,735 3,505 3,615 3,707 3.798 3,890 3,981 4,073 4,049 4,025 4,001 3,977 3,953 3,929 3,905 3,901

Tobacco 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,005 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 250,000

Urea (kg) 1,408 1.045 1,874 1,416 1,256 1,490 1,505 1,572 1,559 1,546 1,533 1,520 1,507 I,404 1,400 1,467 1,454 I,440 1,427 I,414

TSP (kg) 1,478 1,530 1,794 1,937 1,923 1,059 1,700 1,766 1,753 1,739 1,725 1,712 1,051 I,591 1,530 1,470 1,410 1,349 1,289 1,228

Pesticide (I) 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30.000 30.000 30.000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30.000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30.000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000

Labor (p4) 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,005 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000

Tractor Hire (ha) 270,000 270,000 270,000 270,000 270,000 270.000 270,000 270.000 270,000 270,000 270.000 270,000 270,000 270,000 270,000 270.000 270,000 270,000 270.000 270,000
E. Output Prices ('008 Rp)

Financial (per ton)

Rice 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,190 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,l00 1,100 1,100 I,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 t,I00

Maize 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1.000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1.000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,900 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000

Soybean 3.500 3.500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 - 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500

Tobacco 3,700 3,700 3.700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,705 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700
Economic (per ton)

Rice 1,674 1,023 1.981 1,886 2,013 2,006 1,974 1,953 1,931 1,910 1,809 1.067 1,856 1,844 1,033 1,922 1,810 1,799 1,787 1,776

Mnize 1,267 1.322 1.707 1,364 1,253 1,277 1,305 1,315 1,326 1,336 1,346 1,357 1,343 1,329 1,315 1,301 1,288 1,274 I,260 1,246

Soybean 2,409 2,368 2,826 2,879 2,490 2,339 2,410 2,471 2,532 2,593 2,654 2,715 2,699 2,683 2,667 2,651 2,635 2,619 2,603 2,587

Tobacco 3,700 3,700 3.700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700
ha = heclare, kg kilogram, I = liter, pd = perono-day, TSP = triple superphosphate.

Seed of ice, maize, and ooybean valued at 50 percent higher than market price.
0
CD
><
0)
(a
CD
Co


Jurang Batu Scheme, WNT(continued)
tern 1994 .1995 1996 1991 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013-2034
F. Financial Costs of Production ('000 Rp)

Without-Project
Seed Rice 330000 330.000 330,000 330,000 330,000 330000 330,000 330,000 330000 330.000 330,000 330,000 330000 330,000 330.000 330,000 330.000 330,000 330,000 330,000
Maize 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36.000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000
Soybean 7.875 7.678 7,486 7,299 7,117 6,939 6,765 6.596 6,431 6,270 6.114 5,961 5,812 5,666 5,525 5.387 5.252 5.121 4,993 4,868
Tobacco 12,500 12.188 11,883 11,586 11,296 11.014 10,738 10,470 10,208 9,953 9,704 9,462 9,225 8,894 8.769 8,550 8,337 8.128 7.925 7,727
Urea 398,750 394,281 389,924 305,676 381,534 377,496 373,558 369,719 365,977 362,327 358,769 355,300 351,917 348,619 345,404 342,269 339,212 336,232 333,328 330,493
TSP 232500 226.688 221,020 215,495 210,107 204,055 199,733 194.740 189,872 185,125 180.497 175,984 171,585 167,295 163,113 159,035 155.059 151,182 147,403 143,718
Pesticide 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Laber 2.925600 2,911,875 2,899,078 2,886,601 2,874,436 2,862,575 2,851,011 2,839,736 2,828,742 2,818,024 . 2,807,573 2,797,384 2,787,449 2,777,763 2,768,319 2.759.111 2.750,133 2.741.380 2,732,845 2,724,524
Tractorllire 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 3,942,625 3.918.705 3,895,392 3,872,657 3,850,490 3,828,878 3,807,806 3,787.261 3,767,230 3,747,699 3,728,656 3,710,090 3,691,988 3,674,336 3,657,130 3,640,351 3,623,993 3,608.043 3.592,492 3,577,329
With-Project

Seed Rice 419,375 504,167 478,958 453,750 443,667 428,542 418,458 403,333 388,208 378,125 363,000 352,917 337,792 352,817 403,333 428,542 453,750. 453,750 453,750 453,750
Maize 24,500 23,667 23,833 24,000 24,067 24,167 24,233 24,333 24,433 24,500 24,600 24,667 24,787 24,667 24,333 24,167 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000
Soybean 52,500 70,000 66,500 63,000 61,600 59,500 58,100 56,000 53,900 52,500 50,400 49,000 46,900 49,000 56,000 59.500 63,000 63,000 63,000 63,000
Tobacco 83.333 111,111 105,556 lOt,OtO 97,778 94,444 92,222 88,989 85,556 83,333 80,000 77,778 74,444 77,778 88,889 94,444 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000
Urea 1,173,333 1,546,111 1,471,556 1,397,000 1,367,178 1,322,444 1,292,622 1,247,889 1,203,156 1,173,333 1,128,600 1,090,778 1,054,044 1,056,778 1.247,889 1,322,444 1,397,000 1,397,000 1,397,000 1.397,000
TSP 787,500 1,050,000 997,500 945,000 924,000 892,500 871,500 840,000 809,500 787,500 758,000 735,000 703,500 735,000 840,000 892,500 945,000 945,000 945,000 945,000
Pesticide 137,500 183,333 174,167 165,000 161,333 155,833 152,167 146,667 141,167 137,500 132,000 128,333 122,833 128,333 146,667 155,833 165,000 165.000 165,000 185,000
Labtr 4,487,500 5,783,333 5,524,167 5,265,000 5,16l 333 5,005,833 4,902,167 4,746,667 4,591,167 4,487,500 4,332,000 4,228,333 4,072,833 4,228,333 4,746,667 5,005,833 5.265,000 5.265,000 5,265,000 5,265,080
Tractor Hire 1,500,080 2,000,000 1,908,000 1,800,000 1,760,080 1,700,000 1,860,000 1,600,000 1,540,000 1,500,000 1.440,000 1,400,000 1,340,000 1,400,000 1,600,000 1,700,600 1,800.000 1,800,000 1,800,000 1,800,000
Total 7,165,542 9.271,722 8,842,236 8,412,750 8,240,958 7,983,264 7 .8 11,469 7,553,778 7,296,086 7,124,292 6,866,600 6,694.806 6,437,114 8.894.606 7,553.778 7.983,264 8,412.750 8,412,750 8,412,750 8,412,750 N.)
0. Economic Costs of Production ('009 Rp)
Without-Project
Seed Rice 502,071 546,760 594,327 565,888 603,806 601,775 592,295 585,863 579,430 572,998 566,565 560,133 556,713 553,294 549,875 546,455 543,036 539,616 536,197 532,778
Maize 45,596 47,580 61,437 49,102 45,100 45,960 46,985 47,356 47,726 48,096 48,467 48,837 48,341 47,945 47,349 46.853 46,357 45,861 45,365 44,889
Soybean 5,555 5,195 6,045 6,003 5,063 4,638 4,659 4,657 4,653 4,646 4,636 4,624 4,482 4,344 4,210 4,080 3,954 3,832 3,714 3,589
Tobacco 12,500 12,188 11,883 11,586 11,296 11,014 10,738 10,470 10,208 9,953 9,704 9,462 9,225 8,994 8,769 8,550 8,337 8,128 7,925 7,727

Urea 510,419 661,165 664,246 496,518 435,809 511,301 538,224 528,346 518,694 509,261 500,042 491,029 482,087 473,342 464,788 456,419 448,229 440,214 432.368 424,686
TSP 229,154 231,199 264,401 263,862 289,361 253,845 236,979 229,290 221,837 214,613 207,611 200,826 188,891 177,428 166,419 155.850 145.705 135,971 126,632 117,675
Pesticide 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Labor 2,340,000 2.329,500 2,319,263 2,309,281 2,299,549 2,290,060 2,280,809 2,271,788 2,262,994 2,254,419 2,246,058 2,237,907 2,229,959 2,222,210 2,214,655 2,207,289 2,200.106 2,193,104 2,186,276 2.179 ,6 19
Tractor Him 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total 3,645,295 3,833.587 3,921,601 3,702,240 3,869,985 3,718,592 3,710,690 3,677,770 3,645,541 3,613,986 3,583,084 3,552,817 3,519,699 3,487,457 3,456,065 3,425,496 3.395,725 3,366,726 3,338,478 3,310,951
With-Project

Seed Rice 638,048 835,328 862,599 778,096 811,784 781,472 751,063 716.055 681,635 656,560 623,222 599,031 509,858 591,717 672,069 709,633 746,674 741,973 737,271 732,569
Maize 31,031 31,280 40,673 32,734 30,150 30,853 31 .628 32,009 32,392 32,732 33,119 33,462 33,257 32,783 32,004 31,452 30,905 30,574 30,243 29,912
Soybean 37,035 47,360 53,701 51,817 43,827 39,771 40,010 39,540 38,996 38,898 38,221 38,013 36,170 37,565 42,676 45,072 47,435 47,148 46,860 46,572

Tobacco 83.333 111,111 105,556 100,090 97,778 94,444 92,222 88,889 85,556 83,333 80,000 77,778 74,444 77,778 68,889 94,444 100,000 100,000 100,800 100,000
Urea 1,501,921 2.592,652 2,506,833 1,798,492 1,561,666 1,791,190 1,862,414 1.783,290 1,705,217 1,649,154 1,573,009 1,518,524 1,443,921 1,491,878 1,679,203 1,763,493 1,845,974 1,829,034 1,812,095 1,795,155
TSP 778,167 1,070,898 1,193,286 1,157,102 1,184,580 1,105,937 1,034,815 989,028 944.611 912,938 889,569 838,752 774,457 779,517 857.027 874.627 887,996 849,916 811,836 773,756
Pesticide 137,500 183,333 174,167 165,000 161,333 155,833 152,167 146,667 141.167 137,500 132,000 128,333 122,833 128,333 146,667 155,833 165.000 165,000 165,000 165,000
Labor 3,590,000 4,626,667 4,419,333 4,212,000 4,129,087 4,004,667 3,921,733 3,797,333 3,672.933 3,590,000 3,465.600 3,382,667 3,258,267 3,382,667 3,797,333 4,004.667 4,212,000 4,212,000 4,212,000 4,212,050
TractorHire 1,350,000 1,350,000 1.350,000 1,350,000 1,350,000 1,350,000 1,350,000 1,350.000 1,350,000 1,350,000 1,358,000 1,350,000 1,350,000 1,350,000 1,350,000 1,350.000 1.350,000 1,350,000 1.350.000 1,350,000

Total 8,145,036 10,848,629 10,706,147 9,645,242 9,370,185 9,354,167 9,235,253 8,942,809 8,652,507 8,451,116 8,164,740 7,966,561 7,663,208 7,872,238 8,665,869 9,029,221 9,385.983 9,325,644 9,265,304 9,204,965 CD
TSP triple superphoophale. 0

>(
0)
CD
0
Jurang Batu Scheme, WNT(continued)
Item 1994 1995 1996 1997 1996 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2000 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013-2034
H. Financial Value of Output (000 Rp)

Without-Project
Rice 11,770,000 11,992,530 11,883.457 12,107,164 12,333,034 12,563,029 12,796,914 13,033.252 13,272.910 13.515,957 13,762,462 14,012,493 14,266,125 14,523,429 14784,460 15,049,354 15,318,128 15.590,883 15,867,698 16,148,655
Maize 1,800,000 1.333,200 1,333,200 1,346,532 1,359,997 1,373,597 1,387,333 1,401,207 1,415,219 1,429,371 1,443,665 1,458,101 1,472,602 1,487,409 1502,283 1.517.306 1,532,479 1,547,804 1,563,282 1,578,915
- Soybean 122,500 119,438 116,452 113,540 110.702 107,934 105,236 102,605 100,040 97,539 95,100 92,723 90405 88,145 85,941 83,793 81,696 79,655 77,664 75,722
Tobacco 277,500 270,563 263,798 257.203 250,773 244.504 238,391 232,432 226,621 220,955 215,431 210,046 204,795 199,675 184,683 189,816 185,070 180,444 175,932 171,534
Total 13,970,000 13,715,730 13,596,907 13.824.440 14.055,407 14.289,865 14,527,874 14,789,495 15,014.790 15.263.822 15,516,658 15,773.363 16,034,006 16,298.657 16567,387 16,840,208 17.117,376 17,398,786 17,684,576 17,974,826
With-Project
Rice 27,151,667 36,640,022 34.903.391 34,154,133 34,433,497 34,318,499 34,556,349 34,373,774 34,148,392 34,305,990 34,000,640 34,099,884 33705,626 36,151,645 42,195,617 46,011.620 50,020,364 51.510,908 53,045,967 54.626,872
Maize 1,433,333 1,497,944 1.491,222 1,519,945 1,552,686 1,583,283 1,615,634 1.645,216 1,674,064 1,705,356 1,732,840 1.763,273 1,789,140 1,841,361 1,931,315 2,003,294 2,080,403 2.132.367 2.185,785 2,240.699
- Soybean 1,400,000 1,866,667 1,773,333 1.680.000 1,642,667 1,586,667 1548,333 1,493.333 1,437,333 1,400,000 1,344,000 1,306,667 1,250,667 1,306,667 1,493,333 1,586,687 1,680,000 1.680,000 1.680,000 1,680,000
Tobacco 2,158,333 2,877,778 2,733,889 2,590.000 2,532.444 2,446,111 2,388,556 2,302.222 2215,889 2,158,333 2,072,000 2,014,444 1,928,111 2,014,444 2302,222 2,446111 2,590,000 2,590,000 2,590,000 2,590,000
Tolal 32,143,333 42,882,411 40,901,836 39.944.078 40,161,294 39,834,559 40,109,872 39,814,545 39,475,678 39,569.680 39,149,480 39,194,268 38,673,543 41,314,117 47,922,487 52,047,692 56,370,768 57,913,275 59,501,752 61,137.572
Margin Over Costs (financial pricesj

Without-Project 10,027,375 9,797,021 9,701,515 9,951,783 10,204,916 10.460,987 10,720,068 10,902,234 11,247.560 11,516.124 11,788,002 12,063,273 12,342,019 12,624,319 12,910,257 13,199,917 13,493,383 13,790,743 14.092.005 14.397.497 -.
With-Project 24,977,792 33,610.689 32.059.599 31.531.328 31,920,338 31,951,295 32,298,402 32,260.767 32,179,592 32,445,388 32,282,080 32,489,463 32,236,429 34,619,311 40,368,709 44.064.428 47,958.018 49,500,625 51,089,002 52.724,822 (0)
Change 14,950,417 23,813,668 22,358.084 21,579,545 21.715.422 21.490.308 21,578.334 21,278,533 20,932.032 20,929,264 20,494,878 20,426.189 19,894,411 21,994,992 27,458,452 30.864,511 34,464,635 35,709,782 36.996,917 38,327,325
I. Economic Value of Output ('080 Rp)

Without-Project
Rice 17.907.194 19,869.803 21.401,987 20,761,520 22,567,594 - 22.910,900 22,908,342 23,138,479 23,305,233 23,468,528 23,628,283 23,784,415 24,067,100 24,350,685 24635182 24,920,600 25,206948 25.494,233 25,782,463 26,074,645
Maize 2.279,813 1,762.063 2.275,208 1,836,583 1,703,703 1,753,627 1,810,670 1,843,193 1,876,186 1,909.653 1,943,603 1,978,041 1,977,529 1,976,809 1,975,977 1.974,728 1.973,359 1,971,765 1,969,942 1,967,886
Soybean 86,416 80,807 94,038 93,386 78,761 72,146 72,469 72,446 72,370 72,268 72,119 71,932 69,721 67,575 65,493 63,473 61,514 59,612 57,767 55,977
Tobacco 277.500 270.563 263,798 257,203 250,773 244,504 230,361 232,432 226,621 220,955 215,431 210,046 204,795 196,675 194,683 189,816 185,070 180,444 175,932 171,534
Total 20.550,923 21,983,235 24,035,032 22,948,692 24,600,911 24,981,177 25089873 25286,550 25.480.418 25.671,405 25,059,436 26,044,434 26,319,144 26594744 26.871,235 27.148.618 27,426,891 27,706,054 27,986,105 28,267,042
With-Project
Rice 41,309,275 60,706,957 62,860,658 58,567,943 63,003,512 62,581,050 62,022927 61,025,204 59.959,438 59.567,448 58,374,494 57,880,192 56,861.739 60,613801 70,309.996 76,191,789 82.311,668 84,230,707 86,191,186 80.193,872
Maize 1,815,407 1,979,802 2.544,885 2,073,107 1,945,179 2,021,325 2,108,635 2164,171 2,219,342 2,278,372 2,332.920 2,392,032 2,402.470 2,447,221 2,540,160 2,607,227 2,678,917 2,716,447 2,754,378 2,792,703
Soybean 987,609 1,262,920 1,432.023 1,381,787 1,168.711 1.060.573 1,066929 1,054,390 1.039,900 1.037,287 1.019,218 1,013,678 964,524 1,001,744 1,138,030 1,201.511 1.264,940 1,257,267 1,249.595 1,241,923
- Tobacco 2,158,333 2,877,778 2,733,889 2,590,000 2,532.444 2.446,111 2388,556 2,302,222 2,215,889 2,158,333 2,072,000 2,014,444 1,928,111 - 2.014,444 2,302.222 2,446,111 2,590,000 2,590,000 2,590,000 2,590.000
Total 46,270.624 66.827.458 69,571,456 64,612,836 68,649,846 68,109,859 67587047 66545,968 65,434,569 65.041.441 63,798,632 63,300,347 62.156.843 65,077011 76,290,409 82447,038 88.845.525 90.794.422 92,785,160 94,818,498
Margin Over Costs (economic price5)

Without-Project 16,905,620 18,149,649 20.113,430 19.246.452 20,930,927 21.262,585 21,379.183 21,608,700 21,834,877 22.057.419 22,276,352 22,491,616 22.799,445 23,107,287 23.415.170 23.723,121 24,031,166 24.339.328 24,647,629 24.956,091
With-Project 38.125.580 55,978,829 58.865,309 54,967,595 59.279,661 58,755,692 56,351.794 57603,178 56.782,062 56,590.325 55,633,892 55,333,786 54,493,635 58.204,774 67,624,540 73,417,817 79,459,541 81.468,778 83,519,856 85,813,833
Change 21,219,950 37,829,181 38,751.878 35.721,142 38,348,735 37,493,107 36,972,611 35,994,390 34,947.185 34.532,906 33,357,539 32,842.170 31,694,190 35.097,487 44.209.370 49,684,696 55.428,375 57,129,450 58,072,227 60,657,443
-o
CD
(a)
-o
ca
CD
-
Table A3,4: Summary of Performance of Subprojects Visited by the OEM
Item WNT (South Lombok) ENT

West Central Central Central Central Central Central Sumba Sumba Sumba Timor
Timor Timor
Penggaa Parung Jurang Batu Renggung Mujur I & II Ireng Daya Datar" Kambaniruc Melolo" Matalyange Haekto Loll1 Oeluan
Type of Construction Activities R-E R R R R R R N N R/E RJE R R
Command Area (ha) 4149 1,270 3,500 1,260 4,530 278 634 1,240 698 1,216 380 37 76
Rice Output (t)9

Without-Project 21,822 3,104 14,681 6,855 11,757 1,551 3,389 2,993 1,622 2,936 1.711 122 373
With-Project 60,848 7,793 49,661 18,919 39,295 4,238 9,133 19,117 6,346 9,401 3,779 343 757
Increase 39,026 4,689 34,980 12,064 27,538 2,687 5,744 16,124 4,724 6,465 2,068 221 384
Maize Output9
Without-Project 1,513 3,104 1,579 658 2,447 145 356 1,622 6,346 9,401 164 39 13
With-Project 3,854 7,793 2,241 718 7,816 284 709 233 538 3,150 269 5 109
Increase 2,341 4,689 662 60 5,369 139 353 (1,389) (5,808) (6,251) 105 (34) 96
EIRRs (%)
AR 14.0 - - - - 16.7 17.0 12.7 14.4 16.0 20.1 18.3 15.8
PCR 12.4 - - - - 15.5 - 4.5 9.3 15.2 - - -
OEM (baseline)" 11.6 22.1 19.3 23.1 14.4 30.8 47.9 6.5 8.6 14.9 12.7 17.5 11.9
NPW 4% (Rp million/ha)

Investment Cost 74.3 27.3 54.7 42.7 39.9 43.1 28.5 209.2 66.1 41.7 40.4 33.1 51.2
Net Benefits 221.7 108.5 234.7 215.9 148.1 220.5 203.5 274.6 67.5 77.6 116.9 110.9 130.6
NPW 147.4 81.2 179.9 173.2 108.2 177.4 175.0 65.4 1.3 35.9 76.5 77.7 79.4
NPW 10% (Rp million/ha)
Investment Cost 53.5 18.6 37.7 29.7 27.5 31.4 20.8 111.4 47.8 41.7 27.4 24.1 36.4
Net Benefits 101.0 108.5 107.4 102.5 67.1 103.0 97.8 131.0 67.5 169.0 55.3 51.0 62.2
NPW 47.5 89.8 69.7 72.9 39.6 71.6 77.0 19.7 19.7 127.3 27.9 26.9 25.9
Direct Construction Cost'

(Rp million/ha) 48.4 6.8 26.3 17.1 15.8 16.5 6.3 123.2 29.0 6.4 6.3 14.2 13.0
- = not available, AR = appraisal report, EIRR = economic internal rate of return, ENT = East Nusa Tenggara, ha = hectare, OEM operations evaluation mission, N = new system,
PCR = project completion report, R = rehabilitation oniy, RIE = rehabilitation and expansion, WNT = West Nusa Tenggara.
With large dam structure.
Increased area of tobacco cultivation has resulted in significantly higher EIRR.
With large weir on a river With substantial water resources.
High levels of siltation.
Over half the irrigated area used for livestock grazing during the dry season. ><
At least 12 hectares of the scheme has been converted into small fishponds.
Projections of crop outputs at 20 years from completion of investment and NPWs estimated over a 20 year benefit stream.
Baseline EIRR assumes that rehabilitation costs equivalent to original project cost investment are met after 12 years and effective operation and maintenance costs start at $50 per hectare after completion of rehabilitation.
Direct construction costs are priced in constant 1999 Rp.

Table A3.5: Calculation of Economic Internal Rate of Return for the
Jurang Batu Scheme, WNT
(Rp million)
Investment Costs Benefits

Other
Project Civil Support
Year Year Works Costs EOM Total Total Net
1989 -4
1990 -3 610 610 (610)

1991 8,734-2 12,114 20,849 (20,849)

1992 50,330 20,689 71,019 (71,019)

0 1993 32,945 20,271 53,216 (53,216)

1994 7,274 7,274 21,220 13,946
2 1995 37,829 37,829
3 1996 38,752 38,752
4 1997 38,752 38,752
5 1998 35,721 35,721
6 1999 38,349 38,349
7 2000 37,493 37,493
8 2001 36,973 36,973
9 2002 35,994 35,994
10 2003 34,947 34,947
11 2004 34,533 34,533

8,734
12 2005 8,734 33,358 24,623

13 2006 50,330 50,330 32,842 (17,488)

14 2007 32,945 32,945 31,694 (1,251)

15 2008 1,488 1,488 35,097 33,610

16 2009 1,488 1,488 44,209 42,722

17 2010 1,488 1,488 49,695 48,207

18 2011 1,488 1,488 55,428 53,941

19 2012 1,488 1,488 57,129 55,642

20 2013 1,488 1,488 57,129 55,642

21 2014 1,488 1,488 57,129 55,642

22 2015 1,488 1,488 57,129 55,642

23 2016 1,488 1,488 57,129 55,642

24 2017 1,488 1,488 57,129 55,642

25 2018 1,488 1,488 57,129 55,642

26 2019 1,488 1,488 57,129 55,642

27 2020 1,488 1,488 57,129 55,642

28 2021 1,488 1,488 57,129 55,642

29 2022 1,488 1,488 57,129 55,642

30 2023 1,488 1,488 57,129 55,642

31 2024 1,488 1,488 57,129 55,642

32 2025 1,488 1,488 57,129 55,642

33 2026 1,488 1,488 57,129 55,642

34 2027 1,488 1,488 57,129 55,642

35 2028 1,488 1,488 57,129 55,642

EIRR (baseline) 19.3%
Net present value 4% discount rate 10% discount rate

(total Rp'OOO) (Rp'OOOIha) (total Rp'OOO) (Rp'OOO/ha)
NPV of Investment Costs 191,532 54.7 132,105 37.7
NPV of Project Benefits 821,288 234.7 376,030 107.4
Overall NPV 629,755 179.9 243,926 69.7
EIRR = economic internal rate of return, EOM = efficient operation and maintenance, ha = hectare, NPV = net present value.
Table A3.6: Comparison of AR and PCR EIRR Estimates and Sensitivity Analysis for the Entire Project
(%)
Whole
WNT ENT Project
Item Variation EIRR SI EIRR SI EIRR SI
AR Estimates 14.6 16.2 14.9

PCR Estimates 12.9 9.8 11.8

Base Case Estimates 15.6 8.6 13.8
With Support Costs &
Rehabilitation Costs
0)
Excluding Support Costs 23.3 14.1 21.2
Estimates Using:
AR-Projected Rice Price 15.5 10.0 14.1
Output Prices 10% 17.3 1.89 10.0 1.56 15.5 1.89
Input Price (10%) 16.0 0.44 9.1 0.56 14.3 0.56
Yields (With-Project) 10% 18.5 3.22 10.5 2.11 16.5 3.00

CD

Yields (Without-Project) (10%) 13.6 (2.22) 7.7 (100) 12.2 (1.78) 0
AR = appraisal report, EIRR = economic internal rate of return, ENT = East Nusa Tenggara, PCR = project completion report, SI = sensivity
indicator, WNT = West Nusa Tenggara. (0
CD
-.

Table A3.7: Financial Crop Budgets Per Hectare

(Rp in Constant 1999 prices)
b
Without-Project With-Project
Unit Irrigated Rain-fed Irrigated Rain-fed
cost Rice Maize Soybean Tobacco Peanut Rice Maize Rice Maize Soybean Tobacco Peanut Rice Maize
Item mit (Rp) WNT ENT WNT ENT
A. Physical Inputs
Seed kg 50 50 20 30 1 40 50 20 50 50 20 30 1 40 50 20
Fertilizer Urea kg 100 100 50 50 100 50 50 50 200 150 100 50 200 50 100 100
TSP kg 50 50 0 0 50 0 0 0 100 75 0 100 100 0 0 0
Pesticides 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Labor pd 150 150 120 100 200 150 120 120 150 150 120 100 200 150 120 120
Tractor Hire ha 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
B. Costs (Rp)
Seed (Rp/kg) 1,650 1,650 1,500 5,250 250,000 4,500 4,500 4,500 1,650 1650 1,500 5250 250,000 4,500 4,500 4,500
(Rp/ha) 82,500 82,500 30000 157500 250,000 180,000 225,000 o,000 82500 82,500 30,000 157,500 250,000 180,000 225,000 90,000 ,
Fertilizer Urea kg 1,100 110,000 110,000 55,000 55000 110,000 55,000 55,000 55,000 220,000 165,000 110,000 55,000 220,000 55,000 110,000 110,000 -.4
TSP kg 1,500 75,000 75,000 0 0 75,000 0 0 0 150,000 112,500 0 150,000 150,000 0 0 0
Pesticides I 30,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30,000 30,000 0 0 0 0 0 0
Labor pd 5,000 750,000 750,000 600,000 500,000 1,000,000 750,000 600,000 600,000 750,000 750,000 600000 500,000 1,000,000 750,000 600,000 600,000
Tractor Hire ha 300,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 300,000 300,000 300,000 0 0 0 0 0
Land Tax (PBB) 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 3,000 3,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 3000 3,000
Total '000 Rp 1,031 1,031 699 730 1,697 1,002 888 753 1,546 1,454 1,054 880 1,882 1,002 943 808
C. Production kg/ha 3,000 3,000 2,000 700 1,500 800 1700 1,200 5,200 4,400 4,000 1,200 1,800 1,200 2,600 1,500
Selling price Rp/kg 1,100 1,100 1,000 3500 3,700 3,000 1,100 1,000 1,100 1,100 1,000 3,500 3,700 3,000 1,100 1,000
D. Income '000 Rp 3,300 3,300 2,000 2,450 5,550 2,400 1,870 1,200 5,720 4,840 4,000 4,200 6,660 3,600 2,860 1,500
E. Margin '000 Rp (D)-(B) 2,269 2,269 1,302 1,720 3,853 1,399 983 448 4,174 3,386 2,947 3,320 4,778 2,599 1,918 693
F. Return to Family Labo Rp/day 15,126 15,126 10,846 17,203 19,265 9,323 8,188 3,729 27,826 22,576 24,554 33,203 23,890 17,323 15,979 5,771 >
ENT = East Nusa Terrggara, ha = hectare, kg = kilogram, I = liter, PEE = land tax, pd = person-days, TSP = triple superphosphate, WNT = West Nusa Tenggara. (0
'Mthout-Project based on estimates of before projeci situation.
With-Project reflects present situation.
Under the with-Project situation, rain-fed rice and maize yields are assumed to benetit from the available residual irrigation water.
Source: Operations Evaluation Mission inteiviews with farmers in selected schemes. 9)
0)
(0
-
(3,

Table A3.8: Sample Farm Income Analysis

for 0.5 Hectare Average Farm Size
WNT ENT
Item and Unit Without With Difference Without With Difference
Project Project (%) Project Project (%)
A. Crop Areas (ha)

1. Irrigated Area
Rice 0.500 0.900 0.250 0.770
Maize 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Soybean 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.000
Tobacco 0.000 0.110 0.000 0.000
2. Rain-fed Area
Rice 0.185 0.000 0.245 0.180
Maize 0.185 0.000 0.250 0.200

Overall Cl (%) 174.000 223.000 149.000 230.000
B. Income ('000 Rp)

Net Agricultural
583.625
2 67.250 Irrigated 23.1 5.390
1,303.610 308 360
Rain-ted 320.235 0.000 (100) 427.835 326.540 (24),
Total 887.485 231 5.390 161 711.460 1,630.150 129
Cl = cropping intensity, EWI East Nusa Tenggara, ha = hectare, WNT = West Nusa Tenggara.
Source: Operations Evaluation Mission interviews with farmers on selected schemes.
RESETTLEMENT
1. The Asian Development Bank's policy on resettlement covers all categories of affected
people and requires the Government to pay for land and all other assets affected by the Project,
together with measures for income restoration and relocation. Construction of the Pengga dam
in West Nusa Tenggara (Map 2, p. vi) resulted in the resettlement of 923 families (approximately
4,615 people), while construction of the Kambaniru dam in East Nusa Tenggara (Map 3, page,
vii) resulted in the resettlement of 50 families (approximately 200 people). Overall, as many as
4,800 people (1,123 families) were resettled under the Project. The project completion report
reported 407 families. Interviews with local project staff revealed there was no organized
monitoring of the extent and the manner in which the resettlement plan was implemented.
impacts were not recorded or assessed, making evaluation difficult.
2. Through consultations with project authorities, communities affected by the construction

of the Pengga dam chose from three alternative resettlement options. The affected people could
(i) move freely to nearby Mataram city, with compensation for their house lots and
productive land;
(ii) resettle in a newly construóted settlement (complete with public facilities) near
the dam, with land-to-land compensation for their house lots and cash
compensation for the loss of productive land, plants, and trees; or
(iii) receive cash compensation for their productive land and land-to-land
compensation on Sumbawa Island as part of the Government's national
transmigration program.
3. Thirty households moved freely to the nearby city of Mataram, about 15 kilometers from
Pengga village. According to the Operations Evaluation Mission's interviews with the affected
people, people from these households were among the rich people in the village. They received
cash compensation for their house lots and productive land, as well as cash to resettle in new
areas. The 104 households resettled in villages close to the dam received land-to-land
compensation. The Project also provided public facilities such as a school, mosque, and an
asphalt road. About 780 affected people became part of the Government's national
transmigration program. Some 300 affected people were given land that was served by a new
dam and irrigation facilities around Mamak village. Another 481 households were moved to
Labangka village on Sumbawa island.
4. Besides cash compensation for their house lots and productive lands, the affected
people who moved to Mamak village received 1 hectare (ha) of irrigated rice fields, a house,
food allowance for six months, and simple agricultural tools. People who resettled in Labangka
received 2 ha of nonirrigated land and a food allowance for 12 months (Table A4).
5. The Mission's interviews with affected people around the Pengga dam and with those
who had returned to their original location to visit relatives indicated that the affected people
were generally satisfied with the compensation received from the Government. There was a
resettlement plan for communities that were to be resettled, Consultations were done frequently
before the Project started and several local leaders visited the new locations intended for
resettlement, notably in Mamak and in Labangka on Sumbawa island. Overall, resettlement
under the Project was mostly successful.
Table A4: Resettlement Compensation for Households Resettled in Mamak,

Labangka, and Kambaniru
WNT
Type of Compensation Mamak Area Labangka Area ENT
Amount of land (ha) 0.25 0.25 0.25
Housing Area 0.75 - 0.75
Irrigated Area - 1.75 -
Nonirrigated Area 54.00 54.00 54.00
Size of House (m2) 6 months 12 months 6 months
Agricultural Tools Received Received Received
Implementation Agency EA and Local Government Ministry of Transmigration EA and Local Government
- = not applicable, EA executing agency, ENT = East Nusa Tenggara, ha = hectare, m = square meter, WNT = West
Nusa Tenggara.
6. In the case of the Kambanru village in the district of Manggarai of East Nusa Tehggara,
about 200 affected people (54 households) were resettled to higher ground above the high
water level of the impoundment in Kambaniru. As part of the Government's national
transmigration program, each affected family received 0.75 ha of irrigated land, 0.25 ha of
nonirrigated land, a new house, and a food allowance for six months.

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
1. About six months after the project completion report was prepared (in late 1996), the,
economy of Indonesia was severely affected by the Asian financial crisis. The effect of the crisis
has been felt most noticeably in the devaluation of the currency from an exchange rate of
Rp2,300 per dollar at the time of the project completion report to a rate of about Rp8,500 per
dollar during the Qperations Evaluation Mission. The crisis has had a significant impact on the
domestic prices of tradable commodities and on the price of agricultural inputs. The Biro P.usat
Statistik inflation index showed an increase of 78 percent during 1998 alone.
2. The effect of these changes on agricultural inputs was most noticeable for fertilizer
prices, which rose almost 300 percent in 1998. The cost of urea increased from Rp400 per
kilogram (kg) to its present level of Rpi,100 per kg, and the cost of triple superphosphate
increased from Rp500 to Rpl 650 per kg. Pesticides have shown similar price increases, while
the cost of labor has increased by smaller margins. The cost of hired labor increased from
Rp4,000 prior to the crisis to Rp5,000. However, these higher production costs have been offset
by increases in the prices paid at the farm particularly for rice, the price of which has more than
doubled to its present level of Rpl,100 per kg. The gross margin for irrigated rice production in
West Nusa Tenggara has increased from Rpl,605,000 to Rp4,174,000 per hectare as a result
of these changes. This 260 percent increase in the returns to irrigated rice production
represents a substantial contribution to offsetting the higher cost of many basic commodities in
the country.
3. One of the clear effects of the crisis has been the impact on employment in urban areas.
Displaced workers have been returning to the rural areas to engage in agriculture or seek
employment in rural industries. The effect of these movements may be felt in a surplus of labor
in the rural areas, a decline in real wages, and the erosion of some of the benefits of the Project
in terms of the improved well-being of farm laborers. Salaries within the country have generally
not increased in response to the devaluation of the rupiah and the increased cost of living.
4. Based on interviews with project farmers conducted by the Operations Evaluation

Mission, farmers are investing less in fertilizer and other agricultural inputs in the wake of the
crisis. Use of fewer inputs has resulted in some production decline, which is likely to continue in
the future.
5. It has been considered in the reevaluation that the economic price of rice should be set
at import parity levels. As a result of devaluation, the cost of imported rice will have risen
substantially in domestic currency terms, implying that the Project has provided additional
benefit to the economy by effecting foreign exchange savings. The incremental production from
the Project has also contributed to reducing the need for rice importation.
6. The effects of the financial crisis on the farmers within the Project's irrigation schemes
are the (i) higher cost of agricultural inputs (although returns on irrigated rice cropping still
appear attractive), and (ii) increased cost of hired labor (although labor surplus in rural areas
should tend to keep wage rates down). These factors indicate that farmers have escaped the
worst of the impact of the financial crisis. The only factor that may yet have some impact is the
reduced availability of credit facilities for production loans.

Nusa Tenggara Agricultural Development Project

Transféré par

Informations du document

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Nusa Tenggara Agricultural Development Project

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

PPA: INO 21147

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

NUSATENGGARA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

At Appraisal At Project Completion At OertionEvIuation

ADB Asian Development Bank

PROJECT PREPARATION/INSTITUTION BUILDING

KEY DATES Expected Actual

BORROWER Republic of Indonesia

EXECUTING AGENCIES Directorate General of Water Resources Development

PPTA = project preparatory technical assistance, TA = technical assistance.

Examination of operational performance revealed rapid build-up of benefits as farmers

During appraisal, improvement of irrigation schemes and financing of EOM were

Subtotal 21,340 21,468

UMATIMUR 1. Lembor. 6000 4487 SELATAN/

C. Objectives and Scope at Appraisal

II. IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE

B. Contracting, Construction, and Commissioning

16. Comprehensive training programs were extended to 592 representatives of the

C. Organization and Management

D. Actual Cost and Financing

0. Compliance with Loan Covenants

III. PROJECT RESULTS

D. Economic and Financial Reevaluation

E. Socioeconomic and Sociocultural Results

F. Gender and Development

G. Environmental Impacts and Control

H. Gestation and Sustainability

was viewed as making an important contribution to the Government strategy of achieving a

IV. KEY ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE

76. Comprehensive assessments of institutional capacities during project preparation are

79 It is against the background of substantial incremental benefits within the irrigation

Number Title Page Cited on

3 Economic Reevaluation 33 11, 52.

4 Resettlement 49 11, 56.

5 The Financial Crisis 51 13, 66.

Table Al .1: Comparison of Project Investment Costs

Foreign Currency Local Currency Total

Foreign Currency Local Currency Total

Total Base Cost 26,736 29,826 38,371 46,645 65,107 76,471

Foreign Currency Local Currency Total

Foreign Currency Local Currency Total

G. Taxes and Duties 3,415 3,237 3,415 3,237

Foreign Currency Local Currency Total

Foreign Currency Local Currency Total

B. Schemes Visited in West Nusa Tenggara

C. Schemes Visited in East Nusa Tenggara

0. Agricultural Development Component

17. The Project included a component to provide complementary support to irrigation

E. Other Agricultural Support Services

Table A2.1: Average Crop Yields and Cropping Intensitiesa

ARb PCRb OEM?

Province Appraisal Actual _________ Without-Project With-Project

Other Irrigation Schemes

Other Irrigation Schemes

Province Appraisal Actual Without-Project 0 With-Project0

Total 1,342 50 155 0 0 0 2,955 56 1,525 6 605 6

Cropping lntensitiesd Overall Cl Overall Cl

C. Project Life and Phasing of Benefits

0. Results of Economic Reevaluation

E. Comparison with EIRR Estimates at Appraisal and Completion

F. Average Project Farm Income

Rice (Import Parity)

Maize (Import Parity) -